Marc Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020063-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-16
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Marc Archer Counsel
Respondent PMPE Community Association, Inc. Counsel Nicholas Nogami, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Vacating Hearing after the Petitioner voluntarily withdrew his request for rehearing.

Key Issues & Findings

Request for Rehearing Withdrawal

Petitioner requested a rehearing based on actions taken by the Respondent after the initial decision. When informed that a rehearing could only address matters occurring prior to the initial petition filing, Petitioner chose to withdraw the request for rehearing and stated intent to file a new petition challenging Respondent’s denial of his submission to build an addition to his house.

Orders: The hearing in this matter is vacated from the calendar of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: dismissed

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Rehearing, Withdrawal, Vacated Hearing, Procedural
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Marc Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020063-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-16
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Marc Archer Counsel
Respondent PMPE Community Association, Inc. Counsel Nicholas Nogami, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Vacating Hearing after the Petitioner voluntarily withdrew his request for rehearing.

Key Issues & Findings

Request for Rehearing Withdrawal

Petitioner requested a rehearing based on actions taken by the Respondent after the initial decision. When informed that a rehearing could only address matters occurring prior to the initial petition filing, Petitioner chose to withdraw the request for rehearing and stated intent to file a new petition challenging Respondent’s denial of his submission to build an addition to his house.

Orders: The hearing in this matter is vacated from the calendar of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: dismissed

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Rehearing, Withdrawal, Vacated Hearing, Procedural
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Marc Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020063-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-16
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Marc Archer Counsel
Respondent PMPE Community Association, Inc. Counsel Nicholas Nogami, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Vacating Hearing after the Petitioner voluntarily withdrew his request for rehearing.

Key Issues & Findings

Request for Rehearing Withdrawal

Petitioner requested a rehearing based on actions taken by the Respondent after the initial decision. When informed that a rehearing could only address matters occurring prior to the initial petition filing, Petitioner chose to withdraw the request for rehearing and stated intent to file a new petition challenging Respondent’s denial of his submission to build an addition to his house.

Orders: The hearing in this matter is vacated from the calendar of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: dismissed

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Rehearing, Withdrawal, Vacated Hearing, Procedural
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Marc Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020063-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-16
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Marc Archer Counsel
Respondent PMPE Community Association, Inc. Counsel Nicholas Nogami, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Vacating Hearing after the Petitioner voluntarily withdrew his request for rehearing.

Key Issues & Findings

Request for Rehearing Withdrawal

Petitioner requested a rehearing based on actions taken by the Respondent after the initial decision. When informed that a rehearing could only address matters occurring prior to the initial petition filing, Petitioner chose to withdraw the request for rehearing and stated intent to file a new petition challenging Respondent’s denial of his submission to build an addition to his house.

Orders: The hearing in this matter is vacated from the calendar of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: dismissed

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Rehearing, Withdrawal, Vacated Hearing, Procedural
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Carlos J Sanchez & Marinda K Minch, vs. Tempe Villages Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121033-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-09
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch Counsel
Respondent Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Ashley Moscarello

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article 4 Section 1

Outcome Summary

The Petition was dismissed because Petitioners failed to prove the Respondent HOA violated the Bylaws regarding the filling of a vacant Board seat. The ALJ determined the Bylaws did not impose a timeframe for filling the vacancy and the Board acted according to Article IV, Section 3.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Bylaws do not contain a provision providing a timeframe in which a vacancy on the Board must be filled.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Bylaws regarding Board of Directors composition and appointment

Petitioners alleged the HOA violated Bylaws Article 4 Section 1 by leaving a Board seat open following a resignation (August 2020) and not filling it until November 2020. The ALJ found the Bylaws (Sections 1, 2, and 3) did not mandate a timeframe for filling a vacancy, and the HOA followed procedures for appointment.

Orders: Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Governance, Board of Directors, Bylaws, Board Vacancy
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121033-REL Decision – 862059.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:41 (132.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 21F-H2121033-REL


{
“case”: {
“docket_no”: “21F-H2121033-REL”,
“case_title”: “Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch, Petitioners v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc., Respondent”,
“decision_date”: “March 9, 2021”,
“tribunal”: “OAH”,
“agency”: “ADRE”
},
“individuals”: [
{
“name”: “Carlos J. Sanchez”,
“role”: “petitioner”,
“side”: “petitioner”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Candidate for Board election”
},
{
“name”: “Marinda K. Minch”,
“role”: “petitioner”,
“side”: “petitioner”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Candidate for Board election; considered for vacancy appointment; testified”
},
{
“name”: “Ashley Moscarello”,
“role”: “HOA attorney”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “Goodman Lawgroup”,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “Bradley Hudson”,
“role”: “board member”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board”,
“notes”: “President of the Board; testified as witness”
},
{
“name”: “Shawn Nurse”,
“role”: “community manager”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.”,
“notes”: “Testified as witness; received ballots for election”
},
{
“name”: “Sondra J. Vanella”,
“role”: “ALJ”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “OAH”,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “William Skanadore”,
“role”: “board member”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board”,
“notes”: “Incumbent candidate; elected”
},
{
“name”: “Will Terrick”,
“role”: “board member”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board”,
“notes”: “Incumbent candidate; elected”
},
{
“name”: “John Neelsen”,
“role”: “unknown”,
“side”: “unknown”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Candidate for Board election”
},
{
“name”: “Tania Almonte”,
“role”: “board member”,
“side”: “unknown”,
“affiliation”: “Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board”,
“notes”: “Former Board member whose resignation created a vacancy”
},
{
“name”: “Wendelyn Neal”,
“role”: “board member”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board”,
“notes”: “Made motion to appoint Marinda Minch”
},
{
“name”: “Joel Krick”,
“role”: “board member”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board”,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “Kathy Hudson”,
“role”: “board member”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board”,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “Christiane Pieraggi”,
“role”: “board member”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board”,
“notes”: “Appointed to fill vacancy”
},
{
“name”: “Ruby”,
“role”: “witness assistant”,
“side”: “unknown”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Aided in counting votes”
},
{
“name”: “Judy Lowe”,
“role”: “commissioner”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “ADRE”,
“notes”: null
}
]
}






Study Guide – 21F-H2121033-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “21F-H2121033-REL”, “case_title”: “Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.”, “decision_date”: “2021-03-09”, “alj_name”: “Sondra J. Vanella”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.”, “alj_quote”: “In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.”, “legal_basis”: “Bylaws Article IV, Section 3”, “topic_tags”: [ “Board Vacancies”, “Elections”, “Bylaws” ] }, { “question”: ” Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?”, “short_answer”: “Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ ruled that because the community’s Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.”, “alj_quote”: “The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.”, “legal_basis”: “Bylaws Interpretation”, “topic_tags”: [ “Board Vacancies”, “Timelines”, “Bylaws” ] }, { “question”: “Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?”, “short_answer”: “No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.”, “detailed_answer”: “The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.”, “alj_quote”: “Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.”, “legal_basis”: “Testimony / Findings of Fact”, “topic_tags”: [ “Community Manager”, “Authority”, “Board Composition” ] }, { “question”: “What is the ‘burden of proof’ for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a ‘preponderance of the evidence’.”, “detailed_answer”: “This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are ‘more probably true than not.’ It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “Legal Standards”, “Burden of Proof”, “Evidence” ] }, { “question”: “Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn’t expired yet?”, “short_answer”: “Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.”, “alj_quote”: “Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.”, “legal_basis”: “Findings of Fact / Bylaws”, “topic_tags”: [ “Elections”, “Board Terms”, “Voting” ] }, { “question”: “Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?”, “short_answer”: “Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.”, “detailed_answer”: “Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.”, “legal_basis”: “Conclusions of Law”, “topic_tags”: [ “Discrimination/Bias”, “Enforcement”, “Board Conduct” ] } ] }






Blog Post – 21F-H2121033-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “21F-H2121033-REL”, “case_title”: “Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.”, “decision_date”: “2021-03-09”, “alj_name”: “Sondra J. Vanella”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.”, “alj_quote”: “In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.”, “legal_basis”: “Bylaws Article IV, Section 3”, “topic_tags”: [ “Board Vacancies”, “Elections”, “Bylaws” ] }, { “question”: ” Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?”, “short_answer”: “Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ ruled that because the community’s Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.”, “alj_quote”: “The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.”, “legal_basis”: “Bylaws Interpretation”, “topic_tags”: [ “Board Vacancies”, “Timelines”, “Bylaws” ] }, { “question”: “Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?”, “short_answer”: “No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.”, “detailed_answer”: “The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.”, “alj_quote”: “Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.”, “legal_basis”: “Testimony / Findings of Fact”, “topic_tags”: [ “Community Manager”, “Authority”, “Board Composition” ] }, { “question”: “What is the ‘burden of proof’ for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a ‘preponderance of the evidence’.”, “detailed_answer”: “This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are ‘more probably true than not.’ It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “Legal Standards”, “Burden of Proof”, “Evidence” ] }, { “question”: “Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn’t expired yet?”, “short_answer”: “Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.”, “alj_quote”: “Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.”, “legal_basis”: “Findings of Fact / Bylaws”, “topic_tags”: [ “Elections”, “Board Terms”, “Voting” ] }, { “question”: “Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?”, “short_answer”: “Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.”, “detailed_answer”: “Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.”, “legal_basis”: “Conclusions of Law”, “topic_tags”: [ “Discrimination/Bias”, “Enforcement”, “Board Conduct” ] } ] }


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Carlos J. Sanchez (petitioner)
    Candidate for Board election
  • Marinda K. Minch (petitioner)
    Candidate for Board election; considered for vacancy appointment; testified

Respondent Side

  • Ashley Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Lawgroup
  • Bradley Hudson (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    President of the Board; testified as witness
  • Shawn Nurse (community manager)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Testified as witness; received ballots for election
  • William Skanadore (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Incumbent candidate; elected
  • Will Terrick (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Incumbent candidate; elected
  • Wendelyn Neal (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Made motion to appoint Marinda Minch
  • Joel Krick (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
  • Kathy Hudson (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
  • Christiane Pieraggi (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Appointed to fill vacancy

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    ADRE

Other Participants

  • John Neelsen (unknown)
    Candidate for Board election
  • Tania Almonte (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Former Board member whose resignation created a vacancy
  • Ruby (witness assistant)
    Aided in counting votes

Michael J Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-08
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael J Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole Payne, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Section 14.8

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's petition following a rehearing. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Association violated CC&Rs Section 14.8, as that section applies only to the Association's notice obligation to members and not to assessment payments sent by members to the Association.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof because the CC&R provision cited was inapplicable to the dispute. Additionally, the Petitioner was found to have inadvertently caused delays in payment receipt by using restricted delivery, contrary to instructions.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Association violated CC&Rs 14.8.

Petitioner alleged the Association violated CC&Rs Section 14.8 by failing to handle his monthly assessment payments correctly, resulting in late fees and threats of foreclosure. The ALJ found that Section 14.8 governs the Association's notice obligations to members and is inapplicable to the Petitioner's delivery of assessment payments to the Association.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied on rehearing.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CC&Rs, Assessments, Late Fees, Notice Provision, Burden of Proof, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020049-REL-RHG Decision – 861466.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:03 (145.6 KB)

20F-H2020049-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2020049-REL/811290.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:56:54 (131.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg (Petitioner) and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner’s complaint, alleging the Association violated its governing documents and acted in bad faith regarding the handling of his monthly assessment payments, was comprehensively reviewed and ultimately denied. This denial was subsequently affirmed in a rehearing.

The core of the dispute centered on the Petitioner’s unilateral decision to send his monthly payments via restricted U.S. Postal Service delivery to a specific, unpaid volunteer board member. This action, taken despite clear instructions to mail payments to the Association’s P.O. Box, resulted in delayed receipt and returned mail, leading to the imposition of late fees and threats of foreclosure against the Petitioner.

The Administrative Law Judge’s central finding was that the Petitioner fundamentally misinterpreted Section 14.8 of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The judge concluded this section is unambiguously applicable only to notices sent from the Association to its members, and imposes no obligations on the Association regarding mail received from members. The payment delays and resulting penalties were determined to be the direct consequence of the Petitioner’s own “volitionally took” actions, for which the Association bore no responsibility. Furthermore, the Petitioner’s claims of “bad faith” under Arizona’s nonprofit corporation statutes were dismissed as falling outside the jurisdictional authority of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.

I. Case Overview

The legal matter concerns a petition filed by a homeowner against his condominium association, alleging violations of the community’s governing documents and state law.

Case Number

20F-H2020049-REL / 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG

Petitioner

Michael J. Stoltenberg

Respondent

Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Administrative Law Judge

Jenna Clark

The Petitioner’s initial complaint, filed on March 2, 2020, alleged that the Association “fail to do their job, and are acting in bad faith,” specifically citing violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 10-3842 and 10-801, and Section 14.8 of the Association’s CC&Rs. He sought an order compelling the Association’s compliance and the issuance of a civil penalty.

II. Procedural History and Timeline

The dispute progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a granted request for rehearing, and a final binding order.

March 2, 2020: Petitioner files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (“Department”).

March 24, 2020: Respondent files an ANSWER, denying all complaint items.

April 1, 2020: The Department refers the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for an evidentiary hearing.

July 14, 2020: The initial evidentiary hearing is held.

August 3, 2020: An AMENDED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION is issued, denying the Petitioner’s petition.

August 28, 2020: Petitioner submits a request for a rehearing.

September 9, 2020: The Petitioner’s request for a rehearing is granted.

February 16, 2021: A rehearing is held before the same Administrative Law Judge.

March 8, 2021: A final ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION is issued, again denying the Petitioner’s petition.

III. Central Dispute: Assessment Payments and CC&R Section 14.8

The conflict originated from the Petitioner’s method of submitting monthly assessment payments and his interpretation of the Association’s obligations under its CC&Rs.

The Petitioner’s Actions and Their Consequences

Instruction: On January 4, 2016, the Petitioner was advised that the Association’s “primary address for receiving all correspondence and all assessment payments from its members” was PO Box 4333, Yuma, Arizona 85366.

Unilateral Change in Method: Beginning in November 2019, the Petitioner began sending his monthly payments via restricted delivery through the United States Postal Service (USPS), designated for “board member Rhea Carlisle’s pickup only.”

Petitioner’s Rationale: He took this action based on a belief that an agent of the Association’s property management company had previously thrown away one of his mailed payments.

Petitioner’s Acknowledged Awareness: The Petitioner was aware that the Association employed a property management company to collect mail and that Ms. Carlisle was an “unpaid volunteer board member,” not an employee of that company.

Resulting Delays and Penalties: This restricted delivery method caused significant issues.

◦ One payment was returned by USPS on January 25, 2020.

◦ Another was returned by USPS on June 8, 2020.

◦ Other payments were picked up late on various dates.

◦ For each instance where the payment was received late, the Petitioner was assessed a late fee and his residence was placed in danger of foreclosure.

The Disputed Provision: CC&Rs Section 14.8

The legal basis for the Petitioner’s claim rested on his interpretation of Section 14.8 of the Association’s Bylaws.

Full Text of Section 14.8, Notices:

Respondent’s Argument: The Association argued that this section was “inapplicable to the facts as presented” because it governs the Association’s obligation when sending notices to homeowners, not the other way around.

IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

Across two separate decisions, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) consistently found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and that his interpretation of the governing documents was incorrect.

Initial Decision (August 3, 2020)

Inapplicability of Section 14.8: The ALJ’s primary conclusion was a complete rejection of the Petitioner’s legal argument.

Petitioner’s Culpability: The ALJ placed the responsibility for the late payments squarely on the Petitioner.

Outcome: The petition was denied.

Rehearing Decision (March 8, 2021)

The rehearing was granted on the Petitioner’s grounds of an alleged “Error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law” and that the initial decision was “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” The ALJ found no merit in these claims.

Reaffirmation of Core Finding: The ALJ reiterated and strengthened the conclusion regarding Section 14.8.

Jurisdictional Ruling: The ALJ explicitly addressed the Petitioner’s “bad faith” claim by citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, which concerns standards of conduct for officers of nonprofit corporations.

Failure to Support Rehearing Claims: The ALJ noted a complete lack of new evidence to justify the rehearing.

Final Outcome: The petition was again denied. The order was made final and binding, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court.






Study Guide – 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided legal documents.

1. Who are the two primary parties in case No. 20F-H2020049-REL, and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the specific allegation Michael Stoltenberg made against the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association in his petition?

3. Why did the Petitioner, beginning in November 2019, change the way he mailed his monthly assessment payments?

4. What is the specific subject of Section 14.8 of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?

5. What were the consequences for the Petitioner each time the Association received his monthly assessment payment late?

6. According to the Administrative Law Judge, why was Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs inapplicable to the facts of this case?

7. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and what is its definition?

8. On what grounds did the Petitioner request and receive a rehearing after the initial decision was issued?

9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge dismiss the Petitioner’s argument regarding Arizona Revised Statutes § 10-3842 during the rehearing?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on July 14, 2020, and the rehearing on February 16, 2021?

——————————————————————————–

Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Michael J Stoltenberg, the “Petitioner,” and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, the “Respondent.” The Petitioner is a condominium owner and member of the Association who filed a petition alleging violations, while the Respondent is the homeowners’ association that governs the development.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Association was in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 10-3842 and 10-801, and section 14.8 of the Association’s CC&Rs. Specifically, he alleged that the Association “fail to do their job, and are acting in bad faith.”

3. The Petitioner changed his mailing method because he believed an agent of the Association’s property management company had thrown away one of his mailed payments. As a result, he began sending payments via restricted delivery by the USPS, for board member Rhea Carlisle’s pickup only.

4. Section 14.8, titled “Notices,” pertains to any notice permitted or required by the Declaration or Bylaws. It specifically addresses the Association’s notice obligation to its members when mailing them information, outlining when such notices are deemed delivered.

5. Each time the Petitioner’s monthly assessment was received late, he was assessed a late fee by the Association. Additionally, each late payment occurrence put his residence in danger of foreclosure by the Association.

6. The Judge concluded Section 14.8 was inapplicable because its language speaks specifically to the Association’s obligation to provide notice to its members. The section has no binding authority or control over homeowners sending mail to the Association.

7. The Petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” or evidence with the most convincing force that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue.

8. The Petitioner’s rehearing request was granted on the grounds that there was an alleged “Error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law occurring during the proceeding.” He also claimed that the initial findings of fact or decision were “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”

9. The argument regarding ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, which concerns standards of conduct for officers, was dismissed because it falls outside of the Department of Real Estate’s jurisdiction. The Petitioner had been advised of the Department’s jurisdictional limitations when he first filed his petition.

10. In both the initial decision (dated August 03, 2020) and the final order after the rehearing (dated March 08, 2021), the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The Judge concluded in both instances that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to be answered in a detailed essay format, synthesizing information from across the provided documents. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark to deny the Petitioner’s claims in both the initial hearing and the rehearing. Discuss the interpretation of CC&R Section 14.8, the concept of burden of proof, and jurisdictional limitations.

2. Trace the complete procedural history of case No. 20F-H2020049-REL from the filing of the petition to the final order. Include all key dates, actions taken by the parties and the Department, and the specific reasons for each major step, such as the granting of the rehearing.

3. Evaluate the actions taken by the Petitioner, Michael Stoltenberg, regarding his assessment payments. Explain why his unilateral decision to use restricted mail delivery, despite being aware of the Association’s procedures, ultimately caused the negative outcomes he sought to avoid.

4. Explain the contractual relationship between a homeowners’ association and a property owner as described in the legal documents. How do the CC&Rs function as an enforceable contract, and how was this concept central to the dispute?

5. Discuss the roles and authorities of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) in resolving HOA disputes, as demonstrated by this case. What are their powers, and what specific limitations on their jurisdiction are identified in the text?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order. In this case, the ALJ was Jenna Clark.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Association

The Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, a condominium association whose membership is comprised of the condominium owners in the Rancho Del Oro residential real estate development in Yuma, Arizona.

Board of Directors (the Board)

The body that oversees the Homeowners Association.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their contention. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the Respondent violated the CC&Rs.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These governing documents form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, empowering the Association to control certain aspects of property use.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate refers matters for an evidentiary hearing. The OAH has the authority to hear and decide contested cases and interpret the contract (CC&Rs) between parties.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Michael J Stoltenberg, a homeowner and member of the Association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is considered the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Statutory Agent

An individual listed as an official agent for an entity. For the years 2019 and 2020, Diana Crites was listed as the Association’s Statutory Agent.

Abbreviation for the United States Postal Service.






Blog Post – 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided legal documents.

1. Who are the two primary parties in case No. 20F-H2020049-REL, and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the specific allegation Michael Stoltenberg made against the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association in his petition?

3. Why did the Petitioner, beginning in November 2019, change the way he mailed his monthly assessment payments?

4. What is the specific subject of Section 14.8 of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?

5. What were the consequences for the Petitioner each time the Association received his monthly assessment payment late?

6. According to the Administrative Law Judge, why was Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs inapplicable to the facts of this case?

7. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and what is its definition?

8. On what grounds did the Petitioner request and receive a rehearing after the initial decision was issued?

9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge dismiss the Petitioner’s argument regarding Arizona Revised Statutes § 10-3842 during the rehearing?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on July 14, 2020, and the rehearing on February 16, 2021?

——————————————————————————–

Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Michael J Stoltenberg, the “Petitioner,” and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, the “Respondent.” The Petitioner is a condominium owner and member of the Association who filed a petition alleging violations, while the Respondent is the homeowners’ association that governs the development.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Association was in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 10-3842 and 10-801, and section 14.8 of the Association’s CC&Rs. Specifically, he alleged that the Association “fail to do their job, and are acting in bad faith.”

3. The Petitioner changed his mailing method because he believed an agent of the Association’s property management company had thrown away one of his mailed payments. As a result, he began sending payments via restricted delivery by the USPS, for board member Rhea Carlisle’s pickup only.

4. Section 14.8, titled “Notices,” pertains to any notice permitted or required by the Declaration or Bylaws. It specifically addresses the Association’s notice obligation to its members when mailing them information, outlining when such notices are deemed delivered.

5. Each time the Petitioner’s monthly assessment was received late, he was assessed a late fee by the Association. Additionally, each late payment occurrence put his residence in danger of foreclosure by the Association.

6. The Judge concluded Section 14.8 was inapplicable because its language speaks specifically to the Association’s obligation to provide notice to its members. The section has no binding authority or control over homeowners sending mail to the Association.

7. The Petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” or evidence with the most convincing force that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue.

8. The Petitioner’s rehearing request was granted on the grounds that there was an alleged “Error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law occurring during the proceeding.” He also claimed that the initial findings of fact or decision were “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”

9. The argument regarding ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, which concerns standards of conduct for officers, was dismissed because it falls outside of the Department of Real Estate’s jurisdiction. The Petitioner had been advised of the Department’s jurisdictional limitations when he first filed his petition.

10. In both the initial decision (dated August 03, 2020) and the final order after the rehearing (dated March 08, 2021), the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The Judge concluded in both instances that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to be answered in a detailed essay format, synthesizing information from across the provided documents. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark to deny the Petitioner’s claims in both the initial hearing and the rehearing. Discuss the interpretation of CC&R Section 14.8, the concept of burden of proof, and jurisdictional limitations.

2. Trace the complete procedural history of case No. 20F-H2020049-REL from the filing of the petition to the final order. Include all key dates, actions taken by the parties and the Department, and the specific reasons for each major step, such as the granting of the rehearing.

3. Evaluate the actions taken by the Petitioner, Michael Stoltenberg, regarding his assessment payments. Explain why his unilateral decision to use restricted mail delivery, despite being aware of the Association’s procedures, ultimately caused the negative outcomes he sought to avoid.

4. Explain the contractual relationship between a homeowners’ association and a property owner as described in the legal documents. How do the CC&Rs function as an enforceable contract, and how was this concept central to the dispute?

5. Discuss the roles and authorities of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) in resolving HOA disputes, as demonstrated by this case. What are their powers, and what specific limitations on their jurisdiction are identified in the text?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order. In this case, the ALJ was Jenna Clark.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Association

The Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, a condominium association whose membership is comprised of the condominium owners in the Rancho Del Oro residential real estate development in Yuma, Arizona.

Board of Directors (the Board)

The body that oversees the Homeowners Association.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their contention. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the Respondent violated the CC&Rs.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These governing documents form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, empowering the Association to control certain aspects of property use.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate refers matters for an evidentiary hearing. The OAH has the authority to hear and decide contested cases and interpret the contract (CC&Rs) between parties.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Michael J Stoltenberg, a homeowner and member of the Association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is considered the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Statutory Agent

An individual listed as an official agent for an entity. For the years 2019 and 2020, Diana Crites was listed as the Association’s Statutory Agent.

Abbreviation for the United States Postal Service.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael J Stoltenberg (petitioner)
    Rancho Del Oro condominium owner
    Appeared on his own behalf,

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Appeared on behalf of Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association,,
  • Rhea Carlisle (board member)
    Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
    Unpaid volunteer board member; Petitioner directed mail specifically to her,,,
  • Diana Crites (statutory agent)
    Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
    Statutory Agent for 2019 and 2020,
  • Lydia Peirce (HOA attorney staff/contact)
    Linsmeier Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Listed as contact for Respondent in 2020 decision transmission

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner receiving the OAH order,
  • Dan Gardner (HOA coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    HOA Coordinator contact for the Commissioner

Michael J Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-08
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael J Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole Payne, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Section 14.8

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Association did not violate CC&Rs Section 14.8. The provision was determined to be inapplicable, governing the Association’s obligation to provide notice, not the methods homeowners must use to send payments.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. CC&Rs Section 14.8 was inapplicable, and Petitioner's chosen restricted delivery method for assessment payments caused delays, which were not the responsibility of the Respondent.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Association violated CC&Rs 14.8 concerning notice obligations.

Petitioner alleged the Association violated CC&Rs 14.8 by improperly handling or failing to receive his monthly assessment payments, which he sent via restricted delivery to a board member despite receiving instructions to mail payments to the Association's designated P.O. Box address.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied because he failed to sustain his burden of proof that the Association violated CC&Rs Section 14.8.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • CC&Rs 14.8

Analytics Highlights

Topics: homeowner assessments, CC&Rs interpretation, restricted delivery, jurisdiction, notice provision, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842
  • CC&Rs 14.8
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020049-REL-RHG Decision – 861466.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:01 (145.6 KB)

20F-H2020049-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2020049-REL/811290.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:04 (131.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg (Petitioner) and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner’s complaint, alleging the Association violated its governing documents and acted in bad faith regarding the handling of his monthly assessment payments, was comprehensively reviewed and ultimately denied. This denial was subsequently affirmed in a rehearing.

The core of the dispute centered on the Petitioner’s unilateral decision to send his monthly payments via restricted U.S. Postal Service delivery to a specific, unpaid volunteer board member. This action, taken despite clear instructions to mail payments to the Association’s P.O. Box, resulted in delayed receipt and returned mail, leading to the imposition of late fees and threats of foreclosure against the Petitioner.

The Administrative Law Judge’s central finding was that the Petitioner fundamentally misinterpreted Section 14.8 of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The judge concluded this section is unambiguously applicable only to notices sent from the Association to its members, and imposes no obligations on the Association regarding mail received from members. The payment delays and resulting penalties were determined to be the direct consequence of the Petitioner’s own “volitionally took” actions, for which the Association bore no responsibility. Furthermore, the Petitioner’s claims of “bad faith” under Arizona’s nonprofit corporation statutes were dismissed as falling outside the jurisdictional authority of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.

I. Case Overview

The legal matter concerns a petition filed by a homeowner against his condominium association, alleging violations of the community’s governing documents and state law.

Case Number

20F-H2020049-REL / 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG

Petitioner

Michael J. Stoltenberg

Respondent

Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Administrative Law Judge

Jenna Clark

The Petitioner’s initial complaint, filed on March 2, 2020, alleged that the Association “fail to do their job, and are acting in bad faith,” specifically citing violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 10-3842 and 10-801, and Section 14.8 of the Association’s CC&Rs. He sought an order compelling the Association’s compliance and the issuance of a civil penalty.

II. Procedural History and Timeline

The dispute progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a granted request for rehearing, and a final binding order.

March 2, 2020: Petitioner files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (“Department”).

March 24, 2020: Respondent files an ANSWER, denying all complaint items.

April 1, 2020: The Department refers the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for an evidentiary hearing.

July 14, 2020: The initial evidentiary hearing is held.

August 3, 2020: An AMENDED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION is issued, denying the Petitioner’s petition.

August 28, 2020: Petitioner submits a request for a rehearing.

September 9, 2020: The Petitioner’s request for a rehearing is granted.

February 16, 2021: A rehearing is held before the same Administrative Law Judge.

March 8, 2021: A final ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION is issued, again denying the Petitioner’s petition.

III. Central Dispute: Assessment Payments and CC&R Section 14.8

The conflict originated from the Petitioner’s method of submitting monthly assessment payments and his interpretation of the Association’s obligations under its CC&Rs.

The Petitioner’s Actions and Their Consequences

Instruction: On January 4, 2016, the Petitioner was advised that the Association’s “primary address for receiving all correspondence and all assessment payments from its members” was PO Box 4333, Yuma, Arizona 85366.

Unilateral Change in Method: Beginning in November 2019, the Petitioner began sending his monthly payments via restricted delivery through the United States Postal Service (USPS), designated for “board member Rhea Carlisle’s pickup only.”

Petitioner’s Rationale: He took this action based on a belief that an agent of the Association’s property management company had previously thrown away one of his mailed payments.

Petitioner’s Acknowledged Awareness: The Petitioner was aware that the Association employed a property management company to collect mail and that Ms. Carlisle was an “unpaid volunteer board member,” not an employee of that company.

Resulting Delays and Penalties: This restricted delivery method caused significant issues.

◦ One payment was returned by USPS on January 25, 2020.

◦ Another was returned by USPS on June 8, 2020.

◦ Other payments were picked up late on various dates.

◦ For each instance where the payment was received late, the Petitioner was assessed a late fee and his residence was placed in danger of foreclosure.

The Disputed Provision: CC&Rs Section 14.8

The legal basis for the Petitioner’s claim rested on his interpretation of Section 14.8 of the Association’s Bylaws.

Full Text of Section 14.8, Notices:

Respondent’s Argument: The Association argued that this section was “inapplicable to the facts as presented” because it governs the Association’s obligation when sending notices to homeowners, not the other way around.

IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

Across two separate decisions, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) consistently found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and that his interpretation of the governing documents was incorrect.

Initial Decision (August 3, 2020)

Inapplicability of Section 14.8: The ALJ’s primary conclusion was a complete rejection of the Petitioner’s legal argument.

Petitioner’s Culpability: The ALJ placed the responsibility for the late payments squarely on the Petitioner.

Outcome: The petition was denied.

Rehearing Decision (March 8, 2021)

The rehearing was granted on the Petitioner’s grounds of an alleged “Error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law” and that the initial decision was “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” The ALJ found no merit in these claims.

Reaffirmation of Core Finding: The ALJ reiterated and strengthened the conclusion regarding Section 14.8.

Jurisdictional Ruling: The ALJ explicitly addressed the Petitioner’s “bad faith” claim by citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, which concerns standards of conduct for officers of nonprofit corporations.

Failure to Support Rehearing Claims: The ALJ noted a complete lack of new evidence to justify the rehearing.

Final Outcome: The petition was again denied. The order was made final and binding, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court.






Study Guide – 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided legal documents.

1. Who are the two primary parties in case No. 20F-H2020049-REL, and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the specific allegation Michael Stoltenberg made against the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association in his petition?

3. Why did the Petitioner, beginning in November 2019, change the way he mailed his monthly assessment payments?

4. What is the specific subject of Section 14.8 of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?

5. What were the consequences for the Petitioner each time the Association received his monthly assessment payment late?

6. According to the Administrative Law Judge, why was Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs inapplicable to the facts of this case?

7. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and what is its definition?

8. On what grounds did the Petitioner request and receive a rehearing after the initial decision was issued?

9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge dismiss the Petitioner’s argument regarding Arizona Revised Statutes § 10-3842 during the rehearing?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on July 14, 2020, and the rehearing on February 16, 2021?

——————————————————————————–

Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Michael J Stoltenberg, the “Petitioner,” and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, the “Respondent.” The Petitioner is a condominium owner and member of the Association who filed a petition alleging violations, while the Respondent is the homeowners’ association that governs the development.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Association was in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 10-3842 and 10-801, and section 14.8 of the Association’s CC&Rs. Specifically, he alleged that the Association “fail to do their job, and are acting in bad faith.”

3. The Petitioner changed his mailing method because he believed an agent of the Association’s property management company had thrown away one of his mailed payments. As a result, he began sending payments via restricted delivery by the USPS, for board member Rhea Carlisle’s pickup only.

4. Section 14.8, titled “Notices,” pertains to any notice permitted or required by the Declaration or Bylaws. It specifically addresses the Association’s notice obligation to its members when mailing them information, outlining when such notices are deemed delivered.

5. Each time the Petitioner’s monthly assessment was received late, he was assessed a late fee by the Association. Additionally, each late payment occurrence put his residence in danger of foreclosure by the Association.

6. The Judge concluded Section 14.8 was inapplicable because its language speaks specifically to the Association’s obligation to provide notice to its members. The section has no binding authority or control over homeowners sending mail to the Association.

7. The Petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” or evidence with the most convincing force that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue.

8. The Petitioner’s rehearing request was granted on the grounds that there was an alleged “Error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law occurring during the proceeding.” He also claimed that the initial findings of fact or decision were “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”

9. The argument regarding ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, which concerns standards of conduct for officers, was dismissed because it falls outside of the Department of Real Estate’s jurisdiction. The Petitioner had been advised of the Department’s jurisdictional limitations when he first filed his petition.

10. In both the initial decision (dated August 03, 2020) and the final order after the rehearing (dated March 08, 2021), the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The Judge concluded in both instances that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to be answered in a detailed essay format, synthesizing information from across the provided documents. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark to deny the Petitioner’s claims in both the initial hearing and the rehearing. Discuss the interpretation of CC&R Section 14.8, the concept of burden of proof, and jurisdictional limitations.

2. Trace the complete procedural history of case No. 20F-H2020049-REL from the filing of the petition to the final order. Include all key dates, actions taken by the parties and the Department, and the specific reasons for each major step, such as the granting of the rehearing.

3. Evaluate the actions taken by the Petitioner, Michael Stoltenberg, regarding his assessment payments. Explain why his unilateral decision to use restricted mail delivery, despite being aware of the Association’s procedures, ultimately caused the negative outcomes he sought to avoid.

4. Explain the contractual relationship between a homeowners’ association and a property owner as described in the legal documents. How do the CC&Rs function as an enforceable contract, and how was this concept central to the dispute?

5. Discuss the roles and authorities of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) in resolving HOA disputes, as demonstrated by this case. What are their powers, and what specific limitations on their jurisdiction are identified in the text?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order. In this case, the ALJ was Jenna Clark.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Association

The Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, a condominium association whose membership is comprised of the condominium owners in the Rancho Del Oro residential real estate development in Yuma, Arizona.

Board of Directors (the Board)

The body that oversees the Homeowners Association.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their contention. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the Respondent violated the CC&Rs.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These governing documents form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, empowering the Association to control certain aspects of property use.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate refers matters for an evidentiary hearing. The OAH has the authority to hear and decide contested cases and interpret the contract (CC&Rs) between parties.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Michael J Stoltenberg, a homeowner and member of the Association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is considered the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Statutory Agent

An individual listed as an official agent for an entity. For the years 2019 and 2020, Diana Crites was listed as the Association’s Statutory Agent.

Abbreviation for the United States Postal Service.






Blog Post – 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided legal documents.

1. Who are the two primary parties in case No. 20F-H2020049-REL, and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the specific allegation Michael Stoltenberg made against the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association in his petition?

3. Why did the Petitioner, beginning in November 2019, change the way he mailed his monthly assessment payments?

4. What is the specific subject of Section 14.8 of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?

5. What were the consequences for the Petitioner each time the Association received his monthly assessment payment late?

6. According to the Administrative Law Judge, why was Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs inapplicable to the facts of this case?

7. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and what is its definition?

8. On what grounds did the Petitioner request and receive a rehearing after the initial decision was issued?

9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge dismiss the Petitioner’s argument regarding Arizona Revised Statutes § 10-3842 during the rehearing?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on July 14, 2020, and the rehearing on February 16, 2021?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Michael J Stoltenberg, the “Petitioner,” and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, the “Respondent.” The Petitioner is a condominium owner and member of the Association who filed a petition alleging violations, while the Respondent is the homeowners’ association that governs the development.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Association was in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 10-3842 and 10-801, and section 14.8 of the Association’s CC&Rs. Specifically, he alleged that the Association “fail to do their job, and are acting in bad faith.”

3. The Petitioner changed his mailing method because he believed an agent of the Association’s property management company had thrown away one of his mailed payments. As a result, he began sending payments via restricted delivery by the USPS, for board member Rhea Carlisle’s pickup only.

4. Section 14.8, titled “Notices,” pertains to any notice permitted or required by the Declaration or Bylaws. It specifically addresses the Association’s notice obligation to its members when mailing them information, outlining when such notices are deemed delivered.

5. Each time the Petitioner’s monthly assessment was received late, he was assessed a late fee by the Association. Additionally, each late payment occurrence put his residence in danger of foreclosure by the Association.

6. The Judge concluded Section 14.8 was inapplicable because its language speaks specifically to the Association’s obligation to provide notice to its members. The section has no binding authority or control over homeowners sending mail to the Association.

7. The Petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” or evidence with the most convincing force that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue.

8. The Petitioner’s rehearing request was granted on the grounds that there was an alleged “Error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law occurring during the proceeding.” He also claimed that the initial findings of fact or decision were “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”

9. The argument regarding ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, which concerns standards of conduct for officers, was dismissed because it falls outside of the Department of Real Estate’s jurisdiction. The Petitioner had been advised of the Department’s jurisdictional limitations when he first filed his petition.

10. In both the initial decision (dated August 03, 2020) and the final order after the rehearing (dated March 08, 2021), the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The Judge concluded in both instances that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to be answered in a detailed essay format, synthesizing information from across the provided documents. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark to deny the Petitioner’s claims in both the initial hearing and the rehearing. Discuss the interpretation of CC&R Section 14.8, the concept of burden of proof, and jurisdictional limitations.

2. Trace the complete procedural history of case No. 20F-H2020049-REL from the filing of the petition to the final order. Include all key dates, actions taken by the parties and the Department, and the specific reasons for each major step, such as the granting of the rehearing.

3. Evaluate the actions taken by the Petitioner, Michael Stoltenberg, regarding his assessment payments. Explain why his unilateral decision to use restricted mail delivery, despite being aware of the Association’s procedures, ultimately caused the negative outcomes he sought to avoid.

4. Explain the contractual relationship between a homeowners’ association and a property owner as described in the legal documents. How do the CC&Rs function as an enforceable contract, and how was this concept central to the dispute?

5. Discuss the roles and authorities of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) in resolving HOA disputes, as demonstrated by this case. What are their powers, and what specific limitations on their jurisdiction are identified in the text?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order. In this case, the ALJ was Jenna Clark.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Association

The Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, a condominium association whose membership is comprised of the condominium owners in the Rancho Del Oro residential real estate development in Yuma, Arizona.

Board of Directors (the Board)

The body that oversees the Homeowners Association.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their contention. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the Respondent violated the CC&Rs.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These governing documents form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, empowering the Association to control certain aspects of property use.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate refers matters for an evidentiary hearing. The OAH has the authority to hear and decide contested cases and interpret the contract (CC&Rs) between parties.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Michael J Stoltenberg, a homeowner and member of the Association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is considered the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Statutory Agent

An individual listed as an official agent for an entity. For the years 2019 and 2020, Diana Crites was listed as the Association’s Statutory Agent.

Abbreviation for the United States Postal Service.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael J Stoltenberg (petitioner)
    Rancho Del Oro condominium owner
    Appeared on his own behalf,

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Appeared on behalf of Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association,,
  • Rhea Carlisle (board member)
    Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
    Unpaid volunteer board member; Petitioner directed mail specifically to her,,,
  • Diana Crites (statutory agent)
    Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
    Statutory Agent for 2019 and 2020,
  • Lydia Peirce (HOA attorney staff/contact)
    Linsmeier Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Listed as contact for Respondent in 2020 decision transmission

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner receiving the OAH order,
  • Dan Gardner (HOA coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    HOA Coordinator contact for the Commissioner

Lee & Kim Edwards v. Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120028-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-07-28
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lee & Kim Edwards Counsel Terry Foster, Esq.
Respondent Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association Counsel

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1255

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or A.R.S. § 33-1255, ruling that the statute was inapplicable due to the specific provisions in the Declaration regarding the 1/26 assessment calculation.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the ALJ determined A.R.S. § 33-1255 was superseded by the Declaration, which mandated assessments based on the undivided 1/26 interest in the common elements.

Key Issues & Findings

Assessment calculation based on undivided interest in common areas

Petitioner challenged the Association's decision to change assessments from a historical square footage basis to a 1/26 interest calculation, arguing that this method violates A.R.S. § 33-1255 by charging for limited common elements (patios/parking).

Orders: The petition of Lee & Kim Edwards is dismissed; Respondent is deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1255
  • Declaration Article I, Section 5
  • Declaration Article II, Section 5
  • Declaration Article II, Section 7
  • Declaration Article IV, Section 4
  • Declaration Article VI, Section 9

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, assessment, cc&r, statutory interpretation, common elements, limited common elements
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1255
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120028-REL Decision – 856603.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-09T10:06:35 (98.1 KB)

21F-H2120028-REL Decision – 899379.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:36:38 (123.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 21F-H2120028-REL


Assessment Methodology Dispute: Edwards v. Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the legal dispute between homeowners Lee & Kim Edwards (Petitioners) and the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association (Respondent) concerning a change in the methodology for calculating homeowner assessments. The core of the conflict was the Association’s decision to shift from a historical practice of assessments based on unit square footage to a uniform rate where each of the 26 units pays an equal 1/26 share of the common expenses.

The dispute was adjudicated by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in two separate hearings. In both instances, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Association, dismissing the petitions filed by the Edwards.

Key Takeaways:

Change in Methodology: The Association’s Board, acting on legal advice received in January 2020, concluded that its 40-year practice of using a square-footage-based assessment violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Board subsequently implemented a 1/26 equal-share assessment method after a majority of homeowners selected this option.

Initial Ruling on “Uniform Rate”: In the first hearing in February 2021, the Petitioners argued that the historical square footage method was a “uniform rate” and that the Association had waived its right to change the long-standing practice. The ALJ rejected this, finding that the new 1/26 rate complied with the CC&Rs’ requirement for a “uniform rate” (Article VI, Section 9) and aligned with each unit’s specified 1/26 undivided interest in the common elements (Article VI, Section 4(d)).

Rehearing Ruling on State Statute: The Petitioners were granted a rehearing in July 2021, where they argued that the 1/26 method violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1255 by improperly charging all owners for “limited common elements” like patios and parking spaces. The ALJ again ruled against the Petitioners, concluding that the state statute did not apply. The ruling was based on a key provision in the statute: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration.” The judge found that the Association’s Declaration did provide otherwise by defining patios and parking as general common elements and explicitly mandating that costs be shared based on each unit’s 1/26 interest.

Final Outcome: The petition was definitively dismissed after the rehearing, making the ALJ’s order binding. The Association’s adoption of the 1/26 assessment rate was upheld as compliant with its governing documents.

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Background of the Dispute

The legal conflict originated from a single-issue petition filed on November 20, 2020, by Lee and Kim Edwards, owners of unit 6937 in the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium development. The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleged that the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association had violated its CC&Rs, specifically Article VI, Section 9, and Article IV, Section 1.

The central issue was the Association Board’s decision to change the long-standing method of calculating homeowner assessments. For over 40 years, assessments had been based on the square footage of each unit. In 2020, the Board implemented a new system where the Association’s annual budget was divided equally among the 26 units, with each owner paying a 1/26 share. The Petitioners sought to enforce the historical calculation method unless and until the CC&Rs were properly amended.

Chronology of the Assessment Change

Historical Practice: For more than four decades, the Association calculated and charged member assessments based on the square footage of each condominium unit.

Legal Consultation (January 2020): Two members of the Association’s Board consulted with an attorney regarding the legality of the historical assessment method.

Attorney Recommendation (January 24, 2020): The attorney advised the Association that, to ensure compliance with the CC&Rs, it should calculate assessments based on each homeowner’s 1/26 interest in the common areas. The attorney’s letter stated:

Homeowner Consultation: Following the legal advice, the Board informed homeowners that the prior square-footage method violated the CC&Rs. The Board sought input on three potential assessment methods: the 1/26 rate, a variable blended rate, or continuing with the square footage rate. A majority of homeowners selected the 1/26 rate. The Board noted that any method other than the 1/26 rate would require a formal amendment to the CC&Rs.

Implementation (September 26, 2020): The Board officially notified homeowners that it would begin charging assessments based on the 1/26 rate and that an amendment to the CC&Rs was not necessary to implement this change.

Initial Hearing and Decision (February 2021)

An evidentiary hearing was held on February 9, 2021, before Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

Arguments Presented

Petitioners (Edwards)

1. The historical square footage rate qualified as a “uniform rate” and was compliant with the CC&Rs.
2. By using the square footage rate for over 40 years, the Association had waived its right to enforce a different method like the 1/26 rate.

Respondent (Association)

1. The plain language of the CC&Rs requires that each homeowner pay an assessment based on the 1/26 rate.
2. It is not legally possible to waive a mandatory CC&R requirement through past practice.

On February 19, 2021, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing the petition. The judge’s conclusions of law were based on a direct interpretation of the CC&Rs:

Uniform Rate Compliance: The ALJ determined that the “preponderance of the evidence” showed that the Association’s 1/26 rate was a uniform rate that complied with Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioners failed to meet their burden to prove that the Association had violated its governing documents.

Outcome: The Association was deemed the prevailing party, and the petition was dismissed.

Rehearing and Final Decision (July 2021)

The Petitioners filed a request for a rehearing on March 30, 2021, which was granted. The rehearing was held on July 8, 2021. The Respondent did not appear at this hearing, as its counsel had withdrawn from representation without formally notifying the tribunal.

In the rehearing, the Petitioners introduced a new argument, alleging that the 1/26 assessment method violated Arizona state law, specifically A.R.S. § 33-1255.

• The core of this argument was that the 1/26 rate improperly included charges for “limited common elements,” such as patios and assigned parking spaces.

• The Petitioners contended that this forced all homeowners to pay for the maintenance of elements that were assigned to and benefited fewer than all units, in direct violation of the statute.

On July 28, 2021, the ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition. The ruling hinged on the precise wording of both the state statute and the Association’s Declaration.

Applicability of A.R.S. § 33-1255: The judge found that the statute did not apply to this matter. The relevant section of the law, A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), begins with the critical phrase: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration…”

Supremacy of the Declaration: The ALJ concluded that the Association’s Declaration did provide otherwise. The CC&Rs explicitly:

◦ Define “Common Elements” broadly to include patios and parking areas (Article I, Section 3).

◦ Establish that each unit has an “undivided interest in the general common areas” of 1/26 (Article I, Section 5).

◦ Mandate that each unit’s share of costs for repair and maintenance of common areas is the “same as its undivided interest in the common elements” (Article IV, Section 4(d)).

Final Outcome: Because the Declaration’s specific provisions overrode the general terms of the state statute, the Association was found to be in compliance. The petition was dismissed, and the order was deemed binding on the parties.

Key Legal Principles and Definitions

Concept

Definition / Application in Case

Burden of Proof

The Petitioners were required to establish their claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Preponderance of the Evidence

Defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” The ALJ found the Petitioners failed to meet this standard in both hearings.

Restrictive Covenants

Arizona law requires that unambiguous restrictive covenants be enforced to give effect to the parties’ intent and be interpreted as a whole. The ALJ’s decisions were based on a direct interpretation of the CC&Rs’ language.

Common Elements (per CC&Rs)

A broad definition including multifamily structures, land, roofs, ceilings, foundations, storage spaces, patios, parking areas, recreational facilities, lawns, pipes, and conduits.

Unit (per CC&Rs)

A freehold estate consisting of the interior space of an apartment. The definition explicitly states that common elements are not part of the unit.

Undivided Interest (per CC&Rs)

Article I, Section 5 clearly establishes that “The undivided interest in the general common areas… which shall be conveyed with each respective units shall be 1/26.” This provision was central to the final ruling.






Study Guide – 21F-H2120028-REL


Study Guide: Edwards v. Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Lee & Kim Edwards and the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association, based on the provided legal decisions. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a detailed glossary of key terms.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in two to three sentences each, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the central conflict between the Petitioners (Lee & Kim Edwards) and the Respondent (Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association)?

2. For over 40 years, how did the Association historically calculate assessments for homeowners?

3. What specific event in January 2020 prompted the Association’s Board to change the assessment method?

4. In the first hearing on February 9, 2021, what were the two main arguments presented by Mr. Edwards?

5. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion regarding the “uniform rate” requirement from CC&Rs Article VI, Section 9 in the initial decision?

6. Upon what new legal grounds did the Petitioners base their March 30, 2021, request for a re-hearing?

7. According to the CC&Rs, what is the defined undivided interest in the general common areas for each unit?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately conclude that Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1255 did not apply in this case?

9. What legal standard of proof did the Petitioners need to meet to successfully prove their case?

10. What was the final, binding outcome of the re-hearing held on July 8, 2021?

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Answer Key

1. The central conflict concerned the method for calculating homeowner assessments. The Petitioners argued for the historical method based on unit square footage, while the Respondent implemented a new method where each of the 26 units paid an equal share (1/26 rate) of the Association’s costs.

2. For over 40 years, the Association historically calculated assessments based on the square footage of each condominium unit. This practice was changed by the Board in 2020.

3. In January 2020, two Board members met with an attorney who advised that to comply with the CC&Rs, the Association should charge assessments based on each homeowner’s 1/26 interest in the common areas, not on square footage.

4. Mr. Edwards argued that the historical square footage rate was a “uniform rate” that complied with the CC&Rs. He also contended that by using this method for 40 years, the Association had waived its right to enforce a different assessment method like the 1/26 rate.

5. The Judge concluded that the Respondent’s assessment method, based on a uniform rate of 1/26 of the Association’s costs for each unit, did comply with Article VI, Section 9. Therefore, the Petitioners failed to prove the Association had violated the CC&Rs.

6. The Petitioners based their request for a re-hearing on the new allegation that the Respondent had violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1255. They argued the 1/26 rate improperly required members to pay for limited common elements, such as patios and parking spaces, not assigned to them.

7. According to Article I, Section 5 of the Declaration (CC&Rs), the undivided interest in the general common areas established and conveyed with each respective unit is 1/26.

8. The Judge concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1255 did not apply because the statute itself contains an exception: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration.” In this case, the Association’s Declaration explicitly required that each member be charged an assessment equivalent to their 1/26 interest in the total costs, which included patios and parking areas.

9. The Petitioners bore the burden of proof to establish their claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.

10. Following the re-hearing, the Administrative Law Judge again ordered that the petition of Lee & Kim Edwards be dismissed. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party, and the order was declared binding on the parties.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. Answers are not provided.

1. Trace the evolution of the Petitioners’ legal strategy from the initial petition filed on November 20, 2020, to the arguments made during the re-hearing on July 8, 2021. How did their core arguments change, and what new evidence or legal statutes were introduced?

2. Analyze the concept of a “uniform rate” as required by Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs. Discuss how both the Petitioners and the Respondent interpreted this phrase to support their respective assessment methods (square footage vs. 1/26 rate).

3. Explain in detail the role of A.R.S. § 33-1255 in the re-hearing. Why did the Petitioners believe it supported their case, and what specific language in both the statute and the Association’s Declaration led the Administrative Law Judge to rule that it did not apply?

4. Evaluate the actions taken by the Association’s Board of Directors in 2020. Consider their consultation with an attorney, their communication with homeowners, and their final decision to implement the 1/26 rate. Discuss whether these actions were consistent with the powers and obligations outlined in the CC&Rs.

5. Discuss the legal argument of “waiver” raised by Mr. Edwards in the first hearing. Explain what he meant by this and why the Association’s 40-year history of using a square-footage-based assessment was central to this claim. Why did this argument ultimately fail?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

1/26 Rate

The assessment method where the Association’s annual budget is divided 26 ways, with each unit responsible for paying an equal portion. This is based on each unit’s 1/26 undivided interest in the common areas as specified in the CC&Rs.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The independent judicial officer who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and issues a decision. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)

The Arizona Revised Statute that permits a condominium unit owner to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing regarding alleged violations of the Condominium Act.

A.R.S. § 33-1255

The Arizona Revised Statute concerning common expenses. It states that unless the declaration provides otherwise, expenses for a limited common element shall be assessed against the units to which it is assigned, and expenses benefitting fewer than all units shall be assessed exclusively against the units benefitted.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of condominium associations in Arizona.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal proceeding to establish its claims by a required standard of evidence. In this case, the Petitioners bore the burden of proof.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or condominium. Also referred to as the “Declaration” in the provided documents.

Common Area / Common Elements

As defined in Article I, Section 3 of the CC&Rs, this includes the multifamily structure (except for the units), land, air space, bearing walls, roofs, storage spaces, patios, recreational facilities, lawns, pipes, and other premises designed for common use.

Declaration

Another term for the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Lee & Kim Edwards

The Petitioners in the case and owners of unit 6937 in the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium development.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate refers petitions for evidentiary hearings.

Petitioners

The party that initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, Lee & Kim Edwards.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to be met by the Petitioners. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association.

Restricted Common Area

As defined in Article I, Section 3(b) of the CC&Rs, this refers to a separately designed and exclusive parking area for each unit as assigned by the Board of Directors.

Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

The Respondent in the case; the condominium unit owners’ association for the development.

Square Footage Rate

The historical method of calculating assessments for over 40 years, where each unit’s assessment was based on its square footage.

Uniform Rate

A requirement from Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs that states both regular and special assessments must be fixed at a uniform rate for all units. The interpretation of this term was central to the dispute.

As defined in Article I, Section 4 of the CC&Rs, a separately designated freehold estate consisting of the space bounded by the interior surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors, ceilings, windows, and floors of each apartment. It does not include common elements.

Waiver

A legal argument made by the Petitioners that because the Association had charged assessments based on square footage for 40 years, it had relinquished or “waived” its right to enforce a different method.






Blog Post – 21F-H2120028-REL


4 Shocking Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit That Could Upend How You See Your Fees

Introduction: The 40-Year Mistake

If you live in a condominium or a community governed by a Homeowners Association (HOA), you likely operate under a simple assumption: the way things have always been done is the correct and legal way. Monthly fees, maintenance schedules, and community rules that have been in place for decades feel permanent and unassailable. But what if they aren’t?

This was the central question in the case of Lee & Kim Edwards versus the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association. For over 40 years, the Association calculated homeowner fees based on the square footage of each unit—a practice that seemed fair and logical, and one that was never questioned by residents.

Then came the twist. In January 2020, after consulting with an attorney, the HOA board announced a shocking revelation: their 40-year-old assessment method was a direct violation of the community’s own governing documents. The board presented the legal findings to the community and sought their input on how to proceed. After being given the choice between the old method, a blended rate, or a new flat-rate fee that complied with the rules, most homeowners voted for the compliant flat-rate system for every single unit, regardless of its size.

Homeowners sued to keep the old method, sparking a legal battle that went all the way to an administrative court. The resulting decisions offer surprising and crucial lessons for every homeowner paying HOA dues. Here are the four most impactful takeaways from the case that could change how you view your own community’s rules.

1. “Past Practice” Means Nothing if It Violates the Rules

The primary argument made by the petitioners, Mr. and Mrs. Edwards, was that the Association had “waived its right” to change the assessment method. After all, by using the square-footage calculation for four decades, hadn’t they established an unbreakable precedent? It seemed like a common-sense argument rooted in history and consistency.

The court, however, completely rejected this line of reasoning. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was not based on historical practice but on the clear, written rules found in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association argued that it’s “not possible to waive the CC&R requirement,” and the court agreed.

The Lesson: This case powerfully demonstrates that tradition or “how things have always been done” cannot override the explicit language of an HOA’s governing documents. The CC&Rs are a contract. The lesson is clear: if your HOA’s practice contradicts its documents, the practice is invalid. The board has a fiduciary duty to follow the written rules, not a 40-year-old mistake.

2. Your CC&Rs Are a Binding Contract—Read Them

Throughout the legal proceedings, the Administrative Law Judge consistently referred back to the specific text of the CC&Rs to make a final decision. The entire case ultimately hinged on the interpretation of a few key sentences written decades ago.

The most critical passage, which decided the outcome, was from Article VI, Section 4(d) of the community’s governing documents:

“Each unit’s share shall be the same as its undivided interest in the common elements of the total amount determined under the subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) above.” —Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association CC&Rs, Article VI, Section 4(d)

This single sentence was the linchpin. It explicitly linked each unit’s assessment share to its “undivided interest in the common elements.” Another section of the document, Article I, Section 5, had already established that interest as an equal 1/26 for all 26 units.

The Lesson: This is a classic example of legal cross-referencing in a contract. Section 4(d) provided the instruction (base fees on “undivided interest”), while Article I, Section 5 provided the specific value (1/26). With both parts present and unambiguous, the court had no choice but to enforce them exactly as written, leaving no room for interpretations based on fairness or history. The contract was the contract.

3. A “Uniform Rate” Might Not Mean What You Think

One of the central points of contention was the term “uniform rate.” Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs required that all assessments “must be fixed at a uniform rate for all units.”

The homeowners argued that the square footage rate was, in fact, a “uniform rate”—a consistent price per square foot applied to every unit. It’s an interpretation many of us might find reasonable.

However, the HOA Board and the court had a different interpretation. The judge found that the flat 1/26 rate was the correct interpretation of a “uniform rate” because it was uniformly applied to every unit’s established 1/26 interest in the common areas. In the court’s view, the “rate” being applied uniformly was the 1/26 fraction of the total budget. The fact that this resulted in different dollar amounts for square-footage fees was irrelevant; the legal share was what had to be uniform.

The Lesson: Common-sense terms like “uniform” can have very specific legal meanings within the context of your governing documents. The true definition is found not in a dictionary, but in how the term is defined and applied by the rest of the document’s provisions.

4. Your HOA’s Rules Can Sometimes Override State Law

In a final attempt to overturn the decision, the petitioners filed for a re-hearing. This time, they cited a specific Arizona state law, A.R.S. 33-1255. This statute says that expenses for “limited common elements”—things like assigned patios or parking spaces that only benefit specific units—should be assessed only against those units that benefit from them. The homeowners argued that the new 1/26 flat fee unfairly forced them to pay for their neighbors’ patios and parking spots, a direct violation of state law.

Surprisingly, this argument also failed. The reason is found in the crucial introductory clause of the state law itself: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration…”

Because the Scottsdale Embassy’s Declaration did provide otherwise—by explicitly rolling all general and restricted common area costs into the total budget before calculating each unit’s 1/26 share—the community’s own rules legally superseded the default state statute. The judge concluded that the state law “does not apply to this matter because the Declaration requires” a different method.

The Lesson: This is perhaps the most counter-intuitive lesson of all. This demonstrates a key principle of contract law and planned community governance: state statutes often provide a “default” rule for situations a community’s documents don’t address. However, they also grant communities the power to create their own specific rules, which, if legally permissible, will take precedence. Homeowners cannot assume that a state law automatically protects them if their community’s own governing documents have a more specific rule in place.

Conclusion: Are You Sure You Know What You Agreed To?

The central message from the Scottsdale Embassy case is undeniable: in an HOA, the written word is law. The CC&Rs and other governing documents are a binding contract that dictates the rules, regardless of 40 years of history, common-sense assumptions, or even some default state laws. What you believe is fair or standard practice is irrelevant if the document you agreed to upon purchase says otherwise.

This case was decided by a few sentences written decades ago. When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents from cover to cover?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lee Edwards (petitioner, witness)
  • Kim Edwards (petitioner)
  • Teresa H. Foster (petitioner attorney)
    Ellis & Baker, P.C.
    Also referred to as Terri Foster and Terry Foster

Respondent Side

  • Lauren Vie (respondent attorney)
    Appeared for initial hearing; later noted as withdrawn
  • Caleb Koch (board president, witness)
    Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association
  • Mary Edinburgh (board member, witness)
    Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association
  • Beth Mulcahy (respondent attorney)
    Mulcahy Law Firm, PC
    Recipient of transmission; noted as withdrawn counsel prior to rehearing

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient

Other Participants

  • Miranda Alvarez (unknown)
    Associated with transmission for petitioner's attorney

Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC), v. Montelena Master

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120024-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-16
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) Counsel
Respondent Montelena Master Community Association Counsel Troy Stratman

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-442, A.R.S. § 33-1806

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Montelena Master Community Association violated A.R.S. § 33-442 or its CC&Rs regarding the imposition of a transfer fee. The ALJ found that the use of the fee to fund operating expenses and/or reserves was an acceptable purpose under the relevant statute.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish Respondent acted in violation of the community documents and A.R.S. § 33-442.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to unauthorized/unlawful transfer fees charged by HOA

Petitioner alleged that the $2500.00 transfer fee charged to the purchaser was an unlawful transfer fee in violation of A.R.S. § 33-442 and specific CC&R provisions, arguing that the authorized use of the fee (Master Association’s operating expenses and/or reserves) was not specific enough to meet the statutory exception under A.R.S. § 33-442(C).

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1806
  • A.R.S. § 33-442
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA transfer fee, A.R.S. 33-442, CC&R violation, Operating expenses, Reserves
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1806
  • A.R.S. § 33-442
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120024-REL Decision – 855401.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:12 (95.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 21F-H2120024-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “21F-H2120024-REL”, “case_title”: “Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC), Petitioner, vs. Montelena Master Community Association, Respondent”, “decision_date”: “February 16, 2021”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “individuals”: [ { “name”: “Aaron Ricks”, “role”: “petitioner”, “side”: “petitioner”, “affiliation”: “Somerstone Properties, LLC”, “notes”: null }, { “name”: “Troy Stratman”, “role”: “HOA attorney”, “side”: “respondent”, “affiliation”: “Stratman Law Firm, PLC”, “notes”: null }, { “name”: “Tammy L. Eigenheer”, “role”: “ALJ”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: null, “notes”: null }, { “name”: “Judy Lowe”, “role”: “Commissioner”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”, “notes”: null } ] }






Study Guide – 21F-H2120024-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “21F-H2120024-REL”, “case_title”: “Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) v. Montelena Master Community Association”, “decision_date”: “2021-02-16”, “alj_name”: “Tammy L. Eigenheer”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Who is responsible for proving that an HOA violated the law or community documents during a hearing?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the petition must prove that the HOA committed the alleged violations. This must be established by a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ meaning the homeowner’s claims are more likely true than not.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal procedure”, “evidence” ] }, { “question”: “Can an HOA charge a transfer fee that is used for general operating expenses rather than a specific project?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, funding operating expenses or reserves is considered a valid purpose.”, “detailed_answer”: “Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-442), transfer fees are generally prohibited unless they fall under specific exceptions. One exception is if the fee is used for a purpose authorized in the document. The ALJ ruled that using fees for ‘operating expenses and/or… reserves’ satisfies this requirement; it does not need to be for a specific limited purpose like a swimming pool.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner offered no authority to support his interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-442 required that the transfer fee had to be for a more specific purpose than those identified in the governing documents.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-442(C)”, “topic_tags”: [ “transfer fees”, “operating expenses”, “financial management” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA Board set the amount of a transfer fee without a vote if the CC&Rs allow it?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the CC&Rs grant the Board the authority to set the amount.”, “detailed_answer”: “If the community’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) specifically states that the transfer fee amount is ‘to be set by the Board’ or established ‘from time to time by the Board,’ the Board has the authority to determine the fee amount.”, “alj_quote”: “The Master Association may require the new Owner of a Lot or Parcel to pay to the Master Association, or its designated representative, a transfer fee in an amount to be set by the Board . . . .”, “legal_basis”: “CC&Rs Section 6.6; CC&Rs Section 7.15”, “topic_tags”: [ “board authority”, “CC&Rs”, “fees” ] }, { “question”: “Can an HOA charge both a Transfer Fee and a Reserve Contribution fee on the same sale?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, an HOA can charge multiple distinct fees if authorized by the governing documents.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ found that a Transfer Fee can be charged in addition to other fees, such as a Reserve Contribution, provided the governing documents (like a Board Resolution or CC&Rs) explicitly state that the fee is in addition to other assessments.”, “alj_quote”: “This Transfer Fee shall be in addition to any other fees and assessments due and payable in relation to the transfer of the property, including, but not limited to, a Reserve Contribution pursuant to Article 6, Section 6.9 of the Declaration.”, “legal_basis”: “Board Resolution (Recorded July 23, 2010)”, “topic_tags”: [ “reserve contribution”, “transfer fees”, “closing costs” ] }, { “question”: “What does ‘preponderance of the evidence’ mean in an HOA dispute?”, “short_answer”: “It means the evidence shows a claim is more probably true than not.”, “detailed_answer”: “This legal standard requires the party with the burden of proof to provide evidence that has ‘superior evidentiary weight.’ It does not mean removing all doubt, but rather sufficient evidence to incline a fair mind to one side over the other.”, “alj_quote”: “A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”, “legal_basis”: “Arizona Law of Evidence § 5”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal definitions”, “evidence”, “standard of proof” ] }, { “question”: “Is a transfer fee valid if I purchased the property out of bankruptcy?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the CC&Rs require payment immediately upon becoming the owner.”, “detailed_answer”: “The manner of purchase (e.g., out of bankruptcy) does not automatically exempt an owner from transfer fees if the CC&Rs mandate that ‘Each person or entity who purchases a Lot… shall pay… immediately upon becoming the Owner.'”, “alj_quote”: “Therefore, Respondent was able to charge Petitioner the transfer fee pursuant to his purchase of the property out of bankruptcy.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&Rs Section 7.15”, “topic_tags”: [ “bankruptcy”, “property transfer”, “exemptions” ] } ] }






Blog Post – 21F-H2120024-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “21F-H2120024-REL”, “case_title”: “Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) v. Montelena Master Community Association”, “decision_date”: “2021-02-16”, “alj_name”: “Tammy L. Eigenheer”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Who is responsible for proving that an HOA violated the law or community documents during a hearing?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the petition must prove that the HOA committed the alleged violations. This must be established by a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ meaning the homeowner’s claims are more likely true than not.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal procedure”, “evidence” ] }, { “question”: “Can an HOA charge a transfer fee that is used for general operating expenses rather than a specific project?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, funding operating expenses or reserves is considered a valid purpose.”, “detailed_answer”: “Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-442), transfer fees are generally prohibited unless they fall under specific exceptions. One exception is if the fee is used for a purpose authorized in the document. The ALJ ruled that using fees for ‘operating expenses and/or… reserves’ satisfies this requirement; it does not need to be for a specific limited purpose like a swimming pool.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner offered no authority to support his interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-442 required that the transfer fee had to be for a more specific purpose than those identified in the governing documents.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-442(C)”, “topic_tags”: [ “transfer fees”, “operating expenses”, “financial management” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA Board set the amount of a transfer fee without a vote if the CC&Rs allow it?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the CC&Rs grant the Board the authority to set the amount.”, “detailed_answer”: “If the community’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) specifically states that the transfer fee amount is ‘to be set by the Board’ or established ‘from time to time by the Board,’ the Board has the authority to determine the fee amount.”, “alj_quote”: “The Master Association may require the new Owner of a Lot or Parcel to pay to the Master Association, or its designated representative, a transfer fee in an amount to be set by the Board . . . .”, “legal_basis”: “CC&Rs Section 6.6; CC&Rs Section 7.15”, “topic_tags”: [ “board authority”, “CC&Rs”, “fees” ] }, { “question”: “Can an HOA charge both a Transfer Fee and a Reserve Contribution fee on the same sale?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, an HOA can charge multiple distinct fees if authorized by the governing documents.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ found that a Transfer Fee can be charged in addition to other fees, such as a Reserve Contribution, provided the governing documents (like a Board Resolution or CC&Rs) explicitly state that the fee is in addition to other assessments.”, “alj_quote”: “This Transfer Fee shall be in addition to any other fees and assessments due and payable in relation to the transfer of the property, including, but not limited to, a Reserve Contribution pursuant to Article 6, Section 6.9 of the Declaration.”, “legal_basis”: “Board Resolution (Recorded July 23, 2010)”, “topic_tags”: [ “reserve contribution”, “transfer fees”, “closing costs” ] }, { “question”: “What does ‘preponderance of the evidence’ mean in an HOA dispute?”, “short_answer”: “It means the evidence shows a claim is more probably true than not.”, “detailed_answer”: “This legal standard requires the party with the burden of proof to provide evidence that has ‘superior evidentiary weight.’ It does not mean removing all doubt, but rather sufficient evidence to incline a fair mind to one side over the other.”, “alj_quote”: “A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”, “legal_basis”: “Arizona Law of Evidence § 5”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal definitions”, “evidence”, “standard of proof” ] }, { “question”: “Is a transfer fee valid if I purchased the property out of bankruptcy?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the CC&Rs require payment immediately upon becoming the owner.”, “detailed_answer”: “The manner of purchase (e.g., out of bankruptcy) does not automatically exempt an owner from transfer fees if the CC&Rs mandate that ‘Each person or entity who purchases a Lot… shall pay… immediately upon becoming the Owner.'”, “alj_quote”: “Therefore, Respondent was able to charge Petitioner the transfer fee pursuant to his purchase of the property out of bankruptcy.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&Rs Section 7.15”, “topic_tags”: [ “bankruptcy”, “property transfer”, “exemptions” ] } ] }


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Aaron Ricks (petitioner)
    Somerstone Properties, LLC

Respondent Side

  • Troy Stratman (HOA attorney)
    Stratman Law Firm, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

MICHAEL J. STOLTENBERG v. RANCHO DEL ORO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020059-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-12
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole Payne

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 5.1; A.R.S. § 10-3842

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show that the HOA violated the governing documents, primarily because the Petitioner refused access to his back yard, and the CC&Rs were not interpreted to include maintenance of an individual homeowner’s swimming pool.

Why this result: Petitioner refused to allow the HOA access to his back yard to perform landscape services, and failed to establish that pool maintenance was included in the HOA’s landscaping responsibility under the CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to maintain landscaping and acting in bad faith

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs § 5.1 and A.R.S. § 10-3842 by failing to maintain landscaping in 2020. The dispute centered on whether landscaping duties included Petitioner's private pool/hardscape and Petitioner's refusal to grant access to his locked backyard for maintenance services.

Orders: Petition dismissed. Respondent was required to communicate the days and times for performing back yard landscaping so Petitioner could provide access while maintaining safety precautions.

Filing fee: $0.00

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs § 5.1
  • A.R.S. § 10-3842

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Landscaping, Pool Maintenance, Access Denial, CC&R Enforcement, A.R.S. § 10-3842
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • CC&Rs § 5.1
  • A.R.S. § 10-3842

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020059-REL-RHG Decision – 855028.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:25 (139.1 KB)

20F-H2020059-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2020059-REL/815480.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:57:27 (124.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020059-REL-RHG


Briefing on Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and rulings from two administrative hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg (Petitioner) and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its governing documents by failing to maintain landscaping at his property. The case was ultimately dismissed after an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing.

The core of the dispute centered on two key issues: the scope of “landscaping” services required by the HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), and the Petitioner’s denial of access to his backyard. The Petitioner argued that the undefined term “landscaping” in the CC&Rs should be interpreted broadly to include maintenance of his private swimming pool, which he referred to as a “water feature.” Concurrently, he acknowledged keeping his backyard gate locked for liability reasons related to the pool, preventing the HOA’s contractor from performing any work.

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof. The judge concluded that the HOA had made repeated, documented attempts to perform its duties, but was actively prevented from doing so by the Petitioner. Critically, the judge ruled that a reasonable interpretation of “landscaping,” supported by dictionary definitions and the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ distinct licensing classifications for landscaping and swimming pool services, does not include the maintenance of a private pool and its associated mechanical equipment.

I. Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

20F-H2020059-REL and 20F-H2020059-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Petitioner

Michael J. Stoltenberg (Homeowner at 11777 E. Calle Gaudi, Yuma, AZ)

Respondent

Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA)

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella

Hearing Dates

August 3, 2020 (Initial Hearing) and February 2, 2021 (Rehearing)

Final Disposition

Petition Dismissed (February 12, 2021)

II. Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

The Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about April 21, 2020, alleging the HOA acted in “bad faith” and failed to perform its duties in 2020. The core of his case was built on the following claims:

Violation of CC&Rs: The Petitioner alleged a violation of § 5.1 of the HOA’s CC&Rs, which mandates that the “Association shall maintain… landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” He also alleged a violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 10-3842, although this was not addressed at the hearing.

Broad Interpretation of “Landscaping”: The Petitioner contended that since the CC&Rs do not define “landscaping,” the term should encompass all features on his lot. He specifically asserted that the HOA was responsible for maintaining:

◦ His swimming pool (referred to as a “water feature”), including the pump, filter, and chemicals.

◦ His unique xeriscape with geometric patterns.

◦ Walking paths that required staining.

◦ Replenishing decorative rock when it wears thin.

◦ The patio and all hardscape.

Denial of Access: The Petitioner acknowledged that the gate to his backyard was “always locked for liability reasons” due to the pool. At the rehearing, he argued that the HOA failed to communicate the landscaping schedule, which would have afforded him an opportunity to unlock the gate.

Rehearing Claims: In his request for a rehearing, the Petitioner cited several grounds, including an abuse of discretion by the judge, errors in evidence, and issues related to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming hearing loss put him at a “severe disadvantage.” At the rehearing itself, he also asserted that the Respondent was “falsely representing themselves as an HOA” and did not have an elected Board.

III. Respondent’s Defense and Evidence

The HOA, represented by Nicole Payne, Esq., argued that it had fulfilled its obligations and that any failure to maintain the Petitioner’s backyard was due to his own actions.

Consistent Maintenance of Front Yard: The HOA established that its contractor, Mowtown Landscape, had continuously maintained the Petitioner’s front yard since their contract began in January 2020.

Denied Access to Backyard: The central defense was that the HOA’s contractor was repeatedly and deliberately denied access to the backyard. This was supported by substantial evidence:

Testimony of Rian Baas (Mowtown Landscape): Mr. Baas testified that his crews were at the community every Wednesday and Thursday. He stated they knocked on the Petitioner’s door and left notes or business cards four or five times between January and March 2020.

Testimony of Diana Crites (Property Manager): Ms. Crites presented a text message from Mr. Baas dated March 24, 2020, which read:

Documentary Evidence: A photograph of the locked gate was submitted, along with a letter from Mr. Baas stating, “There is a lock on the gate going to the back yard and we were trying to see if they [sic] people inside the house wanted us to maintenance the back yard. No one ever answered or came to the door.”

Scope of HOA Services: Ms. Crites testified that the HOA provides uniform services (front yard maintenance, mowing and blowing of back yards, sprinkler system maintenance) and does not offer “concierge” services like maintaining potted plants or private pools. The community pool, she noted, is maintained by a different company entirely (Crystal Clear Pool Maintenance).

IV. Judicial Findings and Legal Rulings

Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella found in favor of the Respondent in both the initial decision and the rehearing, ultimately dismissing the petition.

Initial Decision (August 17, 2020)

The initial petition was denied because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The judge’s reasoning was:

1. Denial of Access: The Petitioner’s own admission, coupled with “credible, probative, and substantial evidence,” established that he had refused to allow the HOA access to his backyard since January 2020.

2. HOA Attempts: The evidence demonstrated that the HOA had attempted to access the yard on multiple occasions and was “specifically instructed in March 2020, that Respondent was not permitted to access Petitioner’s back yard.”

3. Scope of CC&Rs: The judge concluded that while § 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs requires the HOA to maintain yards, “nothing therein requires Respondent to maintain an individual member’s pool.”

Rehearing Decision (February 12, 2021)

After the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted a rehearing, Judge Vanella again dismissed the petition, providing a more detailed legal analysis of the term “landscaping.”

1. Burden of Proof: The judge reiterated that the Petitioner bore the burden to establish that the HOA was legally obligated to maintain his pool, but “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent must do so.”

2. Definition of “Landscaping”: The judge found that the definitions of “landscaping” from various sources, including dictionaries, “cannot reasonably be read to include a swimming pool and the associated mechanical equipment.”

3. State Licensing as Key Differentiator: The most definitive part of the ruling relied on the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ licensing classifications, which treat landscaping and pool maintenance as two separate and distinct services.

License Classification

Description & Relevance

R-21 Hardscaping and Irrigation Systems (Formerly Landscaping and Irrigation Systems)

Allows for installation and repair of non-loadbearing concrete, patios, decorative walls, irrigation systems, and water features not attached to swimming pools. The classification specifically precludes the licensee from contracting for work on “swimming pools, pool deck coatings.”

R-6 Swimming Pool Service and Repair

A separate license required “to service and perform minor repair of residential pools and accessories.”

The judge concluded: “The Registrar’s licensing scheme supports a conclusion that landscaping maintenance and pool maintenance are two separate and distinct services… the CC&Rs cannot reasonably be interpreted to include pool maintenance when it required Respondent to maintain landscaping.”

Judicial Recommendation

While ruling against the Petitioner, the judge offered a forward-looking, non-binding recommendation:

“…given that Petitioner is required to keep his gate secured due to having a pool, it is reasonable, going forward, for Respondent to communicate the days and times that it will be performing the landscaping of Petitioner’s back yard so that Petitioner can provide access for that service while maintaining safety precautions.”






Study Guide – 20F-H2020059-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2020059-REL

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Please answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, using only information provided in the case documents.

1. Identify the Petitioner and Respondent in this case and describe the core issue of their dispute.

2. What specific provision of the governing documents did the Petitioner, Michael J. Stoltenberg, claim the Respondent violated?

3. According to the Petitioner’s testimony, what unique features did his property’s landscaping include, and what services did he believe the HOA was responsible for?

4. What was the primary reason the Respondent’s landscaping contractor, Mowtown Landscape, was unable to perform maintenance in the Petitioner’s backyard?

5. What was the testimony of Diana Crites, the property manager, regarding the scope of standard landscaping services provided by the HOA?

6. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge deny the Petitioner’s initial petition in the decision dated August 17, 2020?

7. For what primary reasons did the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate grant the Petitioner a rehearing?

8. In the rehearing, what external sources did the Administrative Law Judge consult to determine the definition of “landscaping”?

9. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and who bears the responsibility for meeting it?

10. What was the final order issued after the rehearing on February 12, 2021, and what reasonable suggestion did the judge offer for future interactions?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg. The Respondent was the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). The core dispute concerned the HOA’s alleged failure to maintain the landscaping on the Petitioner’s property as required by the community’s CC&Rs, specifically whether this obligation included maintaining the Petitioner’s private pool.

2. The Petitioner claimed the Respondent violated Section 5.1 of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This section outlines the Association’s duties, including the maintenance of landscaping on individual lots outside of structures. The Petitioner also initially alleged a violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 10-3842.

3. The Petitioner testified that his landscaping was unique, including xeriscape with geometric patterns, “water features” (a pool), and walking paths that needed staining. He contended that the HOA should be responsible for maintaining these features, including replenishing the rock in his front yard when it wore thin.

4. The landscaping contractor was unable to perform maintenance because the gate to the backyard was always locked. The Petitioner acknowledged he kept it locked for liability reasons due to the pool, and evidence showed that in March 2020, a woman at the residence explicitly told the landscapers she did not want anyone in the backyard.

5. Diana Crites testified that the HOA provides uniform services, not “concierge” services. This includes front yard maintenance and mowing and blowing of backyards, but not maintaining potted plants, driveways, property-dividing walls, or individual homeowners’ pools.

6. The judge denied the petition because the evidence, including the Petitioner’s own admission, established that he had refused to allow the Respondent access to his backyard since January 2020. The decision noted the Respondent had made multiple attempts to access the yard and had consistently maintained the front yard.

7. The rehearing was granted for reasons outlined in the Petitioner’s rehearing request. These included claims of irregularity in the proceedings, newly discovered evidence, errors in the admission of evidence, and that the original decision was not supported by evidence or was contrary to law. The Petitioner also cited ADA and privacy issues.

8. The Administrative Law Judge consulted various online dictionary definitions (Oxford English Dictionary, Dictionary.com, Merriam-Webster, Law Insider). She also analyzed the license classifications from the Arizona Registrar of Contractors, specifically the R-21 Hardscaping and Irrigation Systems license and the R-6 Swimming Pool Service and Repair license.

9. The legal standard is “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the proof must convince the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated the governing documents.

10. The final order dismissed the Petitioner’s petition again, finding he failed to prove the HOA was obligated to maintain his pool. However, the judge suggested that it would be reasonable for the Respondent to communicate the days and times of its landscaping services going forward so the Petitioner could provide access while maintaining safety precautions.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of the case. Formulate a detailed essay response for each prompt.

1. Analyze the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Explain who held the burden, what they were required to prove, and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found that they failed to meet this burden in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

2. Discuss the role of access in the dispute between Michael J. Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro HOA. How did the issue of the locked gate impact the initial ruling, and how did the Petitioner attempt to reframe this issue in the rehearing?

3. The interpretation of the word “landscaping” was central to the rehearing. Detail the Petitioner’s interpretation versus the conclusion reached by the Administrative Law Judge. What evidence and legal reasoning did the Judge use to support her conclusion that pool maintenance is not included in landscaping?

4. Trace the procedural history of this case, from the initial petition filing on April 21, 2020, to the final order after the rehearing. Identify the key events, the specific reasons cited for the rehearing, and the legal basis for the final dismissal.

5. Based on the testimony of Diana Crites and Rian Baas, describe the standard landscaping services provided by the Rancho Del Oro HOA and its contractor. How does this standard practice contrast with the specific and unique services the Petitioner demanded for his property?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, Sondra J. Vanella served as the ALJ.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or homeowners’ association.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE), the state agency with jurisdiction over HOA dispute resolution petitions.

Homeowners’ Association. An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Respondent was the Rancho Del Oro HOA.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg.

Petition

A formal written request filed with a court or administrative body to initiate a legal proceeding. Mr. Stoltenberg filed a petition alleging the HOA violated its CC&Rs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases. It requires the party with the burden of proof to convince the fact-finder that their claim is more likely to be true than not true.

Registrar of Contractors

The Arizona state agency responsible for licensing and regulating contractors. The ALJ referenced its license classifications for landscaping (R-21) and swimming pools (R-6) to help define the scope of services.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 20F-H2020059-REL-RHG


Briefing on Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and rulings from two administrative hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg (Petitioner) and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its governing documents by failing to maintain landscaping at his property. The case was ultimately dismissed after an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing.

The core of the dispute centered on two key issues: the scope of “landscaping” services required by the HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), and the Petitioner’s denial of access to his backyard. The Petitioner argued that the undefined term “landscaping” in the CC&Rs should be interpreted broadly to include maintenance of his private swimming pool, which he referred to as a “water feature.” Concurrently, he acknowledged keeping his backyard gate locked for liability reasons related to the pool, preventing the HOA’s contractor from performing any work.

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof. The judge concluded that the HOA had made repeated, documented attempts to perform its duties, but was actively prevented from doing so by the Petitioner. Critically, the judge ruled that a reasonable interpretation of “landscaping,” supported by dictionary definitions and the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ distinct licensing classifications for landscaping and swimming pool services, does not include the maintenance of a private pool and its associated mechanical equipment.

I. Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

20F-H2020059-REL and 20F-H2020059-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Petitioner

Michael J. Stoltenberg (Homeowner at 11777 E. Calle Gaudi, Yuma, AZ)

Respondent

Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA)

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella

Hearing Dates

August 3, 2020 (Initial Hearing) and February 2, 2021 (Rehearing)

Final Disposition

Petition Dismissed (February 12, 2021)

II. Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

The Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about April 21, 2020, alleging the HOA acted in “bad faith” and failed to perform its duties in 2020. The core of his case was built on the following claims:

Violation of CC&Rs: The Petitioner alleged a violation of § 5.1 of the HOA’s CC&Rs, which mandates that the “Association shall maintain… landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” He also alleged a violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 10-3842, although this was not addressed at the hearing.

Broad Interpretation of “Landscaping”: The Petitioner contended that since the CC&Rs do not define “landscaping,” the term should encompass all features on his lot. He specifically asserted that the HOA was responsible for maintaining:

◦ His swimming pool (referred to as a “water feature”), including the pump, filter, and chemicals.

◦ His unique xeriscape with geometric patterns.

◦ Walking paths that required staining.

◦ Replenishing decorative rock when it wears thin.

◦ The patio and all hardscape.

Denial of Access: The Petitioner acknowledged that the gate to his backyard was “always locked for liability reasons” due to the pool. At the rehearing, he argued that the HOA failed to communicate the landscaping schedule, which would have afforded him an opportunity to unlock the gate.

Rehearing Claims: In his request for a rehearing, the Petitioner cited several grounds, including an abuse of discretion by the judge, errors in evidence, and issues related to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming hearing loss put him at a “severe disadvantage.” At the rehearing itself, he also asserted that the Respondent was “falsely representing themselves as an HOA” and did not have an elected Board.

III. Respondent’s Defense and Evidence

The HOA, represented by Nicole Payne, Esq., argued that it had fulfilled its obligations and that any failure to maintain the Petitioner’s backyard was due to his own actions.

Consistent Maintenance of Front Yard: The HOA established that its contractor, Mowtown Landscape, had continuously maintained the Petitioner’s front yard since their contract began in January 2020.

Denied Access to Backyard: The central defense was that the HOA’s contractor was repeatedly and deliberately denied access to the backyard. This was supported by substantial evidence:

Testimony of Rian Baas (Mowtown Landscape): Mr. Baas testified that his crews were at the community every Wednesday and Thursday. He stated they knocked on the Petitioner’s door and left notes or business cards four or five times between January and March 2020.

Testimony of Diana Crites (Property Manager): Ms. Crites presented a text message from Mr. Baas dated March 24, 2020, which read:

Documentary Evidence: A photograph of the locked gate was submitted, along with a letter from Mr. Baas stating, “There is a lock on the gate going to the back yard and we were trying to see if they [sic] people inside the house wanted us to maintenance the back yard. No one ever answered or came to the door.”

Scope of HOA Services: Ms. Crites testified that the HOA provides uniform services (front yard maintenance, mowing and blowing of back yards, sprinkler system maintenance) and does not offer “concierge” services like maintaining potted plants or private pools. The community pool, she noted, is maintained by a different company entirely (Crystal Clear Pool Maintenance).

IV. Judicial Findings and Legal Rulings

Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella found in favor of the Respondent in both the initial decision and the rehearing, ultimately dismissing the petition.

Initial Decision (August 17, 2020)

The initial petition was denied because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The judge’s reasoning was:

1. Denial of Access: The Petitioner’s own admission, coupled with “credible, probative, and substantial evidence,” established that he had refused to allow the HOA access to his backyard since January 2020.

2. HOA Attempts: The evidence demonstrated that the HOA had attempted to access the yard on multiple occasions and was “specifically instructed in March 2020, that Respondent was not permitted to access Petitioner’s back yard.”

3. Scope of CC&Rs: The judge concluded that while § 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs requires the HOA to maintain yards, “nothing therein requires Respondent to maintain an individual member’s pool.”

Rehearing Decision (February 12, 2021)

After the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted a rehearing, Judge Vanella again dismissed the petition, providing a more detailed legal analysis of the term “landscaping.”

1. Burden of Proof: The judge reiterated that the Petitioner bore the burden to establish that the HOA was legally obligated to maintain his pool, but “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent must do so.”

2. Definition of “Landscaping”: The judge found that the definitions of “landscaping” from various sources, including dictionaries, “cannot reasonably be read to include a swimming pool and the associated mechanical equipment.”

3. State Licensing as Key Differentiator: The most definitive part of the ruling relied on the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ licensing classifications, which treat landscaping and pool maintenance as two separate and distinct services.

License Classification

Description & Relevance

R-21 Hardscaping and Irrigation Systems (Formerly Landscaping and Irrigation Systems)

Allows for installation and repair of non-loadbearing concrete, patios, decorative walls, irrigation systems, and water features not attached to swimming pools. The classification specifically precludes the licensee from contracting for work on “swimming pools, pool deck coatings.”

R-6 Swimming Pool Service and Repair

A separate license required “to service and perform minor repair of residential pools and accessories.”

The judge concluded: “The Registrar’s licensing scheme supports a conclusion that landscaping maintenance and pool maintenance are two separate and distinct services… the CC&Rs cannot reasonably be interpreted to include pool maintenance when it required Respondent to maintain landscaping.”

Judicial Recommendation

While ruling against the Petitioner, the judge offered a forward-looking, non-binding recommendation:

“…given that Petitioner is required to keep his gate secured due to having a pool, it is reasonable, going forward, for Respondent to communicate the days and times that it will be performing the landscaping of Petitioner’s back yard so that Petitioner can provide access for that service while maintaining safety precautions.”


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael J. Stoltenberg (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
  • Diana Crites (property manager/witness)
    Crites and Associates
    Owner of Respondent's property management company; licensed broker
  • Rian Baas (witness/contractor owner)
    Mowtown Landscape
    Owner of landscaping company contracted by Respondent
  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Luis (landscaping staff)
    Staff member mentioned in text regarding access attempts
  • Jill (staff/employee)
    Staff member mentioned printing paper for Luis regarding access attempts

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate