Teresa J Johnstonbaugh vs. Clemente Ranch Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919058-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-08-07
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome yes
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Teresa J Johnstonbaugh Counsel
Respondent Clemente Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Lynn Krupnick

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article 3.11(A)(5)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the petition, finding that the Petitioner's boundary walls adjoining the common area were the responsibility of the Association to maintain under the Bylaws and past practice. The Association violated the Bylaws by failing to maintain the wall and attempting to shift costs to the homeowner.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Respondent violated Community Document Bylaws Article 3.11(A)(5)

Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to maintain a boundary wall defined as common area (replacing it with chain-link) and attempted to charge her for repairs, violating the duty to maintain common areas outlined in the Bylaws.

Orders: Respondent shall comply with Article 3.11(A)(5) of its Bylaws.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • Bylaws Article 3.11(A)(5)

Decision Documents

19F-H1919058-REL Decision – 728648.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:16:42 (164.4 KB)

**Case Title:** *Teresa J. Johnstonbaugh v. Clemente Ranch Homeowners Association* (No. 19F-H1919058-REL)

**Hearing Overview**
The hearing was convened on July 19, 2019, before Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark at the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The proceeding addressed a petition filed by homeowner Teresa J. Johnstonbaugh (Petitioner) against the Clemente Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) regarding a dispute over wall repairs and maintenance assessments.

**Key Facts and Arguments**
The central issue was whether the Respondent violated Bylaw Article 3.11(A)(5), which mandates that the Board provide for the operation, care, and maintenance of all Common Areas.

* **Petitioner’s Position:** The Petitioner was assessed a $9,342.60 fee (50% of the cost) for the repair of a wall separating her property from a common area along Queen Creek Road. She argued that the wall constituted a "boundary wall adjacent to the common area" under the CC&Rs and that the Association had historically maintained the area. In March 2019, the Respondent demolished the wall and replaced it with temporary chain-link fencing and plywood, taking no further action to rebuild it.
* **Respondent’s Position:** The Association argued that latent defects were discovered in the subdivision's walls, causing repair estimates to skyrocket to between $2.5 million and $3.1 million. The Board secured a $1.5 million loan, but because this was insufficient to cover the project, they attempted to pass costs to homeowners. The Association claimed that prior legal counsel had incorrectly advised them regarding their responsibility for these repairs and that they were attempting to pass a special assessment to fund the project.
* **Historical Context:** Evidence showed that in 2012, the Board explicitly resolved to pay for wall repairs along Queen Creek Road, noting it was "more efficient to have the Association pay for the cost of the wall repair". The Respondent only changed this stance after realizing the 2019 repair costs exceeded their loan and funding capabilities.

**Legal Findings and Decision**
The Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of the Petitioner, finding she met the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

* **Credibility and Responsibility:** The Judge found the Petitioner’s evidence more persuasive, establishing that the wall adjoined a

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Teresa J. Johnstonbaugh (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Lynn Krupnick (HOA attorney)
    Krupnik & Speas, PLLC
  • Timothy Krupnick (HOA attorney)
    Krupnik & Speas, PLLC
  • Jaime Therrien (community manager)
    Clemente Ranch Homeowners Association
    Witness for Respondent
  • Joseph Therrien (observer)
    Appeared with Respondent
  • Nick Ferre (observer)
    Appeared with Respondent
  • Barbara Dewitt (observer)
    Appeared with Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the transmitted order

Bonnie Senftner v. Desert Wind Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919056-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-07-22
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome false
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Bonnie Senftner Counsel
Respondent Desert Wind Condominium Association Counsel Shlomit Gruber

Alleged Violations

Article XIV, Section 14.2

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated the CC&Rs. The preponderance of evidence showed the damage was caused by an adjoining unit owner, and the CC&Rs assign liability to that owner, not the Association.

Why this result: Petitioner relied on a CC&R section that assigns liability to the specific owner causing damage rather than the HOA, and failed to produce evidence or legal authority obligating the HOA to pay.

Key Issues & Findings

Party Walls and Damage by Adjoining Owners

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated the CC&Rs regarding party walls by not reimbursing her for mold testing costs after a washing machine in an adjoining unit caused water damage. The ALJ found the cited section places responsibility on the owner causing the damage, not the HOA.

Orders: Petition dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Article XIV, Section 14.2
  • Section 1.12
  • Section 10.5

Decision Documents

19F-H1919056-REL Decision – 724318.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:16:38 (88.8 KB)

**Case Title:** *Bonnie Senftner v. Desert Wind Condominium Association*
**Case Number:** 19F-H1919056-REL
**Forum:** Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings
**Date of Decision:** July 22, 2019

### **Summary of Proceedings**
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden presided over a hearing regarding a dispute between Petitioner Bonnie Senftner and Respondent Desert Wind Condominium Association regarding responsibility for water damage and mold testing costs,. The Petitioner alleged the Respondent violated Article XIV, Section 14.2 of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

### **Key Facts**
* **The Incident:** The Petitioner owns Unit 116 (via an LLC). Water originating from the unit above (Unit 216) caused damage to a wall in the Petitioner's unit,.
* **Cause of Damage:** Plumbers determined the water intrusion resulted from an improperly installed washing machine in Unit 216, which over-topped the drain and damaged the pipe,.
* **Repairs:** The Respondent (the Association) paid to repair the pipe, remediate mold, and fix the drywall.
* **The Dispute:** The Petitioner incurred expenses for independent mold testing and sought reimbursement from the Respondent.

### **Main Issues and Arguments**
The central legal issue was whether the Association was liable for the Petitioner’s testing costs under the CC&Rs.

* **Petitioner’s Position:** The Petitioner argued that because the Respondent paid for the repairs, it implicitly accepted responsibility for the damage and should reimburse the testing costs. She further argued that the Association is responsible for acting in cost disputes between owners.
* **Respondent’s Position:** The Association maintained that the damage was caused by the owner of Unit 216 and that the Association’s decision to perform repairs did not create a legal obligation to cover the Petitioner’s additional expenses,.

### **Legal Analysis and Findings**
The Judge determined that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence,.

* **CC&R Interpretation (Section 14.2):** The Judge analyzed the "Party Walls" provision, which states that if a wall is damaged by the act of one owner, that owner must repair it "without cost to the other adjoining Owner"

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Bonnie Senftner (Petitioner)
    Owner of LLC that owns unit 116
  • Michael Senftner (Witness)
    Husband of Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Shlomit Gruber (Respondent Attorney)
    Resnick & Louis, P.C.
    Counsel for Desert Wind Condominium Association
  • Harman Cadis (Witness)
    Focus HOA Management

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed on mailing distribution
  • Felicia Del Sol (Administrative Staff)
    Mailed/processed the order

Colonia Del Rey Homeowners Association v. Gregory Czekaj

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918040-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-07-08
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome false
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gregory L. Czekaj Counsel Gary Wolf
Respondent Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc. Counsel Carolyn Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
Bylaws Sections 6.1, 7.1, 9.2

Outcome Summary

Petitioner failed to prove HOA violated records, voting, or notice statutes. HOA failed to prove Petitioner violated Bylaws by misrepresenting himself as an officer.

Why this result: Petitioner's interpretations of statutes regarding notice and voting were incorrect, and HOA complied with records requests. HOA lacked evidence for its claim against Petitioner.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide records

Petitioner alleged HOA failed to provide requested organizational, business, corporate, and financial records.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party. Petitioner bears his filing fees.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Invalid fee increase due to proxy vote

Petitioner alleged a $5 fee increase was invalid because a proxy vote was used in violation of statutes and rules.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party. Petitioner bears his filing fees.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Failure to provide ten-day meeting notice

Petitioner alleged HOA failed to give ten-day notice for a meeting to vote on Bylaws amendments.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party. Petitioner bears his filing fees.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Petitioner exceeded rights as member

HOA alleged Petitioner misrepresented himself as an officer to obtain insurance and tax information.

Orders: The HOA did not prevail. HOA bears its filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_win

Decision Documents

19F-H1919054-REL Decision – 720897.pdf

Uploaded 2026-02-11T06:34:36 (224.6 KB)

**Case Summary: Czekaj v. Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc.**
**Case Nos:** 19F-H1918040-REL & 19F-H1919054-REL
**Forum:** Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
**Date:** July 8, 2019

**Overview**
This administrative hearing addressed four consolidated complaints involving a nine-unit homeowners association (HOA) in Tucson, Arizona. Three complaints were filed by homeowner Gregory L. Czekaj (Petitioner) regarding records access, fee increases, and meeting notices. One cross-complaint was filed by the HOA alleging the Petitioner exceeded his authority as a member.

**Complaint One: Access to Records**
* **Issue:** Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to provide requested financial and organizational records in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805.
* **Key Facts:** Petitioner submitted multiple requests in 2018. The HOA requested he narrow "burdensome" requests, provided electronic documents, and hosted a physical records review session in November 2018. Petitioner argued the HOA "withheld" documents.
* **Decision:** The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the **HOA**. The evidence showed the HOA timely provided records or opportunities for review. The ALJ noted that once the Petitioner acknowledged receipt of documents, the HOA correctly deemed the request satisfied until new requests were made.

**Complaint Two: Validity of Fee Increase**
* **Issue:** Petitioner argued a May 2017 $5.00 assessment increase was invalid because it relied on a proxy vote, which he claimed violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A).
* **Key Facts:** The initial meeting minutes contained errors regarding vote counts and requirements. However, amended minutes and testimony clarified that the final tally was 5 "YES" and 1 "NO," excluding the disputed proxy.
* **Legal Analysis:** The HOA’s CC&Rs require approval by two-thirds of the *votes cast*, provided a quorum is present. With six members present (constituting a quorum), the 5-1 vote satisfied the two-thirds requirement without utilizing the proxy.
* **Decision:** The ALJ ruled in favor of the **HOA**. The fee increase was validly approved based on the votes of members present.

**Complaint Three: Meeting Notice Timeliness**
* **Issue:** Petitioner claimed the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) regarding a November 2018 meeting to amend Bylaws. He argued the Bylaws were invalid because he *received* the notice less than ten days before the meeting.
* **Legal Analysis:** The statute requires the HOA to "cause notice to be hand-delivered or sent prepaid by mail" not fewer than ten days in advance. The statute expressly states that failure of a member to receive actual notice does not invalidate the meeting.
* **Decision:** The ALJ ruled in favor of the **HOA**. Evidence proved the HOA mailed notices on November 5, thirteen days prior to the November 18 meeting, satisfying the statutory requirement [

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Gregory L. Czekaj (petitioner)
    Homeowner
    Appeared on his own behalf; also Respondent in consolidated counter-claim
  • Gary Wolf (petitioner's attorney)
    Contacted HOA attorney regarding records request

Respondent Side

  • Marybeth Andree (HOA President)
    Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc.
    Represented the HOA; testified at hearing
  • Carolyn Goldschmidt (HOA attorney)
    Responded to Petitioner's attorney regarding records
  • Sarah Hitch (proxy holder)
    Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc.
    Member who cast a proxy vote for Ed Freeman
  • Phil Oliver (board member)
    Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc.
    Provided email clarification regarding the vote; wrote letter regarding irregularities
  • Susan Sotelo (HOA secretary)
    Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc.
    Mailed the ballots for the meeting

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge presiding over the hearing
  • Mr. Tick (witness)
    State Farm (implied)
    HOA insurance agent; testified regarding Petitioner's request for policy
  • Ed Freeman (tenant)
    Tenant living in Oregon; subject of proxy vote dispute
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the transmitted order

Peter de Scheel vs. Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919048-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-06-19
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome yes
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Peter de Scheel Counsel
Respondent Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

Article V Section 1; Article VI Section 1(c)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the petition, finding that the HOA violated the CC&Rs. The evidence established that architectural beams are part of the 'exterior' which the Association must maintain, rather than the 'roof' which is excluded from Association maintenance. The HOA failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that beams were part of the roof.

Key Issues & Findings

Exterior Maintenance Responsibility (Architectural Beams)

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by requiring him to repair architectural beams. The dispute centered on whether beams were part of the 'roof' (owner responsibility) or 'exterior' (HOA responsibility).

Orders: Respondent shall reimburse Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee. Respondent is responsible for the repair and maintenance of architectural beams.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • Article V Section 1
  • Article VI Section 1(c)

Decision Documents

19F-H1919048-REL Decision – 716710.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:16:30 (103.6 KB)

**Case Summary: *de Scheel v. Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc.***
**Case Number:** 19F-H1919048-REL
**Forum:** Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings,
**Date of Decision:** June 19, 2019

**Key Facts and Procedural History**
Petitioner Peter de Scheel, a homeowner in the Sandpiper community, filed a petition against Respondent Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc. (the HOA) regarding a dispute over maintenance responsibilities,. In August 2018, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that he was required to repair disintegrating "architectural wood beams" on his property. The Petitioner contended that the Respondent was responsible for these repairs under the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and filed a petition alleging a violation of Article VI, Section 1 and Article V, Section 1. An evidentiary hearing was held on May 30, 2019.

**Main Issues**
The primary legal issue was whether the maintenance of "architectural wood beams" is the responsibility of the Association or the individual homeowner under the CC&Rs,. Specifically, the Tribunal had to determine if the beams were considered "exterior maintenance" (Association responsibility) or part of the "roof" (Homeowner responsibility),.

**Key Arguments**
* **Respondent’s Argument:** The HOA argued that homeowners are responsible for maintaining their property, including roofs, and contended that architectural beams are part of the roof,. The HOA President testified that she viewed the beams as part of the roof structure, despite a newsletter she issued that listed "roofs" and "architectural beams" as separate items. The HOA also argued that historical practice required owners to repair roofs.
* **Petitioner’s Argument:** The Petitioner did not dispute that homeowners must maintain roofs but argued that architectural beams are not part of the roof. He argued that the beams are part of the exterior building surfaces, and because Article V, Section 1 does not explicitly list beams in its exceptions (unlike roofs, glass, and landscaping), the Association is responsible for their maintenance,.

**Legal Analysis and Findings**
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson analyzed the CC&Rs, which state the Association shall provide exterior maintenance, including painting, repairing, and replacing exterior building surfaces. The Judge noted that while the CC&Rs expressly exclude "roofs" from the Association's duties, there is no specific exception for architectural beams,.

The Judge found that the Respondent failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that architectural beams are part of the roof. The Tribunal noted that the Respondent's own communications distinguished between roofs and architectural beams. Consequently, the evidence established that the beams are part of the exterior, making them the Association's responsibility under Article V, Section 1 and Article VI, Section 1(c).

**Final Decision and Outcome**
The Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of the Petitioner.
* **Holding:** The Respondent violated the CC&Rs by requiring the Petitioner to repair the architectural beams,.
* **Order:** The Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Peter de Scheel (Petitioner)
    Homeowner
    Appeared on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

  • Bradley R. Jardine (Attorney)
    Jardine, Baker, Hickman & Houston, P.L.L.C.
    Attorney for Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc.
  • Mary Lou Pace (Community Manager)
    Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc.
    Witness; also referred to as Mary Loud Pace
  • Carol Nesland (Board President)
    Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc.
    Witness; President of the Board of Directors
  • Pamela L. Polo (Former Property Manager)
    Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc.
    Witness; manager from 1984 to 2015

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the transmitted order

Victor L Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919047-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-06-05
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Victor L Pattarozzi Counsel
Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association Counsel Andrew Apodaca, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Architectural Committee meetings of the HOA were not 'regularly scheduled' within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, and therefore the HOA was not required to hold them open to association members.

Why this result: The petitioner failed to prove that the committee meetings met the requirement of being 'regularly scheduled' because the committee did not meet at fixed or uniform intervals, but rather considered applications as they were received.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Architectural Committee meetings are 'regularly scheduled' and thus required to be open to members.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated ARS 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings of its Architectural Committee (ARC). The ALJ found that because the ARC did not meet on a set schedule or at uniform intervals, it did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings as required by the statute, and thus was not required to be open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Architectural Review Committee, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919047-REL Decision – 713039.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:08 (89.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919047-REL


Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.

The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1919047-REL

Petitioner

Victor L. Pattarozzi

Respondent

Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

May 16, 2019

Decision Date

June 5, 2019

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).

Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”

Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”

The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.

Governing Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) states:

“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”

The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.

Competing Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):

◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.

◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:

Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.

Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.

◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.

Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):

◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.

Findings of Fact

The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.

Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.

“Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.

Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.

Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.

Legal Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.

Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”

The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.

The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.

The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.

Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument

The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:

“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”

The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Final Order

Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.

Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.

Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919047-REL


Study Guide: Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919047-REL, concerning a dispute between Victor L. Pattarozzi and the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association. The guide includes a quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific violation did Petitioner Victor L. Pattarozzi allege against the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association?

3. What was the central argument made by the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association to defend its Architectural Review Committee’s meeting practices?

4. Describe the composition of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) and its method for reviewing applications.

5. What was the “rubber stamp” process used by the ARC, and how many of the 12 applications received in 2019 were approved this way?

6. What suggestion did Mr. Pattarozzi offer for how the ARC could schedule its meetings to comply with his interpretation of the statute?

7. Which of Mr. Pattarozzi’s proposed definitions for the word “regular” did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately accept as the most appropriate interpretation in this context?

8. According to the judge’s Conclusions of Law, why was Mr. Pattarozzi’s argument regarding the open meetings policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) rejected?

9. Who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?

10. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case, and on what date was it issued?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Pattarozzi appeared on his own behalf, while the HOA was represented by Andrew Apodaca, Esq. and its Board president, Stuart Glenn.

2. Mr. Pattarozzi alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1804 and 33-1805. His specific claim was that the HOA’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was failing to hold open meetings as required by section 33-1804.

3. The HOA’s position was that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to all members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.” The statute only mandates that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open.

4. The ARC consists of five members and does not meet on a set schedule, instead considering applications as they are received. The Board president, Mr. Glenn, receives applications, determines if they meet “rubber-stamp” criteria, and if not, forwards them to the other four members for their agreement or disagreement.

5. The “rubber stamp” process was a pre-approved method for approving requests for solar panels and repainting using preapproved colors without further review. Of the twelve applications received by the ARC in 2019, eight were subject to this rubber-stamp approval.

6. Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the Respondent could schedule ARC meetings on a weekly basis. If there were no applications pending for a given week, the HOA could simply cancel the meeting.

7. The judge accepted Mr. Pattarozzi’s second definition of “regular,” which was “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” The judge concluded this meant only committee meetings scheduled on a recurring basis at uniform intervals must be open.

8. The argument was rejected because the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) explicitly references only the “meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors.” Because committee meetings were not mentioned in that specific subsection, the judge ruled that its strong policy in favor of open meetings did not apply to them.

9. The Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is a “preponderance of the evidence.”

10. The final Order was that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition be dismissed. This Order was issued on June 5, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804. Discuss how the judge used principles of statutory interpretation, such as giving meaning to every word and considering legislative intent, to differentiate between board meetings and committee meetings.

2. Evaluate the strength of Victor L. Pattarozzi’s case. What were his key arguments, including his use of dictionary definitions and the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F), and why did the judge ultimately find them unconvincing?

3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain how this standard of proof applied to Mr. Pattarozzi’s petition and why he failed to meet it.

4. Examine the operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC). How did the “rubber stamp” process and the ad-hoc nature of their meetings support the Respondent’s position that the meetings were not “regularly scheduled”?

5. Based on the judge’s reasoning, what specific changes would the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association’s Architectural Committee need to make for its meetings to be considered “regularly scheduled” and therefore required to be open to all members under Arizona law?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge

An official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions and orders.

Architectural Review Committee (ARC)

A committee of the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, consisting of five members, responsible for reviewing and approving member applications for things like solar panels and house painting.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. In this case, § R2-19-119 established the standard of proof.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Arizona Revised Statutes, the laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. Sections 33-1804 and 33-1805 were the statutes central to this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency with legal authority over this matter, which issued the initial Notice of Hearing.

Dismissed

The legal term for the final Order in this case, meaning the Petitioner’s petition was rejected and no action was taken against the Respondent.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The venue where the hearing for this case was held on May 16, 2019.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another. In this case, Victor L. Pattarozzi.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an action is brought. In this case, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association.

Statutory Interpretation

The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The decision outlines several principles, such as giving words their ordinary meanings and ensuring no part of a statute is redundant.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919047-REL


Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.

The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1919047-REL

Petitioner

Victor L. Pattarozzi

Respondent

Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

May 16, 2019

Decision Date

June 5, 2019

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).

Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”

Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”

The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.

Governing Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) states:

“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”

The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.

Competing Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):

◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.

◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:

Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.

Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.

◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.

Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):

◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.

Findings of Fact

The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.

Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.

“Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.

Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.

Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.

Legal Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.

Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”

The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.

The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.

The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.

Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument

The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:

“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”

The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Final Order

Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.

Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.

Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Victor L Pattarozzi (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Andrew Apodaca (attorney)
    Goering, Roberts, Rubin, Brogna, Enos & Treadwell-Rubin, P.C.
    Attorney for Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
  • Stuart Glenn (board member)
    Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
    Board president who presented testimony for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal
  • Felicia Del Sol (Administrative Staff)
    Listed in the final section of the document

Victor L Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919047-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-06-05
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Victor L Pattarozzi Counsel
Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association Counsel Andrew Apodaca, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Architectural Committee meetings of the HOA were not 'regularly scheduled' within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, and therefore the HOA was not required to hold them open to association members.

Why this result: The petitioner failed to prove that the committee meetings met the requirement of being 'regularly scheduled' because the committee did not meet at fixed or uniform intervals, but rather considered applications as they were received.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Architectural Committee meetings are 'regularly scheduled' and thus required to be open to members.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated ARS 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings of its Architectural Committee (ARC). The ALJ found that because the ARC did not meet on a set schedule or at uniform intervals, it did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings as required by the statute, and thus was not required to be open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Architectural Review Committee, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919047-REL Decision – 713039.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:01 (89.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919047-REL


Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.

The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1919047-REL

Petitioner

Victor L. Pattarozzi

Respondent

Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

May 16, 2019

Decision Date

June 5, 2019

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).

Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”

Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”

The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.

Governing Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) states:

“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”

The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.

Competing Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):

◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.

◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:

Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.

Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.

◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.

Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):

◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.

Findings of Fact

The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.

Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.

“Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.

Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.

Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.

Legal Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.

Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”

The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.

The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.

The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.

Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument

The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:

“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”

The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Final Order

Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.

Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.

Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919047-REL


Study Guide: Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919047-REL, concerning a dispute between Victor L. Pattarozzi and the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association. The guide includes a quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific violation did Petitioner Victor L. Pattarozzi allege against the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association?

3. What was the central argument made by the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association to defend its Architectural Review Committee’s meeting practices?

4. Describe the composition of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) and its method for reviewing applications.

5. What was the “rubber stamp” process used by the ARC, and how many of the 12 applications received in 2019 were approved this way?

6. What suggestion did Mr. Pattarozzi offer for how the ARC could schedule its meetings to comply with his interpretation of the statute?

7. Which of Mr. Pattarozzi’s proposed definitions for the word “regular” did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately accept as the most appropriate interpretation in this context?

8. According to the judge’s Conclusions of Law, why was Mr. Pattarozzi’s argument regarding the open meetings policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) rejected?

9. Who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?

10. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case, and on what date was it issued?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Pattarozzi appeared on his own behalf, while the HOA was represented by Andrew Apodaca, Esq. and its Board president, Stuart Glenn.

2. Mr. Pattarozzi alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1804 and 33-1805. His specific claim was that the HOA’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was failing to hold open meetings as required by section 33-1804.

3. The HOA’s position was that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to all members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.” The statute only mandates that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open.

4. The ARC consists of five members and does not meet on a set schedule, instead considering applications as they are received. The Board president, Mr. Glenn, receives applications, determines if they meet “rubber-stamp” criteria, and if not, forwards them to the other four members for their agreement or disagreement.

5. The “rubber stamp” process was a pre-approved method for approving requests for solar panels and repainting using preapproved colors without further review. Of the twelve applications received by the ARC in 2019, eight were subject to this rubber-stamp approval.

6. Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the Respondent could schedule ARC meetings on a weekly basis. If there were no applications pending for a given week, the HOA could simply cancel the meeting.

7. The judge accepted Mr. Pattarozzi’s second definition of “regular,” which was “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” The judge concluded this meant only committee meetings scheduled on a recurring basis at uniform intervals must be open.

8. The argument was rejected because the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) explicitly references only the “meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors.” Because committee meetings were not mentioned in that specific subsection, the judge ruled that its strong policy in favor of open meetings did not apply to them.

9. The Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is a “preponderance of the evidence.”

10. The final Order was that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition be dismissed. This Order was issued on June 5, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804. Discuss how the judge used principles of statutory interpretation, such as giving meaning to every word and considering legislative intent, to differentiate between board meetings and committee meetings.

2. Evaluate the strength of Victor L. Pattarozzi’s case. What were his key arguments, including his use of dictionary definitions and the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F), and why did the judge ultimately find them unconvincing?

3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain how this standard of proof applied to Mr. Pattarozzi’s petition and why he failed to meet it.

4. Examine the operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC). How did the “rubber stamp” process and the ad-hoc nature of their meetings support the Respondent’s position that the meetings were not “regularly scheduled”?

5. Based on the judge’s reasoning, what specific changes would the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association’s Architectural Committee need to make for its meetings to be considered “regularly scheduled” and therefore required to be open to all members under Arizona law?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge

An official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions and orders.

Architectural Review Committee (ARC)

A committee of the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, consisting of five members, responsible for reviewing and approving member applications for things like solar panels and house painting.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. In this case, § R2-19-119 established the standard of proof.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Arizona Revised Statutes, the laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. Sections 33-1804 and 33-1805 were the statutes central to this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency with legal authority over this matter, which issued the initial Notice of Hearing.

Dismissed

The legal term for the final Order in this case, meaning the Petitioner’s petition was rejected and no action was taken against the Respondent.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The venue where the hearing for this case was held on May 16, 2019.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another. In this case, Victor L. Pattarozzi.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an action is brought. In this case, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association.

Statutory Interpretation

The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The decision outlines several principles, such as giving words their ordinary meanings and ensuring no part of a statute is redundant.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919047-REL


Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.

The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1919047-REL

Petitioner

Victor L. Pattarozzi

Respondent

Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

May 16, 2019

Decision Date

June 5, 2019

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).

Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”

Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”

The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.

Governing Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) states:

“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”

The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.

Competing Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):

◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.

◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:

Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.

Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.

◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.

Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):

◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.

Findings of Fact

The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.

Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.

“Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.

Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.

Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.

Legal Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.

Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”

The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.

The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.

The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.

Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument

The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:

“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”

The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Final Order

Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.

Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.

Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Victor L Pattarozzi (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Andrew Apodaca (attorney)
    Goering, Roberts, Rubin, Brogna, Enos & Treadwell-Rubin, P.C.
    Attorney for Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
  • Stuart Glenn (board member)
    Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
    Board president who presented testimony for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal
  • Felicia Del Sol (Administrative Staff)
    Listed in the final section of the document

David & Brenda Norman vs. Rancho Del Lago Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919051-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-28
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner David and Brenda Norman Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Lago Community Association Counsel Ashley N. Moscarello

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.11(D)(1) / Common Project Guidelines § 3.11(D)(1)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition filed by David and Brenda Norman against Rancho Del Lago Community Association, finding that the Department of Real Estate did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute, as it was essentially a conflict between neighboring owners (Petitioners and Hendersons) regarding a wall.

Why this result: The Department lacked jurisdiction over the dispute among or between owners, per A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation by HOA approving a block wall built by neighbors (Hendersons)

Petitioners alleged that Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs § 3.11(D)(1) by approving a block wall built by their next-door neighbors, the Hendersons, and requested the Department require the Hendersons to permit Petitioners to connect to the wall or require the Hendersons to tear the wall down.

Orders: The petition was dismissed because the Department lacked jurisdiction to hear a dispute primarily among or between owners to which the association is not a party, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Jurisdiction, HOA Governance, Architectural Review Committee (ARC), Party Wall, Neighbor Dispute, CC&Rs
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

David & Brenda Norman vs. Rancho Del Lago Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919051-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-28
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner David and Brenda Norman Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Lago Community Association Counsel Ashley N. Moscarello

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.11(D)(1) / Common Project Guidelines § 3.11(D)(1)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition filed by David and Brenda Norman against Rancho Del Lago Community Association, finding that the Department of Real Estate did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute, as it was essentially a conflict between neighboring owners (Petitioners and Hendersons) regarding a wall.

Why this result: The Department lacked jurisdiction over the dispute among or between owners, per A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation by HOA approving a block wall built by neighbors (Hendersons)

Petitioners alleged that Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs § 3.11(D)(1) by approving a block wall built by their next-door neighbors, the Hendersons, and requested the Department require the Hendersons to permit Petitioners to connect to the wall or require the Hendersons to tear the wall down.

Orders: The petition was dismissed because the Department lacked jurisdiction to hear a dispute primarily among or between owners to which the association is not a party, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Jurisdiction, HOA Governance, Architectural Review Committee (ARC), Party Wall, Neighbor Dispute, CC&Rs
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09