Category Archives: HOA Cases

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Lanye C. and Devin E. Willey

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Lanye C. and Devin E. Wilkey

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706518.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:45 (36.5 KB)

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706560.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:49 (108.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919044-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Wilkey

Executive Summary

This document details the findings and decision of an administrative law judge in the case of Pointe Tapatio Community Association versus residents Layne C. and Devin E. Wilkey. The core issue was the operation of a payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, from the Wilkeys’ residential unit. The Association alleged this violated community CC&Rs, which prohibit non-residential uses that create traffic or parking. The Wilkeys admitted that two employees commuted to the unit daily but argued they had received permission from a former property manager.

The judge found in favor of the Association, concluding that the daily commute of two employees constituted the creation of “traffic and parking,” a direct and unambiguous violation of the CC&Rs. The judge deemed the residents’ claims of verbal permission to be unsubstantiated and irrelevant, as the covenant’s language was clear. Consequently, the judge ordered the Wilkeys to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days and imposed a civil penalty of $500.

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Case Overview

Case Name

Pointe Tapatio Community Association, Petitioner, vs. Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1919044-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona Department of Real Estate)

Hearing Date

April 26, 2019

Decision Date

May 7, 2019

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Petitioner’s Counsel

Lauren Vie, Esq.

Respondent’s Counsel

Joseph Velez, Esq.

——————————————————————————–

Central Allegation and Governing Covenant

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) alleged that Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondents) violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by using their residential unit as an office for their business.

The specific provision at issue is Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs, which states:

“Residential. Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

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Key Findings of Fact

The Business Operation

• Respondents: Layne C. Wilkey (mother) and Devin E. Wilkey (son) are co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50).

• Company: They own and operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from this unit. The business also operates from a second, commercial site in Tempe.

• History: The business was moved into the residential unit from a commercial location in late 2009.

• Public Presence: Devau’s website and Google Maps both list the 720 E. North Lane address as an office location, with stated office hours from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The website notes it is a “mailing address only.”

• Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.

Employee Activity and Impact

• The Wilkeys acknowledged that two Devau employees commute to the unit to work.

• One employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday.

• A second employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.

• These employees at times park their vehicles on the community’s streets.

• The business does not have clients or customers who visit the unit.

The Dispute Over Permission

• Respondents’ Claim: The Wilkeys asserted they had permission to operate the business from Howard Flisser, a former property manager. They admitted they had no written confirmation and had never spoken to Mr. Flisser directly about it.

◦ Ms. Wilkey testified that in 2009, she asked her husband, who asked a salesperson, who then allegedly asked Mr. Flisser and relayed that it was permissible.

◦ Mr. Wilkey testified that his now-deceased father would not have taken the risk of moving the business without permission.

• Petitioner’s Rebuttal: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that Mr. Flisser stated a few days before the hearing that he could not recall giving permission and, on two occasions during the conversation, volunteered that he had never given permission.

• Authority: Ms. Duistermars also testified that Mr. Flisser lacked the authority to grant such permission; only the Board of Directors could do so.

Association’s Stance and Actions

• Notification: Through a letter dated August 8, 2018, the Association informed the Wilkeys of the violation and required compliance by August 31, 2018.

• Petition: The Association filed the petition that initiated the hearing on or about January 17, 2019.

• Other Businesses: The Association permits certain home-based businesses that do not generate traffic or parking, such as telecommuting and online teaching, without requiring Board permission.

• Complaints: Ms. Duistermars acknowledged she was unaware of any specific complaints regarding traffic, parking, or noise from the Wilkeys’ unit. However, she testified that the Board was first made aware of the business operation when another resident brought the issue to its attention.

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Legal Analysis and Conclusions

• Standard of Proof: The judge determined all issues based on a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force.

• CC&Rs as Contract: The CC&Rs are a legally binding contract between the Association and the residents.

• Unambiguous Language: The judge found the language in CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1 to be clear and unambiguous. Such covenants must be enforced to give effect to the parties’ original intent.

• Direct Violation: The judge concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly showed the Wilkeys were operating a business from their unit. The admission that two employees drive to the unit and park on the street proves that the business creates both traffic and parking.

• Violation Trigger: The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to constitute a violation. The CC&R does not require that the traffic or parking cause a secondary violation or generate resident complaints. Therefore, the lack of other complaints was deemed to have little probative value.

• Final Conclusion: Based on the facts, the Wilkeys are in clear violation of CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1.

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Final Order and Penalties

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders:

1. Compliance Order: Respondent Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey must cease all business operations at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50) within thirty-five (35) days of the Order’s effective date.

2. Civil Penalty: The Respondents must pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty (60) days of the Order’s effective date. Payment must be made by cashier’s check or money order.

3. Filing Fee: The Petitioner’s request for a refund of its filing fee was denied, as the judge found no legal authority to grant it.

The Order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919044-REL


Study Guide:Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey

This guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey, Case No. 19F-H1919044-REL, heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It details the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the legal standards applied, and the final judgment.

Case Summary

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) filed a complaint against homeowners Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondent), alleging that they were violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by operating a business, Devau Human Resources, from their residential unit. The Association argued that the business, which employed two individuals who commuted to the property, generated traffic and parking, explicitly prohibited by the CC&Rs for non-residential activities. The Wilkeys contended they had received verbal permission years prior and that the business was not disruptive. The Administrative Law Judge found in favor of the Association, ruling that the Wilkeys were in clear violation of the community’s governing documents.

Key Parties & Entities

Name / Entity

Key Actions & Involvement

Pointe Tapatio Community Association

Petitioner

The homeowners’ association that filed the petition alleging a CC&R violation. Represented by Lauren Vie, Esq.

Layne C. Wilkey & Devin E. Wilkey

Respondent

Mother and son, co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1. Operators of Devau Human Resources. Represented by Joseph Velez, Esq.

Thomas Shedden

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Presided over the hearing, made findings of fact, drew conclusions of law, and issued the final order.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Regulatory Body

Issued the initial Notice of Hearing and has legal authority over such disputes under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Paula Duistermars

Board Member, Pointe Tapatio

Testified on behalf of the Association, detailing the Board’s position and interactions regarding the violation.

Howard Flisser

Property Manager (Former or Current)

Named by the Wilkeys as the source of verbal permission to operate their business; Flisser denied recalling this.

Devau Human Resources

Business Entity

A payroll processing company owned by the Wilkeys, operating out of the residential unit and a commercial site in Tempe.

Office of Administrative Hearings

Adjudicative Body

The venue for the hearing, located at 1740 West Adams Street, Lower Level, in Phoenix, Arizona.

Case Timeline

• Late 2009: The Wilkeys move their business, Devau Human Resources, from a commercial location into their unit at Pointe Tapatio.

• August 8, 2018: Pointe Tapatio sends a letter informing the Wilkeys they are out of compliance with the CC&Rs and must comply by August 31, 2018.

• January 17, 2019 (approx.): Pointe Tapatio files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• February 28, 2019: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Hearing.

• April 26, 2019: The administrative hearing is held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

• May 7, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issues the final decision and order.

Central Conflict: CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1

The core of the dispute revolved around the interpretation and enforcement of a specific restrictive covenant within the community’s governing documents.

• The Allegation: Pointe Tapatio alleged that the Wilkeys were using their unit as an office for a “gainful occupation,” which is not a “first class residential use.”

• The Specific Provision: Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs states:

• The Triggering Condition: The prohibition is not absolute. It applies specifically to non-residential uses that create traffic or parking.

Arguments and Evidence

Arguments & Evidence Presented

Petitioner (Pointe Tapatio)

  • Employee Activity: The Wilkeys acknowledged two employees drive to the unit to work Monday through Friday, creating traffic and parking on community streets.
  • Public Information: Devau’s website and Google Maps listed the residential unit as an office address with set business hours (9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.).
  • Owner Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.
  • Lack of Authority: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that property manager Howard Flisser did not have the authority to grant permission for a business; only the Board could. She also testified that Flisser could not recall giving permission and had volunteered that he never did.

Respondent (The Wilkeys)

  • Verbal Permission: The Wilkeys claimed they received verbal permission from property manager Howard Flisser in 2009. They admitted they never spoke to him directly and had nothing in writing.
  • Implied Permission: Mr. Wilkey argued his father would not have taken the risk of moving the payroll business without permission, implying it must have been granted.
  • No Direct Complaints: It was acknowledged that the Association was not aware of specific complaints filed against the Wilkeys for traffic, parking, or noise issues.
  • Residential Use: Mr. Wilkey testified that he considers the unit one of his two primary residences, though he did not provide a responsive answer when asked how often he stayed there.

The Judge’s Decision & Legal Reasoning

ALJ Thomas Shedden concluded that the Wilkeys were in violation of the CC&Rs based on a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• The Wilkeys operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from the unit.

• Two employees commute to the unit for work and sometimes park on community streets.

• The business is publicly listed at the residential address.

• The Wilkeys’ claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser was not substantiated. Testimony from Paula Duistermars indicated Flisser could not recall, and in fact denied, giving such permission.

• The Association does permit some home businesses (e.g., telecommuting, online teaching) that do not create traffic or parking and do not require Board permission.

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowners and the Association.

2. Unambiguous Language: The language in Article 3, section 3.1 is clear and unambiguous. It prohibits businesses that create traffic or parking.

3. Violation Proven: The evidence clearly showed the Wilkeys’ business created both traffic and parking due to its two commuting employees. This is a direct violation of the unambiguous terms of the CC&R.

4. No Other Violation Needed: The fact that no other rules (e.g., specific parking ordinances) were broken is irrelevant. The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to trigger the violation as written.

1. Cease Operations: The Wilkeys were ordered to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1 by ceasing business operations at the unit within 35 days.

2. Civil Penalty: The Wilkeys were ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

3. Filing Fee Request Denied: The Association’s request to have its filing fee refunded was denied because it cited no legal authority showing the judge had the power to grant it.

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Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information in the case file.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondents in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific activity led the petitioner to claim the respondents were violating the CC&Rs?

3. According to Article 3, section 3.1, what condition makes a non-residential use of a property a violation?

4. What was the respondents’ primary defense for operating their business from the unit?

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find the respondents’ primary defense unconvincing?

6. What two specific pieces of evidence demonstrated that the business created traffic and parking?

7. What is the legal standard of proof required in this type of administrative hearing, and what does it mean?

8. What two penalties were imposed on the Wilkeys in the final order?

9. Does the Pointe Tapatio Community Association prohibit all home-based businesses? Explain.

10. Who was Howard Flisser, and what was his significance to the respondents’ case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was the Pointe Tapatio Community Association. The respondents were Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, who were homeowners within the community and co-owners of the unit in question.

2. The Wilkeys were operating their payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, out of their residential unit. This included having two employees commute to the property to work during business hours.

3. A non-residential use becomes a violation if it “creates traffic [or] parking.” The rule does not require a certain amount of traffic or parking, only that it is created by the business activity.

4. The respondents’ primary defense was that they had received verbal permission to operate the business from the community’s property manager, Howard Flisser, back in 2009.

5. The judge found the defense unconvincing because the Wilkeys had no written proof, had not spoken to Mr. Flisser directly, and testimony from a board member indicated Mr. Flisser could not recall—and later denied—ever giving such permission. Furthermore, the property manager likely lacked the authority to grant it.

6. The evidence was the Wilkeys’ own acknowledgement that two of their employees drive to the unit to work on a weekly basis. This commuting by non-resident employees necessarily creates traffic and, at times, requires them to park on community streets.

7. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” This means the greater weight of the evidence must be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other, even if it does not remove all reasonable doubt.

8. The Wilkeys were ordered to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days. They were also ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

9. No, the association does not prohibit all home-based businesses. It allows for activities like telecommuting and teaching online classes, which do not require board permission because they do not create traffic or parking.

10. Howard Flisser was the property manager whom the Wilkeys claimed gave them verbal permission to run their business. His significance was central to their defense, but his alleged permission was unsubstantiated and contradicted by later testimony.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. How did the evidence presented by Pointe Tapatio meet this standard, while the Wilkeys’ evidence did not?

2. Discuss the legal principle that CC&Rs are treated as contracts. Explain how Judge Shedden applied contract law principles, particularly regarding “unambiguous” language, to reach his conclusion.

3. Evaluate the Wilkeys’ defense strategy, focusing on their claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser. Why was this argument legally insufficient? What kind of evidence would have been necessary to make it successful?

4. Examine the distinction the Pointe Tapatio Community Association makes between permissible home-based businesses (like telecommuting) and impermissible ones (like Devau Human Resources). What is the key factor in this distinction according to the CC&Rs, and how does it relate to the core purpose of residential covenants?

5. Based on the judge’s order, discuss the remedies available to a homeowner’s association in Arizona when a CC&R violation is proven. What penalties were imposed, and what penalty was requested but denied?

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Glossary of Key Terms

• Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): A judge and trier of fact who presides over administrative hearings, such as disputes handled by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ renders decisions, called orders, based on evidence and legal arguments.

• CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions): The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or subdivision. In this case, they are treated as a legally binding contract between the association and the homeowners.

• Civil Penalty: A monetary fine levied by a government agency or administrative court for a violation of a statute or rule. In this case, a $500 penalty was imposed on the Wilkeys for violating the community documents.

• Conclusions of Law: The section of a judicial decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a judgment.

• Findings of Fact: The section of a judicial decision that formally lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.

• Order: The final ruling or judgment issued by an Administrative Law Judge that directs the parties on what actions they must take.

• Petitioner: The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the Pointe Tapatio Community Association.

• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases. It requires the trier of fact to believe that it is more likely than not that a claim is true, based on the evidence presented.

• Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919044-REL


4 Surprising Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit That Shut Down a 10-Year-Old Home Business

Introduction: The Rise of the Home Office and the Rules You Didn’t Know Existed

In an age where the line between the living room and the corner office has all but vanished, millions of us have embraced working from home. But as we settle into our home-based routines, a critical question often goes unasked: Are you truly familiar with your homeowner’s association (HOA) rules regarding home-based businesses?

For the Wilkey family, owners of Devau Human Resources, the answer to that question proved to be a costly one. After operating their payroll processing company from their home for nearly a decade without a single complaint, they found themselves in a legal battle that ultimately shut them down. Their case serves as a powerful cautionary tale about what can happen when long-standing home businesses collide with the fine print of HOA rules.

1. It’s Not About Complaints, It’s About the Contract

One of the most chilling lessons from the Wilkey case is that the HOA’s action wasn’t triggered by angry neighbors complaining about noise or traffic. In fact, Board member Paula Duistermars testified that she was unaware of any such complaints. The issue arose simply because “a resident brought the issue to [the Board’s] attention.”

This reveals a crucial legal reality: your business’s existence, not its impact, can be the sole trigger for enforcement. It doesn’t take a chorus of angry neighbors—just one person notifying the Board of a potential rule violation is enough. The Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) are a legally binding contract, and the court’s decision was not based on whether the business was a nuisance, but simply whether it complied with the contract’s terms. Your takeaway: You must operate as if the rulebook will be enforced literally, because it can be.

2. The Deciding Factor: A Single Clause About “Traffic and Parking”

The entire legal dispute hinged on the precise wording of one specific rule. The HOA wasn’t enforcing a vague, blanket ban on all home businesses; its power came from a single, carefully worded clause in the CC&Rs.

The relevant section, Article 3, section 3.1, stated:

“Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

As a legal analyst, I can tell you why this clause was so powerful: its focus on a tangible impact (“creates traffic [or] parking”) made it highly defensible. A blanket prohibition on “all businesses” might be open to challenge, but this specific, impact-based rule was nearly impossible to argue against once the facts were established. The Wilkeys’ business was found in violation specifically because it created traffic and parking, which is also why the HOA permitted other home businesses, like telecommuting, that did not.

3. Your Two-Person TeamIsa Traffic Problem

Many homeowners assume that business traffic rules are meant to prevent a steady stream of clients visiting a residential property. The Wilkeys had no clients come to their unit. However, this did not protect them.

The undisputed fact that proved decisive was that two of the company’s employees commuted to the home to work—one from Monday to Thursday and the other from Monday to Friday. The judge concluded that this daily employee commute constituted the creation of “traffic and parking” as prohibited by the CC&Rs. The employees at times parking on the community’s common streets provided concrete, undeniable evidence of this. This case sets a precedent that a micro-business with just one or two employees commuting to the home can be deemed in violation—a scenario many entrepreneurs wouldn’t even consider a “traffic” issue.

4. “He Said We Could” Is Not a Legal Defense

The Wilkeys asserted that they had received verbal permission to operate their business from the property manager back in 2009. This defense completely fell apart under legal scrutiny.

Courts prioritize written agreements and official board actions over “he said/she said” accounts, especially when they involve multi-level hearsay (in this case, a husband asking a salesperson who asked the manager). The defense failed for several clear reasons: the Wilkeys had no written proof, the manager denied recalling or ever giving such permission, and most importantly, a Board member testified that the manager lacked the authority to grant this permission anyway. Only the Board could.

The takeaway is unambiguous: Never rely on verbal assurances. Get all permissions from your HOA Board in writing, or they do not legally exist.

Conclusion: Know Your Rules Before You Unpack Your Desk

The story of the Wilkey family is a stark reminder that HOA documents are not mere suggestions; they are legally binding contracts where every word matters. The Wilkeys’ experience is a costly lesson for every home-based professional. Proactive compliance is your only true protection. The final outcome was an order for them to cease all business operations from their home within 35 days and pay a $500 civil penalty.

You might have been working from home for years without a problem, but have you ever read the fine print on what your community actually allows?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lauren Vie (HOA attorney)
    Attorney for Petitioner
  • Paula Duistermars (board member)
    Pointe Tapatio Community Association
    Presented testimony for Petitioner
  • Beth Mulchay (HOA attorney)
    Mulchay Law Firm, P.C.
    Listed on transmission list

Respondent Side

  • Layne C. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Devin E. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Joseph A Velez (respondent attorney)
    For Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Howard Flisser (property manager)
    Statements regarding alleged business permission were discussed
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)

Patricia Wiercinski v. Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918028-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-01
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Patricia Wiercinski Counsel —
Respondent Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. Counsel Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied and dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The documents requested (an email string among Board members) were informal communications and were not considered official records of the association because the Board never took formal action on the incident.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Board created or possessed any official documents related to the incident that they failed to produce, as the emails were deemed private, informal communications rather than official records.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to produce association records (un-redacted email string)

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce official documents, specifically an un-redacted email string among Board members concerning an incident where Petitioner's husband allegedly harassed potential property buyers.

Orders: Petition dismissed because the documents sought (un-redacted emails) were informal communications, not official records of the association required to be produced under A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: homeowner records request, association records, informal communications, board quorum, records disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918028-REL-RHG Decision – 705044.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:46 (136.8 KB)

19F-H1918028-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918028-REL/684134.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:50:03 (149.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG


Briefing: Wiercincthe ki v. Long Meadow Ranch East POA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Patricia Wiercinski (“Petitioner”) and the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The core of the dispute was the Petitioner’s demand for association records related to a June 19, 2017, incident where her husband, Wayne Coates, allegedly accosted and verbally abused potential buyers of a neighboring property, causing the sale to fail.

The Petitioner filed a claim alleging the Respondent violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce documents related to the Board of Directors’ handling of the incident. The case evolved through two distinct phases:

1. Initial Hearing (January 2019): The Petitioner argued that because a quorum of the Board discussed the incident via email, they were required to create official records (e.g., minutes of a formal decision), which were not produced. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied this petition, ruling that informal email discussions among volunteer board members do not constitute “official Board business” requiring formal action or record-keeping.

2. Rehearing (April 2019): After being granted a rehearing, the Petitioner changed her legal theory. She argued that the email chain itself constituted an official association record and demanded that the Respondent produce a fully un-redacted version. The Respondent maintained the emails were private communications provided as a courtesy and that names were redacted due to Mr. Coates’ documented history of “bullying and intimidating people.”

Conclusion: The ALJ dismissed the petition again, affirming the initial ruling. The Judge concluded that the email chain was not an official “record of the association.” Consequently, the Respondent was under no statutory obligation to produce it, let alone provide an un-redacted copy. The Judge found the Respondent’s decision to redact names was “not unreasonable” given the circumstances.

Case Background and Procedural History

The Parties

Name/Entity

Patricia Wiercinski

Petitioner; homeowner and member of the Respondent association.

Wayne Coates

Petitioner’s husband; central figure in the alleged incident.

Long Meadow Ranch East POA, Inc.

Respondent; the Homeowners’ Association (HOA) for the development.

Michael “Mike” Olson

President of the Respondent’s Board of Directors.

Gregg Arthur

Director on the Respondent’s Board; also a realtor.

Joe Zielinski

Director on the Respondent’s Board.

Kathy Andrews

Community Manager for the Respondent, employed by Hoamco.

John Allen

An HOA member who was attempting to sell his lot in June 2017.

Diane Mihalsky

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Office of Administrative Hearings.

Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq.

Counsel for the Respondent, Goodman Law Group.

The Precipitating Incident (June 19, 2017)

On or about June 19, 2017, potential buyers, along with their builder, architect, and son, were visiting a lot for sale on Puntenney Rd. owned by John Allen. The lot was located across the street from the residence of Patricia Wiercinski and Wayne Coates. An incident occurred where Mr. Coates allegedly emerged from his home and confronted the visitors. According to emails later provided, Mr. Coates was “belligerent and cursing,” “verbally abusive,” and exhibited “extreme aggressive behavior,” telling the party that nothing was for sale and they needed to leave immediately. The potential buyers subsequently withdrew their interest in the lot, explicitly citing the confrontation.

Legal Proceedings

• October 18, 2018: Petitioner files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce records of its deliberations and actions regarding the June 2017 incident.

• January 10, 2019: An evidentiary hearing is held before ALJ Diane Mihalsky.

• January 22, 2019: The ALJ issues a decision denying the petition.

• Post-January 2019: Petitioner requests a rehearing, alleging misconduct by the judge. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate grants the request.

• April 22, 2019: A rehearing is conducted.

• May 1, 2019: The ALJ issues a final decision, again dismissing the petition.

The Central Evidence: The Email Communications

The primary evidence in the case was an email chain from June 2017 that the Respondent voluntarily produced to the Petitioner, with the names of non-members (the potential buyers and their real estate agent) redacted. The communications reveal the immediate aftermath and concern surrounding the incident.

Key Excerpts from the Emails

• From a Potential Purchaser (June 19, 2017):

• Formal Account from Potential Purchasers (June 20, 2017):

• From the Real Estate Agent (June 20, 2017):

• From Board Director Gregg Arthur (June 20, 2017):

• From Board Director Joe Zielinski (June 20, 2017):

Analysis of Legal Arguments and Rulings

Petitioner’s Arguments

1. Initial Argument: The Petitioner contended that the email discussion among a quorum of the Board legally constituted an informal meeting to discuss association business. As such, the Board was required to memorialize its decision, even a decision to take no action, in official records like meeting minutes. The failure to produce such records was a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805.

2. Rehearing Argument: Shifting her legal theory, the Petitioner argued that the email chain itself was an “official record of the association.” She claimed a right to an un-redacted copy, stating that she and Mr. Coates “had a right to know who was accusing Mr. Coates of belligerence.”

Respondent’s Defense

• Nature of Communications: The Respondent argued the emails were informal, private communications on personal servers between volunteer board members who are also neighbors. They were not official records kept in the course of association business.

• Lack of Formal Action: The Board never voted, met in an executive or open session, or took any official action regarding the incident. Testimony confirmed that only two of the board members replied to the initial email.

• Absence of Authority: The Respondent’s position was that the incident, while serious, was a personal dispute between neighbors and did not violate the association’s CC&Rs or bylaws. Therefore, the Board had no authority or jurisdiction to take official enforcement action.

• Justification for Redactions: Board President Mike Olson testified that names were redacted because “Mr. Coates had a history of bullying and intimidating people.” This was done to protect the potential buyers and their agent from potential harassment.

Administrative Law Judge’s Determinations

The ALJ’s conclusions were consistent across both decisions, finding decisively in favor of the Respondent.

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioner failed to establish by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805.

• “Official Records” Defined: The ALJ drew a clear distinction between informal discussion and official business. The ruling stated: “…the mere fact that a quorum of Board members may discuss a topic does not make it official Board business, especially if they do not end up taking any action to make a matter board business.”

• No Obligation to Create Records: The Judge found no statute requiring an HOA board to create a formal written record about topics they discuss informally but ultimately take no action on, calling such a requirement an “unnecessary and burdensome requirement on volunteers.”

• Ruling on Redacted Emails: In the rehearing decision, the ALJ concluded that because the email string was not an official record, the statute did not require the Respondent to provide it at all. Therefore, the Respondent was not obligated to provide an un-redacted version. The judge also noted the reason for the redaction “does not appear unreasonable.”

• Final Order: Both petitions were denied and dismissed.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Wiercinski v. Long Meadow Ranch East POA

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Petitioner Patricia Wiercinski and Respondent Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. It includes a quiz with an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms, all based on the provided Administrative Law Judge Decisions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the provided case documents.

1. Who are the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what are their roles?

2. What specific event on June 19, 2017, initiated the conflict that led to this case?

3. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner in her original petition filed on October 18, 2018?

4. Why did the Respondent’s Board President, Mike Olson, state that the names in the email string were redacted?

5. In the initial hearing, what did the Petitioner argue the Board was required to do after discussing the incident, even if it chose not to act?

6. What was the legal conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge following the first hearing on January 10, 2019?

7. On what grounds did the Petitioner request and receive a rehearing of the case?

8. How did the Petitioner’s primary legal argument change between the first hearing and the rehearing?

9. According to the testimony of community manager Kathy Andrews, what types of documents are considered official records of the Association?

10. What was the final determination regarding the status of the email string and the Respondent’s obligation to produce an un-redacted version?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Patricia Wiercinski (“Petitioner”) and the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The Petitioner is a homeowner and member of the Respondent association who filed a complaint alleging the association violated state law. The Respondent is the homeowners’ association defending against the petition.

2. The initiating event was an incident where the Petitioner’s husband, Wayne Coates, allegedly acted belligerent, cursed at, and was verbally abusive to a potential buyer, their family, and their architect who were viewing a property for sale across the street from the Petitioner’s home. The potential buyers were so disturbed by the encounter that they decided to remove the lot from their list of considerations.

3. The Petitioner’s core allegation was that the Respondent had violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce official documents related to the Board’s deliberations, decisions, and actions concerning the June 19, 2017 incident involving her husband.

4. Mike Olson testified that the names of the potential purchasers and their real estate agent were redacted from the email string because Mr. Coates has a documented history of bullying, intimidating, and threatening people. The redaction was done to protect these individuals from potential harassment.

5. In the initial hearing, the Petitioner argued that if the Board decided not to take action against her husband over the incident, it was required to make a formal motion and arrive at a formal, written decision to that effect. She claimed she never received such a document or evidence that the Board addressed it in an official meeting.

6. Following the first hearing, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the petition be denied. The judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that any official documents regarding the incident existed that the Respondent had failed to produce, as the email discussions were informal and did not constitute official Board business.

7. The Petitioner requested a rehearing by alleging misconduct on the part of the Administrative Law Judge. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted the request, though the decision noted the Commissioner did not specify what the misconduct was or how it should have changed the outcome.

8. In the rehearing, the Petitioner changed her argument from claiming the Board failed to produce a formal decision to arguing that the email string itself constituted an official record of the Association’s business. Consequently, she contended that A.R.S. § 33-1805 required the Respondent to produce a fully un-redacted copy of it.

9. Kathy Andrews testified that official records include matters of record regarding the Association’s business, such as governing documents, architectural guidelines, Board and general meeting minutes, and anything submitted to the Board for action. Because the Board took no action on the June 19, 2017 incident, the email was not included in the Association’s archived records.

10. The final determination was that the email string was not an official record of the association but rather an informal communication. Therefore, A.R.S. § 33-1805 did not require the Respondent to provide an un-redacted version, and the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the legal distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between informal discussions among board members and official association business. How was A.R.S. § 33-1805 applied in this context, and what precedent might this set for volunteer HOA board members?

2. Discuss the evolution of Patricia Wiercinski’s legal argument from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each argument and explain why the second argument was also ultimately unsuccessful.

3. Examine the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it applies to this case. Explain what the Petitioner was required to prove and detail the specific evidence (or lack thereof) that led the judge to conclude she had not met this burden in either hearing.

4. The Respondent voluntarily provided the redacted email string after the petition was filed. Discuss the strategic implications of this action and how it influenced the proceedings. Furthermore, analyze the justification provided for the redactions and the judge’s assessment of its reasonableness.

5. Based on the testimony from individuals like Mike Olson, Gregg Arthur, and Kathy Andrews, construct a comprehensive narrative of the events and communications following the June 19, 2017 incident from the perspective of the HOA Board. How did their collective testimony undermine the Petitioner’s claim that official records were being withheld or that the emails constituted official business?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding judge, Diane Mihalsky, from the Office of Administrative Hearings who heard the evidence and issued the legal decisions.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

The Arizona Revised Statute cited by the Petitioner, which stipulates that all financial and other records of a homeowners’ association must be made reasonably available for examination by any member.

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)

An Arizona Revised Statute stating that a quorum of a board of directors meeting informally to discuss association business must comply with open meeting and notice provisions, regardless of whether a vote is taken.

Department, The

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and adjudicate petitions from and about homeowners’ associations.

Hoamco

The property management company employed by the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association. Kathy Andrews is an employee of this company.

June 19, 2017 Incident

An altercation where Wayne Coates allegedly engaged in belligerent, cursing, and verbally abusive behavior towards potential property buyers, causing them to lose interest in the property.

Long Meadow Ranch East POA

The Respondent in the case; the homeowners’ association for the Long Meadow Ranch East development in Prescott, Arizona.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

Patricia Wiercinski, a homeowner in Long Meadow Ranch East and a member of the Respondent association who filed the legal petition.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard the Petitioner was required to meet. It is defined as proof that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other, meaning the contention is more probably true than not.

Respondent

The Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc., which was the defendant in the petition filed by Patricia Wiercinski.

Wayne Coates

The husband of the Petitioner, Patricia Wiercinski. His alleged actions during the June 19, 2017 incident are the central subject of the dispute.

An acronym for the Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office, mentioned in an email as a potential agency to file charges for disorderly conduct/harassment.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG


4 Shocking Lessons from One Homeowner’s Lawsuit Against Her HOA

Introduction: The Perils of Neighbor Disputes

Most people who live in a planned community harbor a quiet fear of two things: a “neighbor from hell” and a legal dispute with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA). For one Arizona homeowner, those fears collided in a dramatic fashion. When her husband was involved in an incident with prospective buyers of a neighboring lot, she took her HOA to court to demand records of the board’s discussions. The resulting public legal documents provide a masterclass in community association law, revealing several shocking and counter-intuitive lessons for anyone living under an HOA.

——————————————————————————–

1. Takeaway 1: A “Neighbor from Hell” Can Literally Destroy a Real Estate Deal

The case began with a single incident on June 19, 2017. According to court filings, the homeowner’s husband, Wayne Coates, first confronted the wife and son of a builder viewing a vacant lot across the street. The prospective buyers described Mr. Coates’ behavior as “belligerent and cursing,” telling them that “nothing was for sale around here and they shouldn’t be snooping around.” The wife and son then drove up to inform the builder and architect of the hostile encounter.

The confrontation was so severe that it directly caused the potential buyers to walk away from the deal. They documented their experience in an email that eventually became part of the court record.

In closing when we returned one thing that stands out is would we want to live next to this type of behavior of [a] neighbor? The answer is no, this lot was one that we had in our top 2 Lots as a consideration for purchase but due to the volatile potential of this man, we have decided at this point to remove it from our list.

This case is a rare and powerful illustration of tortious interference with a business relationship in a community association context, providing unambiguous, written proof—from the aggrieved party themselves—that a single resident’s conduct directly caused a quantifiable financial loss to a neighbor.

2. Takeaway 2: Your HOA Board’s Private Emails Aren’t Always “Official Records”

The homeowner, Patricia Wiercinski, filed the lawsuit because she believed an email discussion about the incident among a quorum of the HOA board members constituted official business. Therefore, she argued, those emails were “official records” of the association that she had a legal right to inspect.

In a surprising decision, the court disagreed. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that just because board members informally discuss a topic via email does not automatically make it official HOA business or create an official record. This is especially true if the board never takes any formal action on the matter.

The judge’s reasoning was grounded in the practical realities of volunteer-run corporations. To treat every informal chat as official, recordable business would impose “an unnecessary and burdensome requirement on volunteers who are not compensated for their time who are may be neighbors and who may also be friends, in addition to being Board members.” This ruling reinforces a crucial legal boundary between governance and informal communication. It protects a board’s ability to “think out loud” and explore issues before committing to a formal course of action, an essential function for effective volunteer leadership.

3. Takeaway 3: An HOA’s Power Isn’t Unlimited

After learning that Mr. Coates’ actions had killed a property sale, some board members were immediately and deeply alarmed. They recognized the potential damage to property values for everyone in the community. Board member Gregg Arthur expressed this urgency in an email to his colleagues:

Wayne thru his actions appears to have interfered with and destroyed a property sale. We need to meet and take action on this matter as it will have a broad and chilling effect amongst the realtor community… action needs to be taken and quickly to prevent this from happening again.

Despite this initial alarm, the board ultimately took no formal action against Mr. Coates. Why? Because after reviewing the situation, they determined that the incident was a personal dispute between neighbors. Critically, his conduct did not violate any specific provision of the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), bylaws, or other governing documents.

This decision underscores a vital legal principle: an HOA’s authority is fundamentally contractual, derived solely from the powers granted to it in its governing documents. It is not a governmental body with general police powers. Its authority is strictly limited to enforcing the community’s written rules, not policing all neighborhood conduct.

4. Takeaway 4: A Lawsuit Can Create a Devastating—and Public—Record

The petitioner’s goal was straightforward: to force the HOA to produce an un-redacted copy of the board’s private email chain. The result of her legal action, however, was a textbook example of the “Streisand Effect,” where an attempt to suppress information leads to it being publicized far more widely. In her attempt to access a private record, she created a permanent, public legal record that contained far more damaging information about her husband than the emails she sought.

Because of the lawsuit, the following details about Mr. Coates are now cemented in publicly accessible court documents:

• The full, detailed account from the potential buyers describing his “verbally abusive and extremely confrontational” behavior.

• A statement from a board member, Joe Zielinski, referencing Mr. Coates’ “arrest record and prison term and criminal history.”

• Sworn testimony from the HOA President, Mike Olson, explaining that names were redacted from the original email because Mr. Coates has a “history of bullying and intimidating people.”

The irony is devastating. In her quest to unmask the identities of her husband’s accusers in a private email, the petitioner inadvertently created a permanent, public, and deeply unflattering legal record that now constitutes a matter adjudicated by a court.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: The High Cost of Conflict

This single, unfortunate neighborhood dispute offers powerful lessons for anyone living in a planned community. It clarifies the real-world impact of resident behavior on property rights, sets a clear boundary on what constitutes an “official” HOA record, demonstrates the legal limits of an HOA’s power, and serves as a sobering warning about the unforeseen consequences of litigation. It leaves us with a final, critical question to ponder: When conflict arises in a community, what is the true cost of escalating it, and is the official record you might create worth the price?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Patricia Wiercinski (petitioner)
  • Wayne Coates (petitioner's husband)
    Involved in the June 19, 2017 incident

Respondent Side

  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
  • Michael Olson (board member)
    President of Respondent's board; testified as witness
  • Gregg Arthur (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board; testified as witness
  • Kathy Andrews (property manager)
    HOAMCO
    Community Manager; testified as witness
  • Jim Robertson (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board
  • Joe Zielinski (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board
  • Boris Biloskirka (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board (identified as former in one source)
  • Tom Reid (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Decision transmittal clerk

Other Participants

  • John Allen (HOA member)
    Property owner attempting to sell lot (also spelled Allan)
  • [Redacted Name] (potential purchaser/witness)
    Includes potential buyers, builder, builder's wife, son, and architect involved in the incident
  • [Redacted Name] (real estate agent/witness)
    Real estate agent(s) associated with John Allen's property

Patricia Wiercinski v. Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918028-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-01
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Patricia Wiercinski Counsel —
Respondent Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. Counsel Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied and dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The documents requested (an email string among Board members) were informal communications and were not considered official records of the association because the Board never took formal action on the incident.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Board created or possessed any official documents related to the incident that they failed to produce, as the emails were deemed private, informal communications rather than official records.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to produce association records (un-redacted email string)

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce official documents, specifically an un-redacted email string among Board members concerning an incident where Petitioner's husband allegedly harassed potential property buyers.

Orders: Petition dismissed because the documents sought (un-redacted emails) were informal communications, not official records of the association required to be produced under A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: homeowner records request, association records, informal communications, board quorum, records disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918028-REL-RHG Decision – 705044.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:38 (136.8 KB)

19F-H1918028-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918028-REL/684134.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:40 (149.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG


Briefing: Wiercincthe ki v. Long Meadow Ranch East POA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Patricia Wiercinski (“Petitioner”) and the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The core of the dispute was the Petitioner’s demand for association records related to a June 19, 2017, incident where her husband, Wayne Coates, allegedly accosted and verbally abused potential buyers of a neighboring property, causing the sale to fail.

The Petitioner filed a claim alleging the Respondent violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce documents related to the Board of Directors’ handling of the incident. The case evolved through two distinct phases:

1. Initial Hearing (January 2019): The Petitioner argued that because a quorum of the Board discussed the incident via email, they were required to create official records (e.g., minutes of a formal decision), which were not produced. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied this petition, ruling that informal email discussions among volunteer board members do not constitute “official Board business” requiring formal action or record-keeping.

2. Rehearing (April 2019): After being granted a rehearing, the Petitioner changed her legal theory. She argued that the email chain itself constituted an official association record and demanded that the Respondent produce a fully un-redacted version. The Respondent maintained the emails were private communications provided as a courtesy and that names were redacted due to Mr. Coates’ documented history of “bullying and intimidating people.”

Conclusion: The ALJ dismissed the petition again, affirming the initial ruling. The Judge concluded that the email chain was not an official “record of the association.” Consequently, the Respondent was under no statutory obligation to produce it, let alone provide an un-redacted copy. The Judge found the Respondent’s decision to redact names was “not unreasonable” given the circumstances.

Case Background and Procedural History

The Parties

Name/Entity

Patricia Wiercinski

Petitioner; homeowner and member of the Respondent association.

Wayne Coates

Petitioner’s husband; central figure in the alleged incident.

Long Meadow Ranch East POA, Inc.

Respondent; the Homeowners’ Association (HOA) for the development.

Michael “Mike” Olson

President of the Respondent’s Board of Directors.

Gregg Arthur

Director on the Respondent’s Board; also a realtor.

Joe Zielinski

Director on the Respondent’s Board.

Kathy Andrews

Community Manager for the Respondent, employed by Hoamco.

John Allen

An HOA member who was attempting to sell his lot in June 2017.

Diane Mihalsky

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Office of Administrative Hearings.

Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq.

Counsel for the Respondent, Goodman Law Group.

The Precipitating Incident (June 19, 2017)

On or about June 19, 2017, potential buyers, along with their builder, architect, and son, were visiting a lot for sale on Puntenney Rd. owned by John Allen. The lot was located across the street from the residence of Patricia Wiercinski and Wayne Coates. An incident occurred where Mr. Coates allegedly emerged from his home and confronted the visitors. According to emails later provided, Mr. Coates was “belligerent and cursing,” “verbally abusive,” and exhibited “extreme aggressive behavior,” telling the party that nothing was for sale and they needed to leave immediately. The potential buyers subsequently withdrew their interest in the lot, explicitly citing the confrontation.

Legal Proceedings

• October 18, 2018: Petitioner files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce records of its deliberations and actions regarding the June 2017 incident.

• January 10, 2019: An evidentiary hearing is held before ALJ Diane Mihalsky.

• January 22, 2019: The ALJ issues a decision denying the petition.

• Post-January 2019: Petitioner requests a rehearing, alleging misconduct by the judge. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate grants the request.

• April 22, 2019: A rehearing is conducted.

• May 1, 2019: The ALJ issues a final decision, again dismissing the petition.

The Central Evidence: The Email Communications

The primary evidence in the case was an email chain from June 2017 that the Respondent voluntarily produced to the Petitioner, with the names of non-members (the potential buyers and their real estate agent) redacted. The communications reveal the immediate aftermath and concern surrounding the incident.

Key Excerpts from the Emails

• From a Potential Purchaser (June 19, 2017):

• Formal Account from Potential Purchasers (June 20, 2017):

• From the Real Estate Agent (June 20, 2017):

• From Board Director Gregg Arthur (June 20, 2017):

• From Board Director Joe Zielinski (June 20, 2017):

Analysis of Legal Arguments and Rulings

Petitioner’s Arguments

1. Initial Argument: The Petitioner contended that the email discussion among a quorum of the Board legally constituted an informal meeting to discuss association business. As such, the Board was required to memorialize its decision, even a decision to take no action, in official records like meeting minutes. The failure to produce such records was a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805.

2. Rehearing Argument: Shifting her legal theory, the Petitioner argued that the email chain itself was an “official record of the association.” She claimed a right to an un-redacted copy, stating that she and Mr. Coates “had a right to know who was accusing Mr. Coates of belligerence.”

Respondent’s Defense

• Nature of Communications: The Respondent argued the emails were informal, private communications on personal servers between volunteer board members who are also neighbors. They were not official records kept in the course of association business.

• Lack of Formal Action: The Board never voted, met in an executive or open session, or took any official action regarding the incident. Testimony confirmed that only two of the board members replied to the initial email.

• Absence of Authority: The Respondent’s position was that the incident, while serious, was a personal dispute between neighbors and did not violate the association’s CC&Rs or bylaws. Therefore, the Board had no authority or jurisdiction to take official enforcement action.

• Justification for Redactions: Board President Mike Olson testified that names were redacted because “Mr. Coates had a history of bullying and intimidating people.” This was done to protect the potential buyers and their agent from potential harassment.

Administrative Law Judge’s Determinations

The ALJ’s conclusions were consistent across both decisions, finding decisively in favor of the Respondent.

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioner failed to establish by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805.

• “Official Records” Defined: The ALJ drew a clear distinction between informal discussion and official business. The ruling stated: “…the mere fact that a quorum of Board members may discuss a topic does not make it official Board business, especially if they do not end up taking any action to make a matter board business.”

• No Obligation to Create Records: The Judge found no statute requiring an HOA board to create a formal written record about topics they discuss informally but ultimately take no action on, calling such a requirement an “unnecessary and burdensome requirement on volunteers.”

• Ruling on Redacted Emails: In the rehearing decision, the ALJ concluded that because the email string was not an official record, the statute did not require the Respondent to provide it at all. Therefore, the Respondent was not obligated to provide an un-redacted version. The judge also noted the reason for the redaction “does not appear unreasonable.”

• Final Order: Both petitions were denied and dismissed.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Wiercinski v. Long Meadow Ranch East POA

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Petitioner Patricia Wiercinski and Respondent Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. It includes a quiz with an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms, all based on the provided Administrative Law Judge Decisions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the provided case documents.

1. Who are the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what are their roles?

2. What specific event on June 19, 2017, initiated the conflict that led to this case?

3. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner in her original petition filed on October 18, 2018?

4. Why did the Respondent’s Board President, Mike Olson, state that the names in the email string were redacted?

5. In the initial hearing, what did the Petitioner argue the Board was required to do after discussing the incident, even if it chose not to act?

6. What was the legal conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge following the first hearing on January 10, 2019?

7. On what grounds did the Petitioner request and receive a rehearing of the case?

8. How did the Petitioner’s primary legal argument change between the first hearing and the rehearing?

9. According to the testimony of community manager Kathy Andrews, what types of documents are considered official records of the Association?

10. What was the final determination regarding the status of the email string and the Respondent’s obligation to produce an un-redacted version?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Patricia Wiercinski (“Petitioner”) and the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The Petitioner is a homeowner and member of the Respondent association who filed a complaint alleging the association violated state law. The Respondent is the homeowners’ association defending against the petition.

2. The initiating event was an incident where the Petitioner’s husband, Wayne Coates, allegedly acted belligerent, cursed at, and was verbally abusive to a potential buyer, their family, and their architect who were viewing a property for sale across the street from the Petitioner’s home. The potential buyers were so disturbed by the encounter that they decided to remove the lot from their list of considerations.

3. The Petitioner’s core allegation was that the Respondent had violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce official documents related to the Board’s deliberations, decisions, and actions concerning the June 19, 2017 incident involving her husband.

4. Mike Olson testified that the names of the potential purchasers and their real estate agent were redacted from the email string because Mr. Coates has a documented history of bullying, intimidating, and threatening people. The redaction was done to protect these individuals from potential harassment.

5. In the initial hearing, the Petitioner argued that if the Board decided not to take action against her husband over the incident, it was required to make a formal motion and arrive at a formal, written decision to that effect. She claimed she never received such a document or evidence that the Board addressed it in an official meeting.

6. Following the first hearing, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the petition be denied. The judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that any official documents regarding the incident existed that the Respondent had failed to produce, as the email discussions were informal and did not constitute official Board business.

7. The Petitioner requested a rehearing by alleging misconduct on the part of the Administrative Law Judge. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted the request, though the decision noted the Commissioner did not specify what the misconduct was or how it should have changed the outcome.

8. In the rehearing, the Petitioner changed her argument from claiming the Board failed to produce a formal decision to arguing that the email string itself constituted an official record of the Association’s business. Consequently, she contended that A.R.S. § 33-1805 required the Respondent to produce a fully un-redacted copy of it.

9. Kathy Andrews testified that official records include matters of record regarding the Association’s business, such as governing documents, architectural guidelines, Board and general meeting minutes, and anything submitted to the Board for action. Because the Board took no action on the June 19, 2017 incident, the email was not included in the Association’s archived records.

10. The final determination was that the email string was not an official record of the association but rather an informal communication. Therefore, A.R.S. § 33-1805 did not require the Respondent to provide an un-redacted version, and the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the legal distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between informal discussions among board members and official association business. How was A.R.S. § 33-1805 applied in this context, and what precedent might this set for volunteer HOA board members?

2. Discuss the evolution of Patricia Wiercinski’s legal argument from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each argument and explain why the second argument was also ultimately unsuccessful.

3. Examine the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it applies to this case. Explain what the Petitioner was required to prove and detail the specific evidence (or lack thereof) that led the judge to conclude she had not met this burden in either hearing.

4. The Respondent voluntarily provided the redacted email string after the petition was filed. Discuss the strategic implications of this action and how it influenced the proceedings. Furthermore, analyze the justification provided for the redactions and the judge’s assessment of its reasonableness.

5. Based on the testimony from individuals like Mike Olson, Gregg Arthur, and Kathy Andrews, construct a comprehensive narrative of the events and communications following the June 19, 2017 incident from the perspective of the HOA Board. How did their collective testimony undermine the Petitioner’s claim that official records were being withheld or that the emails constituted official business?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding judge, Diane Mihalsky, from the Office of Administrative Hearings who heard the evidence and issued the legal decisions.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

The Arizona Revised Statute cited by the Petitioner, which stipulates that all financial and other records of a homeowners’ association must be made reasonably available for examination by any member.

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)

An Arizona Revised Statute stating that a quorum of a board of directors meeting informally to discuss association business must comply with open meeting and notice provisions, regardless of whether a vote is taken.

Department, The

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and adjudicate petitions from and about homeowners’ associations.

Hoamco

The property management company employed by the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association. Kathy Andrews is an employee of this company.

June 19, 2017 Incident

An altercation where Wayne Coates allegedly engaged in belligerent, cursing, and verbally abusive behavior towards potential property buyers, causing them to lose interest in the property.

Long Meadow Ranch East POA

The Respondent in the case; the homeowners’ association for the Long Meadow Ranch East development in Prescott, Arizona.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

Patricia Wiercinski, a homeowner in Long Meadow Ranch East and a member of the Respondent association who filed the legal petition.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard the Petitioner was required to meet. It is defined as proof that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other, meaning the contention is more probably true than not.

Respondent

The Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc., which was the defendant in the petition filed by Patricia Wiercinski.

Wayne Coates

The husband of the Petitioner, Patricia Wiercinski. His alleged actions during the June 19, 2017 incident are the central subject of the dispute.

An acronym for the Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office, mentioned in an email as a potential agency to file charges for disorderly conduct/harassment.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG


4 Shocking Lessons from One Homeowner’s Lawsuit Against Her HOA

Introduction: The Perils of Neighbor Disputes

Most people who live in a planned community harbor a quiet fear of two things: a “neighbor from hell” and a legal dispute with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA). For one Arizona homeowner, those fears collided in a dramatic fashion. When her husband was involved in an incident with prospective buyers of a neighboring lot, she took her HOA to court to demand records of the board’s discussions. The resulting public legal documents provide a masterclass in community association law, revealing several shocking and counter-intuitive lessons for anyone living under an HOA.

——————————————————————————–

1. Takeaway 1: A “Neighbor from Hell” Can Literally Destroy a Real Estate Deal

The case began with a single incident on June 19, 2017. According to court filings, the homeowner’s husband, Wayne Coates, first confronted the wife and son of a builder viewing a vacant lot across the street. The prospective buyers described Mr. Coates’ behavior as “belligerent and cursing,” telling them that “nothing was for sale around here and they shouldn’t be snooping around.” The wife and son then drove up to inform the builder and architect of the hostile encounter.

The confrontation was so severe that it directly caused the potential buyers to walk away from the deal. They documented their experience in an email that eventually became part of the court record.

In closing when we returned one thing that stands out is would we want to live next to this type of behavior of [a] neighbor? The answer is no, this lot was one that we had in our top 2 Lots as a consideration for purchase but due to the volatile potential of this man, we have decided at this point to remove it from our list.

This case is a rare and powerful illustration of tortious interference with a business relationship in a community association context, providing unambiguous, written proof—from the aggrieved party themselves—that a single resident’s conduct directly caused a quantifiable financial loss to a neighbor.

2. Takeaway 2: Your HOA Board’s Private Emails Aren’t Always “Official Records”

The homeowner, Patricia Wiercinski, filed the lawsuit because she believed an email discussion about the incident among a quorum of the HOA board members constituted official business. Therefore, she argued, those emails were “official records” of the association that she had a legal right to inspect.

In a surprising decision, the court disagreed. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that just because board members informally discuss a topic via email does not automatically make it official HOA business or create an official record. This is especially true if the board never takes any formal action on the matter.

The judge’s reasoning was grounded in the practical realities of volunteer-run corporations. To treat every informal chat as official, recordable business would impose “an unnecessary and burdensome requirement on volunteers who are not compensated for their time who are may be neighbors and who may also be friends, in addition to being Board members.” This ruling reinforces a crucial legal boundary between governance and informal communication. It protects a board’s ability to “think out loud” and explore issues before committing to a formal course of action, an essential function for effective volunteer leadership.

3. Takeaway 3: An HOA’s Power Isn’t Unlimited

After learning that Mr. Coates’ actions had killed a property sale, some board members were immediately and deeply alarmed. They recognized the potential damage to property values for everyone in the community. Board member Gregg Arthur expressed this urgency in an email to his colleagues:

Wayne thru his actions appears to have interfered with and destroyed a property sale. We need to meet and take action on this matter as it will have a broad and chilling effect amongst the realtor community… action needs to be taken and quickly to prevent this from happening again.

Despite this initial alarm, the board ultimately took no formal action against Mr. Coates. Why? Because after reviewing the situation, they determined that the incident was a personal dispute between neighbors. Critically, his conduct did not violate any specific provision of the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), bylaws, or other governing documents.

This decision underscores a vital legal principle: an HOA’s authority is fundamentally contractual, derived solely from the powers granted to it in its governing documents. It is not a governmental body with general police powers. Its authority is strictly limited to enforcing the community’s written rules, not policing all neighborhood conduct.

4. Takeaway 4: A Lawsuit Can Create a Devastating—and Public—Record

The petitioner’s goal was straightforward: to force the HOA to produce an un-redacted copy of the board’s private email chain. The result of her legal action, however, was a textbook example of the “Streisand Effect,” where an attempt to suppress information leads to it being publicized far more widely. In her attempt to access a private record, she created a permanent, public legal record that contained far more damaging information about her husband than the emails she sought.

Because of the lawsuit, the following details about Mr. Coates are now cemented in publicly accessible court documents:

• The full, detailed account from the potential buyers describing his “verbally abusive and extremely confrontational” behavior.

• A statement from a board member, Joe Zielinski, referencing Mr. Coates’ “arrest record and prison term and criminal history.”

• Sworn testimony from the HOA President, Mike Olson, explaining that names were redacted from the original email because Mr. Coates has a “history of bullying and intimidating people.”

The irony is devastating. In her quest to unmask the identities of her husband’s accusers in a private email, the petitioner inadvertently created a permanent, public, and deeply unflattering legal record that now constitutes a matter adjudicated by a court.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: The High Cost of Conflict

This single, unfortunate neighborhood dispute offers powerful lessons for anyone living in a planned community. It clarifies the real-world impact of resident behavior on property rights, sets a clear boundary on what constitutes an “official” HOA record, demonstrates the legal limits of an HOA’s power, and serves as a sobering warning about the unforeseen consequences of litigation. It leaves us with a final, critical question to ponder: When conflict arises in a community, what is the true cost of escalating it, and is the official record you might create worth the price?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Patricia Wiercinski (petitioner)
  • Wayne Coates (petitioner's husband)
    Involved in the June 19, 2017 incident

Respondent Side

  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
  • Michael Olson (board member)
    President of Respondent's board; testified as witness
  • Gregg Arthur (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board; testified as witness
  • Kathy Andrews (property manager)
    HOAMCO
    Community Manager; testified as witness
  • Jim Robertson (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board
  • Joe Zielinski (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board
  • Boris Biloskirka (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board (identified as former in one source)
  • Tom Reid (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Decision transmittal clerk

Other Participants

  • John Allen (HOA member)
    Property owner attempting to sell lot (also spelled Allan)
  • [Redacted Name] (potential purchaser/witness)
    Includes potential buyers, builder, builder's wife, son, and architect involved in the incident
  • [Redacted Name] (real estate agent/witness)
    Real estate agent(s) associated with John Allen's property

Tom J Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom J Martin Counsel —
Respondent SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. Counsel Carolyn B. Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed because the Administrative Law Judge determined that the alleged violations of the HOA's website and policy manual did not involve 'community documents' as defined by statute, meaning the matter did not fall within the tribunal's jurisdiction under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A).

Why this result: The petition was dismissed because the initial claims did not meet the requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A), as the alleged violations involved documents (website and policy BC-3) that are not considered 'community documents' under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of HOA website and Policy BC-3 concerning the provision of pickleball courts

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its website and Policy Manual (BC-3) regarding the provision of pickleball courts. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the Department lacked jurisdiction because neither the website nor Policy BC-3 are defined as 'community documents' under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2). The ALJ agreed, finding the claim failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A).

Orders: Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, community documents, policy manual, dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • Walker v. Scottsdale
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG Decision – 704322.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:41 (89.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (Case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin versus SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which resulted in the dismissal of the petitioner’s case. The decision, issued on May 10, 2019, centered on a critical jurisdictional question: whether an HOA’s website content and internal policy manual constitute “community documents” under Arizona state law.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded they do not. The petitioner’s claim, which alleged the HOA failed to provide pickleball courts as promised on its website and in its “Policy Number BC-3,” was dismissed because it did not allege a violation of a legally recognized “community document.” According to Arizona Revised Statutes, such documents are strictly defined as the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, and formally adopted rules. As the petitioner’s initial filing cited only the website and a policy not adopted as a rule, the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked the statutory jurisdiction to hear the case. Furthermore, the ALJ determined that the petitioner’s requested relief—a financial award of $463,112 or the construction of eight new courts—was beyond the scope of the tribunal’s authority.

Case Overview

Case Name

Tom J. Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Case Number

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

Tom J. Martin

Respondent

SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Date of Decision

May 10, 2019

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Requested Relief

The petition filed by Tom J. Martin on September 28, 2018, was founded on the central allegation that the SaddleBrooke HOA violated its own website content and its internal policy manual, specifically “Policy Number BC-3.”

• Primary Allegation: The HOA failed to fulfill its advertised and marketed promise to provide pickleball courts.

• Cited Violations: In the initial petition, Martin explicitly alleged violations of the HOA’s website and policy manual. While he checked boxes on the petition form indicating violations of the CC&Rs and Bylaws, he failed to identify any specific provisions from those documents.

• Requested Relief: The petitioner sought a significant remedy from the HOA, requesting one of the following:

1. Financial support in the amount of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

2. The provision of eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year.

3. A commitment from the HOA to be financially responsible for the maintenance of pickleball courts in an amount equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

Procedural History and Key Arguments

The case progressed through several key stages, culminating in a rehearing and a final dismissal.

1. Initial Petition (September 28, 2018): Mr. Martin filed his single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (November 30, 2018): The HOA argued that the Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Its core argument was that hearings under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01 are limited to violations of “community documents,” and that a website and an internal policy do not meet the legal definition of such documents. The HOA also contended the requested relief was outside the tribunal’s authority.

3. Petitioner’s Response (December 4, 2018): In his response, Mr. Martin argued that a “policy” should be interpreted as a “rule” under its ordinary meaning. He further asserted that another HOA policy (CE-3) defined “governing documents” to include “Rules and Regulations,” and therefore Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

4. Initial Dismissal (December 12, 2018): The ALJ dismissed the petition, finding that it had not alleged a violation meeting the statutory requirements.

5. Request for Rehearing (December 31, 2018): Mr. Martin requested a rehearing, reasserting that a “policy” is a “rule.” In this request, he newly alleged that the HOA had violated specific provisions: Bylaws article 4, section 6(3) and Articles of Incorporation Article XII, by failing to implement policy BC-3.

6. Rehearing (April 16, 2019): A rehearing was conducted where both parties presented their cases. The respondent renewed its argument regarding lack of jurisdiction.

Central Legal Dispute: The Definition of “Community Documents”

The determinative issue of the case was the precise legal definition of “community documents” and whether the petitioner’s claims fell within that scope.

• Statutory Definition: The court’s decision was anchored in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2), which defines community documents as:

◦ The declaration (CC&Rs)

◦ Bylaws

◦ Articles of incorporation, if any

◦ Rules, if any

• The Court’s Finding: The ALJ concluded that this legislative definition is exclusive and does not include “a planned community’s statements of policy, statements on its website, or advertising and marketing material.”

• Petitioner’s Argument Rejected: Mr. Martin’s argument that Policy BC-3 should be considered a rule was found to be “not persuasive.” A critical finding of fact was that the “Respondent has not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule” under the authority granted in its CC&Rs (section 4.5). The tribunal must follow the legislature’s explicit definition.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The ALJ’s conclusions of law led directly to the dismissal of the petition on jurisdictional grounds.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Because Mr. Martin’s original petition only alleged that the respondent violated its website and policy manual—neither of which are “community documents” under Arizona law—the petition failed to meet the foundational requirements for a hearing under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A).

• Improper Relief Requested: The ALJ also concluded that the relief Mr. Martin sought was not within the tribunal’s authority. Under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02, an ALJ may order a party to abide by statutes or community documents and may levy civil penalties. The statute does not grant the authority to order large financial payments for construction or to mandate specific capital improvement projects.

• Final Order: Based on these conclusions, the petition was dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

The decision, having been issued as the result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of the order’s service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin vs. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG). It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and final outcome.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG?

2. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner in his initial petition filed on or about September 28, 2018?

3. Describe the two alternative forms of relief the Petitioner requested in his petition.

4. On what primary legal grounds did the Respondent file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. According to Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2), what are the four types of documents that constitute “community documents”?

6. Explain the two main arguments the Petitioner made in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss for why Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

7. What new violation did the Petitioner allege in his request for a rehearing on December 31, 2019?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s findings, what was the final outcome of the Petitioner’s petition and the primary reason for this decision?

9. According to A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, what powers does an administrative law judge have if a violation of community documents is found?

10. What is the process and time frame for a party wishing to appeal this Administrative Law Judge order?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Tom J. Martin, who appeared on his own behalf. The Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which was represented by Carolyn B. Goldschmidt, Esq.

2. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin’s single-issue allegation was that the Respondent violated its website and its policy manual, specifically Policy Number BC-3. He included printouts from the website and a copy of the policy with his petition.

3. The Petitioner requested financial support in the sum of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon. Alternatively, he requested that the Respondent provide eight pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, and be financially responsible for their maintenance at a level equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

4. The Respondent argued that the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. This was because hearings are limited to disputes over “community documents,” and neither the website nor Policy BC-3 qualified as such under the definition provided in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1802(2).

5. Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2) defines “community documents” as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.”

6. First, Mr. Martin argued that based on A.R.S. § 1-213, the word “policy” should be given its ordinary meaning, which is a rule. Second, he asserted that because the Respondent’s own policy CE-3 defines “governing documents” to include Rules and Regulations, then BC-3 must be a governing document.

7. In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Martin alleged for the first time that the Respondent had violated its bylaws, specifically article 4, section 6(3), by failing to implement policy BC-3. He also alleged a violation of Articles of Incorporation Article XII.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Martin’s petition be dismissed. The dismissal was based on the finding that the petition did not meet the requirements of A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) because it alleged violations of a website and a policy manual, which are not legally defined as “community documents.”

9. If a violation is found, an administrative law judge may order any party to abide by the statute or document at issue. The judge may also levy a civil penalty for each violation and, if the petitioner prevails, order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s filing fee.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal must be filed within thirty-five days from the date a copy of the order was served upon the parties, as prescribed by A.R.S. section 12-904(A).

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each question based on the facts and legal principles presented in the decision.

1. Analyze the concept of jurisdiction as it applies to this case. Why was the distinction between “community documents” and other materials like websites or policy manuals the central factor in the judge’s jurisdictional decision?

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, from Mr. Martin’s initial petition to the final order of dismissal. Identify the key filings, arguments, and decisions at each stage of the process.

3. Evaluate the legal arguments presented by Mr. Martin. Explain his reasoning for equating a “policy” with a “rule” and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found this argument unpersuasive, citing relevant statutes and case law mentioned in the decision.

4. Discuss the limitations on the relief an Administrative Law Judge can grant in disputes involving planned communities, as outlined in A.R.S. § 32-2199.02. How did Mr. Martin’s requested relief fall outside the scope of the judge’s authority?

5. Explain the legal principle that when a legislature defines a word or term, a tribunal must follow that definition. How did this principle, as cited in Walker v. Scottsdale, directly influence the outcome of Mr. Martin’s petition?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the State of Arizona.

Articles of Incorporation

A set of formal documents filed with a government body to legally document the creation of a corporation. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

Rules governing the use of land within a particular planned community. Section 4.5 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs sets out its authority to adopt rules.

Community Documents

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), these are “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.” The central legal issue of the case was whether the Respondent’s website and policy manual qualified as community documents.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The Respondent argued, and the ALJ agreed, that the Office of Administrative Hearings did not have jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve “community documents.”

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request by a party for a court or tribunal to dismiss a case. The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 30, 2018, arguing a lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was Tom J. Martin.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues and arguments, granted in this instance after the initial dismissal. The rehearing was conducted on April 16, 2019.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Regulations adopted by a planned community association. The decision notes that while the Respondent has the authority to adopt rules, it had not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


4 Harsh Lessons from a Homeowner’s Failed Lawsuit Against His HOA

Introduction: The Promise vs. The Paperwork

Imagine finding the perfect community. Its website advertises fantastic amenities, including the pickleball courts you’ve been dreaming of. The association’s own policy manual seems to confirm this commitment. But what happens when the courts are never built and the homeowner association (HOA) doesn’t deliver on these perceived promises?

This isn’t a hypothetical scenario. It’s the central conflict in the case of Tom J. Martin versus the SaddleBrooke HOA in Arizona. Mr. Martin believed his HOA was legally obligated to provide pickleball courts based on its policies and marketing materials. His subsequent lawsuit, however, failed spectacularly, revealing some surprising truths about HOA disputes. This case provides several critical, counter-intuitive lessons for any current or future homeowner about the difference between a promise and a legally enforceable contract.

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1. A “Policy” Isn’t Always a Legally Binding “Rule”

Mr. Martin’s argument was straightforward: he believed the HOA violated its own “policy manual,” specifically a section referred to as Policy BC-3, by not providing pickleball courts. He contended that, in the ordinary sense of the word, a “policy” is a rule that must be followed.

The judge, however, dismissed the case based on a harsh legal reality. According to Arizona law, the court’s jurisdiction in this type of hearing is limited to violations of official “community documents.” The judge was bound by the statute’s specific definition of what constitutes these documents.

Based on Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1802(2), “community documents” are strictly defined as:

• The declaration (often called CC&Rs)

• Bylaws

• Articles of incorporation

• Rules

Crucially, the HOA’s own CC&Rs specified the exact procedure for how to adopt an enforceable rule, and the association had never subjected Policy BC-3 to that formal process. It wasn’t just a legal technicality; the HOA was following its own governing documents about how to create—or not create—a binding rule. Because the pickleball policy had not been formally adopted, it was legally unenforceable in this hearing.

Key Takeaway Analysis: In a legal dispute, the common-sense meaning of a word can be overruled by a specific statutory definition. It’s not enough to read an HOA’s policy manual. As a homeowner, you must cross-reference that policy with the CC&Rs or Bylaws to confirm the HOA has followed its own stated procedure for adopting it as a formal, legally binding rule.

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2. Marketing Materials Are Not Governing Documents

To support his case, Mr. Martin presented printouts from the HOA’s website. He felt these materials advertised and marketed the availability of pickleball courts, stating in a legal filing that “the Association is in violation for not providing pickleball courts as advertised and marketed….”

The judge’s conclusion was unequivocal: advertising and marketing materials, just like the internal policy manual, do not qualify as “community documents.” The legal definition is exclusive, and an HOA’s website is not on the list. Therefore, promises or suggestions made on a website carry no legal weight in a dispute over violations of governing documents.

Key Takeaway Analysis: There is a significant gap between marketing promises and legally enforceable obligations. For potential buyers, this is a critical warning. The glossy brochure, the community website, and the sales pitch might paint a picture of community life, but that picture is not guaranteed by the legally binding documents you sign at closing.

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3. You Must Allege a Violation of theRightDocument

The case also reveals a crucial lesson in legal procedure. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin only alleged violations of the HOA’s website and its policy manual. While his petition form indicated alleged violations of the “CC&Rs and Bylaws,” he failed to identify any specific provisions within those official documents that the HOA had actually violated.

It was only after his case was first dismissed that he attempted to specify violations of the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation in his request for a rehearing. By then, it was too late. The initial petition failed to allege a violation of a legitimate community document.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Precision is paramount. To successfully challenge an HOA in an administrative hearing, a homeowner cannot just have a general grievance. You must be able to pinpoint the exact article, section, and provision of an official “community document” (like the CC&Rs or Bylaws) that was violated and state it clearly in your initial complaint.

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4. The Court May Not Have the Power to Grant Your Request

Mr. Martin was clear about what he wanted the court to do. He requested one of two specific forms of relief:

• Provide financial support of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

• Alternatively, construct eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, with the HOA being financially responsible for their maintenance.

The judge noted a final, critical problem with the case: the requested relief was “not within the scope of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority.” The law governing these hearings simply did not give the judge the power to order an HOA to undertake a massive, six-figure construction project.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Even if you have a valid case and prove the HOA violated a rule, the court or tribunal you are in has limits. An administrative hearing might only be empowered to levy a civil penalty or issue an order for the HOA to abide by an existing rule. It likely cannot force the HOA to build new facilities or make large capital expenditures. This highlights the need to research the legal venue before you file to ensure it has the authority to grant the specific outcome you are seeking.

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Conclusion: Read Before You Litigate

The outcome of Mr. Martin’s lawsuit underscores the critical difference between a homeowner’s reasonable expectations and an HOA’s legally enforceable covenants. For homeowners, disputes are won or lost based on the precise wording of official governing documents—the CC&Rs, bylaws, and formal rules.

Before you challenge your HOA, have you read the fine print to see if their promise is written in the one place that truly matters?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom J. Martin (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (respondent attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
  • Michael S. Shupe (attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
    Recipient of transmittal

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)

Other Participants

  • JS (Unknown staff)
    Transmittal initials

Tom J Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom J Martin Counsel —
Respondent SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. Counsel Carolyn B. Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the dismissal of the petition on rehearing, ruling that the HOA's website and policy manual are not 'community documents' as defined by statute, and therefore the Department has no jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding them. Additionally, the requested financial relief was outside the ALJ's authority.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, or rules of the planned community.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of HOA website and Policy Manual (Policy BC-3) regarding pickleball courts

Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated its website and policy manual by failing to provide pickleball courts as marketed. The Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing these documents are not community documents. The ALJ affirmed the dismissal, finding that policies and website statements do not fall under the statutory definition of community documents in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), thus the Department lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, community documents, policy manual, pickleball courts, dismissal, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-213
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904
  • Walker v. Scottsdale, 163 Ariz. 206, 786 P.2d 1057 (App. 1989)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG Decision – 704322.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:17 (89.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (Case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin versus SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which resulted in the dismissal of the petitioner’s case. The decision, issued on May 10, 2019, centered on a critical jurisdictional question: whether an HOA’s website content and internal policy manual constitute “community documents” under Arizona state law.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded they do not. The petitioner’s claim, which alleged the HOA failed to provide pickleball courts as promised on its website and in its “Policy Number BC-3,” was dismissed because it did not allege a violation of a legally recognized “community document.” According to Arizona Revised Statutes, such documents are strictly defined as the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, and formally adopted rules. As the petitioner’s initial filing cited only the website and a policy not adopted as a rule, the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked the statutory jurisdiction to hear the case. Furthermore, the ALJ determined that the petitioner’s requested relief—a financial award of $463,112 or the construction of eight new courts—was beyond the scope of the tribunal’s authority.

Case Overview

Case Name

Tom J. Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Case Number

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

Tom J. Martin

Respondent

SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Date of Decision

May 10, 2019

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Requested Relief

The petition filed by Tom J. Martin on September 28, 2018, was founded on the central allegation that the SaddleBrooke HOA violated its own website content and its internal policy manual, specifically “Policy Number BC-3.”

• Primary Allegation: The HOA failed to fulfill its advertised and marketed promise to provide pickleball courts.

• Cited Violations: In the initial petition, Martin explicitly alleged violations of the HOA’s website and policy manual. While he checked boxes on the petition form indicating violations of the CC&Rs and Bylaws, he failed to identify any specific provisions from those documents.

• Requested Relief: The petitioner sought a significant remedy from the HOA, requesting one of the following:

1. Financial support in the amount of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

2. The provision of eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year.

3. A commitment from the HOA to be financially responsible for the maintenance of pickleball courts in an amount equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

Procedural History and Key Arguments

The case progressed through several key stages, culminating in a rehearing and a final dismissal.

1. Initial Petition (September 28, 2018): Mr. Martin filed his single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (November 30, 2018): The HOA argued that the Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Its core argument was that hearings under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01 are limited to violations of “community documents,” and that a website and an internal policy do not meet the legal definition of such documents. The HOA also contended the requested relief was outside the tribunal’s authority.

3. Petitioner’s Response (December 4, 2018): In his response, Mr. Martin argued that a “policy” should be interpreted as a “rule” under its ordinary meaning. He further asserted that another HOA policy (CE-3) defined “governing documents” to include “Rules and Regulations,” and therefore Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

4. Initial Dismissal (December 12, 2018): The ALJ dismissed the petition, finding that it had not alleged a violation meeting the statutory requirements.

5. Request for Rehearing (December 31, 2018): Mr. Martin requested a rehearing, reasserting that a “policy” is a “rule.” In this request, he newly alleged that the HOA had violated specific provisions: Bylaws article 4, section 6(3) and Articles of Incorporation Article XII, by failing to implement policy BC-3.

6. Rehearing (April 16, 2019): A rehearing was conducted where both parties presented their cases. The respondent renewed its argument regarding lack of jurisdiction.

Central Legal Dispute: The Definition of “Community Documents”

The determinative issue of the case was the precise legal definition of “community documents” and whether the petitioner’s claims fell within that scope.

• Statutory Definition: The court’s decision was anchored in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2), which defines community documents as:

◦ The declaration (CC&Rs)

◦ Bylaws

◦ Articles of incorporation, if any

◦ Rules, if any

• The Court’s Finding: The ALJ concluded that this legislative definition is exclusive and does not include “a planned community’s statements of policy, statements on its website, or advertising and marketing material.”

• Petitioner’s Argument Rejected: Mr. Martin’s argument that Policy BC-3 should be considered a rule was found to be “not persuasive.” A critical finding of fact was that the “Respondent has not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule” under the authority granted in its CC&Rs (section 4.5). The tribunal must follow the legislature’s explicit definition.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The ALJ’s conclusions of law led directly to the dismissal of the petition on jurisdictional grounds.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Because Mr. Martin’s original petition only alleged that the respondent violated its website and policy manual—neither of which are “community documents” under Arizona law—the petition failed to meet the foundational requirements for a hearing under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A).

• Improper Relief Requested: The ALJ also concluded that the relief Mr. Martin sought was not within the tribunal’s authority. Under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02, an ALJ may order a party to abide by statutes or community documents and may levy civil penalties. The statute does not grant the authority to order large financial payments for construction or to mandate specific capital improvement projects.

• Final Order: Based on these conclusions, the petition was dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

The decision, having been issued as the result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of the order’s service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin vs. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG). It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and final outcome.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG?

2. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner in his initial petition filed on or about September 28, 2018?

3. Describe the two alternative forms of relief the Petitioner requested in his petition.

4. On what primary legal grounds did the Respondent file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. According to Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2), what are the four types of documents that constitute “community documents”?

6. Explain the two main arguments the Petitioner made in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss for why Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

7. What new violation did the Petitioner allege in his request for a rehearing on December 31, 2019?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s findings, what was the final outcome of the Petitioner’s petition and the primary reason for this decision?

9. According to A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, what powers does an administrative law judge have if a violation of community documents is found?

10. What is the process and time frame for a party wishing to appeal this Administrative Law Judge order?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Tom J. Martin, who appeared on his own behalf. The Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which was represented by Carolyn B. Goldschmidt, Esq.

2. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin’s single-issue allegation was that the Respondent violated its website and its policy manual, specifically Policy Number BC-3. He included printouts from the website and a copy of the policy with his petition.

3. The Petitioner requested financial support in the sum of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon. Alternatively, he requested that the Respondent provide eight pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, and be financially responsible for their maintenance at a level equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

4. The Respondent argued that the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. This was because hearings are limited to disputes over “community documents,” and neither the website nor Policy BC-3 qualified as such under the definition provided in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1802(2).

5. Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2) defines “community documents” as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.”

6. First, Mr. Martin argued that based on A.R.S. § 1-213, the word “policy” should be given its ordinary meaning, which is a rule. Second, he asserted that because the Respondent’s own policy CE-3 defines “governing documents” to include Rules and Regulations, then BC-3 must be a governing document.

7. In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Martin alleged for the first time that the Respondent had violated its bylaws, specifically article 4, section 6(3), by failing to implement policy BC-3. He also alleged a violation of Articles of Incorporation Article XII.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Martin’s petition be dismissed. The dismissal was based on the finding that the petition did not meet the requirements of A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) because it alleged violations of a website and a policy manual, which are not legally defined as “community documents.”

9. If a violation is found, an administrative law judge may order any party to abide by the statute or document at issue. The judge may also levy a civil penalty for each violation and, if the petitioner prevails, order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s filing fee.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal must be filed within thirty-five days from the date a copy of the order was served upon the parties, as prescribed by A.R.S. section 12-904(A).

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each question based on the facts and legal principles presented in the decision.

1. Analyze the concept of jurisdiction as it applies to this case. Why was the distinction between “community documents” and other materials like websites or policy manuals the central factor in the judge’s jurisdictional decision?

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, from Mr. Martin’s initial petition to the final order of dismissal. Identify the key filings, arguments, and decisions at each stage of the process.

3. Evaluate the legal arguments presented by Mr. Martin. Explain his reasoning for equating a “policy” with a “rule” and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found this argument unpersuasive, citing relevant statutes and case law mentioned in the decision.

4. Discuss the limitations on the relief an Administrative Law Judge can grant in disputes involving planned communities, as outlined in A.R.S. § 32-2199.02. How did Mr. Martin’s requested relief fall outside the scope of the judge’s authority?

5. Explain the legal principle that when a legislature defines a word or term, a tribunal must follow that definition. How did this principle, as cited in Walker v. Scottsdale, directly influence the outcome of Mr. Martin’s petition?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the State of Arizona.

Articles of Incorporation

A set of formal documents filed with a government body to legally document the creation of a corporation. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

Rules governing the use of land within a particular planned community. Section 4.5 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs sets out its authority to adopt rules.

Community Documents

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), these are “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.” The central legal issue of the case was whether the Respondent’s website and policy manual qualified as community documents.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The Respondent argued, and the ALJ agreed, that the Office of Administrative Hearings did not have jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve “community documents.”

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request by a party for a court or tribunal to dismiss a case. The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 30, 2018, arguing a lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was Tom J. Martin.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues and arguments, granted in this instance after the initial dismissal. The rehearing was conducted on April 16, 2019.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Regulations adopted by a planned community association. The decision notes that while the Respondent has the authority to adopt rules, it had not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


4 Harsh Lessons from a Homeowner’s Failed Lawsuit Against His HOA

Introduction: The Promise vs. The Paperwork

Imagine finding the perfect community. Its website advertises fantastic amenities, including the pickleball courts you’ve been dreaming of. The association’s own policy manual seems to confirm this commitment. But what happens when the courts are never built and the homeowner association (HOA) doesn’t deliver on these perceived promises?

This isn’t a hypothetical scenario. It’s the central conflict in the case of Tom J. Martin versus the SaddleBrooke HOA in Arizona. Mr. Martin believed his HOA was legally obligated to provide pickleball courts based on its policies and marketing materials. His subsequent lawsuit, however, failed spectacularly, revealing some surprising truths about HOA disputes. This case provides several critical, counter-intuitive lessons for any current or future homeowner about the difference between a promise and a legally enforceable contract.

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1. A “Policy” Isn’t Always a Legally Binding “Rule”

Mr. Martin’s argument was straightforward: he believed the HOA violated its own “policy manual,” specifically a section referred to as Policy BC-3, by not providing pickleball courts. He contended that, in the ordinary sense of the word, a “policy” is a rule that must be followed.

The judge, however, dismissed the case based on a harsh legal reality. According to Arizona law, the court’s jurisdiction in this type of hearing is limited to violations of official “community documents.” The judge was bound by the statute’s specific definition of what constitutes these documents.

Based on Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1802(2), “community documents” are strictly defined as:

• The declaration (often called CC&Rs)

• Bylaws

• Articles of incorporation

• Rules

Crucially, the HOA’s own CC&Rs specified the exact procedure for how to adopt an enforceable rule, and the association had never subjected Policy BC-3 to that formal process. It wasn’t just a legal technicality; the HOA was following its own governing documents about how to create—or not create—a binding rule. Because the pickleball policy had not been formally adopted, it was legally unenforceable in this hearing.

Key Takeaway Analysis: In a legal dispute, the common-sense meaning of a word can be overruled by a specific statutory definition. It’s not enough to read an HOA’s policy manual. As a homeowner, you must cross-reference that policy with the CC&Rs or Bylaws to confirm the HOA has followed its own stated procedure for adopting it as a formal, legally binding rule.

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2. Marketing Materials Are Not Governing Documents

To support his case, Mr. Martin presented printouts from the HOA’s website. He felt these materials advertised and marketed the availability of pickleball courts, stating in a legal filing that “the Association is in violation for not providing pickleball courts as advertised and marketed….”

The judge’s conclusion was unequivocal: advertising and marketing materials, just like the internal policy manual, do not qualify as “community documents.” The legal definition is exclusive, and an HOA’s website is not on the list. Therefore, promises or suggestions made on a website carry no legal weight in a dispute over violations of governing documents.

Key Takeaway Analysis: There is a significant gap between marketing promises and legally enforceable obligations. For potential buyers, this is a critical warning. The glossy brochure, the community website, and the sales pitch might paint a picture of community life, but that picture is not guaranteed by the legally binding documents you sign at closing.

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3. You Must Allege a Violation of theRightDocument

The case also reveals a crucial lesson in legal procedure. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin only alleged violations of the HOA’s website and its policy manual. While his petition form indicated alleged violations of the “CC&Rs and Bylaws,” he failed to identify any specific provisions within those official documents that the HOA had actually violated.

It was only after his case was first dismissed that he attempted to specify violations of the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation in his request for a rehearing. By then, it was too late. The initial petition failed to allege a violation of a legitimate community document.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Precision is paramount. To successfully challenge an HOA in an administrative hearing, a homeowner cannot just have a general grievance. You must be able to pinpoint the exact article, section, and provision of an official “community document” (like the CC&Rs or Bylaws) that was violated and state it clearly in your initial complaint.

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4. The Court May Not Have the Power to Grant Your Request

Mr. Martin was clear about what he wanted the court to do. He requested one of two specific forms of relief:

• Provide financial support of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

• Alternatively, construct eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, with the HOA being financially responsible for their maintenance.

The judge noted a final, critical problem with the case: the requested relief was “not within the scope of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority.” The law governing these hearings simply did not give the judge the power to order an HOA to undertake a massive, six-figure construction project.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Even if you have a valid case and prove the HOA violated a rule, the court or tribunal you are in has limits. An administrative hearing might only be empowered to levy a civil penalty or issue an order for the HOA to abide by an existing rule. It likely cannot force the HOA to build new facilities or make large capital expenditures. This highlights the need to research the legal venue before you file to ensure it has the authority to grant the specific outcome you are seeking.

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Conclusion: Read Before You Litigate

The outcome of Mr. Martin’s lawsuit underscores the critical difference between a homeowner’s reasonable expectations and an HOA’s legally enforceable covenants. For homeowners, disputes are won or lost based on the precise wording of official governing documents—the CC&Rs, bylaws, and formal rules.

Before you challenge your HOA, have you read the fine print to see if their promise is written in the one place that truly matters?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom J. Martin (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (respondent attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
  • Michael S. Shupe (attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
    Recipient of transmittal

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)

Other Participants

  • JS (Unknown staff)
    Transmittal initials

William P Lee v vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel —
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations; A.R.S. §§ 33-1803, 33-1809

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition after rehearing, concluding the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its CC&Rs, controlling Rules and Regulations (revised July 2018), or relevant statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning parking on association streets and implementing a booting/towing contract.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations of community documents or A.R.S. statutes by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community documents and statutes regarding parking ban and vehicle booting/towing

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, and 3, and Rules and Regulations, by banning all parking on association streets and contracting for vehicle booting/towing. Petitioner also contested the validity of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations due to improper notice and alleged violations of A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Rule Enforcement, Parking Restrictions, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Towing/Booting, Notice Requirement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:39 (110.8 KB)

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918019-REL/678471.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:49:25 (118.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses HOA Parking Dispute

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”). The core of the dispute was Greenlaw’s 2018 implementation of a complete ban on street parking within the community and its subsequent contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles in violation.

Mr. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, alleged that this parking ban violated specific amendments to the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and was enacted through an invalid revision of the community’s Rules and Regulations.

Following an initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and a subsequent rehearing on April 1, 2019, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclusively denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The final decision, issued on April 22, 2019, determined that Mr. Lee failed to meet his burden of proof. The ALJ found that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which explicitly ban all street parking, were the controlling authority. Furthermore, the decision established that these rules do not conflict with the CC&R amendments, as the amendments only prohibit parking in specific, limited scenarios (e.g., fire lanes, snow removal) and do not grant a general right to park on association streets.

Case Overview

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (referred by the Department of Real Estate)

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner

William P. Lee

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”)

Key Dates

– Petition Filed: September 12, 2018
– Initial Hearing: December 13, 2018
– Rehearing: April 1, 2019
– Final Decision: April 22, 2019

Core Allegation

The central issue, as defined in the Notice of Hearing, was Mr. Lee’s single-issue petition alleging that Greenlaw “violated Community Document CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3 and Association Rules and Regulations… when it banned all parking on the association streets and contracted with a towing service to boot vehicles.”

Analysis of Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between Greenlaw’s CC&Rs, its Rules and Regulations, and its Bylaws.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

• Association Authority: Section (I)(b) of the CC&Rs grants Greenlaw ownership of the common areas, which include the streets in question (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops). It specifies that the “maintenance and use shall be controlled by the Association.”

• Parking Amendments: Amendments 1, 2, and 3 were central to Mr. Lee’s argument. These amendments add specific parking prohibitions to the CC&Rs under Article II, PERMITTED USES.

Amendment

Provision

Amendment #1

Prohibits parking in designated fire lanes, which are to be marked with signs and red-painted curbs after consultation with the Flagstaff Fire Marshal.

Amendment #2

Prohibits residents or visitors from parking on association roads during periods of snow removal. Violators may be towed at the vehicle owner’s expense.

Amendment #3

Prohibits parking vehicles at the curb side in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours. Such vehicles are considered abandoned and may be towed.

Rules and Regulations

• 2003 Revised Rules and Regulations: Mr. Lee contended that this was the controlling document and that it allowed for parking on association streets. He argued that Greenlaw’s booting of vehicles in 2017 was a violation of these rules.

• May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations: Greenlaw asserted that this was the new, controlling document, effective July 2018. Section 8 of these rules institutes a complete ban on street parking:

Association Bylaws (1986)

• Notice Requirement: Mr. Lee cited Article V, Section 1 of the Bylaws, which states that notices to lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.” This formed the basis of his argument that the email distribution of the 2018 rules was improper.

Key Arguments Presented

Petitioner (William P. Lee)

• Violation of CC&Rs: The general parking ban enacted in the 2018 Rules contradicted the CC&R amendments, which only banned parking in specific situations.

• Invalidity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revision as required by the 1986 Bylaws, instead sending an email which he contended was insufficient and unclear.

• Controlling Document: The 2003 Rules, which he claimed permitted street parking, should be considered the controlling authority.

• Improper Motivation: The parking ban was enacted solely to appease a board member, Barbara, who did not want cars parked behind her property.

• Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted and that the Greenlaw manager’s response to his inquiry confirmed the association’s policy.

Respondent (Greenlaw HOA)

• Authority Over Common Areas: The CC&Rs grant Greenlaw the authority to control the use of association streets.

• Validity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were properly adopted and represent the current, controlling regulations.

• No Conflict with CC&Rs: The CC&R amendments do not authorize parking; they are a list of specific prohibitions. A general ban on parking does not conflict with these specific restrictions.

• Notice Sufficiency: Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or postal mail delivery only applies to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs, not to amendments to the Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive the revised rules via email on July 6, 2018.

• Cure of Prior Violations: Any alleged violation of the prior (2003) rules was rendered moot and “cured” by the valid enactment of the May 2018 revised rules.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The ALJ’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, leading to the denial of Mr. Lee’s petition.

• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Lee, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” In both decisions, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Lee failed to meet this standard. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

• Controlling Authority: The “weight of the evidence presented at hearing” showed that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were the controlling rules at the time the petition was filed. Mr. Lee failed to establish that the 2003 Rules were still in effect.

• Interpretation of CC&Rs: The ALJ found the restrictive covenants in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 to be unambiguous. The ruling states, “Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs do not allow parking on the streets, but rather, provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” Therefore, Greenlaw’s decision to ban all street parking did not violate these amendments.

• Lack of Evidence for Harm: The ALJ noted that Mr. Lee “did not even allege that Greenlaw booted or towed one of his vehicles.” Furthermore, regarding the booted jeep he observed, “there was no evidence provided that the Greenlaw manager stated that Greenlaw was responsible for booting the jeep. Moreover, Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.”

Final Disposition

Petition Denied: The final order, issued April 22, 2019, following the rehearing, states: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

The decision concluded that Mr. Lee failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or its Rules and Regulations when it banned parking and contracted with a towing company. This order is final and binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two HOA

This study guide provides a review of the administrative legal case between Petitioner William P. Lee and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association, as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decisions No. 19F-H1918019-REL and No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the central dispute?

2. What was Petitioner William P. Lee’s main argument regarding the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?

3. On what grounds did the Greenlaw HOA claim it had the authority to ban all parking on its streets?

4. What three specific parking prohibitions were explicitly listed in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?

5. What was the significance of the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations in the judge’s final decisions?

6. How did Mr. Lee challenge the validity of the revised 2018 Rules and Regulations during the rehearing?

7. What legal standard of proof was required for Mr. Lee’s petition to succeed, and did the judge find that he met it?

8. According to the case findings, what evidence did Mr. Lee present to prove that Greenlaw was responsible for booting or towing member vehicles?

9. What was Greenlaw’s defense against the claim that it failed to provide proper notice of the new rules?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and the rehearing on April 1, 2019?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner William P. Lee, a townhouse owner, and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. The central dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s ban on all street parking and its contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles violated the community’s governing documents.

2. Mr. Lee argued that because CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3 only banned parking in specific scenarios (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles), they implicitly permitted parking at all other times. He contended that a total ban therefore violated these amendments.

3. The Greenlaw HOA argued that Section (I)(b) of its CC&Rs grants it control over the maintenance and use of common areas, which include the association’s streets. They contended this authority was sufficient to ban parking and contract with a towing company.

4. The three amendments prohibited parking in designated fire lanes, on subdivision roads during periods of snow removal, and for vehicles parked at curbside in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours.

5. The May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations explicitly banned parking on any association street at any time. The judge found these to be the controlling rules, superseding any previous versions, and that they “cured” any purported violations that may have occurred under older rules.

6. During the rehearing, Mr. Lee argued that the 2018 rules were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice. He contended that the association’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email as was done on July 6, 2018.

7. Mr. Lee was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Administrative Law Judge concluded in both decisions that Mr. Lee failed to meet this burden of proof.

8. Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep that had been booted but provided no evidence that Greenlaw was responsible for booting it or any other vehicles belonging to members. The judge found that he did not establish that Greenlaw had booted or towed any vehicles.

9. Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for notice by mail or personal delivery only applied to notices required by statute or the CC&Rs. The association contended it was not required by law or its CC&Rs to provide notice of an amendment to its Rules and Regulations in that specific manner.

10. The final outcome of both hearings was a denial of Mr. Lee’s petition. The Administrative Law Judge ordered in both the December 31, 2018 decision and the April 22, 2019 decision that the petition be denied because Mr. Lee failed to prove Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or Rules and Regulations.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a deeper analysis of the case. Develop an essay-format response for each, drawing evidence and examples from the case documents.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning of the Administrative Law Judge in determining that the CC&R amendments did not grant an affirmative right to park. How did the judge’s interpretation of “restrictive covenants” shape the outcome?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied to William P. Lee’s petition. Using specific examples from the hearings, explain why the judge concluded he failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

3. Trace the evolution of Mr. Lee’s arguments from the initial petition to the rehearing. How did his focus shift, particularly regarding the notification method for the revised Rules and Regulations, and what impact did this shift have on the proceedings?

4. Examine the conflicting interpretations of Greenlaw’s Bylaws regarding the proper method for notifying homeowners of changes. Evaluate the arguments made by both Mr. Lee and Greenlaw on this point and discuss which interpretation the judge implicitly supported.

5. The judge in the initial hearing noted that Greenlaw “has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.” Discuss the legal implications of this finding for homeowners’ associations and their ability to amend rules to address ongoing disputes.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings at government agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Answer (Legal)

A formal written response filed by the respondent to a petition, addressing the allegations made.

Bylaws

The formal rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners’ association. Greenlaw’s Bylaws were recorded on June 16, 1986.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A set of rules established by a developer or homeowners’ association that govern a planned community. All owners are legally bound by these rules.

Common Area

Property within a planned community that is owned by the homeowners’ association for the benefit and use of all lot owners. In this case, the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) are considered common areas.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from HOA members.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding where parties present evidence (such as testimony and exhibits) before a judge to resolve a factual dispute.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties and their residents.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona where administrative law judges conduct evidentiary hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, William P. Lee.

Petition

A formal written request to a court or administrative body, asking for a specific action or decision on a matter.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning the evidence must show that a claim is more likely to be true than not true. This was the burden of proof placed on Mr. Lee.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to allow for reconsideration of the initial decision, often based on new evidence or arguments.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document that limits the use of the property. The principle is that such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Rules and Regulations

A set of operational rules created by an HOA’s board that provide specific details on how to follow the broader principles outlined in the CC&Rs and Bylaws.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


5 Surprising Truths About HOA Power: Lessons from a Homeowner’s Losing Battle Over Parking

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is a delicate balance, and nowhere is this more apparent than with parking rules. A single violation notice can escalate into a years-long conflict. But what happens when a homeowner, convinced the HOA has overstepped its authority, decides to fight back?

William P. Lee believed his HOA’s governing documents were his shield. The court, however, ruled they were a blank check for the board’s authority. Mr. Lee took his HOA to court over a newly enacted, total ban on street parking, contending the rule was not only unreasonable but enacted merely to appease a board member who didn’t want cars parked behind her property. He lost his case, requested a rehearing, and lost again. His determined but ultimately failed battle provides a masterclass in the surprising and often counter-intuitive extent of an HOA’s power, revealing five critical lessons for every homeowner.

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1. What Isn’t Forbidden Can Still Be Banned

Mr. Lee’s primary argument was rooted in the community’s founding documents, the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He pointed out that the CC&Rs only prohibited parking in a few specific situations: in designated fire lanes, during snow removal, or for vehicles that were obviously abandoned. By his logic, if parking wasn’t explicitly forbidden at other times, it must be allowed.

The judge’s decision, however, hinged on a critical legal distinction. The ruling concluded that the CC&Rs did not grant an affirmative right to park on the streets; they only listed a few specific prohibitions. This legal gray area gave the HOA Board the authority to create new, more restrictive rules to fill in the gaps.

The Takeaway: This case is a stark warning about “permissive silence.” Homeowners should treat their CC&Rs not as a list of guaranteed rights, but as a minimum set of restrictions. The absence of a specific prohibition does not guarantee a right, and a future board can—and likely will—build upon those foundational rules to enact stricter policies.

2. The Board Can Retroactively ‘Cure’ Its Own Violations

Part of Mr. Lee’s case was that the HOA had been improperly booting vehicles back in 2017, under the old, more permissive rules. He argued that these past actions were a violation, regardless of any later changes.

The judge found that the HOA’s new rule effectively neutralized this argument. The decision explicitly states that even if the association had acted improperly in the past, “Greenlaw has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.”

The Takeaway: This finding sets a sobering precedent, revealing an HOA’s power to “move the goalposts” retroactively. By codifying its desired policy into a new rule, a board can effectively legitimize its past actions. This makes it incredibly difficult for homeowners to win disputes over actions that, while questionable at the time, are now sanctioned by current regulations.

3. The “Fine Print” Is Now a PDF Attachment

Mr. Lee also argued that the rule change itself was invalid because he was never properly notified. He cited the association’s 1986 Bylaws, which required official notices to be delivered personally or by postal mail.

The court rejected this argument. The HOA successfully contended—and the judge agreed—that the old bylaw for mail delivery was narrow in scope. It only applied to notices that were required to be sent to homeowners under statute or the CC&Rs, and there was no such underlying requirement for a simple rule change. Therefore, the court found that an email sent in early July 2018 with a PDF attachment titled “Greenlaw II Townhomes Rules and Regulations – May 2018.pdf” constituted sufficient legal notice.

The Takeaway: This ruling underscores the shifting legal definition of “notice” in the digital age. It creates a vulnerability for less tech-savvy residents or those simply overwhelmed by digital clutter. A routine email from your HOA can carry the full weight of a formal legal notice, and the excuse “I didn’t see the email” is no longer a valid defense.

4. An HOA Can Ban Parking on Streets It Owns

The new rule implemented by the Greenlaw HOA was absolute. Its language leaves no room for interpretation:

Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time. Eva, Heidi and Jeffrey Loops are not city streets. They are owned and maintained solely by the HOA. Under city code, the streets are considered “Private Fire Access Lanes.” Consequently, cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.

The critical factor here is ownership. The streets within the Greenlaw community were not public city streets; they were private property, common areas owned and maintained by the HOA. This distinction gave the board sweeping authority to control them.

The Takeaway: If your community’s streets are private property owned by the HOA, the board’s power to regulate them is immense—far exceeding what would be possible on public roads. As this case demonstrates, that authority can extend to a complete and total ban on all street parking, at any time.

5. Suspicion Isn’t Proof: The High Bar of Evidence

In any legal hearing, the person bringing the complaint has the “burden of proof.” Mr. Lee had to convince the judge that his claims were “more probably true than not,” a standard known as a “preponderance of the evidence.”

He failed to meet this standard. The court decision notes that he “provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.” While he testified to seeing a booted Jeep, his case unraveled under questioning. When he inquired with the HOA manager, her response was non-committal and did not admit responsibility. In court, Mr. Lee admitted he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” Critically, his own vehicle had never been booted or towed.

The Takeaway: There is a vast difference between observing something you believe to be a violation and proving it in a formal hearing. For any homeowner considering legal action, this is a vital lesson. Without documented, concrete evidence—admissions in emails, dated photos, official violation notices, or direct witness testimony—a complaint built on suspicion alone is likely to fail.

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Conclusion: The Vigilant Homeowner

The case of William P. Lee serves as a powerful illustration of the “presumption of board authority” that often prevails in community governance disputes. Courts tend to defer to the board’s interpretation of its own rules and its authority to act, unless there is an explicit, unambiguous violation of the law or the governing documents themselves. His story demonstrates that winning a dispute requires more than a sense of injustice; it demands a deep understanding that an HOA’s power is often broader and more flexible than many residents assume. For the modern homeowner, vigilance is not just a good idea—it is an essential practice.

This homeowner scrutinized the rules and bylaws, yet the board’s power expanded beyond them. Are you prepared for the rules you follow today to change tomorrow?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William P. Lee (petitioner)
    Testified on behalf of himself,

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Timothy D. Butterfield (respondent attorney)
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent for the initial hearing and rehearing,
  • Barbara (board member)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
    Board member who Petitioner alleged influenced policy

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge for the initial hearing and rehearing,
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate,

William P Lee v vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel —
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809; CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited governing documents (CC&Rs/Rules) or state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning street parking and contracting for vehicle booting/towing.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding violations of CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. The ALJ found the July 2018 revised Rules, which banned parking, were controlling.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation regarding banning parking and use of towing/booting company.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly banned street parking and contracted with a towing/booting company, arguing this violated specific CC&R amendments, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. He also claimed the 2018 revised Rules were invalid due to improper electronic notice instead of personal delivery or mail.

Orders: Petitioners’ petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Notice, Towing, Booting, A.R.S. 33-1803, A.R.S. 33-1809
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:10 (110.8 KB)

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918019-REL/678471.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:11 (118.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses HOA Parking Dispute

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”). The core of the dispute was Greenlaw’s 2018 implementation of a complete ban on street parking within the community and its subsequent contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles in violation.

Mr. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, alleged that this parking ban violated specific amendments to the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and was enacted through an invalid revision of the community’s Rules and Regulations.

Following an initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and a subsequent rehearing on April 1, 2019, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclusively denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The final decision, issued on April 22, 2019, determined that Mr. Lee failed to meet his burden of proof. The ALJ found that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which explicitly ban all street parking, were the controlling authority. Furthermore, the decision established that these rules do not conflict with the CC&R amendments, as the amendments only prohibit parking in specific, limited scenarios (e.g., fire lanes, snow removal) and do not grant a general right to park on association streets.

Case Overview

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (referred by the Department of Real Estate)

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner

William P. Lee

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”)

Key Dates

– Petition Filed: September 12, 2018
– Initial Hearing: December 13, 2018
– Rehearing: April 1, 2019
– Final Decision: April 22, 2019

Core Allegation

The central issue, as defined in the Notice of Hearing, was Mr. Lee’s single-issue petition alleging that Greenlaw “violated Community Document CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3 and Association Rules and Regulations… when it banned all parking on the association streets and contracted with a towing service to boot vehicles.”

Analysis of Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between Greenlaw’s CC&Rs, its Rules and Regulations, and its Bylaws.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

• Association Authority: Section (I)(b) of the CC&Rs grants Greenlaw ownership of the common areas, which include the streets in question (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops). It specifies that the “maintenance and use shall be controlled by the Association.”

• Parking Amendments: Amendments 1, 2, and 3 were central to Mr. Lee’s argument. These amendments add specific parking prohibitions to the CC&Rs under Article II, PERMITTED USES.

Amendment

Provision

Amendment #1

Prohibits parking in designated fire lanes, which are to be marked with signs and red-painted curbs after consultation with the Flagstaff Fire Marshal.

Amendment #2

Prohibits residents or visitors from parking on association roads during periods of snow removal. Violators may be towed at the vehicle owner’s expense.

Amendment #3

Prohibits parking vehicles at the curb side in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours. Such vehicles are considered abandoned and may be towed.

Rules and Regulations

• 2003 Revised Rules and Regulations: Mr. Lee contended that this was the controlling document and that it allowed for parking on association streets. He argued that Greenlaw’s booting of vehicles in 2017 was a violation of these rules.

• May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations: Greenlaw asserted that this was the new, controlling document, effective July 2018. Section 8 of these rules institutes a complete ban on street parking:

Association Bylaws (1986)

• Notice Requirement: Mr. Lee cited Article V, Section 1 of the Bylaws, which states that notices to lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.” This formed the basis of his argument that the email distribution of the 2018 rules was improper.

Key Arguments Presented

Petitioner (William P. Lee)

• Violation of CC&Rs: The general parking ban enacted in the 2018 Rules contradicted the CC&R amendments, which only banned parking in specific situations.

• Invalidity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revision as required by the 1986 Bylaws, instead sending an email which he contended was insufficient and unclear.

• Controlling Document: The 2003 Rules, which he claimed permitted street parking, should be considered the controlling authority.

• Improper Motivation: The parking ban was enacted solely to appease a board member, Barbara, who did not want cars parked behind her property.

• Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted and that the Greenlaw manager’s response to his inquiry confirmed the association’s policy.

Respondent (Greenlaw HOA)

• Authority Over Common Areas: The CC&Rs grant Greenlaw the authority to control the use of association streets.

• Validity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were properly adopted and represent the current, controlling regulations.

• No Conflict with CC&Rs: The CC&R amendments do not authorize parking; they are a list of specific prohibitions. A general ban on parking does not conflict with these specific restrictions.

• Notice Sufficiency: Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or postal mail delivery only applies to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs, not to amendments to the Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive the revised rules via email on July 6, 2018.

• Cure of Prior Violations: Any alleged violation of the prior (2003) rules was rendered moot and “cured” by the valid enactment of the May 2018 revised rules.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The ALJ’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, leading to the denial of Mr. Lee’s petition.

• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Lee, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” In both decisions, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Lee failed to meet this standard. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

• Controlling Authority: The “weight of the evidence presented at hearing” showed that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were the controlling rules at the time the petition was filed. Mr. Lee failed to establish that the 2003 Rules were still in effect.

• Interpretation of CC&Rs: The ALJ found the restrictive covenants in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 to be unambiguous. The ruling states, “Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs do not allow parking on the streets, but rather, provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” Therefore, Greenlaw’s decision to ban all street parking did not violate these amendments.

• Lack of Evidence for Harm: The ALJ noted that Mr. Lee “did not even allege that Greenlaw booted or towed one of his vehicles.” Furthermore, regarding the booted jeep he observed, “there was no evidence provided that the Greenlaw manager stated that Greenlaw was responsible for booting the jeep. Moreover, Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.”

Final Disposition

Petition Denied: The final order, issued April 22, 2019, following the rehearing, states: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

The decision concluded that Mr. Lee failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or its Rules and Regulations when it banned parking and contracted with a towing company. This order is final and binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two HOA

This study guide provides a review of the administrative legal case between Petitioner William P. Lee and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association, as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decisions No. 19F-H1918019-REL and No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the central dispute?

2. What was Petitioner William P. Lee’s main argument regarding the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?

3. On what grounds did the Greenlaw HOA claim it had the authority to ban all parking on its streets?

4. What three specific parking prohibitions were explicitly listed in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?

5. What was the significance of the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations in the judge’s final decisions?

6. How did Mr. Lee challenge the validity of the revised 2018 Rules and Regulations during the rehearing?

7. What legal standard of proof was required for Mr. Lee’s petition to succeed, and did the judge find that he met it?

8. According to the case findings, what evidence did Mr. Lee present to prove that Greenlaw was responsible for booting or towing member vehicles?

9. What was Greenlaw’s defense against the claim that it failed to provide proper notice of the new rules?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and the rehearing on April 1, 2019?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner William P. Lee, a townhouse owner, and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. The central dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s ban on all street parking and its contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles violated the community’s governing documents.

2. Mr. Lee argued that because CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3 only banned parking in specific scenarios (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles), they implicitly permitted parking at all other times. He contended that a total ban therefore violated these amendments.

3. The Greenlaw HOA argued that Section (I)(b) of its CC&Rs grants it control over the maintenance and use of common areas, which include the association’s streets. They contended this authority was sufficient to ban parking and contract with a towing company.

4. The three amendments prohibited parking in designated fire lanes, on subdivision roads during periods of snow removal, and for vehicles parked at curbside in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours.

5. The May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations explicitly banned parking on any association street at any time. The judge found these to be the controlling rules, superseding any previous versions, and that they “cured” any purported violations that may have occurred under older rules.

6. During the rehearing, Mr. Lee argued that the 2018 rules were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice. He contended that the association’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email as was done on July 6, 2018.

7. Mr. Lee was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Administrative Law Judge concluded in both decisions that Mr. Lee failed to meet this burden of proof.

8. Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep that had been booted but provided no evidence that Greenlaw was responsible for booting it or any other vehicles belonging to members. The judge found that he did not establish that Greenlaw had booted or towed any vehicles.

9. Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for notice by mail or personal delivery only applied to notices required by statute or the CC&Rs. The association contended it was not required by law or its CC&Rs to provide notice of an amendment to its Rules and Regulations in that specific manner.

10. The final outcome of both hearings was a denial of Mr. Lee’s petition. The Administrative Law Judge ordered in both the December 31, 2018 decision and the April 22, 2019 decision that the petition be denied because Mr. Lee failed to prove Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or Rules and Regulations.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a deeper analysis of the case. Develop an essay-format response for each, drawing evidence and examples from the case documents.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning of the Administrative Law Judge in determining that the CC&R amendments did not grant an affirmative right to park. How did the judge’s interpretation of “restrictive covenants” shape the outcome?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied to William P. Lee’s petition. Using specific examples from the hearings, explain why the judge concluded he failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

3. Trace the evolution of Mr. Lee’s arguments from the initial petition to the rehearing. How did his focus shift, particularly regarding the notification method for the revised Rules and Regulations, and what impact did this shift have on the proceedings?

4. Examine the conflicting interpretations of Greenlaw’s Bylaws regarding the proper method for notifying homeowners of changes. Evaluate the arguments made by both Mr. Lee and Greenlaw on this point and discuss which interpretation the judge implicitly supported.

5. The judge in the initial hearing noted that Greenlaw “has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.” Discuss the legal implications of this finding for homeowners’ associations and their ability to amend rules to address ongoing disputes.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings at government agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Answer (Legal)

A formal written response filed by the respondent to a petition, addressing the allegations made.

Bylaws

The formal rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners’ association. Greenlaw’s Bylaws were recorded on June 16, 1986.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A set of rules established by a developer or homeowners’ association that govern a planned community. All owners are legally bound by these rules.

Common Area

Property within a planned community that is owned by the homeowners’ association for the benefit and use of all lot owners. In this case, the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) are considered common areas.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from HOA members.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding where parties present evidence (such as testimony and exhibits) before a judge to resolve a factual dispute.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties and their residents.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona where administrative law judges conduct evidentiary hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, William P. Lee.

Petition

A formal written request to a court or administrative body, asking for a specific action or decision on a matter.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning the evidence must show that a claim is more likely to be true than not true. This was the burden of proof placed on Mr. Lee.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to allow for reconsideration of the initial decision, often based on new evidence or arguments.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document that limits the use of the property. The principle is that such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Rules and Regulations

A set of operational rules created by an HOA’s board that provide specific details on how to follow the broader principles outlined in the CC&Rs and Bylaws.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


5 Surprising Truths About HOA Power: Lessons from a Homeowner’s Losing Battle Over Parking

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is a delicate balance, and nowhere is this more apparent than with parking rules. A single violation notice can escalate into a years-long conflict. But what happens when a homeowner, convinced the HOA has overstepped its authority, decides to fight back?

William P. Lee believed his HOA’s governing documents were his shield. The court, however, ruled they were a blank check for the board’s authority. Mr. Lee took his HOA to court over a newly enacted, total ban on street parking, contending the rule was not only unreasonable but enacted merely to appease a board member who didn’t want cars parked behind her property. He lost his case, requested a rehearing, and lost again. His determined but ultimately failed battle provides a masterclass in the surprising and often counter-intuitive extent of an HOA’s power, revealing five critical lessons for every homeowner.

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1. What Isn’t Forbidden Can Still Be Banned

Mr. Lee’s primary argument was rooted in the community’s founding documents, the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He pointed out that the CC&Rs only prohibited parking in a few specific situations: in designated fire lanes, during snow removal, or for vehicles that were obviously abandoned. By his logic, if parking wasn’t explicitly forbidden at other times, it must be allowed.

The judge’s decision, however, hinged on a critical legal distinction. The ruling concluded that the CC&Rs did not grant an affirmative right to park on the streets; they only listed a few specific prohibitions. This legal gray area gave the HOA Board the authority to create new, more restrictive rules to fill in the gaps.

The Takeaway: This case is a stark warning about “permissive silence.” Homeowners should treat their CC&Rs not as a list of guaranteed rights, but as a minimum set of restrictions. The absence of a specific prohibition does not guarantee a right, and a future board can—and likely will—build upon those foundational rules to enact stricter policies.

2. The Board Can Retroactively ‘Cure’ Its Own Violations

Part of Mr. Lee’s case was that the HOA had been improperly booting vehicles back in 2017, under the old, more permissive rules. He argued that these past actions were a violation, regardless of any later changes.

The judge found that the HOA’s new rule effectively neutralized this argument. The decision explicitly states that even if the association had acted improperly in the past, “Greenlaw has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.”

The Takeaway: This finding sets a sobering precedent, revealing an HOA’s power to “move the goalposts” retroactively. By codifying its desired policy into a new rule, a board can effectively legitimize its past actions. This makes it incredibly difficult for homeowners to win disputes over actions that, while questionable at the time, are now sanctioned by current regulations.

3. The “Fine Print” Is Now a PDF Attachment

Mr. Lee also argued that the rule change itself was invalid because he was never properly notified. He cited the association’s 1986 Bylaws, which required official notices to be delivered personally or by postal mail.

The court rejected this argument. The HOA successfully contended—and the judge agreed—that the old bylaw for mail delivery was narrow in scope. It only applied to notices that were required to be sent to homeowners under statute or the CC&Rs, and there was no such underlying requirement for a simple rule change. Therefore, the court found that an email sent in early July 2018 with a PDF attachment titled “Greenlaw II Townhomes Rules and Regulations – May 2018.pdf” constituted sufficient legal notice.

The Takeaway: This ruling underscores the shifting legal definition of “notice” in the digital age. It creates a vulnerability for less tech-savvy residents or those simply overwhelmed by digital clutter. A routine email from your HOA can carry the full weight of a formal legal notice, and the excuse “I didn’t see the email” is no longer a valid defense.

4. An HOA Can Ban Parking on Streets It Owns

The new rule implemented by the Greenlaw HOA was absolute. Its language leaves no room for interpretation:

Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time. Eva, Heidi and Jeffrey Loops are not city streets. They are owned and maintained solely by the HOA. Under city code, the streets are considered “Private Fire Access Lanes.” Consequently, cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.

The critical factor here is ownership. The streets within the Greenlaw community were not public city streets; they were private property, common areas owned and maintained by the HOA. This distinction gave the board sweeping authority to control them.

The Takeaway: If your community’s streets are private property owned by the HOA, the board’s power to regulate them is immense—far exceeding what would be possible on public roads. As this case demonstrates, that authority can extend to a complete and total ban on all street parking, at any time.

5. Suspicion Isn’t Proof: The High Bar of Evidence

In any legal hearing, the person bringing the complaint has the “burden of proof.” Mr. Lee had to convince the judge that his claims were “more probably true than not,” a standard known as a “preponderance of the evidence.”

He failed to meet this standard. The court decision notes that he “provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.” While he testified to seeing a booted Jeep, his case unraveled under questioning. When he inquired with the HOA manager, her response was non-committal and did not admit responsibility. In court, Mr. Lee admitted he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” Critically, his own vehicle had never been booted or towed.

The Takeaway: There is a vast difference between observing something you believe to be a violation and proving it in a formal hearing. For any homeowner considering legal action, this is a vital lesson. Without documented, concrete evidence—admissions in emails, dated photos, official violation notices, or direct witness testimony—a complaint built on suspicion alone is likely to fail.

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Conclusion: The Vigilant Homeowner

The case of William P. Lee serves as a powerful illustration of the “presumption of board authority” that often prevails in community governance disputes. Courts tend to defer to the board’s interpretation of its own rules and its authority to act, unless there is an explicit, unambiguous violation of the law or the governing documents themselves. His story demonstrates that winning a dispute requires more than a sense of injustice; it demands a deep understanding that an HOA’s power is often broader and more flexible than many residents assume. For the modern homeowner, vigilance is not just a good idea—it is an essential practice.

This homeowner scrutinized the rules and bylaws, yet the board’s power expanded beyond them. Are you prepared for the rules you follow today to change tomorrow?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William P. Lee (petitioner)
    Testified on behalf of himself,

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Timothy D. Butterfield (respondent attorney)
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent for the initial hearing and rehearing,
  • Barbara (board member)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
    Board member who Petitioner alleged influenced policy

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge for the initial hearing and rehearing,
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate,