Category Archives: HOA Cases

Linda Curtin vs. The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918034-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-05
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Linda Curtin Counsel —
Respondent The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel —

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner established that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide access to requested association records within the statutory ten-day period. The petition was granted and Respondent was ordered to reimburse the $500.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide timely access to association financial records

Petitioner filed a single-issue petition alleging Respondent violated CC&Rs § 4.8 and A.R.S. § 33-1805 by refusing to make available association records or to produce a receipt identifying a contractor and the amount paid for a cinderblock wall built by the community’s clubhouse.

Orders: The petition was granted because Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide access to records within ten days of Petitioner’s September 12, 2018 request. Respondent was ordered to reimburse the $500.00 filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • CC&R § 4.8

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records, Record Inspection, Timely Disclosure, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Reimbursement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • CC&R § 4.8
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918034-REL Decision – 692859.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:04 (151.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918034-REL


Briefing Document: Curtin v. The Ridge at Diamante del Lago HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 19F-H1918034-REL, a dispute between homeowner Linda Curtin and The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc. (HOA). The central conflict arose from the HOA’s failure to provide financial records related to a small construction project within the timeframe mandated by Arizona law.

The petitioner, Ms. Curtin, alleged that the HOA violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805 by not producing an invoice for a $1,000 cinderblock wall project at the community clubhouse. While the HOA did eventually provide the requested records, the ALJ found that it failed to do so within the legally required ten-day period following Ms. Curtin’s formal written request on September 12, 2018.

Consequently, the ALJ granted the petition in favor of Ms. Curtin, ruling that the HOA was in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The HOA was ordered to reimburse Ms. Curtin for her $500 petition filing fee. However, the ALJ dismissed all of the petitioner’s ancillary complaints, including suspicions of forgery, concerns about the contractor’s licensing status, and other issues of HOA governance, deeming them either unsubstantiated or outside the narrow scope of the single-issue petition. The ruling underscores the strict procedural compliance required of HOAs regarding member record requests while limiting the scope of such legal challenges to the specific violations alleged.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview

• Case Number: 19F-H1918034-REL

• Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Petitioner: Linda Curtin (“Complainant”), a homeowner and HOA member.

• Respondent: The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc. (“HOA”), represented by Community Manager Tracy Schofield.

• Administrative Law Judge: Diane Mihalsky

• Core Allegation: The HOA violated its governing documents and state law by failing to make association records available to a member upon request. Specifically, the petitioner sought a receipt and contractor details for a cinderblock wall built at the community clubhouse.

II. Governing Rules and Statutes

The case centered on the interpretation and enforcement of the HOA’s internal rules and a specific Arizona statute governing planned communities.

Rule/Statute

Key Provision

CC&R § 4.8

Requires the HOA Board to keep “true and correct records of account in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles” and to make such books and records available for inspection by all owners upon request during normal business hours.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Mandates that all financial and other association records be made “reasonably available for examination” by any member. The statute explicitly requires the association to fulfill a request for examination within ten business days. A similar ten-day deadline applies for providing copies of records.

The respondent did not claim any legal privilege under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B) that would permit it to withhold the requested documents.

III. Chronology of the Dispute

The conflict unfolded over several months, beginning with an informal inquiry and escalating to a formal legal petition.

• August 1, 2018: Petitioner Linda Curtin first emails Community Manager Tracy Schofield for a contractor recommendation.

• August 2 – September 11, 2018: In a subsequent email exchange, Ms. Curtin asks who built the garbage can walls at the clubhouse. Ms. Schofield provides the name “Roberto” but is unable to provide a contact number, stating that the Board’s Treasurer, Jim Mackiewicz, had arranged the work. The petitioner later characterized this exchange as “evasive.”

• September 12, 2018: Ms. Curtin sends a formal written letter requesting “a copy of the invoice submitted to The Ridge HOA” for the wall construction. This action officially started the ten-day clock under A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

• September 24, 2018: Ms. Schofield responds, stating that she does not have the invoices at her office as records are retained “in the community.” She provides a printout of payments made to contractor Gualberto Castro, which includes a $1,000 check dated November 1, 2017, for “Block work – clubhouse.”

• November 5, 2018: Ms. Curtin requests that the invoice be brought to that day’s HOA board meeting. The document is not provided.

• November 28, 2018: After making an additional 15 phone calls regarding related meeting minutes without a satisfactory response, Ms. Curtin files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• December 10, 2018: The HOA files its answer, claiming the issue has been resolved. On the same day, Ms. Schofield emails the contractor’s invoice to Ms. Curtin. The invoice, from ValleyWide Custom Painting Inc. and dated November 2, 2017, details the $1,000 job.

• December 11, 2018: Ms. Curtin requests additional documents, including a copy of the cashed check and the Architectural Control Committee (ACC) application for the project. Ms. Schofield is reported to have stated that ACC approval was not applicable to work on common areas.

• Post-December 11, 2018: Ms. Schofield eventually provides a copy of the cancelled check for $1,000 made payable to Mr. Castro.

• February 20, 2019: An evidentiary hearing is held before the ALJ.

IV. Analysis of Evidence and Arguments

A. Petitioner’s Position

Ms. Curtin’s case was built on the initial failure to produce records and expanded to include broader suspicions about the HOA’s conduct.

• Primary Claim: The HOA violated state law by failing to fulfill her September 12, 2018 request for records within the ten-day statutory period.

• Suspicions about Documentation: The petitioner expressed dissatisfaction with the documents eventually provided. She opined that the November 2, 2017 receipt “appeared to have two different kinds of handwriting and might be a forgery.” She also pointed to the fact that the check for payment was dated one day before the invoice date.

• Ancillary Governance Concerns: Ms. Curtin raised several issues beyond the scope of her petition, including:

◦ The contractor, Mr. Castro, was not licensed as required by the Registrar of Contractors.

◦ The Board meeting minutes did not show authorization for the $1,000 expenditure.

◦ The HOA’s ACC approval process was not followed for the wall.

◦ A separate, unrelated $125,000 pool remodel project was approved improperly (this was refuted by Ms. Schofield’s testimony that it required a membership vote).

B. Respondent’s Position

The HOA, through Ms. Schofield, acknowledged the delay but argued it had ultimately complied and faced logistical constraints.

• Eventual Compliance: The HOA’s primary defense was that it eventually provided all the documents in its possession related to the expenditure, thereby resolving the complaint.

• Logistical Challenges: Ms. Schofield testified that she is an off-site community manager for numerous associations and does not keep records in her office. She stated that the HOA’s records are stored “in the community” at a separate depository.

• Commitment to Future Compliance: Ms. Schofield testified that for any future requests, she would schedule a time for the petitioner to review records at the depository within the ten-day window.

• Communication: Ms. Schofield maintained that she “communicated with Petitioner on every issue” and provided what information she had available.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision was narrowly focused on the statutory violation, setting aside the petitioner’s other grievances.

A. Conclusions of Law

1. Violation Confirmed: The judge concluded that the petitioner successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The HOA “acknowledged that it did not provide the documents or provide access to Petitioner to view the documents within ten days of Petitioner’s September 12, 2018 request.”

2. Scope of Relief Limited: The ALJ determined that the statute only requires that records be kept and made available in a timely manner. The law “has not authorized the Department… that HOAs produce records that satisfy all of a members’ stated concerns.”

3. Ancillary Claims Dismissed: The judge explicitly rejected the petitioner’s broader concerns, stating: “Petitioner’s concern with ‘transparency’ and dissatisfaction and suspicions about the records that were eventually provided do not entitle her to any additional relief in this forum.” The forgery claim was dismissed for lack of evidence, as Ms. Curtin did not present the opinion of a handwriting expert. The issues related to contractor licensing and internal HOA procedures were deemed outside the jurisdiction of the hearing for an HOA petition.

B. Recommended Order

Based on the findings, the ALJ issued a two-part order:

1. Petition Granted: The petition was granted on the grounds that Ms. Curtin had proven the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

2. Reimbursement of Filing Fee: The HOA was ordered to reimburse the petitioner the $500.00 she paid to file the single-issue petition.

The order, issued on March 5, 2019, was declared binding on both parties unless a request for rehearing was filed within 30 days.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918034-REL


Study Guide: Curtin v. The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918034-REL, involving Petitioner Linda Curtin and Respondent The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test comprehension, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based exclusively on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who are the primary parties involved in this case and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the central allegation in the single-issue petition filed by Linda Curtin on November 28, 2018?

3. Which specific Arizona Revised Statute and CC&R section did the Petitioner claim the Respondent violated?

4. How did the HOA, through its community manager, initially attempt to resolve the records request that led to the petition?

5. What additional documents did Ms. Curtin request after receiving the contractor’s invoice on December 10, 2018?

6. What were Ms. Curtin’s specific suspicions and complaints regarding the quality and validity of the documents she eventually received?

7. What was Community Manager Tracy Schofield’s testimony regarding her role and the location of the association’s records?

8. According to the “Conclusions of Law,” what is the primary requirement of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) regarding member requests for records?

9. On what specific point did the Administrative Law Judge find that the Respondent had violated the statute?

10. What was the final Recommended Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Linda Curtin, the Petitioner and a homeowner, and The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc., the Respondent. Tracy Schofield appeared for the HOA as its Community Manager, and Diane Mihalsky served as the Administrative Law Judge.

2. The central allegation was that the HOA violated its own rules and state law by refusing to make association records available. Specifically, Ms. Curtin sought a receipt identifying the contractor and the amount paid for a cinderblock wall built by the community clubhouse.

3. The Petitioner claimed the Respondent violated CC&R § 4.8, concerning the keeping and availability of accounting records, and A.R.S. § 33-1805, which governs the examination of association records by members.

4. On September 24, 2018, Ms. Schofield responded to Ms. Curtin’s written request by stating she did not have invoices at her office. She did, however, provide a printout of payments made to the contractor, Gaulberto Castro, which included a $1,000.00 payment for “Block work – clubhouse.”

5. After receiving the invoice, Ms. Curtin requested a copy of the cashed check (front and back), the payee’s mailing address, and the completed Architectural Control Committee Application for the project, including the contractor’s address, license number, and insurance company.

6. Ms. Curtin complained that the contractor, Mr. Castro, was not licensed and that the job did not meet the exemption requirements for the Registrar of Contractors. She also opined that the receipt from November 2, 2017, appeared to be a forgery with two different kinds of handwriting.

7. Ms. Schofield testified that she is not an onsite manager, works for numerous associations, and does not keep any association records in her office. She stated that for future requests, she would schedule a time for Ms. Curtin to view the records at the Respondent’s records depository.

8. The primary requirement of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) is that all financial and other records of an association must be made reasonably available for examination by any member. The statute mandates that the association has ten business days to fulfill a request for examination or to provide copies.

9. The Judge found that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) because, while it eventually provided all documents in its possession, it failed to provide the documents or access to them within the statutorily required ten-day period following Ms. Curtin’s September 12, 2018 request.

10. The Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be granted because she established the violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The Judge further ordered that the Respondent reimburse Ms. Curtin the $500.00 she paid to file her single-issue petition.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses using only the evidence and legal reasoning presented in the source document.

1. Analyze the timeline of communication between Linda Curtin and Tracy Schofield, from the initial informal inquiry on August 1, 2018, to the formal petition. How did the nature of the requests and the quality of the responses contribute to the escalation of the dispute?

2. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge used this standard to find the Respondent in violation of the ten-day rule while simultaneously dismissing the Petitioner’s other concerns about transparency and forgery.

3. The Petitioner raised several issues during the hearing that were not part of her original single-issue petition, such as the contractor’s licensing status, the lack of Board meeting minutes authorizing the project, and a proposed $125,000 pool remodel. Why did the Administrative Law Judge deem these points irrelevant to the final decision?

4. Evaluate the responsibilities of a Homeowners Association regarding record-keeping and member access as outlined in CC&R § 4.8 and A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). Based on the testimony and evidence, describe the specific procedural failures of The Ridge at Diamante del Lago HOA in this matter.

5. The Judge’s decision explicitly states that the Petitioner’s “dissatisfaction and suspicions about the records that were eventually provided do not entitle her to any additional relief in this forum.” Explore the distinction the ruling makes between a procedural violation (timeliness of access) and the substantive content or perceived legitimacy of the records themselves.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Diane Mihalsky of the Office of Administrative Hearings served as the ALJ.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

An Arizona Revised Statute requiring that all financial and other records of a homeowners association be made reasonably available for examination by any member within ten business days of a request.

Complainant

An alternative term used in the document to refer to the Petitioner, Linda Curtin.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing documents that create and define the rules for a planned community. In this case, CC&R § 4.8, which deals with accounting records, was cited.

Department (The)

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions for hearings from HOA members and HOAs.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding where evidence is presented and testimony is given before an administrative law judge to resolve a factual dispute. The hearing in this case took place on February 20, 2019.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a planned community that creates and enforces rules for the properties and its members. The Respondent is The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner is Linda Curtin, a homeowner and member of the Respondent HOA.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has greater weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other. The Petitioner bears this burden of proof.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent is The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc.

Restrictive Covenants

Legal obligations imposed in a deed upon the buyer of real estate. The document notes that if unambiguous, they are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Linda Curtin (petitioner)
    Also referred to as 'Complainant'; testified on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Tracy Schofield (community manager)
    The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association
    Appeared for Respondent and testified as Community Manager
  • Jim Mackiewicz (board member)
    The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association
    Board Treasurer
  • Mitch Kellogg (statutory agent)
    The Ridge at Diamante del Lago Homeowners Association, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Gualberto Castro (contractor)
    Gualberto Stucco & Repairs
    Contractor involved in the disputed work
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Transmitted decision electronically

Rogelio A. Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-04
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Rogelio A. Garcia Counsel —
Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1242

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition based on a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 because the Petitioner's failure to respond by certified mail within 21 days meant the HOA's duties to provide further information or notice of the right to petition ADRE were never triggered.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof to show that the Respondent committed the alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was deemed not obligated to provide the specific statutory disclosures because the Petitioner did not respond to the notices of violation by certified mail within 21 calendar days.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of HOA notice requirements

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 by failing to provide specific information (observer name, notice of ADRE petition right) and restricting the 21-day response period in violation notices concerning short term lease provisions. The ALJ found that because the Petitioner did not respond by certified mail within 21 days, the HOA was not required to provide the information under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) or the notice of administrative hearing option under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D).

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, notice of violation, statutory interpretation, right to respond, administrative hearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918009-REL-RHG Decision – 692638.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:25 (89.4 KB)

19F-H1918009-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918009-REL/671673.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:48:37 (85.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the findings, arguments, and conclusions from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Rogelio A. Garcia and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (“Villagio”). The core of the dispute was Mr. Garcia’s allegation that Villagio violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1242 in its handling of violation notices related to an alleged breach of short-term rental policies.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, finding that he failed to meet the burden of proof. The decisions consistently hinged on a critical point: Mr. Garcia did not respond to Villagio’s violation notices by certified mail within the 21-day period prescribed by the statute. This failure meant that the HOA’s subsequent obligations under the statute—specifically, to provide the name of the violation’s observer and to give notice of the right to a state administrative hearing—were never triggered. Villagio successfully argued that by including its own internal appeal process in the violation notices, it had fulfilled its legal requirements under the circumstances. The final ruling deemed Villagio the prevailing party, with the decision after rehearing being binding on both parties.

Background of the Dispute

The case, No. 19F-H1918009-REL, was adjudicated by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson within the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, following a petition filed by Mr. Garcia with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Timeline of Notices and Fines

Villagio issued a series of notices to Mr. Garcia alleging that his unit was being rented in violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) regarding short-term leases.

Date of Notice

Allegation / Action Taken

Instructions Provided to Homeowner

March 8, 2018

Alleged violation of short-term lease provisions.

“If you wish to contest this notice… file an appeal with the Board of Directors… Requests for an appeal must be received within 10 days of receipt of this notice.”

March 22, 2018

A fine of $1,000 posted to Mr. Garcia’s account for the ongoing violation.

Same instructions to appeal within 10 days. The notice also included the phrase, “Please bring this issue into compliance within 10 days of this notice.”

April 5, 2018

A fine of $2,000 posted to Mr. Garcia’s account for the ongoing violation.

Same instructions to appeal within 10 days.

Procedural History

1. Violation Notices: Villagio sent the three notices in March and April 2018.

2. Homeowner Inaction (Statutory): Mr. Garcia did not respond to any of the notices by sending a certified letter within the 21-day period allowed by A.R.S. § 33-1242(B).

3. Homeowner Action (Internal): Mr. Garcia did eventually file an appeal with Villagio regarding the violation and fines, but the HOA did not change its position.

4. Petition Filed: On or about August 17, 2018, Mr. Garcia filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Villagio violated state statutes.

5. Initial Hearing: An evidentiary hearing was held on October 30, 2018.

6. First Decision: On November 19, 2018, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.

7. Rehearing Granted: Mr. Garcia requested a rehearing, which was granted and scheduled.

8. Rehearing: The rehearing was held on February 12, 2019, with testimony from Mr. Garcia and Tom Gordon, Villagio’s Community Manager.

9. Final Decision: On March 4, 2019, the ALJ issued a final decision again dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition. This order was declared binding and appealable only to the superior court.

Core Legal Arguments and Statutory Interpretation

The case centered on the interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 33-1242, which governs the process for notifying and responding to violations of condominium documents.

Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1242

• Section (B): A unit owner receiving a violation notice may provide the association with a written response via certified mail within 21 calendar days of the notice date.

• Section (C): If the owner sends a response as described in Section (B), the association must then respond within 10 business days with specific information, including the name of the person who observed the violation and the process to contest the notice.

• Section (D): An association must give a unit owner written notice of their option to petition for a state administrative hearing unless the information regarding the contest process (required in Section C, paragraph 4) is already provided in the initial violation notice.

Petitioner’s Position (Rogelio A. Garcia)

Mr. Garcia argued that Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 on several grounds:

• The violation letters did not allow him to respond by certified mail within 21 days.

• The notices failed to include the first and last name of the person(s) who observed the violation.

• The notices failed to inform him of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department.

• During the rehearing, he contended that Villagio effectively prevented him from using the 21-day statutory response period. He claimed the rapid succession of notices (14 days apart) and the language demanding compliance “within 10 days” led him to believe he “would only be 10 days before he would acquire another violation.”

Respondent’s Position (Villagio at Tempe HOA)

Villagio disputed all of Mr. Garcia’s allegations, arguing that its actions were fully compliant with the statute:

• The obligation to provide the observer’s name under Section (C) is only triggered after the homeowner first submits a timely certified mail response, which Mr. Garcia failed to do.

• The obligation to provide notice of the right to a state administrative hearing under Section (D) was not applicable because Villagio did provide its internal process for contesting the notice in every letter sent.

• They did not prevent Mr. Garcia from responding. At the rehearing, Mr. Garcia admitted under cross-examination that he was not prohibited by any court order from sending a response.

• Villagio’s Community Manager, Tom Gordon, testified that while the HOA’s policy gives homeowners 10 days to contest internally, the association does not restrict them from also using the 21-day statutory response period.

• As a further defense in the rehearing, Villagio argued that A.R.S. § 33-1242 was not applicable at all, asserting the statute addresses violations concerning the “condition of the property,” whereas Mr. Garcia’s violation concerned the “use of his property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, ruling decisively in favor of the Respondent, Villagio.

Burden of Proof

In both decisions, the Judge established that Mr. Garcia, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof to show that a violation occurred. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the “most convincing force.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Homeowner’s Failure to Respond Was Decisive: The Judge found it was “undisputed” that Mr. Garcia did not respond to any of the three notices within the 21-day period via certified mail. This failure was the central reason his petition was dismissed.

2. HOA Obligations Were Not Triggered: Because Mr. Garcia did not initiate the process described in A.R.S. § 33-1242(B), Villagio’s corresponding obligation under Section (C) to provide the observer’s name was never activated.

3. Internal Appeal Process Satisfied Statutory Requirement: The Judge concluded that because Villagio included instructions on how to contest the notice (i.e., appeal to the Board of Directors) in its letters, it was not required under Section (D) to provide separate notice of the right to a state administrative hearing.

4. No Evidence of Prevention: The Judge found that Mr. Garcia “provided no evidence to establish that Villagio prevented him from responding.” The issuance of subsequent notices and fines before the 21-day period had lapsed was not found to constitute a legal barrier that prevented Mr. Garcia from exercising his statutory right to respond.

5. Final Order: Mr. Garcia failed to establish that Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. His petition was ordered to be dismissed, and Villagio was deemed the prevailing party. The order issued after the rehearing on March 4, 2019, is binding on the parties and can only be appealed by seeking judicial review in the superior court within 35 days of service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided source documents.

1. What was the initial violation alleged by the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Villagio) against Rogelio A. Garcia?

2. According to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(B), what specific action must a unit owner take after receiving a violation notice to trigger the association’s obligations under subsection C?

3. Who bears the burden of proof in this type of administrative hearing, and what is the standard of proof required?

4. Why did the Administrative Law Judge rule that Villagio was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with the name of the person who observed the violation?

5. What was Mr. Garcia’s primary argument during the February 12, 2019 rehearing for why he felt he was prevented from responding to the violation notices?

6. What argument did Villagio present at the rehearing distinguishing between the “condition” of a property and the “use” of a property?

7. What two fines were imposed on Mr. Garcia’s account, and on what dates were the notices sent?

8. Why did the Judge conclude that Villagio was not obligated to inform Mr. Garcia of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department?

9. What was the testimony of Tom Gordon, the Community Manager for Villagio, regarding the association’s policy for contesting a notice?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on October 30, 2018, and the rehearing on February 12, 2019?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. What was the initial violation alleged by the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Villagio) against Rogelio A. Garcia? The initial violation alleged by Villagio was that Mr. Garcia’s unit was being rented in violation of the short-term lease provisions located in Villagio’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The first notice of this violation was mailed to Mr. Garcia on March 8, 2018.

2. According to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(B), what specific action must a unit owner take after receiving a violation notice to trigger the association’s obligations under subsection C? To trigger the association’s obligations, a unit owner who receives a written notice of violation must provide the association with a written response. This response must be sent by certified mail within twenty-one calendar days after the date of the notice.

3. Who bears the burden of proof in this type of administrative hearing, and what is the standard of proof required? The petitioner, Mr. Garcia, bears the burden of proof to show that the respondent committed the alleged violation. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as evidence with the most convincing force that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue.

4. Why did the Administrative Law Judge rule that Villagio was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with the name of the person who observed the violation? The judge ruled that Villagio was not required to provide the observer’s name because that obligation is only triggered after a unit owner responds to the violation notice in writing by certified mail within 21 days. It is undisputed that Mr. Garcia did not respond to the notices within the 21-day period, so Villagio’s obligation was never activated.

5. What was Mr. Garcia’s primary argument during the February 12, 2019 rehearing for why he felt he was prevented from responding to the violation notices? Mr. Garcia argued that Villagio prevented him from responding by certified mail within 21 days because it failed to wait 21 days before issuing additional notices and imposing fines. He stated that the notices’ language requiring compliance within 10 days made him believe he would acquire another violation before the 21-day statutory response period had passed.

6. What argument did Villagio present at the rehearing distinguishing between the “condition” of a property and the “use” of a property? Villagio contended that A.R.S. § 33-1242 does not apply to this case at all because the statute addresses violations related to the “condition” of the property. Villagio argued that it notified Mr. Garcia that the “use” of his property violated its short-term rental policy, not that a physical condition of the property was in violation.

7. What two fines were imposed on Mr. Garcia’s account, and on what dates were the notices sent? A fine of $1,000 was posted to Mr. Garcia’s account, with the notice being sent on March 22, 2018. Subsequently, a $2,000 fine was posted to his account for the same violation, and that notice was sent on April 5, 2018.

8. Why did the Judge conclude that Villagio was not obligated to inform Mr. Garcia of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department? The Judge concluded that Villagio was not obligated to provide this information because A.R.S. § 33-1242(D) only requires it if the association fails to provide the unit owner with the process for contesting the notice. Villagio’s notices all contained instructions on how to contest the violation, specifically by filing an appeal with the Board of Directors via a provided website.

9. What was the testimony of Tom Gordon, the Community Manager for Villagio, regarding the association’s policy for contesting a notice? Tom Gordon testified that homeowners are provided with 10 days to contest a notice with Villagio, pursuant to Villagio’s short-term rental policy. When asked if Villagio would have abided by “this statute” (A.R.S. § 33-1242) if Mr. Garcia had responded in twenty-one days, Mr. Gordon replied, “No.”

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on October 30, 2018, and the rehearing on February 12, 2019? In both the initial hearing and the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Garcia failed to establish that Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. Consequently, Mr. Garcia’s petition was dismissed in both instances, and Villagio was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Develop detailed essay-format answers to the following prompts, drawing evidence and examples exclusively from the provided source documents.

1. Analyze the central arguments presented by both Rogelio A. Garcia and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association regarding the application of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the statute in relation to these arguments in the final decision?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. Explain how Mr. Garcia’s failure to meet this burden led to the dismissal of his petition in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

3. Trace the timeline of events from the first notice sent by Villagio on March 8, 2018, to the final order on March 4, 2019. Explain how Mr. Garcia’s actions, or lack thereof, at key moments influenced the legal obligations of the association and the ultimate outcome of the case.

4. Evaluate Villagio’s argument that A.R.S. § 33-1242 applies only to the “condition” of a property and not its “use.” Although the judge’s decision did not ultimately hinge on this point, discuss the potential implications of this distinction in homeowner association disputes.

5. Explain the two distinct procedural paths available to a unit owner after receiving a violation notice as outlined in this case: the association’s internal appeal process and the statutory process under A.R.S. § 33-1242. Why did the path Mr. Garcia chose fail to trigger the statutory protections he sought?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the administrative hearing and rehearing, evaluates evidence, and issues a decision. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona that regulate condominiums and planned communities.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency that has authority over homeowner association disputes and with which homeowners may petition for a hearing.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, Mr. Garcia bore the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing documents of the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association, which contain the short-term lease provisions Mr. Garcia was alleged to have violated.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The venue where the evidentiary hearing and rehearing for this matter were held.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Rogelio A. Garcia.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this matter, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…that has the most convincing force…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Rehearing

A second hearing on a matter, granted in this case at Mr. Garcia’s request after the initial Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG


He Fought His HOA and Followed Their Rules. Here’s Why He Still Lost.

1.0 Introduction: The Dreaded Letter

For many homeowners, it’s a familiar and unwelcome sight: a crisp envelope from the Homeowners Association (HOA) containing a formal, intimidating violation notice. Your first instinct is to act, to follow the instructions, and to fight back against what feels like an unfair accusation. You read the letter, see a process for an appeal, and dutifully follow it, believing you are protecting your rights. But what if the process outlined in the letter isn’t the one that truly matters under the law?

This isn’t a theoretical warning. It’s the hard lesson learned by a real homeowner in Arizona, Rogelio A. Garcia, who took on his HOA, Villagio at Tempe. He believed the association had violated his rights, and unlike many homeowners, he didn’t ignore the notices—he took action. He filed an appeal with the HOA, just as their letter instructed. Yet, he lost his case, not because he was wrong on the facts, but because he fell into a subtle procedural trap, following the HOA’s internal process while missing a separate, more powerful one defined by state law.

This article breaks down the top three legal takeaways from that court decision. It reveals how taking the wrong action can be just as costly as taking no action at all, offering crucial strategic insights for any homeowner facing a dispute with their association.

2.0 Takeaway 1: Your Rights Often Have an ‘On’ Switch You Must Flip First

Mr. Garcia’s primary complaint was that the HOA failed to provide him with the name of the person who reported his alleged violation—a requirement under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1242. On the surface, this seems like a clear-cut right afforded to homeowners.

However, the court revealed a counter-intuitive legal reality. The HOA’s legal obligation to provide the reporter’s name was not automatic. That right only became active—the obligation was only triggered—if the homeowner first took a specific, formal step: sending a written response to the violation notice via certified mail within 21 calendar days. The record was clear that Mr. Garcia did not send such a response to the March 8, March 22, or April 5 notices. This single procedural failure was fatal to his claim.

The judge’s finding on this point was direct and unambiguous:

“Because Mr. Garcia did not respond in the 21 day period, Villagio was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with the first and last name of the person or persons who observed the violation.”

This illustrates a critical principle: your most important legal rights may exist in state law, but they often lie dormant. To activate them, you must flip the “on” switch by taking the precise action required by statute, which may be entirely different from the process described in the HOA’s notice.

3.0 Takeaway 2: An Internal Process Can Legally Replace—and Distract From—a State-Level One

So why would an engaged homeowner like Mr. Garcia, who went so far as to file an appeal, neglect to send the critical 21-day certified letter? The answer lies in the second key takeaway: the HOA’s violation notice offered its own, separate appeal process with a much shorter deadline, creating a critical and costly distraction.

Mr. Garcia’s second major argument was that Villagio violated the law by not informing him of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department. Again, the law contained a crucial nuance. Under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D), an HOA is only required to notify a homeowner of the state hearing option if it fails to provide its own process for contesting the notice. Villagio’s letters did include a process: the homeowner could “file an appeal with the Board of Directors… within 10 days of receipt of this notice.”

Court records show Mr. Garcia followed this path and “filed an appeal with Villagio.” By doing so, he engaged with the HOA on their terms, likely focusing all his energy on meeting that urgent 10-day deadline. Because Villagio provided this internal process, the judge concluded it had met its legal obligation and was not required to inform Mr. Garcia about the alternative state-level hearing. This created a procedural trap: the HOA satisfied its legal requirement by offering an internal process that simultaneously diverted the homeowner’s attention from the more powerful, but less obvious, 21-day statutory deadline that would have unlocked his other rights.

4.0 Takeaway 3: Conflicting Deadlines Can Create a Legal Minefield

During a rehearing, Mr. Garcia argued that the HOA’s communication style effectively “prevented” him from using his full 21-day statutory response window. The notices demanded compliance within 10 days and were sent every 14 days with escalating fines. He felt the rapid succession of notices created a pressure cooker, making it impossible to properly exercise his rights.

The court flatly rejected this argument, highlighting a harsh legal truth. The judge found no evidence that Villagio had explicitly told Mr. Garcia he could not respond or had physically prevented him from sending a certified letter. The issuance of a second notice with a demanding 10-day timeline did not legally nullify the 21-day window he had to respond to the first. When asked directly if he was prohibited by a court order from sending a response, Mr. Garcia answered, “No.”

This reveals a common tactic, whether intentional or not, in HOA disputes. The violation notices contained two conflicting timelines: a prominent, urgent “10 days to comply” demand and the less obvious, but legally superior, 21-day statutory right to respond. This conflict creates confusion and pressure, causing homeowners to focus on the immediate threat (the 10-day deadline) while missing the most important legal one. The court, however, places the burden squarely on the homeowner to navigate this minefield, as feeling pressured is not a legal defense for failing to meet a statutory deadline.

5.0 Conclusion: Know the Rules Before You Play the Game

The case of Mr. Garcia versus the Villagio at Tempe HOA is a powerful reminder that successfully challenging an HOA is not about being “right,” or even about taking action. It is about taking the correct, procedurally perfect action defined by law.

Mr. Garcia was not passive; he engaged and appealed the violation. His case was lost because he followed the path laid out for him by the HOA, not the one laid out for him by state statute. This crucial distinction—between an association’s internal process and the homeowner’s statutory rights—can mean the difference between victory and defeat. Before you act on any violation notice, you must first understand the precise rules of engagement, which may not be written in the notice itself.

If you received a violation notice today, would you know whether the appeal process in the letter is your only option, or a potential distraction from the legal first step required to truly protect your rights?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Rogelio A. Garcia (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
    Brown Olcott, PLLC
  • Tom Gordon (community manager)
    Villagio / AAMAZ
    Testified as witness for Villagio
  • Amanda Shaw (property manager/agent)
    AAM LLC
    Listed as agent for Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Rogelio A. Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-04
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Rogelio A. Garcia Counsel —
Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition for rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the statutory details or the notice of the right to petition ADRE because the Petitioner failed to submit a written response by certified mail within 21 days of the violation notices.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the information listed in A.R.S. § 33-1242 (C) or the notice of right to petition in (D) because the Petitioner did not submit a written response by certified mail within twenty-one days, which is the triggering requirement for those obligations.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory requirements for homeowner association violation notices.

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 requirements regarding violation notices. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to establish the violation because he did not respond by certified mail within the 21-day statutory period, meaning the HOA was not triggered to fulfill its obligations under § 33-1242(C) and (D).

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Notice Violation, A.R.S. 33-1242, Statutory Construction, Homeowner Petition Dismissed
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Home Builders Association of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 187 Ariz. 479, 483, 930 P.2d 993, 997(1997)
  • Canon School Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Constr. Co., 177 Ariz. 526, 529, 869 P.2d 500, 503 (1994)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918009-REL-RHG Decision – 692638.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:08 (89.4 KB)

19F-H1918009-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918009-REL/671673.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:10 (85.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the findings, arguments, and conclusions from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Rogelio A. Garcia and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (“Villagio”). The core of the dispute was Mr. Garcia’s allegation that Villagio violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1242 in its handling of violation notices related to an alleged breach of short-term rental policies.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, finding that he failed to meet the burden of proof. The decisions consistently hinged on a critical point: Mr. Garcia did not respond to Villagio’s violation notices by certified mail within the 21-day period prescribed by the statute. This failure meant that the HOA’s subsequent obligations under the statute—specifically, to provide the name of the violation’s observer and to give notice of the right to a state administrative hearing—were never triggered. Villagio successfully argued that by including its own internal appeal process in the violation notices, it had fulfilled its legal requirements under the circumstances. The final ruling deemed Villagio the prevailing party, with the decision after rehearing being binding on both parties.

Background of the Dispute

The case, No. 19F-H1918009-REL, was adjudicated by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson within the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, following a petition filed by Mr. Garcia with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Timeline of Notices and Fines

Villagio issued a series of notices to Mr. Garcia alleging that his unit was being rented in violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) regarding short-term leases.

Date of Notice

Allegation / Action Taken

Instructions Provided to Homeowner

March 8, 2018

Alleged violation of short-term lease provisions.

“If you wish to contest this notice… file an appeal with the Board of Directors… Requests for an appeal must be received within 10 days of receipt of this notice.”

March 22, 2018

A fine of $1,000 posted to Mr. Garcia’s account for the ongoing violation.

Same instructions to appeal within 10 days. The notice also included the phrase, “Please bring this issue into compliance within 10 days of this notice.”

April 5, 2018

A fine of $2,000 posted to Mr. Garcia’s account for the ongoing violation.

Same instructions to appeal within 10 days.

Procedural History

1. Violation Notices: Villagio sent the three notices in March and April 2018.

2. Homeowner Inaction (Statutory): Mr. Garcia did not respond to any of the notices by sending a certified letter within the 21-day period allowed by A.R.S. § 33-1242(B).

3. Homeowner Action (Internal): Mr. Garcia did eventually file an appeal with Villagio regarding the violation and fines, but the HOA did not change its position.

4. Petition Filed: On or about August 17, 2018, Mr. Garcia filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Villagio violated state statutes.

5. Initial Hearing: An evidentiary hearing was held on October 30, 2018.

6. First Decision: On November 19, 2018, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.

7. Rehearing Granted: Mr. Garcia requested a rehearing, which was granted and scheduled.

8. Rehearing: The rehearing was held on February 12, 2019, with testimony from Mr. Garcia and Tom Gordon, Villagio’s Community Manager.

9. Final Decision: On March 4, 2019, the ALJ issued a final decision again dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition. This order was declared binding and appealable only to the superior court.

Core Legal Arguments and Statutory Interpretation

The case centered on the interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 33-1242, which governs the process for notifying and responding to violations of condominium documents.

Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1242

• Section (B): A unit owner receiving a violation notice may provide the association with a written response via certified mail within 21 calendar days of the notice date.

• Section (C): If the owner sends a response as described in Section (B), the association must then respond within 10 business days with specific information, including the name of the person who observed the violation and the process to contest the notice.

• Section (D): An association must give a unit owner written notice of their option to petition for a state administrative hearing unless the information regarding the contest process (required in Section C, paragraph 4) is already provided in the initial violation notice.

Petitioner’s Position (Rogelio A. Garcia)

Mr. Garcia argued that Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 on several grounds:

• The violation letters did not allow him to respond by certified mail within 21 days.

• The notices failed to include the first and last name of the person(s) who observed the violation.

• The notices failed to inform him of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department.

• During the rehearing, he contended that Villagio effectively prevented him from using the 21-day statutory response period. He claimed the rapid succession of notices (14 days apart) and the language demanding compliance “within 10 days” led him to believe he “would only be 10 days before he would acquire another violation.”

Respondent’s Position (Villagio at Tempe HOA)

Villagio disputed all of Mr. Garcia’s allegations, arguing that its actions were fully compliant with the statute:

• The obligation to provide the observer’s name under Section (C) is only triggered after the homeowner first submits a timely certified mail response, which Mr. Garcia failed to do.

• The obligation to provide notice of the right to a state administrative hearing under Section (D) was not applicable because Villagio did provide its internal process for contesting the notice in every letter sent.

• They did not prevent Mr. Garcia from responding. At the rehearing, Mr. Garcia admitted under cross-examination that he was not prohibited by any court order from sending a response.

• Villagio’s Community Manager, Tom Gordon, testified that while the HOA’s policy gives homeowners 10 days to contest internally, the association does not restrict them from also using the 21-day statutory response period.

• As a further defense in the rehearing, Villagio argued that A.R.S. § 33-1242 was not applicable at all, asserting the statute addresses violations concerning the “condition of the property,” whereas Mr. Garcia’s violation concerned the “use of his property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, ruling decisively in favor of the Respondent, Villagio.

Burden of Proof

In both decisions, the Judge established that Mr. Garcia, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof to show that a violation occurred. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the “most convincing force.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Homeowner’s Failure to Respond Was Decisive: The Judge found it was “undisputed” that Mr. Garcia did not respond to any of the three notices within the 21-day period via certified mail. This failure was the central reason his petition was dismissed.

2. HOA Obligations Were Not Triggered: Because Mr. Garcia did not initiate the process described in A.R.S. § 33-1242(B), Villagio’s corresponding obligation under Section (C) to provide the observer’s name was never activated.

3. Internal Appeal Process Satisfied Statutory Requirement: The Judge concluded that because Villagio included instructions on how to contest the notice (i.e., appeal to the Board of Directors) in its letters, it was not required under Section (D) to provide separate notice of the right to a state administrative hearing.

4. No Evidence of Prevention: The Judge found that Mr. Garcia “provided no evidence to establish that Villagio prevented him from responding.” The issuance of subsequent notices and fines before the 21-day period had lapsed was not found to constitute a legal barrier that prevented Mr. Garcia from exercising his statutory right to respond.

5. Final Order: Mr. Garcia failed to establish that Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. His petition was ordered to be dismissed, and Villagio was deemed the prevailing party. The order issued after the rehearing on March 4, 2019, is binding on the parties and can only be appealed by seeking judicial review in the superior court within 35 days of service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided source documents.

1. What was the initial violation alleged by the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Villagio) against Rogelio A. Garcia?

2. According to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(B), what specific action must a unit owner take after receiving a violation notice to trigger the association’s obligations under subsection C?

3. Who bears the burden of proof in this type of administrative hearing, and what is the standard of proof required?

4. Why did the Administrative Law Judge rule that Villagio was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with the name of the person who observed the violation?

5. What was Mr. Garcia’s primary argument during the February 12, 2019 rehearing for why he felt he was prevented from responding to the violation notices?

6. What argument did Villagio present at the rehearing distinguishing between the “condition” of a property and the “use” of a property?

7. What two fines were imposed on Mr. Garcia’s account, and on what dates were the notices sent?

8. Why did the Judge conclude that Villagio was not obligated to inform Mr. Garcia of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department?

9. What was the testimony of Tom Gordon, the Community Manager for Villagio, regarding the association’s policy for contesting a notice?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on October 30, 2018, and the rehearing on February 12, 2019?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. What was the initial violation alleged by the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Villagio) against Rogelio A. Garcia? The initial violation alleged by Villagio was that Mr. Garcia’s unit was being rented in violation of the short-term lease provisions located in Villagio’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The first notice of this violation was mailed to Mr. Garcia on March 8, 2018.

2. According to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(B), what specific action must a unit owner take after receiving a violation notice to trigger the association’s obligations under subsection C? To trigger the association’s obligations, a unit owner who receives a written notice of violation must provide the association with a written response. This response must be sent by certified mail within twenty-one calendar days after the date of the notice.

3. Who bears the burden of proof in this type of administrative hearing, and what is the standard of proof required? The petitioner, Mr. Garcia, bears the burden of proof to show that the respondent committed the alleged violation. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as evidence with the most convincing force that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue.

4. Why did the Administrative Law Judge rule that Villagio was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with the name of the person who observed the violation? The judge ruled that Villagio was not required to provide the observer’s name because that obligation is only triggered after a unit owner responds to the violation notice in writing by certified mail within 21 days. It is undisputed that Mr. Garcia did not respond to the notices within the 21-day period, so Villagio’s obligation was never activated.

5. What was Mr. Garcia’s primary argument during the February 12, 2019 rehearing for why he felt he was prevented from responding to the violation notices? Mr. Garcia argued that Villagio prevented him from responding by certified mail within 21 days because it failed to wait 21 days before issuing additional notices and imposing fines. He stated that the notices’ language requiring compliance within 10 days made him believe he would acquire another violation before the 21-day statutory response period had passed.

6. What argument did Villagio present at the rehearing distinguishing between the “condition” of a property and the “use” of a property? Villagio contended that A.R.S. § 33-1242 does not apply to this case at all because the statute addresses violations related to the “condition” of the property. Villagio argued that it notified Mr. Garcia that the “use” of his property violated its short-term rental policy, not that a physical condition of the property was in violation.

7. What two fines were imposed on Mr. Garcia’s account, and on what dates were the notices sent? A fine of $1,000 was posted to Mr. Garcia’s account, with the notice being sent on March 22, 2018. Subsequently, a $2,000 fine was posted to his account for the same violation, and that notice was sent on April 5, 2018.

8. Why did the Judge conclude that Villagio was not obligated to inform Mr. Garcia of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department? The Judge concluded that Villagio was not obligated to provide this information because A.R.S. § 33-1242(D) only requires it if the association fails to provide the unit owner with the process for contesting the notice. Villagio’s notices all contained instructions on how to contest the violation, specifically by filing an appeal with the Board of Directors via a provided website.

9. What was the testimony of Tom Gordon, the Community Manager for Villagio, regarding the association’s policy for contesting a notice? Tom Gordon testified that homeowners are provided with 10 days to contest a notice with Villagio, pursuant to Villagio’s short-term rental policy. When asked if Villagio would have abided by “this statute” (A.R.S. § 33-1242) if Mr. Garcia had responded in twenty-one days, Mr. Gordon replied, “No.”

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on October 30, 2018, and the rehearing on February 12, 2019? In both the initial hearing and the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Garcia failed to establish that Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. Consequently, Mr. Garcia’s petition was dismissed in both instances, and Villagio was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Develop detailed essay-format answers to the following prompts, drawing evidence and examples exclusively from the provided source documents.

1. Analyze the central arguments presented by both Rogelio A. Garcia and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association regarding the application of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the statute in relation to these arguments in the final decision?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. Explain how Mr. Garcia’s failure to meet this burden led to the dismissal of his petition in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

3. Trace the timeline of events from the first notice sent by Villagio on March 8, 2018, to the final order on March 4, 2019. Explain how Mr. Garcia’s actions, or lack thereof, at key moments influenced the legal obligations of the association and the ultimate outcome of the case.

4. Evaluate Villagio’s argument that A.R.S. § 33-1242 applies only to the “condition” of a property and not its “use.” Although the judge’s decision did not ultimately hinge on this point, discuss the potential implications of this distinction in homeowner association disputes.

5. Explain the two distinct procedural paths available to a unit owner after receiving a violation notice as outlined in this case: the association’s internal appeal process and the statutory process under A.R.S. § 33-1242. Why did the path Mr. Garcia chose fail to trigger the statutory protections he sought?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the administrative hearing and rehearing, evaluates evidence, and issues a decision. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona that regulate condominiums and planned communities.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency that has authority over homeowner association disputes and with which homeowners may petition for a hearing.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, Mr. Garcia bore the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing documents of the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association, which contain the short-term lease provisions Mr. Garcia was alleged to have violated.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The venue where the evidentiary hearing and rehearing for this matter were held.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Rogelio A. Garcia.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this matter, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…that has the most convincing force…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Rehearing

A second hearing on a matter, granted in this case at Mr. Garcia’s request after the initial Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG


He Fought His HOA and Followed Their Rules. Here’s Why He Still Lost.

1.0 Introduction: The Dreaded Letter

For many homeowners, it’s a familiar and unwelcome sight: a crisp envelope from the Homeowners Association (HOA) containing a formal, intimidating violation notice. Your first instinct is to act, to follow the instructions, and to fight back against what feels like an unfair accusation. You read the letter, see a process for an appeal, and dutifully follow it, believing you are protecting your rights. But what if the process outlined in the letter isn’t the one that truly matters under the law?

This isn’t a theoretical warning. It’s the hard lesson learned by a real homeowner in Arizona, Rogelio A. Garcia, who took on his HOA, Villagio at Tempe. He believed the association had violated his rights, and unlike many homeowners, he didn’t ignore the notices—he took action. He filed an appeal with the HOA, just as their letter instructed. Yet, he lost his case, not because he was wrong on the facts, but because he fell into a subtle procedural trap, following the HOA’s internal process while missing a separate, more powerful one defined by state law.

This article breaks down the top three legal takeaways from that court decision. It reveals how taking the wrong action can be just as costly as taking no action at all, offering crucial strategic insights for any homeowner facing a dispute with their association.

2.0 Takeaway 1: Your Rights Often Have an ‘On’ Switch You Must Flip First

Mr. Garcia’s primary complaint was that the HOA failed to provide him with the name of the person who reported his alleged violation—a requirement under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1242. On the surface, this seems like a clear-cut right afforded to homeowners.

However, the court revealed a counter-intuitive legal reality. The HOA’s legal obligation to provide the reporter’s name was not automatic. That right only became active—the obligation was only triggered—if the homeowner first took a specific, formal step: sending a written response to the violation notice via certified mail within 21 calendar days. The record was clear that Mr. Garcia did not send such a response to the March 8, March 22, or April 5 notices. This single procedural failure was fatal to his claim.

The judge’s finding on this point was direct and unambiguous:

“Because Mr. Garcia did not respond in the 21 day period, Villagio was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with the first and last name of the person or persons who observed the violation.”

This illustrates a critical principle: your most important legal rights may exist in state law, but they often lie dormant. To activate them, you must flip the “on” switch by taking the precise action required by statute, which may be entirely different from the process described in the HOA’s notice.

3.0 Takeaway 2: An Internal Process Can Legally Replace—and Distract From—a State-Level One

So why would an engaged homeowner like Mr. Garcia, who went so far as to file an appeal, neglect to send the critical 21-day certified letter? The answer lies in the second key takeaway: the HOA’s violation notice offered its own, separate appeal process with a much shorter deadline, creating a critical and costly distraction.

Mr. Garcia’s second major argument was that Villagio violated the law by not informing him of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department. Again, the law contained a crucial nuance. Under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D), an HOA is only required to notify a homeowner of the state hearing option if it fails to provide its own process for contesting the notice. Villagio’s letters did include a process: the homeowner could “file an appeal with the Board of Directors… within 10 days of receipt of this notice.”

Court records show Mr. Garcia followed this path and “filed an appeal with Villagio.” By doing so, he engaged with the HOA on their terms, likely focusing all his energy on meeting that urgent 10-day deadline. Because Villagio provided this internal process, the judge concluded it had met its legal obligation and was not required to inform Mr. Garcia about the alternative state-level hearing. This created a procedural trap: the HOA satisfied its legal requirement by offering an internal process that simultaneously diverted the homeowner’s attention from the more powerful, but less obvious, 21-day statutory deadline that would have unlocked his other rights.

4.0 Takeaway 3: Conflicting Deadlines Can Create a Legal Minefield

During a rehearing, Mr. Garcia argued that the HOA’s communication style effectively “prevented” him from using his full 21-day statutory response window. The notices demanded compliance within 10 days and were sent every 14 days with escalating fines. He felt the rapid succession of notices created a pressure cooker, making it impossible to properly exercise his rights.

The court flatly rejected this argument, highlighting a harsh legal truth. The judge found no evidence that Villagio had explicitly told Mr. Garcia he could not respond or had physically prevented him from sending a certified letter. The issuance of a second notice with a demanding 10-day timeline did not legally nullify the 21-day window he had to respond to the first. When asked directly if he was prohibited by a court order from sending a response, Mr. Garcia answered, “No.”

This reveals a common tactic, whether intentional or not, in HOA disputes. The violation notices contained two conflicting timelines: a prominent, urgent “10 days to comply” demand and the less obvious, but legally superior, 21-day statutory right to respond. This conflict creates confusion and pressure, causing homeowners to focus on the immediate threat (the 10-day deadline) while missing the most important legal one. The court, however, places the burden squarely on the homeowner to navigate this minefield, as feeling pressured is not a legal defense for failing to meet a statutory deadline.

5.0 Conclusion: Know the Rules Before You Play the Game

The case of Mr. Garcia versus the Villagio at Tempe HOA is a powerful reminder that successfully challenging an HOA is not about being “right,” or even about taking action. It is about taking the correct, procedurally perfect action defined by law.

Mr. Garcia was not passive; he engaged and appealed the violation. His case was lost because he followed the path laid out for him by the HOA, not the one laid out for him by state statute. This crucial distinction—between an association’s internal process and the homeowner’s statutory rights—can mean the difference between victory and defeat. Before you act on any violation notice, you must first understand the precise rules of engagement, which may not be written in the notice itself.

If you received a violation notice today, would you know whether the appeal process in the letter is your only option, or a potential distraction from the legal first step required to truly protect your rights?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Rogelio A. Garcia (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
    Brown Olcott, PLLC
  • Tom Gordon (community manager)
    Villagio / AAMAZ
    Testified as witness for Villagio
  • Amanda Shaw (property manager/agent)
    AAM LLC
    Listed as agent for Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG, 18F-H1818045-REL, 18F-H1818054-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-18
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Warren R. Brown Counsel —
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.; Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge ruled partially in favor of Petitioner Warren R. Brown, finding that Mogollon Airpark, Inc. violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) by imposing a $25 late payment fee, and ordered the fee rescinded and the $500 filing fee refunded,,,. The ALJ ruled against both Petitioners (Brown and Stevens) regarding the challenge to the $325 assessment increase, dismissing those petitions because they failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A),,,.

Why this result: Petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the combined $325 assessment increase violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) because their definition of 'regular assessment' as encompassing all assessments enacted through proper procedures was not supported by statutory construction principles,.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to assessment increase exceeding 20% limit (Brown Docket 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG)

Petitioner Brown alleged the combined $325 increase, consisting of a $116 regular increase and a $209 special assessment, violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) because 'regular assessment' refers to the creation process, making the total increase subject to the 20% cap,,,,.

Orders: Petition dismissed. Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. deemed the prevailing party in the 029 matter,,,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • 4
  • 6
  • 32
  • 33
  • 35
  • 36
  • 73
  • 74
  • 76
  • 77

Challenge to assessment increase exceeding 20% limit (Stevens Docket 18F-H1818054-REL)

Petitioner Stevens alleged the total $325 assessment increase violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) and raised accompanying allegations of deceptive accounting and lack of authority to impose special assessments,,.

Orders: Petition dismissed. Respondent deemed the prevailing party in the 054 matter,,,,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • 7
  • 20
  • 32
  • 33
  • 35
  • 36
  • 38
  • 61
  • 73
  • 74
  • 76
  • 77
  • 79
  • 94
  • 99
  • 101

Challenge to late payment charges (Brown Docket 18F-H1818045-REL)

Petitioner Brown alleged that the $25 late fee and 18% interest charged by Mogollon violated the statutory limits set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1803(A),,. The ALJ found the $25 late charge violated the statute because the limit applies to all 'assessments',.

Orders: Petitioner Warren R. Brown deemed the prevailing party. Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee and pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • 5
  • 7
  • 32
  • 34
  • 37
  • 46
  • 47
  • 59
  • 73
  • 75
  • 78

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA assessment cap, Late fee violation, Statutory construction, Regular assessment definition, Special assessment, Filing fee refund
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • U.S. Parking Sys v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 211, 772 P.2d 33, 34 (App. 1989)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 692388.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:09 (102.8 KB)

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1818054-REL/666285.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:48:01 (151.9 KB)

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1818054-REL/672623.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:48:02 (144.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Brown and Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from a consolidated administrative law case involving petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against their homeowners’ association (HOA), Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The central dispute concerned a 2018 assessment increase of $325, which represented a 39.4% increase over the previous year, and the imposition of a new $25 late fee.

The petitioners argued that the entire assessment increase violated Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1803(A), which limits annual regular assessment increases to 20%. They contended that the term “regular” describes the procedural enactment of an assessment, making the entire 325increaseasingleregularassessment.Conversely,theHOAassertedthatithadbifurcatedtheincreaseintoacompliant14.1116) regular assessment increase and a separate $209 special assessment, which is not subject to the 20% statutory cap.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately sided with Mogollon Airpark on the assessment increase, dismissing the petitions of both Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens. The ALJ’s rationale, based on principles of statutory construction, was that “regular assessment” refers to a type of assessment, distinct from a “special assessment,” and that to rule otherwise would render the word “regular” meaningless in the statute. A subsequent rehearing requested by Mr. Stevens was also denied on the same grounds.

However, the ALJ ruled in favor of Mr. Brown on the matter of the late fee. The decision found that the statutory limit on late fees applies to all “assessments,” not just regular ones, making the HOA’s $25 fee a clear violation. Underlying the legal challenges were substantial allegations by the petitioners of deceptive accounting and financial mismanagement by the HOA to create a “fabricated shortfall,” though the ALJ noted these issues were outside the narrow scope of the administrative hearing and better suited for civil court.

Case Overview and Parties Involved

This matter consolidates three separate petitions filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, which were heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Petitioners:

◦ Warren R. Brown (Docket Nos. 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG & 18F-H1818045-REL)

◦ Brad W. Stevens (Docket No. 18F-H1818054-REL)

• Respondent:

◦ Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

• Venue and Adjudication:

◦ Tribunal: Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

◦ Administrative Law Judge: Thomas Shedden

◦ Hearing Date (Consolidated Matters): September 28, 2018

◦ Rehearing Date (Stevens Matter): February 11, 2019

Key Financial Figures

Amount/Rate

Calculation/Note

Previous Year’s Assessment (2017)

The baseline for calculating the increase percentage.

Total 2018 Assessment Increase

The total amount disputed by the petitioners.

Total Increase Percentage

($325 / $825)

“Regular Assessment” Increase

As classified by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (14.1% increase).

“Special Assessment”

As classified by Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

New Late Fee

Challenged as exceeding statutory limits.

New Interest Rate

For past-due accounts.

Statutory Late Fee Limit

Greater of $15 or 10%

Per ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A).

Statutory Assessment Increase Limit

20% over prior year

Per ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), applies to regular assessments.

Analysis of Core Legal Disputes

The hearings focused on two primary violations of Arizona statute alleged by the petitioners.

The 2018 Assessment Increase (39.4%)

The crux of the case in dockets 029 and 054 was the interpretation of the term “regular assessment” within ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A).

• Petitioners’ Position (Brown & Stevens):

◦ The total $325 increase, constituting a 39.4% hike, is a clear violation of the 20% statutory cap.

◦ The term “regular assessment” as used in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created (i.e., by motion, second, and vote). As the entire $325 was passed via this standard procedure, it constitutes a single regular assessment.

◦ They further argued that Mogollon Airpark, Inc.’s governing documents (Bylaws and CC&Rs) do not provide any explicit authority to impose “special assessments,” meaning any assessment levied must be a regular one.

• Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.):

◦ The assessment was properly bifurcated into two distinct parts: a $116 increase to the regular assessment (a 14.1% increase, well within the 20% limit) and a $209 special assessment.

◦ “Regular assessment” and “special assessment” are established terms of art in the HOA industry, denoting different types of assessments, not the process of their creation.

◦ The existence of both terms in other parts of Arizona law, such as § 33-1806, demonstrates the legislature’s intent to treat them as separate categories.

Late Fees and Interest Charges

In docket 045, Mr. Brown challenged the legality of the newly instituted penalties for late payments.

• Petitioner’s Position (Brown):

◦ The statute explicitly limits late fees to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.”

◦ The HOA’s imposition of a flat $25 late fee is a direct violation of this provision. An invoice provided as evidence showed Mr. Brown was charged this $25 fee plus $1.57 in interest.

• Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.):

◦ The HOA argued that the statutory limitation on late fees applied only to regular assessments, not to special assessments. This argument was explicitly rejected by the ALJ.

Underlying Allegations of Financial Misconduct

While the administrative hearings were limited to the specific statutory violations, the petitions were motivated by deep-seated concerns over the HOA’s financial management. These allegations were not adjudicated but were noted by the ALJ.

• Core Allegation: The petitioners claimed the HOA treasurer and others engaged in “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods” to manufacture a financial crisis and justify the assessment increase.

• Specific Claims:

◦ Mr. Brown alleged that the accounting was “deliberately misleading” to obscure the fact that the 2016 board left the treasury approximately “$200,000 better off.”

◦ Mr. Stevens submitted a 45-page petition with over 600 pages of exhibits detailing the alleged improprieties, including “keeping two sets of books,” to create a “fabricated shortfall.” He testified that he believed the HOA possessed over $1 million and did not need an increase.

• Judicial Comment: The ALJ noted that these complex financial allegations were not addressed in the hearing and suggested that “the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.”

Judicial Decisions and Rationale

The ALJ issued separate findings and orders for each docket, culminating in a split decision. The rulings on the assessment increase were further solidified in a subsequent rehearing.

Summary of Outcomes

Docket No.

Petitioner

Core Issue

Ruling

Prevailing Party

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG

Warren R. Brown

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed

Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

18F-H1818054-REL

Brad W. Stevens

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed

Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

18F-H1818045-REL

Warren R. Brown

$25 Late Fee

Violation Found

Warren R. Brown

Rationale for Initial Decision (October 18, 2018)

• On the Assessment Increase: The ALJ found that the petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation occurred. The ruling rested on statutory interpretation:

◦ The petitioners’ definition of “regular assessment” as a process was rejected because it would render the word “regular” in the statute “trivial or void,” as all assessments are presumed to follow a regular process.

◦ The only “fair and sensible result” that gives meaning to every word in the statute is to interpret “regular” and “special” as distinct types of assessments.

• On the Late Fees: The ALJ found that Mr. Brown successfully proved a violation.

◦ The statutory text on late fees applies to “assessments” generally, without the qualifier “regular.”

◦ Mogollon’s argument required adding the word “regular” where the legislature did not use it, which violates principles of statutory construction.

◦ Order: Mogollon was ordered to rescind the $25 fee assessed against Mr. Brown and reimburse his $500 filing fee.

Rationale for Rehearing Decision (March 1, 2019)

Mr. Stevens’s request for a rehearing on his dismissed petition was granted but ultimately denied again.

• Mr. Stevens’s Rehearing Arguments: He argued the ALJ erred by not applying a definition of “special assessment” from the case Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona and reasserted that an assessment unauthorized by the HOA’s documents must logically be a regular one.

• ALJ’s Rejection:

◦ The reliance on Northwest Fire District was “misplaced” because that case applies to special taxing districts created under a different state title, not private HOAs.

◦ The argument that an unauthorized special assessment becomes a regular one was deemed “nonsensical.” The ALJ noted, “More reasonably, if Mogollon has no authority to issue a special assessment, any such assessment would be void.”

◦ The core statutory interpretation from the initial hearing was affirmed. The petition was dismissed a final time.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Brown and Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided legal documents.

1. Identify the petitioners and the respondent in this consolidated legal matter and describe their relationship.

2. What specific financial changes did Mogollon Airpark, Inc. implement in 2018 that led to the legal dispute?

3. What was the central legal argument presented by petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens regarding the assessment increase?

4. How did Mogollon Airpark, Inc. justify its total assessment increase of $325 in the face of the legal challenge?

5. Explain the Administrative Law Judge’s primary reason for dismissing the petitions concerning the assessment increase (the 029 and 054 matters).

6. What was the specific subject of the petition in the 045 matter, and what was the final ruling in that case?

7. What was the judge’s legal reasoning for finding Mogollon’s $25 late fee to be in violation of the statute?

8. Why did the hearing not address the petitioners’ underlying allegations of deceptive accounting and financial impropriety?

9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which parties were responsible for meeting it?

10. In the rehearing for the 054 matter, what was Brad Stevens’s argument regarding the definition of “special assessment,” and why did the judge find his reliance on the Northwest Fire District case to be misplaced?

——————————————————————————–

Quiz Answer Key

1. The petitioners were Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens, who were members of the homeowners’ association (HOA). The respondent was Mogollon Airpark, Inc., the HOA itself. The dispute arose from actions taken by the HOA board that the petitioners, as members, believed to be unlawful.

2. In 2018, Mogollon Airpark, Inc. raised its total annual assessment by $325 over the previous year’s $825. Additionally, the HOA instituted a new late payment fee of $25 and began charging 18% interest on past-due accounts.

3. The petitioners’ central argument was that the total $325 assessment increase, representing a 39.4% hike over the prior year, violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A). This statute prohibits an HOA from imposing a “regular assessment” that is more than 20% greater than the previous year’s assessment without member approval.

4. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. argued that the $325 increase was composed of two separate parts: a $116 increase to the “regular assessment” (14.1%) and a $209 “special assessment.” They contended that the 20% statutory limit in section 33-1803(A) applies only to regular assessments, not special assessments, and therefore their actions were lawful.

5. The judge dismissed the petitions based on principles of statutory construction. He concluded that “regular assessment” is a specific type of assessment, distinct from a “special assessment,” and that if “regular” merely referred to the process of passing an assessment (motion, second, vote), the word would be redundant and meaningless in the statute. Since the regular assessment portion of the increase was below the 20% threshold, no violation occurred.

6. The 045 matter, filed by Warren R. Brown, specifically challenged Mogollon’s new $25 late fee and 18% interest charge. The judge ruled in favor of Mr. Brown, deeming him the prevailing party, and ordered Mogollon to rescind the $25 late fee and refund his $500 filing fee.

7. The judge found the $25 late fee violated the statute because the section of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) limiting late charges applies to “assessments” generally, not just “regular assessments.” Unlike the clause on assessment increases, the legislature did not use the limiting word “regular,” so applying that limitation would violate principles of statutory construction.

8. The hearing did not address the allegations of deceptive accounting because the petitions filed by Mr. Brown (029) and Mr. Stevens (054) were “single-issue petitions.” This limited the scope of the hearing strictly to the question of whether Mogollon violated the specific statute, section 33-1803(A). The judge noted that civil courts may be a more suitable venue for the financial allegations.

9. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the petitioners, Messrs. Brown and Stevens, to prove their respective allegations against the respondent, Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

10. Mr. Stevens argued that the definition of “special assessment” from the case Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona should be applied, which it failed to meet. The judge found this reliance misplaced because that case applies to special taxing districts created under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 48, and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. is an HOA, not such a taxing district.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-format response. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the competing interpretations of the term “regular assessment” as presented by the petitioners and the respondent. Discuss the Administrative Law Judge’s final interpretation and the principles of statutory construction used to arrive at that conclusion.

2. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision distinguishes between the legality of the assessment increase and the legality of the late fee. Explain the legal reasoning behind this split decision, focusing on the specific wording of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) and the different statutory construction applied to each clause.

3. Discuss the procedural limitations of the hearings as described in the legal decision, specifically referencing the concept of a “single-issue petition.” How did this limitation affect the scope of the case and prevent the judge from ruling on certain serious allegations made by Brown and Stevens?

4. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” describe the background allegations of financial misconduct made by the petitioners against Mogollon’s treasurer and board. Although not ruled upon, explain how these allegations served as the primary motivation for their legal challenges regarding the assessment and fee increases.

5. Trace the procedural history of the “029 matter,” from its original petition and dismissal to the eventual rehearing and final order. What does this process reveal about the requirements for filing a successful petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions, in this case, Judge Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

The specific Arizona statute at the heart of the dispute. It limits HOA regular assessment increases to 20% over the prior year and caps late payment charges to the greater of $15 or 10% of the unpaid assessment.

Assessment

A fee or charge levied by a homeowners’ association on its members to cover operating expenses, reserve funds, and other costs.

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, like an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Part of the governing documents.

Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions. These are legal obligations recorded in the deed of a property, governing its use and maintenance. Part of the governing documents.

Consolidated Matter

A legal procedure where multiple separate cases or petitions involving common questions of law or fact are combined into a single hearing to promote efficiency.

Docket Number

A unique number assigned by a court or administrative office to identify a specific case. The matters in this case were identified as 029, 045, and 054.

Governing Documents

The collection of legal documents, including CC&Rs and Bylaws, that establish the rules and authority of a homeowners’ association.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action in an administrative or court proceeding. In this case, Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case. It means the greater weight of the evidence shows that a fact is more likely than not to be true.

Regular Assessment

As interpreted by the ALJ, a specific type of recurring annual assessment for an HOA’s general operating budget, subject to the 20% increase limit in section 33-1803(A).

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Single-Issue Petition

A petition that limits the scope of the administrative hearing to a single, specific legal question or alleged violation, as was the case for the 029 and 054 matters.

Special Assessment

As interpreted by the ALJ, a one-time or non-recurring assessment levied for a specific purpose (e.g., replenishing a reserve fund). The ALJ found it is not subject to the 20% annual increase cap that applies to regular assessments.

Statutory Construction

The process and principles used by judges to interpret and apply legislation. The judge used these principles to determine the meaning of “regular” and “assessment” in the statute.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG


How One Word Let an HOA Raise Dues by 40%—And 4 Surprising Lessons for Every Homeowner

Imagine opening your annual bill from your Homeowner’s Association (HOA) and discovering your dues have skyrocketed by nearly 40% overnight. This isn’t a hypothetical scenario. It’s precisely what happened to homeowners in the Mogollon Airpark community in Arizona when their HOA board raised the annual assessment by $325, from $825 to $1,150—a staggering 39.4% increase.

But the homeowners weren’t just angry about the amount; they alleged the increase was justified by a “fabricated shortfall” created through “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods.” At first glance, the hike also seemed legally impossible. Arizona state law, specifically ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A), clearly states that an HOA cannot impose a regular assessment that is more than 20% greater than the previous year’s. So how did the Mogollon Airpark board legally circumvent this cap? The answer, found in the fine print of an administrative law judge’s decision, reveals critical lessons for every homeowner about the power of language, legal strategy, and reading the fine print.

1. The Power of a Name: The “Special Assessment” Loophole

The HOA’s strategy was deceptively simple. Instead of raising the annual assessment by the full $325, the Mogollon Airpark board split the increase into two distinct parts. First, it raised the “regular assessment” by $116. This amounted to a 14.1% increase over the previous year’s $825, keeping it well within the 20% legal limit. The remaining $209 was then levied as a separate fee, which the board classified as a “special assessment.”

When homeowners challenged this, the Administrative Law Judge sided with the HOA. The judge’s ruling was based on a strict reading of the statute: the 20% cap applies only to “regular assessments,” not “special assessments.” By simply calling a portion of the increase a “special assessment,” the HOA legally circumvented the very law designed to protect homeowners from massive, sudden fee hikes.

Lesson 1 for Homeowners: The name of a fee is everything. State-mandated caps on “regular” assessments offer zero protection if your HOA can simply reclassify an increase as a “special” assessment.

2. Every Word Is a Battlefield: “Regular” Doesn’t Mean What You Think

The homeowners, petitioners Warren Brown and Brad Stevens, built their case on a common-sense interpretation of the law. They argued that the term “regular assessment” in the statute referred to the process by which an assessment is created—that is, any fee approved through a regular motion, second, and vote by the board. By this logic, the entire $325 increase was a single “regular assessment” and therefore violated the 20% cap. They also argued that the HOA had no authority under its own governing documents to impose a special assessment in the first place.

The judge, however, rejected this definition. The judge reasoned that lawmakers don’t add words to statutes for no reason. If “regular” simply meant “voted on normally,” the word would be redundant, as all assessments are assumed to be passed this way. To give the word meaning, it must refer to a specific type of assessment. To support this interpretation, the judge pointed to another Arizona statute, 33-1806, which explicitly uses the distinct terms “regular assessments” and “special assessment[s].” This proved that the state legislature intended for them to be entirely different categories of fees, cementing the HOA’s victory on the main issue.

Lesson 2 for Homeowners: Every word in a statute has a purpose. Courts assume lawmakers don’t use words accidentally, and a layperson’s “common-sense” definition of a term can be easily defeated by established principles of legal interpretation.

3. A Small Victory on a Technicality: Why You Should Still Read the Fine Print

While the homeowners lost the battle over the 39.4% dues increase, one petitioner, Mr. Brown, secured a small but significant win on a separate issue: late fees. The Mogollon Airpark board had instituted a new $25 late fee, which Mr. Brown challenged.

Arizona law limits late fees to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” The HOA argued that this limit, like the 20% cap, only applied to regular assessments. This time, the judge disagreed. The judge’s logic was a textbook example of statutory interpretation: when lawmakers include a specific word in one part of a law but omit it from another, courts assume the omission was deliberate. In the section of the law governing late fees, the limit applies to “assessments” in general; the word “regular” is conspicuously absent.

Because the HOA’s $25 fee exceeded the legal limit, the judge ruled in favor of Mr. Brown. The court ordered the HOA to rescind the illegal late fee and, importantly, to reimburse Mr. Brown for his $500 filing fee.

Lesson 3 for Homeowners: The fine print cuts both ways. While one word can create a loophole for an HOA, the absence of that same word elsewhere can be your most powerful weapon.

4. Fighting the Right Battle in the Right Place: The Allegations a Judge Couldn’t Hear

Underlying the dispute over the 20% cap were much more serious allegations. The homeowners’ petitions claimed the HOA board used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods,” including keeping “two sets of books,” to create a “fabricated shortfall” and justify the massive fee increase.

Yet, none of these explosive claims were ever addressed during the hearing. The reason was a crucial matter of legal procedure. The homeowners had filed what are known as “single-issue petitions,” which focused narrowly and exclusively on the violation of the 20% assessment cap in statute 33-1803(A). This strategic choice legally prevented the judge from considering the broader allegations of financial mismanagement, regardless of their merit.

In a pointed footnote, the judge highlighted the procedural constraints and suggested the homeowners had chosen the wrong legal venue for their most serious claims:

Considering the nature of Messrs. Brown and Stevens’s allegations, the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.

Lesson 4 for Homeowners: Your legal strategy is as important as your evidence. Choosing the right claims to file and the right venue to file them in can determine whether a judge is even allowed to hear your most compelling arguments.

Conclusion: Your Most Powerful Tool

The case of Mogollon Airpark is a powerful illustration of how legal battles are won and lost not on broad principles of fairness, but on the precise definitions of individual words. The presence of the word “regular” in one clause of the law cost the homeowners their central fight, allowing the HOA to circumvent the 20% cap. In a stunning contrast, the absence of that very same word in another clause handed them a clear victory on late fees.

This case is a stark reminder of the power hidden in legal definitions and fine print. It leaves every homeowner with a critical question: Do you really know what your governing documents—and the state laws that bind them—truly allow?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Warren R. Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared pro se
  • Brad W. Stevens (petitioner)
    Appeared pro se; presented testimony/evidence

Respondent Side

  • Gregory A. Stein (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Spelled Mark K. Saul in some transmissions

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (clerk/staff)
    Transmitting staff

Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-01
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brad W. Stevens Counsel —
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Greg Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A). The increase in the regular assessment (14.1%) was below the statutory 20% limit, and the overall increase included a special assessment which the statute does not cover.

Why this result: The Petitioner's definition of 'regular assessment' was rejected as not supported by statutory construction principles, and the issue was limited to the definition and application of ARS § 33-1803(A).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A) by increasing the regular assessment more than 20%.

Petitioner alleged that the HOA's total assessment increase of $325 (which was 39.4% over the previous assessment of $825) constituted an unlawful increase of the 'regular assessment' under ARS § 33-1803(A). The HOA argued the increase to the 'regular assessment' was only 14.1% ($116 increase), and the remaining $209 was a separate, one-time assessment.

Orders: Petitioner Brad W. Stevens’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment, Statutory Interpretation, Regular Assessment, Special Assessment, ARS 33-1803(A)
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 692388.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:21 (102.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the matter of Brad W. Stevens versus Mogollon Airpark, Inc., a case centered on the legality of a homeowner association (HOA) assessment increase. The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, ultimately dismissed the petition filed by Mr. Stevens, finding he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mogollon Airpark violated Arizona state law.

The core of the dispute was a $325 increase to the annual assessment for 2018, which represented a 39.4% increase over the previous year’s $825 fee. The petitioner alleged this violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), which prohibits HOAs from increasing a “regular assessment” by more than 20% without member approval. The respondent, Mogollon Airpark, argued the increase was composed of two distinct parts: a 14.1% ($116) increase to the regular assessment to cover a budget shortfall, and a separate $209 one-time “special assessment” to replenish a reserve fund.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a critical interpretation of statutory language, concluding that “regular assessments” and “special assessments” are legally distinct categories. The judge rejected the petitioner’s argument that “regular” refers to the process of an assessment rather than its type, deeming this interpretation contrary to principles of statutory construction and nonsensical. Furthermore, the judge found the petitioner’s legal citations to be inapplicable and confirmed that the scope of the hearing was limited strictly to the alleged violation of the 20% rule, not the HOA’s general authority to levy special assessments.

Case Background and Procedural History

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens

◦ Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (HOA)

• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, on behalf of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

• Timeline:

◦ June 7, 2018: Mr. Stevens files a single-issue petition with the Department of Real Estate.

◦ September 28, 2018: An initial hearing is conducted on the matter, consolidated with two others.

◦ January 2, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Rehearing.

◦ February 11, 2019: The rehearing is conducted.

◦ March 1, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, dismissing the petition.

The matter came before the Office of Administrative Hearings for a rehearing after Mr. Stevens alleged errors of law and an abuse of discretion in the original hearing’s decision.

The Core Dispute: The 2018 Assessment Increase

The central facts of the case revolve around a decision made at a Mogollon Airpark board meeting in November 2017. To address a shortage in its operating budget and to replenish approximately $53,000 borrowed from its reserve fund, the Board approved a two-part increase to its annual fees.

Assessment Component

Previous Year (2017)

2018 Increase

Justification

Percentage Increase

Regular Assessment

+ $116

Cover operating budget shortfall

Special Assessment

+ $209

Replenish reserve fund

Total Assessment

+ $325

Total for 2018

This total 39.4% increase formed the basis of Mr. Stevens’s legal challenge under A.R.S. § 33-1803(A), which limits increases to “regular assessments” to 20% over the preceding fiscal year.

Analysis of Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Brad W. Stevens)

Mr. Stevens’s case was built on the assertion that the entire $325 increase constituted a single “regular assessment” and was therefore illegal. His key arguments were:

• Definition of “Regular”: He contended that “regular” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created—i.e., one that is “according to rule.” He argued that it does not denote a type of assessment (e.g., recurring vs. one-time).

• Lack of Authority for Special Assessments: Mr. Stevens argued that Mogollon Airpark has no authority to issue special assessments. Therefore, any assessment it imposes, regardless of its label, must legally be considered a “regular assessment.”

• Legal Precedent: He cited Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona to define a “special assessment,” arguing that the $209 charge did not qualify because he received no “particularized benefit” as required by that case. He also presented definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary.

Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)

Mogollon Airpark’s defense was straightforward and relied on the distinction between the two components of the assessment increase:

• Statutory Limitation: The respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.”

• Compliance with Statute: The increase to the regular assessment was $116, a 14.1% rise over the previous year’s $825 fee. This amount is well within the 20% statutory limit.

• Distinct Nature of Assessments: The $209 charge was a separate, one-time “special assessment” intended for a specific purpose (replenishing the reserve fund) and is not subject to the 20% limitation governing regular assessments.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ systematically dismantled the petitioner’s arguments, finding they were not supported by evidence or principles of statutory construction.

Rejection of Petitioner’s Statutory Interpretation

• The ALJ found that Mr. Stevens’s definition of “regular” as referring to the assessment process was an insupportable interpretation. If all validly passed assessments were “regular,” the word “regular” in the statute would be “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”

• To support this conclusion, the decision points to A.R.S. § 33-1806, where the legislature explicitly references “regular assessments” and “special assessment[s],” demonstrating a clear intent to treat them as different types of assessments.

• The judge characterized the petitioner’s logic as leading to a “nonsensical result.” Under Mr. Stevens’s reasoning, an unauthorized special assessment would become a valid regular assessment, a position deemed not to be a “sensible interpretation of the statute.” A more reasonable conclusion, the judge noted, would be that an unauthorized assessment is simply void.

Misapplication of Legal Precedent

• The petitioner’s reliance on Northwest Fire District was deemed “misplaced.” The judge clarified that this case applies to special taxing districts created under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 48, a legal framework that does not govern an HOA like Mogollon Airpark.

Scope of the Hearing and Burden of Proof

• The ALJ emphasized that the hearing was limited by the petitioner’s “single-issue petition.” The only question properly before the tribunal was whether A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) had been violated.

• Consequently, the broader question of whether Mogollon Airpark’s bylaws grant it the authority to impose special assessments was “not at issue.” This rendered the various definitions of “special assessment” offered by Mr. Stevens as having “no substantial probative value” to the case at hand.

• The final legal conclusion was that Mr. Stevens, who bore the burden of proof, failed to show by a “preponderance of the evidence” that Mogollon Airpark violated the statute.

Final Order and Disposition

Based on the findings and conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

• Order: The petition of Brad W. Stevens is dismissed.

• Prevailing Party: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. is deemed the prevailing party.

• Binding Nature: The decision, issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

• Appeal Process: Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.


Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Aripark, Inc.,

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG, 18F-H1818045-REL, 18F-H1818054-REL, 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-01
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Warren R. Brown Counsel —
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.; Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ ruled that Mogollon Airpark, Inc. violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) by charging a $25 late fee, as the statutory limit applies to all assessments,. However, the ALJ found no violation regarding the $325 assessment increase because the $209 portion was a special assessment and the remaining regular increase did not exceed the 20% limit,,.

Why this result: The Petitioners' primary loss on the assessment cap issue was due to a failed legal interpretation that 'regular assessment' encompasses all assessments, a view the ALJ found would render statutory language redundant,.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to $325 Assessment Increase (Docket 029-RHG)

Petitioner Brown argued that 'regular assessment' refers to the procedure (motion, second, vote) and thus the entire $325 increase should be subject to the 20% cap,. The ALJ rejected this, finding that $116 was a regular increase (14.1%) and $209 was a special assessment, to which the cap did not apply,.

Orders: Petition in Docket No. 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • Deer Valley v. Houser

Excessive Late Fee and Interest (Docket 045)

Petitioner Brown alleged that the $25 late charge and interest rate exceeded the limits of A.R.S. § 33-1803(A). The ALJ ruled that the statutory limit on late fees applies to all 'assessments', not just 'regular assessments', and found the HOA in violation,.

Orders: Respondent must rescind the $25 late fee and pay Petitioner his $500 filing fee within thirty days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • U.S. Parking Sys v. City of Phoenix

Challenge to $325 Assessment Increase (Docket 054 & Rehearing)

Petitioner Stevens argued the entire $325 must be a regular assessment because the HOA lacked authority to impose special assessments or used deceptive accounting to justify the increase,,. The ALJ found that 'regular assessment' is a specific type of assessment and the $116 increase (14.1%) did not exceed the cap,,.

Orders: Petition in Docket No. 18F-H1818054-REL and the subsequent rehearing are dismissed,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1806
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Assessment Increase Cap, Regular Assessment vs Special Assessment, Late Fee Limit, Statutory Construction, Accounting Impropriety Allegations, Rehearing, Consolidated Matter
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1806
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • A.A.C. § R2-19-119
  • Deer Valley v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • U.S. Parking Sys v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 211, 772 P.2d 33, 34 (App. 1989)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL Decision – 666285.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-19T15:21:24 (151.9 KB)

18F-H1818054-REL Decision – 672623.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-19T15:21:25 (144.6 KB)

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Warren R. Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf
  • Brad W. Stevens (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf and testified

Respondent Side

  • Gregory A. Stein (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Counsel for Respondent, referred to as Greg Stein in rehearing
  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Counsel for Respondent (also spelled Sahl/Saul)

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (staff/clerk)
    Transmitting staff

Charles P. Mandela vs. Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-02-28
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Charles P. Mandela Counsel —
Respondent Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County Homeowners' Association Counsel Paul K. Frame

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.1(a); Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's petition alleging violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by the HOA. The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the violation, specifically concluding that the proposed cedar patio structure was a second detached structure or a temporary structure, both prohibited under the CC&Rs given the Petitioner already had a tool shed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by failing to prove that his proposed cedar patio structure was not a barred detached structure (since he already had a shed) or a barred temporary structure.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation by HOA for denial of detached patio structure construction

Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by denying his request to construct a approximately 150 square feet detached patio structure because he already had a tool shed on his property, while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • Title 33, Chapter 16
  • CC&Rs § 3.1(a)
  • Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918006-REL-RHG Decision – 692294.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:21 (119.5 KB)

19F-H1918006-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918006-REL/669528.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:48:30 (91.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County (“Blue Ridge”). The core of the conflict involves Mr. Mandela’s multiple failed attempts to gain approval for a 150-square-foot patio structure on his property, which already contained a tool shed.

Blue Ridge denied Mr. Mandela’s three separate requests on distinct grounds: the first for exceeding the size limit for a “play structure,” the second for submitting incomplete plans for an “attached structure,” and the third for violating the “one detached structure” rule. In response, Mr. Mandela filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that Blue Ridge had violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and engaged in discriminatory practices.

Following an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge conclusively denied Mr. Mandela’s petition. The judge found that Mr. Mandela failed to meet the burden of proof to establish any violation by Blue Ridge. The decisions affirmed that the HOA’s denials were consistent with its governing documents, that Mr. Mandela’s interpretation of key terms like “detached structure” and “temporary structure” was incorrect, and that his allegations of discrimination were unsubstantiated by evidence. The final order from the rehearing is binding on both parties.

Case Overview

This case documents a series of requests and denials between a homeowner and his HOA, culminating in a formal legal dispute adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

Parties Involved

Name/Entity

Petitioner

Charles P. Mandela

Respondent

Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County

Respondent’s Counsel

Paul Frame, Esq. (FRAME LAW PLLC)

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Timeline of Key Events

Date (Approx.)

Feb 1, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits his first request: a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. It is denied for exceeding the 80 sq. ft. size limit.

Mar 2, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits his second request: to attach a cedar patio shade to his home. Blue Ridge requests detailed plans.

Mar 8, 2018

Mr. Mandela’s second request is formally denied due to “incomplete information.”

Mar 23, 2018

Mr. Mandela files an appeal with Blue Ridge regarding the denial, which is subsequently denied.

Undisclosed

Mr. Mandela submits his third request: to build a detached 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. It is denied because he already has a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure.

Jul 31, 2018

Mr. Mandela files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Blue Ridge violated CC&R § 3.1(a).

Oct 17, 2018

An evidentiary hearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge.

Nov 6, 2018

The ALJ issues a decision denying Mr. Mandela’s petition.

Dec 12, 2018

The Department of Real Estate issues an order for a rehearing.

Feb 8, 2019

The rehearing is held.

Feb 28, 2019

The ALJ issues a final decision on the rehearing, once again denying the petition. This order is binding.

Analysis of Petitioner’s Requests and HOA Denials

Mr. Mandela made three distinct applications to the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee for his proposed patio structure, each of which was denied for violating a different set of rules.

Request 1: Play Structure Application

Mr. Mandela first attempted to gain approval by using a “Play Structure Approval Request” form from the Blue Ridge website.

• Request Details: Construction of a cedar patio structure of approximately 150 square feet.

• Reason for Denial: The request was denied because the structure’s size exceeded the established limit. The application form explicitly states that play structures such as a “Tree House, Tree Viewing Stand, Play House/Fort” cannot exceed 80 square feet.

Request 2: Attached Patio Shade Application

Mr. Mandela next submitted a request to attach the cedar patio shade directly to his home.

• Request Details: The proposal involved attaching a structure to the main residence.

• HOA Actions: Blue Ridge Chairman John Hart requested documents, such as plans and materials, to verify the structure would not be free-standing.

• Petitioner’s Response: In a March 3, 2018 email, Mr. Mandela stated: “I am building this myself. I am not an Architect, I have not software to show (6) 2 by 4”s to attach from the single family roof lie to the roof lien of the same roof. The structures will be attached.”

• Reason for Denial: The request was denied on March 8, 2018, due to “incomplete information.” The denial letter specified that Mr. Mandela needed to provide detailed drawings matching the proposed construction and use the official 9-page form as required by CC&R guidelines. The subsequent appeal was also denied, with the board noting a need for an “elevation drawing of your specific construction” showing dimensions, materials, and foundation/attachment methods.

Request 3: Detached Patio Structure Application

Finally, Mr. Mandela submitted a request to build the 150-square-foot structure as a detached unit.

• Request Details: A free-standing, detached patio structure in his backyard.

• Reason for Denial: This request was denied because Mr. Mandela already had a tool shed on his property. According to CC&R § 3.1(A) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D), only one detached structure is permitted on a lot.

Core Legal Arguments and Adjudication

In the hearings, Mr. Mandela presented several arguments to challenge the HOA’s decisions. The Administrative Law Judge addressed each claim and found that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Definition of a “Detached Structure”

• Mandela’s Position: Argued that the proposed patio structure was not a “detached structure” under the CC&Rs because, unlike a shed, it could not be “easily converted into a second residence.” He claimed this interpretation was supported by a prior ALJ decision involving Blue Ridge.

• ALJ’s Conclusion: The Judge found this argument unpersuasive. The decision states that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that “prior administrative law judge decisions are not precedent or binding on future administrative law decisions.” It was undisputed that Mr. Mandela already had a shed, and the judge concluded the proposed patio was a “barred detached structure” under the governing rules.

Allegations of Discrimination and Unequal Enforcement

• Mandela’s Position: Mr. Mandela contended that Blue Ridge was discriminating against him. His claims included:

1. The play structure rule allowing a second detached structure under 80 sq. ft. unfairly discriminates against residents without children.

2. Blue Ridge was not enforcing the 80 sq. ft. limit against other homeowners.

3. Blue Ridge had previously approved a “Tuff Shed” for another member, showing unequal enforcement.

• ALJ’s Conclusion: The petitioner failed to provide credible evidence for these claims. Testimony from Blue Ridge Vice President Joseph Hancock refuted Mandela’s specific examples, showing that cited lots either had no violations or contained structures predating the relevant rules. The judge found Hancock’s testimony credible and noted that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction over potential constitutional equal protection claims.

Definition of a “Temporary Structure”

• Mandela’s Position: Mr. Mandela argued his proposed structure was not a prohibited temporary structure. He cited the product’s 5-year warranty against rot and his plan to use concrete pavers at the base, which he asserted constituted a “cement foundation” under the rules.

• HOA’s Position: Joseph Hancock testified that a concrete paver is not the equivalent of a “cement or slab foundation.”

• ALJ’s Conclusion: The judge agreed with the HOA. The decision states: “The preponderance of the evidence shows that the proposed play structure is a temporary structure under the Blue Ridge CC&Rs because it does not have a cement or block foundation. The preponderance of the evidence shows that concrete pavers are not the equivalent of cement or block foundation.”

Governing Rules and Regulations

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of specific sections of the Blue Ridge Estates CC&Rs and the Architectural Committee’s aligned regulations.

Regulation

Summary of Provision

CC&R § 3.1

Restricts property use to “Single Family Residential Use.” Prohibits any building or structure separate from the main residence, with the exception of a garage.

Arch. Committee Reg. 3(D)

Modifies CC&R § 3.1 by allowing one detached structure to be constructed on a property with prior committee approval.

CC&R § 3.6 & Aligned Reg.

Prohibits temporary structures. Defines a temporary structure as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”

CC&R § 3.24

Requires prior written approval from the Architectural Committee for any structure to be “commenced, erected, maintained, improved or altered.”

Modified Rules (April 6, 2016)

Establishes rules for “Play Structures.” Allows for one of each type but no more than two total. Limits Tree Houses, Viewing Stands, and Play Houses/Forts to a maximum of 80 square feet.

Final Orders and Outcome

The legal proceedings resulted in a definitive ruling in favor of the Respondent, Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association.

• Initial Decision (November 6, 2018): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.

• Rehearing Decision (February 28, 2019): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.

The decision on the rehearing is noted as binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review filed with the superior court within 35 days of the order.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case involving petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. It is based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the initial hearing on October 17, 2018, and the rehearing on February 8, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Describe the three separate requests Charles Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA and the basis for the HOA’s denial of each.

2. What was Mr. Mandela’s central allegation in the petition he filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?

3. Explain the argument Mr. Mandela made regarding a prior Administrative Law Judge decision concerning detached structures, and why Judge Moses-Thompson found it unpersuasive.

4. According to the Blue Ridge governing documents, what is the definition of a “temporary structure,” and how did Mr. Mandela argue his proposed patio did not fit this definition?

5. What specific, incomplete information did the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee cite when denying Mr. Mandela’s second request to build an attached cedar patio shade?

6. Identify the two different rules that limit the size and number of structures on a property and explain how they were applied to Mr. Mandela’s requests.

7. What was Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s play structure policy, and what was the stated purpose for which he wanted to build the patio?

8. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key points did his testimony establish during the rehearing?

9. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and identify which party in this case was responsible for meeting this burden of proof.

10. What was the final, binding order issued by the Administrative Law Judge after the rehearing, and what was the petitioner’s next course of action for an appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot limit for play structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied for providing incomplete information and insufficient plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio, which was denied because he already had a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure per property.

2. In his petition, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its own CC&Rs, specifically § 3.1(a). He claimed the HOA was unfairly denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while it had allowed another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

3. Mr. Mandela contended that a prior ALJ decision had defined a “detached structure” as one that could be easily converted into a second residence, which his open-air patio could not. Judge Moses-Thompson rejected this argument, stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future cases.

4. The HOA’s rules define a temporary structure as one without a cement or block foundation to which it is permanently attached. Mr. Mandela argued his proposed patio was not temporary because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he asserted constituted a cement foundation.

5. The Architectural Committee denied the request for an attached structure due to incomplete information, specifically the lack of an elevation drawing. The denial letter stated that such a drawing was needed to show detailed views, sizes, dimensions, specifications, construction methods, and foundation attachment details for his specific proposed construction.

6. Architectural Committee Regulation 3(D) limits homeowners to one detached structure per property. The modified Rules and Regulations for “Play Structures” allow for a second structure if it is a play structure, but it cannot exceed 80 square feet. Mr. Mandela’s request for a 150-square-foot detached patio was denied under the first rule because he already had a shed, and his initial request under the play structure rule was denied because it exceeded the 80-square-foot size limit.

7. Mr. Mandela argued that the play structure policy, which allows for a second detached structure, discriminates against people who do not have children. He explained that he did not want the structure for children’s play but so that his mother would have a shaded place to come outside and rest.

8. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of Blue Ridge and a licensed contractor who assisted in reviewing Mr. Mandela’s requests. He testified that Mr. Mandela’s plans for an attached structure were insufficient, failing to account for height and width differentials, and opined that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or slab foundation under the HOA’s rules.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the legal standard requiring proof that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, Charles P. Mandela, bore the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

10. The final order denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, making the decision binding on the parties. The notice specified that any further appeal must be made through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case materials. Construct a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the series of requests and denials between Charles Mandela and the Blue Ridge HOA. Discuss how the HOA’s different governing documents (CC&Rs, Architectural Committee regulations, and modified Rules and Regulations) were applied at each stage of the process and evaluate the consistency of their application.

2. Examine the legal arguments presented by Charles Mandela in the rehearing, including his claims of discrimination, his interpretation of a “temporary structure,” and his assertion that he provided sufficient information. Discuss why the Administrative Law Judge found each of these arguments unpersuasive, citing specific evidence and testimony from the hearing.

3. Trace the distinction made in the Blue Ridge governing documents between a primary residence, a detached structure (like a garage or shed), and a “play structure.” How did this distinction become the central point of conflict in the case of Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates?

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this administrative hearing. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail the specific ways in which the petitioner, Charles Mandela, failed to meet this burden according to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

5. The Blue Ridge HOA has at least three layers of governing documents mentioned: the CC&Rs (Declaration), Architectural Committee Aligned Standards, and the Rules and Regulations. Explain the hierarchy and purpose of these documents as revealed in the case, and discuss how the authority to create and modify them is defined.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings for government agencies, in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the Blue Ridge HOA responsible for reviewing and approving or denying any construction, erection, maintenance, improvement, or alteration of structures on any lot, as per CC&R § 3.24.

Blue Ridge Estates HOA

The homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development in Happy Jack, Arizona, and the respondent in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner had the burden of proof.

Charles P. Mandela

The homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA who filed the petition against the association; the petitioner in this case.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The primary governing document for the homeowners’ association, also referred to as the “Declaration.” It outlines land use, permitted structures, and restrictions.

Declaration

The formal term for the CC&Rs document. Amending it requires an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots.

Detached Structure

A building or structure erected or maintained separately from the Single Family Residence. Under Architectural Committee rules, only one is permitted per lot.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela.

Play Structure

A specific type of structure defined in the modified Rules and Regulations, including swing sets, tree houses, and playhouses. When detached, certain types are limited to 80 square feet.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.

Single Family Residential Use

The exclusive use for which property in Blue Ridge Estates is designated, as outlined in CC&R § 3.1.

Temporary Structure

A structure prohibited by the CC&Rs and defined by the Architectural Committee regulations as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”






Blog Post – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case involving petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. It is based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the initial hearing on October 17, 2018, and the rehearing on February 8, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Describe the three separate requests Charles Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA and the basis for the HOA’s denial of each.

2. What was Mr. Mandela’s central allegation in the petition he filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?

3. Explain the argument Mr. Mandela made regarding a prior Administrative Law Judge decision concerning detached structures, and why Judge Moses-Thompson found it unpersuasive.

4. According to the Blue Ridge governing documents, what is the definition of a “temporary structure,” and how did Mr. Mandela argue his proposed patio did not fit this definition?

5. What specific, incomplete information did the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee cite when denying Mr. Mandela’s second request to build an attached cedar patio shade?

6. Identify the two different rules that limit the size and number of structures on a property and explain how they were applied to Mr. Mandela’s requests.

7. What was Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s play structure policy, and what was the stated purpose for which he wanted to build the patio?

8. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key points did his testimony establish during the rehearing?

9. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and identify which party in this case was responsible for meeting this burden of proof.

10. What was the final, binding order issued by the Administrative Law Judge after the rehearing, and what was the petitioner’s next course of action for an appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot limit for play structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied for providing incomplete information and insufficient plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio, which was denied because he already had a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure per property.

2. In his petition, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its own CC&Rs, specifically § 3.1(a). He claimed the HOA was unfairly denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while it had allowed another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

3. Mr. Mandela contended that a prior ALJ decision had defined a “detached structure” as one that could be easily converted into a second residence, which his open-air patio could not. Judge Moses-Thompson rejected this argument, stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future cases.

4. The HOA’s rules define a temporary structure as one without a cement or block foundation to which it is permanently attached. Mr. Mandela argued his proposed patio was not temporary because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he asserted constituted a cement foundation.

5. The Architectural Committee denied the request for an attached structure due to incomplete information, specifically the lack of an elevation drawing. The denial letter stated that such a drawing was needed to show detailed views, sizes, dimensions, specifications, construction methods, and foundation attachment details for his specific proposed construction.

6. Architectural Committee Regulation 3(D) limits homeowners to one detached structure per property. The modified Rules and Regulations for “Play Structures” allow for a second structure if it is a play structure, but it cannot exceed 80 square feet. Mr. Mandela’s request for a 150-square-foot detached patio was denied under the first rule because he already had a shed, and his initial request under the play structure rule was denied because it exceeded the 80-square-foot size limit.

7. Mr. Mandela argued that the play structure policy, which allows for a second detached structure, discriminates against people who do not have children. He explained that he did not want the structure for children’s play but so that his mother would have a shaded place to come outside and rest.

8. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of Blue Ridge and a licensed contractor who assisted in reviewing Mr. Mandela’s requests. He testified that Mr. Mandela’s plans for an attached structure were insufficient, failing to account for height and width differentials, and opined that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or slab foundation under the HOA’s rules.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the legal standard requiring proof that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, Charles P. Mandela, bore the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

10. The final order denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, making the decision binding on the parties. The notice specified that any further appeal must be made through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case materials. Construct a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the series of requests and denials between Charles Mandela and the Blue Ridge HOA. Discuss how the HOA’s different governing documents (CC&Rs, Architectural Committee regulations, and modified Rules and Regulations) were applied at each stage of the process and evaluate the consistency of their application.

2. Examine the legal arguments presented by Charles Mandela in the rehearing, including his claims of discrimination, his interpretation of a “temporary structure,” and his assertion that he provided sufficient information. Discuss why the Administrative Law Judge found each of these arguments unpersuasive, citing specific evidence and testimony from the hearing.

3. Trace the distinction made in the Blue Ridge governing documents between a primary residence, a detached structure (like a garage or shed), and a “play structure.” How did this distinction become the central point of conflict in the case of Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates?

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this administrative hearing. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail the specific ways in which the petitioner, Charles Mandela, failed to meet this burden according to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

5. The Blue Ridge HOA has at least three layers of governing documents mentioned: the CC&Rs (Declaration), Architectural Committee Aligned Standards, and the Rules and Regulations. Explain the hierarchy and purpose of these documents as revealed in the case, and discuss how the authority to create and modify them is defined.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings for government agencies, in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the Blue Ridge HOA responsible for reviewing and approving or denying any construction, erection, maintenance, improvement, or alteration of structures on any lot, as per CC&R § 3.24.

Blue Ridge Estates HOA

The homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development in Happy Jack, Arizona, and the respondent in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner had the burden of proof.

Charles P. Mandela

The homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA who filed the petition against the association; the petitioner in this case.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The primary governing document for the homeowners’ association, also referred to as the “Declaration.” It outlines land use, permitted structures, and restrictions.

Declaration

The formal term for the CC&Rs document. Amending it requires an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots.

Detached Structure

A building or structure erected or maintained separately from the Single Family Residence. Under Architectural Committee rules, only one is permitted per lot.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela.

Play Structure

A specific type of structure defined in the modified Rules and Regulations, including swing sets, tree houses, and playhouses. When detached, certain types are limited to 80 square feet.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.

Single Family Residential Use

The exclusive use for which property in Blue Ridge Estates is designated, as outlined in CC&R § 3.1.

Temporary Structure

A structure prohibited by the CC&Rs and defined by the Architectural Committee regulations as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Charles P. Mandela (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself,.

Respondent Side

  • Paul K. Frame (HOA attorney)
    FRAME LAW PLLC
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent Blue Ridge Estates HOA,.
  • John Hart (board member)
    Blue Ridge Estates HOA
    Chairman of Blue Ridge,.
  • Joseph Hancock (board member/witness)
    Blue Ridge Estates HOA
    Vice President of Blue Ridge; presented testimony,.

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Transmitted decision.

Charles P. Mandela vs. Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-02-28
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Charles P. Mandela Counsel —
Respondent Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County Homeowners' Association Counsel Paul K. Frame, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.1(a)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition in its entirety, finding the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) when denying the construction of a cedar patio structure.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that the HOA violated CC&R 3.1(a). The proposed structure was found to be a second detached structure and/or a temporary structure barred by the community documents, and the Petitioner had previously failed to submit sufficient information for an attached structure proposal.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by denying request for patio structure while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly denied his request for a detached cedar patio structure (150 sq ft) based on CC&R § 3.1(A) which limits properties to one detached structure (Petitioner already had a tool shed). The ALJ found Petitioner failed to establish the violation, concluding the proposed structure was a second barred detached structure or a temporary structure (as concrete pavers were not equivalent to a required cement/block foundation). Petitioner also failed to provide sufficient architectural details for an attached structure request.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • CC&R § 3.1(a)
  • Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA rules enforcement, architectural review, detached structures, temporary structures, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • CC&R § 3.1(a)
  • Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918006-REL-RHG Decision – 692294.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:59 (119.5 KB)

19F-H1918006-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918006-REL/669528.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:02 (91.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County (“Blue Ridge”). The core of the conflict involves Mr. Mandela’s multiple failed attempts to gain approval for a 150-square-foot patio structure on his property, which already contained a tool shed.

Blue Ridge denied Mr. Mandela’s three separate requests on distinct grounds: the first for exceeding the size limit for a “play structure,” the second for submitting incomplete plans for an “attached structure,” and the third for violating the “one detached structure” rule. In response, Mr. Mandela filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that Blue Ridge had violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and engaged in discriminatory practices.

Following an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge conclusively denied Mr. Mandela’s petition. The judge found that Mr. Mandela failed to meet the burden of proof to establish any violation by Blue Ridge. The decisions affirmed that the HOA’s denials were consistent with its governing documents, that Mr. Mandela’s interpretation of key terms like “detached structure” and “temporary structure” was incorrect, and that his allegations of discrimination were unsubstantiated by evidence. The final order from the rehearing is binding on both parties.

Case Overview

This case documents a series of requests and denials between a homeowner and his HOA, culminating in a formal legal dispute adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

Parties Involved

Name/Entity

Petitioner

Charles P. Mandela

Respondent

Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County

Respondent’s Counsel

Paul Frame, Esq. (FRAME LAW PLLC)

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Timeline of Key Events

Date (Approx.)

Feb 1, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits his first request: a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. It is denied for exceeding the 80 sq. ft. size limit.

Mar 2, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits his second request: to attach a cedar patio shade to his home. Blue Ridge requests detailed plans.

Mar 8, 2018

Mr. Mandela’s second request is formally denied due to “incomplete information.”

Mar 23, 2018

Mr. Mandela files an appeal with Blue Ridge regarding the denial, which is subsequently denied.

Undisclosed

Mr. Mandela submits his third request: to build a detached 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. It is denied because he already has a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure.

Jul 31, 2018

Mr. Mandela files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Blue Ridge violated CC&R § 3.1(a).

Oct 17, 2018

An evidentiary hearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge.

Nov 6, 2018

The ALJ issues a decision denying Mr. Mandela’s petition.

Dec 12, 2018

The Department of Real Estate issues an order for a rehearing.

Feb 8, 2019

The rehearing is held.

Feb 28, 2019

The ALJ issues a final decision on the rehearing, once again denying the petition. This order is binding.

Analysis of Petitioner’s Requests and HOA Denials

Mr. Mandela made three distinct applications to the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee for his proposed patio structure, each of which was denied for violating a different set of rules.

Request 1: Play Structure Application

Mr. Mandela first attempted to gain approval by using a “Play Structure Approval Request” form from the Blue Ridge website.

• Request Details: Construction of a cedar patio structure of approximately 150 square feet.

• Reason for Denial: The request was denied because the structure’s size exceeded the established limit. The application form explicitly states that play structures such as a “Tree House, Tree Viewing Stand, Play House/Fort” cannot exceed 80 square feet.

Request 2: Attached Patio Shade Application

Mr. Mandela next submitted a request to attach the cedar patio shade directly to his home.

• Request Details: The proposal involved attaching a structure to the main residence.

• HOA Actions: Blue Ridge Chairman John Hart requested documents, such as plans and materials, to verify the structure would not be free-standing.

• Petitioner’s Response: In a March 3, 2018 email, Mr. Mandela stated: “I am building this myself. I am not an Architect, I have not software to show (6) 2 by 4”s to attach from the single family roof lie to the roof lien of the same roof. The structures will be attached.”

• Reason for Denial: The request was denied on March 8, 2018, due to “incomplete information.” The denial letter specified that Mr. Mandela needed to provide detailed drawings matching the proposed construction and use the official 9-page form as required by CC&R guidelines. The subsequent appeal was also denied, with the board noting a need for an “elevation drawing of your specific construction” showing dimensions, materials, and foundation/attachment methods.

Request 3: Detached Patio Structure Application

Finally, Mr. Mandela submitted a request to build the 150-square-foot structure as a detached unit.

• Request Details: A free-standing, detached patio structure in his backyard.

• Reason for Denial: This request was denied because Mr. Mandela already had a tool shed on his property. According to CC&R § 3.1(A) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D), only one detached structure is permitted on a lot.

Core Legal Arguments and Adjudication

In the hearings, Mr. Mandela presented several arguments to challenge the HOA’s decisions. The Administrative Law Judge addressed each claim and found that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Definition of a “Detached Structure”

• Mandela’s Position: Argued that the proposed patio structure was not a “detached structure” under the CC&Rs because, unlike a shed, it could not be “easily converted into a second residence.” He claimed this interpretation was supported by a prior ALJ decision involving Blue Ridge.

• ALJ’s Conclusion: The Judge found this argument unpersuasive. The decision states that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that “prior administrative law judge decisions are not precedent or binding on future administrative law decisions.” It was undisputed that Mr. Mandela already had a shed, and the judge concluded the proposed patio was a “barred detached structure” under the governing rules.

Allegations of Discrimination and Unequal Enforcement

• Mandela’s Position: Mr. Mandela contended that Blue Ridge was discriminating against him. His claims included:

1. The play structure rule allowing a second detached structure under 80 sq. ft. unfairly discriminates against residents without children.

2. Blue Ridge was not enforcing the 80 sq. ft. limit against other homeowners.

3. Blue Ridge had previously approved a “Tuff Shed” for another member, showing unequal enforcement.

• ALJ’s Conclusion: The petitioner failed to provide credible evidence for these claims. Testimony from Blue Ridge Vice President Joseph Hancock refuted Mandela’s specific examples, showing that cited lots either had no violations or contained structures predating the relevant rules. The judge found Hancock’s testimony credible and noted that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction over potential constitutional equal protection claims.

Definition of a “Temporary Structure”

• Mandela’s Position: Mr. Mandela argued his proposed structure was not a prohibited temporary structure. He cited the product’s 5-year warranty against rot and his plan to use concrete pavers at the base, which he asserted constituted a “cement foundation” under the rules.

• HOA’s Position: Joseph Hancock testified that a concrete paver is not the equivalent of a “cement or slab foundation.”

• ALJ’s Conclusion: The judge agreed with the HOA. The decision states: “The preponderance of the evidence shows that the proposed play structure is a temporary structure under the Blue Ridge CC&Rs because it does not have a cement or block foundation. The preponderance of the evidence shows that concrete pavers are not the equivalent of cement or block foundation.”

Governing Rules and Regulations

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of specific sections of the Blue Ridge Estates CC&Rs and the Architectural Committee’s aligned regulations.

Regulation

Summary of Provision

CC&R § 3.1

Restricts property use to “Single Family Residential Use.” Prohibits any building or structure separate from the main residence, with the exception of a garage.

Arch. Committee Reg. 3(D)

Modifies CC&R § 3.1 by allowing one detached structure to be constructed on a property with prior committee approval.

CC&R § 3.6 & Aligned Reg.

Prohibits temporary structures. Defines a temporary structure as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”

CC&R § 3.24

Requires prior written approval from the Architectural Committee for any structure to be “commenced, erected, maintained, improved or altered.”

Modified Rules (April 6, 2016)

Establishes rules for “Play Structures.” Allows for one of each type but no more than two total. Limits Tree Houses, Viewing Stands, and Play Houses/Forts to a maximum of 80 square feet.

Final Orders and Outcome

The legal proceedings resulted in a definitive ruling in favor of the Respondent, Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association.

• Initial Decision (November 6, 2018): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.

• Rehearing Decision (February 28, 2019): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.

The decision on the rehearing is noted as binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review filed with the superior court within 35 days of the order.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case involving petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. It is based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the initial hearing on October 17, 2018, and the rehearing on February 8, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Describe the three separate requests Charles Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA and the basis for the HOA’s denial of each.

2. What was Mr. Mandela’s central allegation in the petition he filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?

3. Explain the argument Mr. Mandela made regarding a prior Administrative Law Judge decision concerning detached structures, and why Judge Moses-Thompson found it unpersuasive.

4. According to the Blue Ridge governing documents, what is the definition of a “temporary structure,” and how did Mr. Mandela argue his proposed patio did not fit this definition?

5. What specific, incomplete information did the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee cite when denying Mr. Mandela’s second request to build an attached cedar patio shade?

6. Identify the two different rules that limit the size and number of structures on a property and explain how they were applied to Mr. Mandela’s requests.

7. What was Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s play structure policy, and what was the stated purpose for which he wanted to build the patio?

8. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key points did his testimony establish during the rehearing?

9. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and identify which party in this case was responsible for meeting this burden of proof.

10. What was the final, binding order issued by the Administrative Law Judge after the rehearing, and what was the petitioner’s next course of action for an appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot limit for play structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied for providing incomplete information and insufficient plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio, which was denied because he already had a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure per property.

2. In his petition, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its own CC&Rs, specifically § 3.1(a). He claimed the HOA was unfairly denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while it had allowed another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

3. Mr. Mandela contended that a prior ALJ decision had defined a “detached structure” as one that could be easily converted into a second residence, which his open-air patio could not. Judge Moses-Thompson rejected this argument, stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future cases.

4. The HOA’s rules define a temporary structure as one without a cement or block foundation to which it is permanently attached. Mr. Mandela argued his proposed patio was not temporary because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he asserted constituted a cement foundation.

5. The Architectural Committee denied the request for an attached structure due to incomplete information, specifically the lack of an elevation drawing. The denial letter stated that such a drawing was needed to show detailed views, sizes, dimensions, specifications, construction methods, and foundation attachment details for his specific proposed construction.

6. Architectural Committee Regulation 3(D) limits homeowners to one detached structure per property. The modified Rules and Regulations for “Play Structures” allow for a second structure if it is a play structure, but it cannot exceed 80 square feet. Mr. Mandela’s request for a 150-square-foot detached patio was denied under the first rule because he already had a shed, and his initial request under the play structure rule was denied because it exceeded the 80-square-foot size limit.

7. Mr. Mandela argued that the play structure policy, which allows for a second detached structure, discriminates against people who do not have children. He explained that he did not want the structure for children’s play but so that his mother would have a shaded place to come outside and rest.

8. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of Blue Ridge and a licensed contractor who assisted in reviewing Mr. Mandela’s requests. He testified that Mr. Mandela’s plans for an attached structure were insufficient, failing to account for height and width differentials, and opined that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or slab foundation under the HOA’s rules.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the legal standard requiring proof that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, Charles P. Mandela, bore the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

10. The final order denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, making the decision binding on the parties. The notice specified that any further appeal must be made through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case materials. Construct a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the series of requests and denials between Charles Mandela and the Blue Ridge HOA. Discuss how the HOA’s different governing documents (CC&Rs, Architectural Committee regulations, and modified Rules and Regulations) were applied at each stage of the process and evaluate the consistency of their application.

2. Examine the legal arguments presented by Charles Mandela in the rehearing, including his claims of discrimination, his interpretation of a “temporary structure,” and his assertion that he provided sufficient information. Discuss why the Administrative Law Judge found each of these arguments unpersuasive, citing specific evidence and testimony from the hearing.

3. Trace the distinction made in the Blue Ridge governing documents between a primary residence, a detached structure (like a garage or shed), and a “play structure.” How did this distinction become the central point of conflict in the case of Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates?

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this administrative hearing. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail the specific ways in which the petitioner, Charles Mandela, failed to meet this burden according to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

5. The Blue Ridge HOA has at least three layers of governing documents mentioned: the CC&Rs (Declaration), Architectural Committee Aligned Standards, and the Rules and Regulations. Explain the hierarchy and purpose of these documents as revealed in the case, and discuss how the authority to create and modify them is defined.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings for government agencies, in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the Blue Ridge HOA responsible for reviewing and approving or denying any construction, erection, maintenance, improvement, or alteration of structures on any lot, as per CC&R § 3.24.

Blue Ridge Estates HOA

The homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development in Happy Jack, Arizona, and the respondent in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner had the burden of proof.

Charles P. Mandela

The homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA who filed the petition against the association; the petitioner in this case.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The primary governing document for the homeowners’ association, also referred to as the “Declaration.” It outlines land use, permitted structures, and restrictions.

Declaration

The formal term for the CC&Rs document. Amending it requires an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots.

Detached Structure

A building or structure erected or maintained separately from the Single Family Residence. Under Architectural Committee rules, only one is permitted per lot.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela.

Play Structure

A specific type of structure defined in the modified Rules and Regulations, including swing sets, tree houses, and playhouses. When detached, certain types are limited to 80 square feet.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.

Single Family Residential Use

The exclusive use for which property in Blue Ridge Estates is designated, as outlined in CC&R § 3.1.

Temporary Structure

A structure prohibited by the CC&Rs and defined by the Architectural Committee regulations as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”






Blog Post – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case involving petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. It is based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the initial hearing on October 17, 2018, and the rehearing on February 8, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Describe the three separate requests Charles Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA and the basis for the HOA’s denial of each.

2. What was Mr. Mandela’s central allegation in the petition he filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?

3. Explain the argument Mr. Mandela made regarding a prior Administrative Law Judge decision concerning detached structures, and why Judge Moses-Thompson found it unpersuasive.

4. According to the Blue Ridge governing documents, what is the definition of a “temporary structure,” and how did Mr. Mandela argue his proposed patio did not fit this definition?

5. What specific, incomplete information did the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee cite when denying Mr. Mandela’s second request to build an attached cedar patio shade?

6. Identify the two different rules that limit the size and number of structures on a property and explain how they were applied to Mr. Mandela’s requests.

7. What was Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s play structure policy, and what was the stated purpose for which he wanted to build the patio?

8. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key points did his testimony establish during the rehearing?

9. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and identify which party in this case was responsible for meeting this burden of proof.

10. What was the final, binding order issued by the Administrative Law Judge after the rehearing, and what was the petitioner’s next course of action for an appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot limit for play structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied for providing incomplete information and insufficient plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio, which was denied because he already had a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure per property.

2. In his petition, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its own CC&Rs, specifically § 3.1(a). He claimed the HOA was unfairly denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while it had allowed another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

3. Mr. Mandela contended that a prior ALJ decision had defined a “detached structure” as one that could be easily converted into a second residence, which his open-air patio could not. Judge Moses-Thompson rejected this argument, stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future cases.

4. The HOA’s rules define a temporary structure as one without a cement or block foundation to which it is permanently attached. Mr. Mandela argued his proposed patio was not temporary because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he asserted constituted a cement foundation.

5. The Architectural Committee denied the request for an attached structure due to incomplete information, specifically the lack of an elevation drawing. The denial letter stated that such a drawing was needed to show detailed views, sizes, dimensions, specifications, construction methods, and foundation attachment details for his specific proposed construction.

6. Architectural Committee Regulation 3(D) limits homeowners to one detached structure per property. The modified Rules and Regulations for “Play Structures” allow for a second structure if it is a play structure, but it cannot exceed 80 square feet. Mr. Mandela’s request for a 150-square-foot detached patio was denied under the first rule because he already had a shed, and his initial request under the play structure rule was denied because it exceeded the 80-square-foot size limit.

7. Mr. Mandela argued that the play structure policy, which allows for a second detached structure, discriminates against people who do not have children. He explained that he did not want the structure for children’s play but so that his mother would have a shaded place to come outside and rest.

8. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of Blue Ridge and a licensed contractor who assisted in reviewing Mr. Mandela’s requests. He testified that Mr. Mandela’s plans for an attached structure were insufficient, failing to account for height and width differentials, and opined that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or slab foundation under the HOA’s rules.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the legal standard requiring proof that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, Charles P. Mandela, bore the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

10. The final order denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, making the decision binding on the parties. The notice specified that any further appeal must be made through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case materials. Construct a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the series of requests and denials between Charles Mandela and the Blue Ridge HOA. Discuss how the HOA’s different governing documents (CC&Rs, Architectural Committee regulations, and modified Rules and Regulations) were applied at each stage of the process and evaluate the consistency of their application.

2. Examine the legal arguments presented by Charles Mandela in the rehearing, including his claims of discrimination, his interpretation of a “temporary structure,” and his assertion that he provided sufficient information. Discuss why the Administrative Law Judge found each of these arguments unpersuasive, citing specific evidence and testimony from the hearing.

3. Trace the distinction made in the Blue Ridge governing documents between a primary residence, a detached structure (like a garage or shed), and a “play structure.” How did this distinction become the central point of conflict in the case of Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates?

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this administrative hearing. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail the specific ways in which the petitioner, Charles Mandela, failed to meet this burden according to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

5. The Blue Ridge HOA has at least three layers of governing documents mentioned: the CC&Rs (Declaration), Architectural Committee Aligned Standards, and the Rules and Regulations. Explain the hierarchy and purpose of these documents as revealed in the case, and discuss how the authority to create and modify them is defined.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings for government agencies, in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the Blue Ridge HOA responsible for reviewing and approving or denying any construction, erection, maintenance, improvement, or alteration of structures on any lot, as per CC&R § 3.24.

Blue Ridge Estates HOA

The homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development in Happy Jack, Arizona, and the respondent in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner had the burden of proof.

Charles P. Mandela

The homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA who filed the petition against the association; the petitioner in this case.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The primary governing document for the homeowners’ association, also referred to as the “Declaration.” It outlines land use, permitted structures, and restrictions.

Declaration

The formal term for the CC&Rs document. Amending it requires an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots.

Detached Structure

A building or structure erected or maintained separately from the Single Family Residence. Under Architectural Committee rules, only one is permitted per lot.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela.

Play Structure

A specific type of structure defined in the modified Rules and Regulations, including swing sets, tree houses, and playhouses. When detached, certain types are limited to 80 square feet.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.

Single Family Residential Use

The exclusive use for which property in Blue Ridge Estates is designated, as outlined in CC&R § 3.1.

Temporary Structure

A structure prohibited by the CC&Rs and defined by the Architectural Committee regulations as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Charles P. Mandela (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself,.

Respondent Side

  • Paul K. Frame (HOA attorney)
    FRAME LAW PLLC
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent Blue Ridge Estates HOA,.
  • John Hart (board member)
    Blue Ridge Estates HOA
    Chairman of Blue Ridge,.
  • Joseph Hancock (board member/witness)
    Blue Ridge Estates HOA
    Vice President of Blue Ridge; presented testimony,.

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Transmitted decision.

Nathan Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918029-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-02-04
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Nathan Brown Counsel —
Respondent Val Vista Lakes Community Association Counsel Clint Goodman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's claim that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) was dismissed, as the notice issued was determined to be a Notice of Non-Compliance (courtesy letter) and not a Notice of Violation required to carry the specific disclosure.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) by failing to include notice of the option to petition for an administrative hearing in a Notice of Non-Compliance.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent's Notice of Non-Compliance regarding dead vegetation was actually a Notice of Violation and lacked the statutory disclosure required by A.R.S. § 33-1803(E). The ALJ found the document was a courtesy letter and not a Notice of Violation, and even if it were, the statute did not require the disclosure in this context because the Petitioner filed the petition before Respondent took enforcement action or completed the statutory response exchange.

Orders: Petitioner Nathan Brown's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(D)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11

Analytics Highlights

Topics: statutory interpretation, violation notice, non-compliance, courtesy letter, right to petition
Additional Citations:

  • 33-1803(E)
  • 32-2199.01
  • 33-1803(C)
  • 33-1803(D)
  • R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918029-REL Decision – 686796.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:49 (88.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918029-REL


Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association: Case Briefing

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, wherein Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition against the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was dismissed. The central issue was whether an initial “Notice of Non-Compliance” sent by the Association constituted a formal “Notice of Violation” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 33-1803(E), thereby requiring immediate disclosure of the member’s right to an administrative hearing.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent Association. The decision rested on two primary conclusions: First, a reasonable reading of the document in question showed it to be a preliminary “courtesy letter” and not a formal Notice of Violation, as it explicitly warned that a Notice of Violation would be issued later if the issue was not remedied. Second, the ALJ determined that even if the document were considered a Notice of Violation, a plain reading of the statute does not require the disclosure of hearing rights to be included in the initial notice itself. The statute allows for this information to be provided at a later stage in the process, specifically after the member has submitted a formal response. The Petitioner’s failure to follow the statutory response procedure was a key factor in the ruling that the Association had not yet been required to provide the disclosure. Ultimately, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and his petition was dismissed.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1918029-REL

Parties

Petitioner: Nathan Brown
Respondent: Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Hearing Date

January 16, 2019

Decision Date

February 4, 2019

Final Outcome

Petition Dismissed; Respondent deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Background and Timeline of Events

• October 18, 2018: The Val Vista Lakes Community Association mailed a “Notice of Non-Compliance” to Nathan Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard. The notice requested that the situation be remedied by November 1, 2018, and warned that failure to do so would result in the issuance of a “Notice of Violation that may involve fines.”

• October 24, 2018 (approx.): Mr. Brown filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal matter.

• November 11, 2018: The Association issued a formal “Notice of Violation” to Mr. Brown concerning the same issue raised in the initial notice.

• November 27, 2018: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing.

• January 16, 2019: An administrative hearing was held, with Mr. Brown representing himself and Clint Goodman, Esq. representing the Association. Testimony was heard from Mr. Brown and Simone McGinnis, the Association’s general manager.

• February 4, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a decision dismissing Mr. Brown’s petition.

——————————————————————————–

Core Legal Dispute and Arguments

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 33-1803, which governs the process for notifying homeowners of violations of community documents.

Petitioner’s Position (Nathan Brown)

• Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” received on October 18, 2018, was functionally and legally a “Notice of Violation.”

• Alleged Violation: The notice violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) because it failed to include “written notice of the member’s option to petition for an administrative hearing on the matter in the state real estate department.”

Respondent’s Position (Val Vista Lakes Community Association)

• Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” was not a formal “Notice of Violation” but rather a “courtesy letter,” which is a common industry practice permitted by the Association’s governing documents.

• Defense: Because the initial letter was not a statutory Notice of Violation, the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1803 were not applicable to that specific communication.

——————————————————————————–

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner, Mr. Brown, bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to meet that standard. The decision was based on a series of factual findings and legal conclusions drawn from a “fair and sensible” interpretation of the statute.

Key Findings of Fact

• The Association mailed Mr. Brown a Notice of Non-Compliance on October 18, 2018.

• This notice informed Mr. Brown of a CC&R violation (dead vegetation) and stated that a failure to remedy the issue would result in a subsequent “Notice of Violation” with potential fines.

• Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Association regarding the Notice of Non-Compliance, a step outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1803(C).

• Mr. Brown was later issued a formal Notice of Violation on November 11, 2018.

Conclusions of Law (Legal Rationale)

The ALJ’s decision to dismiss the petition was founded on three distinct legal interpretations:

1. Distinction Between Notices: The judge ruled that the initial communication was not a statutory Notice of Violation.

◦ The ruling states, “a reasonable reading of the Notice of Non-Compliance shows that it is not a Notice of Violation, because it informs Mr. Brown that a Notice of Violation would be issued if he did not appropriately address the ‘situation.'”

◦ This established the letter as a preliminary courtesy notice, distinct from the formal enforcement action that triggers statutory requirements.

2. Statutory Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1803: The judge concluded that even if the initial notice was a Notice of Violation, the Association still did not violate the statute.

◦ The decision notes, “a plain reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803 shows that a Notice of Violation is not required to include notice of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate because subsections D and E both show that any required notice can be given at other times.”

◦ The statute outlines a process where the member can respond via certified mail, and the Association’s duty to provide information about contesting the notice (including the right to a hearing) arises from that exchange.

3. Petitioner’s Procedural Failure: The judge found that the Association’s obligations under the statute were never triggered because Mr. Brown bypassed the prescribed process.

◦ The decision highlights that Mr. Brown did not file a written response with the Association but instead filed his petition with the Department just a few days after receiving the initial notice.

◦ The ruling concludes, “a sensible reading of the statute shows that the Respondent was not required to provide Mr. Brown with notice of a right to petition the Department at any time pertinent to this matter.”

——————————————————————————–

Final Order and Implications

• Order: The ALJ ordered that “Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition is dismissed.”

• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Val Vista Lakes Community Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• Further Action: The decision is binding unless a party files for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.02(B), 32-2199.04, and 41-1092.09.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918029-REL


Study Guide: Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association (No. 19F-H1918029-REL)

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information from the provided case decision.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, and what were their roles?

2. What specific statute did the Petitioner, Nathan Brown, allege that the Respondent violated?

3. What was the initial issue that prompted the Respondent to contact Mr. Brown on October 18, 2018?

4. What was Nathan Brown’s central legal argument concerning the “Notice of Non-Compliance”?

5. How did the Val Vista Lakes Community Association characterize the “Notice of Non-Compliance,” and why was this distinction critical to its defense?

6. According to the Findings of Fact, what procedural step did Mr. Brown fail to take after receiving the initial notice from the association?

7. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party was responsible for meeting it?

8. What were the Administrative Law Judge’s two primary legal conclusions that led to the dismissal of the petition?

9. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on February 4, 2019?

10. What recourse was available to the parties following the judge’s Order, and what was the specified time limit for that action?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Nathan Brown, who served as the Petitioner, and the Val Vista Lakes Community Association, which was the Respondent. Mr. Brown brought the complaint against the association, which was defending its actions.

2. Nathan Brown alleged that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E). This section concerns an association’s obligation to provide a member with written notice of their option to petition for an administrative hearing.

3. The Respondent contacted Mr. Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard, which was considered a violation of the community’s CC&Rs. The “Notice of Non-Compliance” requested that he remedy the situation by November 1, 2018.

4. Mr. Brown’s central argument was that the “Notice of Non-Compliance” was, in fact, a “Notice of Violation.” Therefore, he contended it should have included written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department, as required by statute.

5. The Association characterized the notice as a “courtesy letter,” which is a common practice for providing an initial warning before formal action. This distinction was critical because the Association argued that as a mere courtesy letter and not a formal “Notice of Violation,” it was not subject to the statutory disclosure requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803.

6. Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Respondent via certified mail within 21 calendar days of the notice. This response is an option provided to members under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C).

7. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Nathan Brown, to show that the Respondent had violated the statute.

8. First, the judge concluded that a reasonable reading of the document shows it was not a “Notice of Violation” because it explicitly threatened that one would be issued later. Second, the judge concluded that even if it were a “Notice of Violation,” the statute does not require the hearing disclosure to be in the initial notice, and since Mr. Brown did not follow the response procedure, the Respondent’s obligation to provide that disclosure had not yet been triggered.

9. The final Order was that Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition be dismissed. The judge also deemed the Respondent to be the prevailing party in the matter.

10. A party could file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09, this request had to be filed within 30 days of the service of the Order.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions. Formulate comprehensive, evidence-based answers using only the information and legal reasoning presented in the case decision.

1. Analyze the distinction between a “Notice of Non-Compliance” (or “courtesy letter”) and a “Notice of Violation” as presented in this case. Discuss why this distinction was the central point of contention and how the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the document’s plain language resolved the issue.

2. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Discuss how Nathan Brown’s failure to meet this standard, as the party with the burden of proof, was fundamental to the dismissal of his petition.

3. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the procedural requirements outlined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C), (D), and (E). How does the judge’s “sensible reading” of the statute’s timeline and reciprocal obligations undermine the Petitioner’s claim, even setting aside the debate over the notice’s title?

4. Describe the complete procedural timeline of this case, from the initial notice sent by the association to the final order from the Administrative Law Judge. Identify the key dates and actions taken by each party and by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

5. Discuss the role of statutory interpretation in this legal decision. How did the judge apply established legal principles, such as aiming for a “fair and sensible result” and avoiding “absurd and unreasonable construction,” to support the final ruling against the Petitioner?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings and makes legal decisions.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The specific statute at the center of this case is section 33-1803.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Nathan Brown.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The decision implies these are the governing community documents that Mr. Brown was accused of violating due to dead vegetation.

Courtesy Letter

A term used by the Respondent to describe the “Notice of Non-Compliance.” It is characterized as a common industry practice to inform a resident of an issue before issuing a formal Notice of Violation.

Notice of Non-Compliance

The specific document dated October 18, 2018, sent to Mr. Brown. It informed him of dead vegetation, requested a remedy, and warned that a “Notice of Violation” could follow.

Notice of Violation

A formal notification that a violation has occurred. The decision establishes this as a distinct and more serious step than a “Notice of Non-Compliance,” and one was issued to Mr. Brown on November 11, 2018.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Nathan Brown was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins the legal case. The Administrative Law Judge deemed the Respondent to be the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A legal process to have a case heard again. The parties were notified of their right to request a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was the Respondent.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918029-REL



📔

19F-H1918029-REL

1 source

This source is the Administrative Law Judge Decision for a case titled Nathan Brown vs. Val Vista Lakes Community Association, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The dispute centers on whether a Notice of Non-Compliance sent to Mr. Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard constitutes a Notice of Violation under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E). Mr. Brown argued that the Association violated this statute by failing to include written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing in the initial notice. However, the Administrative Law Judge found that the initial document was merely a courtesy letter and not a formal Notice of Violation, and further concluded that the statute does not require the disclosure of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate within the initial violation notice. Ultimately, the judge determined that the Association was not required to provide Mr. Brown with the notice of his right to petition at any relevant time and dismissed Mr. Brown’s petition.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Nathan Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Clint Goodman (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Appeared for the Respondent
  • Simone McGinnis (general manager)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Presented testimony
  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Recipient of transmission
  • Clint Brown (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Recipient of transmission (listed separately from Clint Goodman)

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • F Del Sol (admin staff)
    Transmitted document

Nathan Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918029-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-02-04
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Nathan Brown Counsel —
Respondent Val Vista Lakes Community Association Counsel Clint Goodman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's claim that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) was dismissed, as the notice issued was determined to be a Notice of Non-Compliance (courtesy letter) and not a Notice of Violation required to carry the specific disclosure.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) by failing to include notice of the option to petition for an administrative hearing in a Notice of Non-Compliance.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent's Notice of Non-Compliance regarding dead vegetation was actually a Notice of Violation and lacked the statutory disclosure required by A.R.S. § 33-1803(E). The ALJ found the document was a courtesy letter and not a Notice of Violation, and even if it were, the statute did not require the disclosure in this context because the Petitioner filed the petition before Respondent took enforcement action or completed the statutory response exchange.

Orders: Petitioner Nathan Brown's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(D)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11

Analytics Highlights

Topics: statutory interpretation, violation notice, non-compliance, courtesy letter, right to petition
Additional Citations:

  • 33-1803(E)
  • 32-2199.01
  • 33-1803(C)
  • 33-1803(D)
  • R2-19-119

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918029-REL Decision – 686796.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:46 (88.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918029-REL


Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association: Case Briefing

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, wherein Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition against the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was dismissed. The central issue was whether an initial “Notice of Non-Compliance” sent by the Association constituted a formal “Notice of Violation” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 33-1803(E), thereby requiring immediate disclosure of the member’s right to an administrative hearing.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent Association. The decision rested on two primary conclusions: First, a reasonable reading of the document in question showed it to be a preliminary “courtesy letter” and not a formal Notice of Violation, as it explicitly warned that a Notice of Violation would be issued later if the issue was not remedied. Second, the ALJ determined that even if the document were considered a Notice of Violation, a plain reading of the statute does not require the disclosure of hearing rights to be included in the initial notice itself. The statute allows for this information to be provided at a later stage in the process, specifically after the member has submitted a formal response. The Petitioner’s failure to follow the statutory response procedure was a key factor in the ruling that the Association had not yet been required to provide the disclosure. Ultimately, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and his petition was dismissed.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1918029-REL

Parties

Petitioner: Nathan Brown
Respondent: Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Hearing Date

January 16, 2019

Decision Date

February 4, 2019

Final Outcome

Petition Dismissed; Respondent deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Background and Timeline of Events

• October 18, 2018: The Val Vista Lakes Community Association mailed a “Notice of Non-Compliance” to Nathan Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard. The notice requested that the situation be remedied by November 1, 2018, and warned that failure to do so would result in the issuance of a “Notice of Violation that may involve fines.”

• October 24, 2018 (approx.): Mr. Brown filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal matter.

• November 11, 2018: The Association issued a formal “Notice of Violation” to Mr. Brown concerning the same issue raised in the initial notice.

• November 27, 2018: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing.

• January 16, 2019: An administrative hearing was held, with Mr. Brown representing himself and Clint Goodman, Esq. representing the Association. Testimony was heard from Mr. Brown and Simone McGinnis, the Association’s general manager.

• February 4, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a decision dismissing Mr. Brown’s petition.

——————————————————————————–

Core Legal Dispute and Arguments

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 33-1803, which governs the process for notifying homeowners of violations of community documents.

Petitioner’s Position (Nathan Brown)

• Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” received on October 18, 2018, was functionally and legally a “Notice of Violation.”

• Alleged Violation: The notice violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) because it failed to include “written notice of the member’s option to petition for an administrative hearing on the matter in the state real estate department.”

Respondent’s Position (Val Vista Lakes Community Association)

• Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” was not a formal “Notice of Violation” but rather a “courtesy letter,” which is a common industry practice permitted by the Association’s governing documents.

• Defense: Because the initial letter was not a statutory Notice of Violation, the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1803 were not applicable to that specific communication.

——————————————————————————–

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner, Mr. Brown, bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to meet that standard. The decision was based on a series of factual findings and legal conclusions drawn from a “fair and sensible” interpretation of the statute.

Key Findings of Fact

• The Association mailed Mr. Brown a Notice of Non-Compliance on October 18, 2018.

• This notice informed Mr. Brown of a CC&R violation (dead vegetation) and stated that a failure to remedy the issue would result in a subsequent “Notice of Violation” with potential fines.

• Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Association regarding the Notice of Non-Compliance, a step outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1803(C).

• Mr. Brown was later issued a formal Notice of Violation on November 11, 2018.

Conclusions of Law (Legal Rationale)

The ALJ’s decision to dismiss the petition was founded on three distinct legal interpretations:

1. Distinction Between Notices: The judge ruled that the initial communication was not a statutory Notice of Violation.

◦ The ruling states, “a reasonable reading of the Notice of Non-Compliance shows that it is not a Notice of Violation, because it informs Mr. Brown that a Notice of Violation would be issued if he did not appropriately address the ‘situation.'”

◦ This established the letter as a preliminary courtesy notice, distinct from the formal enforcement action that triggers statutory requirements.

2. Statutory Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1803: The judge concluded that even if the initial notice was a Notice of Violation, the Association still did not violate the statute.

◦ The decision notes, “a plain reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803 shows that a Notice of Violation is not required to include notice of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate because subsections D and E both show that any required notice can be given at other times.”

◦ The statute outlines a process where the member can respond via certified mail, and the Association’s duty to provide information about contesting the notice (including the right to a hearing) arises from that exchange.

3. Petitioner’s Procedural Failure: The judge found that the Association’s obligations under the statute were never triggered because Mr. Brown bypassed the prescribed process.

◦ The decision highlights that Mr. Brown did not file a written response with the Association but instead filed his petition with the Department just a few days after receiving the initial notice.

◦ The ruling concludes, “a sensible reading of the statute shows that the Respondent was not required to provide Mr. Brown with notice of a right to petition the Department at any time pertinent to this matter.”

——————————————————————————–

Final Order and Implications

• Order: The ALJ ordered that “Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition is dismissed.”

• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Val Vista Lakes Community Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• Further Action: The decision is binding unless a party files for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.02(B), 32-2199.04, and 41-1092.09.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918029-REL


Study Guide: Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association (No. 19F-H1918029-REL)

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information from the provided case decision.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, and what were their roles?

2. What specific statute did the Petitioner, Nathan Brown, allege that the Respondent violated?

3. What was the initial issue that prompted the Respondent to contact Mr. Brown on October 18, 2018?

4. What was Nathan Brown’s central legal argument concerning the “Notice of Non-Compliance”?

5. How did the Val Vista Lakes Community Association characterize the “Notice of Non-Compliance,” and why was this distinction critical to its defense?

6. According to the Findings of Fact, what procedural step did Mr. Brown fail to take after receiving the initial notice from the association?

7. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party was responsible for meeting it?

8. What were the Administrative Law Judge’s two primary legal conclusions that led to the dismissal of the petition?

9. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on February 4, 2019?

10. What recourse was available to the parties following the judge’s Order, and what was the specified time limit for that action?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Nathan Brown, who served as the Petitioner, and the Val Vista Lakes Community Association, which was the Respondent. Mr. Brown brought the complaint against the association, which was defending its actions.

2. Nathan Brown alleged that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E). This section concerns an association’s obligation to provide a member with written notice of their option to petition for an administrative hearing.

3. The Respondent contacted Mr. Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard, which was considered a violation of the community’s CC&Rs. The “Notice of Non-Compliance” requested that he remedy the situation by November 1, 2018.

4. Mr. Brown’s central argument was that the “Notice of Non-Compliance” was, in fact, a “Notice of Violation.” Therefore, he contended it should have included written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department, as required by statute.

5. The Association characterized the notice as a “courtesy letter,” which is a common practice for providing an initial warning before formal action. This distinction was critical because the Association argued that as a mere courtesy letter and not a formal “Notice of Violation,” it was not subject to the statutory disclosure requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803.

6. Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Respondent via certified mail within 21 calendar days of the notice. This response is an option provided to members under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C).

7. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Nathan Brown, to show that the Respondent had violated the statute.

8. First, the judge concluded that a reasonable reading of the document shows it was not a “Notice of Violation” because it explicitly threatened that one would be issued later. Second, the judge concluded that even if it were a “Notice of Violation,” the statute does not require the hearing disclosure to be in the initial notice, and since Mr. Brown did not follow the response procedure, the Respondent’s obligation to provide that disclosure had not yet been triggered.

9. The final Order was that Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition be dismissed. The judge also deemed the Respondent to be the prevailing party in the matter.

10. A party could file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09, this request had to be filed within 30 days of the service of the Order.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions. Formulate comprehensive, evidence-based answers using only the information and legal reasoning presented in the case decision.

1. Analyze the distinction between a “Notice of Non-Compliance” (or “courtesy letter”) and a “Notice of Violation” as presented in this case. Discuss why this distinction was the central point of contention and how the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the document’s plain language resolved the issue.

2. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Discuss how Nathan Brown’s failure to meet this standard, as the party with the burden of proof, was fundamental to the dismissal of his petition.

3. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the procedural requirements outlined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C), (D), and (E). How does the judge’s “sensible reading” of the statute’s timeline and reciprocal obligations undermine the Petitioner’s claim, even setting aside the debate over the notice’s title?

4. Describe the complete procedural timeline of this case, from the initial notice sent by the association to the final order from the Administrative Law Judge. Identify the key dates and actions taken by each party and by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

5. Discuss the role of statutory interpretation in this legal decision. How did the judge apply established legal principles, such as aiming for a “fair and sensible result” and avoiding “absurd and unreasonable construction,” to support the final ruling against the Petitioner?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings and makes legal decisions.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The specific statute at the center of this case is section 33-1803.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Nathan Brown.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The decision implies these are the governing community documents that Mr. Brown was accused of violating due to dead vegetation.

Courtesy Letter

A term used by the Respondent to describe the “Notice of Non-Compliance.” It is characterized as a common industry practice to inform a resident of an issue before issuing a formal Notice of Violation.

Notice of Non-Compliance

The specific document dated October 18, 2018, sent to Mr. Brown. It informed him of dead vegetation, requested a remedy, and warned that a “Notice of Violation” could follow.

Notice of Violation

A formal notification that a violation has occurred. The decision establishes this as a distinct and more serious step than a “Notice of Non-Compliance,” and one was issued to Mr. Brown on November 11, 2018.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Nathan Brown was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins the legal case. The Administrative Law Judge deemed the Respondent to be the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A legal process to have a case heard again. The parties were notified of their right to request a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was the Respondent.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918029-REL



📔

19F-H1918029-REL

1 source

This source is the Administrative Law Judge Decision for a case titled Nathan Brown vs. Val Vista Lakes Community Association, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The dispute centers on whether a Notice of Non-Compliance sent to Mr. Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard constitutes a Notice of Violation under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E). Mr. Brown argued that the Association violated this statute by failing to include written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing in the initial notice. However, the Administrative Law Judge found that the initial document was merely a courtesy letter and not a formal Notice of Violation, and further concluded that the statute does not require the disclosure of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate within the initial violation notice. Ultimately, the judge determined that the Association was not required to provide Mr. Brown with the notice of his right to petition at any relevant time and dismissed Mr. Brown’s petition.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Nathan Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Clint Goodman (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Appeared for the Respondent
  • Simone McGinnis (general manager)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Presented testimony
  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Recipient of transmission
  • Clint Brown (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Recipient of transmission (listed separately from Clint Goodman)

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • F Del Sol (admin staff)
    Transmitted document