The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association
Counsel
Maria Kupillas
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, and CC&Rs
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition in its entirety, concluding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, or the association's CC&Rs.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of any statute or covenant alleged. The core findings supported the HOA's position that the lessee was engaging in prohibited business activity and subletting, and that the charged attorney fees were permissible.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violations concerning notice procedures, leasing restrictions, prohibited business use, and excessive fees.
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 by failing to include proper citations in violation notices, violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 and CC&Rs by imposing illegal restrictions on occupancy dates and prohibiting tenant guests, and violated fee limits under A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E) by charging $250 in attorney fees.
Orders: The Petition was dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1242
A.R.S. § 33-1260.01
A.R.S. § 33-1258
A.A.C. R2-19-119
CC&Rs Section 7.21
CC&Rs Section 7.3
Analytics Highlights
Topics: condominium, HOA dispute, leasing restrictions, short-term rental, business use, notice procedure, attorney fees
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1242
A.R.S. § 33-1260.01
A.R.S. § 33-1258
A.A.C. R2-19-119
CC&Rs Section 7.21
CC&Rs Section 7.3
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1918013-REL Decision – 677039.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:46 (115.9 KB)
19F-H1918013-REL Decision – 677040.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:49 (47.9 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918013-REL
Briefing Document: Lord v. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918013-REL, involving Petitioner George E. Lord and Respondent The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association. The judge ultimately dismissed all claims brought by the Petitioner, ruling that the Association acted within the bounds of Arizona statutes and its governing documents.
The core of the dispute centered on Mr. Lord’s leasing of three condominium units to an individual, Barrie Shepley, who used the properties to house participants for his commercial fitness training camps. The Association contended this arrangement constituted a prohibited short-term sublease and an improper business use of the units, leading them to suspend amenity access for the occupants.
The judge’s decision affirmed the Association’s position on all counts. Key takeaways include:
• Substance Over Form: The judge concluded that despite the absence of a formal sublease agreement, the nature of the arrangement—specifically a camp pricing structure that varied based on the number of occupants per condo—was effectively a sublet designed to house an “itinerant population,” contrary to the “spirit and purpose” of the community’s rules.
• Business Use Violation: The operation was found to be a business activity that violated the CC&Rs by requiring persons (camp participants) to come to the residential units.
• Procedural Compliance: The Association’s violation notices were deemed compliant with Arizona law. The judge noted that the statute only requires a detailed citation of the violated rule after the owner responds to the initial notice, which the Petitioner failed to do.
• Legality of Fees: A $250 charge levied by the Association’s counsel was determined to be a permissible charge for attorney’s fees related to potential collection, not an illegal penalty for leasing information as the Petitioner alleged.
As a result of these findings, the Petitioner’s request for relief was denied, and the petition was dismissed in its entirety.
I. Case Overview
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: George E. Lord (unit owner)
◦ Respondent: The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association
• Case Number: 19F-H1918013-REL
• Venue: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
• Presiding Judge: Tammy L. Eigenheer, Administrative Law Judge
• Hearing Date: November 26, 2018
• Decision Date: December 17, 2018
• Final Disposition: The petition filed by George E. Lord was dismissed.
II. Factual Background and Timeline of Events
1. Lease Agreements: On or about December 4, 2017, Petitioner George Lord, through his management company, leased two units at The Boulders to Barrie Shepley for a term from March 7, 2018, to April 30, 2018. A third unit was subsequently leased to Mr. Shepley on or about January 15, 2018.
2. Commercial Use: Mr. Shepley operated a Canadian fitness business, “Personal Best,” which offered training camps in Tucson. Accommodations at The Boulders were included in the camp packages. The price for a camp varied based on occupancy:
◦ $950.00 each for four campers in a condo
◦ $1075.00 each for three campers in a condo
◦ $1299.00 each for two campers in a condo
3. Occupancy Begins: On March 7, 2018, guests of Mr. Shepley (camp participants) began arriving to occupy the three leased units.
4. Association Intervention: On March 9, 2018, Community Manager Danielle Morris emailed Mr. Lord, stating the Association’s belief that he was in violation of the CC&Rs by allowing subleasing for periods less than the 30-day minimum. Ms. Morris informed him that amenity access cards for the three units were deactivated.
5. Dispute Escalation: Mr. Lord contended that the occupants were merely “guests” of Mr. Shepley, not subletters. Ms. Morris countered that the Association required the names of all occupants and the duration of their stays, and that each occupant must stay for a minimum of 30 days.
6. Information Provided: On March 13, 2018, Mr. Lord provided the names of the occupants and their dates of occupancy, requesting that amenities be restored.
7. Violation Reiterated: On March 16, 2018, Ms. Morris stated the violation was ongoing, as occupants staying from March 7 to March 31 did not meet the 30-day minimum stay requirement.
8. Formal Notice of Violation: On March 18, 2018, Mr. Lord received formal Notices of Violations for the three units. The notices stated that amenity access was suspended because the HOA was not provided with the names of adult occupants and their timeframes. The notice warned that a $300 fine could be applied. Mr. Lord did not respond to these notices.
9. Attorney Involvement: On March 22, 2018, Mr. Lord received a letter from the Association’s legal counsel outlining its legal position and noting an amount due of $250 for attorney’s fees already incurred.
10. Lease Cancellation & Financial Loss: On April 2, 2018, Mr. Shepley cancelled the remainder of the leases due to the lack of amenities for his guests. Mr. Lord asserted a resulting financial loss of $6,900 in rental fees for April 2018.
11. Petition Filing: On August 31, 2018, Mr. Lord filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Association violated state statutes and its own CC&Rs.
III. Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments
Mr. Lord’s petition was based on three primary allegations against the Association:
• Allegation 1: Defective Violation Notice (A.R.S. § 33-1242): The Petitioner argued that the Notices of Violations were legally deficient because they failed to cite the specific statute or CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated.
• Allegation 2: Unlawful Occupancy Requirements (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 & CC&Rs): The Petitioner asserted that the Association overstepped its authority by demanding that each occupant, whom he characterized as a “guest” of the primary lessee, must stay for a minimum of 30 days. He argued the 30-day minimum lease term applied only to the primary lease with Mr. Shepley, not to the occupants.
• Allegation 3: Improper Fees (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E)): The Petitioner claimed that the $250 charge from the Association’s attorney constituted an illegal fee, penalty, or charge related to providing leasing information, which he argued was prohibited by statute.
IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof for any of his allegations and dismissed the petition. The judge’s reasoning is detailed below.
Finding 1: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242 (Violation Notice)
The judge determined that the Association’s initial Notices of Violations were legally sufficient.
• Legal Reasoning: A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) requires an association to cite the specific provision of the condominium documents that has been violated. However, this obligation is only triggered after the unit owner sends a written response to the initial notice by certified mail.
• Factual Basis: The Petitioner admitted that he did not respond to the formal Notices of Violations he received.
• Conclusion: Because the Petitioner did not take the legally required step to trigger the Association’s duty to provide a specific citation, the Association did not violate the statute.
Finding 2: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 or CC&Rs (Leasing Rules)
The judge concluded that the Association was justified in its actions regarding the occupancy of the units.
• The Arrangement was a “Form” of Subletting: The judge ruled against the Petitioner’s argument that the occupants were merely “guests.” The fact that the price of the fitness camp changed based on how many people shared a unit was seen as evidence that Mr. Shepley was, in effect, subletting the units for his business.
• Prohibited Business Activity: The judge found that Mr. Shepley was operating a business from the units in a manner prohibited by Section 7.3 of the CC&Rs, which disallows business activity that “involve[s] persons coming to the Unit.”
• Spirit of the Law: The decision acknowledged that the specific facts of the case “falls between the cracks of the specific language of the statutes and the regulations.” However, the judge emphasized that the Association’s actions were consistent with the broader intent of its rules, stating, “given the totality of the circumstances, the spirit and purpose of the applicable rules is to allow an association to know who is in the community and to prevent an itinerant population.”
• Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to establish that the Association violated leasing statutes or its own CC&Rs.
Finding 3: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E) (Fees)
The judge found that the $250 charge was not an illegal penalty.
• Nature of the Charge: The evidence showed that no fines for the lease policy violation had actually been assessed. The $250 charge was explicitly for attorney’s fees related to the potential collection of assessments.
• Legal Reasoning: The judge stated, “Nothing in the cited statute or the CC&Rs prohibits such a charge being implemented.” The fee was not a penalty for “incomplete or late information” as covered by the statute, but a charge for legal costs incurred by the Association.
• Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to establish a violation regarding the assessed fees.
V. Referenced Statutes and Governing Documents
Reference
Provision Summary
Relevance to Case
A.R.S. § 33-1242(B)&(C)
Outlines the process for a unit owner to respond to a violation notice and the association’s subsequent duty to provide specific details of the violation.
The judge found no violation because the Petitioner did not follow the procedure to trigger the association’s duty.
A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(C)
Limits the information an association can require about a tenant to names, contact info for adults, lease period, and vehicle information.
The Petitioner’s case rested on interpreting this statute; the judge found the Association’s inquiries justified by the unique circumstances.
A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E)
Prohibits an association from imposing fees greater than $15 for incomplete or late leasing information.
The Petitioner argued the $250 attorney fee violated this, but the judge found it was a permissible charge for legal costs, not a penalty.
CC&R Section 7.21
Requires leases to be in writing, for a term of not less than 30 days, and requires owners to provide lessee names and lease dates.
The Association argued the arrangement violated the 30-day minimum stay rule for occupants, which the judge upheld in spirit.
CC&R Section 7.3
Prohibits business activities within a unit that involve persons coming to the unit.
The judge found Mr. Shepley’s fitness camp, which housed participants in the units, was a clear violation of this provision.
Leasing Policy
States a $300 fine may be imposed for violations of the 30-day minimum lease policy.
The Notice of Violation referenced this potential fine, though it was never actually assessed.
VI. Final Order and Procedural Notes
• Order: Based on the above findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petition be dismissed.
• Binding Nature: The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
• Related Filings: On the same day the decision was issued, December 17, 2018, the court also issued a separate “Order Vacating Hearing,” likely a procedural filing to cancel a future hearing that was rendered unnecessary by the dismissal of the case.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918013-REL
Study Guide: Lord v. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association
This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918013-REL, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The case involves a dispute between a condominium unit owner, George E. Lord, and his condominium association, The Boulders at La Reserve, concerning leasing policies, occupant regulations, and alleged statutory violations.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source documents.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and what were their respective roles?
2. Describe the business arrangement that Barrie Shepley, the petitioner’s lessee, was operating from the leased condominium units.
3. What was the first official action the Condominium Association’s management took in response to the arrival of Barrie Shepley’s guests, and what was their stated reason?
4. According to the Association, what two specific provisions of the governing documents were being violated by the petitioner and his lessee?
5. What was the petitioner’s central argument for why the occupants of the units were not in violation of the Association’s 30-day minimum stay requirement?
6. On what procedural grounds did the petitioner, George Lord, claim that the Association’s “Notice of Violations” was itself a violation of Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1242)?
7. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately rule that the Association did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1242?
8. How did the judge interpret the fact that the price for Barrie Shepley’s fitness camps varied based on the number of people sharing a condo?
9. What financial loss did the petitioner claim to have suffered, and what was the direct cause of this loss?
10. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were George E. Lord, the petitioner and owner of multiple condominium units, and The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association, the respondent and governing body for the community. The case was adjudicated by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.
2. Barrie Shepley operated a fitness business called “Personal Best” that offered training camps in the Tucson area. The price for these camps included accommodations at The Boulders, with the cost per person varying based on how many campers shared a condominium unit.
3. The Association’s first action was to deactivate the amenity access cards for the three units leased by Shepley. Danielle Morris, the Community Manager, stated this was due to a belief that the petitioner’s lessee was subleasing the units for periods of less than the 30-day minimum in violation of the CC&Rs.
4. The Association alleged violations of the CC&Rs related to subleasing for less than the 30-day minimum timeframe. The formal Notices of Violations also cited the failure to provide the names of all adult occupants and the timeframes of their stays to the HOA.
5. The petitioner argued that because his lessee, Mr. Shepley, was not charging a specific rental fee to the occupants, they were merely “guests” and not sub-lessees. Therefore, the 30-day minimum stay requirement applicable to leases did not apply to them.
6. The petitioner alleged that the Association’s failure to include a citation to the specific statute or CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated in the initial Notice of Violations was a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242.
7. The judge ruled against the petitioner because A.R.S. § 33-1242 only requires an association to provide the specific provision violated after the unit owner sends a written response to the initial notice by certified mail. The petitioner admitted that he did not respond to the Notices of Violations.
8. The judge found that the tiered pricing structure supported the conclusion that Mr. Shepley was, “in a form, subletting the units.” The fact that the camp price decreased as more people shared a unit indicated that the occupants were paying for their accommodations, not simply staying as guests.
9. The petitioner asserted a financial loss of $6,900 in rental fees for April 2018. This loss was directly caused by Barrie Shepley canceling the remainder of his leases due to the lack of amenities for his occupants.
10. The Administrative Law Judge’s final order was that the Petition filed by George E. Lord be dismissed. This decision was binding unless a rehearing was granted.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, citing specific facts, arguments, and legal interpretations from the case file.
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning for concluding that Barrie Shepley was “in a form, subletting” the units. Discuss the evidence cited and the concept of the “spirit and purpose” of the rules versus their literal interpretation.
2. Examine the procedural misstep made by the petitioner, George Lord, after receiving the Notices of Violations. How did this action directly impact the judge’s ruling on his claim regarding A.R.S. § 33-1242?
3. Discuss the conflict between a unit owner’s right to lease their property and a condominium association’s right to enforce its governing documents, using the specific provisions of the CC&Rs (Sections 7.21 and 7.3) and state law (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01) as examples from the case.
4. Explain the distinction the judge made between the $300 potential fine mentioned in the Notice of Violations and the $250 attorney’s fee charged to the petitioner. How did this distinction relate to A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E), and why was the Association’s action deemed permissible?
5. Evaluate the concept of an “itinerant population” as mentioned by the judge. How did Barrie Shepley’s business model contribute to this concern for the Association, and how did it ultimately weigh into the judge’s decision to dismiss the petition?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Term / Name
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings on disputes involving government agencies. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.
A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)
The codified body of laws for the state of Arizona. The petitioner alleged violations of specific statutes within this code, namely A.R.S. § 33-1242 and § 33-1260.01.
A.R.S. § 33-1242
A state law governing the process for notifying a unit owner of a violation of condominium documents and the procedures for the owner to respond and contest the notice.
A.R.S. § 33-1260.01
A state law that places limitations on what information an association can require from a unit owner regarding a tenant and caps certain fees or penalties for incomplete information at $15.
Amenity
A feature or facility of a property that provides comfort, convenience, or pleasure. In this case, access to amenities was controlled by key cards, which the Association deactivated.
Barrie Shepley
The individual who leased three condominium units from the petitioner. He operated a fitness business, “Personal Best,” and used the units to house clients attending his training camps.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or condominium. The Association alleged Shepley’s use of the units violated Sections 7.21 (leasing limitations) and 7.3 (business use limitations).
George E. Lord
The Petitioner in the case. He was the owner of multiple condominium units at The Boulders at La Reserve and filed the petition against the Association.
Itinerant population
A term used by the judge to describe a population of short-term, transient occupants. The judge concluded that the purpose of the Association’s rules was, in part, to prevent this type of occupancy.
Notice of Violations
A formal written document sent by the Association to the petitioner informing him of alleged violations of the governing documents and outlining potential consequences, such as fines.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, George E. Lord.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It means that the petitioner had the burden of showing that the facts they sought to prove were “more probable than not.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association.
Subletting
The practice of a tenant leasing a rented property to a third party. The Association contended Shepley was subletting the units to his campers, while the petitioner argued they were merely guests.
The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association
The Respondent in the case. The homeowners’ association (HOA) responsible for governing the condominium community in Oro Valley, Arizona.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918013-REL
The $6,900 ‘Guest’ Mistake: 3 Hard Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit
A $6,900 loss in rental income and a losing legal battle with his HOA—all because of a dispute over the definition of a “guest.” This case between owner George Lord and The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association is a masterclass in how quickly and completely an owner can lose when they misinterpret the rules and underestimate an association’s power.
For any homeowner or landlord, this dispute provides three crucial lessons distilled from the administrative court’s decision. Understanding these precedents is essential before you ever find yourself at odds with your own HOA.
Lesson 1: The “Spirit of the Rule” Can Outweigh Your Clever Workaround
The dispute began when the property owner, Mr. Lord, leased three condos to Barrie Shepley, who ran fitness training camps. Mr. Shepley then used the condos to house his camp attendees, often for periods shorter than the HOA’s 30-day minimum lease term.
The owner argued his arrangement complied with the rules. He claimed his tenant, Mr. Shepley, was not subleasing the units; the attendees were merely “guests,” and therefore not subject to the 30-day minimum. It was a clever workaround, but it fell apart under scrutiny for two distinct reasons.
First, the judge looked past the “guest” label to the financial substance of the arrangement. A key piece of evidence was the camp’s pricing: the cost changed based on how many campers shared a condo ($950 each for four campers vs. $1299 each for two). The judge saw this as clear proof that housing was being paid for, making it a form of subletting.
Second, the judge found that the arrangement constituted a prohibited business activity. The association’s CC&Rs (Section 7.3) explicitly forbade any business activity that “involve[s] persons coming to the Unit.” Since the fitness camp required attendees to come to the condos for lodging, it was a direct violation. The judge’s decision was therefore not just based on a subjective interpretation, but was also grounded in a concrete rule violation.
The court looked at the “totality of the circumstances” to make its ruling, a point powerfully summarized in the final decision:
However, given the totality of the circumstances, the spirit and purpose of the applicable rules is to allow an association to know who is in the community and to prevent an itinerant population.
Pro Tip: Before implementing a workaround, ask yourself: “Does this honor the community’s stated goal?” If the answer is no, you’re on thin ice, even if you think you’ve found a loophole.
Lesson 2: You Must Follow Procedure to the Letter, Or You Forfeit Your Rights
Confident in his “guest” interpretation, the homeowner made his next critical error by underestimating the importance of legal procedure. He argued that the HOA’s initial “Notice of Violations” was invalid because it failed to cite the specific CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated.
This argument was swiftly dismissed due to a simple but fatal mistake: the owner never sent a formal written response to the notice by certified mail.
Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1242), an owner’s formal written response via certified mail triggers the HOA’s obligation to provide the specific provision that was violated. Without that trigger, the HOA’s duty to explain further is never activated. The homeowner failed to pull the trigger. Because he did not follow this exact procedure, his claim was thrown out, and the HOA had no further legal obligation to detail its case.
Analyst’s Takeaway: In a legal dispute, communication that isn’t sent via the officially mandated channel (like certified mail) is legally equivalent to communication that never happened.
Lesson 3: The HOA’s Legal Fees Can Hit Your Wallet Sooner Than You Think
Early in the dispute, the owner received a letter from the HOA’s legal counsel. The letter outlined the association’s position and included a charge for $250.00. This was not a fine for the violation. It was a fee for the lawyer’s time, as explained in the letter:
“As you know, the Association is entitled to recover its costs and attorneys’ fees from you, including $250.00 already incurred for the preparation of this letter.”
Many governing documents contain clauses that allow an HOA to recover its “costs of enforcement.” This letter was an enforcement action, and the legal fee was the cost. The judge found that nothing in the law or CC&Rs prohibited the HOA from immediately passing this expense to the owner.
This initial charge was a precursor to a much larger financial blow. As an enforcement tool for the violations discussed in Lesson 1, the HOA suspended the tenants’ access to community amenities. This pressure tactic worked perfectly. The tenant, Mr. Shepley, cancelled his leases due to the lack of amenity access, leading to the owner’s stated loss of $6,900 in rental fees.
Pro Tip: Assume your HOA’s first legal letter starts a running tab. Budget for legal costs from day one of a formal dispute, not just for potential fines.
Conclusion: Knowledge is Your Best Defense
The case of Lord vs. The Boulders at La Reserve establishes three clear precedents for owners: a rule’s intent can supersede its literal interpretation, procedural shortcuts void your rights, and the financial clock starts ticking the moment an HOA retains counsel.
This case is a firm reminder of an HOA’s power to enforce its rules, but it also highlights the owner’s responsibility to understand them. It begs the question: In our own communities, are we fully aware of the rules we’ve agreed to live by?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
George E. Lord(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Maria Kupillas(respondent attorney) Law offices of Farley, Choate & Bergin
Danielle Morris(community manager) The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(ADRE Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
AHansen(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
djones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
DGardner(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
ncano(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.
Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.
Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.
Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.
The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.
Case Overview
• Parties Involved:
◦ Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.
◦ Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.
• Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.
• Decision Date: November 30, 2018.
• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.
Background and Timeline of the Dispute
The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).
• Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):
◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.
◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.
◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.
◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.
• May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:
◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.
◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.
◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.
• MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.
• July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.
• MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.
• July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.
• July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.
Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)
The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”
• Specific Violations Alleged:
◦ Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.
◦ Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.
◦ Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.
• Evidence Presented at Hearing:
◦ Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.
◦ Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).
◦ Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.
◦ Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.
Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)
The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.
• Core Arguments:
◦ Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.
◦ Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.
◦ Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.
• Actions Taken by MCIII:
◦ Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.
◦ Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.
◦ Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.
◦ Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.
◦ Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.
Governing Rules and CC&Rs
The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.
Document
Article/Rule
Provision
Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)
Rule 3
Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.12
Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.13
States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.14
Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.
• Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.
• Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.
◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.
◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”
◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.
◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.
• Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.
Final Order
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:
1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918004-REL
Study Guide: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918004-REL, concerning a dispute over the enforcement of parking regulations. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What were the two main issues John W. Gray alleged in his petition filed with the Department on July 30, 2018?
3. According to the MCIII rules in effect at the time of the complaint, what were the primary restrictions placed on vehicle ownership and parking for residents?
4. Describe the key evidence the Petitioner presented at the hearing to substantiate his claims of widespread parking rule violations.
5. What was the Respondent’s primary defense for not enforcing the more restrictive parking rules that were in place at the time of the complaint?
6. How did the new rules, adopted on October 23, 2018, change the association’s approach to vehicle limits and garage use?
7. Explain the significance of the inoperable red truck to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.
8. What was the required standard of proof for the Petitioner in this case, and did the judge determine that he met it?
9. Prior to the hearing, what specific enforcement actions did MCIII take in response to the Petitioner’s documented complaints?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was MCIII required to do?
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were John W. Gray, the Petitioner, who was a condominium owner in the MCIII development, and the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the Respondent and the governing unit owners’ association for the development. Mr. Gray initiated the legal action against the association for allegedly failing to enforce its rules.
2. The Petitioner’s two main allegations were that the association had failed to provide him with a copy of its management company agreement and that it refused to enforce its parking rules. He specifically alleged multiple units were violating rules regarding the number of vehicles and the presence of inoperable vehicles.
3. The rules in effect at the time of the complaint limited owners to a maximum of two cars per unit. The rules also “assigned” the garage as the designated parking spot for the first car and explicitly banned “inoperable” vehicles from the property.
4. The Petitioner presented credible evidence including photographs from multiple exhibits (6-16) showing numerous violations. He also testified based on his personal observations, identified specific units with three cars using garages for storage, and provided vehicle registration information obtained through a private investigator.
5. The Respondent defended its lack of enforcement by arguing that the existing restrictive rules were “almost impossible” to enforce without constant surveillance. The Community Manager also testified that she had received no prior complaints about parking from other residents.
6. The new rules, adopted October 23, 2018, removed the limit on the number of cars permitted per unit. However, they instituted a new requirement that owners must park their vehicles in their respective garages before using any common area parking spaces.
7. The inoperable red truck was significant because it had been parked in the same spot for over a year, serving as undisputed evidence of a long-standing violation. The judge noted that MCIII’s single letter to the owner, sent long after the violation began, demonstrated a clear failure to enforce its rules regarding inoperable vehicles.
8. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning the Petitioner had to convince the judge that his contentions were more probably true than not. The judge concluded that the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof.
9. MCIII’s primary enforcement actions were to place the issue on its July 24, 2018, Board meeting agenda and to send one letter on July 23, 2018, to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck. The record also shows MCIII had previously enforced parking rules against the Petitioner himself by having his truck towed from a fire lane.
10. The judge ordered that the Petitioner be deemed the prevailing party in the case. The judge further ordered that MCIII must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the order.
Essay Questions
The following questions are designed to promote deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the facts and arguments presented in the source document.
1. Analyze the Respondent’s argument that revising the parking rules made the Petitioner’s complaints “moot.” Based on the judge’s decision, evaluate the strength of this defense and explain why it was ultimately unsuccessful.
2. Discuss the concept of a condominium association’s duty to enforce its own rules and CC&Rs, using the specific examples of MCIII’s actions (and inactions) from the case. How did the association’s selective enforcement—such as towing the Petitioner’s vehicle but not others—factor into the case’s context?
3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Which party presented a more compelling case, and why? Support your analysis by citing specific exhibits, testimony, and documented observations mentioned in the decision.
4. Explore the timeline of events from the Petitioner’s first complaint in May 2018 to the judge’s decision in November 2018. How does this timeline illustrate the dispute’s escalation and the association’s response strategy?
5. The Administrative Law Judge found that MCIII’s argument of the rules being “unenforceable” was not a viable defense. What practical enforcement actions, short of 24/7 surveillance, could the association have taken according to the information provided in the hearing record?
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision. In this case, it was Kay Abramsohn.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community like a condominium. MCIII’s CC&Rs were effective January 12, 1999.
Common Elements
Also referred to as the “Common Area,” these are parts of the condominium property, such as the parking lot, available for use by all unit owners.
Community Manager
An employee of the management company (Curtiss Management) hired by the association to handle its affairs. In this case, the manager was Andrea Lacombe.
Evidentiary Hearing
A formal legal proceeding where parties present evidence (exhibits) and testimony to prove their case before a judge or hearing officer.
Inoperable Vehicle
A vehicle that cannot be operated. Both the old and new MCIII rules, as well as CC&R 4.14, prohibited storing such vehicles on the property outside of an enclosed garage.
A term used to describe an issue that is no longer in dispute or of practical significance. MCIII argued that its new rules made the Petitioner’s issues moot.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, John W. Gray.
A map, drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land. The plat for MCIII showed there were 36 parking spaces in the lot.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case. It is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true; it is a superior evidentiary weight that inclines an impartial mind to one side.
Prevailing Party
The party who is found to have won the legal case. The judge deemed the Petitioner to be the prevailing party.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the defending party. In this case, the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918004-REL
He Fought the HOA Over Parking—and Won. Here Are the 5 Surprising Lessons from His Battle.
Introduction: The Familiar Frustration of HOA Parking
For anyone living in a condo, townhome, or planned community, the daily dance of parking is a familiar routine. It’s a world of limited spaces, confusing rules about guest parking, and the constant fear of a warning sticker or, worse, a tow truck. This shared frustration often simmers just below the surface of community life, where the rules established by a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel arbitrary and inconsistently applied.
This post breaks down a real-life administrative court case where one resident, John W. Gray, took on his Condominium Association for its complete failure to enforce its own parking rules. Without getting lost in legal jargon, we will explore how a single, determined individual was able to hold his HOA accountable. This wasn’t just a simple disagreement; it was a formal challenge that went before a judge.
The official court decision in Gray’s favor offers powerful and surprising lessons for any homeowner, renter, or board member. This David vs. Goliath story is more than just a victory for one resident; it’s a practical guide filled with takeaways on how to effectively address community disputes and understand the true responsibilities of an HOA.
1. The ‘It’s Too Hard to Enforce’ Excuse Doesn’t Work
The association (MCIII) built its primary defense on the argument that its own parking rules were “almost impossible” to enforce. They claimed that the two-car limit per unit was too restrictive and would require constant, 24/7 monitoring and picture-taking, which was simply not feasible.
The administrative law judge completely rejected this excuse. The core lesson from the ruling is that an HOA cannot simply choose to ignore its governing documents because enforcement is inconvenient. The judge pointed out that the association had simpler tools at its disposal, such as issuing violation notices and levying fines as outlined in their rules, but failed to take even these basic steps.
The judge’s finding offers a powerful reality check for any board that feels overwhelmed by its own regulations:
MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable is not a viable defense in this instance, as the rules contained many provisions that could have been noticed to the units regarding parking rules and their enforcement.
2. Meticulous Data is Your Strongest Weapon
John W. Gray didn’t just complain; he built an airtight case. His methodical approach to proving the association’s failure was a key factor in his success. The court record details the specific actions he took:
• He conducted personal observations and took photographs of the offending vehicles.
• He identified the specific units that had too many cars and were using their garages for storage instead of parking.
• He hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to definitively link cars to specific units.
The judge found this evidence to be “credible and convincing.” Gray’s detailed documentation painted a clear picture of the problem’s scale. According to his calculations, just 12 of the community’s 33 units were monopolizing 27 parking spaces, leaving very few for the remaining 21 units. This takeaway is clear: a well-documented, fact-based complaint is infinitely more powerful than anecdotal grievances.
3. Changing the Rules Doesn’t Erase Past Failures
In response to Gray’s formal complaint, the HOA Board took a strategic but ultimately unsuccessful step. Just days before the scheduled hearing, the Board reviewed and adopted a new set of parking rules. These new rules conveniently removed the two-car limit that the association had claimed was unenforceable.
The association then argued that this rule change made the petitioner’s original complaint “moot,” or irrelevant. They essentially claimed that since the rule he was complaining about no longer existed, there was no longer a case to be heard.
This strategy failed because the judge ruled on the HOA’s past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the complaint. This is a crucial lesson in accountability. An organization cannot escape responsibility for its prior negligence simply by changing the rules at the last minute. The failure to act had already occurred, and the consequences of that failure were the basis of the lawsuit.
4. Ignoring Small Violations Can Create a Major Crisis
Nowhere was the HOA’s failure more obvious than in the case of a single inoperable red truck. The vehicle had been parked in the same spot for over a year, in clear violation of the rules prohibiting the storage of inoperable vehicles on the property.
Despite this long-term, visible violation, the hearing record shows the HOA’s response was both delayed and minimal. They sent only one letter to the unit owner about the truck, and this action was taken “long after” the violation began and only after Gray had formally complained.
The judge’s observation on this single vehicle underscores the wider impact of the board’s inaction:
Even the clearing of just one more space would have made the tenuous parking situation better.
The red truck was a symptom of a much larger disease. The failure to address one obvious, easily-proven violation demonstrated a systemic failure to manage the community’s shared resources, which directly contributed to the parking crisis and the disproportionate use of spaces by a few residents.
5. Enforcement Must Be Fair, Not Just Convenient
Perhaps the most telling detail from the hearing record was the apparent double standard in the HOA’s enforcement actions. The record explicitly mentions only two enforcement actions the association had taken regarding parking:
• Towing the petitioner’s own truck on one occasion for parking in a fire lane.
• Sending a single, very late letter about the red truck that had been parked for over a year.
The hearing record is devastatingly clear on this point. The only enforcement actions the board could point to were punitive or reactive: towing the truck of the very resident demanding action, and sending a single, belated letter about a year-old violation after he had filed a formal complaint. This wasn’t just inconsistent enforcement; it was a textbook case of selective enforcement that targeted the complainant while ignoring the systemic problem.
For an HOA’s authority to be respected and legally defensible, its rules must be applied fairly and consistently to all residents, not just when it is convenient or aimed at a perceived nuisance.
Conclusion: A Win for the Power of One
The judge’s order was a decisive victory for resident rights, affirming that an HOA’s duty to enforce its own rules is not optional. While the association was ordered to repay his $500 filing fee, the real prize was the validation that one resident, armed with credible evidence, can successfully hold a board accountable to the entire community. This case proves that meticulous documentation, persistence, and a refusal to be ignored are the great equalizers in community governance. It makes you wonder: what ‘unenforceable’ rules in your community are just waiting for a champion to demand they be followed?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John W. Gray(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Austin Baillio(attorney) Maxwell & Morgan PC Represented Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
Andrea Lacombe(community manager) Curtiss Management Testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Kay Abramsohn(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del Sol(administrative staff) Transmitted decision electronically
The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.
Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.
Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.
Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.
The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.
Case Overview
• Parties Involved:
◦ Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.
◦ Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.
• Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.
• Decision Date: November 30, 2018.
• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.
Background and Timeline of the Dispute
The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).
• Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):
◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.
◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.
◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.
◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.
• May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:
◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.
◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.
◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.
• MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.
• July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.
• MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.
• July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.
• July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.
Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)
The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”
• Specific Violations Alleged:
◦ Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.
◦ Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.
◦ Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.
• Evidence Presented at Hearing:
◦ Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.
◦ Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).
◦ Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.
◦ Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.
Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)
The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.
• Core Arguments:
◦ Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.
◦ Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.
◦ Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.
• Actions Taken by MCIII:
◦ Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.
◦ Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.
◦ Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.
◦ Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.
◦ Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.
Governing Rules and CC&Rs
The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.
Document
Article/Rule
Provision
Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)
Rule 3
Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.12
Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.13
States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.14
Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.
• Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.
• Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.
◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.
◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”
◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.
◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.
• Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.
Final Order
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:
1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918004-REL
Study Guide: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918004-REL, concerning a dispute over the enforcement of parking regulations. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What were the two main issues John W. Gray alleged in his petition filed with the Department on July 30, 2018?
3. According to the MCIII rules in effect at the time of the complaint, what were the primary restrictions placed on vehicle ownership and parking for residents?
4. Describe the key evidence the Petitioner presented at the hearing to substantiate his claims of widespread parking rule violations.
5. What was the Respondent’s primary defense for not enforcing the more restrictive parking rules that were in place at the time of the complaint?
6. How did the new rules, adopted on October 23, 2018, change the association’s approach to vehicle limits and garage use?
7. Explain the significance of the inoperable red truck to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.
8. What was the required standard of proof for the Petitioner in this case, and did the judge determine that he met it?
9. Prior to the hearing, what specific enforcement actions did MCIII take in response to the Petitioner’s documented complaints?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was MCIII required to do?
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were John W. Gray, the Petitioner, who was a condominium owner in the MCIII development, and the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the Respondent and the governing unit owners’ association for the development. Mr. Gray initiated the legal action against the association for allegedly failing to enforce its rules.
2. The Petitioner’s two main allegations were that the association had failed to provide him with a copy of its management company agreement and that it refused to enforce its parking rules. He specifically alleged multiple units were violating rules regarding the number of vehicles and the presence of inoperable vehicles.
3. The rules in effect at the time of the complaint limited owners to a maximum of two cars per unit. The rules also “assigned” the garage as the designated parking spot for the first car and explicitly banned “inoperable” vehicles from the property.
4. The Petitioner presented credible evidence including photographs from multiple exhibits (6-16) showing numerous violations. He also testified based on his personal observations, identified specific units with three cars using garages for storage, and provided vehicle registration information obtained through a private investigator.
5. The Respondent defended its lack of enforcement by arguing that the existing restrictive rules were “almost impossible” to enforce without constant surveillance. The Community Manager also testified that she had received no prior complaints about parking from other residents.
6. The new rules, adopted October 23, 2018, removed the limit on the number of cars permitted per unit. However, they instituted a new requirement that owners must park their vehicles in their respective garages before using any common area parking spaces.
7. The inoperable red truck was significant because it had been parked in the same spot for over a year, serving as undisputed evidence of a long-standing violation. The judge noted that MCIII’s single letter to the owner, sent long after the violation began, demonstrated a clear failure to enforce its rules regarding inoperable vehicles.
8. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning the Petitioner had to convince the judge that his contentions were more probably true than not. The judge concluded that the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof.
9. MCIII’s primary enforcement actions were to place the issue on its July 24, 2018, Board meeting agenda and to send one letter on July 23, 2018, to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck. The record also shows MCIII had previously enforced parking rules against the Petitioner himself by having his truck towed from a fire lane.
10. The judge ordered that the Petitioner be deemed the prevailing party in the case. The judge further ordered that MCIII must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the order.
Essay Questions
The following questions are designed to promote deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the facts and arguments presented in the source document.
1. Analyze the Respondent’s argument that revising the parking rules made the Petitioner’s complaints “moot.” Based on the judge’s decision, evaluate the strength of this defense and explain why it was ultimately unsuccessful.
2. Discuss the concept of a condominium association’s duty to enforce its own rules and CC&Rs, using the specific examples of MCIII’s actions (and inactions) from the case. How did the association’s selective enforcement—such as towing the Petitioner’s vehicle but not others—factor into the case’s context?
3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Which party presented a more compelling case, and why? Support your analysis by citing specific exhibits, testimony, and documented observations mentioned in the decision.
4. Explore the timeline of events from the Petitioner’s first complaint in May 2018 to the judge’s decision in November 2018. How does this timeline illustrate the dispute’s escalation and the association’s response strategy?
5. The Administrative Law Judge found that MCIII’s argument of the rules being “unenforceable” was not a viable defense. What practical enforcement actions, short of 24/7 surveillance, could the association have taken according to the information provided in the hearing record?
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision. In this case, it was Kay Abramsohn.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community like a condominium. MCIII’s CC&Rs were effective January 12, 1999.
Common Elements
Also referred to as the “Common Area,” these are parts of the condominium property, such as the parking lot, available for use by all unit owners.
Community Manager
An employee of the management company (Curtiss Management) hired by the association to handle its affairs. In this case, the manager was Andrea Lacombe.
Evidentiary Hearing
A formal legal proceeding where parties present evidence (exhibits) and testimony to prove their case before a judge or hearing officer.
Inoperable Vehicle
A vehicle that cannot be operated. Both the old and new MCIII rules, as well as CC&R 4.14, prohibited storing such vehicles on the property outside of an enclosed garage.
A term used to describe an issue that is no longer in dispute or of practical significance. MCIII argued that its new rules made the Petitioner’s issues moot.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, John W. Gray.
A map, drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land. The plat for MCIII showed there were 36 parking spaces in the lot.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case. It is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true; it is a superior evidentiary weight that inclines an impartial mind to one side.
Prevailing Party
The party who is found to have won the legal case. The judge deemed the Petitioner to be the prevailing party.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the defending party. In this case, the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918004-REL
He Fought the HOA Over Parking—and Won. Here Are the 5 Surprising Lessons from His Battle.
Introduction: The Familiar Frustration of HOA Parking
For anyone living in a condo, townhome, or planned community, the daily dance of parking is a familiar routine. It’s a world of limited spaces, confusing rules about guest parking, and the constant fear of a warning sticker or, worse, a tow truck. This shared frustration often simmers just below the surface of community life, where the rules established by a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel arbitrary and inconsistently applied.
This post breaks down a real-life administrative court case where one resident, John W. Gray, took on his Condominium Association for its complete failure to enforce its own parking rules. Without getting lost in legal jargon, we will explore how a single, determined individual was able to hold his HOA accountable. This wasn’t just a simple disagreement; it was a formal challenge that went before a judge.
The official court decision in Gray’s favor offers powerful and surprising lessons for any homeowner, renter, or board member. This David vs. Goliath story is more than just a victory for one resident; it’s a practical guide filled with takeaways on how to effectively address community disputes and understand the true responsibilities of an HOA.
1. The ‘It’s Too Hard to Enforce’ Excuse Doesn’t Work
The association (MCIII) built its primary defense on the argument that its own parking rules were “almost impossible” to enforce. They claimed that the two-car limit per unit was too restrictive and would require constant, 24/7 monitoring and picture-taking, which was simply not feasible.
The administrative law judge completely rejected this excuse. The core lesson from the ruling is that an HOA cannot simply choose to ignore its governing documents because enforcement is inconvenient. The judge pointed out that the association had simpler tools at its disposal, such as issuing violation notices and levying fines as outlined in their rules, but failed to take even these basic steps.
The judge’s finding offers a powerful reality check for any board that feels overwhelmed by its own regulations:
MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable is not a viable defense in this instance, as the rules contained many provisions that could have been noticed to the units regarding parking rules and their enforcement.
2. Meticulous Data is Your Strongest Weapon
John W. Gray didn’t just complain; he built an airtight case. His methodical approach to proving the association’s failure was a key factor in his success. The court record details the specific actions he took:
• He conducted personal observations and took photographs of the offending vehicles.
• He identified the specific units that had too many cars and were using their garages for storage instead of parking.
• He hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to definitively link cars to specific units.
The judge found this evidence to be “credible and convincing.” Gray’s detailed documentation painted a clear picture of the problem’s scale. According to his calculations, just 12 of the community’s 33 units were monopolizing 27 parking spaces, leaving very few for the remaining 21 units. This takeaway is clear: a well-documented, fact-based complaint is infinitely more powerful than anecdotal grievances.
3. Changing the Rules Doesn’t Erase Past Failures
In response to Gray’s formal complaint, the HOA Board took a strategic but ultimately unsuccessful step. Just days before the scheduled hearing, the Board reviewed and adopted a new set of parking rules. These new rules conveniently removed the two-car limit that the association had claimed was unenforceable.
The association then argued that this rule change made the petitioner’s original complaint “moot,” or irrelevant. They essentially claimed that since the rule he was complaining about no longer existed, there was no longer a case to be heard.
This strategy failed because the judge ruled on the HOA’s past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the complaint. This is a crucial lesson in accountability. An organization cannot escape responsibility for its prior negligence simply by changing the rules at the last minute. The failure to act had already occurred, and the consequences of that failure were the basis of the lawsuit.
4. Ignoring Small Violations Can Create a Major Crisis
Nowhere was the HOA’s failure more obvious than in the case of a single inoperable red truck. The vehicle had been parked in the same spot for over a year, in clear violation of the rules prohibiting the storage of inoperable vehicles on the property.
Despite this long-term, visible violation, the hearing record shows the HOA’s response was both delayed and minimal. They sent only one letter to the unit owner about the truck, and this action was taken “long after” the violation began and only after Gray had formally complained.
The judge’s observation on this single vehicle underscores the wider impact of the board’s inaction:
Even the clearing of just one more space would have made the tenuous parking situation better.
The red truck was a symptom of a much larger disease. The failure to address one obvious, easily-proven violation demonstrated a systemic failure to manage the community’s shared resources, which directly contributed to the parking crisis and the disproportionate use of spaces by a few residents.
5. Enforcement Must Be Fair, Not Just Convenient
Perhaps the most telling detail from the hearing record was the apparent double standard in the HOA’s enforcement actions. The record explicitly mentions only two enforcement actions the association had taken regarding parking:
• Towing the petitioner’s own truck on one occasion for parking in a fire lane.
• Sending a single, very late letter about the red truck that had been parked for over a year.
The hearing record is devastatingly clear on this point. The only enforcement actions the board could point to were punitive or reactive: towing the truck of the very resident demanding action, and sending a single, belated letter about a year-old violation after he had filed a formal complaint. This wasn’t just inconsistent enforcement; it was a textbook case of selective enforcement that targeted the complainant while ignoring the systemic problem.
For an HOA’s authority to be respected and legally defensible, its rules must be applied fairly and consistently to all residents, not just when it is convenient or aimed at a perceived nuisance.
Conclusion: A Win for the Power of One
The judge’s order was a decisive victory for resident rights, affirming that an HOA’s duty to enforce its own rules is not optional. While the association was ordered to repay his $500 filing fee, the real prize was the validation that one resident, armed with credible evidence, can successfully hold a board accountable to the entire community. This case proves that meticulous documentation, persistence, and a refusal to be ignored are the great equalizers in community governance. It makes you wonder: what ‘unenforceable’ rules in your community are just waiting for a champion to demand they be followed?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John W. Gray(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Austin Baillio(attorney) Maxwell & Morgan PC Represented Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
Andrea Lacombe(community manager) Curtiss Management Testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Kay Abramsohn(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del Sol(administrative staff) Transmitted decision electronically
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition for rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the statutory details or the notice of the right to petition ADRE because the Petitioner failed to submit a written response by certified mail within 21 days of the violation notices.
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the information listed in A.R.S. § 33-1242 (C) or the notice of right to petition in (D) because the Petitioner did not submit a written response by certified mail within twenty-one days, which is the triggering requirement for those obligations.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of statutory requirements for homeowner association violation notices.
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 requirements regarding violation notices. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to establish the violation because he did not respond by certified mail within the 21-day statutory period, meaning the HOA was not triggered to fulfill its obligations under § 33-1242(C) and (D).
Home Builders Association of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 187 Ariz. 479, 483, 930 P.2d 993, 997(1997)
Canon School Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Constr. Co., 177 Ariz. 526, 529, 869 P.2d 500, 503 (1994)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1918009-REL Decision – 671673.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:23 (85.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918009-REL
Briefing Document: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge Decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Rogelio A. Garcia (Petitioner) and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the case is Mr. Garcia’s allegation that the HOA violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1242 by failing to follow specific procedures after issuing notices for a violation of its short-term rental policy.
The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The central finding was that Mr. Garcia failed to meet a critical prerequisite outlined in the statute: he did not respond to the violation notices by certified mail within the 21-day period. This failure meant that the HOA’s corresponding statutory obligations—such as providing the name of the person who observed the violation—were never triggered.
Furthermore, the judge determined that the HOA was not required to inform Mr. Garcia of his right to an administrative hearing because the violation notices themselves included instructions on the HOA’s internal process for contesting the matter. Mr. Garcia’s argument that the HOA’s rapid issuance of fines and subsequent notices prevented him from responding was found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The decisions underscore a strict interpretation of the statute, placing the initial burden of response on the unit owner.
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I. Case Overview
This matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings after a petition was filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The case involved an initial hearing and a rehearing requested by the Petitioner.
Entity / Individual
Petitioner
Rogelio A. Garcia
Respondent
Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (“Villagio”)
Respondent’s Counsel
Nathan Tennyson, Esq.
Adjudicating Body
Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judge
Velva Moses-Thompson
Case Number (Initial)
19F-H1918009-REL
Case Number (Rehearing)
19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
Core Allegation
Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242 by the Respondent.
II. Chronology of Events
• March 8, 2018: Villagio mails the first letter to Mr. Garcia, alleging a violation of short-term lease provisions in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The letter instructs him to file an appeal with the Board of Directors within 10 days of receipt.
• March 22, 2018: Villagio mails a second notice for the same violation, informing Mr. Garcia that a $1,000 fine has been posted to his account. This notice also contains instructions for contesting the violation.
• April 5, 2018: Villagio mails a third notice, informing Mr. Garcia that a $2,000 fine has been posted to his account for the continuing violation.
• Response from Garcia: Mr. Garcia did not respond to any of the three notices within the 21-calendar-day period specified by statute. He did, at some point, file an appeal directly with Villagio, which held a hearing but did not change its position.
• August 17, 2018 (approx.): Mr. Garcia files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, formally initiating the administrative hearing process.
• October 30, 2018: The first evidentiary hearing is held before Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.
• November 19, 2018: The initial Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.
• January 3, 2019 (approx.): The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues an order setting a rehearing for the matter, following a request from Mr. Garcia.
• February 12, 2019: The rehearing is held. Mr. Garcia testifies on his own behalf, and Villagio presents testimony from Community Manager Tom Gordon.
• March 4, 2019: The final Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, again dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.
III. Central Legal Issue: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1242
The entire dispute centered on the procedural requirements laid out in A.R.S. § 33-1242, which governs how an HOA must handle notices of violation to a unit owner. The key provisions are:
• Unit Owner’s Responsibility (Subsection B): A unit owner who receives a written notice of violation may provide the association with a written response. This response must be sent by certified mail within twenty-one calendar days after the date of the notice.
• Association’s Obligations upon Response (Subsection C):Within ten business days after receiving the certified mail response, the association must provide a written explanation that includes:
1. The specific provision of the condominium documents allegedly violated.
2. The date the violation occurred or was observed.
3. The first and last name of the person(s) who observed the violation.
4. The process the unit owner must follow to contest the notice.
• Association’s Obligation Regarding Administrative Hearings (Subsection D): An association must provide written notice of the owner’s option to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department unless the information required in Subsection C, paragraph 4 (the contest process) is provided in the initial notice of violation.
IV. Analysis of Arguments and Evidence
Petitioner’s Position (Rogelio A. Garcia)
Mr. Garcia’s arguments, presented across both hearings, focused on three primary claims of statutory violation by Villagio:
1. Failure to Provide Required Information: Villagio violated the statute by not providing him with the first and last name of the person who observed the violation.
2. Failure to Notify of Hearing Rights: Villagio did not inform him of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department.
3. Prevention of Response: Mr. Garcia contended that Villagio effectively prevented him from responding via certified mail within the 21-day statutory period. He argued that the notices’ demand for compliance within 10 days, combined with the issuance of a second notice and a fine just 14 days after the first, led him to believe he only had 10 days to act before incurring another violation.
Respondent’s Position (Villagio at Tempe HOA)
Villagio presented a defense based on a direct reading of the statute and Mr. Garcia’s inaction:
1. Statutory Obligations Not Triggered: Villagio’s central argument was that its obligations under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C)—including the duty to name the observer—are only triggered after a unit owner submits a written response by certified mail within 21 days. Since Mr. Garcia never sent such a response, these obligations never came into effect.
2. Internal Contest Process Satisfied Statute: Per A.R.S. § 33-1242(D), the duty to notify an owner of their right to an administrative hearing only applies if the HOA fails to provide its own contest process. Villagio argued that because all three notices explicitly stated the process for appealing to the Board of Directors, it had fulfilled its statutory duty.
3. No Prevention of Response: Mr. Garcia was never legally or physically prevented from sending a certified letter. During cross-examination, he admitted he was not under any court order prohibiting him from responding.
4. Statute Inapplicability (Argument from Rehearing): Villagio further contended that A.R.S. § 33-1242 applies specifically to violations concerning the “condition of the property,” not the “use” of the property. Since short-term renting is a use, Villagio argued the statute did not apply to this situation at all.
Key Testimony from Rehearing
During the February 12, 2019 rehearing, Villagio’s Community Manager, Tom Gordon, testified.
• On direct examination, Mr. Gordon stated that Villagio does not restrict homeowners from responding to violation notices within the 21-day period.
• On cross-examination, when asked by Mr. Garcia if Villagio would have abided by “this statute” had he responded in 21 days, Mr. Gordon replied, “No.” He explained this by stating that homeowners are given 10 days to contest a notice with Villagio pursuant to its own short-term rental policy.
V. Administrative Law Judge’s Decisions and Rationale
The judge’s findings were consistent across both the initial decision and the rehearing decision, leading to the same conclusion in each instance.
Initial Decision (November 19, 2018)
• Finding of Fact: It was undisputed that Mr. Garcia did not respond to the March 8, March 22, or April 5, 2018 notices within 21 calendar days.
• Conclusion 1: Because Mr. Garcia did not respond within the 21-day period, Villagio was not required to provide him with the first and last name of the person(s) who observed the violation.
• Conclusion 2: Because Villagio notified Mr. Garcia of the process for contesting the notice, it was not required under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D) to provide him with notice of the right to petition for an administrative hearing.
• Outcome: Mr. Garcia failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation occurred. The petition was dismissed.
Rehearing Decision (March 4, 2019)
The judge reaffirmed the initial findings and addressed Mr. Garcia’s argument that he was prevented from responding.
• Finding on “Prevention”: The judge found no evidence that Villagio informed Mr. Garcia he could not respond within 21 days or otherwise prevented him from doing so. The issuance of a second notice 14 days after the first was not deemed a preventative act that nullified Mr. Garcia’s statutory window to respond to the first notice.
• Statutory Construction: The decision invoked the legal principle that “what the Legislature means, it will say,” indicating a strict, literal interpretation of the statute’s requirements.
• Reaffirmed Conclusions: The judge again concluded that because Mr. Garcia failed to submit a written response by certified mail, Villagio’s obligations under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) were not triggered, and its inclusion of an internal appeal process satisfied the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1242(D).
• Outcome: Mr. Garcia’s petition was dismissed for a second time, with Villagio deemed the prevailing party.
VI. Final Disposition
The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Garcia’s petition be dismissed. The decision issued after the rehearing on March 4, 2019, is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918009-REL
Study Guide: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association
This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the administrative case between Rogelio A. Garcia and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association, as detailed in case number 19F-H1918009-REL.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the provided source context.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific violation did the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association initially accuse Mr. Garcia of committing?
3. What was the core of Mr. Garcia’s legal complaint against the Homeowners Association?
4. According to the court’s findings, what crucial step did Mr. Garcia fail to take after receiving the violation notices?
5. What was Villagio’s main argument for why it was not obligated to provide Mr. Garcia with the name of the person who observed the violation?
6. Under what circumstance did Villagio argue it was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with notice of his right to petition for an administrative hearing?
7. What new fines were imposed on Mr. Garcia in the notices dated March 22, 2018, and April 5, 2018?
8. At the rehearing, what was Mr. Garcia’s explanation for why he was unable to respond to the notices within the statutory 21-day period?
9. What argument did Villagio introduce at the rehearing concerning the distinction between a property’s “condition” and its “use”?
10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing and the subsequent rehearing?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Rogelio A. Garcia, the Petitioner who brought the complaint, and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association, the Respondent defending against the complaint. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.
2. Villagio accused Mr. Garcia of violating the short-term lease provisions located in the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The association alleged that Mr. Garcia’s unit was being rented in violation of its short-term rental policy.
3. Mr. Garcia alleged that Villagio violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242. He claimed Villagio failed to provide him the opportunity to respond by certified mail within 21 days, did not inform him of his right to an administrative hearing, and did not provide the name of the person who observed the violation.
4. The court found that Mr. Garcia did not respond to the violation notices sent on March 8, March 22, and April 5, 2018. Specifically, he failed to provide the association with a written response by sending it via certified mail within 21 calendar days after the date of the notices.
5. Villagio argued that its obligation to provide the observer’s name under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) is only triggered if the unit owner first submits a written response by certified mail within the 21-day period. Because Mr. Garcia did not do so, Villagio was not required to provide that information.
6. Villagio argued it was not required to provide notice of the right to petition for a hearing because it had already fulfilled its legal obligation under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D). The violation notices it sent to Mr. Garcia contained instructions on the process for contesting the notice with the Board of Directors.
7. The notice dated March 22, 2018, informed Mr. Garcia that a fine of $1,000 had been posted to his account. The subsequent notice on April 5, 2018, stated that an additional $2,000 fine had been posted for the same violation.
8. Mr. Garcia contended that Villagio prevented him from responding because it did not wait 21 days before issuing subsequent notices and fines. He believed he only had 10 days to comply based on language in the notices, which created confusion and pressure.
9. At the rehearing, Villagio argued that A.R.S. § 33-1242 did not apply because the statute addresses violations related to the “condition of the property.” Villagio asserted its notices concerned the “use” of Mr. Garcia’s property (short-term renting), not its physical condition.
10. In both the initial hearing decision issued on November 19, 2018, and the rehearing decision issued on March 4, 2019, the Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Garcia failed to prove Villagio had violated the statute. Consequently, Mr. Garcia’s petition was dismissed in both instances.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to provoke deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, drawing evidence and reasoning exclusively from the case documents.
1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson to dismiss Mr. Garcia’s petition. How did the judge interpret and apply the specific subsections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242 to the facts presented in the initial hearing and the rehearing?
2. Trace the progression of arguments made by both Rogelio A. Garcia and Villagio from the initial petition through the rehearing. How did their claims and defenses evolve, and what new evidence or legal theories were introduced in the second hearing?
3. Discuss the significance of the “burden of proof” in this case, which rested upon Mr. Garcia. Explain the standard of a “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the legal decision and detail why the judge concluded Mr. Garcia failed to meet this standard.
4. Evaluate the strength and potential implications of Villagio’s argument, introduced at the rehearing, that A.R.S. § 33-1242 applies only to the “condition” of a property and not its “use.” Although the judge did not base the final decision on this point, discuss how this interpretation could affect future disputes between homeowners and associations.
5. Based on the dates and actions described in the two decisions, construct a detailed procedural timeline of this case. Begin with the first violation letter from Villagio and conclude with the notice of the right to appeal the rehearing decision, including all key notices, filings, hearings, and fines.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)
The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The central statute in this case was A.R.S. § 33-1242.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove its allegations. In this matter, Mr. Garcia bore the burden of proof to show that Villagio committed the alleged violation.
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)
The governing documents that dictate how a condominium or planned community must be operated and maintained, and which contain the rules that unit owners must follow. Mr. Garcia was accused of violating the short-term lease provisions of Villagio’s CC&Rs.
Certified Mail
A type of mail service that provides the sender with a mailing receipt and electronic verification that an article was delivered or that a delivery attempt was made. A.R.S. § 33-1242(B) specifies this method for a unit owner’s written response to a violation notice.
Evidentiary Hearing
A formal proceeding, similar to a trial, where parties present evidence (such as testimony and documents) to a neutral decision-maker. Hearings were held in this case on October 30, 2018, and February 12, 2019.
Office of Administrative Hearings
A state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies, boards, and commissions. This office was responsible for conducting the hearings in this case.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Rogelio A. Garcia was the Petitioner.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to reconsider the original decision, often granted to review the evidence or arguments. Mr. Garcia requested and was granted a rehearing after the initial decision was issued.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association was the Respondent.
Unit Owner
A person who owns a unit within a condominium or planned community and is subject to the association’s governing documents. Mr. Garcia is a unit owner in the Villagio at Tempe community.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918009-REL
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19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
2 sources
These sources consist of two Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between Rogelio A. Garcia (Petitioner) and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Respondent). The first document records the initial decision from October 2018, which dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition alleging the HOA violated Arizona statute § 33-1242 by not providing required information following a notice of violation for short-term leasing. The second document details the rehearing decision from February 2019, which again found that Mr. Garcia failed to prove the HOA violated the statute because he did not respond to the violation notices by certified mail within the mandatory 21-day period to trigger the HOA’s legal obligations. Both rulings concluded that since the HOA provided him with the process for contesting the notices, they were not required to provide written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing. Consequently, both decisions dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition and designated the HOA as the prevailing party.
What are the legal requirements concerning notice and response for HOA violations?
How did the unit owner’s failure to respond impact their statutory rights?
What legal interpretation was key to dismissing the homeowner’s administrative petition?
Based on 2 sources
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Rogelio A. Garcia(petitioner) Appeared on behalf of himself,
Respondent Side
Nathan Tennyson(HOA attorney) Brown Olcott, PLLC Appeared on behalf of Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association,
Tom Gordon(Community Manager/witness) AAM LLC Community Manager for Villagio; testified on behalf of Villagio
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ) Administrative Law Judge,
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of electronic transmission of the decision,
Other Participants
Amanda Shaw(Representative/Contact) AAM LLC Listed as c/o for service of process for Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition for rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the statutory details or the notice of the right to petition ADRE because the Petitioner failed to submit a written response by certified mail within 21 days of the violation notices.
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the information listed in A.R.S. § 33-1242 (C) or the notice of right to petition in (D) because the Petitioner did not submit a written response by certified mail within twenty-one days, which is the triggering requirement for those obligations.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of statutory requirements for homeowner association violation notices.
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 requirements regarding violation notices. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to establish the violation because he did not respond by certified mail within the 21-day statutory period, meaning the HOA was not triggered to fulfill its obligations under § 33-1242(C) and (D).
Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County Homeowners' Association
Counsel
Paul K. Frame, Esq.
Alleged Violations
CC&Rs § 3.1(a)
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition in its entirety, finding the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) when denying the construction of a cedar patio structure.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that the HOA violated CC&R 3.1(a). The proposed structure was found to be a second detached structure and/or a temporary structure barred by the community documents, and the Petitioner had previously failed to submit sufficient information for an attached structure proposal.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by denying request for patio structure while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.
Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly denied his request for a detached cedar patio structure (150 sq ft) based on CC&R § 3.1(A) which limits properties to one detached structure (Petitioner already had a tool shed). The ALJ found Petitioner failed to establish the violation, concluding the proposed structure was a second barred detached structure or a temporary structure (as concrete pavers were not equivalent to a required cement/block foundation). Petitioner also failed to provide sufficient architectural details for an attached structure request.
Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates HOA
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from two administrative law hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County (“Blue Ridge”). The core of the dispute was Blue Ridge’s repeated denial of Mr. Mandela’s requests to construct a 150-square-foot cedar patio structure on his property.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied Mr. Mandela’s petition in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, finding that the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish any violation of the association’s governing documents. The ALJ’s decisions affirmed that Blue Ridge acted within its authority and correctly applied its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and architectural regulations.
Key takeaways from the rulings include:
• Violation of Detached Structure Limit: Mr. Mandela’s request for a detached patio was denied because he already had a tool shed, and the HOA rules explicitly permit only one detached structure per property.
• Improper “Play Structure” Request: An initial request framing the patio as a “play structure” was correctly denied as its proposed 150 sq. ft. size exceeded the 80 sq. ft. limit for certain play structures.
• Insufficient Plans for Attached Structure: A separate request to attach the structure to his home was denied due to Mr. Mandela’s failure to provide the required detailed architectural plans and construction drawings, which the HOA deemed necessary for approval.
• Arguments Found Lacking: Mr. Mandela’s arguments—including claims of selective enforcement, discrimination against homeowners without children, and misinterpretation of the term “temporary structure”—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded the structure would be a prohibited temporary structure as the proposed concrete pavers do not constitute a permanent foundation under the HOA’s definition.
Case Overview
Parties Involved
Description
Petitioner
Charles P. Mandela
A homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.
Respondent
Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County
The governing homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development.
Adjudicator
Velva Moses-Thompson
Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.
Timeline of Key Events
c. Feb 1, 2018
Mr. Mandela submits his first request for a 150 sq. ft. patio, using a “Play Structure Approval Request” form. Blue Ridge denies it for exceeding the size limit.
c. Mar 2, 2018
Mr. Mandela submits a second request, this time to attach a cedar patio shade to his home. Blue Ridge requests detailed plans and materials.
c. Mar 8, 2018
Blue Ridge denies the request for an attached structure due to “incomplete information,” instructing Mr. Mandela to provide formal drawings as per CC&R guidelines.
c. Mar 23, 2018
Mr. Mandela files an internal appeal with Blue Ridge, which is subsequently denied for the same reason of incomplete construction information.
Post-Mar 23, 2018
Mr. Mandela submits a third request for a detached 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. Blue Ridge denies it because he already has a detached tool shed.
c. Jul 31, 2018
Mr. Mandela files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Blue Ridge violated CC&R § 3.1(a) by denying his request while allowing another member a Tuff Shed.
Oct 17, 2018
An evidentiary hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.
Nov 6, 2018
The ALJ issues the initial decision, denying Mr. Mandela’s petition.
Dec 12, 2018
The Arizona Department of Real Estate orders a rehearing of the matter.
Feb 8, 2019
The rehearing is held before the same ALJ.
Feb 28, 2019
The ALJ issues the final decision, again finding in favor of Blue Ridge and denying Mr. Mandela’s petition.
Analysis of Construction Requests and Denials
Mr. Mandela made three distinct applications to the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee for his proposed 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure, each of which was denied for different reasons based on the HOA’s governing documents.
Request 1: Detached “Play Structure”
Mr. Mandela’s initial application on February 1, 2018, was submitted using a “Play Structure Approval Request” form.
• HOA Rule: The form, based on modified Rules and Regulations from April 6, 2016, states: “Cannot exceed 80 SF if it’s a Tree House, Tree Viewing Stand, Play House/Fort.”
• Denial Rationale: Blue Ridge denied the request because the proposed 150 sq. ft. size of the structure exceeded the 80 sq. ft. limit specified for this type of structure.
Request 2: Attached Cedar Patio Shade
On March 2, 2018, Mr. Mandela submitted a new request to attach the structure to his home.
• HOA Action: The committee chairman, John Hart, requested documents showing the structure would not be free-standing, such as plans and material specifications.
• Mandela’s Response: In a March 3 email, Mr. Mandela stated: “I am building this myself. I am not an Architect, I have not software to show (6) 2 by 4”s to attach from the single family roof lie to the roof lien of the same roof.” He asserted that photos of other attached structures were sufficient.
• Denial Rationale: The request was denied on March 8 due to “incomplete information.” The denial letter explicitly instructed Mr. Mandela to submit all required documents, including drawings that “match exactly what you are going to build,” per CC&R Section 10.3. His subsequent appeal was also denied, with Blue Ridge noting that a manufacturer’s representative stated they would not warranty the product if the design was altered and reiterating the need for detailed elevation drawings.
Request 3: Detached Cedar Patio Structure
Following the denial of his appeal, Mr. Mandela submitted a third request for a detached version of the patio.
• HOA Rule: According to CC&R § 3.1(A) and Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D), “One detached structure may… be constructed on a property.”
• Denial Rationale: Blue Ridge denied this request because Mr. Mandela already had one detached structure—a tool shed—on his property. The rules permit only one such structure.
Key Arguments and Rulings from Administrative Hearings
At the initial hearing and subsequent rehearing, both parties presented arguments regarding the application of the HOA’s rules. The ALJ systematically addressed and ruled on each point, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.
Petitioner’s Core Arguments (Charles P. Mandela)
• Definition of “Detached Structure”: He argued that his proposed patio was not a “detached structure” under the CC&Rs because, based on his misinterpretation of a prior administrative ruling, a detached structure is one that can be easily converted into a second residence.
• Selective Enforcement: He alleged that Blue Ridge approved a “Tuff Shed” for another member and was not enforcing the 80 sq. ft. play structure size limit against other homeowners, thus discriminating against him.
• Discriminatory Rules: He contended that the rule allowing a second detached structure if it is a “play structure” violates CC&R 3.1 because it discriminates against people without children. He stated he wanted the patio for his mother.
• Definition of “Temporary Structure”: He asserted the structure was not a prohibited temporary structure because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he claimed constituted a “cement foundation” under the rules, and the materials had a 5-year warranty.
• One Detached Structure Rule: The rules unambiguously limit homeowners to one detached structure, and Mr. Mandela already had one.
• Incomplete Submissions: The request for an attached structure lacked the necessary architectural details to ensure it was properly and safely constructed, as required by the CC&Rs. Joseph Hancock, Vice President of Blue Ridge and a former contractor, testified that Mr. Mandela failed to consider critical factors like height and width differentials.
• Temporary Structure Violation: Mr. Hancock testified that a concrete paver is not the equivalent of a “cement or slab foundation.” Therefore, the proposed structure would be a prohibited temporary structure under the CC&Rs.
• No Selective Enforcement: Mr. Hancock refuted Mr. Mandela’s claims of selective enforcement, testifying that the lots Mr. Mandela cited either had structures built before 2003 (predating certain rules) or had no detached structures at all.
Administrative Law Judge’s Final Conclusions
The ALJ found that Mr. Mandela failed to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. The final order denied his petition based on the following conclusions of law:
• Burden of Proof: The petitioner did not meet his burden to prove that Blue Ridge violated CC&R Article III, Section 3.1(a).
• Second Detached Structure: It was undisputed that Mr. Mandela had a shed on his property. The proposed 150 sq. ft. patio therefore constituted a barred second detached structure.
• Prior Rulings Not Precedent: The ALJ noted that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior administrative decision he cited and, furthermore, that “prior administrative law judge decisions are not precedent or binding on future administrative law decisions.”
• Temporary Structure: The preponderance of the evidence showed the proposed structure is a temporary structure under the CC&Rs because “concrete pavers are not the equivalent of cement or block foundation.”
• Denial of Attached Structure: The denial of the request to attach the structure was proper, as the “Petitioner failed to provide sufficient details to illustrate how he would attach the cedar patio structure to his home.”
• No Evidence of Discrimination: The petitioner failed to establish that Blue Ridge approved other oversized play structures or that the denial of his requests was discriminatory. The ALJ also noted the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over potential constitutional claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Relevant HOA Governing Documents
Document/Section
Key Provision / Definition
CC&R § 3.1
Permitted Uses and Restrictions – Single Family: “No building or structure shall be erected or maintained separate from the Single Family Residence located on any Lot, other than a garage…”
Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)
Detached Structures: “One detached structure may, with Architectural Committee approval, be constructed on a property.”
CC&R § 3.6 & Aligned Standard
Temporary Structures: Prohibits temporary structures. A temporary structure is defined as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”
Modified Rules and Regulations (April 6, 2016)
Play Structures: Allows up to two play structures but specifies they “Cannot exceed 80 SF if it’s a Tree House, Tree Viewing Stand, Play House/Fort.”
CC&R § 3.24
Architectural Approval: “No building, fence, wall, screen, residence or other structure shall be commenced, erected, maintained, improved or altered… without the prior written approval of the… Architectural Committee.”
CC&R § 10.3
Architectural Submission Guidelines: Specifies the format and information required for submittals to the architectural committee.
CC&R § 12.2
Declaration Amendments: Requires an affirmative vote or written consent of members owning at least 75% of all lots to amend the Declaration.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918006-REL
Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates HOA
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal dispute between petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. The case revolves around Mr. Mandela’s multiple attempts to gain approval for a patio structure on his property and the subsequent legal proceedings. The material is drawn from two Administrative Law Judge Decisions, dated November 6, 2018, and February 28, 2019.
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Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing your information directly from the provided case documents.
1. What were the three distinct requests Mr. Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA, and what was the outcome of each?
2. Explain the HOA’s rule regarding detached structures and why Mr. Mandela’s third request for a detached patio was denied under this rule.
3. On what grounds did the HOA deny Mr. Mandela’s second request to attach a cedar patio shade to his home?
4. What was Mr. Mandela’s primary allegation in his initial petition filed with the Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?
5. How do the Blue Ridge rules define a “temporary structure,” and why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude Mr. Mandela’s proposed patio fell into this category?
6. Describe Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s policy on play structures.
7. What is the legal standard of proof the petitioner was required to meet in this case, and what does this standard mean?
8. Mr. Mandela cited a prior administrative law judge decision to support his case. What was his interpretation of that decision, and how did the presiding judge respond to this line of argument?
9. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key pieces of testimony did he provide on behalf of the HOA during the rehearing?
10. According to the CC&Rs, what is the procedural difference between amending the Declaration (the CC&Rs themselves) versus adopting new “Rules and Regulations”?
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Answer Key
1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot size limit for such structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied due to incomplete information and a lack of adequate plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio structure, which was denied because he already had another detached structure on his property.
2. According to CC&Rs § 3.1(A) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D), a property is permitted to have only one detached structure. Mr. Mandela’s third request was denied because it was undisputed that he already had a tool shed on his property. The proposed detached patio would have constituted a prohibited second detached structure.
3. The HOA denied the request to attach the patio shade because Mr. Mandela submitted incomplete information and failed to provide sufficient plans. The HOA requested detailed elevation drawings showing construction methods, dimensions, foundation details, and attachment methods, which Mr. Mandela did not provide.
4. In his petition of July 31, 2018, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a). His specific claim was that the HOA discriminated against him by denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.
5. The Architectural Committee rules define a temporary structure as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.” The judge concluded the proposed patio was a temporary structure because Mr. Mandela planned to use concrete pavers, which, according to the credible testimony of Joseph Hancock, are not the equivalent of a permanent cement or block foundation.
6. Mr. Mandela argued that the modified rule allowing a second detached play structure (up to 80 sq ft) violates CC&R 3.1 because it discriminates against people who do not have children. He asserted the policy was unfair because he wanted to build the structure for his mother to rest outside, not for children’s play.
7. The petitioner, Mr. Mandela, had the burden of proof to establish his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue rather than the other, meaning the contention is more probably true than not.
8. Mr. Mandela argued that a prior administrative law judge decision had found that a “detached structure” under Blue Ridge CC&Rs is a structure that can be easily converted into a second residence, which his patio could not. The presiding judge dismissed this by stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future decisions.
9. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of the Blue Ridge HOA and a former general, electrical, and HVAC contractor. He testified that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or block foundation, that Mr. Mandela’s plans for attaching the structure were insufficient, and that he had investigated lots Mr. Mandela cited for alleged violations and found none.
10. According to the CC&Rs, adopting, amending, or repealing “Rules and Regulations” can be done by a majority vote of the Board (§ 4.2). In contrast, amending the Declaration of CC&Rs themselves is a much more stringent process, requiring the affirmative vote or written consent of members owning at least seventy-five percent (75%) of all lots (§ 12.2).
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate your answers in a standard essay format, using specific evidence from the source documents to support your arguments.
1. Analyze the progression of Mr. Mandela’s three distinct requests to the HOA. How did the denial of his first request (as a “Play Structure”) appear to influence his subsequent applications and legal arguments?
2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies in this case. Explain why Mr. Mandela ultimately failed to convince the Administrative Law Judge that the HOA violated its own rules, citing specific examples of his failed arguments (e.g., the temporary structure definition, claims of selective enforcement, and the adequacy of his submitted plans).
3. Examine the distinction made in the Blue Ridge Estates governing documents between the core CC&Rs and the “Rules and Regulations” adopted by the Board. How did this distinction allow the HOA to have a rule permitting a second “play structure” while the main CC&Rs seem to limit properties to a single residence and one other detached structure (a garage)?
4. The HOA denied Mr. Mandela’s request for an attached structure due to “incomplete information.” Based on the evidence presented in the decisions, evaluate the reasonableness of the HOA’s request for detailed plans versus Mr. Mandela’s assertion that he had provided sufficient information for approval.
5. Trace Mr. Mandela’s various claims of unfair treatment, including selective enforcement (the Tuff Shed), discrimination (the play structure rule), and his interpretation of key terms like “detached structure.” For each claim, explain the HOA’s counter-position or the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings for state agencies, such as the one between Mr. Mandela and the HOA. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.
Architectural Committee
A committee within the HOA granted authority by CC&R § 10.2 to approve or deny proposed construction and promulgate regulations aligned with the CC&Rs. It denied all of Mr. Mandela’s requests.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner (Mr. Mandela) bore the burden of proof.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the primary governing documents for the Blue Ridge Estates community, outlining land use, permitted structures, and rules members must follow.
Detached Structure
A building or structure on a property that is separate from the main single-family residence. According to Architectural Committee regulation 3(D), only one such structure is permitted per lot.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela is the petitioner.
Play Structure
A structure defined by the HOA’s modified rules to include items like Swing Sets, Jungle Gyms, Tree Houses, and Ground Placed Play Houses/Forts. Play Houses/Forts and Tree Houses are limited to 80 square feet.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of the evidence.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association is the respondent.
Rules and Regulations
Rules that can be adopted, amended, or repealed by a majority vote of the HOA Board, as distinct from the CC&Rs which require a 75% vote of all lot owners to amend. The “Play Structure” rules are an example.
Temporary Structure
As defined by the Architectural Committee regulations, a structure “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.” Such structures are prohibited by CC&R § 3.6.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918006-REL
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19F-H1918006-REL-RHG
2 sources
These sources document two decisions from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association (HOA). The first document presents the initial Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision which denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, finding he failed to prove the HOA violated its governing documents by denying his request to build a patio structure. The second document is the ALJ Decision following a rehearing, which reaffirms the initial denial, concluding that Mr. Mandela’s proposed structure was either a prohibited second detached structure or a temporary structure lacking a proper foundation, and that he failed to provide sufficient plans for an attached structure. Both sources establish that Mr. Mandela did not meet his burden of proof to show the HOA discriminated against him or otherwise violated the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
What were the specific reasons the HOA denied Charles Mandela’s requests?
How did the HOA Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions govern detached structures?
What was the ultimate outcome of Charles Mandela’s petition and subsequent rehearing?
Based on 2 sources
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Charles P. Mandela(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Paul Frame(HOA attorney) FRAME LAW PLLC
John Hart(HOA Chairman) Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association Reviewed petitioner's requests
Joseph Hancock(HOA Vice President, witness) Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association Presented testimony
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(ADRE Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of transmitted decision
Other Participants
Felicia Del Sol(administrative staff) Transmitted decision electronically
Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County Homeowners' Association
Counsel
Paul K. Frame, Esq.
Alleged Violations
CC&Rs § 3.1(a)
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition in its entirety, finding the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) when denying the construction of a cedar patio structure.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that the HOA violated CC&R 3.1(a). The proposed structure was found to be a second detached structure and/or a temporary structure barred by the community documents, and the Petitioner had previously failed to submit sufficient information for an attached structure proposal.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by denying request for patio structure while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.
Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly denied his request for a detached cedar patio structure (150 sq ft) based on CC&R § 3.1(A) which limits properties to one detached structure (Petitioner already had a tool shed). The ALJ found Petitioner failed to establish the violation, concluding the proposed structure was a second barred detached structure or a temporary structure (as concrete pavers were not equivalent to a required cement/block foundation). Petitioner also failed to provide sufficient architectural details for an attached structure request.
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
18F-H1818045-REL
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2018-10-18
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
partial
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Warren R. Brown
Counsel
—
Respondent
Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Counsel
Gregory A. Stein, Esq.; Mark K. Sahl, Esq.
Alleged Violations
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
Outcome Summary
The matter was consolidated with two other petitions concerning assessment increases (18F-H1818029-REL-RHG and 18F-H1818054-REL). The ALJ dismissed the claims regarding the $325 assessment increase (029 and 054 matters) against the HOA. However, Petitioner Brown prevailed in the 045 matter, proving the HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) by charging a $25 late fee, resulting in an order for rescission of the fee and refund of his $500 filing fee.
Why this result: Petitioner Brown (029 matter) and Petitioner Stevens (054 matter) lost their claims regarding the $325 assessment increase because they failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Mogollon violated section 33-1803(A). The ALJ determined that the petitioners' definition of 'regular assessment' as referring to process (motion, second, vote) was not supported by principles of statutory construction.
Key Issues & Findings
Late payment charges limitation
Petitioner Brown alleged that the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803 by charging a late fee of $25 and interest of 18% on late payments, asserting the statute limits late charges to the greater of $15.00 or 10%. The ALJ agreed, concluding the statute's limit on late charges applies to all assessments, not just regular assessments, and found the $25 late charge violated the statute.
Orders: Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee assessed against Mr. Brown and must pay him his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 666285.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:33 (151.9 KB)
18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 672623.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:33 (144.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG
Briefing Document: Brown and Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision concerning three consolidated petitions filed by residents Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against their homeowners’ association, Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The core of the dispute revolves around a significant 2018 assessment increase and the legality of associated late fees under Arizona statute.
The central legal question was the interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A), which limits an HOA’s ability to “impose a regular assessment that is more than twenty percent greater than the immediately preceding fiscal year’s assessment.” The petitioners argued that the HOA’s total 39.4% increase violated this cap. The HOA contended the increase was comprised of a compliant “regular assessment” and a separate “special assessment” not subject to the cap.
The ALJ’s decision resulted in a split outcome:
• On the Assessment Increase: The judge ruled in favor of Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The petitions challenging the assessment increase were dismissed. The ALJ’s rationale was that statutory construction requires distinguishing between “regular” and “special” assessments, and the 20% cap applies only to the former.
• On the Late Fees: The judge ruled in favor of Petitioner Warren R. Brown. The HOA’s $25 late fee was found to be in violation of the statutory limit, which applies to “assessments” in general, not just “regular assessments.” The HOA was ordered to rescind the fee and reimburse the petitioner’s filing costs.
Underlying these specific legal challenges were broader allegations by the petitioners of deceptive accounting practices and financial mismanagement by the HOA’s treasurer, which they claimed were intended to create a false justification for the assessment increase. These allegations were noted but not adjudicated in this hearing.
I. Case Overview
The matter concerns a consolidated hearing held on September 28, 2018, at the Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix, Arizona. Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden presided over the case, which combined three separate petitions against the respondent, Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
• Petitioners: Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens.
• Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
• Docket Numbers:
◦ 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG (“029 matter”): Warren R. Brown, Petitioner
◦ 18F-H1818045-REL (“045 matter”): Warren R. Brown, Petitioner
◦ 18F-H1818054-REL (“054 matter”): Brad W. Stevens, Petitioner
II. Central Disputes and Allegations
A. The 2018 Assessment Increase (Matters 029 & 054)
The primary dispute centered on Mogollon Airpark’s 2018 assessment changes.
• Previous Assessment (2017): $825
• 2018 Increase: $325, representing a 39.4% total increase.
• HOA’s Breakdown of Increase:
◦ Regular Assessment Increase: $116 (a 14.1% increase over $825)
◦ Special Assessment: $209
• Legal Challenge: The petitioners alleged the total $325 increase violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A), which prohibits an HOA from imposing a “regular assessment that is more than [20%] greater than the immediately preceding fiscal year’s assessment” without member approval.
B. Late Fees and Interest Charges (Matter 045)
The second dispute, raised by Mr. Brown, concerned new penalties for late payments.
• New Charges: A $25 late fee and 18% interest on past-due accounts.
• Legal Challenge: Mr. Brown alleged these charges violated the same statute, which limits late fees to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” He presented an invoice showing he was charged a $25 late fee and $1.57 in interest.
C. Underlying Allegations of Financial Impropriety
Although the hearing’s scope was limited, the petitions were rooted in serious allegations of financial misconduct by the HOA. These claims formed the petitioners’ motive for challenging the assessments but were not the direct subject of the ALJ’s ruling.
• Core Claim: The petitioners asserted that Mogollon’s treasurer and others used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods,” including keeping two sets of books, to create the appearance of a financial shortfall.
• Alleged Purpose: This “fabricated shortfall” was allegedly used to convince the Board of Directors that a 39.4% dues increase was necessary.
• Petitioners’ Financial View: Mr. Stevens testified that he believed the HOA possessed funds in excess of $1 million and therefore did not require the increased assessment.
• ALJ’s Acknowledgment: The decision noted, “Considering the nature of Messrs. Brown and Stevens’s allegations, the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise. Regardless, the substance of their allegations was not addressed in this hearing.”
III. Arguments of the Parties
The central legal conflict hinged on the interpretation of the term “regular assessment” within the statute.
Petitioners’ Position (Brown & Stevens)
Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)
Assessment Increase
The term “regular assessment” in § 33-1803(A) describes the process by which an assessment is instituted (i.e., by motion, second, and vote). Therefore, the entire $325 increase is a single assessment subject to and in violation of the 20% statutory cap. They further argued the HOA’s governing documents provide no authority to impose “special assessments.”
“Regular assessment” and “special assessment” are distinct types of assessments and industry terms of art. The 20% cap applies only to the regular portion. The $116 regular increase (14.1%) was compliant. The existence of the term “special assessment” in another statute (§ 33-1806) proves the legislature intended this distinction.
Late Fees
The 25latefeeisaclearviolationofthestatutorylimitof”15.00 or 10%.” The statutory text for late fees applies to “assessments” generally, not just “regular assessments.”
The statutory limit on late fees applies only to regular assessments. Since the late fee was charged on a special assessment, it did not violate the statute.
IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ applied principles of statutory construction to arrive at a split decision, finding for the respondent on the main issue of the assessment increase but for the petitioner on the secondary issue of late fees.
A. Ruling on the Assessment Increase (Matters 029 & 054)
• Conclusion: The petitions filed by Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens were dismissed. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. was deemed the prevailing party.
• Rationale: The judge concluded that the petitioners had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the statute was violated. Their definition of “regular assessment” as a procedural term was found to be inconsistent with principles of statutory construction. The judge reasoned that if “regular” simply meant the standard process of passing an assessment, the word would be redundant (“trivial or void”) because all assessments must follow that process. This interpretation supports the view that the legislature intended to differentiate between types of assessments, and that the 20% cap applies only to the “regular” type.
B. Ruling on Late Fees (Matter 045)
• Conclusion: Petitioner Warren R. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.
• Rationale: The judge rejected Mogollon’s argument that late fee limits apply only to regular assessments. The statutory text states, “Charges for the late payment of assessments are limited to…” without the “regular” qualifier. The ALJ determined that adding the word “regular” where the legislature chose to omit it would violate statutory construction principles. Therefore, the $25 late fee, being greater than the allowed $15 or 10%, was illegal.
V. Final Orders
The ALJ issued the following binding orders on October 18, 2018:
• ORDER FOR DOCKET NO. 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG (Brown vs. Mogollon):
◦ The petition is dismissed.
• ORDER FOR DOCKET NO. 18F-H1818045-REL (Brown vs. Mogollon):
◦ Petitioner Warren R. Brown is deemed the prevailing party.
◦ Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee it assessed against Mr. Brown.
◦ Mogollon Airpark Inc. must pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days.
• ORDER FOR DOCKET NO. 18F-H1818054-REL (Stevens vs. Mogollon):
◦ The petition is dismissed.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Brown and Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
This study guide provides a review of the consolidated administrative hearing involving petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against the respondent, Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The case centers on disputes over Homeowners Association (HOA) assessments and fees under Arizona law.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this consolidated matter and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific actions did Mogollon Airpark, Inc. take in 2018 that led to the legal petitions?
3. What was the total percentage increase of the 2018 assessment, and how did Mogollon Airpark, Inc. break down this increase?
4. Explain the petitioners’ main legal argument regarding the assessment increase and which statute they claimed was violated.
5. How did Mogollon Airpark, Inc. legally defend its decision to increase the assessment by more than 20%?
6. What was the central issue in the “045 matter” filed by Warren R. Brown?
7. Upon what legal principle did the Administrative Law Judge primarily rely to reach his conclusions on both the assessment increase and the late fee?
8. Why did the judge rule in favor of Mogollon Airpark on the assessment increase but in favor of Warren R. Brown on the late fee?
9. What were the underlying allegations made by the petitioners concerning Mogollon Airpark’s financial management that were not addressed in the hearing?
10. What was the final outcome and order for each of the three consolidated petitions (029, 045, and 054)?
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Answer Key
1. The petitioners were Warren R. Brown (dockets 029 and 045) and Brad W. Stevens (docket 054), who were members of the HOA. The respondent was Mogollon Airpark, Inc., the HOA being challenged. The matter was decided by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.
2. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. raised its 2018 assessment by a total of $325. It also instituted a new $25 fee for late payments and began charging 18% interest on past-due accounts.
3. The total increase of $325 over the previous year’s assessment of $825 constituted a 39.4% increase. Mogollon classified this increase as two separate parts: a $116 (14.1%) increase to the “regular assessment” and a $209 “special assessment.”
4. The petitioners argued that the total $325 increase violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A), which prohibits an HOA from imposing a “regular assessment” that is more than 20% greater than the previous year’s assessment. They contended that the term “regular assessment” refers to the standard process of levying an assessment (motion, second, vote), not a specific type of assessment.
5. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. argued that the 20% limit in section 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments” and not to “special assessments,” which it claimed is a separate term of art in the industry. Since the increase to the regular assessment was only $116 (14.1%), it was below the 20% statutory threshold and therefore legal.
6. The central issue in the “045 matter” was Warren R. Brown’s allegation that Mogollon’s $25 late fee and 18% interest charge violated section 33-1803(A). The statute limits late charges to the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the unpaid assessment.
7. The judge primarily relied on principles of statutory construction. This involved giving meaning to every word in the statute and not reading words into a provision where the legislature omitted them, which led to different interpretations of the statute’s clauses on assessments versus late fees.
8. The judge ruled against the petitioners on the assessment because their interpretation would make the word “regular” in the statute redundant. However, he ruled for Brown on the late fee because the statutory text limits charges on “assessments” in general, not just “regular assessments,” and to rule otherwise would require adding a word the legislature did not include.
9. The petitioners alleged that Mogollon’s treasurer engaged in deceptive and nonstandard accounting practices, including keeping two sets of books, to create a “fabricated shortfall.” They claimed this was done to falsely justify the need for the assessment increase, as the HOA actually had over $1 million in funds.
10. The petitions in the 029 matter (Brown) and 054 matter (Stevens) concerning the assessment increase were both dismissed. The petition in the 045 matter (Brown) concerning the late fee was successful; Mogollon was ordered to rescind the $25 fee and reimburse Brown’s $500 filing fee.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: Consider the following questions for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response based solely on the information in the provided legal decision.
1. Analyze the role of statutory construction in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. How did the interpretation of the specific word “regular” and the general term “assessments” shape the final, divergent outcomes for the consolidated petitions?
2. Discuss the petitioners’ underlying allegations of deceptive accounting practices. Although not the central issue of the hearing, how did these claims frame the dispute, and why did the judge note that civil courts might be better suited to address them?
3. Compare and contrast the legal arguments presented by the petitioners and the respondent regarding the interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A). Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each side’s position as described in the decision.
4. Trace the procedural history of the “029 matter,” from its initial filing and dismissal to the rehearing. What does this progression reveal about the procedural requirements for filing a successful petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings?
5. Evaluate the outcome of the consolidated hearing. Why was one petitioner successful on one claim while both were unsuccessful on another, despite the claims originating from the same set of actions by the HOA?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues decisions and orders.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
The specific Arizona statute at the center of the dispute. It limits HOA “regular assessment” increases to 20% over the prior year and caps late payment charges at the greater of $15 or 10% of the unpaid assessment.
Assessment
A fee imposed by an HOA on its members. The case distinguishes between a “regular assessment” (a recurring charge) and a “special assessment” (a one-time charge for a specific purpose).
Burden of Proof
The obligation of the petitioners, Messrs. Brown and Stevens, to prove their allegations against the respondent.
Consolidated Matter
The joining of multiple, separate legal petitions (in this case, 029, 045, and 054) into a single hearing because they involved the same parties and related issues.
Petitioner
A party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this matter, Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens were the petitioners.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence with the most convincing force that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, Mogollon Airpark, Inc. was the respondent.
Single-Issue Petition
A petition filed with the Department of Real Estate that is limited to a single allegation, which in the case of Mr. Stevens’s 054 matter required a $500 filing fee.
Statutory Construction
The legal process of interpreting and applying legislation. The judge used principles of statutory construction to determine the meaning of “regular assessment” and “assessments” in the relevant statute.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG
How One Word Created an HOA Loophole for a 40% Fee Hike—And How Another Word Gave a Homeowner a Key Victory
1.0 Introduction: The Dreaded HOA Letter
It’s the letter every homeowner dreads opening. A crisp envelope from the Homeowners Association lands in your mailbox, and inside is a notice that your mandatory fees are about to skyrocket. For a group of homeowners in Arizona’s Mogollon Airpark, this scenario became a reality when their HOA announced a staggering 39.4% increase in their annual assessments.
What followed was a legal battle that provides a fascinating and cautionary tale for every homeowner living under an HOA. The dispute, which pitted homeowners Warren Brown and Brad Stevens against Mogollon Airpark, Inc., didn’t hinge on fairness or financial need, but on the legal interpretation of a single word. This article distills the surprising and counter-intuitive lessons learned from their fight, revealing loopholes and legal technicalities that can make all the difference.
2.0 A 40% Fee Hike Can Be Legal Thanks to the “Special Assessment” Loophole
The core of the dispute was the massive fee hike. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. raised its 2018 assessment by $325 from the previous year’s $825—a 39.4% increase. This seemed to be a clear violation of Arizona law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)), which explicitly prohibits an HOA from increasing a “regular assessment” by more than 20% in one year without a majority vote from members.
The HOA, however, employed a clever strategy. It split the $325 increase into two distinct parts:
• A $116 “regular assessment” increase, which amounted to a legal 14.1% hike.
• A separate $209 “special assessment.”
The HOA argued that the 20% statutory cap only applied to the “regular” portion of the increase, making their move perfectly legal.
The homeowners countered that this was a deceptive maneuver. They argued that the term “regular assessment” in the law refers to the process of creating an assessment (a motion, a second, and a vote), not a specific type of assessment. From their perspective, the entire 39.4% increase was a single action and was therefore illegal.
In a surprising ruling, the Administrative Law Judge sided with the HOA. The judge reasoned that if the homeowners’ interpretation was correct and all assessments followed the same “regular” process, then the word “regular” in the statute would be rendered “trivial or void.” By giving meaning to that single word, the judge affirmed that “regular assessments” and “special assessments” are different categories, and the 20% cap only applies to the former. This interpretation effectively creates a significant loophole for HOAs to bypass statutory limits and implement large fee increases.
3.0 The Devil Is in the Details: “Regular Assessment” vs. “Assessments”
While the HOA won the main argument over the 39.4% increase, they lost on a smaller but crucial point: late fees. Along with the assessment hike, the HOA instituted a new $25 late fee for overdue payments.
Homeowner Warren Brown challenged this fee, pointing to the same state law. He argued that the statute limits late fees to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” Since the new $25 fee exceeded this limit, it was a direct violation.
Emboldened by their victory on the assessment increase, the HOA extended its logic, arguing that since the late fee was applied to a special assessment, the statutory limit—which they claimed was intended for regular assessments—did not apply.
This time, the judge decisively ruled in favor of the homeowner. The judge highlighted a critical distinction in the law’s wording. The part of the statute limiting assessment increases uses the specific term “regular assessment.” However, the part of the law limiting late charges uses the broader, more general term “assessments.” The omission of the word “regular” was the key.
The judge’s reasoning was a masterclass in statutory construction:
This argument fails because the statute’s limit on late charges applies to “assessments,” not “regular assessments.” Under Mogollon’s interpretation, it is necessary to add the word “regular” where the legislature chose not to use it. This violates principles of statutory construction.
This outcome underscores the immense importance of precise legal language. The legislature’s choice to omit a single word in one clause of a law gave the homeowner a clear victory and held the HOA accountable.
4.0 Serious Allegations Don’t Guarantee a Day in Court
Underlying the homeowners’ legal challenge were serious allegations of financial misconduct. Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens claimed the HOA treasurer used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods,” kept “two sets of books,” and created a “fabricated shortfall” to justify the assessment increase and “convince the Board that a 39.4% increase in dues was required.”
Surprisingly, none of these explosive allegations were addressed during the hearing. The reason for this is a crucial lesson in legal strategy. The homeowners had filed “single-issue petitions,” which legally limited the scope of the administrative hearing to one narrow question: did the HOA violate the specific statute governing assessment increases (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A))? All other matters, including the allegations of accounting improprieties, were outside the hearing’s jurisdiction.
The judge explicitly noted this limitation in a footnote to the decision:
Considering the nature of Messrs. Brown and Stevens’s allegations, the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise. Regardless, the substance of their allegations was not addressed in this hearing.
This case is a powerful reminder that in law, the structure of your argument can be more important than the weight of your accusations. By filing a narrow petition, the homeowners guaranteed a hearing on that one issue but forfeited the chance to have their broader, more serious claims heard in that venue.
5.0 A Partial Victory Is Still a Victory
The final outcome of the consolidated case was decidedly mixed. The homeowners lost their primary challenge, and the court upheld the HOA’s $325 assessment increase.
However, Mr. Brown was officially deemed the “prevailing party” in his case regarding the illegal late fees. This was not just a moral victory; it came with a direct order from the judge. Mogollon Airpark Inc. was ordered to:
• Rescind the $25 late fee it assessed against Mr. Brown.
• Pay Mr. Brown back his $500 filing fee for the case.
While it wasn’t the total win they had hoped for, this outcome demonstrates that a single, well-prepared homeowner can successfully hold their HOA accountable for breaking the law, even on smaller matters. It proves that knowing the rules and persevering can lead to tangible results, forcing an association to correct its illegal actions and compensating the homeowner for the cost of the fight.
6.0 Conclusion: Know the Law, Word by Word
The case of Brown and Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark is a potent lesson in how legal battles are won and lost in the margins. A single word—”regular”—opened a loophole for the HOA to impose a nearly 40% fee hike, while the deliberate absence of that same word in a later clause empowered a homeowner to strike back and win.
This case serves as a powerful reminder that when it comes to the laws governing your community, every word matters. It poses a vital question for all homeowners: are the protections you count on in state law as ironclad as you think, or could they evaporate based on the interpretation of a single adjective?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Warren R. Brown(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Brad W. Stevens(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf; presented testimony
Respondent Side
Gregory A. Stein(attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP Counsel for Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Mark K. Sahl(attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP Counsel for Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The ALJ found Mogollon did not violate ARS § 33-1803(A) concerning the 39.4% assessment increase (Matters 029 and 054), rejecting the Petitioners' interpretation of 'regular assessment.' However, Petitioner Brown prevailed in Matter 045, proving Mogollon violated the late charge limit of ARS § 33-1803(A) by charging a $25 late fee, resulting in a refund of his $500 filing fee and rescission of the fee.
Why this result: The assessment increase claims (029 and 054) were lost because the ALJ determined that interpreting 'regular assessment' as referring to the procedural method (motion, second, vote) would render the word 'regular' trivial or void in the statute.
Key Issues & Findings
Late payment charges limitation (045 Matter)
Petitioner Brown (045 matter) alleged the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A) by charging a $25 late fee. The ALJ found that the statutory limitation on late charges applies to all 'assessments,' not just 'regular assessments,' and found the $25 late charge was in violation.
Orders: Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee assessed against Mr. Brown; Mogollon must pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
Assessment increase greater than 20% limit (029 Matter)
Petitioner Brown (029-RHG matter) argued the 39.4% increase violated the 20% cap because 'regular assessment' refers to the procedure for instituting any assessment. The ALJ rejected this interpretation, finding it rendered the word 'regular' void in the statute.
Orders: Petition dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
Assessment increase greater than 20% limit (054 Matter)
Petitioner Stevens (054 matter) alleged the HOA's $325 assessment increase was unlawful under the 20% cap. The ALJ dismissed the petition, applying the same statutory interpretation as in the 029 matter, holding that Mogollon's classification of the majority of the increase as a special assessment was valid under the statute.
Orders: Petition dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
Decision Documents
18F-H1818029-REL Decision – 666285.pdf
Uploaded 2025-12-17T18:16:26 (151.9 KB)
18F-H1818029-REL Decision – 672623.pdf
Uploaded 2025-12-17T18:16:27 (144.6 KB)
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Warren R. Brown(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Brad W. Stevens(petitioner; witness) Appeared on his own behalf; presented testimony at hearing
Respondent Side
Gregory A. Stein(HOA attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP Counsel for Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Mark K. Sahl(HOA attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP Counsel for Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The ALJ dismissed the petitions regarding the assessment increase (Dockets 029 and 054), ruling that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)'s 20% cap applies only to 'regular assessments' and not special assessments. However, the ALJ ruled in favor of Petitioner Brown regarding late fees (Docket 045), finding that the statutory limit on late charges applies to all assessments, ordering the HOA to rescind the $25 fee and refund the filing fee.
Why this result: For the assessment issues, the ALJ rejected the petitioners' interpretation that 'regular' refers to the approval process rather than the assessment type, finding that applying the cap to special assessments would violate principles of statutory construction.
Key Issues & Findings
Assessment Increase (Docket 029 – Brown)
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated the statute by increasing assessments by $325 (39.4%), exceeding the 20% limit.
Orders: Petition dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Late Fees (Docket 045 – Brown)
Petitioner alleged the HOA charged a $25 late fee, which exceeds the statutory limit of the greater of $15 or 10%.
Orders: Respondent ordered to rescind the $25 late fee and refund the $500 filing fee.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Assessment Increase (Docket 054 – Stevens)
Petitioner alleged the $325 assessment increase violated the statutory 20% cap and that the HOA used deceptive accounting.
Orders: Petition dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Decision Documents
18F-H1818045-REL Decision – 666285.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:14:50 (151.9 KB)
18F-H1818045-REL Decision – 672623.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:14:51 (144.6 KB)
Based on the provided administrative hearing records, here is a summary of the proceedings for case **18F-H1818045-REL**.
### **Case Overview**
* **Case Number:** 18F-H1818045-REL (The "045" matter).
* **Petitioner:** Warren R. Brown.
* **Respondent:** Mogollon Airpark, Inc..
* **Administrative Law Judge (ALJ):** Thomas Shedden.
* **Hearing Date:** September 28, 2018.
### **Proceedings**
The hearing was a consolidated matter addressing three separate petitions: two filed by Mr. Brown (the "029" and "045" matters) and one by Brad W. Stevens (the "054" matter). While the petitions initially contained broad allegations regarding accounting improprieties and the Board's authority, the hearing was limited to specific legal questions regarding violations of **ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A)**,.
In the 045 matter, Mr. Brown and Mogollon agreed that the issues could be resolved as a matter of law without presenting witnesses,.
### **Key Facts and Main Issues**
Mogollon Airpark raised its 2018 assessment by $325 and instituted a **$25 late fee** and **18% interest** for past due accounts.
**The specific issue in the 045 matter** was whether these late charges violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A).
* **Statutory Context:** The statute states that charges for late payment are limited to "the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment".
* **Petitioner's Argument:** Mr. Brown argued that the $25 fee exceeded the statutory limit of "$15.00 or 10%",. He requested the unlawful penalties be voided.
* **Respondent's Argument:** Mogollon argued that the statutory limits in § 33-1803(A) apply only to "regular assessments." They contended that because the late fee was applied to a "special assessment," the statutory cap did not apply,.
### **Legal Analysis and Decision**
The Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of Mr. Brown regarding the 045 matter.
**Statutory Interpretation:**
The ALJ rejected Mogollon's argument that the late fee cap applies only to regular assessments. The decision noted that while the statute mentions "regular assessment" in the context of capping annual increases, the sentence regarding late fees refers simply to "assessments",.
* The ALJ cited principles of statutory construction, stating that courts should not read terms (such as the word "regular") into a section where the legislature chose to omit them,.
* Consequently, the statutory cap applies to *all* assessments, rendering Mogollon's $25 late fee a violation of the statute,.
### **Final Outcome**
While the petitions challenging the assessment increase itself (029 and 054) were dismissed, Mr. Brown prevailed in the 045 matter regarding the late fees.
**Order:**
1. **Violation Found:** Mr. Brown showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the $25 late charge violated § 33-1803(A),.
2. **Remedy:** Mogollon Airpark, Inc. was ordered to **rescind the $25 late fee** assessed against Mr. Brown,.
3. **Costs:** Mogollon was ordered to reimburse Mr. Brown his **$500.00 filing fee** within 30 days of the Order,.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Warren R. Brown(petitioner) Petitioner in docket Nos. 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG and 18F-H1818045-REL; appeared on his own behalf
Brad W. Stevens(petitioner) Petitioner in docket No. 18F-H1818054-REL; appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Gregory A. Stein(respondent attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP Attorney for Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Mark K. Sahl(respondent attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP Attorney for Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings Administrative Law Judge presiding over the consolidated hearing
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of the transmitted decision
Felicia Del Sol(clerk) Office of Administrative Hearings Transmitted the decision
