The Petitioner's claim that the HOA violated CC&Rs Article 10.8 (Notice of Violation) was dismissed because the Article governs only recorded notices, and the Petitioner did not prove the notices in question were recorded.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mountain Rose violated its CC&Rs Article 10.8, because that provision applies only to recorded notices, and the notices issued to the Petitioner were not recorded.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&R notice requirements regarding clarity and completeness of violation notices.
The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs Article 10.8 because the violation notices sent to him failed to include five mandatory pieces of information required by that section of the CC&Rs. The Petitioner also sought the refund of $175 in fines.
Orders: Petitioners' petition in this matter is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.A.C. R2-19-119
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, CC&R, Notice of Violation, Recording
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.A.C. R2-19-119
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817019-REL Decision – 620124.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:22:41 (78.5 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817019-REL
Case Briefing: Webster v. Mountain Rose Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817019-REL, wherein Petitioner Jerry L. Webster’s complaint against the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association was dismissed. The central issue revolved around Mr. Webster’s claim that the HOA engaged in a pattern of harassment by issuing vague and improper violation notices that failed to comply with Article 10.8 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
The case was decided on a critical legal interpretation of the CC&Rs. The presiding judge determined that the specific requirements of Article 10.8, which Mr. Webster cited as being violated, apply exclusively to violation notices that are formally “Recorded” with the Maricopa County Recorder’s office. The petitioner failed to provide any evidence, or even make the claim, that the notices he received had been recorded. Consequently, Mr. Webster did not meet his burden of proof to demonstrate that the HOA had violated the cited article. The dismissal of the petition was based entirely on this procedural and definitional distinction, without a ruling on the petitioner’s underlying allegations of harassment or selective enforcement.
Case Background
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Jerry L. Webster, a homeowner and member of the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association.
◦ Respondent: Mountain Rose Homeowners Association (“Mountain Rose”), located in Scottsdale, Arizona.
• Adjudicating Body:
◦ The Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix, Arizona.
◦ Administrative Law Judge: Velva Moses-Thompson.
• Key Dates:
◦ 2016–2017: Mountain Rose issues a series of violation notices to Mr. Webster regarding tree trimming and debris cleanup.
◦ December 6, 2017: Mr. Webster files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
◦ February 9, 2018: A hearing is held.
◦ February 9, 2018: The Administrative Law Judge issues the decision dismissing the petition.
Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments
Mr. Webster’s petition centered on the claim that the HOA’s actions constituted harassment and violated specific provisions of the governing documents.
Core Claim: Violation of CC&Rs Article 10.8
Mr. Webster contended that the violation notices he received from Mountain Rose were invalid because they failed to contain information mandated by Article 10.8 (“Notice of Violation”) of the CC&Rs. Specifically, he alleged the notices omitted the following required elements:
• (ii) The legal description of the lot against which the notice is being Recorded.
• (iii) A brief description of the nature of the violation.
• (iv) A statement that the notice is being Recorded by the Association pursuant to the Declaration.
• (v) A statement of the specific steps which must be taken by the Owner or occupant to cure the violation.
Allegations of Harassment and Prejudicial Treatment
In his petition, Mr. Webster framed the HOA’s actions as a targeted and unfair campaign against him.
• Stated Intent: “The intent of this action is to stop the HOA from violating our civil rights by prejudicially harassing us with unclear and unwarranted violation notices.”
• History of Conflict: He alleged that “The HOA has harassed us for over 10 years with vague violation notices.”
• Lack of Communication: He claimed that his “Numerous requests were made for clarification…which were ignored.”
• Financial Penalties: Mr. Webster stated he was recently fined three times for a total of $175, which he sought to have refunded.
• Alleged Bias: To demonstrate selective enforcement, Mr. Webster noted that a review of the neighborhood revealed “22 trees touching dwellings, including ours,” and stated, “It is very doubtful any other member received notices or fines for identical circumstances.”
• Supporting Evidence: Mr. Webster submitted an aerial photo from 2012 showing the tree in a similar condition, a 2017 photo of another home with a tree touching the dwelling, and a 2017 photo of HOA-maintained trees.
Respondent’s Position
The Mountain Rose HOA, represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq., presented a focused defense based on the specific language of the CC&Rs.
• Central Argument: The HOA contended that the violation notices issued to Mr. Webster were not recorded with the Maricopa County Recorder.
• Legal Position: Because the notices were not recorded, the stringent requirements outlined in Article 10.8 did not apply to them.
• Additional Detail: The HOA also argued that it had previously communicated the necessary corrective action to Mr. Webster, stating that “his tree needed to be trimmed 8 feet above the ground.”
The Decisive Legal Interpretation and Ruling
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the precise definition and application of “Recording” as established within the Mountain Rose CC&Rs.
The Definition of “Recording”
Article 1.33 of the CC&Rs provides the controlling definition:
“Recording” means placing an instrument of public record in the office of County Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona, and “Recorded” means having been so placed of public record.
Application of Law to Facts
The Judge concluded that Mr. Webster’s entire case rested on a misapplication of Article 10.8.
• Limited Scope of Article 10.8: The ruling states, “Mountain Rose CC&Rs Article 10.8. applies to the recording of notices and recorded notices.”
• Burden of Proof: Under Arizona law (A.A.C. R2-19-119), the burden of proof fell to the petitioner, Mr. Webster, to demonstrate his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Crucial Factual Finding: The decision explicitly states, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the notices issued to Mr. Webster were recorded.“
• Petitioner’s Failure to Allege: The Judge further noted, “Mr. Webster did not even contend that Mountain Rose recorded the notices issued to him.”
Conclusion of Law
Based on the evidence and the plain language of the CC&Rs, the Judge found that Mr. Webster failed to make his case.
“Mr. Webster failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mountain Rose violated its CC&Rs as described above.”
Final Order and Disposition
The petition was summarily dismissed based on the failure to prove that the relevant CC&R article was applicable to the facts presented.
Order:
“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition in this matter is dismissed.”
The order was dated February 9, 2018, and transmitted to the parties on February 28, 2018.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817019-REL
Study Guide: Case No. 18F-H1817019-REL
This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Jerry L. Webster v. Mountain Rose Homeowners Association, heard on February 9, 2018. It includes a quiz to test comprehension, suggested essay topics for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined within the source document.
Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source text.
1. Identify the primary parties involved in this case and describe their respective roles.
2. What was the central accusation that Petitioner Jerry L. Webster made against the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association?
3. Which specific article of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) did Mr. Webster claim the HOA violated, and what key information did he allege was missing from the notices he received?
4. Beyond the content of the violation notices, what other complaints did Mr. Webster include in his petition regarding the HOA’s conduct?
5. According to the Mountain Rose CC&Rs, what is the specific definition of “Recording”?
6. What was the key piece of evidence that was absent from the hearing, which proved critical to the final decision?
7. What was the Mountain Rose HOA’s primary defense against Mr. Webster’s allegation that it had violated Article 10.8 of the CC&Rs?
8. In this type of administrative hearing, who holds the burden of proof, and what is the standard of proof required to win the case?
9. What was the final Order issued by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson in this matter?
10. What recourse did the parties have after the judge issued the Order on February 9, 2018?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Jerry L. Webster, a homeowner and member of the association, and Respondent Mountain Rose Homeowners Association, a planned community in Scottsdale, Arizona. Mr. Webster filed a petition alleging violations by the HOA, making him the accuser, while the HOA was the party responding to the allegations.
2. Mr. Webster’s central accusation was that the HOA violated Article 10.8 of its own CC&Rs. He contended that the HOA engaged in prejudicial harassment by sending him a series of vague, unclear, and unwarranted violation notices over a period of more than 10 years.
3. Mr. Webster claimed the HOA violated Article 10.8, titled “Notice of Violation.” He alleged the notices he received failed to include several required subsections, including the legal description of the lot (ii), a brief description of the violation (iii), a statement that the notice was being Recorded (iv), and a statement of the specific steps needed to cure the violation (v).
4. Mr. Webster also complained that his numerous requests for clarification were ignored and that the HOA’s intent was harassment. He claimed he was fined $175 based on invalid notices and that the HOA was engaging in selective enforcement, noting 22 other homes had trees touching dwellings without receiving similar notices or fines.
5. According to Article 1.33 of the CC&Rs, “Recording” is defined as placing an instrument of public record in the office of the County Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona. “Recorded” means that the instrument has been placed on public record in that office.
6. The key piece of evidence absent from the hearing was any proof that the violation notices sent to Mr. Webster were ever recorded with the County Recorder of Maricopa County. The judge’s decision explicitly states, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the notices issued to Mr. Webster were recorded.”
7. The HOA’s primary defense was that the requirements of Article 10.8 only apply to recorded notices. Since the notices issued to Mr. Webster were never recorded, the HOA argued that the article’s specific formatting requirements were not applicable to their correspondence with him.
8. The burden of proof falls to the party asserting the claim, which in this case was the Petitioner, Mr. Webster. The standard of proof required is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must have the most convincing force and be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue.
9. The final Order issued by the judge was that the Petitioner’s petition in the matter be dismissed. This means Mr. Webster’s case was unsuccessful.
10. After the Order was issued, the parties had the right to request a rehearing. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, this request had to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
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Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for longer-form, analytical answers. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the petitioner’s argument as presented in the petition. What was the critical legal misinterpretation regarding Article 10.8 that ultimately led to the dismissal of his case?
2. Explain the direct relationship between Article 1.33 (“Recording”) and Article 10.8 (“Notice of Violation”). How did the specific definition in the former article completely undermine the petitioner’s entire claim, which was based on the latter?
3. Discuss the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. Citing specific findings from the decision, explain exactly how the petitioner failed to meet this standard.
4. Mr. Webster raised several secondary issues in his petition, including allegations of long-term harassment, selective enforcement (“22 trees touch dwellings”), and ignored requests for clarification. Why were these claims ultimately not addressed or validated in the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision?
5. Based on the text of Article 10.8, what is the specific function and legal purpose of a recorded Notice of Violation? Why might an HOA choose to go through the formal process of recording a notice rather than just sending an unrecorded letter to a homeowner?
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Glossary
Definition from Source Context
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
An Arizona Revised Statute that permits a homeowner or a planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or statutes.
Burden of Proof
The responsibility of the party asserting a claim or right to prove their case. In this matter, the burden of proof fell to the Petitioner.
An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Mountain Rose, which are the governing documents for the homeowners association.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which Mr. Webster filed his petition.
Notice of Violation (Article 10.8)
A written notice that the Association has the right to record. This article specifies that such a recorded notice must contain five key pieces of information, including the legal description of the lot and the specific steps to cure the violation. Its provisions apply specifically to notices that are formally recorded.
Petitioner
The party who filed the petition. In this case, it was Jerry L. Webster, a homeowner and member of the Mountain Rose HOA.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “the greater weight of the evidence…that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that…is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Recording (Article 1.33)
The act of “placing an instrument of public record in the office of County Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona.” “Recorded” means having been so placed on public record.
Respondent
The party against whom the petition was filed. In this case, it was the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817019-REL
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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona, addressing a dispute between Petitioner Jerry L. Webster and the Respondent Mountain Rose Homeowners Association (HOA). Mr. Webster alleged that the HOA violated Article 10.8 of its CC&Rs by issuing unclear and unwarranted violation notices, specifically regarding the trimming of his tree and cleaning debris, and he sought the refund of recent fines. The HOA contended that the notices were not recorded, making the specific requirements of Article 10.8—which applies to recorded notices—inapplicable to the general violation notices Mr. Webster received. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Webster failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the CC&Rs because the notices in question were never officially recorded, leading to the dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition.
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Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Jerry L. Webster(petitioner)
Pamela Webster(witness)
Respondent Side
Nathan Tennyson(HOA attorney)
Frank Puma(manager) Mountain Rose
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
17F-H1717034-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2018-02-26
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
John L. Shields
Counsel
—
Respondent
Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch
Counsel
Maria R. Kupillas
Alleged Violations
CC&R § 6.2(A)
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated its CC&Rs by approving the wall extension, as the HOA’s approval duties were limited to aesthetic considerations under CC&R § 7.2 and did not extend to enforcing or ensuring adjoining owner approval required by CC&R § 6.2(A).
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent erroneously approved the proposal, as Respondent's duties under CC&R § 7.2 did not require considering adjoining neighbor approval specified in CC&R § 6.2(A).
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&Rs by HOA improperly approving a neighbor's block wall extension without adjoining owner's approval.
Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R § 6.2(A) by approving a neighbor's block wall extension that served as a party wall because Petitioner, the adjoining owner, had not approved the wall. Respondent argued their approval duties under CC&R § 7.2 only concerned aesthetics, not ensuring neighbor approval.
Orders: The petition is dismissed and no action is required of Respondent.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
CC&R § 6.2(A)
CC&R § 7.2
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, CC&R, Architectural Control Committee, Fence, Party Wall, Rehearing, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
Briefing Document: Shields v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch HOA
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner John Shields (Petitioner) and the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Homeowners’ Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute is a 5-foot by 6-foot common block wall extension constructed by the Petitioner’s neighbor, Joe Johnson. The Petitioner alleged the Respondent violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by approving the wall alteration without the Petitioner’s required consent as the adjoining property owner.
Following an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, the Office of Administrative Hearings dismissed the Petitioner’s claims. The decisions established several critical legal and procedural points:
• Distinct HOA Obligations: The HOA’s architectural approval role, governed by CC&R § 7.2, is distinct from the neighbor-approval requirement in CC&R § 6.2(A). The HOA’s approval is based solely on aesthetic and community consistency standards and does not obligate it to verify or enforce separate homeowner-to-homeowner agreements or approvals.
• Homeowner Responsibility: The responsibility to obtain an adjoining owner’s approval for a shared wall alteration rests entirely with the homeowner undertaking the construction (in this case, Mr. Johnson), not with the HOA.
• Discretionary Enforcement: The HOA’s power to enforce CC&R violations is discretionary, not mandatory. CC&R § 8.1 uses the permissive term “may,” granting the board latitude in deciding whether to pursue enforcement actions, particularly in cases with conflicting evidence.
• Alternative Remedy: The Petitioner is not without a remedy. The same CC&R section that grants the HOA enforcement power also explicitly authorizes individual owners to bring a private action against another owner to enforce the CC&Rs.
Ultimately, the HOA was found to have acted within its authority as defined by the governing documents, and both petitions against it were dismissed.
I. Case Overview
This matter concerns a petition filed on May 3, 2017, by John Shields with the Arizona Department of Real Estate against his HOA, Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch. The case was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for adjudication.
Entity
Details
John Shields
Petitioner
Homeowner at 20431 E. Bronco Drive, Queen Creek, Arizona.
Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch
Respondent
The Homeowners’ Association (HOA) for the development.
Joe and Sandy Johnson
Adjoining Neighbor
Constructed the disputed wall extension between their property and the Petitioner’s.
The Disputed Structure
Wall Extension
An approximately 5-foot long by 6-foot high common block wall extension.
The dispute was adjudicated in two separate hearings:
1. Initial Hearing: Held on September 27, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Diane Mihalsky. A decision dismissing the petition was issued on October 11, 2017.
2. Rehearing: Granted on December 5, 2017, and held on February 5, 2018, before ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer. A final decision, again dismissing the petition, was issued on February 26, 2018.
II. Petitioner’s Claim and Central Issue
The Petitioner’s central claim was that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R § 6.2(A) by approving the wall extension built by his neighbor, Joe Johnson, without first securing or verifying the Petitioner’s approval.
• Core Allegation: Any alteration to a shared “Party Wall” requires the approval of both the HOA’s Architectural Control Committee (“the Committee”) and the adjoining owner. The Petitioner asserted he never gave his approval.
• Petitioner’s Testimony: He steadfastly denied ever approving the wall, stating that he expressed his disapproval to the Johnsons on October 16, 2016, three days after its construction. He submitted a photograph and testified the wall “looked like crap” and was an “eyesore.”
• Evolving Argument:
◦ In the first hearing, the Petitioner argued that the HOA was responsible for enforcing the CC&Rs by compelling Mr. Johnson to remove the unapproved wall.
◦ In the rehearing, the Petitioner “vacillated” before firmly asserting his issue was that the HOA had improperly approved Mr. Johnson’s proposal in the first place.
III. Relevant Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)
The decisions in this case hinged on the interpretation and interplay of three specific sections of the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch CC&Rs.
Section
Key Provision
§ 6.2(A)
Fences as Party Walls
“Such Party Walls and Fences shall not be altered, or changed… without [the] approval of the adjoining Owner(s), if any, and the [Architectural Control] Committee.”
Review by the Committee
“No … fences … shall be commenced [or] erected … until the plans and specifications … have been submitted to and approved by the Committee. … the Committee shall have the right to refuse to approve any Alteration which is not suitable or desirable in their opinion for aesthetic or other reasons…” It also states the Committee’s approval is not an endorsement of compliance with laws or ordinances.
Effect of Declaration and Remedies
“In the event of any violation… they may be enforced by an action brought by [Respondent], the Committee or by the Owner or Owners… at law or in equity…”
IV. Chronology of Events and Factual Evidence
1. Prior to Oct 13, 2016: Mr. Johnson discussed his plans to build the wall extension to hide his RV on multiple occasions with the Petitioner present.
◦ Conflicting Testimony: A.J. Denardo testified he was present for at least three such conversations and that the Petitioner voiced no objection, even stating the wall “looked good” immediately after it was built. Sandy Johnson testified the Petitioner was present for at least ten discussions and never disapproved, sometimes nodding in apparent approval. The Petitioner denied ever giving approval.
2. On/About Oct 13, 2016: Mr. Johnson constructed the wall extension without prior approval from the Committee.
3. On/About Oct 16, 2016: The Petitioner expressed his disapproval of the wall to Mr. and Mrs. Johnson.
4. On/About Nov 2, 2016: Mr. Johnson retroactively submitted plans for the wall extension and a proposal to move his gate forward to the Committee for approval.
5. Nov 16, 2016: The newly elected HOA board, acting as the Committee, met and verbally approved Mr. Johnson’s wall. They specifically advised him that “he will need to seek neighboring property owner’s approval.”
6. December 2016: The board held an executive session to obtain legal advice on enforcement issues.
7. Jan 18, 2017: At a regular board meeting, the board formally approved Mr. Johnson’s proposal, resolving “to ratify the unanimous written consent received outside this regular meeting.”
8. Post-Approval: The City of Queen Creek notified Mr. Johnson that he could not move his gate forward as proposed, as it violated city codes.
V. Legal Analysis and Rulings
Both administrative law judges ultimately concluded that the HOA had not violated its CC&Rs and dismissed the petition. The reasoning in each decision focused on different facets of the HOA’s duties.
A. First Hearing Decision (ALJ Diane Mihalsky)
The initial ruling focused on the HOA’s role in enforcement.
• Discretionary Power: The decision centered on the word “may” in CC&R § 8.1. Citing case law (Walker v. Wilkinson), the judge found that “may” indicates a permissive intent, while “shall” indicates a mandatory one. Therefore, the CC&Rs gave the Respondent board the option to bring an enforcement action, but did not require it to do so.
• No Abuse of Discretion: The board was aware of the dispute and the conflicting testimony from multiple witnesses regarding the Petitioner’s prior approval (or lack of objection). The board determined it was not its “job to decide who was telling the truth.” Given this conflicting evidence, the judge found that the board’s decision not to pursue enforcement against Mr. Johnson was not an abuse of its discretion.
• Petitioner’s Remedy: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner was not without a remedy, as CC&R § 8.1 also authorizes him to file his own action directly against the Johnsons for their alleged violation of CC&R § 6.2(A).
B. Rehearing Decision (ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer)
The rehearing focused on the Petitioner’s clarified claim that the HOA’s approval of the plans was improper.
• Separate and Distinct Obligations: The judge ruled that CC&R § 6.2(A) and CC&R § 7.2 create separate obligations for separate parties.
◦ § 6.2(A) requires the homeowner (Mr. Johnson) to obtain the adjoining neighbor’s approval.
◦ § 7.2 requires the HOA Committee to review the proposal based only on aesthetic criteria and consistency with the development.
• Limited Scope of Committee Review: The decision states, “Nothing in CC&R § 7.2 requires Respondent to consider whether the adjoining neighbor had approved the block wall extension.” The board’s role was to evaluate if the wall was “aesthetically pleasing and consistent” with other structures, which it did.
• No Erroneous Approval: Because the HOA’s approval process is defined and limited by § 7.2, its decision to approve the wall based on those criteria was not erroneous. The HOA had “no obligation under CC&R § 6.2(A) to obtain or ensure Petitioner approved the block wall extension.”
VI. Final Outcome
The Petitioner’s petition against the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch HOA was dismissed. The final order from the February 26, 2018, rehearing, which is binding on the parties, concluded that no action was required of the Respondent. The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated its governing documents in either its approval of the wall extension or its decision not to pursue enforcement.
Study Guide – 17F-H1717034-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Shields v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal dispute between John Shields and the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch homeowners’ association. It is based on the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and evidence presented in two separate hearings before the Office of Administrative Hearings.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.
1. Who are the primary parties involved in this legal dispute, and what is their relationship?
2. What specific structure is at the center of the dispute, when was it built, and by whom?
3. According to CC&R § 6.2(A), what two distinct approvals are required before a party wall can be altered?
4. Why did the Respondent’s board state it was unsure whether the Petitioner had approved the wall extension before it was constructed?
5. What criteria did the Architectural Control Committee use when it formally approved the wall extension, as outlined in CC&R § 7.2?
6. Explain the legal significance of the word “may” in CC&R § 8.1 regarding the homeowners’ association’s enforcement duties.
7. On what grounds was the Petitioner, John Shields, granted a rehearing after the initial decision was issued?
8. During the rehearing, what did the Petitioner clarify was his single, primary complaint against the Respondent?
9. What was the final recommended order in both the initial hearing and the subsequent rehearing?
10. According to the first judge’s decision, what other legal remedy is available to the Petitioner to address his grievance against his neighbor?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties are John Shields (the Petitioner) and the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch homeowners’ association (the Respondent). Mr. Shields is a homeowner and member of the association, and his dispute concerns the association’s handling of a wall built by his next-door neighbor, Joe Johnson.
2. The structure is an approximately 5-foot long by 6-foot high common block wall extension. It was built on or about October 13, 2016, by the Petitioner’s neighbor, Joe Johnson, between their two properties.
3. CC&R § 6.2(A) requires that any alteration to a party wall must have the approval of the adjoining owner(s), if any, as well as the approval of the Architectural Control Committee. Both approvals are necessary.
4. The board was unsure about the Petitioner’s prior approval because at least four witnesses stated they heard the Petitioner either actually approve of the wall or fail to object while Mr. Johnson was discussing plans to build it in his presence. This created a conflict between the Petitioner’s claims and the testimony of others.
5. According to testimony from board member Kristi Hancock, the Committee’s approval was based solely on whether the wall was aesthetically pleasing and consistent with other wall extensions in the development. The Committee’s review under CC&R § 7.2 did not require it to confirm whether the adjoining neighbor had given approval.
6. The first decision concluded that the word “may” in CC&R § 8.1 indicates permissive intent, not a mandatory requirement. This means the association had the discretion, but not the obligation, to bring an enforcement action against Mr. Johnson.
7. A rehearing was granted by Commissioner Judy Lowe because the Petitioner claimed there were errors in the admission or rejection of evidence, other errors of law during the proceeding, and misconduct by the Administrative Law Judge that deprived him of a fair hearing.
8. After some vacillation, the Petitioner firmly asserted during the rehearing that his single issue was that the Respondent had improperly approved Mr. Johnson’s proposal to build the block wall extension and move his gate forward.
9. In both hearings, the recommended order was that no action was required of the Respondent and that the petition should be dismissed.
10. The first decision points out that under CC&R § 8.1, the Petitioner is not without a remedy. This section authorizes an owner, not just the association, to file an action against another owner for an alleged violation of the CC&Rs.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, citing specific facts, testimony, and CC&R provisions from the source documents.
1. Analyze the differing responsibilities of the homeowner (Mr. Johnson), the adjoining neighbor (Mr. Shields), and the homeowners’ association (the Respondent) as outlined in CC&Rs § 6.2(A), § 7.2, and § 8.1. How do these distinct roles and responsibilities intersect and conflict in this case?
2. Compare and contrast the evidence and testimony presented in the first hearing (before ALJ Diane Mihalsky) with the focus of the second hearing (before ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer). How did the Petitioner’s framing of his central argument change between the two proceedings?
3. Discuss the legal standard “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain how the conflicting testimony regarding the Petitioner’s “tacit approval” influenced the Respondent’s decision-making and, ultimately, the Administrative Law Judges’ conclusions.
4. Evaluate the Respondent’s decision-making process regarding the approval of the wall extension. Consider the timeline of events from the wall’s unapproved construction in October 2016 to the formal ratification in January 2017, the conditional verbal approval, and the rationale provided by board members for their actions.
5. The first decision explicitly states that CC&R § 8.1 gives the Petitioner a separate remedy against his neighbor. Based on the information in both documents, construct the legal argument the Petitioner could make in a direct action against Mr. and Mrs. Johnson for their alleged violation of CC&R § 6.2(A).
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, takes evidence, and makes decisions or recommendations on legal and factual issues. In this case, Diane Mihalsky and Tammy L. Eigenheer served as ALJs.
Architectural Control Committee (The Committee)
A body within the homeowners’ association responsible for reviewing and approving or disapproving proposed alterations to properties, such as fences, based on aesthetic and other considerations as outlined in the CC&Rs. In this case, the board itself acted as the Committee.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (The Department)
The state agency with which the Petitioner initially filed his petition concerning violations of planned community documents. The Department then referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated the CC&Rs.
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)
The governing legal documents that set out the rights and obligations of the homeowners’ association and its members. The key sections referenced are 6.2(A), 7.2, and 8.1.
Office of Administrative Hearings
The independent state agency responsible for conducting evidentiary hearings for disputes referred by other state agencies, such as the one between Shields and the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch.
Party Wall
A wall built on the boundary line between two adjoining properties, for the common benefit of both owners. CC&R § 6.2(A) governs the alteration of such walls.
Permissive Intent
A legal interpretation of language, such as the word “may,” which indicates that an action is allowed or discretionary but not required. This was central to the interpretation of CC&R § 8.1.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John Shields is the Petitioner.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this civil administrative case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, making it more probable that a contention is true than not.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case, granted in this instance because the Petitioner alleged errors of law and misconduct by the judge in the first proceeding.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch homeowners’ association is the Respondent.
Tacit Approval
Approval that is implied or inferred from actions or from a failure to state an objection, rather than being explicitly stated. Witnesses claimed the Petitioner gave tacit approval to the wall before it was built.
Blog Post – 17F-H1717034-REL-RHG
4 Surprising Lessons From a Neighbor’s Ugly Wall and the HOA That Did Nothing
Introduction: The Homeowner’s Dilemma
In the world of community governance, the gap between homeowner expectation and contractual reality is a fertile ground for conflict. Most people assume their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) exists to be their first line of defense in a neighbor dispute; when a rule is broken, the HOA is expected to step in. But what happens when the HOA decides to do nothing?
This was the exact situation faced by homeowner John Shields, who was appalled when his neighbor, Joe Johnson, built a block wall extension he considered an eyesore. Mr. Shields turned to his HOA, Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch, expecting them to force its removal. The legal battle that followed provides a fascinating case study, revealing surprising realities about the power and obligations of an HOA. For any homeowner in a planned community, the takeaways are as counter-intuitive as they are crucial.
1. Your HOA Isn’t Obligated to Be Your Enforcer
Mr. Shields’s primary argument rested on a common but often mistaken assumption: that an HOA has a strict mandate to enforce every rule. His logic was straightforward: the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) required his approval for the wall extension. Since he never gave it, he believed the HOA was responsible for forcing his neighbor to tear the wall down.
The court, however, pointed to a different section of the CC&Rs (§ 8.1) which stated that the rules may be enforced by the HOA. This single word was the linchpin of the case. The Administrative Law Judge highlighted the critical legal distinction between a permissive option and a mandatory duty.
“[The] use of the word ‘may’ generally indicates permissive intent . . . while ‘shall’ generally indicates a mandatory provision.”
This gave the HOA discretion on whether to act. Because there was conflicting testimony about whether Mr. Shields had given tacit approval beforehand, the court found that the HOA “did not abuse its discretion by declining to bring an enforcement action.” The lesson is clear: your HOA’s governing documents might grant it the right to enforce rules without creating an obligation to do so in every single case.
2. The HOA’s “Approval” Might Not Mean What You Think
Adding another layer to the conflict, Mr. Johnson submitted plans for the wall and a related gate relocation to the HOA’s Architectural Control Committee after the wall was already built. The Committee ultimately approved it. To Mr. Shields, this seemed like the HOA was siding with his neighbor and ignoring his rights.
But the Committee’s review was far narrower than he assumed. According to CC&R § 7.2, their analysis was limited to whether the wall was “esthetically pleasing and consistent with other wall extensions that had been built in the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch development.” The Committee wasn’t tasked with policing neighbor-to-neighbor agreements.
A formal rehearing—granted after the petitioner alleged “errors of law”—clarified this crucial point. The judge found that under CC&R § 6.2(A), it was Mr. Johnson’s responsibility to get his neighbor’s approval, not the HOA’s. As the decision stated, “Respondent had no obligation under CC&R § 6.2(A) to obtain or ensure Petitioner approved the block wall extension.” This separation of duties is common in governing documents, as it strategically shields the HOA from liability in member disputes while allowing it to maintain aesthetic control over the community.
3. Your Silence Can Be Used Against You
The case devolved into a classic “he said, she said” scenario that ultimately weakened Mr. Shields’s position. He testified that he never approved the wall and, on October 16, 2016—three days after it was built—told his neighbors he disapproved, calling it an “eyesore” that “looked like crap.”
However, other witnesses told a different story. One, Mr. Denardo, testified that Mr. Shields “did not voice any objection” before the wall was constructed and even said it “looked good” immediately after. The neighbor’s wife, Mrs. Johnson, testified that Mr. Shields was present for at least ten discussions about the wall, “had never voiced any disapproval,” and had “sometimes nodded, apparently indicating his approval.”
This conflicting testimony was the direct basis for the board invoking its discretionary power. A board member testified that because of the conflicting accounts, the board “was less sure about whether Petitioner had actually or tacitly approved the block wall extension before it was built.” This uncertainty was the key factor that led them not to intervene. When it comes to property matters, clear, timely, and preferably documented communication is your strongest asset; ambiguity and silence can be interpreted as consent.
4. When the HOA Steps Aside, the Fight Might Be Yours Alone
While the court dismissed the petition against the HOA, it did not leave Mr. Shields without a path forward. The judge pointed to the very same rule that gave the HOA its discretion—CC&R § 8.1—as a source of the homeowner’s power. This rule proved to be a double-edged sword.
The judge’s first decision stated that CC&R § 8.1 “authorizes Petitioner to file an action against Mr. and Mrs. Johnson for their alleged violation of CC&R § 6.2(A).” The same clause that gave the HOA the discretion to step aside also explicitly empowered individual homeowners to act in the HOA’s stead.
When an association chooses to stay out of a member-to-member dispute, the responsibility—and the power—to enforce the community’s rules can fall directly to the affected homeowner. The HOA’s inaction does not mean a rule can’t be enforced; it just means you may have to be the one to do it by bringing a private legal action against your neighbor.
Conclusion: Read Your Fine Print
The story of the ugly wall serves as a powerful reminder that a homeowner’s assumptions about their HOA’s power can be miles apart from the legal reality written into the CC&Rs. This case perfectly illustrates the interplay between an HOA’s discretionary enforcement powers (Lesson 1), its carefully separated procedural duties (Lesson 2), the critical importance of homeowner communication and proof (Lesson 3), and the ultimate empowerment of members to enforce rules themselves (Lesson 4). These documents are not just a list of rules; they are a legal framework that dictates who has the power to act, when they are obligated to do so, and what recourse you have when a conflict arises.
You might know your community’s rules on trash cans and lawn care, but do you know who is truly responsible for enforcing them when a real dispute arises?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John Shields(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Maria R. Kupillas(HOA attorney) Law Offices of Farley Choate & Bergin Represented Respondent Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch
Dean Kabanuk(board president) Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Board Testified for Petitioner via subpoena; elected President Nov 2016
Kristi Hancock(board member/witness) Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Board Served as Vice President (Nov 2016-Nov 2017) and President (since Nov 2017)
Brenda Campbell(community manager) Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Witness for Respondent
A.J. Denardo(witness) Not a member of Respondent; lives near Petitioner
Sandy Johnson(witness/neighbor) Wife of Joe Johnson; Petitioner's next-door neighbor
Joe Johnson(neighbor/homeowner) Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Built the block wall extension in question
Neutral Parties
Diane Mihalsky(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings Issued initial ALJ Decision
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings Issued ALJ Decision following rehearing
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Granted Petitioner's request for rehearing
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated its CC&Rs by approving the wall extension, as the HOA’s approval duties were limited to aesthetic considerations under CC&R § 7.2 and did not extend to enforcing or ensuring adjoining owner approval required by CC&R § 6.2(A).
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent erroneously approved the proposal, as Respondent's duties under CC&R § 7.2 did not require considering adjoining neighbor approval specified in CC&R § 6.2(A).
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&Rs by HOA improperly approving a neighbor's block wall extension without adjoining owner's approval.
Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R § 6.2(A) by approving a neighbor's block wall extension that served as a party wall because Petitioner, the adjoining owner, had not approved the wall. Respondent argued their approval duties under CC&R § 7.2 only concerned aesthetics, not ensuring neighbor approval.
Orders: The petition is dismissed and no action is required of Respondent.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
CC&R § 6.2(A)
CC&R § 7.2
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, CC&R, Architectural Control Committee, Fence, Party Wall, Rehearing, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17F-H1717034-REL-RHG Decision – 619560.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:21 (90.8 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717034-REL-RHG
Briefing Document: Analysis of Administrative Law Judge Decision in Shields v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in Case No. 17F-H1717034-REL-RHG, dated February 26, 2018. The central issue was a petition filed by homeowner John L. Shields against the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Homeowners’ Association (HOA), alleging the HOA improperly approved a wall extension built by his neighbor, Joe Johnson, without Mr. Shields’ required consent.
The petition was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the petitioner, Mr. Shields, failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The decision rests on a critical distinction between the responsibilities of a homeowner and the responsibilities of the HOA under separate articles of the CC&Rs. The ALJ determined that the obligation to secure an adjoining neighbor’s approval for a wall alteration (under CC&R § 6.2) falls exclusively on the homeowner undertaking the project. In contrast, the HOA’s duty (under CC&R § 7.2) is limited to an aesthetic review of the proposed alteration, which it conducted appropriately. The HOA had no legal obligation to enforce or verify neighbor-to-neighbor approval.
I. Case Overview
Case Name
John L. Shields (Petitioner) vs. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch (Respondent)
Case Number
17F-H1717034-REL-RHG
Jurisdiction
Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Date of Decision
February 26, 2018
Core Dispute
The petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R § 6.2(A) by approving a neighbor’s approximately 5’ x 6’ block wall extension without the petitioner’s consent.
Final Outcome
The petition was dismissed, with no action required of the respondent HOA.
II. Petitioner’s Claim and Arguments
John L. Shields, a homeowner at 20431 E. Bronco Drive within the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch development, filed a petition against the HOA concerning a wall extension built by his next-door neighbor, Joe Johnson.
• Core Allegation: After vacillating on the specifics of his complaint during the hearing, Mr. Shields firmly asserted that his single issue was that the HOA improperly approved Mr. Johnson’s proposal to build a block wall extension and move his gate forward.
• Basis of Claim: The petitioner argued that under CC&R § 6.2, the HOA should have withheld its approval because Mr. Johnson had not demonstrated that he had first obtained Mr. Shields’ approval for the wall extension between their properties.
• Evidence and Testimony: Mr. Shields denied ever having approved the wall. He submitted a photograph he had taken from his front porch and testified that the block wall extension “was an eyesore.”
III. Respondent’s Position and Evidence
The Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch HOA, represented by board president Kristi Hancock, denied all complaint items and argued its actions were consistent with the governing CC&Rs.
• Basis of Approval: The HOA contended that its approval was based solely on the criteria outlined in CC&R § 7.2. The board, acting as the Architectural Control Committee, reviewed Mr. Johnson’s proposal for its aesthetic qualities and consistency with other properties in the development.
• Aesthetic Review: Ms. Hancock testified that the board inspected other wall extensions and gates and found Mr. Johnson’s proposal to be “aesthetically pleasing and consistent with the other properties.”
• Neighbor Consent Issue: The HOA acknowledged its awareness of Mr. Shields’ objection to the wall after it was built. However, Ms. Hancock testified that the board’s understanding of whether Mr. Shields had approved the wall before construction was unclear. She stated that “at least four witnesses had stated that they heard Petitioner either actually approve of or fail to state an objection to the block wall extension while, in Petitioner’s presence, Mr. Johnson discussed having the block wall extension built.”
• Separation of Duties: The HOA’s position was that its duty under § 7.2 was distinct from the homeowner’s duty under § 6.2. The HOA was not responsible for obtaining or verifying neighbor approval.
IV. Chronology of Key Events
1. October 13, 2016 (approx.): Mr. Johnson has the block wall extension built without first obtaining approval from the HOA’s board or committee.
2. October 16, 2016 (approx.): Mr. Shields expresses his disapproval of the newly built wall to Mr. and Mrs. Johnson.
3. November 2, 2016 (approx.): Mr. Johnson retroactively submits his proposal for the wall extension and a plan to move his gate forward to the Architectural Control Committee for approval.
4. November 2016: The HOA’s newly elected board meets as the Committee and verbally approves Mr. Johnson’s wall but advises him that “he will need to seek neighboring property owner’s approval.”
5. January 2017: The board formally approves Mr. Johnson’s proposal for the wall extension and gate move.
6. May 3, 2017 (approx.): Mr. Shields files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
7. September 27, 2017: An initial hearing is held, and Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky dismisses the petition.
8. December 5, 2017: The Real Estate Commissioner grants Mr. Shields’ request for a rehearing based on his claims of legal errors and judicial misconduct.
9. February 5, 2018: A rehearing is held before Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.
V. Analysis of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)
The judge’s decision hinged on the distinct and separate functions of two key CC&R sections.
This section governs alterations to shared fences and walls.
Such Party Walls and Fences shall not be altered, or changed in design, color, material or construction from the original installation made by the Developer without [the] approval of the adjoining Owner(s), if any, and the [Architectural Control] Committee.
• Interpretation: The ALJ interpreted this section as creating two separate approval requirements for the homeowner making the alteration: one from the adjoining owner and one from the Committee. It does not obligate the Committee to enforce the adjoining owner’s approval.
This section defines the scope and limits of the Architectural Control Committee’s power.
No . . . fences . . . shall be commenced [or] erected . . . until the plans and specifications showing the same shall have been submitted to and approved by the Committee. Approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. However, the Committee shall have the right to refuse to approve any Alteration which is not suitable or desirable in their opinion for aesthetic or other reasons…
• Interpretation: The ALJ found that this section limits the Committee’s review to specific criteria, including aesthetics, harmony with surroundings, and effect on neighboring property. It explicitly states that approval “shall not be unreasonably withheld” and does not require the Committee to verify compliance with other CC&Rs or city ordinances.
VI. Judge’s Conclusions of Law and Rationale for Dismissal
The ALJ’s decision to dismiss the petition was based on a clear legal interpretation of the CC&Rs and the petitioner’s failure to meet the burden of proof.
• Distinct and Separate Obligations: The core of the ruling is that the CC&Rs create parallel but separate responsibilities.
1. Homeowner’s Responsibility: The duty to obtain an adjoining neighbor’s approval for a shared wall alteration under § 6.2(A) rests solely with the homeowner performing the work (Mr. Johnson).
2. HOA’s Responsibility: The HOA’s duty under § 7.2 is limited to reviewing the project on its aesthetic merits and consistency within the community.
• Key Legal Finding: The decision explicitly states the separation of these duties:
• Scope of HOA Review: The ALJ affirmed that the HOA’s scope of review was properly limited.
• Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Because the HOA acted within the authority and limitations defined by CC&R § 7.2, the petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated its governing documents.
• Other Responsibilities: The decision also noted that the responsibility for ensuring compliance with City of Queen Creek ordinances (related to the gate move) ultimately rested with Mr. Johnson, not the HOA.
VII. Final Order
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the petition be dismissed.
• No action is required of the Respondent, Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch HOA.
• The decision, issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.
• Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated its CC&Rs by approving the wall extension, as the HOA’s approval duties were limited to aesthetic considerations under CC&R § 7.2 and did not extend to enforcing or ensuring adjoining owner approval required by CC&R § 6.2(A).
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent erroneously approved the proposal, as Respondent's duties under CC&R § 7.2 did not require considering adjoining neighbor approval specified in CC&R § 6.2(A).
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&Rs by HOA improperly approving a neighbor's block wall extension without adjoining owner's approval.
Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R § 6.2(A) by approving a neighbor's block wall extension that served as a party wall because Petitioner, the adjoining owner, had not approved the wall. Respondent argued their approval duties under CC&R § 7.2 only concerned aesthetics, not ensuring neighbor approval.
Orders: The petition is dismissed and no action is required of Respondent.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
CC&R § 6.2(A)
CC&R § 7.2
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, CC&R, Architectural Control Committee, Fence, Party Wall, Rehearing, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17F-H1717034-REL-RHG Decision – 619560.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:58:07 (90.8 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717034-REL-RHG
Briefing Document: Analysis of Administrative Law Judge Decision in Shields v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in Case No. 17F-H1717034-REL-RHG, dated February 26, 2018. The central issue was a petition filed by homeowner John L. Shields against the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Homeowners’ Association (HOA), alleging the HOA improperly approved a wall extension built by his neighbor, Joe Johnson, without Mr. Shields’ required consent.
The petition was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the petitioner, Mr. Shields, failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The decision rests on a critical distinction between the responsibilities of a homeowner and the responsibilities of the HOA under separate articles of the CC&Rs. The ALJ determined that the obligation to secure an adjoining neighbor’s approval for a wall alteration (under CC&R § 6.2) falls exclusively on the homeowner undertaking the project. In contrast, the HOA’s duty (under CC&R § 7.2) is limited to an aesthetic review of the proposed alteration, which it conducted appropriately. The HOA had no legal obligation to enforce or verify neighbor-to-neighbor approval.
I. Case Overview
Case Name
John L. Shields (Petitioner) vs. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch (Respondent)
Case Number
17F-H1717034-REL-RHG
Jurisdiction
Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Date of Decision
February 26, 2018
Core Dispute
The petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R § 6.2(A) by approving a neighbor’s approximately 5’ x 6’ block wall extension without the petitioner’s consent.
Final Outcome
The petition was dismissed, with no action required of the respondent HOA.
II. Petitioner’s Claim and Arguments
John L. Shields, a homeowner at 20431 E. Bronco Drive within the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch development, filed a petition against the HOA concerning a wall extension built by his next-door neighbor, Joe Johnson.
• Core Allegation: After vacillating on the specifics of his complaint during the hearing, Mr. Shields firmly asserted that his single issue was that the HOA improperly approved Mr. Johnson’s proposal to build a block wall extension and move his gate forward.
• Basis of Claim: The petitioner argued that under CC&R § 6.2, the HOA should have withheld its approval because Mr. Johnson had not demonstrated that he had first obtained Mr. Shields’ approval for the wall extension between their properties.
• Evidence and Testimony: Mr. Shields denied ever having approved the wall. He submitted a photograph he had taken from his front porch and testified that the block wall extension “was an eyesore.”
III. Respondent’s Position and Evidence
The Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch HOA, represented by board president Kristi Hancock, denied all complaint items and argued its actions were consistent with the governing CC&Rs.
• Basis of Approval: The HOA contended that its approval was based solely on the criteria outlined in CC&R § 7.2. The board, acting as the Architectural Control Committee, reviewed Mr. Johnson’s proposal for its aesthetic qualities and consistency with other properties in the development.
• Aesthetic Review: Ms. Hancock testified that the board inspected other wall extensions and gates and found Mr. Johnson’s proposal to be “aesthetically pleasing and consistent with the other properties.”
• Neighbor Consent Issue: The HOA acknowledged its awareness of Mr. Shields’ objection to the wall after it was built. However, Ms. Hancock testified that the board’s understanding of whether Mr. Shields had approved the wall before construction was unclear. She stated that “at least four witnesses had stated that they heard Petitioner either actually approve of or fail to state an objection to the block wall extension while, in Petitioner’s presence, Mr. Johnson discussed having the block wall extension built.”
• Separation of Duties: The HOA’s position was that its duty under § 7.2 was distinct from the homeowner’s duty under § 6.2. The HOA was not responsible for obtaining or verifying neighbor approval.
IV. Chronology of Key Events
1. October 13, 2016 (approx.): Mr. Johnson has the block wall extension built without first obtaining approval from the HOA’s board or committee.
2. October 16, 2016 (approx.): Mr. Shields expresses his disapproval of the newly built wall to Mr. and Mrs. Johnson.
3. November 2, 2016 (approx.): Mr. Johnson retroactively submits his proposal for the wall extension and a plan to move his gate forward to the Architectural Control Committee for approval.
4. November 2016: The HOA’s newly elected board meets as the Committee and verbally approves Mr. Johnson’s wall but advises him that “he will need to seek neighboring property owner’s approval.”
5. January 2017: The board formally approves Mr. Johnson’s proposal for the wall extension and gate move.
6. May 3, 2017 (approx.): Mr. Shields files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
7. September 27, 2017: An initial hearing is held, and Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky dismisses the petition.
8. December 5, 2017: The Real Estate Commissioner grants Mr. Shields’ request for a rehearing based on his claims of legal errors and judicial misconduct.
9. February 5, 2018: A rehearing is held before Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.
V. Analysis of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)
The judge’s decision hinged on the distinct and separate functions of two key CC&R sections.
This section governs alterations to shared fences and walls.
Such Party Walls and Fences shall not be altered, or changed in design, color, material or construction from the original installation made by the Developer without [the] approval of the adjoining Owner(s), if any, and the [Architectural Control] Committee.
• Interpretation: The ALJ interpreted this section as creating two separate approval requirements for the homeowner making the alteration: one from the adjoining owner and one from the Committee. It does not obligate the Committee to enforce the adjoining owner’s approval.
This section defines the scope and limits of the Architectural Control Committee’s power.
No . . . fences . . . shall be commenced [or] erected . . . until the plans and specifications showing the same shall have been submitted to and approved by the Committee. Approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. However, the Committee shall have the right to refuse to approve any Alteration which is not suitable or desirable in their opinion for aesthetic or other reasons…
• Interpretation: The ALJ found that this section limits the Committee’s review to specific criteria, including aesthetics, harmony with surroundings, and effect on neighboring property. It explicitly states that approval “shall not be unreasonably withheld” and does not require the Committee to verify compliance with other CC&Rs or city ordinances.
VI. Judge’s Conclusions of Law and Rationale for Dismissal
The ALJ’s decision to dismiss the petition was based on a clear legal interpretation of the CC&Rs and the petitioner’s failure to meet the burden of proof.
• Distinct and Separate Obligations: The core of the ruling is that the CC&Rs create parallel but separate responsibilities.
1. Homeowner’s Responsibility: The duty to obtain an adjoining neighbor’s approval for a shared wall alteration under § 6.2(A) rests solely with the homeowner performing the work (Mr. Johnson).
2. HOA’s Responsibility: The HOA’s duty under § 7.2 is limited to reviewing the project on its aesthetic merits and consistency within the community.
• Key Legal Finding: The decision explicitly states the separation of these duties:
• Scope of HOA Review: The ALJ affirmed that the HOA’s scope of review was properly limited.
• Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Because the HOA acted within the authority and limitations defined by CC&R § 7.2, the petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated its governing documents.
• Other Responsibilities: The decision also noted that the responsibility for ensuring compliance with City of Queen Creek ordinances (related to the gate move) ultimately rested with Mr. Johnson, not the HOA.
VII. Final Order
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the petition be dismissed.
• No action is required of the Respondent, Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch HOA.
• The decision, issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.
• Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
17F-H1717034-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2018-02-26
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
John L. Shields
Counsel
—
Respondent
Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch
Counsel
Maria R. Kupillas
Alleged Violations
CC&R § 6.2(A)
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition. It was determined that the Respondent (HOA) did not err in approving the neighbor's wall extension proposal, as the responsibility for obtaining adjoining owner approval under CC&R § 6.2(A) lay solely with the neighboring owner, not the HOA. The HOA's approval under CC&R § 7.2 only required considering aesthetic compliance.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent erroneously approved the neighbor's proposal. The HOA was only required by CC&R § 7.2 to consider aesthetics when approving alterations, and neighbor approval (required by CC&R § 6.2(A)) was the sole responsibility of the building owner, not the HOA.
Key Issues & Findings
Respondent improperly approved a block wall extension built by a neighbor without securing Petitioner's required adjoining owner approval.
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its CC&Rs by formally approving a neighbor's block wall extension (approximately 5' long x 6' high) because Petitioner, the adjoining property owner, had not approved the wall as required by CC&R § 6.2(A).
Orders: The petition was dismissed, and no action was required of Respondent.
Briefing Document: Shields v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch HOA
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner John Shields (Petitioner) and the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Homeowners’ Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute is a 5-foot by 6-foot common block wall extension constructed by the Petitioner’s neighbor, Joe Johnson. The Petitioner alleged the Respondent violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by approving the wall alteration without the Petitioner’s required consent as the adjoining property owner.
Following an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, the Office of Administrative Hearings dismissed the Petitioner’s claims. The decisions established several critical legal and procedural points:
• Distinct HOA Obligations: The HOA’s architectural approval role, governed by CC&R § 7.2, is distinct from the neighbor-approval requirement in CC&R § 6.2(A). The HOA’s approval is based solely on aesthetic and community consistency standards and does not obligate it to verify or enforce separate homeowner-to-homeowner agreements or approvals.
• Homeowner Responsibility: The responsibility to obtain an adjoining owner’s approval for a shared wall alteration rests entirely with the homeowner undertaking the construction (in this case, Mr. Johnson), not with the HOA.
• Discretionary Enforcement: The HOA’s power to enforce CC&R violations is discretionary, not mandatory. CC&R § 8.1 uses the permissive term “may,” granting the board latitude in deciding whether to pursue enforcement actions, particularly in cases with conflicting evidence.
• Alternative Remedy: The Petitioner is not without a remedy. The same CC&R section that grants the HOA enforcement power also explicitly authorizes individual owners to bring a private action against another owner to enforce the CC&Rs.
Ultimately, the HOA was found to have acted within its authority as defined by the governing documents, and both petitions against it were dismissed.
I. Case Overview
This matter concerns a petition filed on May 3, 2017, by John Shields with the Arizona Department of Real Estate against his HOA, Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch. The case was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for adjudication.
Entity
Details
John Shields
Petitioner
Homeowner at 20431 E. Bronco Drive, Queen Creek, Arizona.
Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch
Respondent
The Homeowners’ Association (HOA) for the development.
Joe and Sandy Johnson
Adjoining Neighbor
Constructed the disputed wall extension between their property and the Petitioner’s.
The Disputed Structure
Wall Extension
An approximately 5-foot long by 6-foot high common block wall extension.
The dispute was adjudicated in two separate hearings:
1. Initial Hearing: Held on September 27, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Diane Mihalsky. A decision dismissing the petition was issued on October 11, 2017.
2. Rehearing: Granted on December 5, 2017, and held on February 5, 2018, before ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer. A final decision, again dismissing the petition, was issued on February 26, 2018.
II. Petitioner’s Claim and Central Issue
The Petitioner’s central claim was that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R § 6.2(A) by approving the wall extension built by his neighbor, Joe Johnson, without first securing or verifying the Petitioner’s approval.
• Core Allegation: Any alteration to a shared “Party Wall” requires the approval of both the HOA’s Architectural Control Committee (“the Committee”) and the adjoining owner. The Petitioner asserted he never gave his approval.
• Petitioner’s Testimony: He steadfastly denied ever approving the wall, stating that he expressed his disapproval to the Johnsons on October 16, 2016, three days after its construction. He submitted a photograph and testified the wall “looked like crap” and was an “eyesore.”
• Evolving Argument:
◦ In the first hearing, the Petitioner argued that the HOA was responsible for enforcing the CC&Rs by compelling Mr. Johnson to remove the unapproved wall.
◦ In the rehearing, the Petitioner “vacillated” before firmly asserting his issue was that the HOA had improperly approved Mr. Johnson’s proposal in the first place.
III. Relevant Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)
The decisions in this case hinged on the interpretation and interplay of three specific sections of the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch CC&Rs.
Section
Key Provision
§ 6.2(A)
Fences as Party Walls
“Such Party Walls and Fences shall not be altered, or changed… without [the] approval of the adjoining Owner(s), if any, and the [Architectural Control] Committee.”
Review by the Committee
“No … fences … shall be commenced [or] erected … until the plans and specifications … have been submitted to and approved by the Committee. … the Committee shall have the right to refuse to approve any Alteration which is not suitable or desirable in their opinion for aesthetic or other reasons…” It also states the Committee’s approval is not an endorsement of compliance with laws or ordinances.
Effect of Declaration and Remedies
“In the event of any violation… they may be enforced by an action brought by [Respondent], the Committee or by the Owner or Owners… at law or in equity…”
IV. Chronology of Events and Factual Evidence
1. Prior to Oct 13, 2016: Mr. Johnson discussed his plans to build the wall extension to hide his RV on multiple occasions with the Petitioner present.
◦ Conflicting Testimony: A.J. Denardo testified he was present for at least three such conversations and that the Petitioner voiced no objection, even stating the wall “looked good” immediately after it was built. Sandy Johnson testified the Petitioner was present for at least ten discussions and never disapproved, sometimes nodding in apparent approval. The Petitioner denied ever giving approval.
2. On/About Oct 13, 2016: Mr. Johnson constructed the wall extension without prior approval from the Committee.
3. On/About Oct 16, 2016: The Petitioner expressed his disapproval of the wall to Mr. and Mrs. Johnson.
4. On/About Nov 2, 2016: Mr. Johnson retroactively submitted plans for the wall extension and a proposal to move his gate forward to the Committee for approval.
5. Nov 16, 2016: The newly elected HOA board, acting as the Committee, met and verbally approved Mr. Johnson’s wall. They specifically advised him that “he will need to seek neighboring property owner’s approval.”
6. December 2016: The board held an executive session to obtain legal advice on enforcement issues.
7. Jan 18, 2017: At a regular board meeting, the board formally approved Mr. Johnson’s proposal, resolving “to ratify the unanimous written consent received outside this regular meeting.”
8. Post-Approval: The City of Queen Creek notified Mr. Johnson that he could not move his gate forward as proposed, as it violated city codes.
V. Legal Analysis and Rulings
Both administrative law judges ultimately concluded that the HOA had not violated its CC&Rs and dismissed the petition. The reasoning in each decision focused on different facets of the HOA’s duties.
A. First Hearing Decision (ALJ Diane Mihalsky)
The initial ruling focused on the HOA’s role in enforcement.
• Discretionary Power: The decision centered on the word “may” in CC&R § 8.1. Citing case law (Walker v. Wilkinson), the judge found that “may” indicates a permissive intent, while “shall” indicates a mandatory one. Therefore, the CC&Rs gave the Respondent board the option to bring an enforcement action, but did not require it to do so.
• No Abuse of Discretion: The board was aware of the dispute and the conflicting testimony from multiple witnesses regarding the Petitioner’s prior approval (or lack of objection). The board determined it was not its “job to decide who was telling the truth.” Given this conflicting evidence, the judge found that the board’s decision not to pursue enforcement against Mr. Johnson was not an abuse of its discretion.
• Petitioner’s Remedy: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner was not without a remedy, as CC&R § 8.1 also authorizes him to file his own action directly against the Johnsons for their alleged violation of CC&R § 6.2(A).
B. Rehearing Decision (ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer)
The rehearing focused on the Petitioner’s clarified claim that the HOA’s approval of the plans was improper.
• Separate and Distinct Obligations: The judge ruled that CC&R § 6.2(A) and CC&R § 7.2 create separate obligations for separate parties.
◦ § 6.2(A) requires the homeowner (Mr. Johnson) to obtain the adjoining neighbor’s approval.
◦ § 7.2 requires the HOA Committee to review the proposal based only on aesthetic criteria and consistency with the development.
• Limited Scope of Committee Review: The decision states, “Nothing in CC&R § 7.2 requires Respondent to consider whether the adjoining neighbor had approved the block wall extension.” The board’s role was to evaluate if the wall was “aesthetically pleasing and consistent” with other structures, which it did.
• No Erroneous Approval: Because the HOA’s approval process is defined and limited by § 7.2, its decision to approve the wall based on those criteria was not erroneous. The HOA had “no obligation under CC&R § 6.2(A) to obtain or ensure Petitioner approved the block wall extension.”
VI. Final Outcome
The Petitioner’s petition against the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch HOA was dismissed. The final order from the February 26, 2018, rehearing, which is binding on the parties, concluded that no action was required of the Respondent. The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated its governing documents in either its approval of the wall extension or its decision not to pursue enforcement.
Study Guide – 17F-H1717034-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Shields v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal dispute between John Shields and the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch homeowners’ association. It is based on the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and evidence presented in two separate hearings before the Office of Administrative Hearings.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.
1. Who are the primary parties involved in this legal dispute, and what is their relationship?
2. What specific structure is at the center of the dispute, when was it built, and by whom?
3. According to CC&R § 6.2(A), what two distinct approvals are required before a party wall can be altered?
4. Why did the Respondent’s board state it was unsure whether the Petitioner had approved the wall extension before it was constructed?
5. What criteria did the Architectural Control Committee use when it formally approved the wall extension, as outlined in CC&R § 7.2?
6. Explain the legal significance of the word “may” in CC&R § 8.1 regarding the homeowners’ association’s enforcement duties.
7. On what grounds was the Petitioner, John Shields, granted a rehearing after the initial decision was issued?
8. During the rehearing, what did the Petitioner clarify was his single, primary complaint against the Respondent?
9. What was the final recommended order in both the initial hearing and the subsequent rehearing?
10. According to the first judge’s decision, what other legal remedy is available to the Petitioner to address his grievance against his neighbor?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties are John Shields (the Petitioner) and the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch homeowners’ association (the Respondent). Mr. Shields is a homeowner and member of the association, and his dispute concerns the association’s handling of a wall built by his next-door neighbor, Joe Johnson.
2. The structure is an approximately 5-foot long by 6-foot high common block wall extension. It was built on or about October 13, 2016, by the Petitioner’s neighbor, Joe Johnson, between their two properties.
3. CC&R § 6.2(A) requires that any alteration to a party wall must have the approval of the adjoining owner(s), if any, as well as the approval of the Architectural Control Committee. Both approvals are necessary.
4. The board was unsure about the Petitioner’s prior approval because at least four witnesses stated they heard the Petitioner either actually approve of the wall or fail to object while Mr. Johnson was discussing plans to build it in his presence. This created a conflict between the Petitioner’s claims and the testimony of others.
5. According to testimony from board member Kristi Hancock, the Committee’s approval was based solely on whether the wall was aesthetically pleasing and consistent with other wall extensions in the development. The Committee’s review under CC&R § 7.2 did not require it to confirm whether the adjoining neighbor had given approval.
6. The first decision concluded that the word “may” in CC&R § 8.1 indicates permissive intent, not a mandatory requirement. This means the association had the discretion, but not the obligation, to bring an enforcement action against Mr. Johnson.
7. A rehearing was granted by Commissioner Judy Lowe because the Petitioner claimed there were errors in the admission or rejection of evidence, other errors of law during the proceeding, and misconduct by the Administrative Law Judge that deprived him of a fair hearing.
8. After some vacillation, the Petitioner firmly asserted during the rehearing that his single issue was that the Respondent had improperly approved Mr. Johnson’s proposal to build the block wall extension and move his gate forward.
9. In both hearings, the recommended order was that no action was required of the Respondent and that the petition should be dismissed.
10. The first decision points out that under CC&R § 8.1, the Petitioner is not without a remedy. This section authorizes an owner, not just the association, to file an action against another owner for an alleged violation of the CC&Rs.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, citing specific facts, testimony, and CC&R provisions from the source documents.
1. Analyze the differing responsibilities of the homeowner (Mr. Johnson), the adjoining neighbor (Mr. Shields), and the homeowners’ association (the Respondent) as outlined in CC&Rs § 6.2(A), § 7.2, and § 8.1. How do these distinct roles and responsibilities intersect and conflict in this case?
2. Compare and contrast the evidence and testimony presented in the first hearing (before ALJ Diane Mihalsky) with the focus of the second hearing (before ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer). How did the Petitioner’s framing of his central argument change between the two proceedings?
3. Discuss the legal standard “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain how the conflicting testimony regarding the Petitioner’s “tacit approval” influenced the Respondent’s decision-making and, ultimately, the Administrative Law Judges’ conclusions.
4. Evaluate the Respondent’s decision-making process regarding the approval of the wall extension. Consider the timeline of events from the wall’s unapproved construction in October 2016 to the formal ratification in January 2017, the conditional verbal approval, and the rationale provided by board members for their actions.
5. The first decision explicitly states that CC&R § 8.1 gives the Petitioner a separate remedy against his neighbor. Based on the information in both documents, construct the legal argument the Petitioner could make in a direct action against Mr. and Mrs. Johnson for their alleged violation of CC&R § 6.2(A).
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, takes evidence, and makes decisions or recommendations on legal and factual issues. In this case, Diane Mihalsky and Tammy L. Eigenheer served as ALJs.
Architectural Control Committee (The Committee)
A body within the homeowners’ association responsible for reviewing and approving or disapproving proposed alterations to properties, such as fences, based on aesthetic and other considerations as outlined in the CC&Rs. In this case, the board itself acted as the Committee.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (The Department)
The state agency with which the Petitioner initially filed his petition concerning violations of planned community documents. The Department then referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated the CC&Rs.
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)
The governing legal documents that set out the rights and obligations of the homeowners’ association and its members. The key sections referenced are 6.2(A), 7.2, and 8.1.
Office of Administrative Hearings
The independent state agency responsible for conducting evidentiary hearings for disputes referred by other state agencies, such as the one between Shields and the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch.
Party Wall
A wall built on the boundary line between two adjoining properties, for the common benefit of both owners. CC&R § 6.2(A) governs the alteration of such walls.
Permissive Intent
A legal interpretation of language, such as the word “may,” which indicates that an action is allowed or discretionary but not required. This was central to the interpretation of CC&R § 8.1.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John Shields is the Petitioner.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this civil administrative case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, making it more probable that a contention is true than not.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case, granted in this instance because the Petitioner alleged errors of law and misconduct by the judge in the first proceeding.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch homeowners’ association is the Respondent.
Tacit Approval
Approval that is implied or inferred from actions or from a failure to state an objection, rather than being explicitly stated. Witnesses claimed the Petitioner gave tacit approval to the wall before it was built.
Blog Post – 17F-H1717034-REL-RHG
4 Surprising Lessons From a Neighbor’s Ugly Wall and the HOA That Did Nothing
Introduction: The Homeowner’s Dilemma
In the world of community governance, the gap between homeowner expectation and contractual reality is a fertile ground for conflict. Most people assume their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) exists to be their first line of defense in a neighbor dispute; when a rule is broken, the HOA is expected to step in. But what happens when the HOA decides to do nothing?
This was the exact situation faced by homeowner John Shields, who was appalled when his neighbor, Joe Johnson, built a block wall extension he considered an eyesore. Mr. Shields turned to his HOA, Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch, expecting them to force its removal. The legal battle that followed provides a fascinating case study, revealing surprising realities about the power and obligations of an HOA. For any homeowner in a planned community, the takeaways are as counter-intuitive as they are crucial.
1. Your HOA Isn’t Obligated to Be Your Enforcer
Mr. Shields’s primary argument rested on a common but often mistaken assumption: that an HOA has a strict mandate to enforce every rule. His logic was straightforward: the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) required his approval for the wall extension. Since he never gave it, he believed the HOA was responsible for forcing his neighbor to tear the wall down.
The court, however, pointed to a different section of the CC&Rs (§ 8.1) which stated that the rules may be enforced by the HOA. This single word was the linchpin of the case. The Administrative Law Judge highlighted the critical legal distinction between a permissive option and a mandatory duty.
“[The] use of the word ‘may’ generally indicates permissive intent . . . while ‘shall’ generally indicates a mandatory provision.”
This gave the HOA discretion on whether to act. Because there was conflicting testimony about whether Mr. Shields had given tacit approval beforehand, the court found that the HOA “did not abuse its discretion by declining to bring an enforcement action.” The lesson is clear: your HOA’s governing documents might grant it the right to enforce rules without creating an obligation to do so in every single case.
2. The HOA’s “Approval” Might Not Mean What You Think
Adding another layer to the conflict, Mr. Johnson submitted plans for the wall and a related gate relocation to the HOA’s Architectural Control Committee after the wall was already built. The Committee ultimately approved it. To Mr. Shields, this seemed like the HOA was siding with his neighbor and ignoring his rights.
But the Committee’s review was far narrower than he assumed. According to CC&R § 7.2, their analysis was limited to whether the wall was “esthetically pleasing and consistent with other wall extensions that had been built in the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch development.” The Committee wasn’t tasked with policing neighbor-to-neighbor agreements.
A formal rehearing—granted after the petitioner alleged “errors of law”—clarified this crucial point. The judge found that under CC&R § 6.2(A), it was Mr. Johnson’s responsibility to get his neighbor’s approval, not the HOA’s. As the decision stated, “Respondent had no obligation under CC&R § 6.2(A) to obtain or ensure Petitioner approved the block wall extension.” This separation of duties is common in governing documents, as it strategically shields the HOA from liability in member disputes while allowing it to maintain aesthetic control over the community.
3. Your Silence Can Be Used Against You
The case devolved into a classic “he said, she said” scenario that ultimately weakened Mr. Shields’s position. He testified that he never approved the wall and, on October 16, 2016—three days after it was built—told his neighbors he disapproved, calling it an “eyesore” that “looked like crap.”
However, other witnesses told a different story. One, Mr. Denardo, testified that Mr. Shields “did not voice any objection” before the wall was constructed and even said it “looked good” immediately after. The neighbor’s wife, Mrs. Johnson, testified that Mr. Shields was present for at least ten discussions about the wall, “had never voiced any disapproval,” and had “sometimes nodded, apparently indicating his approval.”
This conflicting testimony was the direct basis for the board invoking its discretionary power. A board member testified that because of the conflicting accounts, the board “was less sure about whether Petitioner had actually or tacitly approved the block wall extension before it was built.” This uncertainty was the key factor that led them not to intervene. When it comes to property matters, clear, timely, and preferably documented communication is your strongest asset; ambiguity and silence can be interpreted as consent.
4. When the HOA Steps Aside, the Fight Might Be Yours Alone
While the court dismissed the petition against the HOA, it did not leave Mr. Shields without a path forward. The judge pointed to the very same rule that gave the HOA its discretion—CC&R § 8.1—as a source of the homeowner’s power. This rule proved to be a double-edged sword.
The judge’s first decision stated that CC&R § 8.1 “authorizes Petitioner to file an action against Mr. and Mrs. Johnson for their alleged violation of CC&R § 6.2(A).” The same clause that gave the HOA the discretion to step aside also explicitly empowered individual homeowners to act in the HOA’s stead.
When an association chooses to stay out of a member-to-member dispute, the responsibility—and the power—to enforce the community’s rules can fall directly to the affected homeowner. The HOA’s inaction does not mean a rule can’t be enforced; it just means you may have to be the one to do it by bringing a private legal action against your neighbor.
Conclusion: Read Your Fine Print
The story of the ugly wall serves as a powerful reminder that a homeowner’s assumptions about their HOA’s power can be miles apart from the legal reality written into the CC&Rs. This case perfectly illustrates the interplay between an HOA’s discretionary enforcement powers (Lesson 1), its carefully separated procedural duties (Lesson 2), the critical importance of homeowner communication and proof (Lesson 3), and the ultimate empowerment of members to enforce rules themselves (Lesson 4). These documents are not just a list of rules; they are a legal framework that dictates who has the power to act, when they are obligated to do so, and what recourse you have when a conflict arises.
You might know your community’s rules on trash cans and lawn care, but do you know who is truly responsible for enforcing them when a real dispute arises?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John Shields(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Maria R. Kupillas(HOA attorney) Law Offices of Farley Choate & Bergin Represented Respondent Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch
Dean Kabanuk(board president) Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Board Testified for Petitioner via subpoena; elected President Nov 2016
Kristi Hancock(board member/witness) Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Board Served as Vice President (Nov 2016-Nov 2017) and President (since Nov 2017)
Brenda Campbell(community manager) Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Witness for Respondent
A.J. Denardo(witness) Not a member of Respondent; lives near Petitioner
Sandy Johnson(witness/neighbor) Wife of Joe Johnson; Petitioner's next-door neighbor
Joe Johnson(neighbor/homeowner) Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Built the block wall extension in question
Neutral Parties
Diane Mihalsky(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings Issued initial ALJ Decision
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings Issued ALJ Decision following rehearing
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Granted Petitioner's request for rehearing
Bylaws Article VIII Bylaws Article VIII; Bylaws Article IV, Section 1 ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A), (A)(1), and (A)(2)
Outcome Summary
The Petitioner's petition, raising three issues concerning the HOA's election nominating process, was dismissed entirely. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof on all issues. The ALJ found that the Nominating Committee acted within the authority granted by the Bylaws regarding deadlines and nominee selection discretion, and the relevant election statute (A.R.S. § 33-1812) was not applicable to the nomination process.
Key Issues & Findings
Nominating Committee disregarded a September 29, 2017 deadline by which parties were to submit applications to nominate themselves.
Petitioner alleged the Nominating Committee violated Article VIII by accepting applications after the September 29th administrative deadline, arguing the deadline was a 'term[], limitation[], or rule[] adopted by the Board of Directors'.
Orders: The claim was dismissed. The deadline was an administrative deadline set by management, not a rule adopted by the Board, and therefore the Committee did not violate Bylaws Article VIII by accepting applications late.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Bylaws Article VIII
The Nominating Committee exceeded its authority by asking candidates questions that had the effect of imposing qualification requirements for the Board’s Directors that exceed those set out in the Bylaws.
Petitioner alleged that the Committee imposing questions (such as whether an applicant had filed a lawsuit against the Association) created unauthorized qualifications for the Board, violating the Bylaws.
Orders: The claim was dismissed. Bylaws Article IV Section 3 grants the Nominating Committee discretion to determine the number of nominations, and it was not unreasonable for the Committee to question applicants while exercising this explicit discretion.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Bylaws Article VIII
Bylaws Article IV, Section 3
By failing to include on the election-ballot members who had submitted 'self-nominations,' the Committee violated election statutes.
Petitioner asserted that because members could not vote for the four applicants the Nominating Committee did not nominate, the Committee engaged in proxy voting, violating election requirements set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1812.
Orders: The claim was dismissed. Because Bylaws Article IV Section 3 requires nominations to be made by the Nominating Committee, nominations are not 'votes allocated to a unit' and ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812 is not applicable.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A)(1)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A)(2)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Election, Nominating Committee, Bylaws Enforcement, Director Qualifications, Administrative Deadline, Statutory Interpretation, Self-Nomination
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817017-REL Decision – 615818.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:22:17 (125.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817017-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Travis v. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817017-REL, concerning a petition filed by William Travis against The Val Vista Lakes Community Association. The core of the dispute revolves around the actions of the Association’s Nominating Committee during the process for the November 16, 2017 Board of Directors election.
Mr. Travis raised three primary allegations: 1) the Committee violated Association Bylaws by accepting candidate applications after a stated September 29, 2017 deadline; 2) the Committee exceeded its authority by interviewing candidates, thereby imposing qualification requirements beyond those stipulated in the Bylaws; and 3) the failure to include all applicants on the ballot constituted a violation of Arizona state statutes related to proxy voting.
The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, dismissed Mr. Travis’s petition in its entirety. The decision found that Travis failed to prove the application deadline was a formal rule adopted by the Board, concluding it was an administrative deadline set by the management company. The Judge determined that the Committee’s actions, including interviewing applicants, were a reasonable exercise of the discretion explicitly granted to it by the Bylaws. Finally, the Judge ruled that the state statute cited by Travis applies to the casting of votes, not the internal nomination process, and was therefore inapplicable to the Committee’s actions. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association was deemed the prevailing party.
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Case Overview
Case Number
18F-H1817017-REL
Petitioner
William Travis
Respondent
The Val Vista Lakes Community Association
Hearing Date
January 26, 2018
Decision Date
February 2, 2018
Presiding Judge
Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
Testifying Parties
William Travis (on his own behalf); Simone McGinnis (Association’s on-site manager)
Petitioner’s Allegations
William Travis’s petition, as amended, centered on three specific issues concerning the Nominating Committee’s conduct for the November 16, 2017 Board election:
1. Violation of Application Deadline: The Committee disregarded a September 29, 2017 deadline for candidate applications. Travis contended that this deadline was a “term, limitation, or rule adopted by the Board,” and by accepting applications after this date, the Committee violated Bylaws Article VIII.
2. Exceeding Authority and Imposing Qualifications: The Committee exceeded its authority by interviewing and questioning applicants. Travis argued that this process had the effect of creating new qualification requirements for Board Directors, beyond the sole requirement of Association membership outlined in Bylaws Article IV. He asserted the Committee had no authority to ask any questions.
3. Statutory Violation of Voting Rights: By failing to place all members who submitted “self-nominations” on the official election ballot, the Committee violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A). Travis claimed this action was tantamount to proxy voting because it prevented members from voting for or against certain candidates.
Key Factual Findings
Election and Nomination Timeline
• August 17, 2017: The Board of Directors appoints Cheryl Peterson-McCoy as the Nominating Committee Chairperson.
• September 12, 2017: The Association’s management company emails residents, announcing three open Board positions and an application deadline of September 29, 2017, at 5:00 p.m.
• By September 29, 2017: Four applications are received. At this point, the members of the Nominating Committee (other than the Chairperson) have not yet been selected.
• After September 29, 2017: The Association accepts four additional applications, including one from Mr. Travis. No revised notice is sent to the membership about an extended deadline.
• October 5, 2017: Mr. Travis, then a Board member, makes an email motion to extend the application deadline to October 16, which is denied.
• October 19, 2017: The Board formally approves six members for the Nominating Committee. Mr. Travis’s subsequent motion at this meeting to extend the deadline fails for lack of a second.
Nominating Committee Actions and Rationale
• The Committee considered all eight applications submitted, including the four received after the initial deadline.
• The Committee scheduled and conducted interviews with all eight applicants.
• During interviews, applicants were asked questions including whether they had ever filed a lawsuit against the Association, were considering filing a lawsuit, or had any compliance violations.
• The Committee ultimately nominated four candidates to be placed on the ballot for the election. Of these four, two had applied by the September 29 deadline and two had applied after.
Association’s Position and Testimony
• Simone McGinnis, the Association’s on-site manager, testified that the September 29 deadline was not imposed by the Board but was an administrative deadline set by the management company to allow time for the nomination and ballot-printing process.
• The Association’s position, articulated at the November 16, 2017 Board meeting, is that the only way to get on the ballot is to be nominated by the Nominating Committee, although write-in candidates are permitted during the election.
• The Board acknowledged that it had only strictly adhered to the Bylaw requirement of using a Nominating Committee for the past two years, after thirty years of non-adherence.
• The Board’s attorney stated that the Committee members have a duty to act reasonably and that any member who disagrees with the Committee’s discretionary choices should seek to amend the bylaws.
Analysis of Governing Documents and Statutes
The judge’s decision rested on the interpretation of specific articles within the Association’s Bylaws and relevant Arizona state law.
Document/Statute
Relevant Provision
Application in this Case
Bylaws Article IV, Section 3
“Nominations for election to the Board of Directors shall be made by a Nominating Committee… The Nominating Committee shall make as many nominations… as it shall in its discretion determine…”
This article grants the Committee explicit discretion to select nominees. It does not provide for “self-nomination” or require the Committee to nominate all applicants.
Bylaws Article VIII
“no committee may take action which exceeds its responsibilities. Each committee shall operate in accordance with any terms, limitations, or rules adopted by the Board.”
Mr. Travis argued the deadline was a “rule adopted by the Board.” The court found no evidence to support this, concluding it was an administrative deadline.
Bylaws Article IV, Section 1
States that Board Directors must be members of the Association. It lists no other qualifications.
Mr. Travis argued that questioning candidates imposed extra qualifications. The court found this was part of the Committee’s discretionary selection process, not the imposition of new formal requirements.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812
Prohibits proxy voting and requires that ballots set forth each proposed action and provide an opportunity to vote for or against it.
The court determined this statute applies to “votes allocated to a unit” (i.e., the member’s vote) and not the nomination process itself, which is governed by the Bylaws.
Conclusions of Law and Final Order
The Administrative Law Judge made the following conclusions based on a preponderance of the evidence:
1. Deadline was Administrative: There was no substantial evidence showing the September 29, 2017 deadline was a formal rule adopted by the Board. Therefore, the Nominating Committee did not violate Bylaws Article VIII by accepting applications after this date.
2. Committee Acted Within its Discretion: The plain language of Bylaws Article IV, Section 3 requires nominations to be made by the Committee and grants it discretion. The concept of “self-nomination” is not supported by the Bylaws. It was not unreasonable for the Committee to question applicants as part of exercising its explicit discretion to select nominees.
3. State Voting Statute Not Applicable: The nomination process, as dictated by the Bylaws, is separate from the act of voting. Since ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812 governs “votes allocated to a unit,” it is not applicable to the Committee’s function of selecting nominees.
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner William Travis’s petition is dismissed.
The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested from the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817017-REL
Study Guide: Travis v. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source context.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in case number 18F-H1817017-REL, and what were their roles?
2. What were the three central issues that petitioner William Travis raised regarding the Board election held on November 16, 2017?
3. What was the petitioner’s argument concerning the September 29, 2017, application deadline set by the Association?
4. According to the Association’s on-site manager, Simone McGinnis, what was the origin and purpose of the September 29th deadline?
5. How did the petitioner claim the Nominating Committee exceeded its authority by questioning candidates?
6. What was the Association’s defense for the Nominating Committee’s practice of interviewing and questioning applicants?
7. What is the sole qualification required to serve on the Board of Directors, according to the Val Vista Lakes Community Association Bylaws?
8. How did the petitioner link the Nominating Committee’s failure to place all applicants on the ballot to a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812?
9. According to testimony during the November 16, 2017, Board meeting, how long had the Association been strictly adhering to the Bylaw requirement of using a Nominating Committee?
10. What was the final Order issued by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden in this case?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, William Travis, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, The Val Vista Lakes Community Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Travis represented himself, while the Association was represented by attorneys Mark K. Sahl and Nicholas C. Nogami.
2. The three issues raised by Mr. Travis were: (1) the Nominating Committee improperly disregarded the September 29th application deadline; (2) the Committee exceeded its authority by asking questions that effectively added new qualification requirements for Board members; and (3) the Committee’s failure to include all “self-nominations” on the ballot constituted a violation of Arizona state statutes on proxy voting.
3. Mr. Travis argued that the September 29th deadline was a “term, limitation, or rule adopted by the Board of Directors” under Bylaws Article VIII. Therefore, by accepting applications after this date, the Nominating Committee violated the Association’s own rules.
4. Simone McGinnis testified that the Board did not impose the deadline. Instead, it was an administrative deadline set by the Association’s management company to allow sufficient time for the Nominating Committee to review applications and have ballots printed.
5. Mr. Travis argued that by asking applicants questions, the Nominating Committee was effectively imposing qualification requirements beyond the single one set out in the Bylaws (being a member of the Association). He asserted the committee had no authority to ask any questions at all as part of its process.
6. The Association contended that questioning applicants was a reasonable exercise of the Nominating Committee’s discretion. This discretion is granted by the Bylaws, which state the Committee shall make as many nominations as it determines is appropriate.
7. According to Bylaws Article IV, Section 1, the only qualification required for an individual to serve on the Board of Directors is that they must be a member of the Association. No other qualifications are specified in the Bylaws.
8. Mr. Travis asserted that because members were not allowed to vote for or against the four applicants who were not nominated, the Committee effectively engaged in proxy voting. He argued this violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812, which requires that ballots provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.
9. During the meeting, the Board acknowledged that it had only been following the Bylaw requirement to use a Nominating Committee for the last two years. Prior to that, for approximately thirty years, strict adherence to this Bylaw had not been observed.
10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Petitioner William Travis’s petition be dismissed. The Judge also deemed the Respondent, The Val Vista Lakes Community Association, to be the prevailing party in the matter.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt using only the information and arguments presented in the source document.
1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the Nominating Committee’s role and authority as presented by William Travis and the Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge use the plain language of Bylaws Article IV, Section 3 to resolve this dispute?
2. Discuss the significance of the September 29, 2017 deadline. Evaluate the evidence and arguments presented by both parties regarding its legitimacy and binding nature, and explain the Judge’s reasoning for concluding it was an administrative deadline.
3. Explain William Travis’s legal argument that the Nominating Committee’s selection process constituted a form of proxy voting in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812. Detail the Judge’s conclusion on this matter and the legal reasoning used to determine the statute’s applicability.
4. Examine the concept of “discretion” as it applies to the Nominating Committee’s actions. Based on the hearing testimony, including the Board attorney’s explanation, what are the implied powers and limitations of this discretion?
5. The Judge determined that Mr. Travis failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Identify the key claims made by Mr. Travis and detail why the evidence he presented (or failed to present) was insufficient to prove his case on each of the three issues.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal findings and decisions.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the petitioner was William Travis.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this matter, the respondent was The Val Vista Lakes Community Association.
Bylaws
The formal rules and regulations governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners’ association. They are considered a contract between the association and its members.
An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are rules governing the use of real estate within a planned community. Mr. Travis initially alleged a violation of CC&R Article V, Section 3.
Nominating Committee
A committee, established by the Bylaws, responsible for nominating candidates for election to the Board of Directors. It consists of a Chairperson from the Board and two or more other persons.
Self-Nomination
The act of a member putting their own name forward for consideration for a Board position. The petitioner acknowledged that the Bylaws do not explicitly provide for self-nomination.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the burden of proof was on Mr. Travis.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case. It means the evidence presented is more convincing and has superior evidentiary weight than the evidence offered in opposition, inclining an impartial mind to one side over the other.
Proxy Voting
A form of voting where a member authorizes another person to vote on their behalf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812 prohibits this practice for community associations after the period of declarant control.
Prevailing Party
The party that wins the lawsuit. In this case, the Respondent Association was deemed the prevailing party upon the dismissal of the petition.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817017-REL
Your HOA Bylaws Might Not Mean What You Think: 3 Surprising Lessons from a Legal Showdown
Introduction: The Devil in the Details
Anyone who has ever sat through a contentious HOA annual meeting or received a violation notice for an overgrown flowerbed knows the feeling. You live in a community governed by rules, and you assume those rules operate on a shared understanding of common sense. But what happens when that common sense collides with the cold, hard text of your community’s governing documents?
A recent administrative law case in Arizona, Travis vs. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association, provides a fascinating and instructive look under the hood of HOA governance. The dispute reveals how the precise, technical wording of community bylaws can lead to surprising and counter-intuitive outcomes for residents. This case isn’t just about one community; it’s a masterclass for any homeowner. Here are the three most impactful lessons from the legal showdown.
1. A Deadline Isn’t Always a Deadline
The first major complaint from the petitioner, Mr. Travis, seemed straightforward. For an election with three open seats on the Board of Directors, the HOA’s Nominating Committee had accepted applications after a publicly announced deadline of 5:00 p.m. on September 29, 2017. Four applications arrived on time, but four more—including one from Mr. Travis himself—were accepted after the cutoff. In a delicious twist of irony, Mr. Travis was a sitting Board member who had twice attempted to have the Board formally extend the deadline, but both motions failed. A missed deadline is a missed deadline, right?
Not in this case. The judge dismissed the complaint entirely, drawing a critical distinction: the September 29th deadline was not a formal “term, limitation, or rule adopted by the Board.”
Testimony from the Association’s manager, Simone McGinnis, revealed the deadline’s true nature. It was merely an administrative deadline set by the management company for purely logistical reasons, such as allowing the Nominating Committee enough time to review applications and get the ballots printed.
The Lesson: In legal and governance contexts, the source of a rule is as important as the rule itself. An administrative guideline set by a third-party manager for convenience does not carry the same binding legal weight as a formal rule passed by the Board of Directors according to the procedures outlined in the bylaws.
2. “Nomination” Is a Process of Selection, Not Just Collection
Mr. Travis’s second argument centered on the Nominating Committee’s actions. The committee interviewed all eight applicants and asked them questions, including whether they had ever sued the Association or had any compliance violations. Mr. Travis contended that the committee had exceeded its authority. In fact, he argued that because four members had applied by the original deadline for the three open seats, the committee’s job was already done—it shouldn’t have even been formed, let alone vetted anyone. His position was that its role was simply to collect names, not to filter them.
This argument also failed. The judge found the committee acted squarely within its rights as defined by the Association’s Bylaws. Article IV, Section 3 explicitly grants the Nominating Committee the discretion to “make as many nominations for election to the Board of Directors as it shall in its discretion determine.” The judge concluded that questioning applicants was a reasonable part of exercising this discretion to select candidates.
Adding a fascinating historical twist, the Board admitted during a meeting that for thirty years prior, the Association had not strictly followed its own Bylaw requiring the use of a Nominating Committee, only beginning to do so in the last two years. A long-ignored rule had suddenly become the central mechanism for determining board candidacy.
While the committee must act reasonably—it couldn’t disqualify a candidate for having red hair, the Board’s attorney noted—it absolutely has the power to be selective. The core issue decided by the court was not how the committee used its discretion, but whether the Bylaws granted it discretion in the first place. The answer was a clear yes.
The Lesson: The term “Nominating Committee” can be misleading. Depending on your bylaws, it may not be a passive paper-pusher that forwards all names to the ballot. It can be an active gatekeeper empowered to interview, question, and ultimately select which members get a chance to be elected.
3. The ‘Right’ to Run for Your HOA Board Might Be a Myth
The final issue gets to the heart of homeowner assumptions. Mr. Travis argued for a right to “self-nominate”—his term for a system where any member could place themselves directly on the ballot. He claimed that by failing to include all applicants, the Association was engaging in a form of illegal proxy voting under Arizona state law.
The judge’s refutation of this idea was decisive. Mr. Travis himself acknowledged that the Bylaws contained no provision allowing a member to “self-nominate.” The court found that the only path to the ballot specified in the governing documents was via nomination by the Nominating Committee.
This created a critical procedural prerequisite. Because the Bylaws require nomination by the committee before a member can become a candidate, the state law governing voting (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812) was legally inapplicable. The judge ruled that the act of nomination is not a “vote allocated to a unit.” In other words, if you don’t clear the prerequisite of being nominated, your right to be voted upon by the membership doesn’t even come into play.
The Lesson: This is a powerful and potentially shocking takeaway for many homeowners. Unless your community’s governing documents explicitly guarantee it, you may not have an inherent “right” to run for your HOA board simply by being a member in good standing. The power to decide who appears on the ballot can be exclusively vested in a small, appointed committee.
Conclusion: Read Your Bylaws. Really.
The case of Mr. Travis vs. Val Vista Lakes is a stark reminder that an HOA’s governing documents are a binding contract. In the courtroom of community governance, common-sense assumptions are legally irrelevant; only the written word matters. An administrative deadline may be toothless, a nominating committee may be a powerful gatekeeper, and the right to run for office may not be a right at all.
It all comes down to what is written in the documents. So, when was the last time you read your community’s governing documents from start to finish? The power structures they define might be very different from what you imagine.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
William Travis(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Mark K. Sahl(respondent attorney) Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
Nicholas C. Nogami(respondent attorney) Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
Simone McGinnis(property manager) Testified as a witness
Bylaws Article VIII Bylaws Article VIII; Bylaws Article IV, Section 1 ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A), (A)(1), and (A)(2)
Outcome Summary
The Petitioner's petition, raising three issues concerning the HOA's election nominating process, was dismissed entirely. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof on all issues. The ALJ found that the Nominating Committee acted within the authority granted by the Bylaws regarding deadlines and nominee selection discretion, and the relevant election statute (A.R.S. § 33-1812) was not applicable to the nomination process.
Key Issues & Findings
Nominating Committee disregarded a September 29, 2017 deadline by which parties were to submit applications to nominate themselves.
Petitioner alleged the Nominating Committee violated Article VIII by accepting applications after the September 29th administrative deadline, arguing the deadline was a 'term[], limitation[], or rule[] adopted by the Board of Directors'.
Orders: The claim was dismissed. The deadline was an administrative deadline set by management, not a rule adopted by the Board, and therefore the Committee did not violate Bylaws Article VIII by accepting applications late.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Bylaws Article VIII
The Nominating Committee exceeded its authority by asking candidates questions that had the effect of imposing qualification requirements for the Board’s Directors that exceed those set out in the Bylaws.
Petitioner alleged that the Committee imposing questions (such as whether an applicant had filed a lawsuit against the Association) created unauthorized qualifications for the Board, violating the Bylaws.
Orders: The claim was dismissed. Bylaws Article IV Section 3 grants the Nominating Committee discretion to determine the number of nominations, and it was not unreasonable for the Committee to question applicants while exercising this explicit discretion.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Bylaws Article VIII
Bylaws Article IV, Section 3
By failing to include on the election-ballot members who had submitted 'self-nominations,' the Committee violated election statutes.
Petitioner asserted that because members could not vote for the four applicants the Nominating Committee did not nominate, the Committee engaged in proxy voting, violating election requirements set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1812.
Orders: The claim was dismissed. Because Bylaws Article IV Section 3 requires nominations to be made by the Nominating Committee, nominations are not 'votes allocated to a unit' and ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812 is not applicable.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A)(1)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A)(2)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Election, Nominating Committee, Bylaws Enforcement, Director Qualifications, Administrative Deadline, Statutory Interpretation, Self-Nomination
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817017-REL Decision – 615818.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:12 (125.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817017-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Travis v. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817017-REL, concerning a petition filed by William Travis against The Val Vista Lakes Community Association. The core of the dispute revolves around the actions of the Association’s Nominating Committee during the process for the November 16, 2017 Board of Directors election.
Mr. Travis raised three primary allegations: 1) the Committee violated Association Bylaws by accepting candidate applications after a stated September 29, 2017 deadline; 2) the Committee exceeded its authority by interviewing candidates, thereby imposing qualification requirements beyond those stipulated in the Bylaws; and 3) the failure to include all applicants on the ballot constituted a violation of Arizona state statutes related to proxy voting.
The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, dismissed Mr. Travis’s petition in its entirety. The decision found that Travis failed to prove the application deadline was a formal rule adopted by the Board, concluding it was an administrative deadline set by the management company. The Judge determined that the Committee’s actions, including interviewing applicants, were a reasonable exercise of the discretion explicitly granted to it by the Bylaws. Finally, the Judge ruled that the state statute cited by Travis applies to the casting of votes, not the internal nomination process, and was therefore inapplicable to the Committee’s actions. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association was deemed the prevailing party.
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Case Overview
Case Number
18F-H1817017-REL
Petitioner
William Travis
Respondent
The Val Vista Lakes Community Association
Hearing Date
January 26, 2018
Decision Date
February 2, 2018
Presiding Judge
Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
Testifying Parties
William Travis (on his own behalf); Simone McGinnis (Association’s on-site manager)
Petitioner’s Allegations
William Travis’s petition, as amended, centered on three specific issues concerning the Nominating Committee’s conduct for the November 16, 2017 Board election:
1. Violation of Application Deadline: The Committee disregarded a September 29, 2017 deadline for candidate applications. Travis contended that this deadline was a “term, limitation, or rule adopted by the Board,” and by accepting applications after this date, the Committee violated Bylaws Article VIII.
2. Exceeding Authority and Imposing Qualifications: The Committee exceeded its authority by interviewing and questioning applicants. Travis argued that this process had the effect of creating new qualification requirements for Board Directors, beyond the sole requirement of Association membership outlined in Bylaws Article IV. He asserted the Committee had no authority to ask any questions.
3. Statutory Violation of Voting Rights: By failing to place all members who submitted “self-nominations” on the official election ballot, the Committee violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A). Travis claimed this action was tantamount to proxy voting because it prevented members from voting for or against certain candidates.
Key Factual Findings
Election and Nomination Timeline
• August 17, 2017: The Board of Directors appoints Cheryl Peterson-McCoy as the Nominating Committee Chairperson.
• September 12, 2017: The Association’s management company emails residents, announcing three open Board positions and an application deadline of September 29, 2017, at 5:00 p.m.
• By September 29, 2017: Four applications are received. At this point, the members of the Nominating Committee (other than the Chairperson) have not yet been selected.
• After September 29, 2017: The Association accepts four additional applications, including one from Mr. Travis. No revised notice is sent to the membership about an extended deadline.
• October 5, 2017: Mr. Travis, then a Board member, makes an email motion to extend the application deadline to October 16, which is denied.
• October 19, 2017: The Board formally approves six members for the Nominating Committee. Mr. Travis’s subsequent motion at this meeting to extend the deadline fails for lack of a second.
Nominating Committee Actions and Rationale
• The Committee considered all eight applications submitted, including the four received after the initial deadline.
• The Committee scheduled and conducted interviews with all eight applicants.
• During interviews, applicants were asked questions including whether they had ever filed a lawsuit against the Association, were considering filing a lawsuit, or had any compliance violations.
• The Committee ultimately nominated four candidates to be placed on the ballot for the election. Of these four, two had applied by the September 29 deadline and two had applied after.
Association’s Position and Testimony
• Simone McGinnis, the Association’s on-site manager, testified that the September 29 deadline was not imposed by the Board but was an administrative deadline set by the management company to allow time for the nomination and ballot-printing process.
• The Association’s position, articulated at the November 16, 2017 Board meeting, is that the only way to get on the ballot is to be nominated by the Nominating Committee, although write-in candidates are permitted during the election.
• The Board acknowledged that it had only strictly adhered to the Bylaw requirement of using a Nominating Committee for the past two years, after thirty years of non-adherence.
• The Board’s attorney stated that the Committee members have a duty to act reasonably and that any member who disagrees with the Committee’s discretionary choices should seek to amend the bylaws.
Analysis of Governing Documents and Statutes
The judge’s decision rested on the interpretation of specific articles within the Association’s Bylaws and relevant Arizona state law.
Document/Statute
Relevant Provision
Application in this Case
Bylaws Article IV, Section 3
“Nominations for election to the Board of Directors shall be made by a Nominating Committee… The Nominating Committee shall make as many nominations… as it shall in its discretion determine…”
This article grants the Committee explicit discretion to select nominees. It does not provide for “self-nomination” or require the Committee to nominate all applicants.
Bylaws Article VIII
“no committee may take action which exceeds its responsibilities. Each committee shall operate in accordance with any terms, limitations, or rules adopted by the Board.”
Mr. Travis argued the deadline was a “rule adopted by the Board.” The court found no evidence to support this, concluding it was an administrative deadline.
Bylaws Article IV, Section 1
States that Board Directors must be members of the Association. It lists no other qualifications.
Mr. Travis argued that questioning candidates imposed extra qualifications. The court found this was part of the Committee’s discretionary selection process, not the imposition of new formal requirements.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812
Prohibits proxy voting and requires that ballots set forth each proposed action and provide an opportunity to vote for or against it.
The court determined this statute applies to “votes allocated to a unit” (i.e., the member’s vote) and not the nomination process itself, which is governed by the Bylaws.
Conclusions of Law and Final Order
The Administrative Law Judge made the following conclusions based on a preponderance of the evidence:
1. Deadline was Administrative: There was no substantial evidence showing the September 29, 2017 deadline was a formal rule adopted by the Board. Therefore, the Nominating Committee did not violate Bylaws Article VIII by accepting applications after this date.
2. Committee Acted Within its Discretion: The plain language of Bylaws Article IV, Section 3 requires nominations to be made by the Committee and grants it discretion. The concept of “self-nomination” is not supported by the Bylaws. It was not unreasonable for the Committee to question applicants as part of exercising its explicit discretion to select nominees.
3. State Voting Statute Not Applicable: The nomination process, as dictated by the Bylaws, is separate from the act of voting. Since ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812 governs “votes allocated to a unit,” it is not applicable to the Committee’s function of selecting nominees.
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner William Travis’s petition is dismissed.
The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested from the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817017-REL
Study Guide: Travis v. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source context.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in case number 18F-H1817017-REL, and what were their roles?
2. What were the three central issues that petitioner William Travis raised regarding the Board election held on November 16, 2017?
3. What was the petitioner’s argument concerning the September 29, 2017, application deadline set by the Association?
4. According to the Association’s on-site manager, Simone McGinnis, what was the origin and purpose of the September 29th deadline?
5. How did the petitioner claim the Nominating Committee exceeded its authority by questioning candidates?
6. What was the Association’s defense for the Nominating Committee’s practice of interviewing and questioning applicants?
7. What is the sole qualification required to serve on the Board of Directors, according to the Val Vista Lakes Community Association Bylaws?
8. How did the petitioner link the Nominating Committee’s failure to place all applicants on the ballot to a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812?
9. According to testimony during the November 16, 2017, Board meeting, how long had the Association been strictly adhering to the Bylaw requirement of using a Nominating Committee?
10. What was the final Order issued by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden in this case?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, William Travis, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, The Val Vista Lakes Community Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Travis represented himself, while the Association was represented by attorneys Mark K. Sahl and Nicholas C. Nogami.
2. The three issues raised by Mr. Travis were: (1) the Nominating Committee improperly disregarded the September 29th application deadline; (2) the Committee exceeded its authority by asking questions that effectively added new qualification requirements for Board members; and (3) the Committee’s failure to include all “self-nominations” on the ballot constituted a violation of Arizona state statutes on proxy voting.
3. Mr. Travis argued that the September 29th deadline was a “term, limitation, or rule adopted by the Board of Directors” under Bylaws Article VIII. Therefore, by accepting applications after this date, the Nominating Committee violated the Association’s own rules.
4. Simone McGinnis testified that the Board did not impose the deadline. Instead, it was an administrative deadline set by the Association’s management company to allow sufficient time for the Nominating Committee to review applications and have ballots printed.
5. Mr. Travis argued that by asking applicants questions, the Nominating Committee was effectively imposing qualification requirements beyond the single one set out in the Bylaws (being a member of the Association). He asserted the committee had no authority to ask any questions at all as part of its process.
6. The Association contended that questioning applicants was a reasonable exercise of the Nominating Committee’s discretion. This discretion is granted by the Bylaws, which state the Committee shall make as many nominations as it determines is appropriate.
7. According to Bylaws Article IV, Section 1, the only qualification required for an individual to serve on the Board of Directors is that they must be a member of the Association. No other qualifications are specified in the Bylaws.
8. Mr. Travis asserted that because members were not allowed to vote for or against the four applicants who were not nominated, the Committee effectively engaged in proxy voting. He argued this violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812, which requires that ballots provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.
9. During the meeting, the Board acknowledged that it had only been following the Bylaw requirement to use a Nominating Committee for the last two years. Prior to that, for approximately thirty years, strict adherence to this Bylaw had not been observed.
10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Petitioner William Travis’s petition be dismissed. The Judge also deemed the Respondent, The Val Vista Lakes Community Association, to be the prevailing party in the matter.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt using only the information and arguments presented in the source document.
1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the Nominating Committee’s role and authority as presented by William Travis and the Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge use the plain language of Bylaws Article IV, Section 3 to resolve this dispute?
2. Discuss the significance of the September 29, 2017 deadline. Evaluate the evidence and arguments presented by both parties regarding its legitimacy and binding nature, and explain the Judge’s reasoning for concluding it was an administrative deadline.
3. Explain William Travis’s legal argument that the Nominating Committee’s selection process constituted a form of proxy voting in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812. Detail the Judge’s conclusion on this matter and the legal reasoning used to determine the statute’s applicability.
4. Examine the concept of “discretion” as it applies to the Nominating Committee’s actions. Based on the hearing testimony, including the Board attorney’s explanation, what are the implied powers and limitations of this discretion?
5. The Judge determined that Mr. Travis failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Identify the key claims made by Mr. Travis and detail why the evidence he presented (or failed to present) was insufficient to prove his case on each of the three issues.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal findings and decisions.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the petitioner was William Travis.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this matter, the respondent was The Val Vista Lakes Community Association.
Bylaws
The formal rules and regulations governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners’ association. They are considered a contract between the association and its members.
An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are rules governing the use of real estate within a planned community. Mr. Travis initially alleged a violation of CC&R Article V, Section 3.
Nominating Committee
A committee, established by the Bylaws, responsible for nominating candidates for election to the Board of Directors. It consists of a Chairperson from the Board and two or more other persons.
Self-Nomination
The act of a member putting their own name forward for consideration for a Board position. The petitioner acknowledged that the Bylaws do not explicitly provide for self-nomination.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the burden of proof was on Mr. Travis.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case. It means the evidence presented is more convincing and has superior evidentiary weight than the evidence offered in opposition, inclining an impartial mind to one side over the other.
Proxy Voting
A form of voting where a member authorizes another person to vote on their behalf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812 prohibits this practice for community associations after the period of declarant control.
Prevailing Party
The party that wins the lawsuit. In this case, the Respondent Association was deemed the prevailing party upon the dismissal of the petition.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817017-REL
Your HOA Bylaws Might Not Mean What You Think: 3 Surprising Lessons from a Legal Showdown
Introduction: The Devil in the Details
Anyone who has ever sat through a contentious HOA annual meeting or received a violation notice for an overgrown flowerbed knows the feeling. You live in a community governed by rules, and you assume those rules operate on a shared understanding of common sense. But what happens when that common sense collides with the cold, hard text of your community’s governing documents?
A recent administrative law case in Arizona, Travis vs. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association, provides a fascinating and instructive look under the hood of HOA governance. The dispute reveals how the precise, technical wording of community bylaws can lead to surprising and counter-intuitive outcomes for residents. This case isn’t just about one community; it’s a masterclass for any homeowner. Here are the three most impactful lessons from the legal showdown.
1. A Deadline Isn’t Always a Deadline
The first major complaint from the petitioner, Mr. Travis, seemed straightforward. For an election with three open seats on the Board of Directors, the HOA’s Nominating Committee had accepted applications after a publicly announced deadline of 5:00 p.m. on September 29, 2017. Four applications arrived on time, but four more—including one from Mr. Travis himself—were accepted after the cutoff. In a delicious twist of irony, Mr. Travis was a sitting Board member who had twice attempted to have the Board formally extend the deadline, but both motions failed. A missed deadline is a missed deadline, right?
Not in this case. The judge dismissed the complaint entirely, drawing a critical distinction: the September 29th deadline was not a formal “term, limitation, or rule adopted by the Board.”
Testimony from the Association’s manager, Simone McGinnis, revealed the deadline’s true nature. It was merely an administrative deadline set by the management company for purely logistical reasons, such as allowing the Nominating Committee enough time to review applications and get the ballots printed.
The Lesson: In legal and governance contexts, the source of a rule is as important as the rule itself. An administrative guideline set by a third-party manager for convenience does not carry the same binding legal weight as a formal rule passed by the Board of Directors according to the procedures outlined in the bylaws.
2. “Nomination” Is a Process of Selection, Not Just Collection
Mr. Travis’s second argument centered on the Nominating Committee’s actions. The committee interviewed all eight applicants and asked them questions, including whether they had ever sued the Association or had any compliance violations. Mr. Travis contended that the committee had exceeded its authority. In fact, he argued that because four members had applied by the original deadline for the three open seats, the committee’s job was already done—it shouldn’t have even been formed, let alone vetted anyone. His position was that its role was simply to collect names, not to filter them.
This argument also failed. The judge found the committee acted squarely within its rights as defined by the Association’s Bylaws. Article IV, Section 3 explicitly grants the Nominating Committee the discretion to “make as many nominations for election to the Board of Directors as it shall in its discretion determine.” The judge concluded that questioning applicants was a reasonable part of exercising this discretion to select candidates.
Adding a fascinating historical twist, the Board admitted during a meeting that for thirty years prior, the Association had not strictly followed its own Bylaw requiring the use of a Nominating Committee, only beginning to do so in the last two years. A long-ignored rule had suddenly become the central mechanism for determining board candidacy.
While the committee must act reasonably—it couldn’t disqualify a candidate for having red hair, the Board’s attorney noted—it absolutely has the power to be selective. The core issue decided by the court was not how the committee used its discretion, but whether the Bylaws granted it discretion in the first place. The answer was a clear yes.
The Lesson: The term “Nominating Committee” can be misleading. Depending on your bylaws, it may not be a passive paper-pusher that forwards all names to the ballot. It can be an active gatekeeper empowered to interview, question, and ultimately select which members get a chance to be elected.
3. The ‘Right’ to Run for Your HOA Board Might Be a Myth
The final issue gets to the heart of homeowner assumptions. Mr. Travis argued for a right to “self-nominate”—his term for a system where any member could place themselves directly on the ballot. He claimed that by failing to include all applicants, the Association was engaging in a form of illegal proxy voting under Arizona state law.
The judge’s refutation of this idea was decisive. Mr. Travis himself acknowledged that the Bylaws contained no provision allowing a member to “self-nominate.” The court found that the only path to the ballot specified in the governing documents was via nomination by the Nominating Committee.
This created a critical procedural prerequisite. Because the Bylaws require nomination by the committee before a member can become a candidate, the state law governing voting (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812) was legally inapplicable. The judge ruled that the act of nomination is not a “vote allocated to a unit.” In other words, if you don’t clear the prerequisite of being nominated, your right to be voted upon by the membership doesn’t even come into play.
The Lesson: This is a powerful and potentially shocking takeaway for many homeowners. Unless your community’s governing documents explicitly guarantee it, you may not have an inherent “right” to run for your HOA board simply by being a member in good standing. The power to decide who appears on the ballot can be exclusively vested in a small, appointed committee.
Conclusion: Read Your Bylaws. Really.
The case of Mr. Travis vs. Val Vista Lakes is a stark reminder that an HOA’s governing documents are a binding contract. In the courtroom of community governance, common-sense assumptions are legally irrelevant; only the written word matters. An administrative deadline may be toothless, a nominating committee may be a powerful gatekeeper, and the right to run for office may not be a right at all.
It all comes down to what is written in the documents. So, when was the last time you read your community’s governing documents from start to finish? The power structures they define might be very different from what you imagine.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
William Travis(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Mark K. Sahl(respondent attorney) Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
Nicholas C. Nogami(respondent attorney) Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
Simone McGinnis(property manager) Testified as a witness
CC&Rs Section III (d) and (m) CC&Rs Section VI (6.02, 6.03, 6.04, 6.05)
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's petition entirely. The HOA did not violate CC&Rs regarding road maintenance or abuse its discretion in enforcement against Lot 77.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to establish that the Respondent violated its planned community documents.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether the Respondent has maintained the roadway Sundance Lane properly
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated CC&Rs by failing to properly maintain Sundance Lane. Respondent countered that limited funds necessitated prioritizing roads for full-time residents, but Sundance Lane was accessible.
Whether Respondent has taken appropriate action against the owner of lot 77 in as much as that property allegedly resembles a junk yard
Petitioner alleged Lot 77 violated CC&Rs due to excessive storage and inoperable vehicles. Respondent showed it monitors the property, has written letters, and the owner has previously complied with HOA and County cleanup efforts.
Orders: Complaint regarding enforcement against Lot 77 dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
CC&Rs Section VI
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817016-REL Decision – 613995.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:22:06 (200.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817016-REL
Briefing: Stedronsky v. Copper Canyon Ranches POA
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817016-REL, involving Petitioner Thomas J. Stedronsky and Respondent Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (POA). The Petitioner filed a two-issue petition alleging the POA violated its Covenants, Easements, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by failing to properly maintain a roadway, Sundance Lane, and by failing to take appropriate action against a neighboring property, Lot 77, which allegedly resembled a junkyard.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Diane Mihalsky, denied the petition in its entirety. The decision found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof for both allegations. Regarding road maintenance, the ALJ concluded the POA acted within its reasonable discretion by prioritizing its limited funds ($35,000-$40,000 annually for 20 miles of roads) to maintain roadways used by the community’s approximately 35 full-time residents. Despite the poor condition of the northern section of Sundance Lane, the Petitioner’s lot remained accessible via a passenger car from the south.
Concerning Lot 77, the ALJ determined that the Petitioner did not establish a persistent violation of the CC&Rs. The evidence showed the POA had previously addressed complaints with the lot owner, who had been responsive. Furthermore, the alleged violations were largely located behind the required property buffer zone and were not easily visible from the Petitioner’s property without a telephoto lens. The decision suggests the Petitioner’s long-standing complaints were primarily motivated by his inability to sell his topographically challenging and undeveloped property.
Case Details
Case Information
Details
Case Number
18F-H1817016-REL
Petitioner
Thomas J. Stedronsky (Owner of Lot 76)
Respondent
Copper Canyon Ranches POA
Adjudicating Body
Office of Administrative Hearings, State of Arizona
Presiding Judge
Diane Mihalsky, Administrative Law Judge
Hearing Date
January 10, 2018
Decision Date
January 24, 2018
Final Order
The Petitioner’s petition was denied.
Core Issues
1. Whether the Respondent properly maintained the roadway Sundance Lane. 2. Whether the Respondent took appropriate action against the owner of Lot 77.
Detailed Analysis of Allegations
Allegation 1: Improper Roadway Maintenance of Sundance Lane
The Petitioner alleged that the POA failed to maintain Sundance Lane in accordance with the CC&Rs, particularly the northern section providing access to his Lot 76.
• Photographic Evidence: The Petitioner submitted photographs from September 2017 comparing well-maintained roads like Black Peak Parkway and Copper Hills Road with the poor condition of the northern portion of Sundance Lane near his property. These photos depicted the northern section as a “barely visible road running along the side of a steep hillside that is overgrown with vegetation and has a large number of large boulders.”
• Accessibility Issues: The Petitioner testified that in September 2017, he needed to rent a four-wheel drive truck to access his lot from the northeast via an unnamed road connecting to Sundance Lane.
• Plat Reference: The Petitioner submitted an undated and unsigned preliminary plat that stated “Roadbed 8” Native Gravel Fill Compacted to 95% Maximum Density,” but acknowledged this did not constitute an enforceable requirement for the POA.
• Admission of Access: The Petitioner acknowledged that his lot was usually accessible via passenger car from the southern end of Sundance Lane, where it connects with Black Peak Parkway.
• Testimony of Joe Wilson (POA President):
◦ Road Characteristics: Mr. Wilson described Sundance Lane as an “old two-track mining road from the 1940’s or 1950’s that has never been engineered that is too steep to be a perfect road.” He noted the northern part was rough but not impassable with four-wheel drive.
◦ Maintenance Schedule: The POA blades every roadway, including Sundance Lane, at least twice a year. Sundance Lane was bladed in September 2017 and December 2017. More intensive dozer work is sometimes performed on the worst roads.
◦ Prioritization of Resources: The POA board prioritizes maintenance on roads needed by the approximately 35 full-time residents to access their parcels. With an annual budget of only $35,000 to $40,000 to maintain 20 miles of roads, funds are used to better maintain the most traveled roadways.
◦ Financial Constraints: Blading all roads costs $15,000 to $20,000 per year. Paving all 20 miles would cost millions of dollars, requiring a prohibitive assessment of approximately $50,000 per parcel to raise just $1 million.
◦ Access Confirmation: Mr. Wilson testified that the resident of Lot 77 accesses his property from the south on Sundance Lane, and the Petitioner could access his lot from the south at any time. There are no residences that require access from the north side of Sundance Lane.
• Photographic Evidence: The POA submitted photos from December 2017 and January 9, 2018, showing Sundance Lane graded, passable, and cleared of vegetation following maintenance.
• Section III (d): Grants the POA authority to “Grade and maintain the roadways as needed, provide for proper drainage of roadways, install culverts where necessary.”
• Section III (m): Requires the POA to “maintain, care for, and otherwise manage the roadways…in as good condition (deterioration loss by damage due to environmental occurrences which cannot be reasonabl[y] avoided or insured against excepted)[.]”
• Section III (b): Authorizes acts “necessary, in the reasonable discretion of the Members, for the betterment of the Property and for the general benefit and welfare of the owners.”
Allegation 2: Failure to Enforce CC&Rs against Lot 77
The Petitioner alleged the POA failed to take appropriate action against the owner of neighboring Lot 77, Jerry Hamlin, for violations including inoperable vehicles and junk, creating a nuisance.
• Photographic Evidence: The Petitioner submitted photos of Lot 77 taken in September 2017, many with a telephoto lens. These photos showed multiple vehicles (some with hoods up), a backhoe, a trailer, and vehicle parts. Notations on the photos claimed vehicles were inoperable and had been sitting for years, though this was not apparent from the images themselves.
• Potential for Nuisance: The Petitioner testified to his belief that vehicles might be leaking oil and other fluids, potentially polluting the groundwater. He acknowledged he had no direct proof as he was unwilling to trespass.
• History of Complaints: The Petitioner acknowledged filing numerous complaints about Lot 77 with both the POA and Gila County over many years.
• Testimony of Joe Wilson (POA President):
◦ Enforcement Actions Taken: The POA has written letters to Mr. Hamlin in response to complaints, and Mr. Hamlin has removed vehicles and cleaned up the lot in the past.
◦ Owner’s Responsiveness: Mr. Hamlin has previously cooperated with the POA and Gila County. However, he expressed frustration with being “hassled” by the Petitioner’s continuing complaints after taking remedial action.
◦ Gila County Dismissal: A complaint filed by the Gila County Community Development Division against Mr. Hamlin was dismissed on November 6, 2013, after an inspector determined the property was “no longer in violation of Gila County Zoning Ordinances.”
◦ Condition of Vehicles: Mr. Hamlin stated to Mr. Wilson that all vehicles on the property were operable. Mr. Wilson noted that in rural areas, vehicle hoods are often left open to prevent vermin from nesting in the engine.
◦ Strategic Enforcement: The POA prefers not to take a “heavy hand” with Mr. Hamlin, as he is the “sort of man who would dig in his heels,” potentially leading to costly litigation that would deplete funds for road maintenance.
◦ Limited Enforcement Power: The POA’s primary enforcement mechanisms are writing letters and, after three failures to comply, liening the property.
• Photographic Evidence: The POA submitted recent photos showing the area was cleaner (a tire seen in the Petitioner’s photo had been removed) and that, from a distance without a telephoto lens, there were no apparent CC&R violations.
• 6.03 Storage: Allows up to 5% of a parcel for unenclosed storage, provided it is neat, orderly, and maintained at least 100 feet from the nearest property line.
• 6.04 Inoperable Vehicles and Equipment: Prohibits the repair or storage of more than one unregistered, inoperable motor vehicle within property boundaries.
• 6.05 Hazardous Materials and Nuisances: Prohibits storage of hazardous materials in a way that constitutes a fire hazard or nuisance.
Underlying Context: Petitioner’s Motivation and Property Challenges
The hearing evidence strongly suggests the Petitioner’s complaints were linked to his long-term inability to sell his unimproved 15-acre parcel, Lot 76.
• History of Complaints: The Petitioner sent numerous letters to the POA between 2012 and 2017, explicitly stating that the condition of Sundance Lane and the “junk on Lot 77” were preventing him from selling the property. A 2009 letter complained about the amount of the annual assessment due to his fixed income.
• POA’s Perspective: A September 27, 2017, letter from the POA to the Petitioner stated: “You have been complaining to the POA since 2009 about your inability to sell your property. … You sir are the only one blaming the POA and your neighbors for your inability to sell an undesirable property.”
• Property Characteristics: The Petitioner’s Lot 76 is located at the top of a steep, rocky hill. The POA President testified that it would be “difficult to build” on the lot, as it has “no level place on which to construct a building pad” and would require a “significant amount of bulldozer work.”
• Development Plans: While the Petitioner stated he would like to build a house, he had never planned construction dates or performed a percolation test. His proposed building site was located as close as possible to Lot 77’s garage.
Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order
The ALJ denied the petition, finding the Petitioner failed to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Regarding Sundance Lane: The ALJ concluded that the POA did not abuse its discretion. Its decision to prioritize maintenance on roads used by full-time residents was deemed reasonable given its limited financial resources. The fact that Lot 76 remained accessible via passenger car from the southern end of Sundance Lane was a key factor.
• Regarding Lot 77: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that there was more than one inoperable vehicle on Lot 77 or that other violations were more than a “transitory condition.” The decision notes that the POA monitors the lot and that the owner is “generally responsive.” Crucially, the ALJ found that the vehicles and storage on Lot 77 “occur behind the buffer zone and are not easily visible from Petitioner’s Lot 76 without binoculars or a telephoto lens.”
The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. This order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817016-REL
Study Guide: Case No. 18F-H1817016-REL
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Thomas J. Stedronsky (Petitioner) vs. Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (Respondent). It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, arguments, and legal conclusions presented in the hearing.
Case Summary
The case involves a dispute between a property owner, Thomas J. Stedronsky, and the Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (POA). Mr. Stedronsky, who owns the unimproved Lot 76, filed a petition alleging the POA violated its Covenants, Easements, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The hearing, held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky, focused on two primary issues: whether the POA properly maintained a roadway known as Sundance Lane, and whether the POA took appropriate action against the owner of the adjacent Lot 77, which was alleged to resemble a junkyard. The Judge ultimately denied the Petitioner’s petition on both counts.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their roles?
2. What were the two specific issues adjudicated at the January 10, 2018 hearing?
3. Describe the financial situation of the Copper Canyon Ranches POA as detailed in the hearing evidence.
4. What was the Petitioner’s specific complaint regarding the condition of Sundance Lane, and what evidence did he provide?
5. How did the Respondent, through its president Joe Wilson, defend its maintenance practices for Sundance Lane?
6. What were the Petitioner’s allegations against the owner of Lot 77, and what specific CC&R sections were potentially violated?
7. What actions had the Respondent and Gila County previously taken regarding complaints about Lot 77?
8. According to the legal conclusions, what is the standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and did he succeed?
9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude that the Respondent did not abuse its discretion in its road maintenance practices?
10. On what grounds was the Petitioner’s complaint regarding Lot 77 dismissed?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Thomas J. Stedronsky, the “Petitioner,” and the Copper Canyon Ranches POA, the “Respondent.” The Petitioner owned Lot 76 in the development and filed the complaint, while the Respondent was the property owners’ association responsible for maintaining the community and enforcing its rules.
2. The two issues were: 1) Whether the Respondent had properly maintained the roadway known as Sundance Lane, and 2) Whether the Respondent had taken appropriate action against the owner of Lot 77, which the Petitioner alleged resembled a junkyard.
3. The POA receives between $35,000 and $40,000 annually from assessments of $250 per parcel. It costs the POA between $15,000 and $20,000 per year just to blade the 20 miles of roadways twice, with additional costs for culverts, backfill, and drainage ditches.
4. The Petitioner complained that the northern portion of Sundance Lane, which provides one access route to his Lot 76, was barely visible, overgrown, and required a four-wheel drive vehicle. He provided photographs taken in September 2017 showing this condition, contrasting them with photos of better-maintained roads in the development.
5. Joe Wilson testified that Sundance Lane is an old, steep mining road that is difficult to maintain perfectly. He stated that the POA blades every road, including Sundance Lane, at least twice a year and prioritizes maintenance on roads used by full-time residents due to limited funds. He also provided evidence that Lot 76 was always accessible from the southern portion of Sundance Lane.
6. The Petitioner alleged that Lot 77 was used for storage of inoperable vehicles and junk, resembling a junkyard. The relevant CC&Rs included Section 6.02 (Trash Removal), 6.03 (Storage), 6.04 (Inoperable Vehicles and Equipment), and 6.05 (Hazardous Materials and Nuisances).
7. In response to past complaints, the Respondent had written letters to the owner of Lot 77, Mr. Hamlin, who subsequently removed vehicles. Gila County also pursued a code enforcement action against Mr. Hamlin, which was dismissed in November 2013 after the property was determined to no longer be in violation of county ordinances.
8. The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that a contention is more probably true than not. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden for either of his complaints.
9. The Judge concluded the Respondent did not abuse its discretion because it reasonably prioritized maintaining roads used by full-time residents given its limited financial resources. The decision noted that it would be an “absurdity” to expect perfect maintenance on all 20 miles of dirt roads and that the Petitioner’s lot remained accessible via the southern end of Sundance Lane.
10. The complaint was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to establish there was more than one inoperable vehicle on Lot 77 or that other issues were more than a transitory condition. The Judge found that the Respondent did monitor the lot, that the owner was generally responsive to requests, and that the items in question were behind the CC&R-required buffer zone and not easily visible from the Petitioner’s property.
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Essay Questions
Based on the source document, formulate a comprehensive response to the following prompts. Do not provide answers.
1. Analyze the concept of “reasonable discretion” as it applies to the Copper Canyon Ranches POA’s duties under the CC&Rs. How did the POA’s financial limitations and the physical characteristics of the development influence the Judge’s interpretation of this standard?
2. Evaluate the photographic evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding the conditions of Sundance Lane and Lot 77. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s visual evidence, including the use of different lenses and the timing of the photographs.
3. Discuss the challenges of enforcing CC&Rs in a large, rural community like Copper Canyon Ranches. Using the dispute over Lot 77 as a case study, explain the enforcement mechanisms available to the POA and the strategic reasons a board might choose not to pursue enforcement with a “heavy hand.”
4. Examine the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” Explain how this burden of proof was applied to both of the Petitioner’s claims and detail the specific evidence (or lack thereof) that led the Judge to rule that the Petitioner had not met this standard.
5. Synthesize the evidence presented in the “Petitioner’s Efforts to Sell or Plans to Improve Lot 76” section. What does this evidence suggest about the Petitioner’s underlying motivations for filing the petition against the POA, and how did the Respondent use this history of complaints in its defense?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition within the Context of the Document
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official, in this case Diane Mihalsky, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes decisions on petitions.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party (in this case, the Petitioner) to establish their claims by a preponderance of the evidence.
Covenants, Easements, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents for the Copper Canyon Ranches community, stating they should be construed to protect the value and attractiveness of the property. They outline the POA’s powers and members’ obligations.
Copper Canyon Ranches
A rural development north of Globe, Arizona, consisting of 194 large, multi-acre parcels. It is the planned community governed by the Respondent POA.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
An independent state agency in Arizona that conducts evidentiary hearings for petitions referred to it by other state bodies, such as the Department of Real Estate.
Petitioner
The party who filed the petition, Thomas J. Stedronsky. He is the owner of Lot 76 and a member of the Respondent association.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair mind to one side of an issue rather than the other.
Respondent
The party against whom the petition was filed, the Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (POA).
Roadways
Defined in the CC&Rs as all roads and rights-of-way that the Association owns or is obligated to maintain within the development.
Use Restrictions
A section (Section VI) of the CC&Rs that outlines rules for property owners regarding trash removal, storage of items, inoperable vehicles, and hazardous materials.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817016-REL
We Read a 14-Page HOA Lawsuit So You Don’t Have To. Here Are 4 Surprising Lessons.
Introduction: The Dream of a Rural Escape Meets Reality
For many homeowners, a letter from their Homeowners Association (HOA) or Property Owners’ Association (POA) is a source of instant frustration. It often feels like a one-sided relationship governed by arbitrary rules. But what happens when a homeowner decides they’ve had enough and takes their association to court?
The story of Thomas Stedronsky offers a fascinating glimpse into this exact scenario. In 2003, he purchased a 15-acre unimproved lot in a rugged, rural Arizona development called Copper Canyon Ranches, likely dreaming of a quiet escape. Crucially, he never built on the property and does not reside there. Over the years, that dream soured, leading him to sue his Property Owners’ Association over a “barely visible” road and a neighbor’s property that he claimed resembled a “junkyard.” The official court decision reveals several surprising and counter-intuitive lessons for any current or future homeowner.
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1. Your HOA Doesn’t Have to Be Perfect, Just “Reasonable”
One of Mr. Stedronsky’s core complaints was that Sundance Lane, the road leading to his remote lot, was in terrible condition. His photos showed a path that was overgrown, rocky, and barely visible. Meanwhile, he argued, other main roads in the development were wide and well-maintained. His argument was clear: the POA was failing in its duty. But the POA’s defense was grounded in the harsh realities of the terrain. The president testified that Sundance Lane wasn’t just any road; it was an “old two-track mining road from the 1940’s or 1950’s that has never been engineered that is too steep to be a perfect road.”
This historical context was bolstered by financial reality. The POA operated on a limited annual budget of only $35,000 to $40,000, which had to cover the maintenance of 20 miles of roadways. The board president testified that they made a strategic decision to prioritize maintenance on the roads used daily by the community’s approximately 35 full-time residents.
Ultimately, the judge ruled in favor of the POA. The court found that the association did not abuse its discretion. Prioritizing road maintenance based on usage and a limited budget was deemed a reasonable action. The key takeaway for homeowners is powerful: an HOA isn’t legally obligated to maintain every amenity to the same perfect standard, especially when faced with financial constraints. Their actions only need to be “reasonable.”
2. The “Rural Reality” Can Override Suburban Rules
Mr. Stedronsky’s second major complaint centered on his neighbor’s property, Lot 77, which he alleged was a junkyard filled with inoperable vehicles and clutter, violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). To prove his point, he submitted photographic evidence taken with a telephoto lens. However, the credibility of his evidence was undermined when the court noted he had added his own notations to the photos—such as “All vehicles have been sitting for years”—which “were not apparent in the photograph.”
More importantly, the judge’s perspective was heavily influenced by the setting. In its final conclusion, the court officially determined that because Copper Canyon Ranches consists of large parcels in a remote area, “The CC&Rs also contemplate that parcel owners will have vehicles and other stored items on their parcels, as is common in remote rural areas.”
This point was brought to life by the colorful testimony of the POA president, Mr. Wilson. He explained that in rural areas, it’s common practice to leave vehicle hoods open. Why? To prevent mice and rats from nesting inside the engines. What looks like a clear violation in a manicured suburb is often standard, practical procedure in a rural development. This case shows that homeowner expectations—and an HOA’s enforcement standards—must adapt to the local context and culture.
3. Sometimes, an HOA’s Best Move IsNotto Enforce a Rule
Behind every HOA violation notice is a decision-making process, and this case pulls back the curtain on the strategic thinking involved. The POA president testified that they had, in fact, written letters to the owner of Lot 77, Mr. Hamlin, in the past and that he was “generally responsive.” However, they were hesitant to take a “heavy hand” with him, characterizing him as “the sort of man who would dig in his heels.”
The president’s testimony reveals a fascinating look into the pragmatic balancing act an HOA board must perform. He explained the board’s strategic calculation:
If Mr. Hamlin is pushed beyond the point where Lot 77 needs to be in compliance with the zoning code and CC&Rs, he will resist and Respondent will incur litigation costs that will decrease the amount of money available for road maintenance.
This is a crucial lesson in community governance. The board made a calculated decision that avoiding a costly and protracted legal battle with one resident was more beneficial for the community as a whole than strictly enforcing every rule to the letter. It was a choice between pursuing a single violation and preserving the limited funds needed for essential services for everyone.
4. An Unsellable Property Can Fuel a Losing Battle
While the lawsuit focused on roads and junkyards, the court documents reveal a deeper, underlying motivation. Mr. Stedronsky’s complaints were not new; they started as far back as 2009 and were often linked in his letters to his “inability to sell his property.” His frustration was made more tangible by the fact that he had informed the POA in 2013 that the lot was under contract for sale, a deal that apparently fell through.
From the POA’s perspective, the problem wasn’t the road or the neighbor—it was the lot itself. The board president described Lot 76 as “undesirable” because it was steep, rocky, and would require a significant amount of bulldozer work just to create a level place to build.
After years of complaints, the POA president sent a blunt and revealing letter to Mr. Stedronsky that was included as evidence in the case:
“You have been complaining to the POA since 2009 about your inability to sell your property. Many properties have been unable to sell due to Rural Rugged area. You sir are the only one blaming the POA and your neighbors for your inability to sell an undesirable property. The POA has done its due diligence in this matter. Please cease complaints to the POA on this matter.”
While Mr. Stedronsky’s frustration was evident, the judge ultimately found that he failed to meet the burden of proof for his claims. The case was dismissed. This serves as a powerful reminder that feeling wronged, even for years, is not enough to win a legal dispute.
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Conclusion: A Lesson in Pragmatism
The case of Lot 76 is a powerful story about the gap between homeowner expectations and the messy, pragmatic reality of community governance. It demonstrates that an association’s decisions are often a complex calculation involving limited budgets, local norms, and strategic risk management.
It reminds us that boards are not faceless corporations but groups of neighbors tasked with making difficult choices for the collective good. The next time you disagree with your HOA, will you see them as an adversary, or as a group of neighbors managing limited resources with “reasonable discretion”?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Thomas J Stedronsky(petitioner) Appeared and testified on his own behalf
Respondent Side
John S. Perlman(attorney) Copper Canyon Ranches POA
Joe Wilson(board president, witness) Copper Canyon Ranches POA Testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Diane Mihalsky(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of the decision
Other Participants
Jerry Hamlin(property owner) Lot 77 Subject of CC&R enforcement action
Helen Hamlin(property owner) Lot 77 Named in Gila County enforcement action related to Lot 77
CC&Rs Section III (d) and (m) CC&Rs Section VI (6.02, 6.03, 6.04, 6.05)
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's petition entirely. The HOA did not violate CC&Rs regarding road maintenance or abuse its discretion in enforcement against Lot 77.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to establish that the Respondent violated its planned community documents.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether the Respondent has maintained the roadway Sundance Lane properly
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated CC&Rs by failing to properly maintain Sundance Lane. Respondent countered that limited funds necessitated prioritizing roads for full-time residents, but Sundance Lane was accessible.
Whether Respondent has taken appropriate action against the owner of lot 77 in as much as that property allegedly resembles a junk yard
Petitioner alleged Lot 77 violated CC&Rs due to excessive storage and inoperable vehicles. Respondent showed it monitors the property, has written letters, and the owner has previously complied with HOA and County cleanup efforts.
Orders: Complaint regarding enforcement against Lot 77 dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
CC&Rs Section VI
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817016-REL Decision – 613995.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:09 (200.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817016-REL
Briefing: Stedronsky v. Copper Canyon Ranches POA
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817016-REL, involving Petitioner Thomas J. Stedronsky and Respondent Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (POA). The Petitioner filed a two-issue petition alleging the POA violated its Covenants, Easements, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by failing to properly maintain a roadway, Sundance Lane, and by failing to take appropriate action against a neighboring property, Lot 77, which allegedly resembled a junkyard.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Diane Mihalsky, denied the petition in its entirety. The decision found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof for both allegations. Regarding road maintenance, the ALJ concluded the POA acted within its reasonable discretion by prioritizing its limited funds ($35,000-$40,000 annually for 20 miles of roads) to maintain roadways used by the community’s approximately 35 full-time residents. Despite the poor condition of the northern section of Sundance Lane, the Petitioner’s lot remained accessible via a passenger car from the south.
Concerning Lot 77, the ALJ determined that the Petitioner did not establish a persistent violation of the CC&Rs. The evidence showed the POA had previously addressed complaints with the lot owner, who had been responsive. Furthermore, the alleged violations were largely located behind the required property buffer zone and were not easily visible from the Petitioner’s property without a telephoto lens. The decision suggests the Petitioner’s long-standing complaints were primarily motivated by his inability to sell his topographically challenging and undeveloped property.
Case Details
Case Information
Details
Case Number
18F-H1817016-REL
Petitioner
Thomas J. Stedronsky (Owner of Lot 76)
Respondent
Copper Canyon Ranches POA
Adjudicating Body
Office of Administrative Hearings, State of Arizona
Presiding Judge
Diane Mihalsky, Administrative Law Judge
Hearing Date
January 10, 2018
Decision Date
January 24, 2018
Final Order
The Petitioner’s petition was denied.
Core Issues
1. Whether the Respondent properly maintained the roadway Sundance Lane. 2. Whether the Respondent took appropriate action against the owner of Lot 77.
Detailed Analysis of Allegations
Allegation 1: Improper Roadway Maintenance of Sundance Lane
The Petitioner alleged that the POA failed to maintain Sundance Lane in accordance with the CC&Rs, particularly the northern section providing access to his Lot 76.
• Photographic Evidence: The Petitioner submitted photographs from September 2017 comparing well-maintained roads like Black Peak Parkway and Copper Hills Road with the poor condition of the northern portion of Sundance Lane near his property. These photos depicted the northern section as a “barely visible road running along the side of a steep hillside that is overgrown with vegetation and has a large number of large boulders.”
• Accessibility Issues: The Petitioner testified that in September 2017, he needed to rent a four-wheel drive truck to access his lot from the northeast via an unnamed road connecting to Sundance Lane.
• Plat Reference: The Petitioner submitted an undated and unsigned preliminary plat that stated “Roadbed 8” Native Gravel Fill Compacted to 95% Maximum Density,” but acknowledged this did not constitute an enforceable requirement for the POA.
• Admission of Access: The Petitioner acknowledged that his lot was usually accessible via passenger car from the southern end of Sundance Lane, where it connects with Black Peak Parkway.
• Testimony of Joe Wilson (POA President):
◦ Road Characteristics: Mr. Wilson described Sundance Lane as an “old two-track mining road from the 1940’s or 1950’s that has never been engineered that is too steep to be a perfect road.” He noted the northern part was rough but not impassable with four-wheel drive.
◦ Maintenance Schedule: The POA blades every roadway, including Sundance Lane, at least twice a year. Sundance Lane was bladed in September 2017 and December 2017. More intensive dozer work is sometimes performed on the worst roads.
◦ Prioritization of Resources: The POA board prioritizes maintenance on roads needed by the approximately 35 full-time residents to access their parcels. With an annual budget of only $35,000 to $40,000 to maintain 20 miles of roads, funds are used to better maintain the most traveled roadways.
◦ Financial Constraints: Blading all roads costs $15,000 to $20,000 per year. Paving all 20 miles would cost millions of dollars, requiring a prohibitive assessment of approximately $50,000 per parcel to raise just $1 million.
◦ Access Confirmation: Mr. Wilson testified that the resident of Lot 77 accesses his property from the south on Sundance Lane, and the Petitioner could access his lot from the south at any time. There are no residences that require access from the north side of Sundance Lane.
• Photographic Evidence: The POA submitted photos from December 2017 and January 9, 2018, showing Sundance Lane graded, passable, and cleared of vegetation following maintenance.
• Section III (d): Grants the POA authority to “Grade and maintain the roadways as needed, provide for proper drainage of roadways, install culverts where necessary.”
• Section III (m): Requires the POA to “maintain, care for, and otherwise manage the roadways…in as good condition (deterioration loss by damage due to environmental occurrences which cannot be reasonabl[y] avoided or insured against excepted)[.]”
• Section III (b): Authorizes acts “necessary, in the reasonable discretion of the Members, for the betterment of the Property and for the general benefit and welfare of the owners.”
Allegation 2: Failure to Enforce CC&Rs against Lot 77
The Petitioner alleged the POA failed to take appropriate action against the owner of neighboring Lot 77, Jerry Hamlin, for violations including inoperable vehicles and junk, creating a nuisance.
• Photographic Evidence: The Petitioner submitted photos of Lot 77 taken in September 2017, many with a telephoto lens. These photos showed multiple vehicles (some with hoods up), a backhoe, a trailer, and vehicle parts. Notations on the photos claimed vehicles were inoperable and had been sitting for years, though this was not apparent from the images themselves.
• Potential for Nuisance: The Petitioner testified to his belief that vehicles might be leaking oil and other fluids, potentially polluting the groundwater. He acknowledged he had no direct proof as he was unwilling to trespass.
• History of Complaints: The Petitioner acknowledged filing numerous complaints about Lot 77 with both the POA and Gila County over many years.
• Testimony of Joe Wilson (POA President):
◦ Enforcement Actions Taken: The POA has written letters to Mr. Hamlin in response to complaints, and Mr. Hamlin has removed vehicles and cleaned up the lot in the past.
◦ Owner’s Responsiveness: Mr. Hamlin has previously cooperated with the POA and Gila County. However, he expressed frustration with being “hassled” by the Petitioner’s continuing complaints after taking remedial action.
◦ Gila County Dismissal: A complaint filed by the Gila County Community Development Division against Mr. Hamlin was dismissed on November 6, 2013, after an inspector determined the property was “no longer in violation of Gila County Zoning Ordinances.”
◦ Condition of Vehicles: Mr. Hamlin stated to Mr. Wilson that all vehicles on the property were operable. Mr. Wilson noted that in rural areas, vehicle hoods are often left open to prevent vermin from nesting in the engine.
◦ Strategic Enforcement: The POA prefers not to take a “heavy hand” with Mr. Hamlin, as he is the “sort of man who would dig in his heels,” potentially leading to costly litigation that would deplete funds for road maintenance.
◦ Limited Enforcement Power: The POA’s primary enforcement mechanisms are writing letters and, after three failures to comply, liening the property.
• Photographic Evidence: The POA submitted recent photos showing the area was cleaner (a tire seen in the Petitioner’s photo had been removed) and that, from a distance without a telephoto lens, there were no apparent CC&R violations.
• 6.03 Storage: Allows up to 5% of a parcel for unenclosed storage, provided it is neat, orderly, and maintained at least 100 feet from the nearest property line.
• 6.04 Inoperable Vehicles and Equipment: Prohibits the repair or storage of more than one unregistered, inoperable motor vehicle within property boundaries.
• 6.05 Hazardous Materials and Nuisances: Prohibits storage of hazardous materials in a way that constitutes a fire hazard or nuisance.
Underlying Context: Petitioner’s Motivation and Property Challenges
The hearing evidence strongly suggests the Petitioner’s complaints were linked to his long-term inability to sell his unimproved 15-acre parcel, Lot 76.
• History of Complaints: The Petitioner sent numerous letters to the POA between 2012 and 2017, explicitly stating that the condition of Sundance Lane and the “junk on Lot 77” were preventing him from selling the property. A 2009 letter complained about the amount of the annual assessment due to his fixed income.
• POA’s Perspective: A September 27, 2017, letter from the POA to the Petitioner stated: “You have been complaining to the POA since 2009 about your inability to sell your property. … You sir are the only one blaming the POA and your neighbors for your inability to sell an undesirable property.”
• Property Characteristics: The Petitioner’s Lot 76 is located at the top of a steep, rocky hill. The POA President testified that it would be “difficult to build” on the lot, as it has “no level place on which to construct a building pad” and would require a “significant amount of bulldozer work.”
• Development Plans: While the Petitioner stated he would like to build a house, he had never planned construction dates or performed a percolation test. His proposed building site was located as close as possible to Lot 77’s garage.
Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order
The ALJ denied the petition, finding the Petitioner failed to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Regarding Sundance Lane: The ALJ concluded that the POA did not abuse its discretion. Its decision to prioritize maintenance on roads used by full-time residents was deemed reasonable given its limited financial resources. The fact that Lot 76 remained accessible via passenger car from the southern end of Sundance Lane was a key factor.
• Regarding Lot 77: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that there was more than one inoperable vehicle on Lot 77 or that other violations were more than a “transitory condition.” The decision notes that the POA monitors the lot and that the owner is “generally responsive.” Crucially, the ALJ found that the vehicles and storage on Lot 77 “occur behind the buffer zone and are not easily visible from Petitioner’s Lot 76 without binoculars or a telephoto lens.”
The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. This order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817016-REL
Study Guide: Case No. 18F-H1817016-REL
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Thomas J. Stedronsky (Petitioner) vs. Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (Respondent). It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, arguments, and legal conclusions presented in the hearing.
Case Summary
The case involves a dispute between a property owner, Thomas J. Stedronsky, and the Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (POA). Mr. Stedronsky, who owns the unimproved Lot 76, filed a petition alleging the POA violated its Covenants, Easements, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The hearing, held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky, focused on two primary issues: whether the POA properly maintained a roadway known as Sundance Lane, and whether the POA took appropriate action against the owner of the adjacent Lot 77, which was alleged to resemble a junkyard. The Judge ultimately denied the Petitioner’s petition on both counts.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their roles?
2. What were the two specific issues adjudicated at the January 10, 2018 hearing?
3. Describe the financial situation of the Copper Canyon Ranches POA as detailed in the hearing evidence.
4. What was the Petitioner’s specific complaint regarding the condition of Sundance Lane, and what evidence did he provide?
5. How did the Respondent, through its president Joe Wilson, defend its maintenance practices for Sundance Lane?
6. What were the Petitioner’s allegations against the owner of Lot 77, and what specific CC&R sections were potentially violated?
7. What actions had the Respondent and Gila County previously taken regarding complaints about Lot 77?
8. According to the legal conclusions, what is the standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and did he succeed?
9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude that the Respondent did not abuse its discretion in its road maintenance practices?
10. On what grounds was the Petitioner’s complaint regarding Lot 77 dismissed?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Thomas J. Stedronsky, the “Petitioner,” and the Copper Canyon Ranches POA, the “Respondent.” The Petitioner owned Lot 76 in the development and filed the complaint, while the Respondent was the property owners’ association responsible for maintaining the community and enforcing its rules.
2. The two issues were: 1) Whether the Respondent had properly maintained the roadway known as Sundance Lane, and 2) Whether the Respondent had taken appropriate action against the owner of Lot 77, which the Petitioner alleged resembled a junkyard.
3. The POA receives between $35,000 and $40,000 annually from assessments of $250 per parcel. It costs the POA between $15,000 and $20,000 per year just to blade the 20 miles of roadways twice, with additional costs for culverts, backfill, and drainage ditches.
4. The Petitioner complained that the northern portion of Sundance Lane, which provides one access route to his Lot 76, was barely visible, overgrown, and required a four-wheel drive vehicle. He provided photographs taken in September 2017 showing this condition, contrasting them with photos of better-maintained roads in the development.
5. Joe Wilson testified that Sundance Lane is an old, steep mining road that is difficult to maintain perfectly. He stated that the POA blades every road, including Sundance Lane, at least twice a year and prioritizes maintenance on roads used by full-time residents due to limited funds. He also provided evidence that Lot 76 was always accessible from the southern portion of Sundance Lane.
6. The Petitioner alleged that Lot 77 was used for storage of inoperable vehicles and junk, resembling a junkyard. The relevant CC&Rs included Section 6.02 (Trash Removal), 6.03 (Storage), 6.04 (Inoperable Vehicles and Equipment), and 6.05 (Hazardous Materials and Nuisances).
7. In response to past complaints, the Respondent had written letters to the owner of Lot 77, Mr. Hamlin, who subsequently removed vehicles. Gila County also pursued a code enforcement action against Mr. Hamlin, which was dismissed in November 2013 after the property was determined to no longer be in violation of county ordinances.
8. The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that a contention is more probably true than not. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden for either of his complaints.
9. The Judge concluded the Respondent did not abuse its discretion because it reasonably prioritized maintaining roads used by full-time residents given its limited financial resources. The decision noted that it would be an “absurdity” to expect perfect maintenance on all 20 miles of dirt roads and that the Petitioner’s lot remained accessible via the southern end of Sundance Lane.
10. The complaint was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to establish there was more than one inoperable vehicle on Lot 77 or that other issues were more than a transitory condition. The Judge found that the Respondent did monitor the lot, that the owner was generally responsive to requests, and that the items in question were behind the CC&R-required buffer zone and not easily visible from the Petitioner’s property.
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Essay Questions
Based on the source document, formulate a comprehensive response to the following prompts. Do not provide answers.
1. Analyze the concept of “reasonable discretion” as it applies to the Copper Canyon Ranches POA’s duties under the CC&Rs. How did the POA’s financial limitations and the physical characteristics of the development influence the Judge’s interpretation of this standard?
2. Evaluate the photographic evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding the conditions of Sundance Lane and Lot 77. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s visual evidence, including the use of different lenses and the timing of the photographs.
3. Discuss the challenges of enforcing CC&Rs in a large, rural community like Copper Canyon Ranches. Using the dispute over Lot 77 as a case study, explain the enforcement mechanisms available to the POA and the strategic reasons a board might choose not to pursue enforcement with a “heavy hand.”
4. Examine the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” Explain how this burden of proof was applied to both of the Petitioner’s claims and detail the specific evidence (or lack thereof) that led the Judge to rule that the Petitioner had not met this standard.
5. Synthesize the evidence presented in the “Petitioner’s Efforts to Sell or Plans to Improve Lot 76” section. What does this evidence suggest about the Petitioner’s underlying motivations for filing the petition against the POA, and how did the Respondent use this history of complaints in its defense?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition within the Context of the Document
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official, in this case Diane Mihalsky, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes decisions on petitions.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party (in this case, the Petitioner) to establish their claims by a preponderance of the evidence.
Covenants, Easements, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents for the Copper Canyon Ranches community, stating they should be construed to protect the value and attractiveness of the property. They outline the POA’s powers and members’ obligations.
Copper Canyon Ranches
A rural development north of Globe, Arizona, consisting of 194 large, multi-acre parcels. It is the planned community governed by the Respondent POA.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
An independent state agency in Arizona that conducts evidentiary hearings for petitions referred to it by other state bodies, such as the Department of Real Estate.
Petitioner
The party who filed the petition, Thomas J. Stedronsky. He is the owner of Lot 76 and a member of the Respondent association.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair mind to one side of an issue rather than the other.
Respondent
The party against whom the petition was filed, the Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (POA).
Roadways
Defined in the CC&Rs as all roads and rights-of-way that the Association owns or is obligated to maintain within the development.
Use Restrictions
A section (Section VI) of the CC&Rs that outlines rules for property owners regarding trash removal, storage of items, inoperable vehicles, and hazardous materials.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817016-REL
We Read a 14-Page HOA Lawsuit So You Don’t Have To. Here Are 4 Surprising Lessons.
Introduction: The Dream of a Rural Escape Meets Reality
For many homeowners, a letter from their Homeowners Association (HOA) or Property Owners’ Association (POA) is a source of instant frustration. It often feels like a one-sided relationship governed by arbitrary rules. But what happens when a homeowner decides they’ve had enough and takes their association to court?
The story of Thomas Stedronsky offers a fascinating glimpse into this exact scenario. In 2003, he purchased a 15-acre unimproved lot in a rugged, rural Arizona development called Copper Canyon Ranches, likely dreaming of a quiet escape. Crucially, he never built on the property and does not reside there. Over the years, that dream soured, leading him to sue his Property Owners’ Association over a “barely visible” road and a neighbor’s property that he claimed resembled a “junkyard.” The official court decision reveals several surprising and counter-intuitive lessons for any current or future homeowner.
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1. Your HOA Doesn’t Have to Be Perfect, Just “Reasonable”
One of Mr. Stedronsky’s core complaints was that Sundance Lane, the road leading to his remote lot, was in terrible condition. His photos showed a path that was overgrown, rocky, and barely visible. Meanwhile, he argued, other main roads in the development were wide and well-maintained. His argument was clear: the POA was failing in its duty. But the POA’s defense was grounded in the harsh realities of the terrain. The president testified that Sundance Lane wasn’t just any road; it was an “old two-track mining road from the 1940’s or 1950’s that has never been engineered that is too steep to be a perfect road.”
This historical context was bolstered by financial reality. The POA operated on a limited annual budget of only $35,000 to $40,000, which had to cover the maintenance of 20 miles of roadways. The board president testified that they made a strategic decision to prioritize maintenance on the roads used daily by the community’s approximately 35 full-time residents.
Ultimately, the judge ruled in favor of the POA. The court found that the association did not abuse its discretion. Prioritizing road maintenance based on usage and a limited budget was deemed a reasonable action. The key takeaway for homeowners is powerful: an HOA isn’t legally obligated to maintain every amenity to the same perfect standard, especially when faced with financial constraints. Their actions only need to be “reasonable.”
2. The “Rural Reality” Can Override Suburban Rules
Mr. Stedronsky’s second major complaint centered on his neighbor’s property, Lot 77, which he alleged was a junkyard filled with inoperable vehicles and clutter, violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). To prove his point, he submitted photographic evidence taken with a telephoto lens. However, the credibility of his evidence was undermined when the court noted he had added his own notations to the photos—such as “All vehicles have been sitting for years”—which “were not apparent in the photograph.”
More importantly, the judge’s perspective was heavily influenced by the setting. In its final conclusion, the court officially determined that because Copper Canyon Ranches consists of large parcels in a remote area, “The CC&Rs also contemplate that parcel owners will have vehicles and other stored items on their parcels, as is common in remote rural areas.”
This point was brought to life by the colorful testimony of the POA president, Mr. Wilson. He explained that in rural areas, it’s common practice to leave vehicle hoods open. Why? To prevent mice and rats from nesting inside the engines. What looks like a clear violation in a manicured suburb is often standard, practical procedure in a rural development. This case shows that homeowner expectations—and an HOA’s enforcement standards—must adapt to the local context and culture.
3. Sometimes, an HOA’s Best Move IsNotto Enforce a Rule
Behind every HOA violation notice is a decision-making process, and this case pulls back the curtain on the strategic thinking involved. The POA president testified that they had, in fact, written letters to the owner of Lot 77, Mr. Hamlin, in the past and that he was “generally responsive.” However, they were hesitant to take a “heavy hand” with him, characterizing him as “the sort of man who would dig in his heels.”
The president’s testimony reveals a fascinating look into the pragmatic balancing act an HOA board must perform. He explained the board’s strategic calculation:
If Mr. Hamlin is pushed beyond the point where Lot 77 needs to be in compliance with the zoning code and CC&Rs, he will resist and Respondent will incur litigation costs that will decrease the amount of money available for road maintenance.
This is a crucial lesson in community governance. The board made a calculated decision that avoiding a costly and protracted legal battle with one resident was more beneficial for the community as a whole than strictly enforcing every rule to the letter. It was a choice between pursuing a single violation and preserving the limited funds needed for essential services for everyone.
4. An Unsellable Property Can Fuel a Losing Battle
While the lawsuit focused on roads and junkyards, the court documents reveal a deeper, underlying motivation. Mr. Stedronsky’s complaints were not new; they started as far back as 2009 and were often linked in his letters to his “inability to sell his property.” His frustration was made more tangible by the fact that he had informed the POA in 2013 that the lot was under contract for sale, a deal that apparently fell through.
From the POA’s perspective, the problem wasn’t the road or the neighbor—it was the lot itself. The board president described Lot 76 as “undesirable” because it was steep, rocky, and would require a significant amount of bulldozer work just to create a level place to build.
After years of complaints, the POA president sent a blunt and revealing letter to Mr. Stedronsky that was included as evidence in the case:
“You have been complaining to the POA since 2009 about your inability to sell your property. Many properties have been unable to sell due to Rural Rugged area. You sir are the only one blaming the POA and your neighbors for your inability to sell an undesirable property. The POA has done its due diligence in this matter. Please cease complaints to the POA on this matter.”
While Mr. Stedronsky’s frustration was evident, the judge ultimately found that he failed to meet the burden of proof for his claims. The case was dismissed. This serves as a powerful reminder that feeling wronged, even for years, is not enough to win a legal dispute.
——————————————————————————–
Conclusion: A Lesson in Pragmatism
The case of Lot 76 is a powerful story about the gap between homeowner expectations and the messy, pragmatic reality of community governance. It demonstrates that an association’s decisions are often a complex calculation involving limited budgets, local norms, and strategic risk management.
It reminds us that boards are not faceless corporations but groups of neighbors tasked with making difficult choices for the collective good. The next time you disagree with your HOA, will you see them as an adversary, or as a group of neighbors managing limited resources with “reasonable discretion”?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Thomas J Stedronsky(petitioner) Appeared and testified on his own behalf
Respondent Side
John S. Perlman(attorney) Copper Canyon Ranches POA
Joe Wilson(board president, witness) Copper Canyon Ranches POA Testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Diane Mihalsky(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of the decision
Other Participants
Jerry Hamlin(property owner) Lot 77 Subject of CC&R enforcement action
Helen Hamlin(property owner) Lot 77 Named in Gila County enforcement action related to Lot 77
The Petitioner's petition was dismissed because he failed to appear or provide an authorized representative at the scheduled hearing, resulting in the Respondent being deemed the prevailing party.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to appear at the hearing scheduled at his request and failed to provide an authorized representative (as appearances are considered the practice of law under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31).
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of CC&Rs
Petitioner Jeff Lion alleged that the Respondent violated Article 8 of the CC&Rs.
Orders: Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Dismissal, Failure to Appear, Unauthorized Representation, HOA, CC&R
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817009-REL Decision – 611264.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:07 (69.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817009-REL
Briefing Document: Lion v. Riggs Ranch Meadows HOA (Case No. 18F-H1817009-REL)
Executive Summary
This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Jeff Lion (Petitioner) versus Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner’s case, which alleged a violation of the Respondent’s CC&Rs, was dismissed due to the Petitioner’s failure to appear at the scheduled hearing on January 9, 2018.
The hearing had been rescheduled to this date at the Petitioner’s own request. On the day of the hearing, two witnesses for Mr. Lion appeared but were informed by the tribunal that they could not legally represent him as they were not licensed attorneys, a requirement under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31. Because no authorized representative for the Petitioner was present, no evidence could be presented to support the claim. Consequently, Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden dismissed the petition and designated the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association as the prevailing party.
Case Background and Procedural History
The matter originated from a petition filed by Jeff Lion against the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association.
• Initial Allegation: Mr. Lion alleged that the Respondent violated Article 8 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
• Notice of Hearing: On October 2, 2017, the Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing, initially scheduling the matter for November 29, 2017, at the Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix.
• Continuance: Mr. Lion filed a Motion to Continue the hearing, which was rescheduled for 9:00 a.m. on January 9, 2018, without objection from the Respondent.
Analysis of the January 9, 2018 Hearing
The proceedings on the rescheduled hearing date were pivotal to the case’s outcome.
• Petitioner’s Failure to Appear: Mr. Jeff Lion, the Petitioner, did not appear at the hearing at its scheduled time.
• Attempted Representation by Non-Attorneys: Two witnesses named by Mr. Lion were present. They informed the tribunal that Mr. Lion would not be appearing and that they intended to represent him.
• Tribunal’s Ruling on Representation: The tribunal advised the witnesses that they were legally prohibited from representing Mr. Lion. Citing Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31, the judge clarified that appearances at the Office of Administrative Hearings constitute the practice of law and require representation by an attorney licensed in Arizona. The witnesses confirmed they did not hold such licenses.
• Consequences of Non-Appearance: As there was no authorized representative present for the Petitioner, no evidence was taken. The judge noted that the hearing had been continued to that specific date at Mr. Lion’s request and proceeded to vacate the matter based on his failure to appear.
Legal Findings and Conclusions of Law
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was grounded in established legal principles and procedural rules.
• Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate was confirmed to have authority over the matter pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
• Burden of Proof: The decision reiterated that the party asserting a claim—in this case, Mr. Lion—carries the burden of proof. The standard required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
• Core Rationale for Dismissal: The central conclusion of law was that Mr. Lion failed to meet his burden of proof. By not appearing at the hearing he had requested, and by not securing authorized legal representation, he “failed to present any evidence in support of his petition.”
Final Order and Implications
The decision, issued on January 10, 2018, formally concluded the administrative hearing process with a definitive outcome.
• Dismissal of Petition: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that “Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed.”
• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association, was officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
• Post-Decision Options: The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.
Key Parties and Representatives
Name/Entity
Contact/Representation Information
Petitioner
Jeff Lion
PO Box 1350, Selma, CA 93662
Respondent
Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association
Represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq.
Respondent’s Counsel
Nathan Tennyson, Esq.
BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC, 373 S. Main Ave., Tucson, AZ 85701
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Office of Administrative Hearings
Overseeing Body
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Commissioner: Judy Lowe
Study Guide – 18F-H1817009-REL
Study Guide for Administrative Law Judge Decision: Lion v. Riggs Ranch Meadows HOA
This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Jeff Lion v. Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association, Case No. 18F-H1817009-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms found within the document.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based entirely on the provided legal decision.
1. Who were the petitioner and respondent in this matter, and what was the petitioner’s central allegation?
2. Why was the administrative hearing held on January 9, 2018, instead of the originally scheduled date?
3. Describe the events that occurred at the scheduled hearing time on January 9, 2018.
4. What specific rule was cited by the tribunal to prevent the petitioner’s witnesses from representing him?
5. What is the standard of proof for this matter, and which party had the burden of proof?
6. According to the decision, what was the direct consequence of the petitioner’s failure to have an authorized representative present at the hearing?
7. How does the legal document define the term “preponderance of the evidence”?
8. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge?
9. Who was identified as the “prevailing party” and why?
10. What option was available to the parties if they disagreed with the judge’s order?
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Answer Key
1. The petitioner was Jeff Lion, and the respondent was the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association. Mr. Lion alleged that the respondent had violated Article 8 of its CC&Rs.
2. The hearing was originally set for November 29, 2017. It was rescheduled to January 9, 2018, because the petitioner, Mr. Lion, filed a Motion to Continue, to which the respondent did not object.
3. On January 9, 2018, the petitioner, Jeff Lion, did not appear for the hearing. Two witnesses appeared on his behalf and stated their intention to represent him, but they were not permitted to do so.
4. The tribunal cited Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31, which governs the practice of law. Since the witnesses were not licensed attorneys in Arizona, they were not legally permitted to represent Mr. Lion at the hearing.
5. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The party asserting the claim, in this case, the petitioner Jeff Lion, had the burden of proof.
6. Because no authorized representative was present for Mr. Lion, no evidence was taken in support of his petition. This failure to present evidence was a key factor in the case’s dismissal.
7. The document defines “preponderance of the evidence” by quoting Black’s Law Dictionary as: “The greater weight of the evidence…that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
8. The final order was that Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed. The decision was issued on January 10, 2018.
9. The Respondent, Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association, was deemed the prevailing party. This was because Mr. Lion failed to present any evidence in support of his petition, leading to its dismissal.
10. The parties could request a rehearing pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04. The request had to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
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Suggested Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to explore the procedural and legal principles of the case more deeply.
1. Analyze the significance of Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31 in the outcome of this case. How does the principle that appearances at administrative hearings constitute the “practice of law” affect how individuals can pursue claims?
2. Discuss the interrelated concepts of “burden of proof” and “standard of proof” as they apply to this case. Explain why Jeff Lion’s failure to appear made it legally impossible for him to meet the standard of a “preponderance of the evidence.”
3. Evaluate the procedural fairness of the Administrative Law Judge’s decision to dismiss the petition. Consider the timeline of events, including the petitioner’s own request to reschedule the hearing, in your analysis.
4. Based on the “Conclusions of Law” section, construct an argument explaining the logical steps Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden took to arrive at the final order of dismissal.
5. Examine the roles of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings as outlined in the document. How do these two entities interact in resolving a dispute initiated by a homeowner against a Homeowners Association?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over hearings at an administrative agency to resolve disputes.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the laws passed by the Arizona state legislature. Title 32, Chapter 20, Article 11 is cited as giving the Department of Real Estate authority.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the petitioner (Mr. Lion) had the burden of proof.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are rules governing a planned community or homeowners association. Mr. Lion alleged a violation of Article 8 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs.
Motion to Continue
A formal request made by a party to an administrative tribunal or court to postpone a scheduled hearing to a later date.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The state agency where the hearing took place, which conducts hearings for other state agencies.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another party. In this case, Jeff Lion.
Practice of Law
The act of representing others in legal proceedings. The decision states that appearances at the OAH are considered the practice of law and are restricted to licensed attorneys under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case. It is met when the evidence presented is more convincing and has greater weight than the evidence offered in opposition, inclining a fair mind to one side of the issue.
Prevailing Party
The party who wins a legal case or dispute. The Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association was deemed the prevailing party.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to re-examine the issues and the decision. The parties had 30 days to file a request for a rehearing.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association.
Tribunal
A body established to settle certain types of dispute. In this context, it refers to the Administrative Law Judge presiding over the hearing.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817009-REL
How One Homeowner Lost His Case Against His HOA Before It Even Began
Introduction: The David vs. Goliath Story You Haven’t Heard
Disputes with a Homeowners Association (HOA) are a common source of frustration. It often feels like a David vs. Goliath battle, pitting an individual against a structured organization with rules and resources. When faced with what they believe is an unfair application of those rules, some homeowners decide to fight back.
This was the situation for Jeff Lion, who filed a petition against his HOA, Riggs Ranch Meadows, alleging a violation of Article 8 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). But this story didn’t end with a dramatic debate over property rights. Instead, it was over before it started, derailed by a simple but fatal procedural misstep. This case offers three critical lessons for anyone considering a formal dispute, revealing how understanding the basic rules of the game is far more important than just believing you have a good argument.
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1. The Most Important Step is Showing Up
The central, decisive event of the case was a stunning failure in participation: the petitioner, Jeff Lion, did not appear at the hearing on January 9, 2018. The ultimate procedural irony? This was the exact hearing date that he himself had requested.
The contrast on that day could not have been starker. While Mr. Lion was a no-show for the fight he started, the HOA—the “Goliath” in this story—arrived fully prepared, represented by its attorney, Nathan Tennyson, Esq. The judge’s decision was swift and absolute. Because Mr. Lion did not appear, no evidence was taken, and his petition was dismissed entirely.
This outcome is rooted in a core legal principle known as the “burden of proof.” Simply put, the person making a claim is responsible for presenting evidence to support it. As the one who filed the petition, it was Mr. Lion’s job to prove his case. By failing to appear, he presented zero evidence and could not possibly meet this fundamental burden. The merits of his specific complaint about Article 8 were never even heard, all because of a self-inflicted failure to participate in the process he initiated on the day he chose.
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2. Not Just Anyone Can Speak for You in Court
In a surprising turn, while Mr. Lion was absent, his two named witnesses did appear at the hearing. They informed the judge that the petitioner would not be attending and that they intended to represent him in his absence.
The Administrative Law Judge immediately shut down their attempt. The reason highlights a crucial rule that trips up many non-lawyers: the witnesses were not licensed attorneys, and the law strictly forbids such representation. Appearances at these administrative hearings are legally considered “the practice of law.”
The court’s decision was based on an unambiguous rule, which it cited in its legal conclusions:
Appearances at the Office of Administrative Hearings are considered to be the practice of law. See Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31.
This is a counter-intuitive lesson for many. You might assume a trusted friend, family member, or knowledgeable witness could speak on your behalf. This case demonstrates that the legal system has rigid rules about who is authorized to provide representation. Good intentions and a willingness to help are not enough to grant someone the legal authority to act as your advocate in a formal hearing.
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3. “Winning” is About Tipping the Scale of Evidence
In administrative hearings, the standard for winning is called “a preponderance of the evidence.” This doesn’t mean proving your case beyond all doubt. Think of it like a scale. “Preponderance of the evidence” simply means you have to provide enough evidence to make the scale tip, even just slightly, in your favor.
The formal definition clarifies this concept of relative weight:
The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.
Applying this standard to Mr. Lion’s case makes the outcome painfully clear. Since he failed to appear and no evidence was taken on his behalf, the “weight” of his evidence was zero. It was therefore impossible for him to tip the scale, no matter how strong his case might have been in theory. Because he presented nothing, Riggs Ranch Meadows was deemed the “prevailing party” by default. This demonstrates how the legal system is a structured process focused on evidence presented according to rules, not just on feelings or the theoretical rightness of a claim.
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Conclusion: The Rules of the Game Matter
The case of Jeff Lion provides a masterclass in legal procedure. The three key lessons are simple but absolute: you must show up to your own hearing, especially one you scheduled; only licensed attorneys can legally represent you; and you must present evidence to meet your burden of proof.
This case wasn’t ultimately about CC&Rs or neighborhood rules; it was about procedure. It serves as a stark reminder that before entering any formal dispute, the first question to ask isn’t “Am I right?” but “Do I understand the rules?”
