Jay Janicek vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717033-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-14
Administrative Law Judge Dorinda M. Lang
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jay Janicek Counsel
Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA Counsel Evan Thompson

Alleged Violations

Article 11. Section 11.5 of the CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Petitioner did not establish a violation of the Respondent's CC&Rs and recommended the petition be denied. The ALJ specifically noted the lack of proof that fees were inappropriate and that Petitioner failed to provide legal authority requiring equal benefit. The petition was denied, and the Respondent was not ordered to pay the Petitioner's filing fee.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish a violation of the CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs regarding disproportionate assessment fees

Petitioner alleged Respondent was in violation of its CC&Rs because Master HOA fees were disproportionately borne by existing homeowners and did not benefit the whole development equally. Petitioner failed to establish a violation because required evidentiary documents (plat attached as 'Exhibit B') were missing, and Petitioner offered no legal authority requiring fees to be equally beneficial or even-handed.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied. Respondent shall not pay the filing fee required by section 32-2199.01 to the Petitioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CC&Rs, Master HOA, Assessment Fees, Common Areas, Burden of Proof, Rule Against Perpetuities
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717033-REL Decision – 575166.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:10 (39.1 KB)

17F-H1717033-REL Decision – 582189.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:11 (69.4 KB)

17F-H1717033-REL Decision – 584918.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:11 (674.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717033-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the key findings and legal proceedings in case number 17F-H1717033-REL, wherein Petitioner Jay Janicek filed a complaint against Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA. The petition was ultimately denied by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), a decision formally adopted and finalized by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

The core of the dispute centered on the Petitioner’s allegation that the HOA’s fee structure violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Specifically, Janicek argued that payments made by his first-level association to a master association for common area expenses—most egregiously for a roadway loan—were improper because the benefits were not distributed equally among all homeowners.

The denial of the petition hinged on a critical failure of proof by the Petitioner. The CC&Rs define “Common Areas” by referencing a plat map (“Exhibit B”) that was not submitted into evidence by the Petitioner. Without this crucial document, it was impossible to prove that the fees collected by the HOA were for purposes outside the scope of the CC&Rs. Furthermore, the Petitioner failed to provide any legal authority or provision within the governing documents requiring that association fees be “even-handed or equally beneficial to all homeowners.” A secondary argument regarding the “rule against perpetuities,” introduced post-hearing, was also addressed and dismissed by the ALJ as legally inapplicable to the matter.

Case Overview

The following table outlines the principal parties and details of the administrative hearing.

Case Detail

Information

Petitioner

Jay Janicek

Respondent

Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Respondent’s Counsel

Evan Thompson, Thompson Krone PLC

Respondent’s Representative

Steve Russo

Case Number

17F-H1717033-REL

Docket Number

17F-H1717033-REL

Hearing Date

July 12, 2017

Presiding Judge

Dorinda M. Lang, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Observers

John Shields, Margery and Mathew Janicek

Petitioner’s Allegations

The petition filed by Jay Janicek alleged that Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA was in violation of its governing CC&Rs. The central arguments presented were:

Unequal Distribution of Costs and Benefits: The Petitioner contended that expenses paid by the Respondent association to the Sycamore Vista Master Home Owner’s Association (“Master HOA”) did not benefit all homeowners equally. The most “egregious” example cited was the payment toward a loan for a roadway within the master development.

Violation of CC&Rs: The Petitioner argued that this unequal cost burden was a direct violation of Article 11, Section 11.5 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs. This section stipulates:

Discrepancy Among Associations: The Petitioner asserted that another first-level association within the master development receives more benefit from the common areas but does not pay into the Master HOA.

Rule Against Perpetuities: In a post-hearing submission, the Petitioner introduced a new argument that a “rule against perpetuities” was at stake in the matter.

Adjudication and Findings of Fact

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was based on the Petitioner’s failure to meet the required burden of proof through a preponderance of the evidence.

Evidentiary Failure

The Petitioner’s case failed primarily due to a lack of sufficient evidence to prove a violation of the CC&Rs.

Missing ‘Exhibit B’: The definition of “Common Areas” was essential to the case. According to Article 1, Section 1.6 of the CC&Rs, these areas are delineated on a plat that was supposed to be attached as “Exhibit B.”

Critical Finding: The ALJ noted, “Unfortunately, there was no plat attached to the document that was offered into evidence and it was not to be found among the other exhibits. Therefore, Petitioner was unable to establish that Respondent’s fees pay for anything that is not provided for in the CC&Rs.”

Petitioner’s Concession: The Petitioner did not dispute the Respondent’s argument that the Master HOA fees, including those for roads, were for Common Areas.

Lack of Legal Authority

The Petitioner’s core premise—that fees must be proportional to benefits received—was not substantiated by legal or documentary support.

• The ALJ found that the “Petitioner offered no legal authority that requires that all first level associations must pay the same into a master association or that all homeowners must receive the same benefit from or contribute the same amount (or even a proportionate share) to the common areas.”

• The argument that association fees were “disproportionately heavy” was not established to be a violation of any provision in the CC&Rs.

Post-Hearing Submissions

The record was held open until August 1, 2017, allowing for additional documentation from both parties.

Petitioner (Exhibit 6): Submitted financial documentation, emails, and the argument concerning the rule against perpetuities.

Respondent (Exhibit H): Submitted a Notice of Lien and attachments. This exhibit demonstrated that, regarding a lien for water services on properties not part of the Respondent HOA, the “Respondent’s homeowners are not responsible for it.”

Conclusions of Law and Final Decision

Based on the evidence and arguments presented, the ALJ denied the petition, a decision later finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Denial of Petition

• The primary conclusion of law was that the “Petitioner has not established that Respondent is in violation of its CC&Rs.”

• The payment for Common Areas was found to be in comportment with the CC&Rs.

Rejection of Key Arguments

Equal Benefit: The ALJ explicitly concluded: “Petitioner has offered no legal authority or provision of the CC&Rs that requires the association fees to be even-handed or equally beneficial to all homeowners.”

Rule Against Perpetuities: While this argument was not part of the original petition, the ALJ addressed it to “lay a concern to rest.” The judge explained that the rule, which states that property ownership must vest within a lifetime plus 21 years, evolved from estate law and does not apply to HOA property sales where ownership vests immediately in the developer or a new owner. The judge concluded, “the rule against perpetuities does not apply to a homeowner’s association and it clearly does not apply in this matter.”

Timeline of Orders

1. July 12, 2017: An “Order Holding Record Open” was issued by ALJ Dorinda M. Lang.

2. August 14, 2017: The “Administrative Law Judge Decision” was issued, ordering that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

3. August 21, 2017: A “Final Order” was issued by Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, adopting the ALJ’s decision and officially denying the petition.

Post-Decision Procedures

The Final Order, effective August 21, 2017, concluded the administrative action and outlined the subsequent options available to the parties.

• The order is binding unless a rehearing is granted. A request for rehearing must be filed within 30 days of the service of the final order.

• A rehearing may be granted for the following causes:

1. Irregularity in the proceedings or any order or abuse of discretion that deprived a party of a fair hearing.

2. Misconduct by the Department, ALJ, or the prevailing party.

3. Accident or surprise that could not have been prevented by ordinary prudence.

4. Newly discovered material evidence that could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the original hearing.

5. Excessive or insufficient penalties.

6. Error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law occurring during the proceeding.

7. The findings of fact or decision is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

8. The findings of fact or decision is not supported by the evidence or is contrary to law.

• Parties may appeal the final administrative action by filing a complaint for judicial review.


William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717032-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely provide access to association records

The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.

Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:52 (79.9 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:53 (726.4 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:53 (95.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717032-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.

The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.

Case Timeline and Factual Background

The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.

February 6, 2017

William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.

February 14, 2017

Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.

Post-Feb. 6, 2017

Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

April 13, 2017

The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.

May 2, 2017

Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

May 3, 2017

The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

June 26, 2017

The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.

July 14, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.

July 24, 2017

Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805

The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”

Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)

Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.

Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.

Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.

Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.

Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)

Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.

“Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.

Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine

The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:

“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”

Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.

The Correct Interpretation of the Law

The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:

“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”

Final Conclusion

The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:

1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.

2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.

3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.

Final Order and Mandates

The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.

The key directives of the order were:

Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.

Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.

Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.

No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.


William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717032-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely provide access to association records

The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.

Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:33 (79.9 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:34 (726.4 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:34 (95.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717032-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.

The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.

Case Timeline and Factual Background

The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.

February 6, 2017

William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.

February 14, 2017

Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.

Post-Feb. 6, 2017

Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

April 13, 2017

The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.

May 2, 2017

Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

May 3, 2017

The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

June 26, 2017

The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.

July 14, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.

July 24, 2017

Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805

The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”

Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)

Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.

Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.

Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.

Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.

Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)

Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.

“Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.

Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine

The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:

“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”

Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.

The Correct Interpretation of the Law

The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:

“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”

Final Conclusion

The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:

1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.

2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.

3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.

Final Order and Mandates

The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.

The key directives of the order were:

Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.

Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.

Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.

No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.






Study Guide – 17F-H1717032-REL


Study Guide: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc. (No. 17F-H1717032-REL), heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It covers the central conflict, the legal arguments, the statutory interpretations, and the final resolution of the dispute.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided source documents. Each answer should be approximately 2-3 sentences.

1. What was the initial action taken by William M. Brown on February 6, 2017, and what was Terravita Country Club’s response?

2. On what legal grounds did Terravita justify its refusal to provide the requested records?

3. What was William M. Brown’s primary legal argument against Terravita’s position during the hearing?

4. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Terravita’s argument regarding A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2), and why was it rejected?

5. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof in this case?

6. What key fact regarding the “pending litigation” was central to the Judge’s final decision?

7. What was the final conclusion reached by the Administrative Law Judge regarding Terravita’s actions?

8. Identify the three specific orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge in the “Recommended Order.”

9. What state department adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, making it a “Final Order”?

10. Besides complying with the records request and paying the filing fee, what specific penalty was explicitly not levied against Terravita?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. On February 6, 2017, William M. Brown requested records from Terravita Country Club. On February 14, 2017, Terravita responded via email, refusing to disclose the records because they were allegedly part of pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

2. Terravita justified its refusal by citing Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1805(B)(2). The club argued that this statute allows an association to withhold records related to “pending litigation.”

3. Mr. Brown’s primary argument was that Terravita had violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide records within 10 business days. He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” in § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only when the association itself is a party to that litigation, which Terravita was not in his criminal case.

4. The Judge interpreted Terravita’s argument to mean that an association could deny any records request if the documents related to pending litigation between any two parties anywhere. This interpretation was rejected because it would lead to the “absurd result” of broadly denying access to records, which was not the statute’s intent.

5. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the evidentiary standard where the trier of fact must be convinced that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Brown) bore the burden of proving that Terravita violated the statute, while the Respondent (Terravita) bore the burden of proving its affirmative defenses.

6. The central fact was that Terravita Country Club was not a party to the criminal case brought against Mr. Brown by the City of Scottsdale. Because the association was not a party, the judge ruled that the statutory exemption for withholding records related to pending litigation did not apply.

7. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Brown had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Terravita failed to fulfill his records request within the required 10 business days. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.

8. The Judge ordered that: (1) the Petitioner (Mr. Brown) be deemed the prevailing party; (2) Terravita must comply with the records request within 10 days of the Order; and (3) Terravita must pay the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee within 30 days of the Order.

9. The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This action, dated July 24, 2017, made the decision a binding Final Order.

10. The Recommended Order, which was adopted as the Final Order, explicitly states that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing upon the facts, legal principles, and arguments presented in the source documents.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) presented by William M. Brown and Terravita Country Club. Explain the legal reasoning the Administrative Law Judge used to resolve this dispute, including the principle of avoiding “absurd results.”

2. Describe the complete timeline of the case, from the initial records request to the issuance of the Final Order. For each key date, explain the event’s significance to the progression and outcome of the dispute.

3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain how this standard was applied to both the Petitioner’s claim and the Respondent’s affirmative defense and why the Judge ultimately found that the Petitioner had met this burden.

4. Examine the role of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate in resolving disputes within planned communities, as demonstrated by this case. How does the process flow from an initial petition to a binding order?

5. Based on the Judge’s decision, formulate an argument about the balance between a homeowner’s right to access association records and an association’s right to protect its interests in legal matters. How does A.R.S. § 33-1805 attempt to strike this balance, and how did the ruling in this case clarify its limits?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ.

Affirmative Defense

A set of facts or legal arguments raised by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. Terravita’s claim that A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) exempted them was their affirmative defense.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

The section of Arizona Revised Statutes that requires a planned community association to make financial and other records available for member examination within 10 business days.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

The section of Arizona Revised Statutes that allows an association to withhold books and records from disclosure if the portion withheld relates to “pending litigation.”

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

The Arizona statute that permits an owner or planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of statutes or community documents.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. The Petitioner bore the burden to prove the violation, and the Respondent bore the burden to establish its defense.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency that received the Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown and ultimately adopted the ALJ’s decision, making it final.

Final Order

The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which adopted the ALJ’s Recommended Order. This order is an administrative action and is effective immediately upon service.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where administrative law judges conduct hearings on disputes, such as the one between Mr. Brown and Terravita.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or hearing by filing a petition. In this case, William M. Brown was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and represents “the greater weight of the evidence.”

Prevailing Party

The party who is successful in a legal case. The Final Order deemed William M. Brown the prevailing party.

Recommended Order

The initial decision and orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge following a hearing. This decision is then sent to the relevant state agency (in this case, the Department of Real Estate) for adoption.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. In this case, Terravita Country Club, Inc. was the Respondent.






Blog Post – 17F-H1717032-REL


Your HOA Can’t Use “Pending Litigation” to Hide Records. This Homeowner Proved It.

Introduction: The Wall of Secrecy

For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel like confronting an organization that operates with total authority and little transparency. Board decisions can seem arbitrary, and getting straight answers or access to official documents can be a frustrating, uphill battle. But what happens when an HOA flatly denies a simple request for records, citing a vague legal reason?

One homeowner decided to find out. The case of William M. Brown versus the Terravita Country Club provides a fascinating look at how a single individual challenged his HOA’s interpretation of state law. In doing so, he not only won access to the records he sought but also revealed a crucial limit on an HOA’s power to operate in secret.

The Takeaways: Four Lessons from a Landmark HOA Dispute

This case offers several powerful and practical lessons for any homeowner who has ever felt stonewalled by their association’s board.

Takeaway 1: “Pending Litigation” Isn’t a Blank Check to Deny Records

At the heart of the dispute was a simple request. On February 6, 2017, William M. Brown asked his HOA, Terravita, for access to association records. The HOA denied the request, citing an exemption in Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)) that allows an association to withhold records related to “pending litigation.”

Terravita’s argument was that this exemption applied because of a pending criminal case against Mr. Brown. Crucially, they argued this was not just any unrelated case; the criminal charges stemmed from allegations that Mr. Brown had threatened the HOA’s board members and property. From their perspective, the records request was directly linked to a hostile legal situation involving the association’s leadership. However, the critical fact remained that the HOA itself was not a formal party to the criminal case.

The judge’s ruling was definitive and clear: the “pending litigation” exemption can only be used to withhold records if the litigation is between the association and the member. Because Terravita was not a party to Mr. Brown’s criminal case, it had no legal grounds to use that case as an excuse to withhold its records from him. This ruling draws a bright line: The “pending litigation” shield cannot be borrowed from a separate case, even one that feels highly relevant to the HOA.

Takeaway 2: Legal Interpretations Must Be Sensible, Not Absurd

The HOA argued for a literal interpretation of the law, claiming the statute didn’t explicitly state that the association had to be a party to the litigation. Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson rejected this line of reasoning, stating that it would lead to an “absurd result.”

This is a critical lesson for homeowners. Judges are tasked with ensuring laws are applied sensibly. When an HOA’s interpretation of a rule would create an illogical or unfair outcome, it is vulnerable to legal challenge. The judge highlighted the flaw in the HOA’s logic with a powerful statement in her decision:

Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.

Takeaway 3: A Single Homeowner Can Successfully Challenge Their HOA

Perhaps the most empowering aspect of this case is who argued it. The court documents show that while the HOA was represented by legal counsel (“Joshua Bolen, Esq. appeared on behalf of Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc.”), Mr. Brown represented himself (“Petitioner William M. Brown appeared on behalf of himself”).

Despite being outmatched on paper, Mr. Brown successfully researched the law, presented a logical argument, and held his ground. His victory demonstrates that the legal process is not just for lawyers. A well-researched, logical argument from a homeowner can be more powerful than a law firm’s flawed interpretation of a statute. The judge ultimately found that “Mr. Brown established by a preponderance of the evidence that Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within 10 business days.”

Takeaway 4: Misapplying the Law Can Have Financial Consequences

This wasn’t just a moral victory. The final order, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017, came with tangible consequences for the HOA. For its failure to correctly apply the law, Terravita faced direct and tangible consequences.

• The HOA was ordered to provide the requested records within 10 days.

• The homeowner, Mr. Brown, was deemed the “prevailing party.”

• The HOA, Terravita, was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00.

This outcome underscores a critical point: when an HOA oversteps its authority or misinterprets the law, it can be held financially responsible for the costs incurred by the homeowner forced to challenge its actions.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Power

The story of William M. Brown’s dispute with his HOA serves as a powerful reminder that HOAs do not have unlimited power. They are governed by specific state laws, and understanding those laws is the most effective tool a homeowner possesses.

The central lesson is that an HOA’s authority is not absolute, and its interpretation of its own rules—and, more importantly, state law—must be reasonable and sensible. This case affirms the right of members to transparency and proves that a single, well-prepared homeowner can successfully stand up for those rights.

After seeing how one homeowner held his board accountable, will you take the time to learn your rights before you need them?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William M. Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

  • Joshua Bolen (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717032-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely provide access to association records

The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.

Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:09 (79.9 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:12 (726.4 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:15 (95.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717032-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.

The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.

Case Timeline and Factual Background

The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.

February 6, 2017

William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.

February 14, 2017

Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.

Post-Feb. 6, 2017

Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

April 13, 2017

The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.

May 2, 2017

Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

May 3, 2017

The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

June 26, 2017

The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.

July 14, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.

July 24, 2017

Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805

The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”

Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)

Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.

Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.

Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.

Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.

Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)

Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.

“Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.

Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine

The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:

“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”

Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.

The Correct Interpretation of the Law

The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:

“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”

Final Conclusion

The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:

1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.

2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.

3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.

Final Order and Mandates

The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.

The key directives of the order were:

Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.

Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.

Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.

No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.






Study Guide – 17F-H1717032-REL


Study Guide: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc. (No. 17F-H1717032-REL), heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It covers the central conflict, the legal arguments, the statutory interpretations, and the final resolution of the dispute.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided source documents. Each answer should be approximately 2-3 sentences.

1. What was the initial action taken by William M. Brown on February 6, 2017, and what was Terravita Country Club’s response?

2. On what legal grounds did Terravita justify its refusal to provide the requested records?

3. What was William M. Brown’s primary legal argument against Terravita’s position during the hearing?

4. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Terravita’s argument regarding A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2), and why was it rejected?

5. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof in this case?

6. What key fact regarding the “pending litigation” was central to the Judge’s final decision?

7. What was the final conclusion reached by the Administrative Law Judge regarding Terravita’s actions?

8. Identify the three specific orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge in the “Recommended Order.”

9. What state department adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, making it a “Final Order”?

10. Besides complying with the records request and paying the filing fee, what specific penalty was explicitly not levied against Terravita?

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Answer Key

1. On February 6, 2017, William M. Brown requested records from Terravita Country Club. On February 14, 2017, Terravita responded via email, refusing to disclose the records because they were allegedly part of pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

2. Terravita justified its refusal by citing Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1805(B)(2). The club argued that this statute allows an association to withhold records related to “pending litigation.”

3. Mr. Brown’s primary argument was that Terravita had violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide records within 10 business days. He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” in § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only when the association itself is a party to that litigation, which Terravita was not in his criminal case.

4. The Judge interpreted Terravita’s argument to mean that an association could deny any records request if the documents related to pending litigation between any two parties anywhere. This interpretation was rejected because it would lead to the “absurd result” of broadly denying access to records, which was not the statute’s intent.

5. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the evidentiary standard where the trier of fact must be convinced that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Brown) bore the burden of proving that Terravita violated the statute, while the Respondent (Terravita) bore the burden of proving its affirmative defenses.

6. The central fact was that Terravita Country Club was not a party to the criminal case brought against Mr. Brown by the City of Scottsdale. Because the association was not a party, the judge ruled that the statutory exemption for withholding records related to pending litigation did not apply.

7. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Brown had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Terravita failed to fulfill his records request within the required 10 business days. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.

8. The Judge ordered that: (1) the Petitioner (Mr. Brown) be deemed the prevailing party; (2) Terravita must comply with the records request within 10 days of the Order; and (3) Terravita must pay the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee within 30 days of the Order.

9. The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This action, dated July 24, 2017, made the decision a binding Final Order.

10. The Recommended Order, which was adopted as the Final Order, explicitly states that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing upon the facts, legal principles, and arguments presented in the source documents.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) presented by William M. Brown and Terravita Country Club. Explain the legal reasoning the Administrative Law Judge used to resolve this dispute, including the principle of avoiding “absurd results.”

2. Describe the complete timeline of the case, from the initial records request to the issuance of the Final Order. For each key date, explain the event’s significance to the progression and outcome of the dispute.

3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain how this standard was applied to both the Petitioner’s claim and the Respondent’s affirmative defense and why the Judge ultimately found that the Petitioner had met this burden.

4. Examine the role of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate in resolving disputes within planned communities, as demonstrated by this case. How does the process flow from an initial petition to a binding order?

5. Based on the Judge’s decision, formulate an argument about the balance between a homeowner’s right to access association records and an association’s right to protect its interests in legal matters. How does A.R.S. § 33-1805 attempt to strike this balance, and how did the ruling in this case clarify its limits?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ.

Affirmative Defense

A set of facts or legal arguments raised by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. Terravita’s claim that A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) exempted them was their affirmative defense.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

The section of Arizona Revised Statutes that requires a planned community association to make financial and other records available for member examination within 10 business days.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

The section of Arizona Revised Statutes that allows an association to withhold books and records from disclosure if the portion withheld relates to “pending litigation.”

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

The Arizona statute that permits an owner or planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of statutes or community documents.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. The Petitioner bore the burden to prove the violation, and the Respondent bore the burden to establish its defense.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency that received the Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown and ultimately adopted the ALJ’s decision, making it final.

Final Order

The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which adopted the ALJ’s Recommended Order. This order is an administrative action and is effective immediately upon service.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where administrative law judges conduct hearings on disputes, such as the one between Mr. Brown and Terravita.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or hearing by filing a petition. In this case, William M. Brown was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and represents “the greater weight of the evidence.”

Prevailing Party

The party who is successful in a legal case. The Final Order deemed William M. Brown the prevailing party.

Recommended Order

The initial decision and orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge following a hearing. This decision is then sent to the relevant state agency (in this case, the Department of Real Estate) for adoption.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. In this case, Terravita Country Club, Inc. was the Respondent.






Blog Post – 17F-H1717032-REL


Your HOA Can’t Use “Pending Litigation” to Hide Records. This Homeowner Proved It.

Introduction: The Wall of Secrecy

For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel like confronting an organization that operates with total authority and little transparency. Board decisions can seem arbitrary, and getting straight answers or access to official documents can be a frustrating, uphill battle. But what happens when an HOA flatly denies a simple request for records, citing a vague legal reason?

One homeowner decided to find out. The case of William M. Brown versus the Terravita Country Club provides a fascinating look at how a single individual challenged his HOA’s interpretation of state law. In doing so, he not only won access to the records he sought but also revealed a crucial limit on an HOA’s power to operate in secret.

The Takeaways: Four Lessons from a Landmark HOA Dispute

This case offers several powerful and practical lessons for any homeowner who has ever felt stonewalled by their association’s board.

Takeaway 1: “Pending Litigation” Isn’t a Blank Check to Deny Records

At the heart of the dispute was a simple request. On February 6, 2017, William M. Brown asked his HOA, Terravita, for access to association records. The HOA denied the request, citing an exemption in Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)) that allows an association to withhold records related to “pending litigation.”

Terravita’s argument was that this exemption applied because of a pending criminal case against Mr. Brown. Crucially, they argued this was not just any unrelated case; the criminal charges stemmed from allegations that Mr. Brown had threatened the HOA’s board members and property. From their perspective, the records request was directly linked to a hostile legal situation involving the association’s leadership. However, the critical fact remained that the HOA itself was not a formal party to the criminal case.

The judge’s ruling was definitive and clear: the “pending litigation” exemption can only be used to withhold records if the litigation is between the association and the member. Because Terravita was not a party to Mr. Brown’s criminal case, it had no legal grounds to use that case as an excuse to withhold its records from him. This ruling draws a bright line: The “pending litigation” shield cannot be borrowed from a separate case, even one that feels highly relevant to the HOA.

Takeaway 2: Legal Interpretations Must Be Sensible, Not Absurd

The HOA argued for a literal interpretation of the law, claiming the statute didn’t explicitly state that the association had to be a party to the litigation. Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson rejected this line of reasoning, stating that it would lead to an “absurd result.”

This is a critical lesson for homeowners. Judges are tasked with ensuring laws are applied sensibly. When an HOA’s interpretation of a rule would create an illogical or unfair outcome, it is vulnerable to legal challenge. The judge highlighted the flaw in the HOA’s logic with a powerful statement in her decision:

Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.

Takeaway 3: A Single Homeowner Can Successfully Challenge Their HOA

Perhaps the most empowering aspect of this case is who argued it. The court documents show that while the HOA was represented by legal counsel (“Joshua Bolen, Esq. appeared on behalf of Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc.”), Mr. Brown represented himself (“Petitioner William M. Brown appeared on behalf of himself”).

Despite being outmatched on paper, Mr. Brown successfully researched the law, presented a logical argument, and held his ground. His victory demonstrates that the legal process is not just for lawyers. A well-researched, logical argument from a homeowner can be more powerful than a law firm’s flawed interpretation of a statute. The judge ultimately found that “Mr. Brown established by a preponderance of the evidence that Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within 10 business days.”

Takeaway 4: Misapplying the Law Can Have Financial Consequences

This wasn’t just a moral victory. The final order, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017, came with tangible consequences for the HOA. For its failure to correctly apply the law, Terravita faced direct and tangible consequences.

• The HOA was ordered to provide the requested records within 10 days.

• The homeowner, Mr. Brown, was deemed the “prevailing party.”

• The HOA, Terravita, was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00.

This outcome underscores a critical point: when an HOA oversteps its authority or misinterprets the law, it can be held financially responsible for the costs incurred by the homeowner forced to challenge its actions.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Power

The story of William M. Brown’s dispute with his HOA serves as a powerful reminder that HOAs do not have unlimited power. They are governed by specific state laws, and understanding those laws is the most effective tool a homeowner possesses.

The central lesson is that an HOA’s authority is not absolute, and its interpretation of its own rules—and, more importantly, state law—must be reasonable and sensible. This case affirms the right of members to transparency and proves that a single, well-prepared homeowner can successfully stand up for those rights.

After seeing how one homeowner held his board accountable, will you take the time to learn your rights before you need them?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William M. Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

  • Joshua Bolen (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717032-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely provide access to association records

The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.

Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:05 (79.9 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:05 (726.4 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:06 (95.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717032-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.

The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.

Case Timeline and Factual Background

The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.

February 6, 2017

William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.

February 14, 2017

Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.

Post-Feb. 6, 2017

Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

April 13, 2017

The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.

May 2, 2017

Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

May 3, 2017

The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

June 26, 2017

The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.

July 14, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.

July 24, 2017

Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805

The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”

Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)

Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.

Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.

Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.

Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.

Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)

Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.

“Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.

Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine

The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:

“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”

Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.

The Correct Interpretation of the Law

The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:

“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”

Final Conclusion

The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:

1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.

2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.

3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.

Final Order and Mandates

The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.

The key directives of the order were:

Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.

Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.

Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.

No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.


William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716005-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-10
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after the Tribunal concluded that the Respondent, Terravita Country Club, Inc., violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to timely provide access to records within the mandated 10 business days. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute and refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was imposed.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely respond to records request

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to timely respond to his July 30, 2016 records request, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The Tribunal found that Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent failed to fulfill the request for examination of records within 10 business days, violating A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Orders: Respondent is ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request for records within 10 days of the Order. Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records Request, Failure to Respond, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 574630.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:51 (87.9 KB)

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 575115.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:51 (789.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716005-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and final order in the case of William M. Brown (Petitioner) versus Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Respondent), Case No. 17F-H1716005-REL. The central issue was Terravita’s failure to respond to a member’s request for records within the 10-business-day timeframe mandated by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the Petitioner’s testimony and evidence to be credible, establishing that Mr. Brown submitted a valid records request via e-mail on July 30, 2016, to which Terravita did not timely respond. The ALJ found the testimony of Terravita’s key witness to be unreliable and rejected Terravita’s defenses, which included claims of non-receipt, improper submission procedure, and falsified evidence.

Ultimately, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner, concluding that Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The recommended order, which was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, mandated that Terravita comply with the records request, reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee, and deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party. No civil penalty was assessed.

Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

17F-H1716005-REL (OAH) / HO 17-16/005 (DRE)

Petitioner

William M. Brown (Appeared on behalf of himself)

Respondent

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Represented by Joshua Bolen, Esq.)

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Adopting Authority

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Commissioner

Judy Lowe

Hearing Date

June 19, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

July 10, 2017

Final Order Date

July 11, 2017

Chronology of Events

February 12, 2016: Anita Bell requests records from Terravita via Mr. Brown’s e-mail account. The request is forwarded to General Manager Tom Forbes.

February 19, 2016: Mr. Forbes informs Ms. Bell that the records will be ready on February 22.

March 14, 2016: Ms. Bell submits another records request from Mr. Brown’s e-mail account.

March 18, 2016: Cici Rausch, Terravita’s Director of Administration, informs Ms. Bell when the records can be retrieved.

July 29, 2016: Date of the records request at the center of the legal dispute.

July 30, 2016: Mr. Brown e-mails the records request to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley. On the same day, he separately requests records from the Terravita Community Association, Inc. (TCA).

August 6, 2016: Mr. Brown sends another records request to Ms. Wiley.

August 8, 2016: TCA responds to Mr. Brown’s July 30 request.

August 12, 2016: Terravita responds to Mr. Brown’s August 6 request.

August 18, 2016: Mr. Brown files a Petition for Hearing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond to his July 30 request.

September 9, 2016: Terravita files a response, alleging it did not receive the July 30 records request.

June 19, 2017: The administrative hearing is held.

July 10, 2017: The ALJ issues a decision finding in favor of Mr. Brown.

July 11, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepts the ALJ’s decision and issues a Final Order.

Analysis of the Central Dispute

The core of the case revolved around whether Terravita violated its statutory duty to respond to Mr. Brown’s records request dated July 29, 2016, which he e-mailed on July 30, 2016.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence

Core Allegation: Mr. Brown testified that he sent the records request via e-mail to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley, on July 30, 2016, and that Terravita failed to respond within the 10-business-day period mandated by law.

Evidence: Mr. Brown submitted an August 12, 2016 forwarded e-mail (Exhibit P2) that contained the original July 30, 2016 e-mail sent to Ms. Wiley.

Judicial Finding: The ALJ found Mr. Brown’s testimony to be “credible.”

Respondent’s Defenses and the Court’s Findings

Terravita presented several arguments to contest the allegation, all of which were ultimately unpersuasive to the court.

1. Claim of Non-Receipt: Terravita contended it never received the July 30, 2016 request. Ms. Wiley testified she did not receive a request from Mr. Brown on July 29 or July 30.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ found Ms. Wiley’s testimony to be “unreliable.” The decision noted that Ms. Wiley testified that Terravita was “indirectly” informed around August 5 that “perhaps Mr. Brown had made the request,” which undermined the claim of complete non-awareness.

2. Use of an Incorrect E-mail Address: Ms. Wiley testified that she did not use the e-mail address to which Mr. Brown sent the request for Terravita affairs, claiming she used a different one in her official capacity as Secretary.

Court’s Finding: This argument was implicitly rejected, as the ALJ concluded that Mr. Brown had successfully proven he submitted the request “to its Secretary, Ms. Wiley.”

3. Allegation of Falsified Evidence: Terravita contended that the forwarded e-mail evidence offered by Mr. Brown was falsified.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ noted an inconsistency in Terravita’s position, stating, “Terravita did not contend that the written evidence of Mr. Brown’s August 5, 2016 records request, sent by e-mail to Ms. Wiley, was falsified.” This weakened the credibility of the falsification claim against the July 30 e-mail.

4. Non-Compliance with Internal Policy: Terravita argued that its own Rules, Policies, and Procedures required members to submit records requests to the General Manager and/or Director of Administration, not the Secretary.

Court’s Finding: The decision focused entirely on the violation of the state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1805, indicating that the statutory obligation superseded the association’s internal procedural preferences.

Legal Framework and Conclusions of Law

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) mandates that a homeowners’ association “shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination” of its financial and other records by a member.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner was required to prove the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that Mr. Brown successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1. He submitted a request for records to Terravita’s Secretary via e-mail on July 30, 2016.

2. Terravita failed to fulfill this request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

Final Judgment: The Tribunal concluded that “Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.” It was also noted that Terravita did not contend that any of the statutory exceptions to disclosure, such as privileged communication or pending litigation, applied.

Final Order and Directives

The ALJ’s decision was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on July 11, 2017, making it a Final Order with the following mandates:

Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

Compliance with Request: Terravita was ordered to “comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request of Terravita’s records” within 10 days of the Order.

Reimbursement of Filing Fee: Terravita was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 directly to him within thirty (30) days.

Civil Penalty: The court determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

Effective Date: The Order was made effective five (5) days from the date of its certification. The Final Order itself is effective immediately from the date of service, July 11, 2017.


William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716005-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-10
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after the Tribunal concluded that the Respondent, Terravita Country Club, Inc., violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to timely provide access to records within the mandated 10 business days. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute and refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was imposed.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely respond to records request

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to timely respond to his July 30, 2016 records request, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The Tribunal found that Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent failed to fulfill the request for examination of records within 10 business days, violating A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Orders: Respondent is ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request for records within 10 days of the Order. Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records Request, Failure to Respond, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 574630.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:03 (87.9 KB)

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 575115.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:03 (789.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716005-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and final order in the case of William M. Brown (Petitioner) versus Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Respondent), Case No. 17F-H1716005-REL. The central issue was Terravita’s failure to respond to a member’s request for records within the 10-business-day timeframe mandated by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the Petitioner’s testimony and evidence to be credible, establishing that Mr. Brown submitted a valid records request via e-mail on July 30, 2016, to which Terravita did not timely respond. The ALJ found the testimony of Terravita’s key witness to be unreliable and rejected Terravita’s defenses, which included claims of non-receipt, improper submission procedure, and falsified evidence.

Ultimately, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner, concluding that Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The recommended order, which was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, mandated that Terravita comply with the records request, reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee, and deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party. No civil penalty was assessed.

Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

17F-H1716005-REL (OAH) / HO 17-16/005 (DRE)

Petitioner

William M. Brown (Appeared on behalf of himself)

Respondent

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Represented by Joshua Bolen, Esq.)

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Adopting Authority

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Commissioner

Judy Lowe

Hearing Date

June 19, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

July 10, 2017

Final Order Date

July 11, 2017

Chronology of Events

February 12, 2016: Anita Bell requests records from Terravita via Mr. Brown’s e-mail account. The request is forwarded to General Manager Tom Forbes.

February 19, 2016: Mr. Forbes informs Ms. Bell that the records will be ready on February 22.

March 14, 2016: Ms. Bell submits another records request from Mr. Brown’s e-mail account.

March 18, 2016: Cici Rausch, Terravita’s Director of Administration, informs Ms. Bell when the records can be retrieved.

July 29, 2016: Date of the records request at the center of the legal dispute.

July 30, 2016: Mr. Brown e-mails the records request to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley. On the same day, he separately requests records from the Terravita Community Association, Inc. (TCA).

August 6, 2016: Mr. Brown sends another records request to Ms. Wiley.

August 8, 2016: TCA responds to Mr. Brown’s July 30 request.

August 12, 2016: Terravita responds to Mr. Brown’s August 6 request.

August 18, 2016: Mr. Brown files a Petition for Hearing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond to his July 30 request.

September 9, 2016: Terravita files a response, alleging it did not receive the July 30 records request.

June 19, 2017: The administrative hearing is held.

July 10, 2017: The ALJ issues a decision finding in favor of Mr. Brown.

July 11, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepts the ALJ’s decision and issues a Final Order.

Analysis of the Central Dispute

The core of the case revolved around whether Terravita violated its statutory duty to respond to Mr. Brown’s records request dated July 29, 2016, which he e-mailed on July 30, 2016.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence

Core Allegation: Mr. Brown testified that he sent the records request via e-mail to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley, on July 30, 2016, and that Terravita failed to respond within the 10-business-day period mandated by law.

Evidence: Mr. Brown submitted an August 12, 2016 forwarded e-mail (Exhibit P2) that contained the original July 30, 2016 e-mail sent to Ms. Wiley.

Judicial Finding: The ALJ found Mr. Brown’s testimony to be “credible.”

Respondent’s Defenses and the Court’s Findings

Terravita presented several arguments to contest the allegation, all of which were ultimately unpersuasive to the court.

1. Claim of Non-Receipt: Terravita contended it never received the July 30, 2016 request. Ms. Wiley testified she did not receive a request from Mr. Brown on July 29 or July 30.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ found Ms. Wiley’s testimony to be “unreliable.” The decision noted that Ms. Wiley testified that Terravita was “indirectly” informed around August 5 that “perhaps Mr. Brown had made the request,” which undermined the claim of complete non-awareness.

2. Use of an Incorrect E-mail Address: Ms. Wiley testified that she did not use the e-mail address to which Mr. Brown sent the request for Terravita affairs, claiming she used a different one in her official capacity as Secretary.

Court’s Finding: This argument was implicitly rejected, as the ALJ concluded that Mr. Brown had successfully proven he submitted the request “to its Secretary, Ms. Wiley.”

3. Allegation of Falsified Evidence: Terravita contended that the forwarded e-mail evidence offered by Mr. Brown was falsified.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ noted an inconsistency in Terravita’s position, stating, “Terravita did not contend that the written evidence of Mr. Brown’s August 5, 2016 records request, sent by e-mail to Ms. Wiley, was falsified.” This weakened the credibility of the falsification claim against the July 30 e-mail.

4. Non-Compliance with Internal Policy: Terravita argued that its own Rules, Policies, and Procedures required members to submit records requests to the General Manager and/or Director of Administration, not the Secretary.

Court’s Finding: The decision focused entirely on the violation of the state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1805, indicating that the statutory obligation superseded the association’s internal procedural preferences.

Legal Framework and Conclusions of Law

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) mandates that a homeowners’ association “shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination” of its financial and other records by a member.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner was required to prove the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that Mr. Brown successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1. He submitted a request for records to Terravita’s Secretary via e-mail on July 30, 2016.

2. Terravita failed to fulfill this request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

Final Judgment: The Tribunal concluded that “Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.” It was also noted that Terravita did not contend that any of the statutory exceptions to disclosure, such as privileged communication or pending litigation, applied.

Final Order and Directives

The ALJ’s decision was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on July 11, 2017, making it a Final Order with the following mandates:

Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

Compliance with Request: Terravita was ordered to “comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request of Terravita’s records” within 10 days of the Order.

Reimbursement of Filing Fee: Terravita was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 directly to him within thirty (30) days.

Civil Penalty: The court determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

Effective Date: The Order was made effective five (5) days from the date of its certification. The Final Order itself is effective immediately from the date of service, July 11, 2017.






Study Guide – 17F-H1716005-REL


Study Guide: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716005-REL)

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing decision concerning William M. Brown’s records request to the Terravita Country Club. The case centers on the interpretation and application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. The guide includes a short-answer quiz, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined and used within the legal documents.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing information exclusively from the provided case documents.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what was their established relationship?

2. What specific failure by Terravita Country Club, Inc. led Mr. Brown to file his Petition for Hearing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. According to A.R.S. § 33-1805, what is the required timeframe for an association to fulfill a member’s request to examine its records?

4. What were the primary arguments Terravita presented to defend its failure to provide the requested records?

5. How did the Administrative Law Judge assess the credibility of the testimony provided by Mr. Brown and Terravita’s witness, Ms. Fran Wiley?

6. What piece of documentary evidence did Mr. Brown submit to prove he had sent the records request on July 30, 2016?

7. What is the standard of proof required in this hearing, and how is that standard defined in the decision?

8. What two specific actions did the final Recommended Order compel Terravita to take as a result of the ruling?

9. Why was Terravita’s argument that Mr. Brown failed to follow its internal rules for submitting records requests ultimately unsuccessful?

10. What was the role of the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate after the Administrative Law Judge issued her decision?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was William M. Brown, and the Respondent was Terravita Country Club, Inc. At all times relevant to the matter, Mr. Brown was a member of the Terravita Country Club.

2. Mr. Brown filed the petition because Terravita failed to respond to his July 30, 2016, request for records within the 10-business-day timeframe mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). This failure to provide timely access to the records was the central violation alleged.

3. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) states that the association must fulfill a request for examination of its records within ten business days. If copies are requested, the association has ten business days to provide them and may charge up to fifteen cents per page.

4. Terravita argued that it never received the July 30, 2016, request from Mr. Brown. They also contended that his email evidence was falsified and that he failed to comply with their internal policy requiring such requests be sent to the General Manager or Director of Administration.

5. The Administrative Law Judge found Mr. Brown’s testimony to be credible. Conversely, the Judge found the testimony of Ms. Wiley, who testified on behalf of Terravita, to be unreliable.

6. Mr. Brown submitted an August 12, 2016, forwarded email that contained his original July 30, 2016, email to Ms. Wiley. This original email contained the records request dated July 29, 2016.

7. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The decision defines this as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as having “the most convincing force” or “superior evidentiary weight.”

8. The Recommended Order compelled Terravita to pay Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee within thirty days of the order. It also ordered Terravita to comply with the records request and provide the documents within ten days of the order.

9. The argument was unsuccessful because the Judge concluded that Terravita violated the plain meaning of the state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1805. The ruling focused on this statutory violation, noting that Terravita did not contend that any of the law’s specific exceptions for withholding records applied.

10. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, was responsible for reviewing the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. The Commissioner accepted the decision and issued a Final Order, which made the Judge’s recommendations legally binding and enforceable.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based solely on the provided source documents.

1. Analyze Terravita’s defense strategy. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments regarding not receiving the email, the alleged falsification of evidence, and the club’s internal policies for records requests.

2. Explain the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. How did the Administrative Law Judge apply this standard to the conflicting testimonies of William Brown and Fran Wiley to reach her conclusion?

3. Discuss the significance of A.R.S. § 33-1805 in the context of planned communities. Based on the details in the case, why is a member’s right to access association records important, and what protections does this statute provide?

4. Trace the procedural path of this dispute from Mr. Brown’s initial records request to the Final Order. What roles did the Petitioner, the Respondent, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Department of Real Estate play in this process?

5. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision rested heavily on findings of credibility. Explore the factors detailed in the case documents that might have led the judge to find Mr. Brown’s testimony “credible” and Ms. Wiley’s “unreliable.”

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official (Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, evaluates evidence and testimony, and issues a recommended decision based on the law.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

The Arizona Revised Statute at the heart of the case. It mandates that a planned community association must make all financial and other records reasonably available for a member’s examination within ten business days of a request.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove an assertion. The Petitioner (Mr. Brown) bore the burden of proving that the Respondent (Terravita) violated the statute.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency where Mr. Brown filed his Petition for Hearing. Its Commissioner (Judy Lowe) has the authority to accept an ALJ’s decision and issue a final, binding order.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent agency that conducts formal hearings for disputes concerning violations of planned community statutes, as authorized by A.R.S. § 41-1092.01.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this matter, the Petitioner was William M. Brown.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to prove his case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force.”

Prevailing Party

The party who is successful and wins the legal dispute. The Administrative Law Judge’s order deemed the Petitioner, William M. Brown, to be the prevailing party.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this matter, the Respondent was Terravita Country Club, Inc.






Blog Post – 17F-H1716005-REL


He Sued His HOA Over an Unanswered Email—And Won. Here Are 4 Lessons from the Judge’s Ruling.

1. Introduction: The Black Hole of Bureaucracy

We’ve all been there. You draft a clear, important request, send it to a large organization, and wait. And wait. The silence that follows can feel like your message was sent into a black hole. This frustration is especially common for homeowners dealing with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA), where getting a straight answer or a timely response can seem impossible.

But what if being ignored is more than just frustrating? What if it’s a violation of the law? The case of William M. Brown versus the Terravita Country Club provides a powerful real-world example of one member who fought back against being ignored—and won. His persistence offers crucial lessons for any homeowner who has ever felt powerless against their association’s bureaucracy.

2. Takeaway 1: The “We Never Got the Email” Defense Isn’t Bulletproof

When faced with Mr. Brown’s petition, Terravita’s primary defense was simple: they claimed they never received his July 30, 2016, email requesting association records. They went even further, contending that the email evidence he provided was falsified.

This defense crumbled under scrutiny. Mr. Brown presented a forwarded email as evidence of his original request. In the end, the case came down to witness testimony, and the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion was direct and unambiguous. The judge made two critical findings on the credibility of the parties involved:

I find Mr. Brown’s testimony to be credible.

And regarding the testimony from Terravita’s representative, the Secretary Ms. Wiley:

I find Ms. Wiley’s testimony to be unreliable.

The judge’s conclusion was not arbitrary; it was based on a clear contradiction in the evidence. Ms. Wiley testified that she did not use the specific email address where Mr. Brown sent the request for association business. However, evidence presented to the court showed that just a few months prior, she had successfully received and processed two separate records requests sent to that very same email address, proving it was a valid and functioning channel for communication. This detail demonstrates how an individual’s careful documentation can expose an organization’s flawed defense.

3. Takeaway 2: State Law Overrules Internal Red Tape

Terravita offered a second line of defense: even if they had received the email, Mr. Brown hadn’t followed their internal “Rules, Policies and Procedures.” The association argued that members were required to submit records requests to the General Manager or Director of Administration, not the association’s Secretary, whom Mr. Brown had emailed.

This argument was deemed irrelevant by the judge. The decision hinged not on Terravita’s internal rules, but on the plain language of Arizona state law, A.R.S. § 33-1805. The statute simply requires the association to make records available within ten business days of a request; it does not specify which officer or employee must receive that request.

By failing to respond, Terravita violated the statute, regardless of its own procedural preferences. This is a critical reminder for all homeowners: your rights are often enshrined in state law, and those rights cannot be diminished or negated by an HOA’s internal bylaws or policies.

4. Takeaway 3: A Simple Request Has a Firm Deadline

The core violation in this case was a failure to meet a specific, legally mandated deadline. Under Arizona law A.R.S. § 33-1805, an association has ten business days to fulfill a member’s request for the examination of records.

The timeline of events was clear:

• Mr. Brown sent his records request via email on July 30, 2016.

• The judge found that “Terravita did not respond to Mr. Brown’s records request within 10 business days.”

Adding weight to this was the fact that the association had previously proven itself more than capable of handling requests sent from Mr. Brown’s email account. Earlier that year, another individual had successfully requested records through the same channel. In those instances, Terravita had been prompt, often acknowledging requests within a day or two and making records available well within the legal deadline. This history undermined any claim of inability to respond. The law’s ten-day deadline is not a vague guideline; it is a specific and enforceable protection for members’ right to information.

5. Takeaway 4: Persistence Can Literally Pay Off

After reviewing the evidence, the judge ruled that Mr. Brown was the “prevailing party.” This victory was not just symbolic; it came with concrete orders that held the association accountable.

The judge’s final decision included the following orders:

• Terravita was ordered to comply with the records request within 10 days.

• Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00.

Mr. Brown’s persistence didn’t just get him the documents he was legally entitled to; it also resulted in the full reimbursement of his filing costs. This outcome serves as a powerful example that standing up for your rights as a homeowner is not always a futile or expensive endeavor. With proper documentation and an understanding of the law, a single member can hold their association accountable.

6. Conclusion: Your Rights Are Written in Law

While homeowners are obligated to follow their HOA’s rules, the association is equally obligated to follow state law. These laws provide clear rights and protections designed to ensure transparency and fairness. The case of William M. Brown is a testament to the power of a single, well-documented request and the importance of understanding the laws that govern your association.

The next time you feel ignored by a large organization, what’s the one simple step you can take to ensure your request is not only heard, but documented?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William M. Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself
  • Anita Bell (records requester)
    Requested records via Mr. Brown's e-mail account

Respondent Side

  • Joshua Bolen (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Appeared for Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc.
  • Fran Wiley (secretary/witness)
    Terravita Country Club, Inc.
    Terravita Secretary; testified on behalf of Terravita
  • Tom Forbes (general manager)
    Terravita Country Club, Inc.
  • Cici Rausch (director of administration)
    Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Signed the Final Order
  • Abby Hansen (HOA coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed for rehearing requests and signed mailing notice

William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716005-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-10
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after the Tribunal concluded that the Respondent, Terravita Country Club, Inc., violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to timely provide access to records within the mandated 10 business days. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute and refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was imposed.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely respond to records request

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to timely respond to his July 30, 2016 records request, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The Tribunal found that Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent failed to fulfill the request for examination of records within 10 business days, violating A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Orders: Respondent is ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request for records within 10 days of the Order. Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records Request, Failure to Respond, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 574630.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:51 (87.9 KB)

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 575115.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:55 (789.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716005-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and final order in the case of William M. Brown (Petitioner) versus Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Respondent), Case No. 17F-H1716005-REL. The central issue was Terravita’s failure to respond to a member’s request for records within the 10-business-day timeframe mandated by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the Petitioner’s testimony and evidence to be credible, establishing that Mr. Brown submitted a valid records request via e-mail on July 30, 2016, to which Terravita did not timely respond. The ALJ found the testimony of Terravita’s key witness to be unreliable and rejected Terravita’s defenses, which included claims of non-receipt, improper submission procedure, and falsified evidence.

Ultimately, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner, concluding that Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The recommended order, which was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, mandated that Terravita comply with the records request, reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee, and deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party. No civil penalty was assessed.

Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

17F-H1716005-REL (OAH) / HO 17-16/005 (DRE)

Petitioner

William M. Brown (Appeared on behalf of himself)

Respondent

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Represented by Joshua Bolen, Esq.)

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Adopting Authority

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Commissioner

Judy Lowe

Hearing Date

June 19, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

July 10, 2017

Final Order Date

July 11, 2017

Chronology of Events

February 12, 2016: Anita Bell requests records from Terravita via Mr. Brown’s e-mail account. The request is forwarded to General Manager Tom Forbes.

February 19, 2016: Mr. Forbes informs Ms. Bell that the records will be ready on February 22.

March 14, 2016: Ms. Bell submits another records request from Mr. Brown’s e-mail account.

March 18, 2016: Cici Rausch, Terravita’s Director of Administration, informs Ms. Bell when the records can be retrieved.

July 29, 2016: Date of the records request at the center of the legal dispute.

July 30, 2016: Mr. Brown e-mails the records request to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley. On the same day, he separately requests records from the Terravita Community Association, Inc. (TCA).

August 6, 2016: Mr. Brown sends another records request to Ms. Wiley.

August 8, 2016: TCA responds to Mr. Brown’s July 30 request.

August 12, 2016: Terravita responds to Mr. Brown’s August 6 request.

August 18, 2016: Mr. Brown files a Petition for Hearing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond to his July 30 request.

September 9, 2016: Terravita files a response, alleging it did not receive the July 30 records request.

June 19, 2017: The administrative hearing is held.

July 10, 2017: The ALJ issues a decision finding in favor of Mr. Brown.

July 11, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepts the ALJ’s decision and issues a Final Order.

Analysis of the Central Dispute

The core of the case revolved around whether Terravita violated its statutory duty to respond to Mr. Brown’s records request dated July 29, 2016, which he e-mailed on July 30, 2016.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence

Core Allegation: Mr. Brown testified that he sent the records request via e-mail to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley, on July 30, 2016, and that Terravita failed to respond within the 10-business-day period mandated by law.

Evidence: Mr. Brown submitted an August 12, 2016 forwarded e-mail (Exhibit P2) that contained the original July 30, 2016 e-mail sent to Ms. Wiley.

Judicial Finding: The ALJ found Mr. Brown’s testimony to be “credible.”

Respondent’s Defenses and the Court’s Findings

Terravita presented several arguments to contest the allegation, all of which were ultimately unpersuasive to the court.

1. Claim of Non-Receipt: Terravita contended it never received the July 30, 2016 request. Ms. Wiley testified she did not receive a request from Mr. Brown on July 29 or July 30.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ found Ms. Wiley’s testimony to be “unreliable.” The decision noted that Ms. Wiley testified that Terravita was “indirectly” informed around August 5 that “perhaps Mr. Brown had made the request,” which undermined the claim of complete non-awareness.

2. Use of an Incorrect E-mail Address: Ms. Wiley testified that she did not use the e-mail address to which Mr. Brown sent the request for Terravita affairs, claiming she used a different one in her official capacity as Secretary.

Court’s Finding: This argument was implicitly rejected, as the ALJ concluded that Mr. Brown had successfully proven he submitted the request “to its Secretary, Ms. Wiley.”

3. Allegation of Falsified Evidence: Terravita contended that the forwarded e-mail evidence offered by Mr. Brown was falsified.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ noted an inconsistency in Terravita’s position, stating, “Terravita did not contend that the written evidence of Mr. Brown’s August 5, 2016 records request, sent by e-mail to Ms. Wiley, was falsified.” This weakened the credibility of the falsification claim against the July 30 e-mail.

4. Non-Compliance with Internal Policy: Terravita argued that its own Rules, Policies, and Procedures required members to submit records requests to the General Manager and/or Director of Administration, not the Secretary.

Court’s Finding: The decision focused entirely on the violation of the state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1805, indicating that the statutory obligation superseded the association’s internal procedural preferences.

Legal Framework and Conclusions of Law

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) mandates that a homeowners’ association “shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination” of its financial and other records by a member.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner was required to prove the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that Mr. Brown successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1. He submitted a request for records to Terravita’s Secretary via e-mail on July 30, 2016.

2. Terravita failed to fulfill this request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

Final Judgment: The Tribunal concluded that “Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.” It was also noted that Terravita did not contend that any of the statutory exceptions to disclosure, such as privileged communication or pending litigation, applied.

Final Order and Directives

The ALJ’s decision was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on July 11, 2017, making it a Final Order with the following mandates:

Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

Compliance with Request: Terravita was ordered to “comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request of Terravita’s records” within 10 days of the Order.

Reimbursement of Filing Fee: Terravita was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 directly to him within thirty (30) days.

Civil Penalty: The court determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

Effective Date: The Order was made effective five (5) days from the date of its certification. The Final Order itself is effective immediately from the date of service, July 11, 2017.






Study Guide – 17F-H1716005-REL


Study Guide: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716005-REL)

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing decision concerning William M. Brown’s records request to the Terravita Country Club. The case centers on the interpretation and application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. The guide includes a short-answer quiz, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined and used within the legal documents.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing information exclusively from the provided case documents.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what was their established relationship?

2. What specific failure by Terravita Country Club, Inc. led Mr. Brown to file his Petition for Hearing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. According to A.R.S. § 33-1805, what is the required timeframe for an association to fulfill a member’s request to examine its records?

4. What were the primary arguments Terravita presented to defend its failure to provide the requested records?

5. How did the Administrative Law Judge assess the credibility of the testimony provided by Mr. Brown and Terravita’s witness, Ms. Fran Wiley?

6. What piece of documentary evidence did Mr. Brown submit to prove he had sent the records request on July 30, 2016?

7. What is the standard of proof required in this hearing, and how is that standard defined in the decision?

8. What two specific actions did the final Recommended Order compel Terravita to take as a result of the ruling?

9. Why was Terravita’s argument that Mr. Brown failed to follow its internal rules for submitting records requests ultimately unsuccessful?

10. What was the role of the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate after the Administrative Law Judge issued her decision?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was William M. Brown, and the Respondent was Terravita Country Club, Inc. At all times relevant to the matter, Mr. Brown was a member of the Terravita Country Club.

2. Mr. Brown filed the petition because Terravita failed to respond to his July 30, 2016, request for records within the 10-business-day timeframe mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). This failure to provide timely access to the records was the central violation alleged.

3. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) states that the association must fulfill a request for examination of its records within ten business days. If copies are requested, the association has ten business days to provide them and may charge up to fifteen cents per page.

4. Terravita argued that it never received the July 30, 2016, request from Mr. Brown. They also contended that his email evidence was falsified and that he failed to comply with their internal policy requiring such requests be sent to the General Manager or Director of Administration.

5. The Administrative Law Judge found Mr. Brown’s testimony to be credible. Conversely, the Judge found the testimony of Ms. Wiley, who testified on behalf of Terravita, to be unreliable.

6. Mr. Brown submitted an August 12, 2016, forwarded email that contained his original July 30, 2016, email to Ms. Wiley. This original email contained the records request dated July 29, 2016.

7. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The decision defines this as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as having “the most convincing force” or “superior evidentiary weight.”

8. The Recommended Order compelled Terravita to pay Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee within thirty days of the order. It also ordered Terravita to comply with the records request and provide the documents within ten days of the order.

9. The argument was unsuccessful because the Judge concluded that Terravita violated the plain meaning of the state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1805. The ruling focused on this statutory violation, noting that Terravita did not contend that any of the law’s specific exceptions for withholding records applied.

10. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, was responsible for reviewing the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. The Commissioner accepted the decision and issued a Final Order, which made the Judge’s recommendations legally binding and enforceable.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based solely on the provided source documents.

1. Analyze Terravita’s defense strategy. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments regarding not receiving the email, the alleged falsification of evidence, and the club’s internal policies for records requests.

2. Explain the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. How did the Administrative Law Judge apply this standard to the conflicting testimonies of William Brown and Fran Wiley to reach her conclusion?

3. Discuss the significance of A.R.S. § 33-1805 in the context of planned communities. Based on the details in the case, why is a member’s right to access association records important, and what protections does this statute provide?

4. Trace the procedural path of this dispute from Mr. Brown’s initial records request to the Final Order. What roles did the Petitioner, the Respondent, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Department of Real Estate play in this process?

5. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision rested heavily on findings of credibility. Explore the factors detailed in the case documents that might have led the judge to find Mr. Brown’s testimony “credible” and Ms. Wiley’s “unreliable.”

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official (Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, evaluates evidence and testimony, and issues a recommended decision based on the law.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

The Arizona Revised Statute at the heart of the case. It mandates that a planned community association must make all financial and other records reasonably available for a member’s examination within ten business days of a request.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove an assertion. The Petitioner (Mr. Brown) bore the burden of proving that the Respondent (Terravita) violated the statute.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency where Mr. Brown filed his Petition for Hearing. Its Commissioner (Judy Lowe) has the authority to accept an ALJ’s decision and issue a final, binding order.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent agency that conducts formal hearings for disputes concerning violations of planned community statutes, as authorized by A.R.S. § 41-1092.01.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this matter, the Petitioner was William M. Brown.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to prove his case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force.”

Prevailing Party

The party who is successful and wins the legal dispute. The Administrative Law Judge’s order deemed the Petitioner, William M. Brown, to be the prevailing party.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this matter, the Respondent was Terravita Country Club, Inc.






Blog Post – 17F-H1716005-REL


He Sued His HOA Over an Unanswered Email—And Won. Here Are 4 Lessons from the Judge’s Ruling.

1. Introduction: The Black Hole of Bureaucracy

We’ve all been there. You draft a clear, important request, send it to a large organization, and wait. And wait. The silence that follows can feel like your message was sent into a black hole. This frustration is especially common for homeowners dealing with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA), where getting a straight answer or a timely response can seem impossible.

But what if being ignored is more than just frustrating? What if it’s a violation of the law? The case of William M. Brown versus the Terravita Country Club provides a powerful real-world example of one member who fought back against being ignored—and won. His persistence offers crucial lessons for any homeowner who has ever felt powerless against their association’s bureaucracy.

2. Takeaway 1: The “We Never Got the Email” Defense Isn’t Bulletproof

When faced with Mr. Brown’s petition, Terravita’s primary defense was simple: they claimed they never received his July 30, 2016, email requesting association records. They went even further, contending that the email evidence he provided was falsified.

This defense crumbled under scrutiny. Mr. Brown presented a forwarded email as evidence of his original request. In the end, the case came down to witness testimony, and the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion was direct and unambiguous. The judge made two critical findings on the credibility of the parties involved:

I find Mr. Brown’s testimony to be credible.

And regarding the testimony from Terravita’s representative, the Secretary Ms. Wiley:

I find Ms. Wiley’s testimony to be unreliable.

The judge’s conclusion was not arbitrary; it was based on a clear contradiction in the evidence. Ms. Wiley testified that she did not use the specific email address where Mr. Brown sent the request for association business. However, evidence presented to the court showed that just a few months prior, she had successfully received and processed two separate records requests sent to that very same email address, proving it was a valid and functioning channel for communication. This detail demonstrates how an individual’s careful documentation can expose an organization’s flawed defense.

3. Takeaway 2: State Law Overrules Internal Red Tape

Terravita offered a second line of defense: even if they had received the email, Mr. Brown hadn’t followed their internal “Rules, Policies and Procedures.” The association argued that members were required to submit records requests to the General Manager or Director of Administration, not the association’s Secretary, whom Mr. Brown had emailed.

This argument was deemed irrelevant by the judge. The decision hinged not on Terravita’s internal rules, but on the plain language of Arizona state law, A.R.S. § 33-1805. The statute simply requires the association to make records available within ten business days of a request; it does not specify which officer or employee must receive that request.

By failing to respond, Terravita violated the statute, regardless of its own procedural preferences. This is a critical reminder for all homeowners: your rights are often enshrined in state law, and those rights cannot be diminished or negated by an HOA’s internal bylaws or policies.

4. Takeaway 3: A Simple Request Has a Firm Deadline

The core violation in this case was a failure to meet a specific, legally mandated deadline. Under Arizona law A.R.S. § 33-1805, an association has ten business days to fulfill a member’s request for the examination of records.

The timeline of events was clear:

• Mr. Brown sent his records request via email on July 30, 2016.

• The judge found that “Terravita did not respond to Mr. Brown’s records request within 10 business days.”

Adding weight to this was the fact that the association had previously proven itself more than capable of handling requests sent from Mr. Brown’s email account. Earlier that year, another individual had successfully requested records through the same channel. In those instances, Terravita had been prompt, often acknowledging requests within a day or two and making records available well within the legal deadline. This history undermined any claim of inability to respond. The law’s ten-day deadline is not a vague guideline; it is a specific and enforceable protection for members’ right to information.

5. Takeaway 4: Persistence Can Literally Pay Off

After reviewing the evidence, the judge ruled that Mr. Brown was the “prevailing party.” This victory was not just symbolic; it came with concrete orders that held the association accountable.

The judge’s final decision included the following orders:

• Terravita was ordered to comply with the records request within 10 days.

• Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00.

Mr. Brown’s persistence didn’t just get him the documents he was legally entitled to; it also resulted in the full reimbursement of his filing costs. This outcome serves as a powerful example that standing up for your rights as a homeowner is not always a futile or expensive endeavor. With proper documentation and an understanding of the law, a single member can hold their association accountable.

6. Conclusion: Your Rights Are Written in Law

While homeowners are obligated to follow their HOA’s rules, the association is equally obligated to follow state law. These laws provide clear rights and protections designed to ensure transparency and fairness. The case of William M. Brown is a testament to the power of a single, well-documented request and the importance of understanding the laws that govern your association.

The next time you feel ignored by a large organization, what’s the one simple step you can take to ensure your request is not only heard, but documented?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William M. Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself
  • Anita Bell (records requester)
    Requested records via Mr. Brown's e-mail account

Respondent Side

  • Joshua Bolen (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Appeared for Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc.
  • Fran Wiley (secretary/witness)
    Terravita Country Club, Inc.
    Terravita Secretary; testified on behalf of Terravita
  • Tom Forbes (general manager)
    Terravita Country Club, Inc.
  • Cici Rausch (director of administration)
    Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Signed the Final Order
  • Abby Hansen (HOA coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed for rehearing requests and signed mailing notice

William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716005-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-10
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after the Tribunal concluded that the Respondent, Terravita Country Club, Inc., violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to timely provide access to records within the mandated 10 business days. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute and refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was imposed.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely respond to records request

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to timely respond to his July 30, 2016 records request, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The Tribunal found that Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent failed to fulfill the request for examination of records within 10 business days, violating A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Orders: Respondent is ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request for records within 10 days of the Order. Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records Request, Failure to Respond, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 574630.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:58 (87.9 KB)

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 575115.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:00 (789.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716005-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and final order in the case of William M. Brown (Petitioner) versus Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Respondent), Case No. 17F-H1716005-REL. The central issue was Terravita’s failure to respond to a member’s request for records within the 10-business-day timeframe mandated by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the Petitioner’s testimony and evidence to be credible, establishing that Mr. Brown submitted a valid records request via e-mail on July 30, 2016, to which Terravita did not timely respond. The ALJ found the testimony of Terravita’s key witness to be unreliable and rejected Terravita’s defenses, which included claims of non-receipt, improper submission procedure, and falsified evidence.

Ultimately, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner, concluding that Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The recommended order, which was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, mandated that Terravita comply with the records request, reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee, and deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party. No civil penalty was assessed.

Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

17F-H1716005-REL (OAH) / HO 17-16/005 (DRE)

Petitioner

William M. Brown (Appeared on behalf of himself)

Respondent

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Represented by Joshua Bolen, Esq.)

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Adopting Authority

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Commissioner

Judy Lowe

Hearing Date

June 19, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

July 10, 2017

Final Order Date

July 11, 2017

Chronology of Events

February 12, 2016: Anita Bell requests records from Terravita via Mr. Brown’s e-mail account. The request is forwarded to General Manager Tom Forbes.

February 19, 2016: Mr. Forbes informs Ms. Bell that the records will be ready on February 22.

March 14, 2016: Ms. Bell submits another records request from Mr. Brown’s e-mail account.

March 18, 2016: Cici Rausch, Terravita’s Director of Administration, informs Ms. Bell when the records can be retrieved.

July 29, 2016: Date of the records request at the center of the legal dispute.

July 30, 2016: Mr. Brown e-mails the records request to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley. On the same day, he separately requests records from the Terravita Community Association, Inc. (TCA).

August 6, 2016: Mr. Brown sends another records request to Ms. Wiley.

August 8, 2016: TCA responds to Mr. Brown’s July 30 request.

August 12, 2016: Terravita responds to Mr. Brown’s August 6 request.

August 18, 2016: Mr. Brown files a Petition for Hearing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond to his July 30 request.

September 9, 2016: Terravita files a response, alleging it did not receive the July 30 records request.

June 19, 2017: The administrative hearing is held.

July 10, 2017: The ALJ issues a decision finding in favor of Mr. Brown.

July 11, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepts the ALJ’s decision and issues a Final Order.

Analysis of the Central Dispute

The core of the case revolved around whether Terravita violated its statutory duty to respond to Mr. Brown’s records request dated July 29, 2016, which he e-mailed on July 30, 2016.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence

Core Allegation: Mr. Brown testified that he sent the records request via e-mail to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley, on July 30, 2016, and that Terravita failed to respond within the 10-business-day period mandated by law.

Evidence: Mr. Brown submitted an August 12, 2016 forwarded e-mail (Exhibit P2) that contained the original July 30, 2016 e-mail sent to Ms. Wiley.

Judicial Finding: The ALJ found Mr. Brown’s testimony to be “credible.”

Respondent’s Defenses and the Court’s Findings

Terravita presented several arguments to contest the allegation, all of which were ultimately unpersuasive to the court.

1. Claim of Non-Receipt: Terravita contended it never received the July 30, 2016 request. Ms. Wiley testified she did not receive a request from Mr. Brown on July 29 or July 30.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ found Ms. Wiley’s testimony to be “unreliable.” The decision noted that Ms. Wiley testified that Terravita was “indirectly” informed around August 5 that “perhaps Mr. Brown had made the request,” which undermined the claim of complete non-awareness.

2. Use of an Incorrect E-mail Address: Ms. Wiley testified that she did not use the e-mail address to which Mr. Brown sent the request for Terravita affairs, claiming she used a different one in her official capacity as Secretary.

Court’s Finding: This argument was implicitly rejected, as the ALJ concluded that Mr. Brown had successfully proven he submitted the request “to its Secretary, Ms. Wiley.”

3. Allegation of Falsified Evidence: Terravita contended that the forwarded e-mail evidence offered by Mr. Brown was falsified.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ noted an inconsistency in Terravita’s position, stating, “Terravita did not contend that the written evidence of Mr. Brown’s August 5, 2016 records request, sent by e-mail to Ms. Wiley, was falsified.” This weakened the credibility of the falsification claim against the July 30 e-mail.

4. Non-Compliance with Internal Policy: Terravita argued that its own Rules, Policies, and Procedures required members to submit records requests to the General Manager and/or Director of Administration, not the Secretary.

Court’s Finding: The decision focused entirely on the violation of the state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1805, indicating that the statutory obligation superseded the association’s internal procedural preferences.

Legal Framework and Conclusions of Law

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) mandates that a homeowners’ association “shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination” of its financial and other records by a member.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner was required to prove the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that Mr. Brown successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1. He submitted a request for records to Terravita’s Secretary via e-mail on July 30, 2016.

2. Terravita failed to fulfill this request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

Final Judgment: The Tribunal concluded that “Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.” It was also noted that Terravita did not contend that any of the statutory exceptions to disclosure, such as privileged communication or pending litigation, applied.

Final Order and Directives

The ALJ’s decision was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on July 11, 2017, making it a Final Order with the following mandates:

Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

Compliance with Request: Terravita was ordered to “comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request of Terravita’s records” within 10 days of the Order.

Reimbursement of Filing Fee: Terravita was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 directly to him within thirty (30) days.

Civil Penalty: The court determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

Effective Date: The Order was made effective five (5) days from the date of its certification. The Final Order itself is effective immediately from the date of service, July 11, 2017.


Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716018-REL, 17F-H1716022-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-07
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association Counsel James Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitions were dismissed with prejudice because the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), thereby denying the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the statutory definition of a 'planned community'.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction regarding definition of Planned Community

The Respondent moved to vacate claiming the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Association was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The Respondent did not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant. The ALJ agreed that OAH lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: The Petitions in these consolidated matters are recommended to be dismissed with prejudice. This recommendation was adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802(4), dismissal with prejudice
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 574052.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:57 (91.5 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 575056.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:57 (566.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716018-REL


Briefing Document: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee versus the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association (POA). The central issue was a successful jurisdictional challenge by the Respondent POA, leading to the dismissal of petitions filed by Mr. Satterlee.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent POA does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This definition requires an association to own and operate real estate or hold an easement or covenant to maintain roadways. Both parties agreed that the Respondent POA did not meet these criteria.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that jurisdiction should be inferred from a prior case and from the Respondent’s own community documents—were rejected. The ALJ’s decision emphasized the legal principle that subject matter jurisdiction is dictated by statute, cannot be waived by parties, and cannot be conferred by estoppel or prior administrative oversight. The petitions were ultimately dismissed with prejudice, with the Petitioner retaining the right to pursue action in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Overview

This matter involves consolidated petitions brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Parties and Legal Representation

Representation

Petitioner

Thomas Satterlee

Represented himself

Respondent

Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Represented by James Robles, Esq.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil

Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Commissioner Judy Lowe

Department of Real Estate

Note: The Petitioner argued that Mr. Robles was not authorized to represent the Respondent. The ALJ determined that the filing of a Notice of Appearance was sufficient for the proceeding and that concerns over the propriety of the representation could be addressed in another forum.

Case Identification

Identifier

Details

Consolidated OAH Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Docket Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Case Numbers

HO 17-16/022 & HO 17-16/018

Key Dates

March 15, 2017: Respondent files a motion to vacate, challenging subject matter jurisdiction.

June 27, 2017: Oral argument held on the jurisdictional motion.

July 6, 2017: ALJ Suzanne Marwil issues a decision recommending dismissal.

July 7, 2017: Commissioner Judy Lowe issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Jurisdictional Challenge and Arguments

The case pivoted from a substantive hearing to a dispositive oral argument focused exclusively on the OAH’s authority to hear the dispute.

Respondent’s Motion to Vacate

On March 15, 2017, the Respondent moved to vacate the proceedings, asserting that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The core of this argument was that the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA did not qualify as a “planned community” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The statute requires such a community’s association to either own and operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

During the oral argument on June 27, 2017, a critical fact was established: both the Petitioner and the Respondent agreed that the association did not currently own or operate real estate or possess a roadway easement or covenant.

Petitioner’s Arguments for Jurisdiction

Despite agreeing with the central fact, the Petitioner urged the OAH to exercise jurisdiction based on two main arguments:

1. Prior Precedent: A former Administrative Law Judge, Douglas, had previously exercised jurisdiction over a petition filed by Mr. Satterlee against the same Respondent in docket number 15F-H1515008-BFS.

2. Community Documents: The Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the laws governing planned communities, which, the Petitioner argued, should confer jurisdiction upon the OAH.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

ALJ Suzanne Marwil’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed that jurisdiction was statutorily barred.

Statutory Interpretation of “Planned Community”

The decision centered on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

The Definition: The statute defines a “planned community” as a development where an association of owners owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing or improving the property.

Statutory History: The statute was amended in 2014. The ALJ noted that prior to the amendment, the definition only required ownership of real estate. However, the Respondent association failed to meet the definition under either the pre- or post-2014 versions of the law.

Rejection of Flexible Interpretation: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner’s invitation to use the statute’s introductory phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires,” to expand the definition. Citing the appellate case Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, the decision states that this phrase does not permit a court or agency to “disregard the language of a statute or the legislative intent embodied by that language.” Interpreting the statute to require ownership and operation of real property is “neither mechanical nor rigid” but simply an application of its plain meaning.

Rejection of Estoppel and Prior Case Jurisdiction

The ALJ addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the prior case and the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction.

Analysis of Prior Decision: Upon reviewing the earlier decision by Judge Douglas (15F-1515008-BFS), ALJ Marwil found that while it contained “standard boilerplate language regarding jurisdiction,” the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never raised by any party and, therefore, was not considered by the judge.

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived: The decision strongly affirms a core legal doctrine: a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fatal flaw that cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked. The ALJ states, “Administrative decisions that reach beyond an agency’s statutory power are void.”

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred by Estoppel: Citing legal precedent (Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer), the decision clarifies that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court or agency by the estoppel of a party. The fact that the Respondent may have previously submitted to OAH jurisdiction does not grant the OAH authority where none exists by statute. As stated in the decision, “the statutes, not the parties, lay out the boundaries of administrative jurisdiction.”

Final Disposition and Order

Based on the finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction, the following actions were taken:

Recommendation: That the consolidated petitions be dismissed with prejudice.

Petitioner’s Recourse: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner “remains free, however, to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by Respondent’s community documents.”

Effective Date: The order would become effective 40 days after certification by the Director of the OAH.

Adoption of Decision: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision in full.

Final Action: The Commissioner accepted the recommendation and ordered that the petitions be dismissed with prejudice. This order constituted a final administrative action and was effective immediately.

Further Action: The Final Order specified that it was binding unless a party requested a rehearing within 30 days. It also informed the parties of their right to appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review, noting that the order would not be stayed unless a stay was granted by the reviewing court.