Tag Archives: Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.

Vicky Glover v. Foothills Community Association

Posted on May 30, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1919046-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-05-30
Administrative Law Judge	Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Vicky Glover	Counsel	—
Respondent	Foothills Community Association	Counsel	B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 regarding both the DRC's restriction on speaking during specific deliberations and the use of email communications for non-regularly scheduled committee business.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, specifically because the DRC's restrictions on speaking were deemed reasonable, and email communications were not considered 'regularly scheduled committee meetings' requiring public access.

Key Issues & Findings

Open Meetings and Member Right to Speak (DRC and Email Meetings)

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by denying her the ability to speak at DRC meetings on other members’ requests, and by conducting deliberations and making decisions via email outside of regularly scheduled meetings.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 33-1804
• A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, Sections 33-1801 to 33-1818

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Design Review Committee, Open Meetings, Right to Speak, Email Meetings, A.R.S. 33-1804

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
• A.A.C. R2-19-119
• A.R.S. § 33-1804
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919046-REL Decision – 712028.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:06 (94.0 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Glover v. Foothills Community Association

Executive Summary

On May 30, 2019, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the State of Arizona denied a petition filed by homeowner Vicky Glover against the Foothills Community Association (FCA). The decision concluded that the FCA’s Design Review Committee (DRC) did not violate Arizona’s open meeting law, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The petition centered on two core allegations: 1) that the DRC improperly held “email meetings” to decide on non-emergency matters, and 2) that it unlawfully prevented members from speaking at appropriate times during its meetings.

The ALJ’s ruling rested on a strict interpretation of the statute’s plain language. The judge determined that the specific right for members to speak on an agenda item before a formal vote applies exclusively to Board of Directors meetings, not committee meetings like the DRC. For committee meetings, the statute only requires allowing members to speak at an “appropriate time,” and the DRC’s decision to restrict Ms. Glover from speaking about another member’s application was deemed reasonable. Regarding the email communications, the ALJ concluded they do not constitute “regularly scheduled committee meetings” and are therefore not subject to the open meeting requirements stipulated in the statute. The general state policy favoring open meetings was found insufficient to override these specific statutory provisions.

Case Overview

Details

Case Name

Vicky Glover, Petitioner, vs. Foothills Community Association, Respondent

Case Number

19F-H1919046-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date

May 10, 2019

Decision Date

May 30, 2019

Petitioner’s Allegations

Vicky Glover filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on January 23, 2019, alleging that the Foothills Community Association violated state statutes governing planned communities (A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16). The specific allegations against the association’s Design Review Committee (DRC) were:

1. Unlawful Meetings: The DRC held unannounced email meetings to vote on non-emergency matters, violating open-meeting statutes.

2. Denial of Speech: The DRC refused to allow community members to speak at appropriate times during its regularly scheduled meetings.

Factual Background

The parties did not dispute the underlying events of the case. The established facts are as follows:

• Organizational Structure:

◦ The Foothills Community Association (FCA) is a homeowners association in Phoenix, Arizona.

◦ Its Board of Directors consists of seven members and meets on the fourth Wednesday of the month.

◦ The Design Review Committee (DRC) is appointed by the Board, consists of five members (two of whom are also on the Board), and holds its meetings on the second Wednesday of the month.

• Incidents Leading to Petition:

◦ On December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, Petitioner Vicky Glover attended and recorded DRC meetings.

◦ During these meetings, Ms. Glover was not permitted to speak about other members’ pending requests being discussed by the committee.

• Committee Practices:

◦ During meetings, DRC members were heard discussing plans to share additional information on certain requests via email after the meeting.

◦ Based on this emailed information, members could then approve or deny the request.

◦ Any decisions made via email between meetings were subsequently “ratified” at the next formal DRC meeting.

◦ The FCA Manager, Pat Wontor, denied that the DRC took initial action via email, stating the practice was only for gathering information on matters already discussed in a meeting.

Legal Framework and Statutory Interpretation

The central legal issue was the interpretation of Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804. The burden of proof was on the Petitioner to show a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Relevant Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1804

The ALJ’s decision focused on two key subsections of the statute:

• A.R.S. § 33-1804(A): “Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members… and all members or designated representatives so desiring shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings. The board may place reasonable time restrictions on those persons speaking during the meeting but shall permit a member or member’s designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item…”

• A.R.S. § 33-1804(F): States that it is the policy of the state that all meetings “be conducted openly” and that the provisions of the section should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

Analysis of the Right to Speak

The ALJ concluded that the DRC did not violate the statute by preventing Ms. Glover from speaking.

• Distinction Between Board and Committee Meetings: The judge’s interpretation hinged on the “plain language” of the statute. While members must be allowed to speak at an “appropriate time” at all open meetings, the specific right to speak after the discussion of an agenda item but before a formal vote is taken applies only to the Board of Directors, not to committees.

• “Appropriate Time” Determination: The statute does not define what constitutes an “appropriate time” for committee meetings. The ALJ found it was “reasonable for the DRC to determine that deliberation regarding a different member’s request was not an appropriate time for Petitioner to speak.”

• Conclusion: The DRC’s actions during the December 2018 and January 2019 meetings were not a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Analysis of “Email Meetings”

The ALJ concluded that the DRC’s email communications were not subject to the open meeting law.

• “Regularly Scheduled” Requirement: A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) explicitly applies to “regularly scheduled committee meetings.”

• Email Communications Did Not Qualify: The judge reasoned that email deliberations and decisions do not constitute “regularly scheduled” meetings because they “do not occur at a set time on a weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annual basis.”

• General Policy vs. Specific Language: While acknowledging the statute’s general policy statement in favor of open meetings (Subsection F), the ALJ ruled that this “does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

• Conclusion: The email communications, even if considered a “meeting of the DRC,” did not fall under the open meeting requirements of the statute.

Final Order and Conclusion

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner, Vicky Glover, “did not establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.” Based on this finding, the judge issued the following order:

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.

The decision is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Vicky Glover v. Foothills Community Association

Posted on May 30, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1919046-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-05-30
Administrative Law Judge	Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Vicky Glover	Counsel	—
Respondent	Foothills Community Association	Counsel	B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 regarding both the DRC's restriction on speaking during specific deliberations and the use of email communications for non-regularly scheduled committee business.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, specifically because the DRC's restrictions on speaking were deemed reasonable, and email communications were not considered 'regularly scheduled committee meetings' requiring public access.

Key Issues & Findings

Open Meetings and Member Right to Speak (DRC and Email Meetings)

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by denying her the ability to speak at DRC meetings on other members’ requests, and by conducting deliberations and making decisions via email outside of regularly scheduled meetings.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 33-1804
• A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, Sections 33-1801 to 33-1818

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Design Review Committee, Open Meetings, Right to Speak, Email Meetings, A.R.S. 33-1804

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
• A.A.C. R2-19-119
• A.R.S. § 33-1804
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919046-REL Decision – 712028.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:08:53 (94.0 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Glover v. Foothills Community Association

Executive Summary

On May 30, 2019, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the State of Arizona denied a petition filed by homeowner Vicky Glover against the Foothills Community Association (FCA). The decision concluded that the FCA’s Design Review Committee (DRC) did not violate Arizona’s open meeting law, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The petition centered on two core allegations: 1) that the DRC improperly held “email meetings” to decide on non-emergency matters, and 2) that it unlawfully prevented members from speaking at appropriate times during its meetings.

The ALJ’s ruling rested on a strict interpretation of the statute’s plain language. The judge determined that the specific right for members to speak on an agenda item before a formal vote applies exclusively to Board of Directors meetings, not committee meetings like the DRC. For committee meetings, the statute only requires allowing members to speak at an “appropriate time,” and the DRC’s decision to restrict Ms. Glover from speaking about another member’s application was deemed reasonable. Regarding the email communications, the ALJ concluded they do not constitute “regularly scheduled committee meetings” and are therefore not subject to the open meeting requirements stipulated in the statute. The general state policy favoring open meetings was found insufficient to override these specific statutory provisions.

Case Overview

Details

Case Name

Vicky Glover, Petitioner, vs. Foothills Community Association, Respondent

Case Number

19F-H1919046-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date

May 10, 2019

Decision Date

May 30, 2019

Petitioner’s Allegations

Vicky Glover filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on January 23, 2019, alleging that the Foothills Community Association violated state statutes governing planned communities (A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16). The specific allegations against the association’s Design Review Committee (DRC) were:

1. Unlawful Meetings: The DRC held unannounced email meetings to vote on non-emergency matters, violating open-meeting statutes.

2. Denial of Speech: The DRC refused to allow community members to speak at appropriate times during its regularly scheduled meetings.

Factual Background

The parties did not dispute the underlying events of the case. The established facts are as follows:

• Organizational Structure:

◦ The Foothills Community Association (FCA) is a homeowners association in Phoenix, Arizona.

◦ Its Board of Directors consists of seven members and meets on the fourth Wednesday of the month.

◦ The Design Review Committee (DRC) is appointed by the Board, consists of five members (two of whom are also on the Board), and holds its meetings on the second Wednesday of the month.

• Incidents Leading to Petition:

◦ On December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, Petitioner Vicky Glover attended and recorded DRC meetings.

◦ During these meetings, Ms. Glover was not permitted to speak about other members’ pending requests being discussed by the committee.

• Committee Practices:

◦ During meetings, DRC members were heard discussing plans to share additional information on certain requests via email after the meeting.

◦ Based on this emailed information, members could then approve or deny the request.

◦ Any decisions made via email between meetings were subsequently “ratified” at the next formal DRC meeting.

◦ The FCA Manager, Pat Wontor, denied that the DRC took initial action via email, stating the practice was only for gathering information on matters already discussed in a meeting.

Legal Framework and Statutory Interpretation

The central legal issue was the interpretation of Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804. The burden of proof was on the Petitioner to show a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Relevant Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1804

The ALJ’s decision focused on two key subsections of the statute:

• A.R.S. § 33-1804(A): “Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members… and all members or designated representatives so desiring shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings. The board may place reasonable time restrictions on those persons speaking during the meeting but shall permit a member or member’s designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item…”

• A.R.S. § 33-1804(F): States that it is the policy of the state that all meetings “be conducted openly” and that the provisions of the section should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

Analysis of the Right to Speak

The ALJ concluded that the DRC did not violate the statute by preventing Ms. Glover from speaking.

• Distinction Between Board and Committee Meetings: The judge’s interpretation hinged on the “plain language” of the statute. While members must be allowed to speak at an “appropriate time” at all open meetings, the specific right to speak after the discussion of an agenda item but before a formal vote is taken applies only to the Board of Directors, not to committees.

• “Appropriate Time” Determination: The statute does not define what constitutes an “appropriate time” for committee meetings. The ALJ found it was “reasonable for the DRC to determine that deliberation regarding a different member’s request was not an appropriate time for Petitioner to speak.”

• Conclusion: The DRC’s actions during the December 2018 and January 2019 meetings were not a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Analysis of “Email Meetings”

The ALJ concluded that the DRC’s email communications were not subject to the open meeting law.

• “Regularly Scheduled” Requirement: A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) explicitly applies to “regularly scheduled committee meetings.”

• Email Communications Did Not Qualify: The judge reasoned that email deliberations and decisions do not constitute “regularly scheduled” meetings because they “do not occur at a set time on a weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annual basis.”

• General Policy vs. Specific Language: While acknowledging the statute’s general policy statement in favor of open meetings (Subsection F), the ALJ ruled that this “does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

• Conclusion: The email communications, even if considered a “meeting of the DRC,” did not fall under the open meeting requirements of the statute.

Final Order and Conclusion

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner, Vicky Glover, “did not establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.” Based on this finding, the judge issued the following order:

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.

The decision is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on April 10, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918037-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-09-12
Administrative Law Judge	Jenna Clark
Outcome	full
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Tom Barrs	Counsel	Jonathan A. Dessaules
Respondent	Desert Ranch Homeowners Association	Counsel	B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to provide the full requested documentation relating to EDC actions and communications. The Petitioner's request for relief was granted, resulting in the reimbursement of the $500 filing fee and the imposition of a $500 civil penalty against the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request.

The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fully comply with Petitioner's specific request for EDC records (submissions, requests, and approvals) by providing only a summary table instead of the totality of requested communications within the statutory deadline.

Orders: Petitioner's petition granted. Respondent ordered to reimburse Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) and tender a $500.00 civil penalty to the Department (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)).

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, HOA Violation, Civil Penalty, Filing Fee Reimbursement

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-243
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-107
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918037-REL Decision – 700566.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:55 (149.3 KB)

Briefing Document: Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decisions concerning a records request dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent). The central issue was whether the Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1805 by failing to adequately fulfill a records request submitted by the Petitioner on November 1, 2018.

The initial hearing on March 21, 2019, resulted in an April 10, 2019, decision in favor of the Association. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request to all members of the Association’s Board, and thus the Association’s partial response (a summary table) did not constitute a statutory violation.

Following a successful appeal by the Petitioner, a rehearing was held on August 27, 2019. New evidence demonstrated that the Petitioner had followed prior express instructions from the Association regarding who to contact for records requests. Consequently, the ALJ issued a new decision on September 12, 2019, reversing the original order. The final ruling found the Association in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee and was assessed a civil penalty of $500.

Case Overview

Case Numbers

No. 19F-H1918037-REL (Initial Decision)
No. 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG (Rehearing Decision)

Petitioner

Tom Barrs, a property owner and member of the Association.

Respondent

Desert Ranch Homeowners Association, Scottsdale, Arizona.

Central Issue

Whether the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request for Environmental Design Committee (EDC) actions, requests, and approvals.

Initial Petition

Filed by Tom Barrs on December 17, 2018.

Initial Hearing

March 21, 2019, before ALJ Jenna Clark.

Rehearing

August 27, 2019, before ALJ Jenna Clark.

Final Outcome

Petition granted in favor of Tom Barrs. The Association was found in violation of state law, ordered to reimburse the filing fee, and fined.

Key Individuals and Entities

Role / Affiliation

Tom Barrs

Petitioner; homeowner in the Desert Ranch subdivision.

Desert Ranch HOA

Respondent; homeowners’ association.

Jenna Clark

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Brian Schoeffler

Chairman of the Association’s Environmental Design Committee (EDC); appeared on behalf of the Association.

Catherine Overby

President of the Association’s Board of Directors.

Lori Loch-Lee

Vice President of Client Services at Associated Asset Management (AAM), the Association’s accounting/management company.

Jonathan Dessaules, Esq.

Attorney who appeared on behalf of the Petitioner at the rehearing.

The Records Request and Subsequent Dispute

The Initial Request

On November 1, 2018, at 9:40 p.m., Petitioner submitted an electronic records request to Catherine Overby, Brian Schoeffler, and Lori Loch-Lee. The text of the request was as follows:

“Pursuant to ARS 33-1805, I am requesting a copy of all EDC actions, written requests, and written approvals from October 2017 through October 2018. Soft copies via return email are preferable; otherwise, please let me know when hard copies are available for pickup.”

The Association’s Response and Petitioner’s Follow-Up

• November 2, 2018: Lori Loch-Lee from AAM notified the Petitioner she would forward his request to all Board members, noting that AAM was only the Association’s accounting firm.

• November 18, 2018: The Petitioner received a summary table listing some EDC actions, not the complete set of communications and documents requested. At this time, he was advised by Brian Schoeffler that he “needed to copy all Board members on records requests.”

• March 6, 2019: The Petitioner sent a follow-up email, accusing the Association of willful failure and clarifying the specific records he sought beyond the summary table, including “copies of the communications (letters, emails, and application forms) relating to Environmental Design Review (EDC) submissions, requests, complaints and approvals (or denials).”

• March 11, 2019: Mr. Schoeffler replied, arguing that the request had been complied with on November 18, 2018, and directed the Petitioner to “submit a new request” for the additional information.

• March 17, 2019: Mr. Schoeffler reiterated that the original request was only sent to two of four Board members and stated that providing additional documents could be “interpreted as an admission of guilt.”

As of the rehearing date (August 27, 2019), the Petitioner had still not received all the documentation requested on November 1, 2018.

Legal Proceedings and Rulings

Initial Hearing and Decision (April 10, 2019)

In the first hearing, the dispute centered on the validity of the request submission and the adequacy of the Association’s response.

Arguments:

• Petitioner (Barrs): Argued the Association acted in bad faith and willfully failed to fulfill the request, noting a similar dispute had been previously adjudicated. He was concerned with the completeness of the response, not its timeliness.

• Respondent (HOA): Argued it had complied with the request by providing a summary table, consistent with its handling of a previous dispute with the Petitioner. Mr. Schoeffler testified that the response was untimely (provided on the 11th business day) but asserted it was otherwise sufficient.

ALJ Conclusion: The Judge ruled in favor of the Association, denying the Petitioner’s petition. The key finding was that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request.

“Because the credible evidence of record reflects that Petitioner failed to properly submit his records request to the Board, Petitioner has failed established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 for providing him with a summary table on November 18, 2018.”

The decision also noted that the statute does not legally obligate an HOA to email copies of records.

Rehearing and Final Decision (September 12, 2019)

After the Petitioner’s appeal was granted, a rehearing introduced new evidence that fundamentally changed the outcome.

New Evidence and Concessions:

• July 19, 2017 Instruction: Evidence showed Association President Catherine Overby had previously appointed Brian Schoeffler as the Petitioner’s “primary records request contact.”

• July 18, 2018 Instruction: Evidence showed Ms. Overby had also instructed the Petitioner to direct requests to the management company, AAM.

• Association Concessions: The Respondent conceded that its governing documents do not require all Board members to be copied on records requests and that its own bylaws regarding submission forms are not adhered to or enforced.

ALJ’s Reversed Conclusion: The Judge reversed the prior decision and granted the Petitioner’s petition. The new evidence proved the Petitioner had followed express instructions from the Association.

“Petitioner’s November 01, 2018, records request was not required to be sent to all members of the Association’s Board, as Petitioner had expressly been instructed to only send his records requests to the Association’s EDC Chairman, Mr. Schoeffler, which he did.”

The Judge concluded that the partial response was a clear violation of the law.

“Petitioner is correct that the Association did not fully comply with his specific request, and has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the summary table provided by the Association was a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.”

Final Order and Penalties

The Administrative Law Judge’s Final Order on September 12, 2019, which is binding on the parties, mandated the following:

1. Petition Granted: The Petitioner’s petition was granted.

2. Filing Fee Reimbursement: The Respondent (Desert Ranch HOA) was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

3. Civil Penalty: The Respondent was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on April 10, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918037-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-09-12
Administrative Law Judge	Jenna Clark
Outcome	full
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Tom Barrs	Counsel	Jonathan A. Dessaules
Respondent	Desert Ranch Homeowners Association	Counsel	B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to provide the full requested documentation relating to EDC actions and communications. The Petitioner's request for relief was granted, resulting in the reimbursement of the $500 filing fee and the imposition of a $500 civil penalty against the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request.

The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fully comply with Petitioner's specific request for EDC records (submissions, requests, and approvals) by providing only a summary table instead of the totality of requested communications within the statutory deadline.

Orders: Petitioner's petition granted. Respondent ordered to reimburse Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) and tender a $500.00 civil penalty to the Department (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)).

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, HOA Violation, Civil Penalty, Filing Fee Reimbursement

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-243
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-107
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918037-REL Decision – 700566.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:08:27 (149.3 KB)

Briefing Document: Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decisions concerning a records request dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent). The central issue was whether the Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1805 by failing to adequately fulfill a records request submitted by the Petitioner on November 1, 2018.

The initial hearing on March 21, 2019, resulted in an April 10, 2019, decision in favor of the Association. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request to all members of the Association’s Board, and thus the Association’s partial response (a summary table) did not constitute a statutory violation.

Following a successful appeal by the Petitioner, a rehearing was held on August 27, 2019. New evidence demonstrated that the Petitioner had followed prior express instructions from the Association regarding who to contact for records requests. Consequently, the ALJ issued a new decision on September 12, 2019, reversing the original order. The final ruling found the Association in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee and was assessed a civil penalty of $500.

Case Overview

Case Numbers

No. 19F-H1918037-REL (Initial Decision)
No. 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG (Rehearing Decision)

Petitioner

Tom Barrs, a property owner and member of the Association.

Respondent

Desert Ranch Homeowners Association, Scottsdale, Arizona.

Central Issue

Whether the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request for Environmental Design Committee (EDC) actions, requests, and approvals.

Initial Petition

Filed by Tom Barrs on December 17, 2018.

Initial Hearing

March 21, 2019, before ALJ Jenna Clark.

Rehearing

August 27, 2019, before ALJ Jenna Clark.

Final Outcome

Petition granted in favor of Tom Barrs. The Association was found in violation of state law, ordered to reimburse the filing fee, and fined.

Key Individuals and Entities

Role / Affiliation

Tom Barrs

Petitioner; homeowner in the Desert Ranch subdivision.

Desert Ranch HOA

Respondent; homeowners’ association.

Jenna Clark

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Brian Schoeffler

Chairman of the Association’s Environmental Design Committee (EDC); appeared on behalf of the Association.

Catherine Overby

President of the Association’s Board of Directors.

Lori Loch-Lee

Vice President of Client Services at Associated Asset Management (AAM), the Association’s accounting/management company.

Jonathan Dessaules, Esq.

Attorney who appeared on behalf of the Petitioner at the rehearing.

The Records Request and Subsequent Dispute

The Initial Request

On November 1, 2018, at 9:40 p.m., Petitioner submitted an electronic records request to Catherine Overby, Brian Schoeffler, and Lori Loch-Lee. The text of the request was as follows:

“Pursuant to ARS 33-1805, I am requesting a copy of all EDC actions, written requests, and written approvals from October 2017 through October 2018. Soft copies via return email are preferable; otherwise, please let me know when hard copies are available for pickup.”

The Association’s Response and Petitioner’s Follow-Up

• November 2, 2018: Lori Loch-Lee from AAM notified the Petitioner she would forward his request to all Board members, noting that AAM was only the Association’s accounting firm.

• November 18, 2018: The Petitioner received a summary table listing some EDC actions, not the complete set of communications and documents requested. At this time, he was advised by Brian Schoeffler that he “needed to copy all Board members on records requests.”

• March 6, 2019: The Petitioner sent a follow-up email, accusing the Association of willful failure and clarifying the specific records he sought beyond the summary table, including “copies of the communications (letters, emails, and application forms) relating to Environmental Design Review (EDC) submissions, requests, complaints and approvals (or denials).”

• March 11, 2019: Mr. Schoeffler replied, arguing that the request had been complied with on November 18, 2018, and directed the Petitioner to “submit a new request” for the additional information.

• March 17, 2019: Mr. Schoeffler reiterated that the original request was only sent to two of four Board members and stated that providing additional documents could be “interpreted as an admission of guilt.”

As of the rehearing date (August 27, 2019), the Petitioner had still not received all the documentation requested on November 1, 2018.

Legal Proceedings and Rulings

Initial Hearing and Decision (April 10, 2019)

In the first hearing, the dispute centered on the validity of the request submission and the adequacy of the Association’s response.

Arguments:

• Petitioner (Barrs): Argued the Association acted in bad faith and willfully failed to fulfill the request, noting a similar dispute had been previously adjudicated. He was concerned with the completeness of the response, not its timeliness.

• Respondent (HOA): Argued it had complied with the request by providing a summary table, consistent with its handling of a previous dispute with the Petitioner. Mr. Schoeffler testified that the response was untimely (provided on the 11th business day) but asserted it was otherwise sufficient.

ALJ Conclusion: The Judge ruled in favor of the Association, denying the Petitioner’s petition. The key finding was that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request.

“Because the credible evidence of record reflects that Petitioner failed to properly submit his records request to the Board, Petitioner has failed established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 for providing him with a summary table on November 18, 2018.”

The decision also noted that the statute does not legally obligate an HOA to email copies of records.

Rehearing and Final Decision (September 12, 2019)

After the Petitioner’s appeal was granted, a rehearing introduced new evidence that fundamentally changed the outcome.

New Evidence and Concessions:

• July 19, 2017 Instruction: Evidence showed Association President Catherine Overby had previously appointed Brian Schoeffler as the Petitioner’s “primary records request contact.”

• July 18, 2018 Instruction: Evidence showed Ms. Overby had also instructed the Petitioner to direct requests to the management company, AAM.

• Association Concessions: The Respondent conceded that its governing documents do not require all Board members to be copied on records requests and that its own bylaws regarding submission forms are not adhered to or enforced.

ALJ’s Reversed Conclusion: The Judge reversed the prior decision and granted the Petitioner’s petition. The new evidence proved the Petitioner had followed express instructions from the Association.

“Petitioner’s November 01, 2018, records request was not required to be sent to all members of the Association’s Board, as Petitioner had expressly been instructed to only send his records requests to the Association’s EDC Chairman, Mr. Schoeffler, which he did.”

The Judge concluded that the partial response was a clear violation of the law.

“Petitioner is correct that the Association did not fully comply with his specific request, and has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the summary table provided by the Association was a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.”

Final Order and Penalties

The Administrative Law Judge’s Final Order on September 12, 2019, which is binding on the parties, mandated the following:

1. Petition Granted: The Petitioner’s petition was granted.

2. Filing Fee Reimbursement: The Respondent (Desert Ranch HOA) was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

3. Civil Penalty: The Respondent was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Jerry R. Collis vs. Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association

Posted on December 18, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H18020-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-12-20
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	none
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Jerry R. Collis	Counsel	—
Respondent	Laveen Meadows HOA c/o Planned Development Services	Counsel	Chad Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Sections 10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16; A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's challenge against the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes when issuing citations.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to HOA fine citations/improper enforcement of parking and nuisance rules

Petitioner claimed the Respondent HOA improperly issued citations against him for vehicle violations (inoperable vehicle, street parking, nuisance), asserting the HOA could not violate CC&R 10.11.4 but that the citations alleging the violation were unwarranted.

Orders: Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&Rs, Vehicle Parking, Nuisance, Burden of Proof

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H18020-REL Decision – 677244.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:11 (97.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA (Case No. 19F-H18020-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H18020-REL, involving Petitioner Jerry R. Collis and Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA. The central issue was a series of violation notices and fines issued by the HOA to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle.

The petition, filed by Mr. Collis, was ultimately dismissed. The Judge ruled that Mr. Collis failed to meet the burden of proof required to show that the Laveen Meadows HOA had violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) or any applicable statutes.

The core of Mr. Collis’s argument was that the HOA wrongly cited him for having an “inoperable vehicle” under CC&R Section 10.11.4, when his vehicle was, in fact, always in operating condition. However, the Judge’s decision rested on the finding that the HOA’s actions were based on multiple violations. While all seven violation notices were titled “Inoperable Vehicle,” evidence and testimony confirmed the vehicle was also in violation of CC&R Section 10.16 (Nuisances) due to its unsightly condition (cobwebs, debris, a flat tire, and a covered window) and Section 10.11.2 (Parking on streets). Because the citations were justified by these other violations, Mr. Collis’s claim regarding the vehicle’s operability was insufficient to invalidate the HOA’s actions.

——————————————————————————–

1. Case Overview

The matter was brought before the Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by Jerry R. Collis with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on September 17, 2018. A hearing was held on December 4, 2018, to adjudicate the dispute between Mr. Collis and the Laveen Meadows HOA.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

19F-H18020-REL

Petitioner

Jerry R. Collis

Respondent

Laveen Meadows HOA

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Hearing Date

December 4, 2018

Decision Date

December 20, 2018

——————————————————————————–

2. Central Arguments and Positions

Petitioner’s Position (Jerry R. Collis)

• Mr. Collis’s primary contention was that the HOA improperly issued citations alleging his vehicle was “inoperable” in violation of CC&R Section 10.11.4.

• He testified that the vehicle was never inoperable.

• Although his initial petition stated the HOA violated Section 10.11.4, he clarified at the hearing that the issue was the HOA wrongly cited him for violating that provision.

Respondent’s Position (Laveen Meadows HOA)

• The HOA, represented by Community Manager Lisa Riesland, argued that the citations were based on more than just the “inoperable vehicle” clause.

• The HOA asserted that Mr. Collis’s vehicle was in violation of three separate CC&R sections:

◦ Section 10.11.2: Prohibiting parking on streets.

◦ Section 10.11.4: Prohibiting non-operating motor vehicles in unenclosed parking areas.

◦ Section 10.16: Prohibiting nuisances, defined to include “unsightly” conditions or those that could “reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.”

——————————————————————————–

3. Analysis of Evidence and Findings of Fact

The Judge’s decision was based on testimony and a series of seven notifications sent by the HOA to Mr. Collis between September 2016 and June 2017.

Violation Notices

• A total of seven notifications/letters were sent to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle.

• All seven notices included the identical violation description: “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.”

• Critically, none of the notices cited a specific CC&R section number that was allegedly violated.

• The letters also made reference to “cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle.”

Vehicle Condition and Nuisance Violation

• Unsightliness: Lisa Riesland provided credible testimony that at various times, the vehicle had cobwebs extending from the chassis to the ground with leaves trapped within them. This was deemed to constitute an “unsightly condition” under CC&R Section 10.16.

• Vandalism and Disrepair: At the time of the June 2017 notices, the vehicle also had a flat tire and a window covered with a bag or cardboard. Mr. Collis acknowledged these facts, explaining they were the result of vandalism.

Chronology of Violations, Fines, and Appeals

The document outlines a series of escalating fines. In each instance where a fine was issued, Mr. Collis was informed of his right to appeal to the HOA Board and his right to request an administrative hearing.

Action by HOA

Fine/Fee Charged

Evidence of Appeal by Mr. Collis

Sep 19, 2016

Notification of violation (expired tags, inoperable vehicle on street).

Not applicable

Oct 11, 2016

Notification of potential $25 fine if not corrected.

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

Dec 1, 2016

Letter informing a $25 fine had been charged.

$25.00

Mr. Collis appealed to the Board.

Jan 26, 2017

Letter from Board informing Mr. Collis his appeal was denied.

Appeal outcome. No evidence of hearing request.

Apr 20, 2017

Letter informing a $50 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$60.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

May 9, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

May 23, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

June 8, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

June 26, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

——————————————————————————–

4. Legal Rationale and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s ruling centered on the burden of proof and the contractual nature of the CC&Rs.

Burden of Proof

• Mr. Collis, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• A preponderance of the evidence is defined as evidence with the “most convincing force” that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Core Legal Conclusion

• The Judge concluded that the evidence demonstrated the HOA issued citations based on violations of CC&R Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

• Because the violations were multifaceted, Mr. Collis’s singular focus on the vehicle’s operability was insufficient to prove the HOA acted improperly.

• The decision states: “Consequently, showing that his vehicle was in operating condition would not be sufficient to show that the citations were unwarranted.”

• The Judge found that Mr. Collis failed to show that the HOA violated any of its CC&Rs, community documents, or the statutes regulating planned communities.

Final Order

• IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

• The Respondent, Laveen Meadows HOA, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Jerry R. Collis vs. Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association

Posted on December 18, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H18020-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-12-20
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	none
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Jerry R. Collis	Counsel	—
Respondent	Laveen Meadows HOA c/o Planned Development Services	Counsel	Chad Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Sections 10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16; A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's challenge against the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes when issuing citations.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to HOA fine citations/improper enforcement of parking and nuisance rules

Petitioner claimed the Respondent HOA improperly issued citations against him for vehicle violations (inoperable vehicle, street parking, nuisance), asserting the HOA could not violate CC&R 10.11.4 but that the citations alleging the violation were unwarranted.

Orders: Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&Rs, Vehicle Parking, Nuisance, Burden of Proof

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H18020-REL Decision – 677244.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:27 (97.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA (Case No. 19F-H18020-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H18020-REL, involving Petitioner Jerry R. Collis and Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA. The central issue was a series of violation notices and fines issued by the HOA to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle.

The petition, filed by Mr. Collis, was ultimately dismissed. The Judge ruled that Mr. Collis failed to meet the burden of proof required to show that the Laveen Meadows HOA had violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) or any applicable statutes.

The core of Mr. Collis’s argument was that the HOA wrongly cited him for having an “inoperable vehicle” under CC&R Section 10.11.4, when his vehicle was, in fact, always in operating condition. However, the Judge’s decision rested on the finding that the HOA’s actions were based on multiple violations. While all seven violation notices were titled “Inoperable Vehicle,” evidence and testimony confirmed the vehicle was also in violation of CC&R Section 10.16 (Nuisances) due to its unsightly condition (cobwebs, debris, a flat tire, and a covered window) and Section 10.11.2 (Parking on streets). Because the citations were justified by these other violations, Mr. Collis’s claim regarding the vehicle’s operability was insufficient to invalidate the HOA’s actions.

——————————————————————————–

1. Case Overview

The matter was brought before the Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by Jerry R. Collis with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on September 17, 2018. A hearing was held on December 4, 2018, to adjudicate the dispute between Mr. Collis and the Laveen Meadows HOA.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

19F-H18020-REL

Petitioner

Jerry R. Collis

Respondent

Laveen Meadows HOA

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Hearing Date

December 4, 2018

Decision Date

December 20, 2018

——————————————————————————–

2. Central Arguments and Positions

Petitioner’s Position (Jerry R. Collis)

• Mr. Collis’s primary contention was that the HOA improperly issued citations alleging his vehicle was “inoperable” in violation of CC&R Section 10.11.4.

• He testified that the vehicle was never inoperable.

• Although his initial petition stated the HOA violated Section 10.11.4, he clarified at the hearing that the issue was the HOA wrongly cited him for violating that provision.

Respondent’s Position (Laveen Meadows HOA)

• The HOA, represented by Community Manager Lisa Riesland, argued that the citations were based on more than just the “inoperable vehicle” clause.

• The HOA asserted that Mr. Collis’s vehicle was in violation of three separate CC&R sections:

◦ Section 10.11.2: Prohibiting parking on streets.

◦ Section 10.11.4: Prohibiting non-operating motor vehicles in unenclosed parking areas.

◦ Section 10.16: Prohibiting nuisances, defined to include “unsightly” conditions or those that could “reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.”

——————————————————————————–

3. Analysis of Evidence and Findings of Fact

The Judge’s decision was based on testimony and a series of seven notifications sent by the HOA to Mr. Collis between September 2016 and June 2017.

Violation Notices

• A total of seven notifications/letters were sent to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle.

• All seven notices included the identical violation description: “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.”

• Critically, none of the notices cited a specific CC&R section number that was allegedly violated.

• The letters also made reference to “cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle.”

Vehicle Condition and Nuisance Violation

• Unsightliness: Lisa Riesland provided credible testimony that at various times, the vehicle had cobwebs extending from the chassis to the ground with leaves trapped within them. This was deemed to constitute an “unsightly condition” under CC&R Section 10.16.

• Vandalism and Disrepair: At the time of the June 2017 notices, the vehicle also had a flat tire and a window covered with a bag or cardboard. Mr. Collis acknowledged these facts, explaining they were the result of vandalism.

Chronology of Violations, Fines, and Appeals

The document outlines a series of escalating fines. In each instance where a fine was issued, Mr. Collis was informed of his right to appeal to the HOA Board and his right to request an administrative hearing.

Action by HOA

Fine/Fee Charged

Evidence of Appeal by Mr. Collis

Sep 19, 2016

Notification of violation (expired tags, inoperable vehicle on street).

Not applicable

Oct 11, 2016

Notification of potential $25 fine if not corrected.

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

Dec 1, 2016

Letter informing a $25 fine had been charged.

$25.00

Mr. Collis appealed to the Board.

Jan 26, 2017

Letter from Board informing Mr. Collis his appeal was denied.

Appeal outcome. No evidence of hearing request.

Apr 20, 2017

Letter informing a $50 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$60.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

May 9, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

May 23, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

June 8, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

June 26, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

——————————————————————————–

4. Legal Rationale and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s ruling centered on the burden of proof and the contractual nature of the CC&Rs.

Burden of Proof

• Mr. Collis, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• A preponderance of the evidence is defined as evidence with the “most convincing force” that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Core Legal Conclusion

• The Judge concluded that the evidence demonstrated the HOA issued citations based on violations of CC&R Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

• Because the violations were multifaceted, Mr. Collis’s singular focus on the vehicle’s operability was insufficient to prove the HOA acted improperly.

• The decision states: “Consequently, showing that his vehicle was in operating condition would not be sufficient to show that the citations were unwarranted.”

• The Judge found that Mr. Collis failed to show that the HOA violated any of its CC&Rs, community documents, or the statutes regulating planned communities.

Final Order

• IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

• The Respondent, Laveen Meadows HOA, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on June 25, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818042-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-06-25
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	total
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen	Counsel	—
Respondent	Carter Ranch Homeowners Association	Counsel	Chad M. Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1813

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the petitioner's request, finding that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 by allowing the president to call a special meeting for board member recall without the required petition signed by homeowners. The HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members and refund the petitioner's filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Removal of board member; special meeting

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when the president called a special meeting to recall three recently elected Board members, arguing that the statute requires a petition signed by homeowners. Respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1804 procedures could also be used. The ALJ ruled that A.R.S. § 33-1813, as the specific statute regarding removal, requires a petition.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is granted. Respondent shall reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell and reimburse the $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 33-1813
• A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Board Removal, Recall Election, Statutory Interpretation, Petition Requirements

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 33-1813
• A.R.S. § 33-1804

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818042-REL Decision – 642530.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:50 (142.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818042-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The central dispute concerned the legality of a special meeting called by the HOA Board President to recall three recently elected board members. The petitioner argued this action violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1813, which requires such a recall to be initiated by a petition from homeowners. The HOA contended that the president had the authority to call the meeting under the broader powers granted in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that when a specific statute and a general statute conflict, the specific statute controls. A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically governs the removal of board members and mandates a homeowner petition process. Therefore, the president’s unilateral call for a recall election was improper. The judge granted the petitioner’s request, ordering the HOA to reinstate the two board members who were removed and to reimburse the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

Background and Procedural History

The case involves a dispute within the Carter Ranch development, a 253-lot community in Coolidge, Arizona.

• Petitioner: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, a homeowner and member of the Carter Ranch HOA.

• Respondent: Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

• Petition: On or about April 5, 2018, Van Dan Elzen filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. He alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when its president, Lance Van Horne, called a special meeting to recall three newly elected board members.

• Hearing: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on June 20, 2018, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

The Contested Elections

The dispute originated from a contentious board election process marked by accusations of misconduct, culminating in a recall election that was later found to be procedurally invalid.

March 20, 2018 Board Election

An initial annual meeting on February 20, 2018, failed to achieve the required quorum of 26 ballots. A second meeting was scheduled for March 20, 2018, for which eight candidates ran for five open board positions.

• Allegations of Misconduct: Prior to the meeting, Community Manager Mary Chaira received reports that three candidates—Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell—were going door-to-door “disseminating allegedly false information about Respondent’s finances, and harvesting ballots.”

• Meeting Conduct: At the March 20 meeting, a quorum of 47 homeowners was present. Board President Lance Van Horne addressed the allegations of false information. However, homeowners who may have filled out ballots based on this information were not permitted to withdraw them. The meeting was described by Ms. Chaira as “unruly and stressful.”

The election results for the top six candidates were as follows:

Candidate

Number of Votes

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Elected

Steve Brownell

Elected

Trish Brownell

Elected

Lance Van Horne

Elected

Steve F.

Tie for 5th position

Tie for 5th position

April 24, 2018 Recall Election

Believing the March 20 election outcome was “compromised” by the alleged dissemination of false information and ballot harvesting, President Van Horne called a special meeting for April 24, 2018, to hold a recall election for the three newly elected members: Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell.

A quorum of 52 homeowners returned ballots for the recall. The results were:

Board Member

Votes for Recall

Votes against Recall

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Remained on Board

Steve Brownell

Removed from Board

Trish Brownell

Removed from Board

Following the recall, other members were elected to fill the vacant board positions.

Central Legal Issue: Statutory Interpretation

The case presented a pure legal question of statutory interpretation, as the facts of what occurred were not in dispute. The core issue was which Arizona statute governs the process for recalling an HOA board member.

Competing Legal Positions

• Petitioner’s Argument: The recall election was invalid because it violated A.R.S. § 33-1813. This statute, titled “Removal of board member; special meeting,” explicitly states that a recall process is initiated upon the board’s receipt of a petition signed by a specified number or percentage of homeowners. The president’s unilateral action did not meet this requirement.

• Respondent’s Argument: The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813 was not the exclusive procedure. It claimed that the president could also call such a meeting under the authority of A.R.S. § 33-1804, a more general statute governing meetings, which states that “Special meetings of the members’ association may be called by the president.”

Statutory Analysis by the Court

The Administrative Law Judge highlighted the direct conflict between the two statutes on the subject of board member removal.

Feature

A.R.S. § 33-1813 (Specific Statute)

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) (General Statute)

Meeting Initiation

By homeowner petition only.

By the president, a board majority, or homeowner petition.

Petition Requirement

For HOAs ≤ 1,000 members: petition signed by at least 100 members or 25% of votes, whichever is less.

Petition signed by at least 25% of votes (or lower if specified in bylaws).

Meeting Notice

Within 30 days after receipt of the petition.

Between 10 and 50 days in advance of the meeting.

The judge noted that A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically overrides the petition requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), demonstrating legislative intent for it to be the controlling authority on this specific issue.

The Judge’s Legal Conclusion

The decision rested on the well-established legal principle that a specific statute governs over a general one when they are inconsistent. Citing case law, the judge reasoned:

“When provisions of a general statute are inconsistent with those of a special nature on the same subject, the special statute controls.”

Applying this canon of statutory construction, the judge concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1813 is the controlling authority for the removal of an HOA board member. Therefore, a valid recall process must be initiated by a homeowner petition as outlined in that statute. The president lacked the authority to call the April 24, 2018 recall meeting on his own initiative.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the legal conclusion that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1813, the Administrative Law Judge issued a recommended order with the following mandates:

1. Petition Granted: The petitioner’s petition is granted.

2. Board Member Reinstatement: The Carter Ranch HOA is required to reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell.

3. Fee Reimbursement: The HOA must reimburse the petitioner, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, for his $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

This order is considered binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on June 25, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818042-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-06-25
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	total
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen	Counsel	—
Respondent	Carter Ranch Homeowners Association	Counsel	Chad M. Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1813

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the petitioner's request, finding that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 by allowing the president to call a special meeting for board member recall without the required petition signed by homeowners. The HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members and refund the petitioner's filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Removal of board member; special meeting

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when the president called a special meeting to recall three recently elected Board members, arguing that the statute requires a petition signed by homeowners. Respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1804 procedures could also be used. The ALJ ruled that A.R.S. § 33-1813, as the specific statute regarding removal, requires a petition.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is granted. Respondent shall reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell and reimburse the $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 33-1813
• A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Board Removal, Recall Election, Statutory Interpretation, Petition Requirements

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 33-1813
• A.R.S. § 33-1804

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818042-REL Decision – 642530.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:05:34 (142.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818042-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The central dispute concerned the legality of a special meeting called by the HOA Board President to recall three recently elected board members. The petitioner argued this action violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1813, which requires such a recall to be initiated by a petition from homeowners. The HOA contended that the president had the authority to call the meeting under the broader powers granted in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that when a specific statute and a general statute conflict, the specific statute controls. A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically governs the removal of board members and mandates a homeowner petition process. Therefore, the president’s unilateral call for a recall election was improper. The judge granted the petitioner’s request, ordering the HOA to reinstate the two board members who were removed and to reimburse the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

Background and Procedural History

The case involves a dispute within the Carter Ranch development, a 253-lot community in Coolidge, Arizona.

• Petitioner: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, a homeowner and member of the Carter Ranch HOA.

• Respondent: Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

• Petition: On or about April 5, 2018, Van Dan Elzen filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. He alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when its president, Lance Van Horne, called a special meeting to recall three newly elected board members.

• Hearing: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on June 20, 2018, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

The Contested Elections

The dispute originated from a contentious board election process marked by accusations of misconduct, culminating in a recall election that was later found to be procedurally invalid.

March 20, 2018 Board Election

An initial annual meeting on February 20, 2018, failed to achieve the required quorum of 26 ballots. A second meeting was scheduled for March 20, 2018, for which eight candidates ran for five open board positions.

• Allegations of Misconduct: Prior to the meeting, Community Manager Mary Chaira received reports that three candidates—Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell—were going door-to-door “disseminating allegedly false information about Respondent’s finances, and harvesting ballots.”

• Meeting Conduct: At the March 20 meeting, a quorum of 47 homeowners was present. Board President Lance Van Horne addressed the allegations of false information. However, homeowners who may have filled out ballots based on this information were not permitted to withdraw them. The meeting was described by Ms. Chaira as “unruly and stressful.”

The election results for the top six candidates were as follows:

Candidate

Number of Votes

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Elected

Steve Brownell

Elected

Trish Brownell

Elected

Lance Van Horne

Elected

Steve F.

Tie for 5th position

Tie for 5th position

April 24, 2018 Recall Election

Believing the March 20 election outcome was “compromised” by the alleged dissemination of false information and ballot harvesting, President Van Horne called a special meeting for April 24, 2018, to hold a recall election for the three newly elected members: Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell.

A quorum of 52 homeowners returned ballots for the recall. The results were:

Board Member

Votes for Recall

Votes against Recall

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Remained on Board

Steve Brownell

Removed from Board

Trish Brownell

Removed from Board

Following the recall, other members were elected to fill the vacant board positions.

Central Legal Issue: Statutory Interpretation

The case presented a pure legal question of statutory interpretation, as the facts of what occurred were not in dispute. The core issue was which Arizona statute governs the process for recalling an HOA board member.

Competing Legal Positions

• Petitioner’s Argument: The recall election was invalid because it violated A.R.S. § 33-1813. This statute, titled “Removal of board member; special meeting,” explicitly states that a recall process is initiated upon the board’s receipt of a petition signed by a specified number or percentage of homeowners. The president’s unilateral action did not meet this requirement.

• Respondent’s Argument: The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813 was not the exclusive procedure. It claimed that the president could also call such a meeting under the authority of A.R.S. § 33-1804, a more general statute governing meetings, which states that “Special meetings of the members’ association may be called by the president.”

Statutory Analysis by the Court

The Administrative Law Judge highlighted the direct conflict between the two statutes on the subject of board member removal.

Feature

A.R.S. § 33-1813 (Specific Statute)

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) (General Statute)

Meeting Initiation

By homeowner petition only.

By the president, a board majority, or homeowner petition.

Petition Requirement

For HOAs ≤ 1,000 members: petition signed by at least 100 members or 25% of votes, whichever is less.

Petition signed by at least 25% of votes (or lower if specified in bylaws).

Meeting Notice

Within 30 days after receipt of the petition.

Between 10 and 50 days in advance of the meeting.

The judge noted that A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically overrides the petition requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), demonstrating legislative intent for it to be the controlling authority on this specific issue.

The Judge’s Legal Conclusion

The decision rested on the well-established legal principle that a specific statute governs over a general one when they are inconsistent. Citing case law, the judge reasoned:

“When provisions of a general statute are inconsistent with those of a special nature on the same subject, the special statute controls.”

Applying this canon of statutory construction, the judge concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1813 is the controlling authority for the removal of an HOA board member. Therefore, a valid recall process must be initiated by a homeowner petition as outlined in that statute. The president lacked the authority to call the April 24, 2018 recall meeting on his own initiative.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the legal conclusion that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1813, the Administrative Law Judge issued a recommended order with the following mandates:

1. Petition Granted: The petitioner’s petition is granted.

2. Board Member Reinstatement: The Carter Ranch HOA is required to reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell.

3. Fee Reimbursement: The HOA must reimburse the petitioner, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, for his $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

This order is considered binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Tom Pyron vs Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

Posted on June 19, 2017 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1717026-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-06-19
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	none
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Tom Pyron	Counsel	—
Respondent	Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.	Counsel	B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

Bylaws, Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA correctly identified only one Board position (the one-year term) was up for election in 2017 based on the Bylaws' staggered term provisions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Dispute over the number of Board of Director positions available for the 2017 election.

Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated Bylaws by stating only one Board position was up for election for a one-year term in 2017, when Petitioner contended two positions (one-year and two-year terms) were open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
• R4-28-1310

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Bylaw Violation, Board Term, Staggered Terms, Condominium Association

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
• R4-28-1310

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 570560.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:26 (120.2 KB)

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 576045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:26 (959.2 KB)

Briefing Document: Pyron v. Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and legal conclusions from an administrative hearing concerning a dispute between homeowner Tom Pyron (“Petitioner”) and the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The central issue was the Petitioner’s allegation that the Respondent violated its bylaws by announcing only one Board of Directors position was open for election in 2017, whereas the Petitioner contended two positions should have been open.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent. The decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the association’s bylaws, specifically Article III, § 3.02, which governs the staggered terms of office for the three-member board. The ALJ found that a board member’s personal understanding of their term length could not amend the plain language of the bylaws. Based on the bylaw’s schedule for staggered terms, the judge concluded that a pivotal 2015 election could only have filled a one-year and a three-year term, which sequentially led to only one position being open in 2017. The Petitioner’s petition was denied, and this decision was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

I. Case Overview

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Tom Pyron, a condominium owner and member of the Respondent association.

◦ Respondent: Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc., represented by B. Austin Baillio, Esq., of Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.

• Case Numbers: 17F-H1717026-REL; HO 17-17/026

• Adjudicator: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky, Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Final Order By: Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• Hearing Date: June 12, 2017.

• Final Order Date: July 12, 2017.

The case was initiated when Tom Pyron filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on March 16, 2017, alleging a violation of the homeowners’ association’s bylaws concerning the 2017 Board of Directors election.

II. Petitioner’s Allegations

The Petitioner’s claim centered on the belief that the Respondent improperly noticed the number of available Board positions for the 2017 election.

• Core Allegation: The Respondent violated its Bylaws (Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06) by informing members that only one Board position for a one-year term was available for the 2017 election.

• Petitioner’s Contention: Two positions—one for a one-year term and one for a two-year term—should have been up for election in 2017.

• Basis of Argument: The Petitioner’s argument was built upon the 2015 election of Barbara Ahlstrand. He contended, supported by Ahlstrand’s testimony, that she was elected to a two-year term. Following this logic:

1. Ahlstrand’s term would run from 2015 to 2017.

2. When she resigned in August 2015, her replacement, Jeff Oursland, was appointed to serve the remainder of that two-year term, which would expire in 2017.

3. Therefore, Jeff Oursland should not have been on the ballot for the 2016 election, and his two-year position should have been one of the two seats open for election in 2017.

III. Respondent’s Position and Pre-Hearing Actions

The Respondent denied any violation of its bylaws and maintained that its actions were consistent with the governing documents.

• Pre-Hearing Resolution Attempts: In response to the Petitioner’s concerns, the Respondent twice rescheduled the 2017 annual meeting and re-issued election ballots. The Respondent also offered to pay the Petitioner’s $500 single-issue filing fee if he was satisfied with the proposed resolution, an offer the Petitioner did not accept.

• Core Defense: The Respondent’s position was based on a direct interpretation of Bylaw § 3.02, which dictates the schedule of staggered terms.

• Basis of Argument: The Respondent argued that according to the bylaw’s prescribed cycle, only the one-year and three-year positions were up for election in 2015.

1. As it was agreed that Sandra Singer received the most votes and was elected to the three-year term, Barbara Ahlstrand must have been elected to the available one-year term.

2. Therefore, Ahlstrand’s term was set to expire in 2016.

3. Her replacement, Jeff Oursland, was correctly appointed to serve only until the 2016 election.

4. Consequently, Oursland was properly elected to a new two-year term in 2016 (expiring in 2018), and the only seat open in 2017 was the one-year term completed by Steve Molever.

IV. Chronology of Board Elections and Appointments

The dispute originated from differing interpretations of election outcomes from 2014 onward. The Board of Directors has consistently been comprised of three members.

Election Year

Agreed Facts & Election Results

Petitioner’s Interpretation/Contention

Respondent’s Interpretation/Position

Anne Fugate elected to a 3-year term.
John Haunschild elected to a 2-year term.
Ron Cadaret elected to a 1-year term.

N/A (Agreed)

N/A (Agreed)

Ron Cadaret re-elected to a 1-year term.

N/A (Agreed)

N/A (Agreed)

Minutes state “the election of Sandra Singer was unanimously passed by acclamation.”

Sandra Singer was elected to a 1-year term. No other officers were elected.

Based on bylaw § 3.02 and the 2015 Board composition, John Haunschild must have been re-elected to a 2-year term (expiring 2016), and Sandra Singer was elected to a 1-year term (expiring 2015).

Sandra Singer and Barbara Ahlstrand were elected. Singer received the most votes and was elected to a 3-year term. Ahlstrand resigned 8/3/2015.

Ahlstrand believed she was elected to a 2-year term (expiring 2017).

Per bylaw § 3.02, only the 1-year and 3-year terms were open. Since Singer got the 3-year term, Ahlstrand must have been elected to the 1-year term (expiring 2016).

Appointment

The Board appointed Jeff Oursland to serve the remainder of Ahlstrand’s term.

Oursland was appointed to a term expiring in 2017.

Oursland was appointed to a term expiring in 2016.

Jeff Oursland was elected to a 2-year term.
Steve Molever was elected to a 1-year term.

Oursland should not have been on the ballot, as his term was not set to expire until 2017.

Oursland’s appointed term expired, so he was properly elected to a new 2-year term (expiring 2018).

No election had been held due to the pending petition.

Two positions should be open for election: the 2-year term (Ahlstrand/Oursland’s) and the 1-year term (Molever’s).

Only one position is open for election: the 1-year term completed by Molever.

V. Analysis and Conclusions of Law

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was based on the legal standard of “a preponderance of the evidence” and a strict textual interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish a violation.

• Primacy of Bylaw Language: The judge’s central legal conclusion was that the bylaws must be interpreted based on their plain meaning. Key quotes from the decision include:

• Key Legal Finding: The pivotal determination concerned the 2015 election. The ALJ found that under the “plain language of Bylaw § 3.02, only the one-year and three-year terms were up for election in 2015.”

◦ Because the parties agreed that Ms. Singer was elected to the three-year term, the judge concluded that “Ms. Ahlstrand must have been elected to the one-year term.”

◦ This finding invalidated the Petitioner’s core premise that Ahlstrand had begun a two-year term.

• Consequential Logic: This central finding created a direct logical chain that affirmed the Respondent’s actions:

1. Ms. Ahlstrand’s term was for one year, expiring in 2016.

2. When she resigned, the Board appointed Mr. Oursland to serve the remainder of her term, which correctly ended at the 2016 election.

3. Mr. Oursland was therefore “properly elected to a two-year term at that time [2016], which will expire in 2018.”

VI. Final Disposition

Based on the analysis of the bylaws and the sequence of elections, the ALJ ruled against the Petitioner.

• Recommended Order (June 19, 2017): The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the “Petitioner’s petition in this matter is denied.”

• Final Order (July 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision. The Final Order states, “The Commissioner accepts the ALJ decision that Petitioner’s petition in this matter is denied.”

• Binding Nature: The Order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. The document outlines eight potential causes for which a rehearing or review may be granted, including procedural irregularities, misconduct, newly discovered material evidence, or a finding of fact that is arbitrary or contrary to law.

Tom Pyron vs Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

Posted on June 19, 2017 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1717026-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-06-19
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	none
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Tom Pyron	Counsel	—
Respondent	Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.	Counsel	B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

Bylaws, Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA correctly identified only one Board position (the one-year term) was up for election in 2017 based on the Bylaws' staggered term provisions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Dispute over the number of Board of Director positions available for the 2017 election.

Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated Bylaws by stating only one Board position was up for election for a one-year term in 2017, when Petitioner contended two positions (one-year and two-year terms) were open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
• R4-28-1310

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Bylaw Violation, Board Term, Staggered Terms, Condominium Association

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
• R4-28-1310

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 570560.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:50:42 (120.2 KB)

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 576045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:50:43 (959.2 KB)

Briefing Document: Pyron v. Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and legal conclusions from an administrative hearing concerning a dispute between homeowner Tom Pyron (“Petitioner”) and the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The central issue was the Petitioner’s allegation that the Respondent violated its bylaws by announcing only one Board of Directors position was open for election in 2017, whereas the Petitioner contended two positions should have been open.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent. The decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the association’s bylaws, specifically Article III, § 3.02, which governs the staggered terms of office for the three-member board. The ALJ found that a board member’s personal understanding of their term length could not amend the plain language of the bylaws. Based on the bylaw’s schedule for staggered terms, the judge concluded that a pivotal 2015 election could only have filled a one-year and a three-year term, which sequentially led to only one position being open in 2017. The Petitioner’s petition was denied, and this decision was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

I. Case Overview

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Tom Pyron, a condominium owner and member of the Respondent association.

◦ Respondent: Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc., represented by B. Austin Baillio, Esq., of Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.

• Case Numbers: 17F-H1717026-REL; HO 17-17/026

• Adjudicator: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky, Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Final Order By: Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• Hearing Date: June 12, 2017.

• Final Order Date: July 12, 2017.

The case was initiated when Tom Pyron filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on March 16, 2017, alleging a violation of the homeowners’ association’s bylaws concerning the 2017 Board of Directors election.

II. Petitioner’s Allegations

The Petitioner’s claim centered on the belief that the Respondent improperly noticed the number of available Board positions for the 2017 election.

• Core Allegation: The Respondent violated its Bylaws (Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06) by informing members that only one Board position for a one-year term was available for the 2017 election.

• Petitioner’s Contention: Two positions—one for a one-year term and one for a two-year term—should have been up for election in 2017.

• Basis of Argument: The Petitioner’s argument was built upon the 2015 election of Barbara Ahlstrand. He contended, supported by Ahlstrand’s testimony, that she was elected to a two-year term. Following this logic:

1. Ahlstrand’s term would run from 2015 to 2017.

2. When she resigned in August 2015, her replacement, Jeff Oursland, was appointed to serve the remainder of that two-year term, which would expire in 2017.

3. Therefore, Jeff Oursland should not have been on the ballot for the 2016 election, and his two-year position should have been one of the two seats open for election in 2017.

III. Respondent’s Position and Pre-Hearing Actions

The Respondent denied any violation of its bylaws and maintained that its actions were consistent with the governing documents.

• Pre-Hearing Resolution Attempts: In response to the Petitioner’s concerns, the Respondent twice rescheduled the 2017 annual meeting and re-issued election ballots. The Respondent also offered to pay the Petitioner’s $500 single-issue filing fee if he was satisfied with the proposed resolution, an offer the Petitioner did not accept.

• Core Defense: The Respondent’s position was based on a direct interpretation of Bylaw § 3.02, which dictates the schedule of staggered terms.

• Basis of Argument: The Respondent argued that according to the bylaw’s prescribed cycle, only the one-year and three-year positions were up for election in 2015.

1. As it was agreed that Sandra Singer received the most votes and was elected to the three-year term, Barbara Ahlstrand must have been elected to the available one-year term.

2. Therefore, Ahlstrand’s term was set to expire in 2016.

3. Her replacement, Jeff Oursland, was correctly appointed to serve only until the 2016 election.

4. Consequently, Oursland was properly elected to a new two-year term in 2016 (expiring in 2018), and the only seat open in 2017 was the one-year term completed by Steve Molever.

IV. Chronology of Board Elections and Appointments

The dispute originated from differing interpretations of election outcomes from 2014 onward. The Board of Directors has consistently been comprised of three members.

Election Year

Agreed Facts & Election Results

Petitioner’s Interpretation/Contention

Respondent’s Interpretation/Position

Anne Fugate elected to a 3-year term.
John Haunschild elected to a 2-year term.
Ron Cadaret elected to a 1-year term.

N/A (Agreed)

N/A (Agreed)

Ron Cadaret re-elected to a 1-year term.

N/A (Agreed)

N/A (Agreed)

Minutes state “the election of Sandra Singer was unanimously passed by acclamation.”

Sandra Singer was elected to a 1-year term. No other officers were elected.

Based on bylaw § 3.02 and the 2015 Board composition, John Haunschild must have been re-elected to a 2-year term (expiring 2016), and Sandra Singer was elected to a 1-year term (expiring 2015).

Sandra Singer and Barbara Ahlstrand were elected. Singer received the most votes and was elected to a 3-year term. Ahlstrand resigned 8/3/2015.

Ahlstrand believed she was elected to a 2-year term (expiring 2017).

Per bylaw § 3.02, only the 1-year and 3-year terms were open. Since Singer got the 3-year term, Ahlstrand must have been elected to the 1-year term (expiring 2016).

Appointment

The Board appointed Jeff Oursland to serve the remainder of Ahlstrand’s term.

Oursland was appointed to a term expiring in 2017.

Oursland was appointed to a term expiring in 2016.

Jeff Oursland was elected to a 2-year term.
Steve Molever was elected to a 1-year term.

Oursland should not have been on the ballot, as his term was not set to expire until 2017.

Oursland’s appointed term expired, so he was properly elected to a new 2-year term (expiring 2018).

No election had been held due to the pending petition.

Two positions should be open for election: the 2-year term (Ahlstrand/Oursland’s) and the 1-year term (Molever’s).

Only one position is open for election: the 1-year term completed by Molever.

V. Analysis and Conclusions of Law

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was based on the legal standard of “a preponderance of the evidence” and a strict textual interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish a violation.

• Primacy of Bylaw Language: The judge’s central legal conclusion was that the bylaws must be interpreted based on their plain meaning. Key quotes from the decision include:

• Key Legal Finding: The pivotal determination concerned the 2015 election. The ALJ found that under the “plain language of Bylaw § 3.02, only the one-year and three-year terms were up for election in 2015.”

◦ Because the parties agreed that Ms. Singer was elected to the three-year term, the judge concluded that “Ms. Ahlstrand must have been elected to the one-year term.”

◦ This finding invalidated the Petitioner’s core premise that Ahlstrand had begun a two-year term.

• Consequential Logic: This central finding created a direct logical chain that affirmed the Respondent’s actions:

1. Ms. Ahlstrand’s term was for one year, expiring in 2016.

2. When she resigned, the Board appointed Mr. Oursland to serve the remainder of her term, which correctly ended at the 2016 election.

3. Mr. Oursland was therefore “properly elected to a two-year term at that time [2016], which will expire in 2018.”

VI. Final Disposition

Based on the analysis of the bylaws and the sequence of elections, the ALJ ruled against the Petitioner.

• Recommended Order (June 19, 2017): The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the “Petitioner’s petition in this matter is denied.”

• Final Order (July 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision. The Final Order states, “The Commissioner accepts the ALJ decision that Petitioner’s petition in this matter is denied.”

• Binding Nature: The Order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. The document outlines eight potential causes for which a rehearing or review may be granted, including procedural irregularities, misconduct, newly discovered material evidence, or a finding of fact that is arbitrary or contrary to law.