Tag Archives: DM

Michelle Ruffo vs. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

Posted on October 3, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818044-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-10-03
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Michelle Ruffo	Counsel	—
Respondent	Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association	Counsel	Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1242, 33-1248, 33-1803(A), 33-1803(B), 33-1805; CC&Rs §§ 1.36, 1.38, 4.7, 2.8.3

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated the governing documents or relevant statutes in assessing fines for unauthorized parking.

Why this result: Petitioner continually violated CC&R § 4.7 and failed to prove Respondent violated any CC&R or statute, particularly as A.R.S. § 33-1242 did not apply to disputes concerning the use of limited common elements.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA violation of CC&Rs and Statutes by imposing parking fines

Petitioner challenged the HOA's decision to assess continuous fines against her account totaling $2,544.00 for repeatedly parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit 52, arguing the fines and enforcement lacked proper statutory process and violated CC&Rs. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof and that the statute cited (A.R.S. § 33-1242) concerning property condition notices did not apply to this dispute regarding limited common elements (parking spaces).

Orders: Petitioner Michelle Ruffo’s petition against Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 33-1242
• A.R.S. § 33-1803
• CC&R § 4.7
• CC&R § 2.8.3

Analytics Highlights

Topics: parking violation, fines, HOA enforcement, limited common elements, due process, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 32-2199
• A.R.S. § 33-1242
• A.R.S. § 33-1248
• A.R.S. § 33-1803
• A.R.S. § 33-1805
• A.R.S. § 12-349
• CC&R § 4.7
• CC&R § 2.8.3

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818044-REL Decision – 663567.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:52 (270.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Ruffo v. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818044-REL, involving Petitioner Michelle Ruffo and Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association. The core of the dispute centers on a series of fines levied by the Association against Ms. Ruffo for repeatedly parking in condominium parking spaces not assigned to her unit.

The Petitioner argued that she had informal written permission from other residents to use their spaces, that the Association’s notices of violation were procedurally flawed, that she was the victim of retaliatory harassment, and that her own assigned space was frequently occupied by others. The Respondent maintained that its actions were in strict accordance with the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which unambiguously require owners to use only their assigned parking spaces and outline a formal process for reallocating them, a process the Petitioner did not follow.

The ALJ ultimately denied the petition, finding that Ms. Ruffo failed to meet her burden of proof. The decision concluded that the Association acted within its rights, that its enforcement actions were consistent with its governing documents, and that the Petitioner’s reliance on informal agreements represented the very “evils that the CC&Rs were designed to prevent.” As of the hearing date, the outstanding balance of fines, interest, and fees on the Petitioner’s account totaled $2,544.00.

Case Background

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Representation / Key Details

Petitioner

Michelle Ruffo

Owner of unit 52, assigned parking space #131. Appeared on her own behalf.

Respondent

Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Assoc.

The condominium unit owners’ association. Represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq. of Brown Olcott, PLLC.

Adjudicator

Diane Mihalsky

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Witnesses

Carol Lundberg

Testified for the Petitioner.

Vanessa Chapman Lubinsky & Gabino Trejo

Former and current property managers, respectively, who testified for the Respondent.

Core Dispute

The central issue is the Association’s imposition of fines against Ms. Ruffo for violating the community’s parking regulations. On or about April 17, 2018, Ms. Ruffo filed a petition alleging the Association violated its CC&Rs and several Arizona statutes by fining her for parking in spaces #38 and #40, which were not assigned to her unit #52. The Association denied any violation, asserting it was enforcing valid community rules.

Chronology of the Dispute

The conflict escalated over a period of approximately two years, marked by a series of notices, fines, and failed attempts at resolution.

• August 2, 2016: The Association sends a “Friendly Reminder” to Ms. Ruffo to cease parking in space #40 and use her assigned space, #131.

• August 5, 2016: A “Notice of Violation” is sent for the same issue, serving as a second warning.

• March 14, 2017: A “Final Non-Compliance Notice” is issued, noting violations in both space #40 and #38. The notice informs Ms. Ruffo of her right to a hearing with the Board of Directors if requested within 14 days.

• March 30, 2017: The first fine of $50.00 is assessed after Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle is again observed in space #38.

• April 17, 2017: Ms. Ruffo responds in writing, claiming she has permission to use the spaces and requests the fine be waived.

• April 27, 2017: The Association’s Board reviews and denies the waiver request. Ms. Ruffo was invited to address the Board but did not attend.

• June 6, 2017: A $200.00 fine is assessed for two observed violations in space #40.

• June 26, 2017: Another $200.00 fine is assessed for violations in spaces #40 and #38.

• July 11, 2017: The Association warns that access to community amenities (pool, fitness room) will be denied if fines remain unpaid. This action is later taken.

• August 31, 2017: A Board meeting is scheduled for Ms. Ruffo and her attorney, Mark F. Williman, to attend. Neither party attends, and they fail to provide advance notice. The Association incurs a $200 legal fee for its attorney’s attendance.

• September 25, 2017: Fines totaling $1,400.00 are assessed for multiple observed violations.

• September 27, 2017: The Association attempts to tow Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle. The attempt is aborted after she refuses to exit the vehicle and calls the Pima County Sheriff’s Office.

• October 4, 2017: The Association’s attorney informs Ms. Ruffo that another hearing will not be scheduled until she reimburses the Association for the $200 legal fee from the missed August 31 meeting.

• October 2017 – January 2018: A series of additional fines are assessed for ongoing violations, and Ms. Ruffo sends multiple letters requesting a hearing and protesting the fines and the $200 reimbursement requirement.

• April 17, 2018: Ms. Ruffo files the formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• September 18, 2018: The evidentiary hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Michelle Ruffo)

Ms. Ruffo’s defense was multi-faceted, based on claims of permission, procedural errors by the Association, and alleged harassment.

• Claim of Permission: Ms. Ruffo testified that since 2005, she had been parking in spaces #38 and #40 with written permission. She claimed a 2006 agreement with the Morleys, then owners of unit #56, for space #40. She also submitted a 2018 email from Julie Ruiz, a tenant in unit #53, granting permission to use space #38.

• Allegations of Improper Notices: She argued the Association’s notices violated A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) because they did not always identify the person who observed the violation or provide photographic evidence.

• Allegations of Harassment and Retaliation: Through an attorney, Ms. Ruffo alleged she was being “unlawfully discriminated against and harassed in retaliation for her role related to allegations that HOA President Mitch Treese misappropriated HOA funds.” The ALJ noted that no evidence was submitted at the hearing to support this claim.

• Counter-Evidence: Ms. Ruffo submitted photographs dated from October 2016 to July 2017 showing other vehicles, including those of Associa maintenance and a landscaping contractor, parked in her assigned space #131.

• Dispute over Hearing Preconditions: She argued that the Association’s demand for a $200 reimbursement for its attorney’s fees as a condition for a new hearing was unlawful and not permitted under the CC&Rs.

Respondent’s Position (The Association)

The Association’s case rested on the explicit language of its governing documents and its adherence to established enforcement procedures.

• Primacy of the CC&Rs: The Association argued that its governing documents are unambiguous. Section 4.7 explicitly forbids owners from parking in any space other than the one assigned to their unit as a Limited Common Element.

• Formal Reallocation Process: Per Section 2.8.3, reallocating a Limited Common Element like a parking space requires a formal, written amendment executed by the unit owners involved and submitted to the Board for approval. Ms. Ruffo never followed this procedure.

• Rejection of Informal Agreements: The property manager testified that such private agreements are not legally binding or enforceable by the Association and create confusion, as evidenced by complaints from subsequent owners and tenants who were unable to use their assigned spaces.

• Adherence to Enforcement Policy: The Association followed its documented Violation Enforcement Policy, starting with a friendly reminder and escalating to formal notices and fines for continued non-compliance.

• Opportunity to Be Heard: Ms. Ruffo was provided opportunities to address the Board on April 27, 2017, and August 31, 2017. She failed to attend either meeting, and her failure to provide notice for the latter caused the Association to incur unnecessary legal fees.

• Witness Testimony: The former property manager, Ms. Chapman, testified that she had personally witnessed all the charged violations.

Governing Documents and Statutes

The case hinged on the interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs and relevant Arizona state law.

Key CC&R Provisions

Section

Provision

Relevance

Motor Vehicles: “no Owner, Lessee or Occupant may park any . . . motor vehicle . . . in any Parking Spaces other than the Parking Space assigned to the Unit as a Limited Common Element.”

The central rule that the Petitioner was found to have repeatedly violated.

§ 2.8.3

Reallocation of Limited Common Elements: A reallocation requires a formal, recorded amendment executed by the owners and submitted to the Board.

The official procedure for changing parking space assignments, which the Petitioner did not follow for her informal agreements.

§ 13.1

Enforcement: Grants the Association the right to impose monetary penalties, suspend an owner’s right to use facilities, and tow vehicles in violation of the rules, after notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Provides the legal authority within the governing documents for the Association’s actions (fines, suspension of amenity access, attempted tow).

§ 1.36

“Parking Space” Definition: Defines a parking space as a portion of the Limited Common Elements.

Legally classifies the disputed parking spaces, making them subject to the rules governing Limited Common Elements.

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

The Petitioner cited A.R.S. § 33-1242(C), which requires an association, upon written request from an owner, to provide details of an alleged violation, including the observer’s name and the date. The ALJ determined this statute was inapplicable to the dispute. The judge’s reasoning was that the statute applies specifically to notices regarding the “condition of the property owned by the unit owner” (i.e., her physical condo unit #52), not her use of Limited Common Elements like parking spaces, which she does not own.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision was a conclusive denial of the petition, siding entirely with the Association.

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Michelle Ruffo’s petition against Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association is denied because Petitioner has not established that Respondent violated the CC&Rs or any statute in assessing fines against her for her repeated violations of CC&R § 4.7 by parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit #52.”

Key Legal Conclusions

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving her claims by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to do so.

• Unambiguous Covenants: The CC&Rs regarding parking are unambiguous and must be enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. CC&R § 4.7 clearly requires owners to park in their assigned spaces.

• Invalidity of Informal Agreements: The ALJ found that the Petitioner’s reliance on informal agreements illustrated “the evils that the CC&Rs were designed to prevent.” These undocumented side deals create instability and conflict when properties are sold or new tenants arrive, undermining the security and order of the community’s parking plan.

• Respondent’s Proper Conduct: The Association was found to have followed its own enforcement policy and provided the Petitioner with opportunities to be heard.

• Attorney’s Fee Condition: While the CC&Rs do not explicitly authorize charging an owner for attorney’s fees as a precondition for a hearing, the ALJ noted that A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(18) allows an association to “exercise any . . . powers necessary and proper for the governance and operation.” Furthermore, civil statutes often require a party to pay for fees they cause an opponent to incur unnecessarily.

• Futility of a Board Hearing: The ALJ concluded that, in light of the Petitioner’s arguments and her “continued violation of Respondent’s parking policy over nearly two years,” a hearing before the Association’s Board would not have changed her behavior or the outcome of the matter.

Financial Implications

The conflict resulted in significant financial penalties for the Petitioner. The fines were assessed on an escalating basis for continued violations.

• March 30, 2017: $50.00

• June 6, 2017: $200.00

• June 26, 2017: $200.00

• August 9, 2017: $200.00

• September 25, 2017: $1,400.00

• October 17, 2017: $100.00

• November 6, 2017: $100.00

As of the hearing on September 18, 2018, the total outstanding balance on Ms. Ruffo’s account, including interest and certified letter fees, was $2,544.00.

Michelle Ruffo vs. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

Posted on October 3, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818044-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-10-03
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Michelle Ruffo	Counsel	—
Respondent	Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association	Counsel	Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1242, 33-1248, 33-1803(A), 33-1803(B), 33-1805; CC&Rs §§ 1.36, 1.38, 4.7, 2.8.3

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated the governing documents or relevant statutes in assessing fines for unauthorized parking.

Why this result: Petitioner continually violated CC&R § 4.7 and failed to prove Respondent violated any CC&R or statute, particularly as A.R.S. § 33-1242 did not apply to disputes concerning the use of limited common elements.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA violation of CC&Rs and Statutes by imposing parking fines

Petitioner challenged the HOA's decision to assess continuous fines against her account totaling $2,544.00 for repeatedly parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit 52, arguing the fines and enforcement lacked proper statutory process and violated CC&Rs. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof and that the statute cited (A.R.S. § 33-1242) concerning property condition notices did not apply to this dispute regarding limited common elements (parking spaces).

Orders: Petitioner Michelle Ruffo’s petition against Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 33-1242
• A.R.S. § 33-1803
• CC&R § 4.7
• CC&R § 2.8.3

Analytics Highlights

Topics: parking violation, fines, HOA enforcement, limited common elements, due process, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 32-2199
• A.R.S. § 33-1242
• A.R.S. § 33-1248
• A.R.S. § 33-1803
• A.R.S. § 33-1805
• A.R.S. § 12-349
• CC&R § 4.7
• CC&R § 2.8.3

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818044-REL Decision – 663567.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:05:38 (270.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Ruffo v. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818044-REL, involving Petitioner Michelle Ruffo and Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association. The core of the dispute centers on a series of fines levied by the Association against Ms. Ruffo for repeatedly parking in condominium parking spaces not assigned to her unit.

The Petitioner argued that she had informal written permission from other residents to use their spaces, that the Association’s notices of violation were procedurally flawed, that she was the victim of retaliatory harassment, and that her own assigned space was frequently occupied by others. The Respondent maintained that its actions were in strict accordance with the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which unambiguously require owners to use only their assigned parking spaces and outline a formal process for reallocating them, a process the Petitioner did not follow.

The ALJ ultimately denied the petition, finding that Ms. Ruffo failed to meet her burden of proof. The decision concluded that the Association acted within its rights, that its enforcement actions were consistent with its governing documents, and that the Petitioner’s reliance on informal agreements represented the very “evils that the CC&Rs were designed to prevent.” As of the hearing date, the outstanding balance of fines, interest, and fees on the Petitioner’s account totaled $2,544.00.

Case Background

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Representation / Key Details

Petitioner

Michelle Ruffo

Owner of unit 52, assigned parking space #131. Appeared on her own behalf.

Respondent

Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Assoc.

The condominium unit owners’ association. Represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq. of Brown Olcott, PLLC.

Adjudicator

Diane Mihalsky

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Witnesses

Carol Lundberg

Testified for the Petitioner.

Vanessa Chapman Lubinsky & Gabino Trejo

Former and current property managers, respectively, who testified for the Respondent.

Core Dispute

The central issue is the Association’s imposition of fines against Ms. Ruffo for violating the community’s parking regulations. On or about April 17, 2018, Ms. Ruffo filed a petition alleging the Association violated its CC&Rs and several Arizona statutes by fining her for parking in spaces #38 and #40, which were not assigned to her unit #52. The Association denied any violation, asserting it was enforcing valid community rules.

Chronology of the Dispute

The conflict escalated over a period of approximately two years, marked by a series of notices, fines, and failed attempts at resolution.

• August 2, 2016: The Association sends a “Friendly Reminder” to Ms. Ruffo to cease parking in space #40 and use her assigned space, #131.

• August 5, 2016: A “Notice of Violation” is sent for the same issue, serving as a second warning.

• March 14, 2017: A “Final Non-Compliance Notice” is issued, noting violations in both space #40 and #38. The notice informs Ms. Ruffo of her right to a hearing with the Board of Directors if requested within 14 days.

• March 30, 2017: The first fine of $50.00 is assessed after Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle is again observed in space #38.

• April 17, 2017: Ms. Ruffo responds in writing, claiming she has permission to use the spaces and requests the fine be waived.

• April 27, 2017: The Association’s Board reviews and denies the waiver request. Ms. Ruffo was invited to address the Board but did not attend.

• June 6, 2017: A $200.00 fine is assessed for two observed violations in space #40.

• June 26, 2017: Another $200.00 fine is assessed for violations in spaces #40 and #38.

• July 11, 2017: The Association warns that access to community amenities (pool, fitness room) will be denied if fines remain unpaid. This action is later taken.

• August 31, 2017: A Board meeting is scheduled for Ms. Ruffo and her attorney, Mark F. Williman, to attend. Neither party attends, and they fail to provide advance notice. The Association incurs a $200 legal fee for its attorney’s attendance.

• September 25, 2017: Fines totaling $1,400.00 are assessed for multiple observed violations.

• September 27, 2017: The Association attempts to tow Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle. The attempt is aborted after she refuses to exit the vehicle and calls the Pima County Sheriff’s Office.

• October 4, 2017: The Association’s attorney informs Ms. Ruffo that another hearing will not be scheduled until she reimburses the Association for the $200 legal fee from the missed August 31 meeting.

• October 2017 – January 2018: A series of additional fines are assessed for ongoing violations, and Ms. Ruffo sends multiple letters requesting a hearing and protesting the fines and the $200 reimbursement requirement.

• April 17, 2018: Ms. Ruffo files the formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• September 18, 2018: The evidentiary hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Michelle Ruffo)

Ms. Ruffo’s defense was multi-faceted, based on claims of permission, procedural errors by the Association, and alleged harassment.

• Claim of Permission: Ms. Ruffo testified that since 2005, she had been parking in spaces #38 and #40 with written permission. She claimed a 2006 agreement with the Morleys, then owners of unit #56, for space #40. She also submitted a 2018 email from Julie Ruiz, a tenant in unit #53, granting permission to use space #38.

• Allegations of Improper Notices: She argued the Association’s notices violated A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) because they did not always identify the person who observed the violation or provide photographic evidence.

• Allegations of Harassment and Retaliation: Through an attorney, Ms. Ruffo alleged she was being “unlawfully discriminated against and harassed in retaliation for her role related to allegations that HOA President Mitch Treese misappropriated HOA funds.” The ALJ noted that no evidence was submitted at the hearing to support this claim.

• Counter-Evidence: Ms. Ruffo submitted photographs dated from October 2016 to July 2017 showing other vehicles, including those of Associa maintenance and a landscaping contractor, parked in her assigned space #131.

• Dispute over Hearing Preconditions: She argued that the Association’s demand for a $200 reimbursement for its attorney’s fees as a condition for a new hearing was unlawful and not permitted under the CC&Rs.

Respondent’s Position (The Association)

The Association’s case rested on the explicit language of its governing documents and its adherence to established enforcement procedures.

• Primacy of the CC&Rs: The Association argued that its governing documents are unambiguous. Section 4.7 explicitly forbids owners from parking in any space other than the one assigned to their unit as a Limited Common Element.

• Formal Reallocation Process: Per Section 2.8.3, reallocating a Limited Common Element like a parking space requires a formal, written amendment executed by the unit owners involved and submitted to the Board for approval. Ms. Ruffo never followed this procedure.

• Rejection of Informal Agreements: The property manager testified that such private agreements are not legally binding or enforceable by the Association and create confusion, as evidenced by complaints from subsequent owners and tenants who were unable to use their assigned spaces.

• Adherence to Enforcement Policy: The Association followed its documented Violation Enforcement Policy, starting with a friendly reminder and escalating to formal notices and fines for continued non-compliance.

• Opportunity to Be Heard: Ms. Ruffo was provided opportunities to address the Board on April 27, 2017, and August 31, 2017. She failed to attend either meeting, and her failure to provide notice for the latter caused the Association to incur unnecessary legal fees.

• Witness Testimony: The former property manager, Ms. Chapman, testified that she had personally witnessed all the charged violations.

Governing Documents and Statutes

The case hinged on the interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs and relevant Arizona state law.

Key CC&R Provisions

Section

Provision

Relevance

Motor Vehicles: “no Owner, Lessee or Occupant may park any . . . motor vehicle . . . in any Parking Spaces other than the Parking Space assigned to the Unit as a Limited Common Element.”

The central rule that the Petitioner was found to have repeatedly violated.

§ 2.8.3

Reallocation of Limited Common Elements: A reallocation requires a formal, recorded amendment executed by the owners and submitted to the Board.

The official procedure for changing parking space assignments, which the Petitioner did not follow for her informal agreements.

§ 13.1

Enforcement: Grants the Association the right to impose monetary penalties, suspend an owner’s right to use facilities, and tow vehicles in violation of the rules, after notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Provides the legal authority within the governing documents for the Association’s actions (fines, suspension of amenity access, attempted tow).

§ 1.36

“Parking Space” Definition: Defines a parking space as a portion of the Limited Common Elements.

Legally classifies the disputed parking spaces, making them subject to the rules governing Limited Common Elements.

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

The Petitioner cited A.R.S. § 33-1242(C), which requires an association, upon written request from an owner, to provide details of an alleged violation, including the observer’s name and the date. The ALJ determined this statute was inapplicable to the dispute. The judge’s reasoning was that the statute applies specifically to notices regarding the “condition of the property owned by the unit owner” (i.e., her physical condo unit #52), not her use of Limited Common Elements like parking spaces, which she does not own.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision was a conclusive denial of the petition, siding entirely with the Association.

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Michelle Ruffo’s petition against Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association is denied because Petitioner has not established that Respondent violated the CC&Rs or any statute in assessing fines against her for her repeated violations of CC&R § 4.7 by parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit #52.”

Key Legal Conclusions

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving her claims by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to do so.

• Unambiguous Covenants: The CC&Rs regarding parking are unambiguous and must be enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. CC&R § 4.7 clearly requires owners to park in their assigned spaces.

• Invalidity of Informal Agreements: The ALJ found that the Petitioner’s reliance on informal agreements illustrated “the evils that the CC&Rs were designed to prevent.” These undocumented side deals create instability and conflict when properties are sold or new tenants arrive, undermining the security and order of the community’s parking plan.

• Respondent’s Proper Conduct: The Association was found to have followed its own enforcement policy and provided the Petitioner with opportunities to be heard.

• Attorney’s Fee Condition: While the CC&Rs do not explicitly authorize charging an owner for attorney’s fees as a precondition for a hearing, the ALJ noted that A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(18) allows an association to “exercise any . . . powers necessary and proper for the governance and operation.” Furthermore, civil statutes often require a party to pay for fees they cause an opponent to incur unnecessarily.

• Futility of a Board Hearing: The ALJ concluded that, in light of the Petitioner’s arguments and her “continued violation of Respondent’s parking policy over nearly two years,” a hearing before the Association’s Board would not have changed her behavior or the outcome of the matter.

Financial Implications

The conflict resulted in significant financial penalties for the Petitioner. The fines were assessed on an escalating basis for continued violations.

• March 30, 2017: $50.00

• June 6, 2017: $200.00

• June 26, 2017: $200.00

• August 9, 2017: $200.00

• September 25, 2017: $1,400.00

• October 17, 2017: $100.00

• November 6, 2017: $100.00

As of the hearing on September 18, 2018, the total outstanding balance on Ms. Ruffo’s account, including interest and certified letter fees, was $2,544.00.

Peter Biondi, Jr. vs. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners

Posted on August 21, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818048-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-08-21
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Peter Biondi, Jr.	Counsel	—
Respondent	Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association	Counsel	Maria R. Kupillas

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1242, 33-1243, Respondent’s Bylaw Article II, Section 3 and Article III, Sections 2 and 3, and Respondent’s CC&Rs Section 8.13

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition, finding that the HOA's remaining Director acted permissibly and reasonably upon legal advice in refusing to defend a previous legal action, as the initial Board decision to remove fellow directors was contrary to mandatory statutory procedures outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1243, which requires removal by unit owners, not by the board.

Why this result: The Board's previous action of removing directors was illegal under A.R.S. § 33-1243 because director removal must be performed by a member vote. Because the HOA lacked a legal defense to the directors' challenge, the current petition failed to prove a violation when the sole remaining Director chose not to incur unnecessary fees contesting an unwinnable case, which was permissive under A.R.S. § 33-1242.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged failure of the sole remaining Director to defend a prior petition challenging the board's removal of two directors.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated governing documents and statutes when the remaining Director chose not to contest a prior Department petition filed by two removed Directors, resulting in their reinstatement. The ALJ found that the initial removal of the Directors by fellow Directors was illegal under A.R.S. § 33-1243(B) and (H), which reserves removal power to members. Because the HOA lacked a good legal defense, the remaining Director's decision not to defend the prior petition, based on legal advice, was permissive under A.R.S. § 33-1242 and not a violation.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 33-1243
• A.R.S. § 33-1242
• A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
• A.R.S. § 33-1803

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominium, HOA Director Removal, Board Authority, Condo Bylaws

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 33-1243
• A.R.S. § 33-1242
• A.R.S. § 32-2199
• A.R.S. § 33-1248
• A.R.S. § 33-1803
• A.A.C. R2-19-119

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818048-REL Decision – 654904.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:58 (155.5 KB)

Briefing Document: Analysis of Administrative Law Judge Decision in Biondi v. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the key findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in Case No. 18F-H1818048-REL, involving Petitioner Peter Biondi, Jr., and Respondent Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association (HOA). The ALJ ultimately denied the petition, concluding that the HOA’s actions were legally sound.

The core of the dispute centered on the decision by the HOA’s sole remaining director, Bonnie Henden, to reinstate two board members, Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier, who had been removed by their fellow directors for alleged violations of the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The petitioner argued that Ms. Henden’s refusal to defend the Board’s removal action in a subsequent legal challenge constituted a violation of the HOA’s governing documents and state law.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a critical legal principle: the supremacy of Arizona state law over an association’s internal bylaws. The dispositive finding was that the initial removal of Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier by their fellow board members was legally improper. Under Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1243, the power to remove a director is reserved exclusively for the association’s unit owners through a formal petition and voting process; a board of directors cannot remove its own members.

Consequently, Ms. Henden’s decision not to defend an indefensible action was deemed a prudent and permissible business judgment. Relying on legal advice from three separate attorneys and the permissive language of A.R.S. § 33-1242, which does not mandate a defense in litigation, her actions were found to have correctly avoided wasting the association’s funds on a legal case it was certain to lose.

Case Overview

• Case Name: Peter Biondi, Jr., vs. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association

• Case Number: 18F-H1818048-REL

• Adjudicating Body: Office of Administrative Hearings, State of Arizona

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky

• Date of Decision: August 21, 2018

Summary of Petition

On May 9, 2018, Petitioner Peter Biondi, Jr., a member of the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs HOA, filed a petition alleging that the HOA violated state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1242 and 33-1243) and its own Bylaws and CC&Rs. The alleged violation occurred when the Board’s sole remaining member, Bonnie Henden, refused to defend the HOA against a petition filed by two former directors, Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier, who were contesting their removal from the Board. Instead of defending the removal, Ms. Henden reinstated them.

Background and Sequence of Events

1. Initial Complaint: Prior to January 2018, complaints were made that two serving directors, Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier, were violating Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs by renting their units as short-term Vacation Rental By Owner (“VRBOs”). This section mandates a minimum lease period of six months.

2. Board Action and Removal: The Board concluded that the two directors had violated the CC&Rs. At a contentious executive session on January 4, 2018, a majority of the five other directors voted to remove or disqualify Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier from their positions on the Board.

3. Legal Challenge: Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier filed a complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to protest their removal.

4. Board Collapse: Following the removal, the Board’s composition changed dramatically. The petitioner and another director, Jeffrey Washburn, resigned “to restore calm in the community.” A third director was removed or resigned for non-payment of assessments. By March or April 2018, this series of departures left Bonnie Henden as the sole remaining director.

5. Henden’s Legal Consultation: As the sole director, Ms. Henden consulted the HOA’s attorney regarding the petition filed by Luzzis and Dubasquier. After this attorney learned that other board members had also potentially used their units as short-term rentals, he withdrew from representing the HOA. Ms. Henden subsequently retained new counsel and consulted a total of three different attorneys.

6. Decision Not to Defend: Based on the legal advice she received, Ms. Henden chose not to file an answer on behalf of the HOA to the petition filed by Luzzis and Dubasquier.

7. Reinstatement of Directors: The Department of Real Estate issued a decision in favor of Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier, ordering the HOA to pay their filing fee. Ms. Henden then officially reinstated them to the Board to complete their elected terms and cancelled the election that had been scheduled to choose their successors.

Dispositive Legal Analysis and Key Findings

The ALJ determined that the central issue was not the factual question of whether the directors had violated the CC&Rs, but the overriding legal question of whether the Board had the authority to remove them.

“The dispositive issue is not the factual issue of whether Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier violated CC&R Section 8.13 by using their units as short-term VRBOs, but the legal issue of whether the other directors on Respondent’s Board properly removed them from the Board…”

Supremacy of State Statute over Association Bylaws

The case highlighted a direct conflict between the HOA’s governing documents and Arizona state law. While the HOA’s bylaws suggested the Board could deem a director ineligible for violating governing documents, this provision was rendered void by state statute.

• A.R.S. § 33-1243 (Director Removal): This statute was the cornerstone of the ALJ’s decision. Its provisions unequivocally establish the process for director removal:

◦ Subsection (B): Explicitly prohibits a board of directors from acting on behalf of the association to “determine the qualifications, powers and duties or terms of office of board of directors members.”

◦ Subsection (H): States that its provisions apply “notwithstanding any provision of the declaration or bylaws to the contrary.” It specifies that only “unit owners who are eligible to vote” may remove a board member, and only by a “majority vote of those voting on the matter at a meeting of the unit owners.” It further details a petition process required to call such a special meeting.

• ALJ Conclusion on Removal: The Board’s action to remove Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier was a direct violation of A.R.S. § 33-1243. The Board did not follow the specific and unequivocal statutory requirements, which mandate that only the members who elected a director can remove that director. As such, the HOA “lacked any good legal defense to Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier’s challenge to their removal.”

Validation of Henden’s Actions

The ALJ found Ms. Henden’s decision not to defend the HOA was legally justified and prudent.

• A.R.S. § 33-1242 (Duty to Defend): This statute governs the powers of an association. It states that an association “may… defend or intervene in litigation or administrative proceedings.” The ALJ focused on the word “may,” interpreting it according to established legal precedent.

• Permissive, Not Mandatory: The use of “may” indicates permissive intent. Therefore, Ms. Henden was not statutorily required to contest the petition filed by Luzzis and Dubasquier.

• Prudent Business Judgment: Having consulted three attorneys who advised her that the HOA would likely not prevail due to the clear language of A.R.S. § 33-1243, her decision was deemed a reasonable measure to protect the association from incurring unnecessary legal fees for a losing cause. The judge noted:

“No statute requires a condominium association or a director to take an ill-advised act or to mount a defense of a previously taken ill-advised act that likely will fail on its merits.”

Final Order and Conclusion

Based on the finding that the original removal of the directors was illegal and that the subsequent decision not to defend the action was permissible, the judge issued a final, binding order.

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.

The ultimate conclusion of this case establishes a critical precedent for HOA governance in Arizona: a condominium association’s Board of Directors has no authority to remove its own members. That power is reserved exclusively for the unit owners through a specific, statutorily defined process. Any attempt by a board to circumvent this process is legally invalid, and an officer’s decision to avoid defending such an improper action in court is a justifiable exercise of their duties.

Peter Biondi, Jr. vs. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners

Posted on August 21, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818048-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-08-21
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Peter Biondi, Jr.	Counsel	—
Respondent	Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association	Counsel	Maria R. Kupillas

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1242, 33-1243, Respondent’s Bylaw Article II, Section 3 and Article III, Sections 2 and 3, and Respondent’s CC&Rs Section 8.13

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition, finding that the HOA's remaining Director acted permissibly and reasonably upon legal advice in refusing to defend a previous legal action, as the initial Board decision to remove fellow directors was contrary to mandatory statutory procedures outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1243, which requires removal by unit owners, not by the board.

Why this result: The Board's previous action of removing directors was illegal under A.R.S. § 33-1243 because director removal must be performed by a member vote. Because the HOA lacked a legal defense to the directors' challenge, the current petition failed to prove a violation when the sole remaining Director chose not to incur unnecessary fees contesting an unwinnable case, which was permissive under A.R.S. § 33-1242.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged failure of the sole remaining Director to defend a prior petition challenging the board's removal of two directors.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated governing documents and statutes when the remaining Director chose not to contest a prior Department petition filed by two removed Directors, resulting in their reinstatement. The ALJ found that the initial removal of the Directors by fellow Directors was illegal under A.R.S. § 33-1243(B) and (H), which reserves removal power to members. Because the HOA lacked a good legal defense, the remaining Director's decision not to defend the prior petition, based on legal advice, was permissive under A.R.S. § 33-1242 and not a violation.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 33-1243
• A.R.S. § 33-1242
• A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
• A.R.S. § 33-1803

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominium, HOA Director Removal, Board Authority, Condo Bylaws

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 33-1243
• A.R.S. § 33-1242
• A.R.S. § 32-2199
• A.R.S. § 33-1248
• A.R.S. § 33-1803
• A.A.C. R2-19-119

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818048-REL Decision – 654904.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:05:54 (155.5 KB)

Briefing Document: Analysis of Administrative Law Judge Decision in Biondi v. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the key findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in Case No. 18F-H1818048-REL, involving Petitioner Peter Biondi, Jr., and Respondent Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association (HOA). The ALJ ultimately denied the petition, concluding that the HOA’s actions were legally sound.

The core of the dispute centered on the decision by the HOA’s sole remaining director, Bonnie Henden, to reinstate two board members, Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier, who had been removed by their fellow directors for alleged violations of the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The petitioner argued that Ms. Henden’s refusal to defend the Board’s removal action in a subsequent legal challenge constituted a violation of the HOA’s governing documents and state law.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a critical legal principle: the supremacy of Arizona state law over an association’s internal bylaws. The dispositive finding was that the initial removal of Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier by their fellow board members was legally improper. Under Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1243, the power to remove a director is reserved exclusively for the association’s unit owners through a formal petition and voting process; a board of directors cannot remove its own members.

Consequently, Ms. Henden’s decision not to defend an indefensible action was deemed a prudent and permissible business judgment. Relying on legal advice from three separate attorneys and the permissive language of A.R.S. § 33-1242, which does not mandate a defense in litigation, her actions were found to have correctly avoided wasting the association’s funds on a legal case it was certain to lose.

Case Overview

• Case Name: Peter Biondi, Jr., vs. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association

• Case Number: 18F-H1818048-REL

• Adjudicating Body: Office of Administrative Hearings, State of Arizona

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky

• Date of Decision: August 21, 2018

Summary of Petition

On May 9, 2018, Petitioner Peter Biondi, Jr., a member of the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs HOA, filed a petition alleging that the HOA violated state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1242 and 33-1243) and its own Bylaws and CC&Rs. The alleged violation occurred when the Board’s sole remaining member, Bonnie Henden, refused to defend the HOA against a petition filed by two former directors, Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier, who were contesting their removal from the Board. Instead of defending the removal, Ms. Henden reinstated them.

Background and Sequence of Events

1. Initial Complaint: Prior to January 2018, complaints were made that two serving directors, Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier, were violating Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs by renting their units as short-term Vacation Rental By Owner (“VRBOs”). This section mandates a minimum lease period of six months.

2. Board Action and Removal: The Board concluded that the two directors had violated the CC&Rs. At a contentious executive session on January 4, 2018, a majority of the five other directors voted to remove or disqualify Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier from their positions on the Board.

3. Legal Challenge: Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier filed a complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to protest their removal.

4. Board Collapse: Following the removal, the Board’s composition changed dramatically. The petitioner and another director, Jeffrey Washburn, resigned “to restore calm in the community.” A third director was removed or resigned for non-payment of assessments. By March or April 2018, this series of departures left Bonnie Henden as the sole remaining director.

5. Henden’s Legal Consultation: As the sole director, Ms. Henden consulted the HOA’s attorney regarding the petition filed by Luzzis and Dubasquier. After this attorney learned that other board members had also potentially used their units as short-term rentals, he withdrew from representing the HOA. Ms. Henden subsequently retained new counsel and consulted a total of three different attorneys.

6. Decision Not to Defend: Based on the legal advice she received, Ms. Henden chose not to file an answer on behalf of the HOA to the petition filed by Luzzis and Dubasquier.

7. Reinstatement of Directors: The Department of Real Estate issued a decision in favor of Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier, ordering the HOA to pay their filing fee. Ms. Henden then officially reinstated them to the Board to complete their elected terms and cancelled the election that had been scheduled to choose their successors.

Dispositive Legal Analysis and Key Findings

The ALJ determined that the central issue was not the factual question of whether the directors had violated the CC&Rs, but the overriding legal question of whether the Board had the authority to remove them.

“The dispositive issue is not the factual issue of whether Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier violated CC&R Section 8.13 by using their units as short-term VRBOs, but the legal issue of whether the other directors on Respondent’s Board properly removed them from the Board…”

Supremacy of State Statute over Association Bylaws

The case highlighted a direct conflict between the HOA’s governing documents and Arizona state law. While the HOA’s bylaws suggested the Board could deem a director ineligible for violating governing documents, this provision was rendered void by state statute.

• A.R.S. § 33-1243 (Director Removal): This statute was the cornerstone of the ALJ’s decision. Its provisions unequivocally establish the process for director removal:

◦ Subsection (B): Explicitly prohibits a board of directors from acting on behalf of the association to “determine the qualifications, powers and duties or terms of office of board of directors members.”

◦ Subsection (H): States that its provisions apply “notwithstanding any provision of the declaration or bylaws to the contrary.” It specifies that only “unit owners who are eligible to vote” may remove a board member, and only by a “majority vote of those voting on the matter at a meeting of the unit owners.” It further details a petition process required to call such a special meeting.

• ALJ Conclusion on Removal: The Board’s action to remove Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier was a direct violation of A.R.S. § 33-1243. The Board did not follow the specific and unequivocal statutory requirements, which mandate that only the members who elected a director can remove that director. As such, the HOA “lacked any good legal defense to Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier’s challenge to their removal.”

Validation of Henden’s Actions

The ALJ found Ms. Henden’s decision not to defend the HOA was legally justified and prudent.

• A.R.S. § 33-1242 (Duty to Defend): This statute governs the powers of an association. It states that an association “may… defend or intervene in litigation or administrative proceedings.” The ALJ focused on the word “may,” interpreting it according to established legal precedent.

• Permissive, Not Mandatory: The use of “may” indicates permissive intent. Therefore, Ms. Henden was not statutorily required to contest the petition filed by Luzzis and Dubasquier.

• Prudent Business Judgment: Having consulted three attorneys who advised her that the HOA would likely not prevail due to the clear language of A.R.S. § 33-1243, her decision was deemed a reasonable measure to protect the association from incurring unnecessary legal fees for a losing cause. The judge noted:

“No statute requires a condominium association or a director to take an ill-advised act or to mount a defense of a previously taken ill-advised act that likely will fail on its merits.”

Final Order and Conclusion

Based on the finding that the original removal of the directors was illegal and that the subsequent decision not to defend the action was permissible, the judge issued a final, binding order.

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.

The ultimate conclusion of this case establishes a critical precedent for HOA governance in Arizona: a condominium association’s Board of Directors has no authority to remove its own members. That power is reserved exclusively for the unit owners through a specific, statutorily defined process. Any attempt by a board to circumvent this process is legally invalid, and an officer’s decision to avoid defending such an improper action in court is a justifiable exercise of their duties.

Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on June 25, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818042-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-06-25
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	total
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen	Counsel	—
Respondent	Carter Ranch Homeowners Association	Counsel	Chad M. Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1813

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the petitioner's request, finding that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 by allowing the president to call a special meeting for board member recall without the required petition signed by homeowners. The HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members and refund the petitioner's filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Removal of board member; special meeting

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when the president called a special meeting to recall three recently elected Board members, arguing that the statute requires a petition signed by homeowners. Respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1804 procedures could also be used. The ALJ ruled that A.R.S. § 33-1813, as the specific statute regarding removal, requires a petition.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is granted. Respondent shall reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell and reimburse the $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 33-1813
• A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Board Removal, Recall Election, Statutory Interpretation, Petition Requirements

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 33-1813
• A.R.S. § 33-1804

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818042-REL Decision – 642530.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:50 (142.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818042-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The central dispute concerned the legality of a special meeting called by the HOA Board President to recall three recently elected board members. The petitioner argued this action violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1813, which requires such a recall to be initiated by a petition from homeowners. The HOA contended that the president had the authority to call the meeting under the broader powers granted in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that when a specific statute and a general statute conflict, the specific statute controls. A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically governs the removal of board members and mandates a homeowner petition process. Therefore, the president’s unilateral call for a recall election was improper. The judge granted the petitioner’s request, ordering the HOA to reinstate the two board members who were removed and to reimburse the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

Background and Procedural History

The case involves a dispute within the Carter Ranch development, a 253-lot community in Coolidge, Arizona.

• Petitioner: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, a homeowner and member of the Carter Ranch HOA.

• Respondent: Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

• Petition: On or about April 5, 2018, Van Dan Elzen filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. He alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when its president, Lance Van Horne, called a special meeting to recall three newly elected board members.

• Hearing: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on June 20, 2018, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

The Contested Elections

The dispute originated from a contentious board election process marked by accusations of misconduct, culminating in a recall election that was later found to be procedurally invalid.

March 20, 2018 Board Election

An initial annual meeting on February 20, 2018, failed to achieve the required quorum of 26 ballots. A second meeting was scheduled for March 20, 2018, for which eight candidates ran for five open board positions.

• Allegations of Misconduct: Prior to the meeting, Community Manager Mary Chaira received reports that three candidates—Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell—were going door-to-door “disseminating allegedly false information about Respondent’s finances, and harvesting ballots.”

• Meeting Conduct: At the March 20 meeting, a quorum of 47 homeowners was present. Board President Lance Van Horne addressed the allegations of false information. However, homeowners who may have filled out ballots based on this information were not permitted to withdraw them. The meeting was described by Ms. Chaira as “unruly and stressful.”

The election results for the top six candidates were as follows:

Candidate

Number of Votes

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Elected

Steve Brownell

Elected

Trish Brownell

Elected

Lance Van Horne

Elected

Steve F.

Tie for 5th position

Tie for 5th position

April 24, 2018 Recall Election

Believing the March 20 election outcome was “compromised” by the alleged dissemination of false information and ballot harvesting, President Van Horne called a special meeting for April 24, 2018, to hold a recall election for the three newly elected members: Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell.

A quorum of 52 homeowners returned ballots for the recall. The results were:

Board Member

Votes for Recall

Votes against Recall

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Remained on Board

Steve Brownell

Removed from Board

Trish Brownell

Removed from Board

Following the recall, other members were elected to fill the vacant board positions.

Central Legal Issue: Statutory Interpretation

The case presented a pure legal question of statutory interpretation, as the facts of what occurred were not in dispute. The core issue was which Arizona statute governs the process for recalling an HOA board member.

Competing Legal Positions

• Petitioner’s Argument: The recall election was invalid because it violated A.R.S. § 33-1813. This statute, titled “Removal of board member; special meeting,” explicitly states that a recall process is initiated upon the board’s receipt of a petition signed by a specified number or percentage of homeowners. The president’s unilateral action did not meet this requirement.

• Respondent’s Argument: The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813 was not the exclusive procedure. It claimed that the president could also call such a meeting under the authority of A.R.S. § 33-1804, a more general statute governing meetings, which states that “Special meetings of the members’ association may be called by the president.”

Statutory Analysis by the Court

The Administrative Law Judge highlighted the direct conflict between the two statutes on the subject of board member removal.

Feature

A.R.S. § 33-1813 (Specific Statute)

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) (General Statute)

Meeting Initiation

By homeowner petition only.

By the president, a board majority, or homeowner petition.

Petition Requirement

For HOAs ≤ 1,000 members: petition signed by at least 100 members or 25% of votes, whichever is less.

Petition signed by at least 25% of votes (or lower if specified in bylaws).

Meeting Notice

Within 30 days after receipt of the petition.

Between 10 and 50 days in advance of the meeting.

The judge noted that A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically overrides the petition requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), demonstrating legislative intent for it to be the controlling authority on this specific issue.

The Judge’s Legal Conclusion

The decision rested on the well-established legal principle that a specific statute governs over a general one when they are inconsistent. Citing case law, the judge reasoned:

“When provisions of a general statute are inconsistent with those of a special nature on the same subject, the special statute controls.”

Applying this canon of statutory construction, the judge concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1813 is the controlling authority for the removal of an HOA board member. Therefore, a valid recall process must be initiated by a homeowner petition as outlined in that statute. The president lacked the authority to call the April 24, 2018 recall meeting on his own initiative.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the legal conclusion that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1813, the Administrative Law Judge issued a recommended order with the following mandates:

1. Petition Granted: The petitioner’s petition is granted.

2. Board Member Reinstatement: The Carter Ranch HOA is required to reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell.

3. Fee Reimbursement: The HOA must reimburse the petitioner, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, for his $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

This order is considered binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on June 25, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818042-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-06-25
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	total
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen	Counsel	—
Respondent	Carter Ranch Homeowners Association	Counsel	Chad M. Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1813

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the petitioner's request, finding that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 by allowing the president to call a special meeting for board member recall without the required petition signed by homeowners. The HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members and refund the petitioner's filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Removal of board member; special meeting

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when the president called a special meeting to recall three recently elected Board members, arguing that the statute requires a petition signed by homeowners. Respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1804 procedures could also be used. The ALJ ruled that A.R.S. § 33-1813, as the specific statute regarding removal, requires a petition.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is granted. Respondent shall reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell and reimburse the $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 33-1813
• A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Board Removal, Recall Election, Statutory Interpretation, Petition Requirements

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 33-1813
• A.R.S. § 33-1804

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818042-REL Decision – 642530.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:05:34 (142.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818042-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The central dispute concerned the legality of a special meeting called by the HOA Board President to recall three recently elected board members. The petitioner argued this action violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1813, which requires such a recall to be initiated by a petition from homeowners. The HOA contended that the president had the authority to call the meeting under the broader powers granted in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that when a specific statute and a general statute conflict, the specific statute controls. A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically governs the removal of board members and mandates a homeowner petition process. Therefore, the president’s unilateral call for a recall election was improper. The judge granted the petitioner’s request, ordering the HOA to reinstate the two board members who were removed and to reimburse the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

Background and Procedural History

The case involves a dispute within the Carter Ranch development, a 253-lot community in Coolidge, Arizona.

• Petitioner: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, a homeowner and member of the Carter Ranch HOA.

• Respondent: Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

• Petition: On or about April 5, 2018, Van Dan Elzen filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. He alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when its president, Lance Van Horne, called a special meeting to recall three newly elected board members.

• Hearing: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on June 20, 2018, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

The Contested Elections

The dispute originated from a contentious board election process marked by accusations of misconduct, culminating in a recall election that was later found to be procedurally invalid.

March 20, 2018 Board Election

An initial annual meeting on February 20, 2018, failed to achieve the required quorum of 26 ballots. A second meeting was scheduled for March 20, 2018, for which eight candidates ran for five open board positions.

• Allegations of Misconduct: Prior to the meeting, Community Manager Mary Chaira received reports that three candidates—Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell—were going door-to-door “disseminating allegedly false information about Respondent’s finances, and harvesting ballots.”

• Meeting Conduct: At the March 20 meeting, a quorum of 47 homeowners was present. Board President Lance Van Horne addressed the allegations of false information. However, homeowners who may have filled out ballots based on this information were not permitted to withdraw them. The meeting was described by Ms. Chaira as “unruly and stressful.”

The election results for the top six candidates were as follows:

Candidate

Number of Votes

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Elected

Steve Brownell

Elected

Trish Brownell

Elected

Lance Van Horne

Elected

Steve F.

Tie for 5th position

Tie for 5th position

April 24, 2018 Recall Election

Believing the March 20 election outcome was “compromised” by the alleged dissemination of false information and ballot harvesting, President Van Horne called a special meeting for April 24, 2018, to hold a recall election for the three newly elected members: Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell.

A quorum of 52 homeowners returned ballots for the recall. The results were:

Board Member

Votes for Recall

Votes against Recall

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Remained on Board

Steve Brownell

Removed from Board

Trish Brownell

Removed from Board

Following the recall, other members were elected to fill the vacant board positions.

Central Legal Issue: Statutory Interpretation

The case presented a pure legal question of statutory interpretation, as the facts of what occurred were not in dispute. The core issue was which Arizona statute governs the process for recalling an HOA board member.

Competing Legal Positions

• Petitioner’s Argument: The recall election was invalid because it violated A.R.S. § 33-1813. This statute, titled “Removal of board member; special meeting,” explicitly states that a recall process is initiated upon the board’s receipt of a petition signed by a specified number or percentage of homeowners. The president’s unilateral action did not meet this requirement.

• Respondent’s Argument: The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813 was not the exclusive procedure. It claimed that the president could also call such a meeting under the authority of A.R.S. § 33-1804, a more general statute governing meetings, which states that “Special meetings of the members’ association may be called by the president.”

Statutory Analysis by the Court

The Administrative Law Judge highlighted the direct conflict between the two statutes on the subject of board member removal.

Feature

A.R.S. § 33-1813 (Specific Statute)

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) (General Statute)

Meeting Initiation

By homeowner petition only.

By the president, a board majority, or homeowner petition.

Petition Requirement

For HOAs ≤ 1,000 members: petition signed by at least 100 members or 25% of votes, whichever is less.

Petition signed by at least 25% of votes (or lower if specified in bylaws).

Meeting Notice

Within 30 days after receipt of the petition.

Between 10 and 50 days in advance of the meeting.

The judge noted that A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically overrides the petition requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), demonstrating legislative intent for it to be the controlling authority on this specific issue.

The Judge’s Legal Conclusion

The decision rested on the well-established legal principle that a specific statute governs over a general one when they are inconsistent. Citing case law, the judge reasoned:

“When provisions of a general statute are inconsistent with those of a special nature on the same subject, the special statute controls.”

Applying this canon of statutory construction, the judge concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1813 is the controlling authority for the removal of an HOA board member. Therefore, a valid recall process must be initiated by a homeowner petition as outlined in that statute. The president lacked the authority to call the April 24, 2018 recall meeting on his own initiative.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the legal conclusion that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1813, the Administrative Law Judge issued a recommended order with the following mandates:

1. Petition Granted: The petitioner’s petition is granted.

2. Board Member Reinstatement: The Carter Ranch HOA is required to reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell.

3. Fee Reimbursement: The HOA must reimburse the petitioner, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, for his $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

This order is considered binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Debbie Westerman v. Bridgewood Townhomes

Posted on April 26, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818028-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-04-26
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Debbie Westerman	Counsel	—
Respondent	Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. aka Bridgewood Townhomes	Counsel	Mark E. Lines and R. Patrick Whelan

Alleged Violations

CC&R § 5(G)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition, concluding the Respondent HOA did not unreasonably deny the Petitioner's architectural request. The HOA's standard specification requiring 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks for courtyard walls was found to be reasonable for maintaining architectural continuity consistent with the original Al Beadle design of the community.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove that the HOA's denial was unreasonable or that the specified 4” x 8” x 16” CMU block was inferior to the 8” x 8” x 16” CMU block she requested, and compliance with the HOA's reasonable specifications was required.

Key Issues & Findings

Unreasonable denial of architectural request to build a courtyard wall

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request to construct a courtyard wall using 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks, which did not comply with the HOA's Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions requiring 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.

Orders: Petition denied because Petitioner failed to establish that CC&R § 5(G) required the Respondent to approve her Architectural Request which did not comply with Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
• A.R.S. § 33-1803
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
• CC&R § 5(G)
• CC&R § 7(B)
• CC&R § 5(J)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Architectural Review, Wall Construction, CMU block, Architectural Standard

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
• A.R.S. § 33-1803
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
• Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
• MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
• BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
• Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
• Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818028-REL Decision – 631265.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:31 (161.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Westerman v. Bridgewood Townhomes HOA (Case No. 18F-H1818028-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Debbie Westerman versus the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. (HOA). The central conflict involved the HOA’s denial of Ms. Westerman’s architectural request to construct a courtyard wall using 8” x 8” x 16” concrete masonry unit (CMU) blocks, which deviated from the association’s established standard of 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied the petitioner’s claim, ruling in favor of the HOA. The decision rested on the finding that the HOA’s architectural standards were reasonable and established to maintain the community’s original design integrity. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to show that the HOA’s denial was unreasonable or that the specified building materials were in any significant way inferior. The HOA successfully argued that its “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions,” in place since 2005, were created to preserve the architectural continuity of the original “Al Beadle design” and have been consistently applied to numerous other homeowner projects.

1. Case Overview and Core Dispute

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Debbie Westerman, owner of condominium unit 31 in Bridgewood Townhomes.

◦ Respondent: Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. (also known as Bridgewood Townhomes).

• Jurisdiction: The case was heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on January 23, 2018.

• Core Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request to build a courtyard wall with 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks. The HOA’s established specification required the use of 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.

2. Chronology of the Dispute

The key events leading to the administrative hearing occurred between October 2017 and January 2018.

Oct 25, 2017

Michael Brubaker, the HOA Board President, emailed the petitioner with the association’s “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.”

Oct 25, 2017

The petitioner submitted an Architectural Request to build a wall with 8″ x 8″ x 16″ CMU blocks, acknowledging the deviation from specifications.

Oct 25, 2017

Mr. Brubaker sent a follow-up email cautioning the petitioner not to pre-order non-conforming materials as her request was not yet approved.

Nov 29, 2017

Mr. Brubaker emailed the petitioner, acknowledging her request as “extraordinary” and stating the Board would need to meet to consider it.

Dec 28, 2017

The petitioner was formally notified of a Board meeting scheduled for January 2, 2018, to review her request.

Jan 2, 2018

The petitioner attended the Board meeting. The Board unanimously rejected her request because it was contrary to the established specifications and “the historical aspects of our compliance structure.” The Board noted its willingness to approve a compliant wall, but the petitioner “stated that she [was] unwilling to comply.”

Jan 8, 2018

The HOA’s attorney sent a letter to the petitioner summarizing the legal basis for the denial.

Jan 23, 2018

The petitioner filed her formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

3. Petitioner’s Arguments and Evidence (Debbie Westerman)

The petitioner’s case was built on three main arguments: the superiority of her proposed materials, the inconsistency of community standards, and the questionable validity of the HOA’s rules.

• Material Superiority: The petitioner claimed her proposed 8” x 8” x 16” blocks were stronger, less expensive, and visually identical to the required blocks.

◦ Evidence: She testified that three different contractors advised her that the larger blocks would be cheaper due to needing fewer units and less mortar.

◦ Evidence: Her subcontractor, Richard Ross, testified that using twice as many blocks (as required by the 4″ specification) “doubles the chance of the wall failing.”

• Inconsistent Community Standards: The petitioner argued that the HOA did not enforce a uniform aesthetic, negating the need for strict adherence to the block size specification.

◦ Evidence: She submitted photographs (Exhibits A5, A6) of walls at units 34 and 38, owned by Board President Michael Brubaker, which she claimed were built with larger blocks visible through stucco.

◦ Evidence: She submitted a photograph (Exhibit A11) showing courtyard walls of different heights, although wall height was not the subject of her dispute.

• Questionable Rule Authenticity: At the hearing, the petitioner challenged the validity of the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” document itself.

◦ Argument: She argued the document was not authentic because the HOA did not produce the official Board meeting minutes from 2005 when the rules were allegedly adopted. This challenge was raised for the first time at the hearing.

4. Respondent’s Arguments and Evidence (Bridgewood HOA)

The HOA’s defense was centered on its legal authority, the reasonableness of its established architectural standards, and the consistent enforcement of its rules.

• Adherence to Established Architectural Standards: The HOA’s primary defense was that its denial was based on a reasonable and long-standing architectural rule.

◦ Authority: The HOA cited CC&R § 5(J), which grants the Board the authority to adopt reasonable rules concerning the use of common elements. Rule 7(a) requires Board approval for any exterior alterations.

◦ Evidence: The HOA submitted the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” (Exhibit 3), which Mr. Brubaker credibly testified was adopted by the Board on March 22, 2005.

◦ Purpose of the Rule: Mr. Brubaker stated the rule’s purpose was to ensure architectural continuity. An email to the petitioner (Exhibit 7) explained:

• Consistent Enforcement: The HOA demonstrated that the rule was not arbitrary but had been consistently applied.

◦ Evidence: Mr. Brubaker testified that since the program’s adoption, “twenty-nine homeowners have had applications approved and constructed courtyard walls to specification.” Four additional compliant applications were approved since the petitioner’s submission. A photograph of a recently completed, compliant wall (Ms. Warren’s) was submitted as Exhibit 16.

• Rebuttal of Petitioner’s Claims: The HOA directly countered the petitioner’s key arguments.

◦ On Inconsistency: Mr. Brubaker testified that the non-conforming walls at units 34 and 38 were constructed before 1980 by the original developer, prior to the HOA assuming control of the property (Exhibit 14).

◦ On Structural Integrity: The HOA submitted two technical bulletins from the National Concrete Masonry Association (Exhibits 19 and 20). These documents stated that 4″ high (“half-high”) units can be considered “structurally equivalent to their corresponding 8-in. (203-mm) high unit” as long as the cross-section is the same.

◦ On Cost: The HOA submitted a bid from J E Bowen Construction for $6,165.00 to build a compliant wall for the petitioner’s unit (Exhibit 17). It also noted that another homeowner’s recent compliant wall cost only $4,268.23 (Exhibit 15).

5. Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found comprehensively in favor of the Respondent (HOA), denying the Petitioner’s petition.

• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that the petitioner bore the burden of proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence” and failed to do so.

• Reasonableness of HOA Standards: The decision affirmed the HOA’s right to establish and enforce aesthetic standards.

• Validity of Specifications: The petitioner’s challenge to the authenticity of the HOA’s rules was dismissed. The ALJ found that she “did not establish that Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions was fraudulent or improperly adopted.”

• Materiality of Block Type: The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to prove her central claim that the larger blocks were superior.

• Aesthetic Impact: The ALJ determined that the petitioner’s proposed wall would violate the community’s aesthetic standards, noting that a wall using the larger blocks “would be noticeably different from walls that were constructed in compliance with the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions and other Al Beadle design elements.”

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because she has not established that CC&R § 5(G) required the Respondent to approve her Architectural Request to build a block wall around her patio that did not comply with Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.”

The order, issued on April 26, 2018, is binding unless a rehearing is requested within 30 days of service.

Debbie Westerman v. Bridgewood Townhomes

Posted on April 26, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818028-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-04-26
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Debbie Westerman	Counsel	—
Respondent	Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. aka Bridgewood Townhomes	Counsel	Mark E. Lines and R. Patrick Whelan

Alleged Violations

CC&R § 5(G)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition, concluding the Respondent HOA did not unreasonably deny the Petitioner's architectural request. The HOA's standard specification requiring 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks for courtyard walls was found to be reasonable for maintaining architectural continuity consistent with the original Al Beadle design of the community.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove that the HOA's denial was unreasonable or that the specified 4” x 8” x 16” CMU block was inferior to the 8” x 8” x 16” CMU block she requested, and compliance with the HOA's reasonable specifications was required.

Key Issues & Findings

Unreasonable denial of architectural request to build a courtyard wall

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request to construct a courtyard wall using 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks, which did not comply with the HOA's Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions requiring 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.

Orders: Petition denied because Petitioner failed to establish that CC&R § 5(G) required the Respondent to approve her Architectural Request which did not comply with Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
• A.R.S. § 33-1803
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
• CC&R § 5(G)
• CC&R § 7(B)
• CC&R § 5(J)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Architectural Review, Wall Construction, CMU block, Architectural Standard

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
• A.R.S. § 33-1803
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
• Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
• MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
• BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
• Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
• Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818028-REL Decision – 631265.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:42 (161.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Westerman v. Bridgewood Townhomes HOA (Case No. 18F-H1818028-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Debbie Westerman versus the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. (HOA). The central conflict involved the HOA’s denial of Ms. Westerman’s architectural request to construct a courtyard wall using 8” x 8” x 16” concrete masonry unit (CMU) blocks, which deviated from the association’s established standard of 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied the petitioner’s claim, ruling in favor of the HOA. The decision rested on the finding that the HOA’s architectural standards were reasonable and established to maintain the community’s original design integrity. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to show that the HOA’s denial was unreasonable or that the specified building materials were in any significant way inferior. The HOA successfully argued that its “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions,” in place since 2005, were created to preserve the architectural continuity of the original “Al Beadle design” and have been consistently applied to numerous other homeowner projects.

1. Case Overview and Core Dispute

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Debbie Westerman, owner of condominium unit 31 in Bridgewood Townhomes.

◦ Respondent: Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. (also known as Bridgewood Townhomes).

• Jurisdiction: The case was heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on January 23, 2018.

• Core Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request to build a courtyard wall with 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks. The HOA’s established specification required the use of 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.

2. Chronology of the Dispute

The key events leading to the administrative hearing occurred between October 2017 and January 2018.

Oct 25, 2017

Michael Brubaker, the HOA Board President, emailed the petitioner with the association’s “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.”

Oct 25, 2017

The petitioner submitted an Architectural Request to build a wall with 8″ x 8″ x 16″ CMU blocks, acknowledging the deviation from specifications.

Oct 25, 2017

Mr. Brubaker sent a follow-up email cautioning the petitioner not to pre-order non-conforming materials as her request was not yet approved.

Nov 29, 2017

Mr. Brubaker emailed the petitioner, acknowledging her request as “extraordinary” and stating the Board would need to meet to consider it.

Dec 28, 2017

The petitioner was formally notified of a Board meeting scheduled for January 2, 2018, to review her request.

Jan 2, 2018

The petitioner attended the Board meeting. The Board unanimously rejected her request because it was contrary to the established specifications and “the historical aspects of our compliance structure.” The Board noted its willingness to approve a compliant wall, but the petitioner “stated that she [was] unwilling to comply.”

Jan 8, 2018

The HOA’s attorney sent a letter to the petitioner summarizing the legal basis for the denial.

Jan 23, 2018

The petitioner filed her formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

3. Petitioner’s Arguments and Evidence (Debbie Westerman)

The petitioner’s case was built on three main arguments: the superiority of her proposed materials, the inconsistency of community standards, and the questionable validity of the HOA’s rules.

• Material Superiority: The petitioner claimed her proposed 8” x 8” x 16” blocks were stronger, less expensive, and visually identical to the required blocks.

◦ Evidence: She testified that three different contractors advised her that the larger blocks would be cheaper due to needing fewer units and less mortar.

◦ Evidence: Her subcontractor, Richard Ross, testified that using twice as many blocks (as required by the 4″ specification) “doubles the chance of the wall failing.”

• Inconsistent Community Standards: The petitioner argued that the HOA did not enforce a uniform aesthetic, negating the need for strict adherence to the block size specification.

◦ Evidence: She submitted photographs (Exhibits A5, A6) of walls at units 34 and 38, owned by Board President Michael Brubaker, which she claimed were built with larger blocks visible through stucco.

◦ Evidence: She submitted a photograph (Exhibit A11) showing courtyard walls of different heights, although wall height was not the subject of her dispute.

• Questionable Rule Authenticity: At the hearing, the petitioner challenged the validity of the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” document itself.

◦ Argument: She argued the document was not authentic because the HOA did not produce the official Board meeting minutes from 2005 when the rules were allegedly adopted. This challenge was raised for the first time at the hearing.

4. Respondent’s Arguments and Evidence (Bridgewood HOA)

The HOA’s defense was centered on its legal authority, the reasonableness of its established architectural standards, and the consistent enforcement of its rules.

• Adherence to Established Architectural Standards: The HOA’s primary defense was that its denial was based on a reasonable and long-standing architectural rule.

◦ Authority: The HOA cited CC&R § 5(J), which grants the Board the authority to adopt reasonable rules concerning the use of common elements. Rule 7(a) requires Board approval for any exterior alterations.

◦ Evidence: The HOA submitted the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” (Exhibit 3), which Mr. Brubaker credibly testified was adopted by the Board on March 22, 2005.

◦ Purpose of the Rule: Mr. Brubaker stated the rule’s purpose was to ensure architectural continuity. An email to the petitioner (Exhibit 7) explained:

• Consistent Enforcement: The HOA demonstrated that the rule was not arbitrary but had been consistently applied.

◦ Evidence: Mr. Brubaker testified that since the program’s adoption, “twenty-nine homeowners have had applications approved and constructed courtyard walls to specification.” Four additional compliant applications were approved since the petitioner’s submission. A photograph of a recently completed, compliant wall (Ms. Warren’s) was submitted as Exhibit 16.

• Rebuttal of Petitioner’s Claims: The HOA directly countered the petitioner’s key arguments.

◦ On Inconsistency: Mr. Brubaker testified that the non-conforming walls at units 34 and 38 were constructed before 1980 by the original developer, prior to the HOA assuming control of the property (Exhibit 14).

◦ On Structural Integrity: The HOA submitted two technical bulletins from the National Concrete Masonry Association (Exhibits 19 and 20). These documents stated that 4″ high (“half-high”) units can be considered “structurally equivalent to their corresponding 8-in. (203-mm) high unit” as long as the cross-section is the same.

◦ On Cost: The HOA submitted a bid from J E Bowen Construction for $6,165.00 to build a compliant wall for the petitioner’s unit (Exhibit 17). It also noted that another homeowner’s recent compliant wall cost only $4,268.23 (Exhibit 15).

5. Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found comprehensively in favor of the Respondent (HOA), denying the Petitioner’s petition.

• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that the petitioner bore the burden of proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence” and failed to do so.

• Reasonableness of HOA Standards: The decision affirmed the HOA’s right to establish and enforce aesthetic standards.

• Validity of Specifications: The petitioner’s challenge to the authenticity of the HOA’s rules was dismissed. The ALJ found that she “did not establish that Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions was fraudulent or improperly adopted.”

• Materiality of Block Type: The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to prove her central claim that the larger blocks were superior.

• Aesthetic Impact: The ALJ determined that the petitioner’s proposed wall would violate the community’s aesthetic standards, noting that a wall using the larger blocks “would be noticeably different from walls that were constructed in compliance with the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions and other Al Beadle design elements.”

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because she has not established that CC&R § 5(G) required the Respondent to approve her Architectural Request to build a block wall around her patio that did not comply with Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.”

The order, issued on April 26, 2018, is binding unless a rehearing is requested within 30 days of service.

Thomas J Stedronsky vs. Copper Canyon Ranches POA

Posted on January 24, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1817016-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-01-24
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	none
Filing Fees Refunded	$1,000.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Thomas J Stedronsky	Counsel	—
Respondent	Copper Canyon Ranches POA	Counsel	John S. Perlman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Section III (d) and (m)
CC&Rs Section VI (6.02, 6.03, 6.04, 6.05)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's petition entirely. The HOA did not violate CC&Rs regarding road maintenance or abuse its discretion in enforcement against Lot 77.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to establish that the Respondent violated its planned community documents.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent has maintained the roadway Sundance Lane properly

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated CC&Rs by failing to properly maintain Sundance Lane. Respondent countered that limited funds necessitated prioritizing roads for full-time residents, but Sundance Lane was accessible.

Orders: Complaint regarding road maintenance dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• CC&Rs Section III
• A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Whether Respondent has taken appropriate action against the owner of lot 77 in as much as that property allegedly resembles a junk yard

Petitioner alleged Lot 77 violated CC&Rs due to excessive storage and inoperable vehicles. Respondent showed it monitors the property, has written letters, and the owner has previously complied with HOA and County cleanup efforts.

Orders: Complaint regarding enforcement against Lot 77 dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• CC&Rs Section VI
• A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817016-REL Decision – 613995.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:09 (200.6 KB)

Briefing: Stedronsky v. Copper Canyon Ranches POA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817016-REL, involving Petitioner Thomas J. Stedronsky and Respondent Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (POA). The Petitioner filed a two-issue petition alleging the POA violated its Covenants, Easements, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by failing to properly maintain a roadway, Sundance Lane, and by failing to take appropriate action against a neighboring property, Lot 77, which allegedly resembled a junkyard.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Diane Mihalsky, denied the petition in its entirety. The decision found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof for both allegations. Regarding road maintenance, the ALJ concluded the POA acted within its reasonable discretion by prioritizing its limited funds ($35,000-$40,000 annually for 20 miles of roads) to maintain roadways used by the community’s approximately 35 full-time residents. Despite the poor condition of the northern section of Sundance Lane, the Petitioner’s lot remained accessible via a passenger car from the south.

Concerning Lot 77, the ALJ determined that the Petitioner did not establish a persistent violation of the CC&Rs. The evidence showed the POA had previously addressed complaints with the lot owner, who had been responsive. Furthermore, the alleged violations were largely located behind the required property buffer zone and were not easily visible from the Petitioner’s property without a telephoto lens. The decision suggests the Petitioner’s long-standing complaints were primarily motivated by his inability to sell his topographically challenging and undeveloped property.

Case Details

Case Information

Details

Case Number

18F-H1817016-REL

Petitioner

Thomas J. Stedronsky (Owner of Lot 76)

Respondent

Copper Canyon Ranches POA

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings, State of Arizona

Presiding Judge

Diane Mihalsky, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

January 10, 2018

Decision Date

January 24, 2018

Final Order

The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Core Issues

1. Whether the Respondent properly maintained the roadway Sundance Lane.
2. Whether the Respondent took appropriate action against the owner of Lot 77.

Detailed Analysis of Allegations

Allegation 1: Improper Roadway Maintenance of Sundance Lane

The Petitioner alleged that the POA failed to maintain Sundance Lane in accordance with the CC&Rs, particularly the northern section providing access to his Lot 76.

• Photographic Evidence: The Petitioner submitted photographs from September 2017 comparing well-maintained roads like Black Peak Parkway and Copper Hills Road with the poor condition of the northern portion of Sundance Lane near his property. These photos depicted the northern section as a “barely visible road running along the side of a steep hillside that is overgrown with vegetation and has a large number of large boulders.”

• Accessibility Issues: The Petitioner testified that in September 2017, he needed to rent a four-wheel drive truck to access his lot from the northeast via an unnamed road connecting to Sundance Lane.

• Plat Reference: The Petitioner submitted an undated and unsigned preliminary plat that stated “Roadbed 8” Native Gravel Fill Compacted to 95% Maximum Density,” but acknowledged this did not constitute an enforceable requirement for the POA.

• Admission of Access: The Petitioner acknowledged that his lot was usually accessible via passenger car from the southern end of Sundance Lane, where it connects with Black Peak Parkway.

• Testimony of Joe Wilson (POA President):

◦ Road Characteristics: Mr. Wilson described Sundance Lane as an “old two-track mining road from the 1940’s or 1950’s that has never been engineered that is too steep to be a perfect road.” He noted the northern part was rough but not impassable with four-wheel drive.

◦ Maintenance Schedule: The POA blades every roadway, including Sundance Lane, at least twice a year. Sundance Lane was bladed in September 2017 and December 2017. More intensive dozer work is sometimes performed on the worst roads.

◦ Prioritization of Resources: The POA board prioritizes maintenance on roads needed by the approximately 35 full-time residents to access their parcels. With an annual budget of only $35,000 to $40,000 to maintain 20 miles of roads, funds are used to better maintain the most traveled roadways.

◦ Financial Constraints: Blading all roads costs $15,000 to $20,000 per year. Paving all 20 miles would cost millions of dollars, requiring a prohibitive assessment of approximately $50,000 per parcel to raise just $1 million.

◦ Access Confirmation: Mr. Wilson testified that the resident of Lot 77 accesses his property from the south on Sundance Lane, and the Petitioner could access his lot from the south at any time. There are no residences that require access from the north side of Sundance Lane.

• Photographic Evidence: The POA submitted photos from December 2017 and January 9, 2018, showing Sundance Lane graded, passable, and cleared of vegetation following maintenance.

• Section III (d): Grants the POA authority to “Grade and maintain the roadways as needed, provide for proper drainage of roadways, install culverts where necessary.”

• Section III (m): Requires the POA to “maintain, care for, and otherwise manage the roadways…in as good condition (deterioration loss by damage due to environmental occurrences which cannot be reasonabl[y] avoided or insured against excepted)[.]”

• Section III (b): Authorizes acts “necessary, in the reasonable discretion of the Members, for the betterment of the Property and for the general benefit and welfare of the owners.”

Allegation 2: Failure to Enforce CC&Rs against Lot 77

The Petitioner alleged the POA failed to take appropriate action against the owner of neighboring Lot 77, Jerry Hamlin, for violations including inoperable vehicles and junk, creating a nuisance.

• Photographic Evidence: The Petitioner submitted photos of Lot 77 taken in September 2017, many with a telephoto lens. These photos showed multiple vehicles (some with hoods up), a backhoe, a trailer, and vehicle parts. Notations on the photos claimed vehicles were inoperable and had been sitting for years, though this was not apparent from the images themselves.

• Potential for Nuisance: The Petitioner testified to his belief that vehicles might be leaking oil and other fluids, potentially polluting the groundwater. He acknowledged he had no direct proof as he was unwilling to trespass.

• History of Complaints: The Petitioner acknowledged filing numerous complaints about Lot 77 with both the POA and Gila County over many years.

• Testimony of Joe Wilson (POA President):

◦ Enforcement Actions Taken: The POA has written letters to Mr. Hamlin in response to complaints, and Mr. Hamlin has removed vehicles and cleaned up the lot in the past.

◦ Owner’s Responsiveness: Mr. Hamlin has previously cooperated with the POA and Gila County. However, he expressed frustration with being “hassled” by the Petitioner’s continuing complaints after taking remedial action.

◦ Gila County Dismissal: A complaint filed by the Gila County Community Development Division against Mr. Hamlin was dismissed on November 6, 2013, after an inspector determined the property was “no longer in violation of Gila County Zoning Ordinances.”

◦ Condition of Vehicles: Mr. Hamlin stated to Mr. Wilson that all vehicles on the property were operable. Mr. Wilson noted that in rural areas, vehicle hoods are often left open to prevent vermin from nesting in the engine.

◦ Strategic Enforcement: The POA prefers not to take a “heavy hand” with Mr. Hamlin, as he is the “sort of man who would dig in his heels,” potentially leading to costly litigation that would deplete funds for road maintenance.

◦ Limited Enforcement Power: The POA’s primary enforcement mechanisms are writing letters and, after three failures to comply, liening the property.

• Photographic Evidence: The POA submitted recent photos showing the area was cleaner (a tire seen in the Petitioner’s photo had been removed) and that, from a distance without a telephoto lens, there were no apparent CC&R violations.

• 6.03 Storage: Allows up to 5% of a parcel for unenclosed storage, provided it is neat, orderly, and maintained at least 100 feet from the nearest property line.

• 6.04 Inoperable Vehicles and Equipment: Prohibits the repair or storage of more than one unregistered, inoperable motor vehicle within property boundaries.

• 6.05 Hazardous Materials and Nuisances: Prohibits storage of hazardous materials in a way that constitutes a fire hazard or nuisance.

Underlying Context: Petitioner’s Motivation and Property Challenges

The hearing evidence strongly suggests the Petitioner’s complaints were linked to his long-term inability to sell his unimproved 15-acre parcel, Lot 76.

• History of Complaints: The Petitioner sent numerous letters to the POA between 2012 and 2017, explicitly stating that the condition of Sundance Lane and the “junk on Lot 77” were preventing him from selling the property. A 2009 letter complained about the amount of the annual assessment due to his fixed income.

• POA’s Perspective: A September 27, 2017, letter from the POA to the Petitioner stated: “You have been complaining to the POA since 2009 about your inability to sell your property. … You sir are the only one blaming the POA and your neighbors for your inability to sell an undesirable property.”

• Property Characteristics: The Petitioner’s Lot 76 is located at the top of a steep, rocky hill. The POA President testified that it would be “difficult to build” on the lot, as it has “no level place on which to construct a building pad” and would require a “significant amount of bulldozer work.”

• Development Plans: While the Petitioner stated he would like to build a house, he had never planned construction dates or performed a percolation test. His proposed building site was located as close as possible to Lot 77’s garage.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The ALJ denied the petition, finding the Petitioner failed to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

• Regarding Sundance Lane: The ALJ concluded that the POA did not abuse its discretion. Its decision to prioritize maintenance on roads used by full-time residents was deemed reasonable given its limited financial resources. The fact that Lot 76 remained accessible via passenger car from the southern end of Sundance Lane was a key factor.

• Regarding Lot 77: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that there was more than one inoperable vehicle on Lot 77 or that other violations were more than a “transitory condition.” The decision notes that the POA monitors the lot and that the owner is “generally responsive.” Crucially, the ALJ found that the vehicles and storage on Lot 77 “occur behind the buffer zone and are not easily visible from Petitioner’s Lot 76 without binoculars or a telephoto lens.”

The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. This order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted.

Thomas J Stedronsky vs. Copper Canyon Ranches POA

Posted on January 24, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1817016-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-01-24
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	none
Filing Fees Refunded	$1,000.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Thomas J Stedronsky	Counsel	—
Respondent	Copper Canyon Ranches POA	Counsel	John S. Perlman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Section III (d) and (m)
CC&Rs Section VI (6.02, 6.03, 6.04, 6.05)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's petition entirely. The HOA did not violate CC&Rs regarding road maintenance or abuse its discretion in enforcement against Lot 77.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to establish that the Respondent violated its planned community documents.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent has maintained the roadway Sundance Lane properly

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated CC&Rs by failing to properly maintain Sundance Lane. Respondent countered that limited funds necessitated prioritizing roads for full-time residents, but Sundance Lane was accessible.

Orders: Complaint regarding road maintenance dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• CC&Rs Section III
• A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Whether Respondent has taken appropriate action against the owner of lot 77 in as much as that property allegedly resembles a junk yard

Petitioner alleged Lot 77 violated CC&Rs due to excessive storage and inoperable vehicles. Respondent showed it monitors the property, has written letters, and the owner has previously complied with HOA and County cleanup efforts.

Orders: Complaint regarding enforcement against Lot 77 dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• CC&Rs Section VI
• A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817016-REL Decision – 613995.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:03:31 (200.6 KB)

Briefing: Stedronsky v. Copper Canyon Ranches POA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817016-REL, involving Petitioner Thomas J. Stedronsky and Respondent Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (POA). The Petitioner filed a two-issue petition alleging the POA violated its Covenants, Easements, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by failing to properly maintain a roadway, Sundance Lane, and by failing to take appropriate action against a neighboring property, Lot 77, which allegedly resembled a junkyard.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Diane Mihalsky, denied the petition in its entirety. The decision found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof for both allegations. Regarding road maintenance, the ALJ concluded the POA acted within its reasonable discretion by prioritizing its limited funds ($35,000-$40,000 annually for 20 miles of roads) to maintain roadways used by the community’s approximately 35 full-time residents. Despite the poor condition of the northern section of Sundance Lane, the Petitioner’s lot remained accessible via a passenger car from the south.

Concerning Lot 77, the ALJ determined that the Petitioner did not establish a persistent violation of the CC&Rs. The evidence showed the POA had previously addressed complaints with the lot owner, who had been responsive. Furthermore, the alleged violations were largely located behind the required property buffer zone and were not easily visible from the Petitioner’s property without a telephoto lens. The decision suggests the Petitioner’s long-standing complaints were primarily motivated by his inability to sell his topographically challenging and undeveloped property.

Case Details

Case Information

Details

Case Number

18F-H1817016-REL

Petitioner

Thomas J. Stedronsky (Owner of Lot 76)

Respondent

Copper Canyon Ranches POA

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings, State of Arizona

Presiding Judge

Diane Mihalsky, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

January 10, 2018

Decision Date

January 24, 2018

Final Order

The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Core Issues

1. Whether the Respondent properly maintained the roadway Sundance Lane.
2. Whether the Respondent took appropriate action against the owner of Lot 77.

Detailed Analysis of Allegations

Allegation 1: Improper Roadway Maintenance of Sundance Lane

The Petitioner alleged that the POA failed to maintain Sundance Lane in accordance with the CC&Rs, particularly the northern section providing access to his Lot 76.

• Photographic Evidence: The Petitioner submitted photographs from September 2017 comparing well-maintained roads like Black Peak Parkway and Copper Hills Road with the poor condition of the northern portion of Sundance Lane near his property. These photos depicted the northern section as a “barely visible road running along the side of a steep hillside that is overgrown with vegetation and has a large number of large boulders.”

• Accessibility Issues: The Petitioner testified that in September 2017, he needed to rent a four-wheel drive truck to access his lot from the northeast via an unnamed road connecting to Sundance Lane.

• Plat Reference: The Petitioner submitted an undated and unsigned preliminary plat that stated “Roadbed 8” Native Gravel Fill Compacted to 95% Maximum Density,” but acknowledged this did not constitute an enforceable requirement for the POA.

• Admission of Access: The Petitioner acknowledged that his lot was usually accessible via passenger car from the southern end of Sundance Lane, where it connects with Black Peak Parkway.

• Testimony of Joe Wilson (POA President):

◦ Road Characteristics: Mr. Wilson described Sundance Lane as an “old two-track mining road from the 1940’s or 1950’s that has never been engineered that is too steep to be a perfect road.” He noted the northern part was rough but not impassable with four-wheel drive.

◦ Maintenance Schedule: The POA blades every roadway, including Sundance Lane, at least twice a year. Sundance Lane was bladed in September 2017 and December 2017. More intensive dozer work is sometimes performed on the worst roads.

◦ Prioritization of Resources: The POA board prioritizes maintenance on roads needed by the approximately 35 full-time residents to access their parcels. With an annual budget of only $35,000 to $40,000 to maintain 20 miles of roads, funds are used to better maintain the most traveled roadways.

◦ Financial Constraints: Blading all roads costs $15,000 to $20,000 per year. Paving all 20 miles would cost millions of dollars, requiring a prohibitive assessment of approximately $50,000 per parcel to raise just $1 million.

◦ Access Confirmation: Mr. Wilson testified that the resident of Lot 77 accesses his property from the south on Sundance Lane, and the Petitioner could access his lot from the south at any time. There are no residences that require access from the north side of Sundance Lane.

• Photographic Evidence: The POA submitted photos from December 2017 and January 9, 2018, showing Sundance Lane graded, passable, and cleared of vegetation following maintenance.

• Section III (d): Grants the POA authority to “Grade and maintain the roadways as needed, provide for proper drainage of roadways, install culverts where necessary.”

• Section III (m): Requires the POA to “maintain, care for, and otherwise manage the roadways…in as good condition (deterioration loss by damage due to environmental occurrences which cannot be reasonabl[y] avoided or insured against excepted)[.]”

• Section III (b): Authorizes acts “necessary, in the reasonable discretion of the Members, for the betterment of the Property and for the general benefit and welfare of the owners.”

Allegation 2: Failure to Enforce CC&Rs against Lot 77

The Petitioner alleged the POA failed to take appropriate action against the owner of neighboring Lot 77, Jerry Hamlin, for violations including inoperable vehicles and junk, creating a nuisance.

• Photographic Evidence: The Petitioner submitted photos of Lot 77 taken in September 2017, many with a telephoto lens. These photos showed multiple vehicles (some with hoods up), a backhoe, a trailer, and vehicle parts. Notations on the photos claimed vehicles were inoperable and had been sitting for years, though this was not apparent from the images themselves.

• Potential for Nuisance: The Petitioner testified to his belief that vehicles might be leaking oil and other fluids, potentially polluting the groundwater. He acknowledged he had no direct proof as he was unwilling to trespass.

• History of Complaints: The Petitioner acknowledged filing numerous complaints about Lot 77 with both the POA and Gila County over many years.

• Testimony of Joe Wilson (POA President):

◦ Enforcement Actions Taken: The POA has written letters to Mr. Hamlin in response to complaints, and Mr. Hamlin has removed vehicles and cleaned up the lot in the past.

◦ Owner’s Responsiveness: Mr. Hamlin has previously cooperated with the POA and Gila County. However, he expressed frustration with being “hassled” by the Petitioner’s continuing complaints after taking remedial action.

◦ Gila County Dismissal: A complaint filed by the Gila County Community Development Division against Mr. Hamlin was dismissed on November 6, 2013, after an inspector determined the property was “no longer in violation of Gila County Zoning Ordinances.”

◦ Condition of Vehicles: Mr. Hamlin stated to Mr. Wilson that all vehicles on the property were operable. Mr. Wilson noted that in rural areas, vehicle hoods are often left open to prevent vermin from nesting in the engine.

◦ Strategic Enforcement: The POA prefers not to take a “heavy hand” with Mr. Hamlin, as he is the “sort of man who would dig in his heels,” potentially leading to costly litigation that would deplete funds for road maintenance.

◦ Limited Enforcement Power: The POA’s primary enforcement mechanisms are writing letters and, after three failures to comply, liening the property.

• Photographic Evidence: The POA submitted recent photos showing the area was cleaner (a tire seen in the Petitioner’s photo had been removed) and that, from a distance without a telephoto lens, there were no apparent CC&R violations.

• 6.03 Storage: Allows up to 5% of a parcel for unenclosed storage, provided it is neat, orderly, and maintained at least 100 feet from the nearest property line.

• 6.04 Inoperable Vehicles and Equipment: Prohibits the repair or storage of more than one unregistered, inoperable motor vehicle within property boundaries.

• 6.05 Hazardous Materials and Nuisances: Prohibits storage of hazardous materials in a way that constitutes a fire hazard or nuisance.

Underlying Context: Petitioner’s Motivation and Property Challenges

The hearing evidence strongly suggests the Petitioner’s complaints were linked to his long-term inability to sell his unimproved 15-acre parcel, Lot 76.

• History of Complaints: The Petitioner sent numerous letters to the POA between 2012 and 2017, explicitly stating that the condition of Sundance Lane and the “junk on Lot 77” were preventing him from selling the property. A 2009 letter complained about the amount of the annual assessment due to his fixed income.

• POA’s Perspective: A September 27, 2017, letter from the POA to the Petitioner stated: “You have been complaining to the POA since 2009 about your inability to sell your property. … You sir are the only one blaming the POA and your neighbors for your inability to sell an undesirable property.”

• Property Characteristics: The Petitioner’s Lot 76 is located at the top of a steep, rocky hill. The POA President testified that it would be “difficult to build” on the lot, as it has “no level place on which to construct a building pad” and would require a “significant amount of bulldozer work.”

• Development Plans: While the Petitioner stated he would like to build a house, he had never planned construction dates or performed a percolation test. His proposed building site was located as close as possible to Lot 77’s garage.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The ALJ denied the petition, finding the Petitioner failed to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

• Regarding Sundance Lane: The ALJ concluded that the POA did not abuse its discretion. Its decision to prioritize maintenance on roads used by full-time residents was deemed reasonable given its limited financial resources. The fact that Lot 76 remained accessible via passenger car from the southern end of Sundance Lane was a key factor.

• Regarding Lot 77: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that there was more than one inoperable vehicle on Lot 77 or that other violations were more than a “transitory condition.” The decision notes that the POA monitors the lot and that the owner is “generally responsive.” Crucially, the ALJ found that the vehicles and storage on Lot 77 “occur behind the buffer zone and are not easily visible from Petitioner’s Lot 76 without binoculars or a telephoto lens.”

The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. This order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted.