Joan A. Tober, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-15
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Joan A. Tober Counsel
Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association Counsel Diana J. Elston, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B) and was the prevailing party on rehearing. The HOA was not required to provide the privileged attorney letter, and Petitioner failed to clarify her vague request for other documents.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to sustain her burden of proof. The primary requested document was privileged, and the overall request was unreasonably broad and left unclarified, preventing the HOA from reasonably making records available.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of HOA member access to records statute regarding timeliness of disclosure.

Petitioner sought a copy of a privileged attorney letter discussed at a Board meeting and "any and all documentation" regarding the North Ridge wall. The issue on rehearing was whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide records within 10 business days. The ALJ found no violation, concluding the letter was privileged communication and the broader request was unreasonably broad and unclarified by the Petitioner.

Orders: The HOA is the prevailing party with regard to the rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA records request, Attorney-Client Privilege, Statutory violation (A.R.S. 33-1805), Timeliness, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – 764197.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:01 (187.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG


Briefing: Case No. 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG, Tober v. Civano 1 HOA

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in Case No. 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG, involving Petitioner Joan A. Tober and Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA). The dispute centered on the HOA’s alleged failure to provide records in accordance with Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805.

The core conflict originated from the Petitioner’s request for a specific attorney’s letter (“the Letter”) concerning the North Ridge wall, which was mentioned at an HOA Board meeting. The Petitioner argued that by discussing the Letter, the HOA waived attorney-client privilege. The HOA maintained the Letter was privileged and rightfully withheld. The Petitioner subsequently expanded her request to “any and all documentation” regarding the wall, which the HOA found to be overly broad.

Following an initial hearing on June 5, 2019, the ALJ ruled in favor of the HOA, finding the Letter was privileged and the HOA had complied with the statute. A rehearing was granted to address the Petitioner’s claim that the ruling “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.”

The final decision, issued after the December 11, 2019 rehearing, reaffirmed the HOA as the prevailing party. The ALJ concluded that the HOA did not violate the 10-business-day requirement of A.R.S. § 33-1805. The ruling determined that the Petitioner’s expanded request was “unreasonably broad,” and her failure to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification prevented the HOA from being able to reasonably provide records. The Petitioner’s appeal was ultimately dismissed.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Number: 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG

Tribunal: In the Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona

Petitioner: Joan A. Tober (Appeared on her own behalf)

Respondent: Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (Represented by Diana J. Elston, Esq.)

Administrative Law Judge: Kay Abramsohn

Subject Matter: A petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging an HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide association records upon request.

Chronology of Key Events

Nov 20, 2018

At an HOA Board meeting, the President mentions a letter from the HOA’s attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, its erosion, and the HOA’s legal responsibility. He suggests he “can … send it out.”

Nov 26, 2018

Petitioner makes her first request for a copy of the attorney’s letter.

Nov 27, 2018

Petitioner makes a second request. The HOA responds that it is waiting for clarification from its attorney.

Nov 29, 2018

Petitioner submits a third, expanded request for “any and all documentation… and all background information” regarding the North Ridge wall.

Nov 29, 2018

The HOA responds that the President had misspoken, the letter is a privileged “Legal Opinion,” and asks if Petitioner needs a copy of the “original engineer report” for clarification. The ALJ found no evidence Petitioner responded to this clarification request.

Dec 26, 2018

Petitioner files her official Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Jan 15-16, 2019

The HOA forwards “historical erosion reports” (2013 and 2014) and an invoice to Petitioner, who acknowledges already possessing the reports.

June 5, 2019

The first administrative hearing is held.

July 29, 2019

The initial ALJ Decision is issued, finding in favor of the HOA.

Aug 5, 2019

Petitioner files a request for rehearing, citing the “timeliness aspect of the law.”

Aug 23, 2019

The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing.

Dec 11, 2019

The rehearing is conducted.

Jan 15, 2020

The final ALJ Decision is issued, again ordering that the HOA is the prevailing party and dismissing the Petitioner’s appeal.

Petitioner’s Position and Arguments

Joan A. Tober, a homeowner since 2001, past Board member, and active observer who taped and transcribed HOA meetings since 2008, built her case on several key arguments:

Waiver of Privilege: The Petitioner’s central initial argument was that the HOA had “intentionally waived confidentiality” of the attorney’s letter. She contended that because the HOA President mentioned the Letter in an open meeting and other Board members did not object, this demonstrated “unanimous consent to waive confidentiality.”

Right to Information: The Petitioner’s requests were framed as a right to access information impacting her dues and the HOA budget. Her first request noted, “Since it was discussed at the Board meeting and impacts my dues in addition to being an integral part of the budget decision I see no reason why I should have to pay for a copy.”

Expanded Request for Full Background: After her initial requests for the Letter were met with a delay, the Petitioner broadened her demand significantly:

Allegation of Incomplete Disclosure: The Petitioner argued that even after filing her petition, the HOA’s response was insufficient. She asserted that “the Association only sent two reports that were already readily available and in my possession.” She believed that given the long-standing nature of the erosion issue (since 2013), “there’s more than just two pieces of documentation in the possession of the Association.”

Focus on Timeliness for Rehearing: The basis for the rehearing request was the specific claim that the original ALJ ruling “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law,” alleging the HOA failed to provide access to records within the 10-business-day period mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Respondent’s Position and Arguments

The Civano 1 HOA, represented by legal counsel, countered the Petitioner’s claims with the following arguments:

Assertion of Attorney-Client Privilege: The HOA’s primary defense was that the Letter constituted “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association,” which is explicitly protected from disclosure to members under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(1).

No Waiver of Privilege: The HOA contended that the “mere mention” of the Letter by the Board President at a meeting did not constitute a legal waiver of its privileged status. The President was found to have “misspoken” when he suggested copies could be provided.

Overly Broad and Vague Request: The HOA argued that the Petitioner’s expanded request for “any and all” documents was too broad and vague to allow for a reasonable response. The HOA was not required to guess what records were being requested.

Attempt at Clarification: The HOA provided evidence that it attempted to clarify the vague request on November 29, 2018, by asking if the Petitioner needed a copy of the “original engineer report.” The ALJ found no evidence that the Petitioner ever responded to this query.

Substantial Compliance: The HOA indicated that by reviewing the exhibits the Petitioner herself presented, it was clear that she had already received copies of the requested historical documents (the 2013 and 2014 reports).

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

After two hearings, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) made determinative findings of fact and law that led to the dismissal of the Petitioner’s case.

Key Findings of Fact

• The Petition was filed solely because the Petitioner wanted a copy of the attorney’s letter discussed at the November 20, 2018 meeting.

• At that meeting, the only document referenced regarding the North Ridge wall was the attorney’s letter/report. No other background documents were mentioned.

• The Petitioner already possessed copies of the 2013 and 2014 engineering reports (which she had obtained from the city) at the time she made her expanded request.

• The Petitioner’s expanded request of November 29, 2018, was the first time she asked for more than just the Letter.

• The Petitioner failed to provide evidence that she responded to the HOA’s November 29, 2018 email seeking to clarify her request.

• The record contains no evidence of any erosion reports other than the 2013 and 2014 reports, nor any evidence of remediation work having been performed by the HOA related to the erosion issue.

Conclusions of Law

1. The Letter is Privileged: Under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(1), the attorney’s letter is a privileged communication. Therefore, the “HOA was not required to provide access to, or a copy of, the Letter to Petitioner or to any member within any time period.”

2. The Request Was Unreasonably Broad: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s third request, for “the letter … and all background information,” was “unreasonably broad and remained unclarified by Petitioner.”

3. Petitioner’s Failure to Clarify Precluded HOA Action: The Petitioner’s failure to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification “prevent[ed] the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.” The ruling states, “An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.”

4. No Violation of Statute: Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded that the HOA did not violate the 10-business-day provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof. The final decision clarifies that the HOA “acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805.”

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that the HOA is the prevailing party with regard to the rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal is dismissed.

The order, issued on January 15, 2020, is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days.


John W. Gray vs. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918004-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-11-30
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome win
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John W. Gray Counsel
Respondent Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association Counsel Austin Baillio, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to enforce parking rules (vehicle limits, garage use, inoperable vehicles)

Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.

Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • MCIII Rules and Regulations #2 and #3
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.12
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.13
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.14

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, Parking Rules, Filing Fee Refund, Inoperable Vehicle, CC&R Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918004-REL Decision – 674057.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:41 (139.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918004-REL


Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.

The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.

Case Overview

Parties Involved:

Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.

Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.

Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.

Decision Date: November 30, 2018.

Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.

Background and Timeline of the Dispute

The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).

Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):

◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.

◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.

◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.

◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.

May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:

◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.

◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.

◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.

MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.

July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.

MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.

July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.

July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.

Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)

The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”

Specific Violations Alleged:

Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.

Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.

Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.

Evidence Presented at Hearing:

Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.

Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).

Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.

Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.

Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)

The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.

Core Arguments:

Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.

Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.

Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.

Actions Taken by MCIII:

Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.

Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.

Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.

Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.

Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.

Governing Rules and CC&Rs

The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.

Document

Article/Rule

Provision

Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)

Rule 3

Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.12

Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.13

States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.14

Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.

Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.

Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.

◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.

◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”

◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.

◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.

Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.

Final Order

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:

1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.


John W. Gray vs. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918004-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-11-30
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome win
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John W. Gray Counsel
Respondent Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association Counsel Austin Baillio, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to enforce parking rules (vehicle limits, garage use, inoperable vehicles)

Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.

Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • MCIII Rules and Regulations #2 and #3
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.12
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.13
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.14

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, Parking Rules, Filing Fee Refund, Inoperable Vehicle, CC&R Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918004-REL Decision – 674057.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:18 (139.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918004-REL


Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.

The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.

Case Overview

Parties Involved:

Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.

Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.

Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.

Decision Date: November 30, 2018.

Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.

Background and Timeline of the Dispute

The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).

Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):

◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.

◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.

◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.

◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.

May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:

◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.

◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.

◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.

MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.

July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.

MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.

July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.

July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.

Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)

The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”

Specific Violations Alleged:

Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.

Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.

Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.

Evidence Presented at Hearing:

Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.

Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).

Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.

Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.

Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)

The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.

Core Arguments:

Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.

Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.

Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.

Actions Taken by MCIII:

Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.

Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.

Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.

Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.

Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.

Governing Rules and CC&Rs

The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.

Document

Article/Rule

Provision

Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)

Rule 3

Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.12

Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.13

States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.14

Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.

Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.

Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.

◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.

◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”

◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.

◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.

Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.

Final Order

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:

1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.