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Tom J Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Posted on April 26, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918022-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	respondent_win
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Tom J Martin	Counsel	—
Respondent	SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.	Counsel	Carolyn B. Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)

Outcome Summary

The case was dismissed because the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction, as the alleged violations (HOA website and policy BC-3) did not pertain to 'community documents' as defined by Arizona statute.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A) by alleging violations of documents (website, policy manual) that are not defined as 'community documents' under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2).

Key Issues & Findings

Jurisdiction based on alleged violations of non-community documents (HOA website and policy manual)

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its website and Policy BC-3 by failing to provide pickleball courts as advertised, requesting $463,112.00 in financial support or court construction. The ALJ found that neither the website nor Policy BC-3 are defined as 'community documents' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), thus denying jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A). The petition was dismissed.

Orders: Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-213
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Walker v. Scottsdale, 163 Ariz. 206, 786 P.2d 1057 (App. 1989)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, community_documents, dismissal, policy_manual, pickleball, statutory_interpretation

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-213
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.
• Walker v. Scottsdale

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG Decision – 704322.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:07:45 (89.7 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Martin v. SaddleBrooke HOA #1

Executive Summary

The petition filed by Tom J. Martin against the SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. was dismissed by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. The core of the decision rests on a strict interpretation of Arizona state law, which limits the hearing office’s authority to violations of formally defined “community documents.”

Mr. Martin’s primary grievance was the HOA’s alleged failure to provide and fund pickleball courts as advertised on its website and outlined in an internal policy document (Policy BC-3). However, the ALJ found that neither an HOA’s website nor its internal policies qualify as “community documents” under the statutory definition, which is restricted to the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, and rules. Mr. Martin’s attempt to equate “policy” with “rule” was deemed unpersuasive because the policy in question had not been formally adopted as a rule by the HOA.

Furthermore, the specific relief requested by Mr. Martin—a demand for $463,112.00, the construction of eight new courts, and mandated maintenance funding—was found to be outside the scope of the ALJ’s statutory authority to grant. The dismissal, issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

Case Background and Procedural History

This briefing document outlines the findings and decision in case number 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG, presided over by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden. The matter involved a dispute between Petitioner Tom J. Martin and Respondent SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

September 28, 2018

Mr. Martin filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 30, 2018

The HOA filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenging the Department’s jurisdiction.

December 4, 2018

Mr. Martin filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss.

December 12, 2018

An Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, ordering the petition be dismissed.

December 31, 2018

Mr. Martin filed a request for a rehearing.

April 16, 2019

The rehearing was conducted.

May 10, 2019

The final Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, dismissing the petition.

Petitioner’s Allegations and Requested Relief

Initial Petition Allegations

• The core of Mr. Martin’s petition, filed September 28, 2018, was the allegation that the SaddleBrooke HOA violated its website and its policy manual, specifically Policy Number BC-3.

• The central claim was that “the Association is in violation for not providing pickleball courts as advertised and marketed….”

• While Mr. Martin checked boxes on the petition form indicating violations of the CC&Rs and Bylaws, he did not identify any specific provisions of those documents in his initial filing.

Allegations on Rehearing

In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Martin attempted to amend his claim by alleging specific violations of formal community documents:

• He argued the HOA violated Bylaws article 4, section 6(3) by failing to implement policy BC-3.

• He alleged the HOA violated Articles of Incorporation Article XII by not providing pickleball as promised, which he tied back to the failure to implement policy BC-3.

Requested Relief

Mr. Martin sought significant remedies from the HOA, requesting that it either:

1. Provide financial support of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon; or

2. Provide eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year.

Additionally, he demanded that the HOA be held financially responsible for the maintenance of the pickleball courts in an amount equal to what it spent on eight tennis courts.

Respondent’s Jurisdictional Challenge

The SaddleBrooke HOA’s primary defense was a jurisdictional challenge, arguing that the petition fell outside the legal authority of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Limited Jurisdiction: The HOA contended that pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01, administrative hearings are limited to disputes regarding violations of “planned community documents” or applicable state statutes.

• Definition of “Community Documents”: The HOA cited ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2), which defines “community documents” as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.”

• Exclusion of Policies and Websites: Based on this statutory definition, the HOA argued that its website and Policy BC-3 are not “community documents,” and therefore any alleged violation of them cannot be adjudicated in this forum.

• Authority to Grant Relief: The HOA also argued that the specific financial and construction-related relief Mr. Martin sought was not within the tribunal’s authority to grant.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Legal Rationale

The ALJ ultimately sided with the Respondent HOA and ordered the petition dismissed. The decision was based on a strict application of Arizona statutes governing planned communities and the administrative hearing process.

Conclusions of Law

1. Statutory Limitations: The judge affirmed that hearings under A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) are restricted to alleged “violations of … planned community documents or violations of the statutes that regulate … planned communities.”

2. Definition of “Community Documents” is Controlling: The decision hinges on the explicit definition of “community documents” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2). The judge noted that the tribunal must follow definitions provided by the legislature. The finding states: “This definition does not include a planned community’s statements of policy, statements on its website, or advertising and marketing material.”

3. A “Policy” is Not a “Rule”: Mr. Martin’s argument that a “policy” should be interpreted as a “rule” was found to be “not persuasive.” The judge found that the HOA had not formally adopted Policy BC-3 as a rule under the authority granted in its CC&Rs (section 4.5). Therefore, the policy could not be treated as an enforceable “community document.”

4. Petition’s Failure to Meet Requirements: Because Mr. Martin’s original petition only alleged violations of the website and the policy manual—neither of which are legally defined as community documents—the petition “does not meet the requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01(A).”

5. Relief Outside of Authority: The ALJ also concluded that the requested relief was “not within the scope of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority” as prescribed by A.R.S. § 32-2199.02. The statute allows an ALJ to order a party to abide by the documents at issue and levy civil penalties, but not to order large monetary payments for construction or specific performance of capital projects.

Final Order

• “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.”

• The decision, being the result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

• Any party wishing to appeal must file for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service of the order.

Tom J Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Posted on April 26, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918022-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	respondent_win
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Tom J Martin	Counsel	—
Respondent	SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.	Counsel	Carolyn B. Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)

Outcome Summary

The case was dismissed because the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction, as the alleged violations (HOA website and policy BC-3) did not pertain to 'community documents' as defined by Arizona statute.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A) by alleging violations of documents (website, policy manual) that are not defined as 'community documents' under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2).

Key Issues & Findings

Jurisdiction based on alleged violations of non-community documents (HOA website and policy manual)

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its website and Policy BC-3 by failing to provide pickleball courts as advertised, requesting $463,112.00 in financial support or court construction. The ALJ found that neither the website nor Policy BC-3 are defined as 'community documents' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), thus denying jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A). The petition was dismissed.

Orders: Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-213
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Walker v. Scottsdale, 163 Ariz. 206, 786 P.2d 1057 (App. 1989)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, community_documents, dismissal, policy_manual, pickleball, statutory_interpretation

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-213
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.
• Walker v. Scottsdale

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG Decision – 704322.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:41 (89.7 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Martin v. SaddleBrooke HOA #1

Executive Summary

The petition filed by Tom J. Martin against the SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. was dismissed by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. The core of the decision rests on a strict interpretation of Arizona state law, which limits the hearing office’s authority to violations of formally defined “community documents.”

Mr. Martin’s primary grievance was the HOA’s alleged failure to provide and fund pickleball courts as advertised on its website and outlined in an internal policy document (Policy BC-3). However, the ALJ found that neither an HOA’s website nor its internal policies qualify as “community documents” under the statutory definition, which is restricted to the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, and rules. Mr. Martin’s attempt to equate “policy” with “rule” was deemed unpersuasive because the policy in question had not been formally adopted as a rule by the HOA.

Furthermore, the specific relief requested by Mr. Martin—a demand for $463,112.00, the construction of eight new courts, and mandated maintenance funding—was found to be outside the scope of the ALJ’s statutory authority to grant. The dismissal, issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

Case Background and Procedural History

This briefing document outlines the findings and decision in case number 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG, presided over by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden. The matter involved a dispute between Petitioner Tom J. Martin and Respondent SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

September 28, 2018

Mr. Martin filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 30, 2018

The HOA filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenging the Department’s jurisdiction.

December 4, 2018

Mr. Martin filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss.

December 12, 2018

An Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, ordering the petition be dismissed.

December 31, 2018

Mr. Martin filed a request for a rehearing.

April 16, 2019

The rehearing was conducted.

May 10, 2019

The final Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, dismissing the petition.

Petitioner’s Allegations and Requested Relief

Initial Petition Allegations

• The core of Mr. Martin’s petition, filed September 28, 2018, was the allegation that the SaddleBrooke HOA violated its website and its policy manual, specifically Policy Number BC-3.

• The central claim was that “the Association is in violation for not providing pickleball courts as advertised and marketed….”

• While Mr. Martin checked boxes on the petition form indicating violations of the CC&Rs and Bylaws, he did not identify any specific provisions of those documents in his initial filing.

Allegations on Rehearing

In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Martin attempted to amend his claim by alleging specific violations of formal community documents:

• He argued the HOA violated Bylaws article 4, section 6(3) by failing to implement policy BC-3.

• He alleged the HOA violated Articles of Incorporation Article XII by not providing pickleball as promised, which he tied back to the failure to implement policy BC-3.

Requested Relief

Mr. Martin sought significant remedies from the HOA, requesting that it either:

1. Provide financial support of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon; or

2. Provide eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year.

Additionally, he demanded that the HOA be held financially responsible for the maintenance of the pickleball courts in an amount equal to what it spent on eight tennis courts.

Respondent’s Jurisdictional Challenge

The SaddleBrooke HOA’s primary defense was a jurisdictional challenge, arguing that the petition fell outside the legal authority of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Limited Jurisdiction: The HOA contended that pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01, administrative hearings are limited to disputes regarding violations of “planned community documents” or applicable state statutes.

• Definition of “Community Documents”: The HOA cited ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2), which defines “community documents” as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.”

• Exclusion of Policies and Websites: Based on this statutory definition, the HOA argued that its website and Policy BC-3 are not “community documents,” and therefore any alleged violation of them cannot be adjudicated in this forum.

• Authority to Grant Relief: The HOA also argued that the specific financial and construction-related relief Mr. Martin sought was not within the tribunal’s authority to grant.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Legal Rationale

The ALJ ultimately sided with the Respondent HOA and ordered the petition dismissed. The decision was based on a strict application of Arizona statutes governing planned communities and the administrative hearing process.

Conclusions of Law

1. Statutory Limitations: The judge affirmed that hearings under A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) are restricted to alleged “violations of … planned community documents or violations of the statutes that regulate … planned communities.”

2. Definition of “Community Documents” is Controlling: The decision hinges on the explicit definition of “community documents” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2). The judge noted that the tribunal must follow definitions provided by the legislature. The finding states: “This definition does not include a planned community’s statements of policy, statements on its website, or advertising and marketing material.”

3. A “Policy” is Not a “Rule”: Mr. Martin’s argument that a “policy” should be interpreted as a “rule” was found to be “not persuasive.” The judge found that the HOA had not formally adopted Policy BC-3 as a rule under the authority granted in its CC&Rs (section 4.5). Therefore, the policy could not be treated as an enforceable “community document.”

4. Petition’s Failure to Meet Requirements: Because Mr. Martin’s original petition only alleged violations of the website and the policy manual—neither of which are legally defined as community documents—the petition “does not meet the requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01(A).”

5. Relief Outside of Authority: The ALJ also concluded that the requested relief was “not within the scope of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority” as prescribed by A.R.S. § 32-2199.02. The statute allows an ALJ to order a party to abide by the documents at issue and levy civil penalties, but not to order large monetary payments for construction or specific performance of capital projects.

Final Order

• “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.”

• The decision, being the result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

• Any party wishing to appeal must file for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service of the order.

Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Posted on March 1, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818054-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-03-01
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Brad W. Stevens	Counsel	—
Respondent	Mogollon Airpark, Inc.	Counsel	Greg Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A). The increase in the regular assessment (14.1%) was below the statutory 20% limit, and the overall increase included a special assessment which the statute does not cover.

Why this result: The Petitioner's definition of 'regular assessment' was rejected as not supported by statutory construction principles, and the issue was limited to the definition and application of ARS § 33-1803(A).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A) by increasing the regular assessment more than 20%.

Petitioner alleged that the HOA's total assessment increase of $325 (which was 39.4% over the previous assessment of $825) constituted an unlawful increase of the 'regular assessment' under ARS § 33-1803(A). The HOA argued the increase to the 'regular assessment' was only 14.1% ($116 increase), and the remaining $209 was a separate, one-time assessment.

Orders: Petitioner Brad W. Stevens’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
• Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
• Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
• State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
• Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment, Statutory Interpretation, Regular Assessment, Special Assessment, ARS 33-1803(A)

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
• Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
• Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
• State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
• Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 692388.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:09 (102.8 KB)

Briefing Document: Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the matter of Brad W. Stevens versus Mogollon Airpark, Inc., a case centered on the legality of a homeowner association (HOA) assessment increase. The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, ultimately dismissed the petition filed by Mr. Stevens, finding he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mogollon Airpark violated Arizona state law.

The core of the dispute was a $325 increase to the annual assessment for 2018, which represented a 39.4% increase over the previous year’s $825 fee. The petitioner alleged this violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), which prohibits HOAs from increasing a “regular assessment” by more than 20% without member approval. The respondent, Mogollon Airpark, argued the increase was composed of two distinct parts: a 14.1% ($116) increase to the regular assessment to cover a budget shortfall, and a separate $209 one-time “special assessment” to replenish a reserve fund.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a critical interpretation of statutory language, concluding that “regular assessments” and “special assessments” are legally distinct categories. The judge rejected the petitioner’s argument that “regular” refers to the process of an assessment rather than its type, deeming this interpretation contrary to principles of statutory construction and nonsensical. Furthermore, the judge found the petitioner’s legal citations to be inapplicable and confirmed that the scope of the hearing was limited strictly to the alleged violation of the 20% rule, not the HOA’s general authority to levy special assessments.

Case Background and Procedural History

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens

◦ Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (HOA)

• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, on behalf of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

• Timeline:

◦ June 7, 2018: Mr. Stevens files a single-issue petition with the Department of Real Estate.

◦ September 28, 2018: An initial hearing is conducted on the matter, consolidated with two others.

◦ January 2, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Rehearing.

◦ February 11, 2019: The rehearing is conducted.

◦ March 1, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, dismissing the petition.

The matter came before the Office of Administrative Hearings for a rehearing after Mr. Stevens alleged errors of law and an abuse of discretion in the original hearing’s decision.

The Core Dispute: The 2018 Assessment Increase

The central facts of the case revolve around a decision made at a Mogollon Airpark board meeting in November 2017. To address a shortage in its operating budget and to replenish approximately $53,000 borrowed from its reserve fund, the Board approved a two-part increase to its annual fees.

Assessment Component

Previous Year (2017)

2018 Increase

Justification

Percentage Increase

Regular Assessment

+ $116

Cover operating budget shortfall

Special Assessment

+ $209

Replenish reserve fund

Total Assessment

+ $325

Total for 2018

This total 39.4% increase formed the basis of Mr. Stevens’s legal challenge under A.R.S. § 33-1803(A), which limits increases to “regular assessments” to 20% over the preceding fiscal year.

Analysis of Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Brad W. Stevens)

Mr. Stevens’s case was built on the assertion that the entire $325 increase constituted a single “regular assessment” and was therefore illegal. His key arguments were:

• Definition of “Regular”: He contended that “regular” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created—i.e., one that is “according to rule.” He argued that it does not denote a type of assessment (e.g., recurring vs. one-time).

• Lack of Authority for Special Assessments: Mr. Stevens argued that Mogollon Airpark has no authority to issue special assessments. Therefore, any assessment it imposes, regardless of its label, must legally be considered a “regular assessment.”

• Legal Precedent: He cited Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona to define a “special assessment,” arguing that the $209 charge did not qualify because he received no “particularized benefit” as required by that case. He also presented definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary.

Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)

Mogollon Airpark’s defense was straightforward and relied on the distinction between the two components of the assessment increase:

• Statutory Limitation: The respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.”

• Compliance with Statute: The increase to the regular assessment was $116, a 14.1% rise over the previous year’s $825 fee. This amount is well within the 20% statutory limit.

• Distinct Nature of Assessments: The $209 charge was a separate, one-time “special assessment” intended for a specific purpose (replenishing the reserve fund) and is not subject to the 20% limitation governing regular assessments.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ systematically dismantled the petitioner’s arguments, finding they were not supported by evidence or principles of statutory construction.

Rejection of Petitioner’s Statutory Interpretation

• The ALJ found that Mr. Stevens’s definition of “regular” as referring to the assessment process was an insupportable interpretation. If all validly passed assessments were “regular,” the word “regular” in the statute would be “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”

• To support this conclusion, the decision points to A.R.S. § 33-1806, where the legislature explicitly references “regular assessments” and “special assessment[s],” demonstrating a clear intent to treat them as different types of assessments.

• The judge characterized the petitioner’s logic as leading to a “nonsensical result.” Under Mr. Stevens’s reasoning, an unauthorized special assessment would become a valid regular assessment, a position deemed not to be a “sensible interpretation of the statute.” A more reasonable conclusion, the judge noted, would be that an unauthorized assessment is simply void.

Misapplication of Legal Precedent

• The petitioner’s reliance on Northwest Fire District was deemed “misplaced.” The judge clarified that this case applies to special taxing districts created under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 48, a legal framework that does not govern an HOA like Mogollon Airpark.

Scope of the Hearing and Burden of Proof

• The ALJ emphasized that the hearing was limited by the petitioner’s “single-issue petition.” The only question properly before the tribunal was whether A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) had been violated.

• Consequently, the broader question of whether Mogollon Airpark’s bylaws grant it the authority to impose special assessments was “not at issue.” This rendered the various definitions of “special assessment” offered by Mr. Stevens as having “no substantial probative value” to the case at hand.

• The final legal conclusion was that Mr. Stevens, who bore the burden of proof, failed to show by a “preponderance of the evidence” that Mogollon Airpark violated the statute.

Final Order and Disposition

Based on the findings and conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

• Order: The petition of Brad W. Stevens is dismissed.

• Prevailing Party: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. is deemed the prevailing party.

• Binding Nature: The decision, issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

• Appeal Process: Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Posted on March 1, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818054-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-03-01
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Brad W. Stevens	Counsel	—
Respondent	Mogollon Airpark, Inc.	Counsel	Greg Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A). The increase in the regular assessment (14.1%) was below the statutory 20% limit, and the overall increase included a special assessment which the statute does not cover.

Why this result: The Petitioner's definition of 'regular assessment' was rejected as not supported by statutory construction principles, and the issue was limited to the definition and application of ARS § 33-1803(A).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A) by increasing the regular assessment more than 20%.

Petitioner alleged that the HOA's total assessment increase of $325 (which was 39.4% over the previous assessment of $825) constituted an unlawful increase of the 'regular assessment' under ARS § 33-1803(A). The HOA argued the increase to the 'regular assessment' was only 14.1% ($116 increase), and the remaining $209 was a separate, one-time assessment.

Orders: Petitioner Brad W. Stevens’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
• Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
• Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
• State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
• Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment, Statutory Interpretation, Regular Assessment, Special Assessment, ARS 33-1803(A)

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
• Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
• Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
• State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
• Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 692388.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:21 (102.8 KB)

Briefing Document: Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the matter of Brad W. Stevens versus Mogollon Airpark, Inc., a case centered on the legality of a homeowner association (HOA) assessment increase. The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, ultimately dismissed the petition filed by Mr. Stevens, finding he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mogollon Airpark violated Arizona state law.

The core of the dispute was a $325 increase to the annual assessment for 2018, which represented a 39.4% increase over the previous year’s $825 fee. The petitioner alleged this violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), which prohibits HOAs from increasing a “regular assessment” by more than 20% without member approval. The respondent, Mogollon Airpark, argued the increase was composed of two distinct parts: a 14.1% ($116) increase to the regular assessment to cover a budget shortfall, and a separate $209 one-time “special assessment” to replenish a reserve fund.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a critical interpretation of statutory language, concluding that “regular assessments” and “special assessments” are legally distinct categories. The judge rejected the petitioner’s argument that “regular” refers to the process of an assessment rather than its type, deeming this interpretation contrary to principles of statutory construction and nonsensical. Furthermore, the judge found the petitioner’s legal citations to be inapplicable and confirmed that the scope of the hearing was limited strictly to the alleged violation of the 20% rule, not the HOA’s general authority to levy special assessments.

Case Background and Procedural History

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens

◦ Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (HOA)

• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, on behalf of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

• Timeline:

◦ June 7, 2018: Mr. Stevens files a single-issue petition with the Department of Real Estate.

◦ September 28, 2018: An initial hearing is conducted on the matter, consolidated with two others.

◦ January 2, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Rehearing.

◦ February 11, 2019: The rehearing is conducted.

◦ March 1, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, dismissing the petition.

The matter came before the Office of Administrative Hearings for a rehearing after Mr. Stevens alleged errors of law and an abuse of discretion in the original hearing’s decision.

The Core Dispute: The 2018 Assessment Increase

The central facts of the case revolve around a decision made at a Mogollon Airpark board meeting in November 2017. To address a shortage in its operating budget and to replenish approximately $53,000 borrowed from its reserve fund, the Board approved a two-part increase to its annual fees.

Assessment Component

Previous Year (2017)

2018 Increase

Justification

Percentage Increase

Regular Assessment

+ $116

Cover operating budget shortfall

Special Assessment

+ $209

Replenish reserve fund

Total Assessment

+ $325

Total for 2018

This total 39.4% increase formed the basis of Mr. Stevens’s legal challenge under A.R.S. § 33-1803(A), which limits increases to “regular assessments” to 20% over the preceding fiscal year.

Analysis of Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Brad W. Stevens)

Mr. Stevens’s case was built on the assertion that the entire $325 increase constituted a single “regular assessment” and was therefore illegal. His key arguments were:

• Definition of “Regular”: He contended that “regular” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created—i.e., one that is “according to rule.” He argued that it does not denote a type of assessment (e.g., recurring vs. one-time).

• Lack of Authority for Special Assessments: Mr. Stevens argued that Mogollon Airpark has no authority to issue special assessments. Therefore, any assessment it imposes, regardless of its label, must legally be considered a “regular assessment.”

• Legal Precedent: He cited Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona to define a “special assessment,” arguing that the $209 charge did not qualify because he received no “particularized benefit” as required by that case. He also presented definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary.

Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)

Mogollon Airpark’s defense was straightforward and relied on the distinction between the two components of the assessment increase:

• Statutory Limitation: The respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.”

• Compliance with Statute: The increase to the regular assessment was $116, a 14.1% rise over the previous year’s $825 fee. This amount is well within the 20% statutory limit.

• Distinct Nature of Assessments: The $209 charge was a separate, one-time “special assessment” intended for a specific purpose (replenishing the reserve fund) and is not subject to the 20% limitation governing regular assessments.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ systematically dismantled the petitioner’s arguments, finding they were not supported by evidence or principles of statutory construction.

Rejection of Petitioner’s Statutory Interpretation

• The ALJ found that Mr. Stevens’s definition of “regular” as referring to the assessment process was an insupportable interpretation. If all validly passed assessments were “regular,” the word “regular” in the statute would be “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”

• To support this conclusion, the decision points to A.R.S. § 33-1806, where the legislature explicitly references “regular assessments” and “special assessment[s],” demonstrating a clear intent to treat them as different types of assessments.

• The judge characterized the petitioner’s logic as leading to a “nonsensical result.” Under Mr. Stevens’s reasoning, an unauthorized special assessment would become a valid regular assessment, a position deemed not to be a “sensible interpretation of the statute.” A more reasonable conclusion, the judge noted, would be that an unauthorized assessment is simply void.

Misapplication of Legal Precedent

• The petitioner’s reliance on Northwest Fire District was deemed “misplaced.” The judge clarified that this case applies to special taxing districts created under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 48, a legal framework that does not govern an HOA like Mogollon Airpark.

Scope of the Hearing and Burden of Proof

• The ALJ emphasized that the hearing was limited by the petitioner’s “single-issue petition.” The only question properly before the tribunal was whether A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) had been violated.

• Consequently, the broader question of whether Mogollon Airpark’s bylaws grant it the authority to impose special assessments was “not at issue.” This rendered the various definitions of “special assessment” offered by Mr. Stevens as having “no substantial probative value” to the case at hand.

• The final legal conclusion was that Mr. Stevens, who bore the burden of proof, failed to show by a “preponderance of the evidence” that Mogollon Airpark violated the statute.

Final Order and Disposition

Based on the findings and conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

• Order: The petition of Brad W. Stevens is dismissed.

• Prevailing Party: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. is deemed the prevailing party.

• Binding Nature: The decision, issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

• Appeal Process: Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

Nathan Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Posted on February 4, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918029-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-02-04
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Nathan Brown	Counsel	—
Respondent	Val Vista Lakes Community Association	Counsel	Clint Goodman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's claim that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) was dismissed, as the notice issued was determined to be a Notice of Non-Compliance (courtesy letter) and not a Notice of Violation required to carry the specific disclosure.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) by failing to include notice of the option to petition for an administrative hearing in a Notice of Non-Compliance.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent's Notice of Non-Compliance regarding dead vegetation was actually a Notice of Violation and lacked the statutory disclosure required by A.R.S. § 33-1803(E). The ALJ found the document was a courtesy letter and not a Notice of Violation, and even if it were, the statute did not require the disclosure in this context because the Petitioner filed the petition before Respondent took enforcement action or completed the statutory response exchange.

Orders: Petitioner Nathan Brown's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(D)
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11

Analytics Highlights

Topics: statutory interpretation, violation notice, non-compliance, courtesy letter, right to petition

Additional Citations:

• 33-1803(E)
• 32-2199.01
• 33-1803(C)
• 33-1803(D)
• R2-19-119

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918029-REL Decision – 686796.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:08:07 (88.4 KB)

Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association: Case Briefing

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, wherein Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition against the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was dismissed. The central issue was whether an initial “Notice of Non-Compliance” sent by the Association constituted a formal “Notice of Violation” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 33-1803(E), thereby requiring immediate disclosure of the member’s right to an administrative hearing.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent Association. The decision rested on two primary conclusions: First, a reasonable reading of the document in question showed it to be a preliminary “courtesy letter” and not a formal Notice of Violation, as it explicitly warned that a Notice of Violation would be issued later if the issue was not remedied. Second, the ALJ determined that even if the document were considered a Notice of Violation, a plain reading of the statute does not require the disclosure of hearing rights to be included in the initial notice itself. The statute allows for this information to be provided at a later stage in the process, specifically after the member has submitted a formal response. The Petitioner’s failure to follow the statutory response procedure was a key factor in the ruling that the Association had not yet been required to provide the disclosure. Ultimately, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and his petition was dismissed.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1918029-REL

Parties

Petitioner: Nathan Brown
Respondent: Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Hearing Date

January 16, 2019

Decision Date

February 4, 2019

Final Outcome

Petition Dismissed; Respondent deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Background and Timeline of Events

• October 18, 2018: The Val Vista Lakes Community Association mailed a “Notice of Non-Compliance” to Nathan Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard. The notice requested that the situation be remedied by November 1, 2018, and warned that failure to do so would result in the issuance of a “Notice of Violation that may involve fines.”

• October 24, 2018 (approx.): Mr. Brown filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal matter.

• November 11, 2018: The Association issued a formal “Notice of Violation” to Mr. Brown concerning the same issue raised in the initial notice.

• November 27, 2018: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing.

• January 16, 2019: An administrative hearing was held, with Mr. Brown representing himself and Clint Goodman, Esq. representing the Association. Testimony was heard from Mr. Brown and Simone McGinnis, the Association’s general manager.

• February 4, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a decision dismissing Mr. Brown’s petition.

——————————————————————————–

Core Legal Dispute and Arguments

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 33-1803, which governs the process for notifying homeowners of violations of community documents.

Petitioner’s Position (Nathan Brown)

• Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” received on October 18, 2018, was functionally and legally a “Notice of Violation.”

• Alleged Violation: The notice violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) because it failed to include “written notice of the member’s option to petition for an administrative hearing on the matter in the state real estate department.”

Respondent’s Position (Val Vista Lakes Community Association)

• Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” was not a formal “Notice of Violation” but rather a “courtesy letter,” which is a common industry practice permitted by the Association’s governing documents.

• Defense: Because the initial letter was not a statutory Notice of Violation, the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1803 were not applicable to that specific communication.

——————————————————————————–

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner, Mr. Brown, bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to meet that standard. The decision was based on a series of factual findings and legal conclusions drawn from a “fair and sensible” interpretation of the statute.

Key Findings of Fact

• The Association mailed Mr. Brown a Notice of Non-Compliance on October 18, 2018.

• This notice informed Mr. Brown of a CC&R violation (dead vegetation) and stated that a failure to remedy the issue would result in a subsequent “Notice of Violation” with potential fines.

• Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Association regarding the Notice of Non-Compliance, a step outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1803(C).

• Mr. Brown was later issued a formal Notice of Violation on November 11, 2018.

Conclusions of Law (Legal Rationale)

The ALJ’s decision to dismiss the petition was founded on three distinct legal interpretations:

1. Distinction Between Notices: The judge ruled that the initial communication was not a statutory Notice of Violation.

◦ The ruling states, “a reasonable reading of the Notice of Non-Compliance shows that it is not a Notice of Violation, because it informs Mr. Brown that a Notice of Violation would be issued if he did not appropriately address the ‘situation.'”

◦ This established the letter as a preliminary courtesy notice, distinct from the formal enforcement action that triggers statutory requirements.

2. Statutory Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1803: The judge concluded that even if the initial notice was a Notice of Violation, the Association still did not violate the statute.

◦ The decision notes, “a plain reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803 shows that a Notice of Violation is not required to include notice of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate because subsections D and E both show that any required notice can be given at other times.”

◦ The statute outlines a process where the member can respond via certified mail, and the Association’s duty to provide information about contesting the notice (including the right to a hearing) arises from that exchange.

3. Petitioner’s Procedural Failure: The judge found that the Association’s obligations under the statute were never triggered because Mr. Brown bypassed the prescribed process.

◦ The decision highlights that Mr. Brown did not file a written response with the Association but instead filed his petition with the Department just a few days after receiving the initial notice.

◦ The ruling concludes, “a sensible reading of the statute shows that the Respondent was not required to provide Mr. Brown with notice of a right to petition the Department at any time pertinent to this matter.”

——————————————————————————–

Final Order and Implications

• Order: The ALJ ordered that “Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition is dismissed.”

• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Val Vista Lakes Community Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• Further Action: The decision is binding unless a party files for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.02(B), 32-2199.04, and 41-1092.09.

Nathan Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Posted on February 4, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918029-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-02-04
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Nathan Brown	Counsel	—
Respondent	Val Vista Lakes Community Association	Counsel	Clint Goodman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's claim that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) was dismissed, as the notice issued was determined to be a Notice of Non-Compliance (courtesy letter) and not a Notice of Violation required to carry the specific disclosure.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) by failing to include notice of the option to petition for an administrative hearing in a Notice of Non-Compliance.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent's Notice of Non-Compliance regarding dead vegetation was actually a Notice of Violation and lacked the statutory disclosure required by A.R.S. § 33-1803(E). The ALJ found the document was a courtesy letter and not a Notice of Violation, and even if it were, the statute did not require the disclosure in this context because the Petitioner filed the petition before Respondent took enforcement action or completed the statutory response exchange.

Orders: Petitioner Nathan Brown's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(D)
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11

Analytics Highlights

Topics: statutory interpretation, violation notice, non-compliance, courtesy letter, right to petition

Additional Citations:

• 33-1803(E)
• 32-2199.01
• 33-1803(C)
• 33-1803(D)
• R2-19-119

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918029-REL Decision – 686796.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:49 (88.4 KB)

Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association: Case Briefing

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, wherein Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition against the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was dismissed. The central issue was whether an initial “Notice of Non-Compliance” sent by the Association constituted a formal “Notice of Violation” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 33-1803(E), thereby requiring immediate disclosure of the member’s right to an administrative hearing.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent Association. The decision rested on two primary conclusions: First, a reasonable reading of the document in question showed it to be a preliminary “courtesy letter” and not a formal Notice of Violation, as it explicitly warned that a Notice of Violation would be issued later if the issue was not remedied. Second, the ALJ determined that even if the document were considered a Notice of Violation, a plain reading of the statute does not require the disclosure of hearing rights to be included in the initial notice itself. The statute allows for this information to be provided at a later stage in the process, specifically after the member has submitted a formal response. The Petitioner’s failure to follow the statutory response procedure was a key factor in the ruling that the Association had not yet been required to provide the disclosure. Ultimately, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and his petition was dismissed.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1918029-REL

Parties

Petitioner: Nathan Brown
Respondent: Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Hearing Date

January 16, 2019

Decision Date

February 4, 2019

Final Outcome

Petition Dismissed; Respondent deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Background and Timeline of Events

• October 18, 2018: The Val Vista Lakes Community Association mailed a “Notice of Non-Compliance” to Nathan Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard. The notice requested that the situation be remedied by November 1, 2018, and warned that failure to do so would result in the issuance of a “Notice of Violation that may involve fines.”

• October 24, 2018 (approx.): Mr. Brown filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal matter.

• November 11, 2018: The Association issued a formal “Notice of Violation” to Mr. Brown concerning the same issue raised in the initial notice.

• November 27, 2018: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing.

• January 16, 2019: An administrative hearing was held, with Mr. Brown representing himself and Clint Goodman, Esq. representing the Association. Testimony was heard from Mr. Brown and Simone McGinnis, the Association’s general manager.

• February 4, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a decision dismissing Mr. Brown’s petition.

——————————————————————————–

Core Legal Dispute and Arguments

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 33-1803, which governs the process for notifying homeowners of violations of community documents.

Petitioner’s Position (Nathan Brown)

• Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” received on October 18, 2018, was functionally and legally a “Notice of Violation.”

• Alleged Violation: The notice violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) because it failed to include “written notice of the member’s option to petition for an administrative hearing on the matter in the state real estate department.”

Respondent’s Position (Val Vista Lakes Community Association)

• Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” was not a formal “Notice of Violation” but rather a “courtesy letter,” which is a common industry practice permitted by the Association’s governing documents.

• Defense: Because the initial letter was not a statutory Notice of Violation, the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1803 were not applicable to that specific communication.

——————————————————————————–

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner, Mr. Brown, bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to meet that standard. The decision was based on a series of factual findings and legal conclusions drawn from a “fair and sensible” interpretation of the statute.

Key Findings of Fact

• The Association mailed Mr. Brown a Notice of Non-Compliance on October 18, 2018.

• This notice informed Mr. Brown of a CC&R violation (dead vegetation) and stated that a failure to remedy the issue would result in a subsequent “Notice of Violation” with potential fines.

• Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Association regarding the Notice of Non-Compliance, a step outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1803(C).

• Mr. Brown was later issued a formal Notice of Violation on November 11, 2018.

Conclusions of Law (Legal Rationale)

The ALJ’s decision to dismiss the petition was founded on three distinct legal interpretations:

1. Distinction Between Notices: The judge ruled that the initial communication was not a statutory Notice of Violation.

◦ The ruling states, “a reasonable reading of the Notice of Non-Compliance shows that it is not a Notice of Violation, because it informs Mr. Brown that a Notice of Violation would be issued if he did not appropriately address the ‘situation.'”

◦ This established the letter as a preliminary courtesy notice, distinct from the formal enforcement action that triggers statutory requirements.

2. Statutory Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1803: The judge concluded that even if the initial notice was a Notice of Violation, the Association still did not violate the statute.

◦ The decision notes, “a plain reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803 shows that a Notice of Violation is not required to include notice of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate because subsections D and E both show that any required notice can be given at other times.”

◦ The statute outlines a process where the member can respond via certified mail, and the Association’s duty to provide information about contesting the notice (including the right to a hearing) arises from that exchange.

3. Petitioner’s Procedural Failure: The judge found that the Association’s obligations under the statute were never triggered because Mr. Brown bypassed the prescribed process.

◦ The decision highlights that Mr. Brown did not file a written response with the Association but instead filed his petition with the Department just a few days after receiving the initial notice.

◦ The ruling concludes, “a sensible reading of the statute shows that the Respondent was not required to provide Mr. Brown with notice of a right to petition the Department at any time pertinent to this matter.”

——————————————————————————–

Final Order and Implications

• Order: The ALJ ordered that “Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition is dismissed.”

• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Val Vista Lakes Community Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• Further Action: The decision is binding unless a party files for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.02(B), 32-2199.04, and 41-1092.09.

Lawrence Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Posted on January 17, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818052-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-01-17
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Lawrence M. Stewart	Counsel	—
Respondent	Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.	Counsel	Nicolas C. S. Nogami

Alleged Violations

Association Bylaws section 5.4

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart's petition and deemed the Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., to be the prevailing party.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4 or acted unreasonably or in bad faith when denying his request for a variance. The Bylaw section cited was determined to be a liability shield for the Board, not a source of duty owed to the homeowner.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged failure of HOA Board to act in good faith when denying Petitioner's request for a variance for unauthorized common area changes

Petitioner made changes to the common area without permission and the Board denied his subsequent request for a variance. Petitioner alleged the Board violated Bylaws Section 5.4 by failing to act in good faith and showing bias. The ALJ found that Section 5.4 is a liability shield for the Board, not a duty imposed upon them, and Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show bad faith or unreasonableness.

Orders: Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, variance denial, common area modifications, good faith requirement, board liability shield, prevailing party

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – 683622.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:11 (95.5 KB)

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – 694095.pdf

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Lawrence Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Posted on January 17, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818052-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-01-17
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Lawrence M. Stewart	Counsel	—
Respondent	Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.	Counsel	Nicolas C. S. Nogami

Alleged Violations

Association Bylaws section 5.4

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart's petition and deemed the Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., to be the prevailing party.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4 or acted unreasonably or in bad faith when denying his request for a variance. The Bylaw section cited was determined to be a liability shield for the Board, not a source of duty owed to the homeowner.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged failure of HOA Board to act in good faith when denying Petitioner's request for a variance for unauthorized common area changes

Petitioner made changes to the common area without permission and the Board denied his subsequent request for a variance. Petitioner alleged the Board violated Bylaws Section 5.4 by failing to act in good faith and showing bias. The ALJ found that Section 5.4 is a liability shield for the Board, not a duty imposed upon them, and Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show bad faith or unreasonableness.

Orders: Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, variance denial, common area modifications, good faith requirement, board liability shield, prevailing party

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – 683622.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:04 (95.5 KB)

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – 694095.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:04 (90.8 KB)

Jerry R. Collis vs. Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association

Posted on December 18, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H18020-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-12-20
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	none
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Jerry R. Collis	Counsel	—
Respondent	Laveen Meadows HOA c/o Planned Development Services	Counsel	Chad Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Sections 10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16; A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's challenge against the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes when issuing citations.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to HOA fine citations/improper enforcement of parking and nuisance rules

Petitioner claimed the Respondent HOA improperly issued citations against him for vehicle violations (inoperable vehicle, street parking, nuisance), asserting the HOA could not violate CC&R 10.11.4 but that the citations alleging the violation were unwarranted.

Orders: Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&Rs, Vehicle Parking, Nuisance, Burden of Proof

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H18020-REL Decision – 677244.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:11 (97.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA (Case No. 19F-H18020-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H18020-REL, involving Petitioner Jerry R. Collis and Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA. The central issue was a series of violation notices and fines issued by the HOA to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle.

The petition, filed by Mr. Collis, was ultimately dismissed. The Judge ruled that Mr. Collis failed to meet the burden of proof required to show that the Laveen Meadows HOA had violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) or any applicable statutes.

The core of Mr. Collis’s argument was that the HOA wrongly cited him for having an “inoperable vehicle” under CC&R Section 10.11.4, when his vehicle was, in fact, always in operating condition. However, the Judge’s decision rested on the finding that the HOA’s actions were based on multiple violations. While all seven violation notices were titled “Inoperable Vehicle,” evidence and testimony confirmed the vehicle was also in violation of CC&R Section 10.16 (Nuisances) due to its unsightly condition (cobwebs, debris, a flat tire, and a covered window) and Section 10.11.2 (Parking on streets). Because the citations were justified by these other violations, Mr. Collis’s claim regarding the vehicle’s operability was insufficient to invalidate the HOA’s actions.

——————————————————————————–

1. Case Overview

The matter was brought before the Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by Jerry R. Collis with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on September 17, 2018. A hearing was held on December 4, 2018, to adjudicate the dispute between Mr. Collis and the Laveen Meadows HOA.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

19F-H18020-REL

Petitioner

Jerry R. Collis

Respondent

Laveen Meadows HOA

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Hearing Date

December 4, 2018

Decision Date

December 20, 2018

——————————————————————————–

2. Central Arguments and Positions

Petitioner’s Position (Jerry R. Collis)

• Mr. Collis’s primary contention was that the HOA improperly issued citations alleging his vehicle was “inoperable” in violation of CC&R Section 10.11.4.

• He testified that the vehicle was never inoperable.

• Although his initial petition stated the HOA violated Section 10.11.4, he clarified at the hearing that the issue was the HOA wrongly cited him for violating that provision.

Respondent’s Position (Laveen Meadows HOA)

• The HOA, represented by Community Manager Lisa Riesland, argued that the citations were based on more than just the “inoperable vehicle” clause.

• The HOA asserted that Mr. Collis’s vehicle was in violation of three separate CC&R sections:

◦ Section 10.11.2: Prohibiting parking on streets.

◦ Section 10.11.4: Prohibiting non-operating motor vehicles in unenclosed parking areas.

◦ Section 10.16: Prohibiting nuisances, defined to include “unsightly” conditions or those that could “reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.”

——————————————————————————–

3. Analysis of Evidence and Findings of Fact

The Judge’s decision was based on testimony and a series of seven notifications sent by the HOA to Mr. Collis between September 2016 and June 2017.

Violation Notices

• A total of seven notifications/letters were sent to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle.

• All seven notices included the identical violation description: “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.”

• Critically, none of the notices cited a specific CC&R section number that was allegedly violated.

• The letters also made reference to “cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle.”

Vehicle Condition and Nuisance Violation

• Unsightliness: Lisa Riesland provided credible testimony that at various times, the vehicle had cobwebs extending from the chassis to the ground with leaves trapped within them. This was deemed to constitute an “unsightly condition” under CC&R Section 10.16.

• Vandalism and Disrepair: At the time of the June 2017 notices, the vehicle also had a flat tire and a window covered with a bag or cardboard. Mr. Collis acknowledged these facts, explaining they were the result of vandalism.

Chronology of Violations, Fines, and Appeals

The document outlines a series of escalating fines. In each instance where a fine was issued, Mr. Collis was informed of his right to appeal to the HOA Board and his right to request an administrative hearing.

Action by HOA

Fine/Fee Charged

Evidence of Appeal by Mr. Collis

Sep 19, 2016

Notification of violation (expired tags, inoperable vehicle on street).

Not applicable

Oct 11, 2016

Notification of potential $25 fine if not corrected.

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

Dec 1, 2016

Letter informing a $25 fine had been charged.

$25.00

Mr. Collis appealed to the Board.

Jan 26, 2017

Letter from Board informing Mr. Collis his appeal was denied.

Appeal outcome. No evidence of hearing request.

Apr 20, 2017

Letter informing a $50 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$60.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

May 9, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

May 23, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

June 8, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

June 26, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

——————————————————————————–

4. Legal Rationale and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s ruling centered on the burden of proof and the contractual nature of the CC&Rs.

Burden of Proof

• Mr. Collis, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• A preponderance of the evidence is defined as evidence with the “most convincing force” that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Core Legal Conclusion

• The Judge concluded that the evidence demonstrated the HOA issued citations based on violations of CC&R Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

• Because the violations were multifaceted, Mr. Collis’s singular focus on the vehicle’s operability was insufficient to prove the HOA acted improperly.

• The decision states: “Consequently, showing that his vehicle was in operating condition would not be sufficient to show that the citations were unwarranted.”

• The Judge found that Mr. Collis failed to show that the HOA violated any of its CC&Rs, community documents, or the statutes regulating planned communities.

Final Order

• IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

• The Respondent, Laveen Meadows HOA, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Jerry R. Collis vs. Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association

Posted on December 18, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H18020-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-12-20
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	none
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Jerry R. Collis	Counsel	—
Respondent	Laveen Meadows HOA c/o Planned Development Services	Counsel	Chad Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Sections 10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16; A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's challenge against the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes when issuing citations.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to HOA fine citations/improper enforcement of parking and nuisance rules

Petitioner claimed the Respondent HOA improperly issued citations against him for vehicle violations (inoperable vehicle, street parking, nuisance), asserting the HOA could not violate CC&R 10.11.4 but that the citations alleging the violation were unwarranted.

Orders: Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&Rs, Vehicle Parking, Nuisance, Burden of Proof

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H18020-REL Decision – 677244.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:27 (97.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA (Case No. 19F-H18020-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H18020-REL, involving Petitioner Jerry R. Collis and Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA. The central issue was a series of violation notices and fines issued by the HOA to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle.

The petition, filed by Mr. Collis, was ultimately dismissed. The Judge ruled that Mr. Collis failed to meet the burden of proof required to show that the Laveen Meadows HOA had violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) or any applicable statutes.

The core of Mr. Collis’s argument was that the HOA wrongly cited him for having an “inoperable vehicle” under CC&R Section 10.11.4, when his vehicle was, in fact, always in operating condition. However, the Judge’s decision rested on the finding that the HOA’s actions were based on multiple violations. While all seven violation notices were titled “Inoperable Vehicle,” evidence and testimony confirmed the vehicle was also in violation of CC&R Section 10.16 (Nuisances) due to its unsightly condition (cobwebs, debris, a flat tire, and a covered window) and Section 10.11.2 (Parking on streets). Because the citations were justified by these other violations, Mr. Collis’s claim regarding the vehicle’s operability was insufficient to invalidate the HOA’s actions.

——————————————————————————–

1. Case Overview

The matter was brought before the Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by Jerry R. Collis with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on September 17, 2018. A hearing was held on December 4, 2018, to adjudicate the dispute between Mr. Collis and the Laveen Meadows HOA.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

19F-H18020-REL

Petitioner

Jerry R. Collis

Respondent

Laveen Meadows HOA

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Hearing Date

December 4, 2018

Decision Date

December 20, 2018

——————————————————————————–

2. Central Arguments and Positions

Petitioner’s Position (Jerry R. Collis)

• Mr. Collis’s primary contention was that the HOA improperly issued citations alleging his vehicle was “inoperable” in violation of CC&R Section 10.11.4.

• He testified that the vehicle was never inoperable.

• Although his initial petition stated the HOA violated Section 10.11.4, he clarified at the hearing that the issue was the HOA wrongly cited him for violating that provision.

Respondent’s Position (Laveen Meadows HOA)

• The HOA, represented by Community Manager Lisa Riesland, argued that the citations were based on more than just the “inoperable vehicle” clause.

• The HOA asserted that Mr. Collis’s vehicle was in violation of three separate CC&R sections:

◦ Section 10.11.2: Prohibiting parking on streets.

◦ Section 10.11.4: Prohibiting non-operating motor vehicles in unenclosed parking areas.

◦ Section 10.16: Prohibiting nuisances, defined to include “unsightly” conditions or those that could “reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.”

——————————————————————————–

3. Analysis of Evidence and Findings of Fact

The Judge’s decision was based on testimony and a series of seven notifications sent by the HOA to Mr. Collis between September 2016 and June 2017.

Violation Notices

• A total of seven notifications/letters were sent to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle.

• All seven notices included the identical violation description: “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.”

• Critically, none of the notices cited a specific CC&R section number that was allegedly violated.

• The letters also made reference to “cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle.”

Vehicle Condition and Nuisance Violation

• Unsightliness: Lisa Riesland provided credible testimony that at various times, the vehicle had cobwebs extending from the chassis to the ground with leaves trapped within them. This was deemed to constitute an “unsightly condition” under CC&R Section 10.16.

• Vandalism and Disrepair: At the time of the June 2017 notices, the vehicle also had a flat tire and a window covered with a bag or cardboard. Mr. Collis acknowledged these facts, explaining they were the result of vandalism.

Chronology of Violations, Fines, and Appeals

The document outlines a series of escalating fines. In each instance where a fine was issued, Mr. Collis was informed of his right to appeal to the HOA Board and his right to request an administrative hearing.

Action by HOA

Fine/Fee Charged

Evidence of Appeal by Mr. Collis

Sep 19, 2016

Notification of violation (expired tags, inoperable vehicle on street).

Not applicable

Oct 11, 2016

Notification of potential $25 fine if not corrected.

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

Dec 1, 2016

Letter informing a $25 fine had been charged.

$25.00

Mr. Collis appealed to the Board.

Jan 26, 2017

Letter from Board informing Mr. Collis his appeal was denied.

Appeal outcome. No evidence of hearing request.

Apr 20, 2017

Letter informing a $50 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$60.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

May 9, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

May 23, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

June 8, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

June 26, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

——————————————————————————–

4. Legal Rationale and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s ruling centered on the burden of proof and the contractual nature of the CC&Rs.

Burden of Proof

• Mr. Collis, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• A preponderance of the evidence is defined as evidence with the “most convincing force” that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Core Legal Conclusion

• The Judge concluded that the evidence demonstrated the HOA issued citations based on violations of CC&R Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

• Because the violations were multifaceted, Mr. Collis’s singular focus on the vehicle’s operability was insufficient to prove the HOA acted improperly.

• The decision states: “Consequently, showing that his vehicle was in operating condition would not be sufficient to show that the citations were unwarranted.”

• The Judge found that Mr. Collis failed to show that the HOA violated any of its CC&Rs, community documents, or the statutes regulating planned communities.

Final Order

• IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

• The Respondent, Laveen Meadows HOA, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.