Warren R. Brown vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc(ROOT)

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818045-REL (Consolidated with 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG & 18F-H1818054-REL)
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-18
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Warren R. Brown Counsel
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner Brown prevailed in the 045 matter regarding the excessive late fee ($25 instead of $15 or 10%) in violation of ARS 33-1803(A). However, both petitioners (Brown in 029, Stevens in 054) failed to prove a violation of ARS 33-1803(A) regarding the overall 39.4% assessment increase, resulting in those petitions being dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioners lost the challenge to the assessment increase because their definition of “regular assessment” was not supported by principles of statutory construction, which would have rendered the word “regular” trivial or void in the statute.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA charging excessive late payment fees and interest.

Mogollon charged a $25 late fee, exceeding the statutory limit set in ARS 33-1803(A), which limits late charges to the greater of $15 or 10% of the unpaid assessment.

Orders: Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee assessed against Mr. Brown and must pay to Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA assessment increase, Late fees, Statutory interpretation, Regular vs Special assessment, Homeowner petition
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 666285.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:50 (151.9 KB)

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 672623.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:51 (144.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG


Administrative Law Decision Briefing: Brown and Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision from October 18, 2018, concerning three consolidated petitions filed by homeowners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against their homeowners’ association (HOA), Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The core of the dispute centers on Mogollon’s 2018 financial actions, specifically a 39.4% increase in total annual assessments and the imposition of new late payment penalties.

The case produced a split decision. The ALJ ruled in favor of Mogollon Airpark on the primary issue of the assessment increase. The judge determined that the statutory 20% cap on annual increases, as defined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), applies exclusively to “regular assessments” and not to “special assessments.” Mogollon had structured its $325 increase as a combination of a compliant 14.1% regular assessment hike and a separate $209 special assessment, a practice the ALJ found permissible under the law.

Conversely, the ALJ ruled in favor of Petitioner Brown regarding the HOA’s $25 late fee. The judge found this fee to be in direct violation of § 33-1803(A), which limits such charges to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” The ALJ’s rationale was that this statutory limit applies to all “assessments” without qualification, not just regular ones.

While the hearing was limited to these specific statutory violations, the petitions were underpinned by serious allegations from Brown and Stevens of deceptive accounting practices and financial mismanagement by Mogollon’s leadership, intended to create a “fabricated shortfall” to justify the fee increases. These underlying allegations were not substantively addressed in the hearing.

Case Overview

This consolidated matter combines three separate petitions heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The hearing was conducted on September 28, 2018, with Thomas Shedden serving as the Administrative Law Judge.

Petitioners: Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens.

Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Docket Numbers:

◦ 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG (“029 matter”), Petitioner: Warren R. Brown

◦ 18F-H1818045-REL (“045 matter”), Petitioner: Warren R. Brown

◦ 18F-H1818054-REL (“054 matter”), Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens

Core Issues Contested

The dispute arose from Mogollon Airpark’s 2018 decision to increase assessments and institute new fees for late payments and past-due accounts.

1. The 2018 Assessment Increase

The central conflict involved the legality of a significant increase in annual homeowner assessments.

Financial Details:

Previous Year’s Assessment (2017): $825

2018 Total Increase: $325

Total Percentage Increase: 39.4%

Mogollon’s Breakdown of the Increase:

Regular Assessment Increase: $116 (a 14.1% increase over $825)

Special Assessment: $209

Argument on the Assessment Increase

Petitioners (Brown & Stevens)

Argued that the entire $325 increase constituted a single assessment action. Because the 39.4% increase exceeded the 20% annual cap stipulated in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), it was unlawful. They contended that the term “regular assessment” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created (i.e., by motion, second, and vote), not a specific type of assessment. They further alleged that Mogollon’s governing documents provided no authority to levy a “special assessment.”

Respondent (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)

Asserted that § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.” They argued that their regular assessment increase of $116 (14.1%) was well within the 20% limit. The $209 portion was a “special assessment,” which they described as a “term of art in the industry” not subject to the 20% cap. They cited the use of the term “special assessment” in another statute, § 33-1806, as evidence of legislative intent to differentiate between assessment types.

2. Late Payment Charges

Petitioner Brown separately challenged the legality of newly instituted penalties for late payments.

Charges Implemented by Mogollon:

◦ A flat $25 fee for late payments.

◦ 18% interest on past-due accounts.

Petitioner’s Argument (Brown): The $25 late fee violated the plain language of § 33-1803(A), which explicitly limits late payment charges to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” Brown provided an invoice showing he was charged a $25 late fee and $1.57 in interest.

Respondent’s Argument (Mogollon): The HOA argued that the statutory limits on late fees did not apply in this case because the fee was charged on a special assessment, which they contended was outside the scope of § 33-1803(A).

Underlying Allegations of Financial Misconduct

Although the hearing was limited to the narrow legal questions above, the petitioners’ filings contained extensive allegations of financial impropriety against Mogollon’s treasurer and board. These claims formed the motive for the contested assessments.

Core Allegation: The petitioners asserted that the HOA leadership engaged in “numerous accounting improprieties” and used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods, including keeping two sets of books.”

Alleged Purpose: The goal was to create a “fabricated shortfall” and present an “inaccurate picture of the HOA finances.” This was done, according to Mr. Brown, “ostensibly to show that the 2016 board of directors left office showing a loss of funds,” when in fact they had improved the treasury by approximately $200,000.

Justification for Increase: This artificially created financial need was then used “to convince the Board that a 39.4% increase in dues was required.”

Evidence and Testimony: Mr. Stevens submitted a 45-page petition with over 600 pages of exhibits detailing the alleged accounting practices. He testified that Mogollon possessed over $1 million and did not need an assessment increase. He also stated his belief that the $209 special assessment was a “trial run” for future assessments for purposes not authorized by the governing documents.

ALJ’s Position: The judge noted these underlying allegations but stated, “the substance of their allegations was not addressed in this hearing.” A footnote suggested that “the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ issued a split decision, ruling for the Respondent on the assessment increase and for the Petitioner on the late fee. The decision was based on established principles of statutory construction.

Legal Principles Applied

Burden of Proof: Placed on Petitioners Brown and Stevens to prove their allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Construction:

1. Statutes must be interpreted to yield a “fair and sensible result” and avoid “absurd and unreasonable construction.”

2. Every word and phrase in a statute must be given meaning so that no part is “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”

3. When a term is used in one part of a statute but omitted in another, it should not be read into the section where it is absent.

Conclusion on the Assessment Increase (Matters 029 & 054)

Verdict: The petitions of Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens were dismissed. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. was deemed the prevailing party.

Rationale: The ALJ rejected the petitioners’ definition of “regular assessment.” The judge reasoned that if “regular” simply meant passed by a regular process (motion, second, vote), then the word would be meaningless (“trivial or void”), as all assessments are assumed to follow that process. This would violate a core principle of statutory construction. Therefore, the legislature must have intended “regular assessment” to be a specific type of assessment, distinct from others like “special assessments.” Because the 20% cap in § 33-1803(A) explicitly applies only to regular assessments, Mogollon’s $209 special assessment was not subject to that limit.

Conclusion on the Late Fee (Matter 045)

Verdict: Petitioner Warren R. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

Rationale: The ALJ found that the statutory clause limiting late fees applies to “assessments” in general, not specifically to “regular assessments.” The legislature’s omission of the word “regular” in this part of the statute was deliberate. Mogollon’s argument that the limit only applied to regular assessments required reading a word into the statute that was not there, which “violates principles of statutory construction.” The $25 fee clearly exceeded the allowable limit.

Final Orders

The ALJ issued separate orders for each consolidated docket, reflecting the split decision.

Docket Number

Petitioner

Primary Issue

Outcome

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG

Warren R. Brown

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed. Mogollon deemed prevailing party.

18F-H1818054-REL

Brad W. Stevens

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed. Mogollon deemed prevailing party.

18F-H1818045-REL

Warren R. Brown

Late Fee Charge

Petitioner Deemed Prevailing Party. Mogollon ordered to rescind the $25 late fee and pay Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.


Warren R. Brown vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc(ROOT)

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818045-REL (Consolidated with 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG & 18F-H1818054-REL)
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-18
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Warren R. Brown Counsel
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner Brown prevailed in the 045 matter regarding the excessive late fee ($25 instead of $15 or 10%) in violation of ARS 33-1803(A). However, both petitioners (Brown in 029, Stevens in 054) failed to prove a violation of ARS 33-1803(A) regarding the overall 39.4% assessment increase, resulting in those petitions being dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioners lost the challenge to the assessment increase because their definition of “regular assessment” was not supported by principles of statutory construction, which would have rendered the word “regular” trivial or void in the statute.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA charging excessive late payment fees and interest.

Mogollon charged a $25 late fee, exceeding the statutory limit set in ARS 33-1803(A), which limits late charges to the greater of $15 or 10% of the unpaid assessment.

Orders: Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee assessed against Mr. Brown and must pay to Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA assessment increase, Late fees, Statutory interpretation, Regular vs Special assessment, Homeowner petition
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 666285.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:33 (151.9 KB)

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 672623.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:33 (144.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG


Administrative Law Decision Briefing: Brown and Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision from October 18, 2018, concerning three consolidated petitions filed by homeowners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against their homeowners’ association (HOA), Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The core of the dispute centers on Mogollon’s 2018 financial actions, specifically a 39.4% increase in total annual assessments and the imposition of new late payment penalties.

The case produced a split decision. The ALJ ruled in favor of Mogollon Airpark on the primary issue of the assessment increase. The judge determined that the statutory 20% cap on annual increases, as defined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), applies exclusively to “regular assessments” and not to “special assessments.” Mogollon had structured its $325 increase as a combination of a compliant 14.1% regular assessment hike and a separate $209 special assessment, a practice the ALJ found permissible under the law.

Conversely, the ALJ ruled in favor of Petitioner Brown regarding the HOA’s $25 late fee. The judge found this fee to be in direct violation of § 33-1803(A), which limits such charges to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” The ALJ’s rationale was that this statutory limit applies to all “assessments” without qualification, not just regular ones.

While the hearing was limited to these specific statutory violations, the petitions were underpinned by serious allegations from Brown and Stevens of deceptive accounting practices and financial mismanagement by Mogollon’s leadership, intended to create a “fabricated shortfall” to justify the fee increases. These underlying allegations were not substantively addressed in the hearing.

Case Overview

This consolidated matter combines three separate petitions heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The hearing was conducted on September 28, 2018, with Thomas Shedden serving as the Administrative Law Judge.

Petitioners: Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens.

Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Docket Numbers:

◦ 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG (“029 matter”), Petitioner: Warren R. Brown

◦ 18F-H1818045-REL (“045 matter”), Petitioner: Warren R. Brown

◦ 18F-H1818054-REL (“054 matter”), Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens

Core Issues Contested

The dispute arose from Mogollon Airpark’s 2018 decision to increase assessments and institute new fees for late payments and past-due accounts.

1. The 2018 Assessment Increase

The central conflict involved the legality of a significant increase in annual homeowner assessments.

Financial Details:

Previous Year’s Assessment (2017): $825

2018 Total Increase: $325

Total Percentage Increase: 39.4%

Mogollon’s Breakdown of the Increase:

Regular Assessment Increase: $116 (a 14.1% increase over $825)

Special Assessment: $209

Argument on the Assessment Increase

Petitioners (Brown & Stevens)

Argued that the entire $325 increase constituted a single assessment action. Because the 39.4% increase exceeded the 20% annual cap stipulated in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), it was unlawful. They contended that the term “regular assessment” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created (i.e., by motion, second, and vote), not a specific type of assessment. They further alleged that Mogollon’s governing documents provided no authority to levy a “special assessment.”

Respondent (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)

Asserted that § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.” They argued that their regular assessment increase of $116 (14.1%) was well within the 20% limit. The $209 portion was a “special assessment,” which they described as a “term of art in the industry” not subject to the 20% cap. They cited the use of the term “special assessment” in another statute, § 33-1806, as evidence of legislative intent to differentiate between assessment types.

2. Late Payment Charges

Petitioner Brown separately challenged the legality of newly instituted penalties for late payments.

Charges Implemented by Mogollon:

◦ A flat $25 fee for late payments.

◦ 18% interest on past-due accounts.

Petitioner’s Argument (Brown): The $25 late fee violated the plain language of § 33-1803(A), which explicitly limits late payment charges to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” Brown provided an invoice showing he was charged a $25 late fee and $1.57 in interest.

Respondent’s Argument (Mogollon): The HOA argued that the statutory limits on late fees did not apply in this case because the fee was charged on a special assessment, which they contended was outside the scope of § 33-1803(A).

Underlying Allegations of Financial Misconduct

Although the hearing was limited to the narrow legal questions above, the petitioners’ filings contained extensive allegations of financial impropriety against Mogollon’s treasurer and board. These claims formed the motive for the contested assessments.

Core Allegation: The petitioners asserted that the HOA leadership engaged in “numerous accounting improprieties” and used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods, including keeping two sets of books.”

Alleged Purpose: The goal was to create a “fabricated shortfall” and present an “inaccurate picture of the HOA finances.” This was done, according to Mr. Brown, “ostensibly to show that the 2016 board of directors left office showing a loss of funds,” when in fact they had improved the treasury by approximately $200,000.

Justification for Increase: This artificially created financial need was then used “to convince the Board that a 39.4% increase in dues was required.”

Evidence and Testimony: Mr. Stevens submitted a 45-page petition with over 600 pages of exhibits detailing the alleged accounting practices. He testified that Mogollon possessed over $1 million and did not need an assessment increase. He also stated his belief that the $209 special assessment was a “trial run” for future assessments for purposes not authorized by the governing documents.

ALJ’s Position: The judge noted these underlying allegations but stated, “the substance of their allegations was not addressed in this hearing.” A footnote suggested that “the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ issued a split decision, ruling for the Respondent on the assessment increase and for the Petitioner on the late fee. The decision was based on established principles of statutory construction.

Legal Principles Applied

Burden of Proof: Placed on Petitioners Brown and Stevens to prove their allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Construction:

1. Statutes must be interpreted to yield a “fair and sensible result” and avoid “absurd and unreasonable construction.”

2. Every word and phrase in a statute must be given meaning so that no part is “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”

3. When a term is used in one part of a statute but omitted in another, it should not be read into the section where it is absent.

Conclusion on the Assessment Increase (Matters 029 & 054)

Verdict: The petitions of Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens were dismissed. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. was deemed the prevailing party.

Rationale: The ALJ rejected the petitioners’ definition of “regular assessment.” The judge reasoned that if “regular” simply meant passed by a regular process (motion, second, vote), then the word would be meaningless (“trivial or void”), as all assessments are assumed to follow that process. This would violate a core principle of statutory construction. Therefore, the legislature must have intended “regular assessment” to be a specific type of assessment, distinct from others like “special assessments.” Because the 20% cap in § 33-1803(A) explicitly applies only to regular assessments, Mogollon’s $209 special assessment was not subject to that limit.

Conclusion on the Late Fee (Matter 045)

Verdict: Petitioner Warren R. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

Rationale: The ALJ found that the statutory clause limiting late fees applies to “assessments” in general, not specifically to “regular assessments.” The legislature’s omission of the word “regular” in this part of the statute was deliberate. Mogollon’s argument that the limit only applied to regular assessments required reading a word into the statute that was not there, which “violates principles of statutory construction.” The $25 fee clearly exceeded the allowable limit.

Final Orders

The ALJ issued separate orders for each consolidated docket, reflecting the split decision.

Docket Number

Petitioner

Primary Issue

Outcome

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG

Warren R. Brown

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed. Mogollon deemed prevailing party.

18F-H1818054-REL

Brad W. Stevens

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed. Mogollon deemed prevailing party.

18F-H1818045-REL

Warren R. Brown

Late Fee Charge

Petitioner Deemed Prevailing Party. Mogollon ordered to rescind the $25 late fee and pay Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.


Lawrence M. Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-17
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart Counsel
Respondent Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel Nicolas C. S. Nogami

Alleged Violations

Association Bylaws section 5.4

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart's petition and deemed the Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., to be the prevailing party.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4 or acted unreasonably or in bad faith when denying his request for a variance. The Bylaw section cited was determined to be a liability shield for the Board, not a source of duty owed to the homeowner.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged failure of HOA Board to act in good faith when denying Petitioner's request for a variance for unauthorized common area changes

Petitioner made changes to the common area without permission and the Board denied his subsequent request for a variance. Petitioner alleged the Board violated Bylaws Section 5.4 by failing to act in good faith and showing bias. The ALJ found that Section 5.4 is a liability shield for the Board, not a duty imposed upon them, and Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show bad faith or unreasonableness.

Orders: Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, variance denial, common area modifications, good faith requirement, board liability shield, prevailing party
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818052-REL Decision – 660026.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:05 (91.5 KB)

18F-H1818052-REL Decision – 720468.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:06 (103.5 KB)

Lawrence M. Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-17
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart Counsel
Respondent Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel Nicolas C. S. Nogami

Alleged Violations

Association Bylaws section 5.4

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart's petition and deemed the Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., to be the prevailing party.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4 or acted unreasonably or in bad faith when denying his request for a variance. The Bylaw section cited was determined to be a liability shield for the Board, not a source of duty owed to the homeowner.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged failure of HOA Board to act in good faith when denying Petitioner's request for a variance for unauthorized common area changes

Petitioner made changes to the common area without permission and the Board denied his subsequent request for a variance. Petitioner alleged the Board violated Bylaws Section 5.4 by failing to act in good faith and showing bias. The ALJ found that Section 5.4 is a liability shield for the Board, not a duty imposed upon them, and Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show bad faith or unreasonableness.

Orders: Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, variance denial, common area modifications, good faith requirement, board liability shield, prevailing party
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818052-REL Decision – 660026.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:02 (91.5 KB)

18F-H1818052-REL Decision – 720468.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:02 (103.5 KB)

Jeff Lion vs. Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817009-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-01-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jeff Lion Counsel
Respondent Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

Article 8 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition was dismissed because he failed to appear or provide an authorized representative at the scheduled hearing, resulting in the Respondent being deemed the prevailing party.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to appear at the hearing scheduled at his request and failed to provide an authorized representative (as appearances are considered the practice of law under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31).

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of CC&Rs

Petitioner Jeff Lion alleged that the Respondent violated Article 8 of the CC&Rs.

Orders: Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Dismissal, Failure to Appear, Unauthorized Representation, HOA, CC&R
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817009-REL Decision – 611264.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:03:25 (69.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817009-REL


Briefing Document: Lion v. Riggs Ranch Meadows HOA (Case No. 18F-H1817009-REL)

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Jeff Lion (Petitioner) versus Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner’s case, which alleged a violation of the Respondent’s CC&Rs, was dismissed due to the Petitioner’s failure to appear at the scheduled hearing on January 9, 2018.

The hearing had been rescheduled to this date at the Petitioner’s own request. On the day of the hearing, two witnesses for Mr. Lion appeared but were informed by the tribunal that they could not legally represent him as they were not licensed attorneys, a requirement under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31. Because no authorized representative for the Petitioner was present, no evidence could be presented to support the claim. Consequently, Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden dismissed the petition and designated the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association as the prevailing party.

Case Background and Procedural History

The matter originated from a petition filed by Jeff Lion against the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association.

Initial Allegation: Mr. Lion alleged that the Respondent violated Article 8 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Notice of Hearing: On October 2, 2017, the Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing, initially scheduling the matter for November 29, 2017, at the Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix.

Continuance: Mr. Lion filed a Motion to Continue the hearing, which was rescheduled for 9:00 a.m. on January 9, 2018, without objection from the Respondent.

Analysis of the January 9, 2018 Hearing

The proceedings on the rescheduled hearing date were pivotal to the case’s outcome.

Petitioner’s Failure to Appear: Mr. Jeff Lion, the Petitioner, did not appear at the hearing at its scheduled time.

Attempted Representation by Non-Attorneys: Two witnesses named by Mr. Lion were present. They informed the tribunal that Mr. Lion would not be appearing and that they intended to represent him.

Tribunal’s Ruling on Representation: The tribunal advised the witnesses that they were legally prohibited from representing Mr. Lion. Citing Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31, the judge clarified that appearances at the Office of Administrative Hearings constitute the practice of law and require representation by an attorney licensed in Arizona. The witnesses confirmed they did not hold such licenses.

Consequences of Non-Appearance: As there was no authorized representative present for the Petitioner, no evidence was taken. The judge noted that the hearing had been continued to that specific date at Mr. Lion’s request and proceeded to vacate the matter based on his failure to appear.

Legal Findings and Conclusions of Law

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was grounded in established legal principles and procedural rules.

Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate was confirmed to have authority over the matter pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Burden of Proof: The decision reiterated that the party asserting a claim—in this case, Mr. Lion—carries the burden of proof. The standard required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Core Rationale for Dismissal: The central conclusion of law was that Mr. Lion failed to meet his burden of proof. By not appearing at the hearing he had requested, and by not securing authorized legal representation, he “failed to present any evidence in support of his petition.”

Final Order and Implications

The decision, issued on January 10, 2018, formally concluded the administrative hearing process with a definitive outcome.

Dismissal of Petition: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that “Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed.”

Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association, was officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

Post-Decision Options: The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.

Key Parties and Representatives

Name/Entity

Contact/Representation Information

Petitioner

Jeff Lion

PO Box 1350, Selma, CA 93662

Respondent

Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association

Represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq.

Respondent’s Counsel

Nathan Tennyson, Esq.

BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC, 373 S. Main Ave., Tucson, AZ 85701

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings

Overseeing Body

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Commissioner: Judy Lowe


Jeff Lion vs. Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817009-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-01-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jeff Lion Counsel
Respondent Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

Article 8 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition was dismissed because he failed to appear or provide an authorized representative at the scheduled hearing, resulting in the Respondent being deemed the prevailing party.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to appear at the hearing scheduled at his request and failed to provide an authorized representative (as appearances are considered the practice of law under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31).

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of CC&Rs

Petitioner Jeff Lion alleged that the Respondent violated Article 8 of the CC&Rs.

Orders: Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Dismissal, Failure to Appear, Unauthorized Representation, HOA, CC&R
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817009-REL Decision – 611264.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:07 (69.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817009-REL


Briefing Document: Lion v. Riggs Ranch Meadows HOA (Case No. 18F-H1817009-REL)

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Jeff Lion (Petitioner) versus Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner’s case, which alleged a violation of the Respondent’s CC&Rs, was dismissed due to the Petitioner’s failure to appear at the scheduled hearing on January 9, 2018.

The hearing had been rescheduled to this date at the Petitioner’s own request. On the day of the hearing, two witnesses for Mr. Lion appeared but were informed by the tribunal that they could not legally represent him as they were not licensed attorneys, a requirement under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31. Because no authorized representative for the Petitioner was present, no evidence could be presented to support the claim. Consequently, Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden dismissed the petition and designated the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association as the prevailing party.

Case Background and Procedural History

The matter originated from a petition filed by Jeff Lion against the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association.

Initial Allegation: Mr. Lion alleged that the Respondent violated Article 8 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Notice of Hearing: On October 2, 2017, the Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing, initially scheduling the matter for November 29, 2017, at the Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix.

Continuance: Mr. Lion filed a Motion to Continue the hearing, which was rescheduled for 9:00 a.m. on January 9, 2018, without objection from the Respondent.

Analysis of the January 9, 2018 Hearing

The proceedings on the rescheduled hearing date were pivotal to the case’s outcome.

Petitioner’s Failure to Appear: Mr. Jeff Lion, the Petitioner, did not appear at the hearing at its scheduled time.

Attempted Representation by Non-Attorneys: Two witnesses named by Mr. Lion were present. They informed the tribunal that Mr. Lion would not be appearing and that they intended to represent him.

Tribunal’s Ruling on Representation: The tribunal advised the witnesses that they were legally prohibited from representing Mr. Lion. Citing Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31, the judge clarified that appearances at the Office of Administrative Hearings constitute the practice of law and require representation by an attorney licensed in Arizona. The witnesses confirmed they did not hold such licenses.

Consequences of Non-Appearance: As there was no authorized representative present for the Petitioner, no evidence was taken. The judge noted that the hearing had been continued to that specific date at Mr. Lion’s request and proceeded to vacate the matter based on his failure to appear.

Legal Findings and Conclusions of Law

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was grounded in established legal principles and procedural rules.

Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate was confirmed to have authority over the matter pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Burden of Proof: The decision reiterated that the party asserting a claim—in this case, Mr. Lion—carries the burden of proof. The standard required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Core Rationale for Dismissal: The central conclusion of law was that Mr. Lion failed to meet his burden of proof. By not appearing at the hearing he had requested, and by not securing authorized legal representation, he “failed to present any evidence in support of his petition.”

Final Order and Implications

The decision, issued on January 10, 2018, formally concluded the administrative hearing process with a definitive outcome.

Dismissal of Petition: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that “Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed.”

Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association, was officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

Post-Decision Options: The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.

Key Parties and Representatives

Name/Entity

Contact/Representation Information

Petitioner

Jeff Lion

PO Box 1350, Selma, CA 93662

Respondent

Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association

Represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq.

Respondent’s Counsel

Nathan Tennyson, Esq.

BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC, 373 S. Main Ave., Tucson, AZ 85701

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings

Overseeing Body

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Commissioner: Judy Lowe