Wendy Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020043-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-08
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome total_loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth Counsel Brian Hatch
Respondent Vincenz Homeowners' Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl

Alleged Violations

VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1

Outcome Summary

The petition concerning the alleged violation of CC&R section 10.11.1 by the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment request regarding waiver of enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that VHA violated CC&R section 10.11.1 by a preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to rule on the declaratory judgment requested by the Petitioner regarding VHA's waiver of its enforcement rights.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 regarding parking enforcement and waiver

Petitioner alleged VHA waived its right to enforce CC&R 10.11.1 (parking prohibition) because violations had been frequent since inception. The tribunal found Petitioner failed to establish VHA violated section 10.11.1, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction regarding the requested declaratory judgment on waiver of enforcement.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Violation, Parking, Waiver, Jurisdiction
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020043-REL Decision – 820839.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:53 (95.4 KB)

Wendy Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020043-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-08
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome total_loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth Counsel Brian Hatch
Respondent Vincenz Homeowners' Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl

Alleged Violations

VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1

Outcome Summary

The petition concerning the alleged violation of CC&R section 10.11.1 by the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment request regarding waiver of enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that VHA violated CC&R section 10.11.1 by a preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to rule on the declaratory judgment requested by the Petitioner regarding VHA's waiver of its enforcement rights.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 regarding parking enforcement and waiver

Petitioner alleged VHA waived its right to enforce CC&R 10.11.1 (parking prohibition) because violations had been frequent since inception. The tribunal found Petitioner failed to establish VHA violated section 10.11.1, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction regarding the requested declaratory judgment on waiver of enforcement.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Violation, Parking, Waiver, Jurisdiction
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020043-REL Decision – 820839.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:11:06 (95.4 KB)

Thomas J Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen Counsel
Respondent Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner's complaint, finding the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA's flag display rule was inconsistent with its governing documents or improperly adopted, and deemed the Respondent (HOA) the prevailing party.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs or that the Association improperly adopted the rule.

Key Issues & Findings

Flags and Sings

Petitioner filed a single issue petition alleging the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 by issuing a violation notice for displaying a "Trump 2020" flag. Petitioner argued the HOA's Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs because the CC&Rs only defined signs, not flags. The ALJ concluded the Petitioner had not established the rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs or improperly adopted.

Orders: Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10
  • P.L. 94-344

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919071-REL-RHG Decision – 767071.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:09:45 (69.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch HOA

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), case number 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG. The dispute centered on the HOA’s prohibition of a “Trump 2020” flag displayed by Mr. Van Dan Elzen at his property. The petitioner alleged this prohibition violated Arizona state law.

The ALJ ultimately dismissed the petition, ruling in favor of the Carter Ranch HOA. The decision was based on the petitioner’s failure to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was inconsistent with its foundational Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) or that the rule was improperly adopted. Crucially, the ALJ found that the petitioner had not sufficiently alleged a direct violation of the relevant state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1808. The ruling effectively upholds the HOA’s authority, granted by its CC&Rs, to regulate the display of flags not explicitly protected by Arizona law.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview

Case Name: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, Petitioner, vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, Respondent.

Case Number: 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG

Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

Hearing Date: January 10, 2020

Decision Date: January 30, 2020

Subject of Dispute: The validity of an HOA rule prohibiting the display of a “Trump 2020” political flag, which the petitioner claimed violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

II. Chronology of Key Events

May 21, 2019: Carter Ranch HOA notifies petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen that his “Trump 2020” flag violates Association Rules.

June 14, 2019: Mr. Van Dan Elzen files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

November 18, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues an order setting the matter for a rehearing.

January 10, 2020: The rehearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge.

III. Petitioner’s Position (Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen)

Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s case was predicated on the argument that the HOA’s rules regarding flags were inconsistent with its own governing documents, specifically the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Core Allegation: The HOA’s enforcement action violated A.R.S. § 33-1808, which governs flags and signs.

Primary Argument: Mr. Van Dan Elzen contended that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was invalid because the CC&Rs do not explicitly mention the word “flag.” He argued that the relevant section of the governing documents, DCC&R 3.14, only defines “SIGNS.”

Direct Quotation from Petition: The petition stated the following, highlighting the perceived discrepancy:

IV. Respondent’s Position (Carter Ranch HOA)

The Carter Ranch HOA maintained that its “Flag Display Rule” was valid, properly enacted, and did not violate state law or its own governing documents.

The “Flag Display Rule”: The HOA’s rules explicitly prohibit flying any flag other than those on an approved list, which includes:

◦ The American Flag

◦ Official flags of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard

◦ A POW/MIA flag

◦ An Arizona Indian National flag

◦ The Arizona State flag

◦ The Gadsden Flag

Authority to Regulate: The HOA asserted its authority to create this rule stemmed from Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. This section grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and repeal rules pertaining to “the health, safety or welfare of the owners… or restrictions on the use of Lots.” It also specifies that such rules are “enforceable in the same manner” as the CC&Rs themselves.

Defense Arguments: The HOA contended that the petition should be dismissed because:

1. The Flag Display Rule was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

2. The rule was properly adopted under the authority granted in the CC&Rs.

3. The petitioner failed to allege that the HOA had actually violated a specific statute or provision of its governing documents.

V. Analysis of Governing Law: A.R.S. § 33-1808

This Arizona Revised Statute was central to the dispute. It places specific limitations on an HOA’s ability to regulate the display of certain flags and political signs.

Provision

Description of Regulation

Subsection A: Protected Flags

An HOA cannot prohibit the outdoor display of: The American flag (if displayed consistent with federal code), official U.S. military flags, the POW/MIA flag, the Arizona state flag, an Arizona Indian nations flag, or the Gadsden flag.

Subsection C: Political Signs

An HOA cannot prohibit the display of political signs on a member’s property, but may regulate them. Permissible regulations include:
Time: Prohibiting display earlier than 71 days before an election and later than 3 days after an election.
Size & Number: Regulations must be no more restrictive than applicable city/county ordinances. If no such ordinance exists, the HOA cannot limit the number of signs, but can cap the maximum aggregate dimensions at nine square feet.

Definition of “Political Sign”: The statute defines a political sign as “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election.”

VI. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Order

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to meet the required burden of proof, which is to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

1. Rule Consistency: The ALJ concluded that the “Petitioner has not established that the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.”

2. Rule Adoption: The ALJ found that the “Petitioner has not established that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule under its CC&Rs.”

3. Failure to Allege Violation: The judge noted that the “Petitioner has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.” This indicates a failure in the petition’s framing to connect the HOA’s actions to a specific statutory prohibition.

4. Final Determination: Based on these conclusions, the judge determined that “Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s petition should be dismissed and the Respondent be deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.”

Dismissal: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed.”

Binding Nature: The order is binding on the parties as it resulted from a rehearing.

Appeal Rights: Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within 35 days from the date the order was served.


Thomas J Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen Counsel
Respondent Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner's complaint, finding the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA's flag display rule was inconsistent with its governing documents or improperly adopted, and deemed the Respondent (HOA) the prevailing party.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs or that the Association improperly adopted the rule.

Key Issues & Findings

Flags and Sings

Petitioner filed a single issue petition alleging the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 by issuing a violation notice for displaying a "Trump 2020" flag. Petitioner argued the HOA's Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs because the CC&Rs only defined signs, not flags. The ALJ concluded the Petitioner had not established the rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs or improperly adopted.

Orders: Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10
  • P.L. 94-344

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919071-REL-RHG Decision – 767071.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:24 (69.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch HOA

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), case number 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG. The dispute centered on the HOA’s prohibition of a “Trump 2020” flag displayed by Mr. Van Dan Elzen at his property. The petitioner alleged this prohibition violated Arizona state law.

The ALJ ultimately dismissed the petition, ruling in favor of the Carter Ranch HOA. The decision was based on the petitioner’s failure to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was inconsistent with its foundational Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) or that the rule was improperly adopted. Crucially, the ALJ found that the petitioner had not sufficiently alleged a direct violation of the relevant state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1808. The ruling effectively upholds the HOA’s authority, granted by its CC&Rs, to regulate the display of flags not explicitly protected by Arizona law.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview

Case Name: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, Petitioner, vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, Respondent.

Case Number: 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG

Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

Hearing Date: January 10, 2020

Decision Date: January 30, 2020

Subject of Dispute: The validity of an HOA rule prohibiting the display of a “Trump 2020” political flag, which the petitioner claimed violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

II. Chronology of Key Events

May 21, 2019: Carter Ranch HOA notifies petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen that his “Trump 2020” flag violates Association Rules.

June 14, 2019: Mr. Van Dan Elzen files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

November 18, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues an order setting the matter for a rehearing.

January 10, 2020: The rehearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge.

III. Petitioner’s Position (Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen)

Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s case was predicated on the argument that the HOA’s rules regarding flags were inconsistent with its own governing documents, specifically the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Core Allegation: The HOA’s enforcement action violated A.R.S. § 33-1808, which governs flags and signs.

Primary Argument: Mr. Van Dan Elzen contended that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was invalid because the CC&Rs do not explicitly mention the word “flag.” He argued that the relevant section of the governing documents, DCC&R 3.14, only defines “SIGNS.”

Direct Quotation from Petition: The petition stated the following, highlighting the perceived discrepancy:

IV. Respondent’s Position (Carter Ranch HOA)

The Carter Ranch HOA maintained that its “Flag Display Rule” was valid, properly enacted, and did not violate state law or its own governing documents.

The “Flag Display Rule”: The HOA’s rules explicitly prohibit flying any flag other than those on an approved list, which includes:

◦ The American Flag

◦ Official flags of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard

◦ A POW/MIA flag

◦ An Arizona Indian National flag

◦ The Arizona State flag

◦ The Gadsden Flag

Authority to Regulate: The HOA asserted its authority to create this rule stemmed from Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. This section grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and repeal rules pertaining to “the health, safety or welfare of the owners… or restrictions on the use of Lots.” It also specifies that such rules are “enforceable in the same manner” as the CC&Rs themselves.

Defense Arguments: The HOA contended that the petition should be dismissed because:

1. The Flag Display Rule was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

2. The rule was properly adopted under the authority granted in the CC&Rs.

3. The petitioner failed to allege that the HOA had actually violated a specific statute or provision of its governing documents.

V. Analysis of Governing Law: A.R.S. § 33-1808

This Arizona Revised Statute was central to the dispute. It places specific limitations on an HOA’s ability to regulate the display of certain flags and political signs.

Provision

Description of Regulation

Subsection A: Protected Flags

An HOA cannot prohibit the outdoor display of: The American flag (if displayed consistent with federal code), official U.S. military flags, the POW/MIA flag, the Arizona state flag, an Arizona Indian nations flag, or the Gadsden flag.

Subsection C: Political Signs

An HOA cannot prohibit the display of political signs on a member’s property, but may regulate them. Permissible regulations include:
Time: Prohibiting display earlier than 71 days before an election and later than 3 days after an election.
Size & Number: Regulations must be no more restrictive than applicable city/county ordinances. If no such ordinance exists, the HOA cannot limit the number of signs, but can cap the maximum aggregate dimensions at nine square feet.

Definition of “Political Sign”: The statute defines a political sign as “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election.”

VI. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Order

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to meet the required burden of proof, which is to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

1. Rule Consistency: The ALJ concluded that the “Petitioner has not established that the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.”

2. Rule Adoption: The ALJ found that the “Petitioner has not established that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule under its CC&Rs.”

3. Failure to Allege Violation: The judge noted that the “Petitioner has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.” This indicates a failure in the petition’s framing to connect the HOA’s actions to a specific statutory prohibition.

4. Final Determination: Based on these conclusions, the judge determined that “Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s petition should be dismissed and the Respondent be deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.”

Dismissal: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed.”

Binding Nature: The order is binding on the parties as it resulted from a rehearing.

Appeal Rights: Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within 35 days from the date the order was served.


Thomas J Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen Counsel
Respondent Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner's case, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 or improperly adopted its Flag Display Rule.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1808 and failed to prove that the HOA's Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with or improperly adopted under the CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

Flags and Sings

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen filed a petition arguing that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 after being notified he violated Association Rules by displaying a “Trump 2020” flag. He argued the HOA's Flag Display Rule was invalid because the CC&Rs only defined SIGNS (DCC&R 3.14) and had no reference to Flags whatsoever, thus the rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

Orders: Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990)
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Flag Display, Political Sign, CC&Rs, Rules & Regulations
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919071-REL Decision – 767071.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:09:41 (69.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919071-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch HOA

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), case number 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG. The dispute centered on the HOA’s prohibition of a “Trump 2020” flag displayed by Mr. Van Dan Elzen at his property. The petitioner alleged this prohibition violated Arizona state law.

The ALJ ultimately dismissed the petition, ruling in favor of the Carter Ranch HOA. The decision was based on the petitioner’s failure to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was inconsistent with its foundational Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) or that the rule was improperly adopted. Crucially, the ALJ found that the petitioner had not sufficiently alleged a direct violation of the relevant state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1808. The ruling effectively upholds the HOA’s authority, granted by its CC&Rs, to regulate the display of flags not explicitly protected by Arizona law.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview

Case Name: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, Petitioner, vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, Respondent.

Case Number: 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG

Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

Hearing Date: January 10, 2020

Decision Date: January 30, 2020

Subject of Dispute: The validity of an HOA rule prohibiting the display of a “Trump 2020” political flag, which the petitioner claimed violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

II. Chronology of Key Events

May 21, 2019: Carter Ranch HOA notifies petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen that his “Trump 2020” flag violates Association Rules.

June 14, 2019: Mr. Van Dan Elzen files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

November 18, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues an order setting the matter for a rehearing.

January 10, 2020: The rehearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge.

III. Petitioner’s Position (Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen)

Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s case was predicated on the argument that the HOA’s rules regarding flags were inconsistent with its own governing documents, specifically the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Core Allegation: The HOA’s enforcement action violated A.R.S. § 33-1808, which governs flags and signs.

Primary Argument: Mr. Van Dan Elzen contended that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was invalid because the CC&Rs do not explicitly mention the word “flag.” He argued that the relevant section of the governing documents, DCC&R 3.14, only defines “SIGNS.”

Direct Quotation from Petition: The petition stated the following, highlighting the perceived discrepancy:

IV. Respondent’s Position (Carter Ranch HOA)

The Carter Ranch HOA maintained that its “Flag Display Rule” was valid, properly enacted, and did not violate state law or its own governing documents.

The “Flag Display Rule”: The HOA’s rules explicitly prohibit flying any flag other than those on an approved list, which includes:

◦ The American Flag

◦ Official flags of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard

◦ A POW/MIA flag

◦ An Arizona Indian National flag

◦ The Arizona State flag

◦ The Gadsden Flag

Authority to Regulate: The HOA asserted its authority to create this rule stemmed from Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. This section grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and repeal rules pertaining to “the health, safety or welfare of the owners… or restrictions on the use of Lots.” It also specifies that such rules are “enforceable in the same manner” as the CC&Rs themselves.

Defense Arguments: The HOA contended that the petition should be dismissed because:

1. The Flag Display Rule was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

2. The rule was properly adopted under the authority granted in the CC&Rs.

3. The petitioner failed to allege that the HOA had actually violated a specific statute or provision of its governing documents.

V. Analysis of Governing Law: A.R.S. § 33-1808

This Arizona Revised Statute was central to the dispute. It places specific limitations on an HOA’s ability to regulate the display of certain flags and political signs.

Provision

Description of Regulation

Subsection A: Protected Flags

An HOA cannot prohibit the outdoor display of: The American flag (if displayed consistent with federal code), official U.S. military flags, the POW/MIA flag, the Arizona state flag, an Arizona Indian nations flag, or the Gadsden flag.

Subsection C: Political Signs

An HOA cannot prohibit the display of political signs on a member’s property, but may regulate them. Permissible regulations include:
Time: Prohibiting display earlier than 71 days before an election and later than 3 days after an election.
Size & Number: Regulations must be no more restrictive than applicable city/county ordinances. If no such ordinance exists, the HOA cannot limit the number of signs, but can cap the maximum aggregate dimensions at nine square feet.

Definition of “Political Sign”: The statute defines a political sign as “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election.”

VI. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Order

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to meet the required burden of proof, which is to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

1. Rule Consistency: The ALJ concluded that the “Petitioner has not established that the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.”

2. Rule Adoption: The ALJ found that the “Petitioner has not established that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule under its CC&Rs.”

3. Failure to Allege Violation: The judge noted that the “Petitioner has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.” This indicates a failure in the petition’s framing to connect the HOA’s actions to a specific statutory prohibition.

4. Final Determination: Based on these conclusions, the judge determined that “Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s petition should be dismissed and the Respondent be deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.”

Dismissal: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed.”

Binding Nature: The order is binding on the parties as it resulted from a rehearing.

Appeal Rights: Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within 35 days from the date the order was served.


Thomas J Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen Counsel
Respondent Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner's case, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 or improperly adopted its Flag Display Rule.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1808 and failed to prove that the HOA's Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with or improperly adopted under the CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

Flags and Sings

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen filed a petition arguing that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 after being notified he violated Association Rules by displaying a “Trump 2020” flag. He argued the HOA's Flag Display Rule was invalid because the CC&Rs only defined SIGNS (DCC&R 3.14) and had no reference to Flags whatsoever, thus the rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

Orders: Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990)
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Flag Display, Political Sign, CC&Rs, Rules & Regulations
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919071-REL Decision – 767071.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:23 (69.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919071-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch HOA

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), case number 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG. The dispute centered on the HOA’s prohibition of a “Trump 2020” flag displayed by Mr. Van Dan Elzen at his property. The petitioner alleged this prohibition violated Arizona state law.

The ALJ ultimately dismissed the petition, ruling in favor of the Carter Ranch HOA. The decision was based on the petitioner’s failure to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was inconsistent with its foundational Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) or that the rule was improperly adopted. Crucially, the ALJ found that the petitioner had not sufficiently alleged a direct violation of the relevant state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1808. The ruling effectively upholds the HOA’s authority, granted by its CC&Rs, to regulate the display of flags not explicitly protected by Arizona law.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview

Case Name: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, Petitioner, vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, Respondent.

Case Number: 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG

Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

Hearing Date: January 10, 2020

Decision Date: January 30, 2020

Subject of Dispute: The validity of an HOA rule prohibiting the display of a “Trump 2020” political flag, which the petitioner claimed violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

II. Chronology of Key Events

May 21, 2019: Carter Ranch HOA notifies petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen that his “Trump 2020” flag violates Association Rules.

June 14, 2019: Mr. Van Dan Elzen files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

November 18, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues an order setting the matter for a rehearing.

January 10, 2020: The rehearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge.

III. Petitioner’s Position (Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen)

Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s case was predicated on the argument that the HOA’s rules regarding flags were inconsistent with its own governing documents, specifically the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Core Allegation: The HOA’s enforcement action violated A.R.S. § 33-1808, which governs flags and signs.

Primary Argument: Mr. Van Dan Elzen contended that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was invalid because the CC&Rs do not explicitly mention the word “flag.” He argued that the relevant section of the governing documents, DCC&R 3.14, only defines “SIGNS.”

Direct Quotation from Petition: The petition stated the following, highlighting the perceived discrepancy:

IV. Respondent’s Position (Carter Ranch HOA)

The Carter Ranch HOA maintained that its “Flag Display Rule” was valid, properly enacted, and did not violate state law or its own governing documents.

The “Flag Display Rule”: The HOA’s rules explicitly prohibit flying any flag other than those on an approved list, which includes:

◦ The American Flag

◦ Official flags of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard

◦ A POW/MIA flag

◦ An Arizona Indian National flag

◦ The Arizona State flag

◦ The Gadsden Flag

Authority to Regulate: The HOA asserted its authority to create this rule stemmed from Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. This section grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and repeal rules pertaining to “the health, safety or welfare of the owners… or restrictions on the use of Lots.” It also specifies that such rules are “enforceable in the same manner” as the CC&Rs themselves.

Defense Arguments: The HOA contended that the petition should be dismissed because:

1. The Flag Display Rule was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

2. The rule was properly adopted under the authority granted in the CC&Rs.

3. The petitioner failed to allege that the HOA had actually violated a specific statute or provision of its governing documents.

V. Analysis of Governing Law: A.R.S. § 33-1808

This Arizona Revised Statute was central to the dispute. It places specific limitations on an HOA’s ability to regulate the display of certain flags and political signs.

Provision

Description of Regulation

Subsection A: Protected Flags

An HOA cannot prohibit the outdoor display of: The American flag (if displayed consistent with federal code), official U.S. military flags, the POW/MIA flag, the Arizona state flag, an Arizona Indian nations flag, or the Gadsden flag.

Subsection C: Political Signs

An HOA cannot prohibit the display of political signs on a member’s property, but may regulate them. Permissible regulations include:
Time: Prohibiting display earlier than 71 days before an election and later than 3 days after an election.
Size & Number: Regulations must be no more restrictive than applicable city/county ordinances. If no such ordinance exists, the HOA cannot limit the number of signs, but can cap the maximum aggregate dimensions at nine square feet.

Definition of “Political Sign”: The statute defines a political sign as “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election.”

VI. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Order

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to meet the required burden of proof, which is to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

1. Rule Consistency: The ALJ concluded that the “Petitioner has not established that the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.”

2. Rule Adoption: The ALJ found that the “Petitioner has not established that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule under its CC&Rs.”

3. Failure to Allege Violation: The judge noted that the “Petitioner has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.” This indicates a failure in the petition’s framing to connect the HOA’s actions to a specific statutory prohibition.

4. Final Determination: Based on these conclusions, the judge determined that “Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s petition should be dismissed and the Respondent be deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.”

Dismissal: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed.”

Binding Nature: The order is binding on the parties as it resulted from a rehearing.

Appeal Rights: Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within 35 days from the date the order was served.


William P Lee v vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809; CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited governing documents (CC&Rs/Rules) or state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning street parking and contracting for vehicle booting/towing.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding violations of CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. The ALJ found the July 2018 revised Rules, which banned parking, were controlling.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation regarding banning parking and use of towing/booting company.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly banned street parking and contracted with a towing/booting company, arguing this violated specific CC&R amendments, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. He also claimed the 2018 revised Rules were invalid due to improper electronic notice instead of personal delivery or mail.

Orders: Petitioners’ petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Notice, Towing, Booting, A.R.S. 33-1803, A.R.S. 33-1809
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:07:43 (110.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Administrative Hearing Briefing: William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG, where Petitioner William P. Lee’s complaint against the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (Greenlaw) was denied. Mr. Lee, a homeowner, alleged that Greenlaw’s complete ban on street parking and its contract with a towing company to enforce the ban violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Lee failed to meet the required burden of proof. The central conclusion was that Greenlaw’s revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, are the controlling authority and explicitly permit a total ban on street parking. The ALJ determined that the specific parking prohibitions detailed in the CC&R amendments—concerning fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles—do not preclude the association from enacting a more comprehensive ban via its rules. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that Greenlaw had actually taken the alleged enforcement actions (booting or towing) against any member’s vehicle.

Case Overview

Detail

Information

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

William P. Lee (Homeowner)

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Homeowners Association)

Hearing Date

April 1, 2019 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

April 22, 2019

Final Order

Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Presiding ALJ

Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Arguments

William P. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, centered on the claim that Greenlaw acted outside its authority by banning all street parking and contracting with a towing company for enforcement. His arguments were:

Violation of CC&Rs: The total parking ban directly contradicted CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. Mr. Lee contended these amendments established an exhaustive list of permissible parking restrictions, limited to:

◦ Designated fire lanes (Amendment #1).

◦ Periods of snow removal (Amendment #2).

◦ Vehicles in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours (Amendment #3).

Invalidity of Revised Rules: Mr. Lee argued that the July 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which contain the parking ban, were not valid or controlling due to improper notification.

◦ He contended that Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required that such notices be delivered personally or by postal mail.

◦ He received notice only via a July 6, 2018 email, which he claimed did not clearly indicate that the rules had been substantively changed.

Improper Motive: Mr. Lee contended that “the only reason that the Association banned parking was to please Barbara, a board member who did not want anyone to park behind her property.”

Respondent’s Defense

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two asserted that its actions were proper and within the scope of its authority as an HOA. Its defense included the following points:

Controlling Authority: Greenlaw maintained that its revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, were the controlling documents governing parking.

Notice Protocol: The association contended that the Bylaw provision requiring personal or postal mail notice applies only to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs. Greenlaw argued there is no such requirement for providing notice of amendments to the Rules and Regulations.

Sufficient Notice: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee received actual notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

Analysis of Key Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between several of Greenlaw’s governing documents.

Document

Key Provision / Content

Relevance to Case

CC&R Amendments 1, 2, & 3

These amendments, added to Article II (Permitted Uses), establish specific, conditional parking prohibitions related to fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles.

The petitioner argued these amendments represented the only circumstances under which parking could be banned. The ALJ found they were not an exhaustive list.

Bylaws, Article V, Section 1

“Notices to directors and lot owners shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.”

The petitioner cited this to argue that the email notice for the revised rules was improper, thus invalidating the rules. The ALJ sided with the Respondent’s interpretation.

Rules and Regulations (July 2018), Section 8

“Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time… cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.” The rule specifies that the streets (Eva, Heidi, Jeffrey Loops) are private and owned by the HOA.

This document contains the explicit, total parking ban at the heart of the dispute. The ALJ found this rule to be the valid and controlling authority.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision was based on a comprehensive review of the evidence and legal standards, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.

Burden of Proof

The decision established that Mr. Lee bore the burden of proof “to establish that Greenlaw violated amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, and the Greenlaw Rules and Regulations by a preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Validity of the 2018 Rules: The ALJ concluded that “the weight of the evidence presented at hearing shows that Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations were revised effective July 2018 and are the controlling Rules and Regulations of Greenlaw.” Mr. Lee failed to establish that any prior version remained in effect.

2. Scope of CC&R Amendments: The decision found that the CC&R amendments only “provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” They do not restrict the association from implementing a broader ban through its Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the total ban did not violate the CC&Rs.

3. No Violation of Rules: Because the July 2018 rules were found to be controlling, and they explicitly authorize a total parking ban, the ALJ concluded that Greenlaw’s decision did not violate its own Rules and Regulations.

4. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: A critical failure in the petitioner’s case was the lack of evidence.

◦ The decision notes, “Mr. Lee provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.”

◦ His testimony about observing a booted jeep was dismissed as insufficient, as he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” The Greenlaw manager’s subsequent comment was not found to be an admission of responsibility.

◦ Mr. Lee did not allege that any of his own vehicles had been booted or towed.

5. No Statutory Violation: The judge found that Mr. Lee failed to establish any violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 33-1803 and 33-1809.

Final Order and Implications

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order.

Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

Appeal Process: As the order resulted from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal must seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.


William P Lee v vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809; CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited governing documents (CC&Rs/Rules) or state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning street parking and contracting for vehicle booting/towing.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding violations of CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. The ALJ found the July 2018 revised Rules, which banned parking, were controlling.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation regarding banning parking and use of towing/booting company.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly banned street parking and contracted with a towing/booting company, arguing this violated specific CC&R amendments, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. He also claimed the 2018 revised Rules were invalid due to improper electronic notice instead of personal delivery or mail.

Orders: Petitioners’ petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Notice, Towing, Booting, A.R.S. 33-1803, A.R.S. 33-1809
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:39 (110.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Administrative Hearing Briefing: William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG, where Petitioner William P. Lee’s complaint against the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (Greenlaw) was denied. Mr. Lee, a homeowner, alleged that Greenlaw’s complete ban on street parking and its contract with a towing company to enforce the ban violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Lee failed to meet the required burden of proof. The central conclusion was that Greenlaw’s revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, are the controlling authority and explicitly permit a total ban on street parking. The ALJ determined that the specific parking prohibitions detailed in the CC&R amendments—concerning fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles—do not preclude the association from enacting a more comprehensive ban via its rules. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that Greenlaw had actually taken the alleged enforcement actions (booting or towing) against any member’s vehicle.

Case Overview

Detail

Information

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

William P. Lee (Homeowner)

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Homeowners Association)

Hearing Date

April 1, 2019 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

April 22, 2019

Final Order

Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Presiding ALJ

Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Arguments

William P. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, centered on the claim that Greenlaw acted outside its authority by banning all street parking and contracting with a towing company for enforcement. His arguments were:

Violation of CC&Rs: The total parking ban directly contradicted CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. Mr. Lee contended these amendments established an exhaustive list of permissible parking restrictions, limited to:

◦ Designated fire lanes (Amendment #1).

◦ Periods of snow removal (Amendment #2).

◦ Vehicles in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours (Amendment #3).

Invalidity of Revised Rules: Mr. Lee argued that the July 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which contain the parking ban, were not valid or controlling due to improper notification.

◦ He contended that Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required that such notices be delivered personally or by postal mail.

◦ He received notice only via a July 6, 2018 email, which he claimed did not clearly indicate that the rules had been substantively changed.

Improper Motive: Mr. Lee contended that “the only reason that the Association banned parking was to please Barbara, a board member who did not want anyone to park behind her property.”

Respondent’s Defense

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two asserted that its actions were proper and within the scope of its authority as an HOA. Its defense included the following points:

Controlling Authority: Greenlaw maintained that its revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, were the controlling documents governing parking.

Notice Protocol: The association contended that the Bylaw provision requiring personal or postal mail notice applies only to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs. Greenlaw argued there is no such requirement for providing notice of amendments to the Rules and Regulations.

Sufficient Notice: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee received actual notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

Analysis of Key Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between several of Greenlaw’s governing documents.

Document

Key Provision / Content

Relevance to Case

CC&R Amendments 1, 2, & 3

These amendments, added to Article II (Permitted Uses), establish specific, conditional parking prohibitions related to fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles.

The petitioner argued these amendments represented the only circumstances under which parking could be banned. The ALJ found they were not an exhaustive list.

Bylaws, Article V, Section 1

“Notices to directors and lot owners shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.”

The petitioner cited this to argue that the email notice for the revised rules was improper, thus invalidating the rules. The ALJ sided with the Respondent’s interpretation.

Rules and Regulations (July 2018), Section 8

“Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time… cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.” The rule specifies that the streets (Eva, Heidi, Jeffrey Loops) are private and owned by the HOA.

This document contains the explicit, total parking ban at the heart of the dispute. The ALJ found this rule to be the valid and controlling authority.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision was based on a comprehensive review of the evidence and legal standards, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.

Burden of Proof

The decision established that Mr. Lee bore the burden of proof “to establish that Greenlaw violated amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, and the Greenlaw Rules and Regulations by a preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Validity of the 2018 Rules: The ALJ concluded that “the weight of the evidence presented at hearing shows that Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations were revised effective July 2018 and are the controlling Rules and Regulations of Greenlaw.” Mr. Lee failed to establish that any prior version remained in effect.

2. Scope of CC&R Amendments: The decision found that the CC&R amendments only “provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” They do not restrict the association from implementing a broader ban through its Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the total ban did not violate the CC&Rs.

3. No Violation of Rules: Because the July 2018 rules were found to be controlling, and they explicitly authorize a total parking ban, the ALJ concluded that Greenlaw’s decision did not violate its own Rules and Regulations.

4. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: A critical failure in the petitioner’s case was the lack of evidence.

◦ The decision notes, “Mr. Lee provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.”

◦ His testimony about observing a booted jeep was dismissed as insufficient, as he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” The Greenlaw manager’s subsequent comment was not found to be an admission of responsibility.

◦ Mr. Lee did not allege that any of his own vehicles had been booted or towed.

5. No Statutory Violation: The judge found that Mr. Lee failed to establish any violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 33-1803 and 33-1809.

Final Order and Implications

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order.

Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

Appeal Process: As the order resulted from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal must seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.


Rogelio A. Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-04
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Rogelio A. Garcia Counsel
Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1242

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner Rogelio A. Garcia failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1242 regarding procedures for notices of violation. Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof. The HOA was not required to provide the requested information because Petitioner did not respond by certified mail within 21 calendar days. The HOA also provided the process for contesting the notice, negating the requirement to inform the Petitioner of the option to petition for an administrative hearing.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory notice requirements for property violations.

Petitioner Rogelio A. Garcia alleged that Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The ALJ found that because Mr. Garcia did not submit a written response by certified mail within twenty-one days, Villagio was not required to provide the information required under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C), such as the observer's name. Since Villagio notified Mr. Garcia of the appeal process in the notices, they were not required to provide notice of the right to petition for an administrative hearing.

Orders: Mr. Garcia’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Statute Violation, Notice Procedure, A.R.S. 33-1242, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918009-REL-RHG Decision – 692638.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:07:03 (89.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG


Administrative Hearing Brief: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Rogelio A. Garcia (Petitioner) and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute was Mr. Garcia’s allegation that the HOA violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1242 in its handling of a violation notice for an improper short-term rental.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition in both an initial hearing on October 30, 2018, and a subsequent rehearing on February 12, 2019. The rulings consistently found that Mr. Garcia failed to meet his burden of proof.

The central conclusion of the ALJ was that the statutory protections Mr. Garcia claimed he was denied under A.R.S. § 33-1242 are contingent upon the homeowner first taking a specific action: responding to a violation notice in writing via certified mail within 21 calendar days. It was undisputed in both hearings that Mr. Garcia did not take this step. Consequently, the HOA’s statutory obligations to provide the name of the violation’s observer and other specific information were never triggered. Furthermore, because the HOA’s violation notices included instructions for its own internal appeal process, it was not required by statute to inform Mr. Garcia of his option to petition for a separate administrative hearing.

Case Background and Chronology

The case centers on a series of violation notices sent by the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association to unit owner Rogelio A. Garcia concerning the use of his property. Mr. Garcia subsequently petitioned the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging procedural violations by the HOA.

March 8, 2018

Villagio sends Mr. Garcia a letter alleging his unit is being rented in violation of short-term lease provisions in the CC&Rs.

March 22, 2018

Villagio sends a second notice, indicating a $1,000 fine has been posted to Mr. Garcia’s account for the ongoing violation.

April 5, 2018

Villagio sends a third notice, indicating a $2,000 fine has been posted to his account.

August 17, 2018

Mr. Garcia files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242.

October 30, 2018

The initial evidentiary hearing is held before Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

November 19, 2018

The ALJ issues a decision dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.

January 3, 2019

The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues an order for a rehearing of the matter at Mr. Garcia’s request.

February 12, 2019

A rehearing is held, with testimony from Mr. Garcia and Tom Gordon, Villagio’s Community Manager.

March 4, 2019

The ALJ issues a final decision, again dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition and affirming Villagio as the prevailing party. The order is made binding on the parties.

Petitioner’s Arguments (Rogelio A. Garcia)

Across both hearings, Mr. Garcia maintained that Villagio violated the procedural requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1242. His specific arguments included:

Failure to Provide Observer’s Name: Villagio did not provide the first and last name of the person or persons who observed the alleged short-term rental violation.

Denial of Administrative Hearing Notice: The HOA failed to provide written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department.

Denial of Response Opportunity: Mr. Garcia contended that Villagio effectively prevented him from responding via certified mail within the 21-day statutory window. He based this claim on two points:

◦ The HOA issued a second notice and a fine only 14 days after the first notice, creating confusion and pressure that precluded a 21-day response.

◦ The notices included the phrase, “Please bring this issue into compliance within 10 days of this notice,” which he interpreted as the operative deadline, superseding the 21-day statutory period.

• In his petition, he stated the violation letter “did not allow for home owner to respond to violation by certified letter within 21 calendar days after the date of the notice.”

Respondent’s Arguments (Villagio at Tempe HOA)

Villagio’s defense, presented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq., centered on a direct interpretation of the statute and Mr. Garcia’s failure to adhere to its requirements.

Petitioner’s Inaction as the Decisive Factor: Villagio’s primary argument was that Mr. Garcia never took the necessary step to trigger the protections of A.R.S. § 33-1242(C). The statute requires the homeowner to first send a written response via certified mail within 21 days. As Mr. Garcia did not do this, Villagio was under no obligation to provide the observer’s name or the other detailed information outlined in that subsection.

Sufficiency of Internal Appeal Process: The HOA argued it was exempt from the requirement to provide notice of an administrative hearing because its violation letters fulfilled the statute’s alternative. The letters provided a clear process for contesting the notice, directing Mr. Garcia to a website (http://www.hoacompliance.com/Apoeals) to file an appeal with the Board of Directors.

Statutory Inapplicability (Argument from Rehearing): During the rehearing, Villagio introduced a new argument that A.R.S. § 33-1242 was not applicable to the dispute at all. They contended the statute addresses violations related to the condition of a property, whereas Mr. Garcia’s violation was a matter of property use (i.e., short-term renting).

No Prevention of Response: Villagio’s community manager, Tom Gordon, testified that the HOA does not restrict homeowners from responding to notices within the 21-day period. Mr. Garcia also admitted under cross-examination that no court order had prohibited him from sending a response.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided with the Respondent in both decisions, dismissing the petition based on a strict interpretation of the law and the evidence presented.

Burden of Proof

The ALJ established in both rulings that Mr. Garcia, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence offered in opposition to it.

Interpretation and Application of A.R.S. § 33-1242

The decisions hinged on a procedural reading of the statute:

1. Response Requirement is a Prerequisite: The ALJ found that the obligations for an HOA under subsection (C) of the statute—including providing the observer’s name, the date of the violation, and the specific rule violated—are expressly conditioned on the unit owner first providing a written response via certified mail within 21 days as stipulated in subsection (B).

2. Internal Appeal Process Satisfies Notice Requirement: The ALJ concluded that under subsection (D), an HOA is only required to provide notice of the option for a state administrative hearing if it has not already provided the process the unit owner must follow to contest the notice.

Rulings and Final Disposition

Based on this legal framework, the ALJ made the following conclusive findings:

Petitioner Failed to Act: It was undisputed that Mr. Garcia did not respond in writing via certified mail to any of the three notices within the 21-day period. This failure meant Villagio’s statutory duty to provide the observer’s name was never activated.

No Evidence of Prevention: Mr. Garcia failed to provide evidence showing how the issuance of subsequent notices legally prevented him from responding to the initial notice within its 21-day window. The ALJ found his belief that he only had 10 days was a misinterpretation and did not constitute prevention by the HOA.

HOA Fulfilled Its Obligation: Villagio’s notices included instructions for contesting the violation through its own internal process. By doing so, Villagio satisfied the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1242(D) and was therefore not obligated to inform Mr. Garcia of the option to petition for a separate administrative hearing.

Petition Dismissed: Because Mr. Garcia failed to meet his burden of proof to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242, his petition was ordered dismissed in both the initial and rehearing decisions. The March 4, 2019, order was deemed binding on the parties, with any further appeal required to be filed with the superior court.


Rogelio A. Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-04
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Rogelio A. Garcia Counsel
Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1242

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner Rogelio A. Garcia failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1242 regarding procedures for notices of violation. Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof. The HOA was not required to provide the requested information because Petitioner did not respond by certified mail within 21 calendar days. The HOA also provided the process for contesting the notice, negating the requirement to inform the Petitioner of the option to petition for an administrative hearing.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory notice requirements for property violations.

Petitioner Rogelio A. Garcia alleged that Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The ALJ found that because Mr. Garcia did not submit a written response by certified mail within twenty-one days, Villagio was not required to provide the information required under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C), such as the observer's name. Since Villagio notified Mr. Garcia of the appeal process in the notices, they were not required to provide notice of the right to petition for an administrative hearing.

Orders: Mr. Garcia’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Statute Violation, Notice Procedure, A.R.S. 33-1242, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918009-REL-RHG Decision – 692638.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:25 (89.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG


Administrative Hearing Brief: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Rogelio A. Garcia (Petitioner) and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute was Mr. Garcia’s allegation that the HOA violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1242 in its handling of a violation notice for an improper short-term rental.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition in both an initial hearing on October 30, 2018, and a subsequent rehearing on February 12, 2019. The rulings consistently found that Mr. Garcia failed to meet his burden of proof.

The central conclusion of the ALJ was that the statutory protections Mr. Garcia claimed he was denied under A.R.S. § 33-1242 are contingent upon the homeowner first taking a specific action: responding to a violation notice in writing via certified mail within 21 calendar days. It was undisputed in both hearings that Mr. Garcia did not take this step. Consequently, the HOA’s statutory obligations to provide the name of the violation’s observer and other specific information were never triggered. Furthermore, because the HOA’s violation notices included instructions for its own internal appeal process, it was not required by statute to inform Mr. Garcia of his option to petition for a separate administrative hearing.

Case Background and Chronology

The case centers on a series of violation notices sent by the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association to unit owner Rogelio A. Garcia concerning the use of his property. Mr. Garcia subsequently petitioned the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging procedural violations by the HOA.

March 8, 2018

Villagio sends Mr. Garcia a letter alleging his unit is being rented in violation of short-term lease provisions in the CC&Rs.

March 22, 2018

Villagio sends a second notice, indicating a $1,000 fine has been posted to Mr. Garcia’s account for the ongoing violation.

April 5, 2018

Villagio sends a third notice, indicating a $2,000 fine has been posted to his account.

August 17, 2018

Mr. Garcia files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging Villagio violated A.R.S. § 33-1242.

October 30, 2018

The initial evidentiary hearing is held before Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

November 19, 2018

The ALJ issues a decision dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.

January 3, 2019

The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues an order for a rehearing of the matter at Mr. Garcia’s request.

February 12, 2019

A rehearing is held, with testimony from Mr. Garcia and Tom Gordon, Villagio’s Community Manager.

March 4, 2019

The ALJ issues a final decision, again dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition and affirming Villagio as the prevailing party. The order is made binding on the parties.

Petitioner’s Arguments (Rogelio A. Garcia)

Across both hearings, Mr. Garcia maintained that Villagio violated the procedural requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1242. His specific arguments included:

Failure to Provide Observer’s Name: Villagio did not provide the first and last name of the person or persons who observed the alleged short-term rental violation.

Denial of Administrative Hearing Notice: The HOA failed to provide written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department.

Denial of Response Opportunity: Mr. Garcia contended that Villagio effectively prevented him from responding via certified mail within the 21-day statutory window. He based this claim on two points:

◦ The HOA issued a second notice and a fine only 14 days after the first notice, creating confusion and pressure that precluded a 21-day response.

◦ The notices included the phrase, “Please bring this issue into compliance within 10 days of this notice,” which he interpreted as the operative deadline, superseding the 21-day statutory period.

• In his petition, he stated the violation letter “did not allow for home owner to respond to violation by certified letter within 21 calendar days after the date of the notice.”

Respondent’s Arguments (Villagio at Tempe HOA)

Villagio’s defense, presented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq., centered on a direct interpretation of the statute and Mr. Garcia’s failure to adhere to its requirements.

Petitioner’s Inaction as the Decisive Factor: Villagio’s primary argument was that Mr. Garcia never took the necessary step to trigger the protections of A.R.S. § 33-1242(C). The statute requires the homeowner to first send a written response via certified mail within 21 days. As Mr. Garcia did not do this, Villagio was under no obligation to provide the observer’s name or the other detailed information outlined in that subsection.

Sufficiency of Internal Appeal Process: The HOA argued it was exempt from the requirement to provide notice of an administrative hearing because its violation letters fulfilled the statute’s alternative. The letters provided a clear process for contesting the notice, directing Mr. Garcia to a website (http://www.hoacompliance.com/Apoeals) to file an appeal with the Board of Directors.

Statutory Inapplicability (Argument from Rehearing): During the rehearing, Villagio introduced a new argument that A.R.S. § 33-1242 was not applicable to the dispute at all. They contended the statute addresses violations related to the condition of a property, whereas Mr. Garcia’s violation was a matter of property use (i.e., short-term renting).

No Prevention of Response: Villagio’s community manager, Tom Gordon, testified that the HOA does not restrict homeowners from responding to notices within the 21-day period. Mr. Garcia also admitted under cross-examination that no court order had prohibited him from sending a response.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided with the Respondent in both decisions, dismissing the petition based on a strict interpretation of the law and the evidence presented.

Burden of Proof

The ALJ established in both rulings that Mr. Garcia, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence offered in opposition to it.

Interpretation and Application of A.R.S. § 33-1242

The decisions hinged on a procedural reading of the statute:

1. Response Requirement is a Prerequisite: The ALJ found that the obligations for an HOA under subsection (C) of the statute—including providing the observer’s name, the date of the violation, and the specific rule violated—are expressly conditioned on the unit owner first providing a written response via certified mail within 21 days as stipulated in subsection (B).

2. Internal Appeal Process Satisfies Notice Requirement: The ALJ concluded that under subsection (D), an HOA is only required to provide notice of the option for a state administrative hearing if it has not already provided the process the unit owner must follow to contest the notice.

Rulings and Final Disposition

Based on this legal framework, the ALJ made the following conclusive findings:

Petitioner Failed to Act: It was undisputed that Mr. Garcia did not respond in writing via certified mail to any of the three notices within the 21-day period. This failure meant Villagio’s statutory duty to provide the observer’s name was never activated.

No Evidence of Prevention: Mr. Garcia failed to provide evidence showing how the issuance of subsequent notices legally prevented him from responding to the initial notice within its 21-day window. The ALJ found his belief that he only had 10 days was a misinterpretation and did not constitute prevention by the HOA.

HOA Fulfilled Its Obligation: Villagio’s notices included instructions for contesting the violation through its own internal process. By doing so, Villagio satisfied the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1242(D) and was therefore not obligated to inform Mr. Garcia of the option to petition for a separate administrative hearing.

Petition Dismissed: Because Mr. Garcia failed to meet his burden of proof to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242, his petition was ordered dismissed in both the initial and rehearing decisions. The March 4, 2019, order was deemed binding on the parties, with any further appeal required to be filed with the superior court.