Tag Archives: Burden of Proof

Travis Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners

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Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818053-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-31
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Travis Prall Counsel —
Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners Association Counsel Lydia Pierce Linsmeier

Alleged Violations

Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition following a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs because there was no credible evidence that the disputed landscaping (tree) had been originally installed by the developer.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the landscaping was originally installed by the Declarant, which was a prerequisite for HOA maintenance responsibility under the relevant CC&R section.

Key Issues & Findings

Neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R Section 7.1.4 by failing to maintain a tree in his back yard, arguing the back yard qualified as a 'Public Yard' and the tree was originally installed by the Declarant.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA maintenance, CC&R interpretation, burden of proof, landscaping
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818053-REL-RHG Decision – 686236.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:07 (116.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818053-REL-RHG


Briefing: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA Dispute

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the findings and legal rationale from a homeowners’ association dispute between Petitioner Travis Prall and Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena HOA. The case centered on whether the HOA was responsible for maintaining a tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by neglecting maintenance in what he defined as a “Public Yard.”

The dispute was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, resulting in two decisions, an initial ruling and a subsequent ruling on rehearing, both of which dismissed the Petitioner’s case. The critical takeaway is that the case was decided not on the ambiguous definition of “Public” versus “Private” yards, but on a crucial qualifying clause in the CC&Rs. Section 7.1.4 obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping only “as originally installed by Declarant.”

The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that the tree in question was part of the original developer’s landscaping. Conversely, the HOA presented credible testimony from an early homeowner and board member stating that all backyards in the community were sold as “just dirt,” with no developer-installed landscaping or irrigation. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Petitioner’s arguments were based on “suppositions and inferences” and did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required to prove his claim.

Case Overview

This dispute was initiated by a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The core issue was the interpretation of HOA maintenance responsibilities as defined in the community’s governing documents.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

18F-H1818053-REL

Petitioner

Travis Prall

Respondent

Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Initial Hearing

September 4, 2018

Initial Decision

September 24, 2018 (Petition Dismissed)

Rehearing

January 11, 2019

Final Decision

January 31, 2019 (Petition Dismissed)

Timeline of Key Events

• 2010: Petitioner Travis Prall purchases his home, an “interior” unit, and believes the HOA is responsible for both front and backyard maintenance.

• July 26, 2014: A storm knocks over a large tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. He pays for its removal while asserting it was the HOA’s responsibility.

• Post-2014: The tree regrows from its remaining trunk.

• 2018: The HOA observes that the regrown tree’s roots are causing a “pony wall” to buckle and hires Sun King Fencing & Gates to perform repairs. The repair company recommends removing the tree to prevent recurrence.

• May 3, 2018: The HOA issues a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, requesting he “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”

• June 4, 2018: In response, the Petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal proceedings.

Central Allegation and Dispute

The Petitioner alleged that the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of its CC&Rs by “neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards.” His central claim was that his backyard, though enclosed, qualifies as a “Public Yard” under the CC&Rs and that the HOA was therefore responsible for the maintenance and removal of the problematic tree. The HOA’s demand that he handle the tree himself constituted, in his view, a violation of their duties.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

The case presented conflicting interpretations of the CC&Rs and opposing accounts of historical maintenance practices.

Petitioner’s Position (Travis Prall)

The Petitioner’s case was built on his interpretation of the CC&Rs and inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.

• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that his backyard is a “Public Yard” because, while enclosed by a four-foot wall (two-foot block plus two-foot aluminum fence), it is “generally visible from Neighboring Property” via a community walkway.

• Claim of Prior Maintenance: Testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA did provide landscaping maintenance for his backyard.

• Inferences about Original Landscaping:

◦ Posited that the large size of the tree in 2010 indicated it must have been planted by the original developer around 2000.

◦ Argued that the similar design of irrigation systems across the community suggested they were all installed during original construction, including those in backyards.

◦ Noted that the sprinkler system in his backyard wrapped around the tree, further suggesting they were installed together by the developer.

Respondent’s Position (Villas at Tierra Buena HOA)

The Respondent’s defense relied on its own interpretation of the CC&Rs, consistent historical practice, and direct testimony regarding the community’s development.

• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that an “enclosed” yard is, by definition, a “Private Yard,” making the homeowner responsible for its maintenance.

• Denial of Prior Maintenance: Stated unequivocally that it had never provided landscaping services for any resident’s backyard. Its responsibility is limited to front yards and common areas.

• Practical and Liability Concerns: Argued that it has no access to control backyard irrigation systems and that its workers entering enclosed yards would create liability issues, such as pets escaping.

• Crucial Rehearing Testimony: Presented testimony from Maureen Karpinski, the HOA Board President.

◦ Ms. Karpinski, a real estate agent, purchased her home from the developer in 2002 and was involved with the community during its construction phase.

◦ She testified with certainty that her backyard was “just dirt” with no landscaping or irrigation when she purchased it.

◦ She stated that, to the best of her knowledge, “none of the homes in Respondent’s community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the back yards and were just dirt.”

Interpretation of Governing CC&R Sections

The dispute revolved around the specific language in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements.

Section

Provision

Significance in the Case

The HOA must “Replace and maintain all landscaping and other Improvements as originally installed by Declarant on the Public Yards of Lots…“

This became the dispositive clause. The Petitioner’s entire claim depended on proving the tree was “originally installed by Declarant.”

“Private Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property. “Public Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is generally visible from Neighboring Property…

This created a central point of interpretive conflict. The Petitioner argued the clause meant “enclosed and not visible,” while the HOA argued it meant “enclosed or shielded.” The Judge ultimately did not rule on this ambiguity.

“Visible from Neighboring Property” means… visible to a person six feet tall standing on any part of such neighboring property…

This definition supported the Petitioner’s claim that his backyard was, in fact, “visible” from the common area walkway.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the Petitioner’s case in both the initial hearing and the rehearing, focusing on the burden of proof related to a single, critical phrase in the CC&Rs.

Initial Decision (September 24, 2018)

• Avoidance of Ambiguity: The ALJ acknowledged the potential merit of the Petitioner’s interpretation of “Public Yard,” stating “the language of the CC&Rs may lend itself to a reading that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the enclosed back yards of the interior homes.” However, the ALJ concluded the tribunal was “not required to reach that issue in this matter.”

• Focus on “Originally Installed by Declarant”: The decision hinged entirely on Section 7.1.4. The ALJ found that the “Petitioner failed to present any evidence that the tree at issue was originally installed by the Declarant.”

• Lack of Proof: The ALJ noted that the tree’s rapid regrowth from 2013 to 2018 made it impossible to conclude that the original tree must have been planted by the developer in 2000.

• Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof, and the petition was dismissed.

Rehearing Decision (January 31, 2019)

• Rejection of Petitioner’s Inferences: The ALJ characterized the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the tree’s age and the irrigation system as “suppositions and inferences.”

• Credibility of Respondent’s Testimony: In contrast, the ALJ found the testimony of HOA President Maureen Karpinski to be “the only credible evidence offered regarding the landscaping of the homes.”

• Definitive Factual Finding: Based on Ms. Karpinski’s testimony, the ALJ concluded there was “no evidence there was any landscaping or improvements originally installed by Declarant.”

• Final Conclusion: As the precondition of Section 7.1.4 (that landscaping be “originally installed by Declarant”) was not met, the HOA had no maintenance duty for the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner again failed to establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and the petition was dismissed with finality.


Jerry R. Collis vs. Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H18020-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-20
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry R. Collis Counsel —
Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA c/o Planned Development Services Counsel Chad Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Sections 10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16; A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's challenge against the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes when issuing citations.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to HOA fine citations/improper enforcement of parking and nuisance rules

Petitioner claimed the Respondent HOA improperly issued citations against him for vehicle violations (inoperable vehicle, street parking, nuisance), asserting the HOA could not violate CC&R 10.11.4 but that the citations alleging the violation were unwarranted.

Orders: Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&Rs, Vehicle Parking, Nuisance, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H18020-REL Decision – 677244.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:27 (97.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H18020-REL


Briefing Document: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA (Case No. 19F-H18020-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H18020-REL, involving Petitioner Jerry R. Collis and Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA. The central issue was a series of violation notices and fines issued by the HOA to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle.

The petition, filed by Mr. Collis, was ultimately dismissed. The Judge ruled that Mr. Collis failed to meet the burden of proof required to show that the Laveen Meadows HOA had violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) or any applicable statutes.

The core of Mr. Collis’s argument was that the HOA wrongly cited him for having an “inoperable vehicle” under CC&R Section 10.11.4, when his vehicle was, in fact, always in operating condition. However, the Judge’s decision rested on the finding that the HOA’s actions were based on multiple violations. While all seven violation notices were titled “Inoperable Vehicle,” evidence and testimony confirmed the vehicle was also in violation of CC&R Section 10.16 (Nuisances) due to its unsightly condition (cobwebs, debris, a flat tire, and a covered window) and Section 10.11.2 (Parking on streets). Because the citations were justified by these other violations, Mr. Collis’s claim regarding the vehicle’s operability was insufficient to invalidate the HOA’s actions.

——————————————————————————–

1. Case Overview

The matter was brought before the Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by Jerry R. Collis with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on September 17, 2018. A hearing was held on December 4, 2018, to adjudicate the dispute between Mr. Collis and the Laveen Meadows HOA.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

19F-H18020-REL

Petitioner

Jerry R. Collis

Respondent

Laveen Meadows HOA

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Hearing Date

December 4, 2018

Decision Date

December 20, 2018

——————————————————————————–

2. Central Arguments and Positions

Petitioner’s Position (Jerry R. Collis)

• Mr. Collis’s primary contention was that the HOA improperly issued citations alleging his vehicle was “inoperable” in violation of CC&R Section 10.11.4.

• He testified that the vehicle was never inoperable.

• Although his initial petition stated the HOA violated Section 10.11.4, he clarified at the hearing that the issue was the HOA wrongly cited him for violating that provision.

Respondent’s Position (Laveen Meadows HOA)

• The HOA, represented by Community Manager Lisa Riesland, argued that the citations were based on more than just the “inoperable vehicle” clause.

• The HOA asserted that Mr. Collis’s vehicle was in violation of three separate CC&R sections:

◦ Section 10.11.2: Prohibiting parking on streets.

◦ Section 10.11.4: Prohibiting non-operating motor vehicles in unenclosed parking areas.

◦ Section 10.16: Prohibiting nuisances, defined to include “unsightly” conditions or those that could “reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.”

——————————————————————————–

3. Analysis of Evidence and Findings of Fact

The Judge’s decision was based on testimony and a series of seven notifications sent by the HOA to Mr. Collis between September 2016 and June 2017.

Violation Notices

• A total of seven notifications/letters were sent to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle.

• All seven notices included the identical violation description: “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.”

• Critically, none of the notices cited a specific CC&R section number that was allegedly violated.

• The letters also made reference to “cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle.”

Vehicle Condition and Nuisance Violation

• Unsightliness: Lisa Riesland provided credible testimony that at various times, the vehicle had cobwebs extending from the chassis to the ground with leaves trapped within them. This was deemed to constitute an “unsightly condition” under CC&R Section 10.16.

• Vandalism and Disrepair: At the time of the June 2017 notices, the vehicle also had a flat tire and a window covered with a bag or cardboard. Mr. Collis acknowledged these facts, explaining they were the result of vandalism.

Chronology of Violations, Fines, and Appeals

The document outlines a series of escalating fines. In each instance where a fine was issued, Mr. Collis was informed of his right to appeal to the HOA Board and his right to request an administrative hearing.

Action by HOA

Fine/Fee Charged

Evidence of Appeal by Mr. Collis

Sep 19, 2016

Notification of violation (expired tags, inoperable vehicle on street).

Not applicable

Oct 11, 2016

Notification of potential $25 fine if not corrected.

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

Dec 1, 2016

Letter informing a $25 fine had been charged.

$25.00

Mr. Collis appealed to the Board.

Jan 26, 2017

Letter from Board informing Mr. Collis his appeal was denied.

Appeal outcome. No evidence of hearing request.

Apr 20, 2017

Letter informing a $50 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$60.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

May 9, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

May 23, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

June 8, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

June 26, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

——————————————————————————–

4. Legal Rationale and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s ruling centered on the burden of proof and the contractual nature of the CC&Rs.

Burden of Proof

• Mr. Collis, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• A preponderance of the evidence is defined as evidence with the “most convincing force” that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Core Legal Conclusion

• The Judge concluded that the evidence demonstrated the HOA issued citations based on violations of CC&R Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

• Because the violations were multifaceted, Mr. Collis’s singular focus on the vehicle’s operability was insufficient to prove the HOA acted improperly.

• The decision states: “Consequently, showing that his vehicle was in operating condition would not be sufficient to show that the citations were unwarranted.”

• The Judge found that Mr. Collis failed to show that the HOA violated any of its CC&Rs, community documents, or the statutes regulating planned communities.

Final Order

• IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

• The Respondent, Laveen Meadows HOA, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.


Jerry R. Collis vs. Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H18020-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-20
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry R. Collis Counsel —
Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA c/o Planned Development Services Counsel Chad Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Sections 10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16; A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's challenge against the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes when issuing citations.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to HOA fine citations/improper enforcement of parking and nuisance rules

Petitioner claimed the Respondent HOA improperly issued citations against him for vehicle violations (inoperable vehicle, street parking, nuisance), asserting the HOA could not violate CC&R 10.11.4 but that the citations alleging the violation were unwarranted.

Orders: Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&Rs, Vehicle Parking, Nuisance, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H18020-REL Decision – 677244.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:11 (97.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H18020-REL


Briefing Document: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA (Case No. 19F-H18020-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H18020-REL, involving Petitioner Jerry R. Collis and Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA. The central issue was a series of violation notices and fines issued by the HOA to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle.

The petition, filed by Mr. Collis, was ultimately dismissed. The Judge ruled that Mr. Collis failed to meet the burden of proof required to show that the Laveen Meadows HOA had violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) or any applicable statutes.

The core of Mr. Collis’s argument was that the HOA wrongly cited him for having an “inoperable vehicle” under CC&R Section 10.11.4, when his vehicle was, in fact, always in operating condition. However, the Judge’s decision rested on the finding that the HOA’s actions were based on multiple violations. While all seven violation notices were titled “Inoperable Vehicle,” evidence and testimony confirmed the vehicle was also in violation of CC&R Section 10.16 (Nuisances) due to its unsightly condition (cobwebs, debris, a flat tire, and a covered window) and Section 10.11.2 (Parking on streets). Because the citations were justified by these other violations, Mr. Collis’s claim regarding the vehicle’s operability was insufficient to invalidate the HOA’s actions.

——————————————————————————–

1. Case Overview

The matter was brought before the Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by Jerry R. Collis with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on September 17, 2018. A hearing was held on December 4, 2018, to adjudicate the dispute between Mr. Collis and the Laveen Meadows HOA.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

19F-H18020-REL

Petitioner

Jerry R. Collis

Respondent

Laveen Meadows HOA

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Hearing Date

December 4, 2018

Decision Date

December 20, 2018

——————————————————————————–

2. Central Arguments and Positions

Petitioner’s Position (Jerry R. Collis)

• Mr. Collis’s primary contention was that the HOA improperly issued citations alleging his vehicle was “inoperable” in violation of CC&R Section 10.11.4.

• He testified that the vehicle was never inoperable.

• Although his initial petition stated the HOA violated Section 10.11.4, he clarified at the hearing that the issue was the HOA wrongly cited him for violating that provision.

Respondent’s Position (Laveen Meadows HOA)

• The HOA, represented by Community Manager Lisa Riesland, argued that the citations were based on more than just the “inoperable vehicle” clause.

• The HOA asserted that Mr. Collis’s vehicle was in violation of three separate CC&R sections:

◦ Section 10.11.2: Prohibiting parking on streets.

◦ Section 10.11.4: Prohibiting non-operating motor vehicles in unenclosed parking areas.

◦ Section 10.16: Prohibiting nuisances, defined to include “unsightly” conditions or those that could “reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.”

——————————————————————————–

3. Analysis of Evidence and Findings of Fact

The Judge’s decision was based on testimony and a series of seven notifications sent by the HOA to Mr. Collis between September 2016 and June 2017.

Violation Notices

• A total of seven notifications/letters were sent to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle.

• All seven notices included the identical violation description: “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.”

• Critically, none of the notices cited a specific CC&R section number that was allegedly violated.

• The letters also made reference to “cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle.”

Vehicle Condition and Nuisance Violation

• Unsightliness: Lisa Riesland provided credible testimony that at various times, the vehicle had cobwebs extending from the chassis to the ground with leaves trapped within them. This was deemed to constitute an “unsightly condition” under CC&R Section 10.16.

• Vandalism and Disrepair: At the time of the June 2017 notices, the vehicle also had a flat tire and a window covered with a bag or cardboard. Mr. Collis acknowledged these facts, explaining they were the result of vandalism.

Chronology of Violations, Fines, and Appeals

The document outlines a series of escalating fines. In each instance where a fine was issued, Mr. Collis was informed of his right to appeal to the HOA Board and his right to request an administrative hearing.

Action by HOA

Fine/Fee Charged

Evidence of Appeal by Mr. Collis

Sep 19, 2016

Notification of violation (expired tags, inoperable vehicle on street).

Not applicable

Oct 11, 2016

Notification of potential $25 fine if not corrected.

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

Dec 1, 2016

Letter informing a $25 fine had been charged.

$25.00

Mr. Collis appealed to the Board.

Jan 26, 2017

Letter from Board informing Mr. Collis his appeal was denied.

Appeal outcome. No evidence of hearing request.

Apr 20, 2017

Letter informing a $50 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$60.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

May 9, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

May 23, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

June 8, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

June 26, 2017

Letter informing a $100 fine and $10 mailing fee had been charged.

$110.00

No evidence of appeal or hearing request.

——————————————————————————–

4. Legal Rationale and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s ruling centered on the burden of proof and the contractual nature of the CC&Rs.

Burden of Proof

• Mr. Collis, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• A preponderance of the evidence is defined as evidence with the “most convincing force” that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Core Legal Conclusion

• The Judge concluded that the evidence demonstrated the HOA issued citations based on violations of CC&R Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

• Because the violations were multifaceted, Mr. Collis’s singular focus on the vehicle’s operability was insufficient to prove the HOA acted improperly.

• The decision states: “Consequently, showing that his vehicle was in operating condition would not be sufficient to show that the citations were unwarranted.”

• The Judge found that Mr. Collis failed to show that the HOA violated any of its CC&Rs, community documents, or the statutes regulating planned communities.

Final Order

• IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

• The Respondent, Laveen Meadows HOA, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.


Brent J Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818050-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-11
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brent J. Mathews Counsel —
Respondent American Ranch Community Association Counsel Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik

Alleged Violations

American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.

Why this result: The Board was authorized to grant a variance to the CC&Rs regarding the well on Lot 2, a power delegated to the Association, meaning the Board did not exceed its authority under the Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, when the Board entered into the 'Well Agreement' (Well Agreement 2).

Petitioner asserted that the Board violated the Bylaws by entering into Well Agreement 2, claiming the Board lacked the authority to grant exceptions or variances to the CC&Rs regarding the use of a private water well on Lot 2. The Board agreed the well existed in violation of CC&Rs Section 3.26, but argued Well Agreement 2 constituted a variance, not an amendment.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA authority, Bylaws 3.11, CC&Rs, Variance, Amendment, Well Agreement, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818050-REL Decision – 664186.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:00 (112.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818050-REL


Briefing Document: Analysis of Administrative Law Judge Decision in Mathews vs. American Ranch Community Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818050-REL, a dispute between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and the Respondent, American Ranch Community Association. The petition, filed on May 16, 2018, was ultimately dismissed by the ALJ on October 11, 2018.

The core of the dispute was the American Ranch Board of Directors’ authority to enter into a “Well Agreement” on August 9, 2016, with the owners of Lot 2. This agreement permitted the continued use of a private well for irrigation, an activity explicitly prohibited by the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Petitioner argued that this agreement constituted an unauthorized amendment to the CC&Rs, an action requiring a 75% vote of the membership, and therefore violated the Board’s powers as defined in the community’s Bylaws.

The ALJ’s decision hinged on the critical legal distinction between a “variance” and an “amendment.” The Judge concluded that the Board’s action was not an amendment but a variance granted to an individual owner. The ruling established that the community’s governing documents delegate the power to grant variances to the Architectural Review Committee. According to the Bylaws, the Board of Directors is empowered to exercise any authority delegated to the Association that is not exclusively reserved for the membership. As the power to grant variances was not reserved for the membership, the Board acted within its authority. Consequently, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, leading to the dismissal of the case.

Case Overview

Case Name

Brent J. Mathews vs. American Ranch Community Association

Case Number

18F-H1818050-REL

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Petitioner

Brent J. Mathews (representing himself)

Respondent

American Ranch Community Association (represented by Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik)

Hearing Date

September 21, 2018

Decision Date

October 11, 2018

Final Ruling

The Petition is dismissed.

The Central Dispute: The Well Agreement for Lot 2

The conflict originated from a water well installed on Lot 2 of the American Ranch community around 2007. This installation was in direct violation of the CC&Rs.

• CC&R Section 3.26 (Water Wells): This section explicitly states, “The placement, drilling and operation of water wells is prohibited on all Lots except Equestrian Lots.” The use of any approved well on an Equestrian Lot is further restricted to irrigating pasture land and providing drinking water for horses.

To address the existing violation, the Association’s Board entered into two separate agreements over several years.

1. Well Agreement 1 (June 2011): The Board and the then-owners of Lot 2 entered into an agreement that allowed the continued use of the well for irrigation. A key provision required the owners to install a water meter and pay the Association a per-gallon charge equivalent to the local water district’s rate. The Board later determined it lacked the authority to bill homeowners for water from a private well, viewing this function as the responsibility of the water district, which rendered this agreement problematic.

2. Well Agreement 2 (August 9, 2016): This agreement, the subject of the legal dispute, was executed with new prospective buyers, Mark and Diane Kaplan. The Kaplans, upon discovering Well Agreement 1 during escrow, expressed concerns and stated they would be “unable to proceed with the purchase” without clarification. Under time pressure, the Board executed Well Agreement 2, which invalidated the first agreement. The new agreement permitted the well’s continued use for irrigation purposes but stipulated that “the owners would not be billed for the water used.”

Petitioner’s Position and Arguments

After initially alleging multiple violations, including an “Open Meeting Violation,” Petitioner Brent J. Mathews was directed to clarify his claim to a single issue. His final argument focused on a specific alleged violation of the Association’s governing documents.

• Clarified Single Issue: The Petitioner asserted that the Board violated American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, which outlines the Board’s powers and duties. His formal clarification stated: “When the Board entered into the ‘Well Agreement’ they may have assumed they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. The American Ranch Community Association Bylaws do not empower the Board to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s.”

• Core Argument: The Petitioner contended that Well Agreement 2 was not merely an exception but an effective amendment of the CC&Rs.

• Supporting Rationale: Citing CC&R Section 9.3.1, which requires the “written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners” to amend the CC&Rs, the Petitioner argued the Board acted unilaterally and without the necessary membership approval.

• Conclusion: By entering into the agreement without a membership vote, the Board exceeded the powers granted to it by the Bylaws.

Respondent’s Position and Justification

The American Ranch Community Association presented its actions as a necessary and reasonable response to a complex situation, grounded in its interpretation of its duties and authority.

• Immediate Justification: The Board’s decision was prompted by an urgent request from the Kaplans on July 30, 2016. The pending sale of Lot 2 was at risk due to concerns over the validity of Well Agreement 1.

• Rationale for New Agreement: The Board determined that Well Agreement 1 was likely unenforceable because the Association lacked the “ability or authority to bill the owners of the lot for water used.” The Board concluded that entering into a new agreement to invalidate the first one was the “best course of action.”

• Nature of the Action: The Respondent’s defense implicitly framed Well Agreement 2 not as a permanent change to the community rules (an amendment), but as a specific, situational resolution (a variance) to a long-standing issue inherited from a previous Board.

The Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision provides a clear legal analysis that ultimately led to the petition’s dismissal. The ruling affirmed the Board’s authority by interpreting the Well Agreement as a variance rather than an amendment.

The decision first established that the Petitioner “bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.” The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet this standard.

The central point of the ruling was the rejection of the Petitioner’s primary argument. The Judge found the argument that the agreement constituted an amendment to be “faulty.”

• Direct Ruling on the Issue: “A variance granted to an individual owner from a restriction under the CC&Rs does not constitute an amendment of the CC&Rs.”

The ALJ outlined a clear hierarchy of power derived from the Association’s own governing documents to demonstrate that the Board acted within its purview.

1. Power to Grant Variances: CC&R Section 3.31 explicitly grants the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) the authority to grant variances from restrictions in “extenuating circumstances” if the variance does not have a “substantial adverse effect on the Owners.”

2. Delegation of Power to the Board: Bylaw Section 3.11, and specifically Section 3.11.8, grants the Board the power to “exercise for the Association all powers, duties and authority vested in or delegated to the Association and not reserved to the membership.”

3. Conclusion on Authority: The ALJ connected these two provisions directly, stating: “As the power to grant variances was delegated to the Architectural Review Committee and was not reserved to the membership, the Board had the authority to grant such a variance.”

Based on this legal reasoning, the ALJ issued a definitive order.

• Final Conclusion: “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into Well Agreement 2. Thus, Petitioner failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation of Section 3.11 of the Bylaws.”

• Order: “In view of the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition be dismissed.”


Brent J Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818050-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-11
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brent J. Mathews Counsel —
Respondent American Ranch Community Association Counsel Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik

Alleged Violations

American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.

Why this result: The Board was authorized to grant a variance to the CC&Rs regarding the well on Lot 2, a power delegated to the Association, meaning the Board did not exceed its authority under the Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, when the Board entered into the 'Well Agreement' (Well Agreement 2).

Petitioner asserted that the Board violated the Bylaws by entering into Well Agreement 2, claiming the Board lacked the authority to grant exceptions or variances to the CC&Rs regarding the use of a private water well on Lot 2. The Board agreed the well existed in violation of CC&Rs Section 3.26, but argued Well Agreement 2 constituted a variance, not an amendment.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA authority, Bylaws 3.11, CC&Rs, Variance, Amendment, Well Agreement, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818050-REL Decision – 664186.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:00 (112.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818050-REL


Briefing Document: Analysis of Administrative Law Judge Decision in Mathews vs. American Ranch Community Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818050-REL, a dispute between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and the Respondent, American Ranch Community Association. The petition, filed on May 16, 2018, was ultimately dismissed by the ALJ on October 11, 2018.

The core of the dispute was the American Ranch Board of Directors’ authority to enter into a “Well Agreement” on August 9, 2016, with the owners of Lot 2. This agreement permitted the continued use of a private well for irrigation, an activity explicitly prohibited by the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Petitioner argued that this agreement constituted an unauthorized amendment to the CC&Rs, an action requiring a 75% vote of the membership, and therefore violated the Board’s powers as defined in the community’s Bylaws.

The ALJ’s decision hinged on the critical legal distinction between a “variance” and an “amendment.” The Judge concluded that the Board’s action was not an amendment but a variance granted to an individual owner. The ruling established that the community’s governing documents delegate the power to grant variances to the Architectural Review Committee. According to the Bylaws, the Board of Directors is empowered to exercise any authority delegated to the Association that is not exclusively reserved for the membership. As the power to grant variances was not reserved for the membership, the Board acted within its authority. Consequently, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, leading to the dismissal of the case.

Case Overview

Case Name

Brent J. Mathews vs. American Ranch Community Association

Case Number

18F-H1818050-REL

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Petitioner

Brent J. Mathews (representing himself)

Respondent

American Ranch Community Association (represented by Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik)

Hearing Date

September 21, 2018

Decision Date

October 11, 2018

Final Ruling

The Petition is dismissed.

The Central Dispute: The Well Agreement for Lot 2

The conflict originated from a water well installed on Lot 2 of the American Ranch community around 2007. This installation was in direct violation of the CC&Rs.

• CC&R Section 3.26 (Water Wells): This section explicitly states, “The placement, drilling and operation of water wells is prohibited on all Lots except Equestrian Lots.” The use of any approved well on an Equestrian Lot is further restricted to irrigating pasture land and providing drinking water for horses.

To address the existing violation, the Association’s Board entered into two separate agreements over several years.

1. Well Agreement 1 (June 2011): The Board and the then-owners of Lot 2 entered into an agreement that allowed the continued use of the well for irrigation. A key provision required the owners to install a water meter and pay the Association a per-gallon charge equivalent to the local water district’s rate. The Board later determined it lacked the authority to bill homeowners for water from a private well, viewing this function as the responsibility of the water district, which rendered this agreement problematic.

2. Well Agreement 2 (August 9, 2016): This agreement, the subject of the legal dispute, was executed with new prospective buyers, Mark and Diane Kaplan. The Kaplans, upon discovering Well Agreement 1 during escrow, expressed concerns and stated they would be “unable to proceed with the purchase” without clarification. Under time pressure, the Board executed Well Agreement 2, which invalidated the first agreement. The new agreement permitted the well’s continued use for irrigation purposes but stipulated that “the owners would not be billed for the water used.”

Petitioner’s Position and Arguments

After initially alleging multiple violations, including an “Open Meeting Violation,” Petitioner Brent J. Mathews was directed to clarify his claim to a single issue. His final argument focused on a specific alleged violation of the Association’s governing documents.

• Clarified Single Issue: The Petitioner asserted that the Board violated American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, which outlines the Board’s powers and duties. His formal clarification stated: “When the Board entered into the ‘Well Agreement’ they may have assumed they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. The American Ranch Community Association Bylaws do not empower the Board to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s.”

• Core Argument: The Petitioner contended that Well Agreement 2 was not merely an exception but an effective amendment of the CC&Rs.

• Supporting Rationale: Citing CC&R Section 9.3.1, which requires the “written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners” to amend the CC&Rs, the Petitioner argued the Board acted unilaterally and without the necessary membership approval.

• Conclusion: By entering into the agreement without a membership vote, the Board exceeded the powers granted to it by the Bylaws.

Respondent’s Position and Justification

The American Ranch Community Association presented its actions as a necessary and reasonable response to a complex situation, grounded in its interpretation of its duties and authority.

• Immediate Justification: The Board’s decision was prompted by an urgent request from the Kaplans on July 30, 2016. The pending sale of Lot 2 was at risk due to concerns over the validity of Well Agreement 1.

• Rationale for New Agreement: The Board determined that Well Agreement 1 was likely unenforceable because the Association lacked the “ability or authority to bill the owners of the lot for water used.” The Board concluded that entering into a new agreement to invalidate the first one was the “best course of action.”

• Nature of the Action: The Respondent’s defense implicitly framed Well Agreement 2 not as a permanent change to the community rules (an amendment), but as a specific, situational resolution (a variance) to a long-standing issue inherited from a previous Board.

The Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision provides a clear legal analysis that ultimately led to the petition’s dismissal. The ruling affirmed the Board’s authority by interpreting the Well Agreement as a variance rather than an amendment.

The decision first established that the Petitioner “bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.” The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet this standard.

The central point of the ruling was the rejection of the Petitioner’s primary argument. The Judge found the argument that the agreement constituted an amendment to be “faulty.”

• Direct Ruling on the Issue: “A variance granted to an individual owner from a restriction under the CC&Rs does not constitute an amendment of the CC&Rs.”

The ALJ outlined a clear hierarchy of power derived from the Association’s own governing documents to demonstrate that the Board acted within its purview.

1. Power to Grant Variances: CC&R Section 3.31 explicitly grants the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) the authority to grant variances from restrictions in “extenuating circumstances” if the variance does not have a “substantial adverse effect on the Owners.”

2. Delegation of Power to the Board: Bylaw Section 3.11, and specifically Section 3.11.8, grants the Board the power to “exercise for the Association all powers, duties and authority vested in or delegated to the Association and not reserved to the membership.”

3. Conclusion on Authority: The ALJ connected these two provisions directly, stating: “As the power to grant variances was delegated to the Architectural Review Committee and was not reserved to the membership, the Board had the authority to grant such a variance.”

Based on this legal reasoning, the ALJ issued a definitive order.

• Final Conclusion: “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into Well Agreement 2. Thus, Petitioner failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation of Section 3.11 of the Bylaws.”

• Order: “In view of the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition be dismissed.”


Travis Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818053-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-31
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Travis Prall Counsel —
Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners Association Counsel Lydia Pierce Linsmeier

Alleged Violations

Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition following a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs because there was no credible evidence that the disputed landscaping (tree) had been originally installed by the developer.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the landscaping was originally installed by the Declarant, which was a prerequisite for HOA maintenance responsibility under the relevant CC&R section.

Key Issues & Findings

Neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R Section 7.1.4 by failing to maintain a tree in his back yard, arguing the back yard qualified as a 'Public Yard' and the tree was originally installed by the Declarant.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA maintenance, CC&R interpretation, burden of proof, landscaping
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 661820.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:06 (107.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818053-REL


Briefing: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA Dispute

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the findings and legal rationale from a homeowners’ association dispute between Petitioner Travis Prall and Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena HOA. The case centered on whether the HOA was responsible for maintaining a tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by neglecting maintenance in what he defined as a “Public Yard.”

The dispute was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, resulting in two decisions, an initial ruling and a subsequent ruling on rehearing, both of which dismissed the Petitioner’s case. The critical takeaway is that the case was decided not on the ambiguous definition of “Public” versus “Private” yards, but on a crucial qualifying clause in the CC&Rs. Section 7.1.4 obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping only “as originally installed by Declarant.”

The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that the tree in question was part of the original developer’s landscaping. Conversely, the HOA presented credible testimony from an early homeowner and board member stating that all backyards in the community were sold as “just dirt,” with no developer-installed landscaping or irrigation. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Petitioner’s arguments were based on “suppositions and inferences” and did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required to prove his claim.

Case Overview

This dispute was initiated by a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The core issue was the interpretation of HOA maintenance responsibilities as defined in the community’s governing documents.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

18F-H1818053-REL

Petitioner

Travis Prall

Respondent

Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Initial Hearing

September 4, 2018

Initial Decision

September 24, 2018 (Petition Dismissed)

Rehearing

January 11, 2019

Final Decision

January 31, 2019 (Petition Dismissed)

Timeline of Key Events

• 2010: Petitioner Travis Prall purchases his home, an “interior” unit, and believes the HOA is responsible for both front and backyard maintenance.

• July 26, 2014: A storm knocks over a large tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. He pays for its removal while asserting it was the HOA’s responsibility.

• Post-2014: The tree regrows from its remaining trunk.

• 2018: The HOA observes that the regrown tree’s roots are causing a “pony wall” to buckle and hires Sun King Fencing & Gates to perform repairs. The repair company recommends removing the tree to prevent recurrence.

• May 3, 2018: The HOA issues a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, requesting he “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”

• June 4, 2018: In response, the Petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal proceedings.

Central Allegation and Dispute

The Petitioner alleged that the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of its CC&Rs by “neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards.” His central claim was that his backyard, though enclosed, qualifies as a “Public Yard” under the CC&Rs and that the HOA was therefore responsible for the maintenance and removal of the problematic tree. The HOA’s demand that he handle the tree himself constituted, in his view, a violation of their duties.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

The case presented conflicting interpretations of the CC&Rs and opposing accounts of historical maintenance practices.

Petitioner’s Position (Travis Prall)

The Petitioner’s case was built on his interpretation of the CC&Rs and inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.

• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that his backyard is a “Public Yard” because, while enclosed by a four-foot wall (two-foot block plus two-foot aluminum fence), it is “generally visible from Neighboring Property” via a community walkway.

• Claim of Prior Maintenance: Testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA did provide landscaping maintenance for his backyard.

• Inferences about Original Landscaping:

◦ Posited that the large size of the tree in 2010 indicated it must have been planted by the original developer around 2000.

◦ Argued that the similar design of irrigation systems across the community suggested they were all installed during original construction, including those in backyards.

◦ Noted that the sprinkler system in his backyard wrapped around the tree, further suggesting they were installed together by the developer.

Respondent’s Position (Villas at Tierra Buena HOA)

The Respondent’s defense relied on its own interpretation of the CC&Rs, consistent historical practice, and direct testimony regarding the community’s development.

• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that an “enclosed” yard is, by definition, a “Private Yard,” making the homeowner responsible for its maintenance.

• Denial of Prior Maintenance: Stated unequivocally that it had never provided landscaping services for any resident’s backyard. Its responsibility is limited to front yards and common areas.

• Practical and Liability Concerns: Argued that it has no access to control backyard irrigation systems and that its workers entering enclosed yards would create liability issues, such as pets escaping.

• Crucial Rehearing Testimony: Presented testimony from Maureen Karpinski, the HOA Board President.

◦ Ms. Karpinski, a real estate agent, purchased her home from the developer in 2002 and was involved with the community during its construction phase.

◦ She testified with certainty that her backyard was “just dirt” with no landscaping or irrigation when she purchased it.

◦ She stated that, to the best of her knowledge, “none of the homes in Respondent’s community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the back yards and were just dirt.”

Interpretation of Governing CC&R Sections

The dispute revolved around the specific language in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements.

Section

Provision

Significance in the Case

The HOA must “Replace and maintain all landscaping and other Improvements as originally installed by Declarant on the Public Yards of Lots…“

This became the dispositive clause. The Petitioner’s entire claim depended on proving the tree was “originally installed by Declarant.”

“Private Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property. “Public Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is generally visible from Neighboring Property…

This created a central point of interpretive conflict. The Petitioner argued the clause meant “enclosed and not visible,” while the HOA argued it meant “enclosed or shielded.” The Judge ultimately did not rule on this ambiguity.

“Visible from Neighboring Property” means… visible to a person six feet tall standing on any part of such neighboring property…

This definition supported the Petitioner’s claim that his backyard was, in fact, “visible” from the common area walkway.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the Petitioner’s case in both the initial hearing and the rehearing, focusing on the burden of proof related to a single, critical phrase in the CC&Rs.

Initial Decision (September 24, 2018)

• Avoidance of Ambiguity: The ALJ acknowledged the potential merit of the Petitioner’s interpretation of “Public Yard,” stating “the language of the CC&Rs may lend itself to a reading that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the enclosed back yards of the interior homes.” However, the ALJ concluded the tribunal was “not required to reach that issue in this matter.”

• Focus on “Originally Installed by Declarant”: The decision hinged entirely on Section 7.1.4. The ALJ found that the “Petitioner failed to present any evidence that the tree at issue was originally installed by the Declarant.”

• Lack of Proof: The ALJ noted that the tree’s rapid regrowth from 2013 to 2018 made it impossible to conclude that the original tree must have been planted by the developer in 2000.

• Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof, and the petition was dismissed.

Rehearing Decision (January 31, 2019)

• Rejection of Petitioner’s Inferences: The ALJ characterized the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the tree’s age and the irrigation system as “suppositions and inferences.”

• Credibility of Respondent’s Testimony: In contrast, the ALJ found the testimony of HOA President Maureen Karpinski to be “the only credible evidence offered regarding the landscaping of the homes.”

• Definitive Factual Finding: Based on Ms. Karpinski’s testimony, the ALJ concluded there was “no evidence there was any landscaping or improvements originally installed by Declarant.”

• Final Conclusion: As the precondition of Section 7.1.4 (that landscaping be “originally installed by Declarant”) was not met, the HOA had no maintenance duty for the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner again failed to establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and the petition was dismissed with finality.


Travis Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818053-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-31
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Travis Prall Counsel —
Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners Association Counsel Lydia Pierce Linsmeier

Alleged Violations

Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition following a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs because there was no credible evidence that the disputed landscaping (tree) had been originally installed by the developer.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the landscaping was originally installed by the Declarant, which was a prerequisite for HOA maintenance responsibility under the relevant CC&R section.

Key Issues & Findings

Neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R Section 7.1.4 by failing to maintain a tree in his back yard, arguing the back yard qualified as a 'Public Yard' and the tree was originally installed by the Declarant.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA maintenance, CC&R interpretation, burden of proof, landscaping
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 661820.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:14 (107.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818053-REL


Briefing: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA Dispute

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the findings and legal rationale from a homeowners’ association dispute between Petitioner Travis Prall and Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena HOA. The case centered on whether the HOA was responsible for maintaining a tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by neglecting maintenance in what he defined as a “Public Yard.”

The dispute was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, resulting in two decisions, an initial ruling and a subsequent ruling on rehearing, both of which dismissed the Petitioner’s case. The critical takeaway is that the case was decided not on the ambiguous definition of “Public” versus “Private” yards, but on a crucial qualifying clause in the CC&Rs. Section 7.1.4 obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping only “as originally installed by Declarant.”

The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that the tree in question was part of the original developer’s landscaping. Conversely, the HOA presented credible testimony from an early homeowner and board member stating that all backyards in the community were sold as “just dirt,” with no developer-installed landscaping or irrigation. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Petitioner’s arguments were based on “suppositions and inferences” and did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required to prove his claim.

Case Overview

This dispute was initiated by a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The core issue was the interpretation of HOA maintenance responsibilities as defined in the community’s governing documents.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

18F-H1818053-REL

Petitioner

Travis Prall

Respondent

Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Initial Hearing

September 4, 2018

Initial Decision

September 24, 2018 (Petition Dismissed)

Rehearing

January 11, 2019

Final Decision

January 31, 2019 (Petition Dismissed)

Timeline of Key Events

• 2010: Petitioner Travis Prall purchases his home, an “interior” unit, and believes the HOA is responsible for both front and backyard maintenance.

• July 26, 2014: A storm knocks over a large tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. He pays for its removal while asserting it was the HOA’s responsibility.

• Post-2014: The tree regrows from its remaining trunk.

• 2018: The HOA observes that the regrown tree’s roots are causing a “pony wall” to buckle and hires Sun King Fencing & Gates to perform repairs. The repair company recommends removing the tree to prevent recurrence.

• May 3, 2018: The HOA issues a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, requesting he “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”

• June 4, 2018: In response, the Petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal proceedings.

Central Allegation and Dispute

The Petitioner alleged that the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of its CC&Rs by “neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards.” His central claim was that his backyard, though enclosed, qualifies as a “Public Yard” under the CC&Rs and that the HOA was therefore responsible for the maintenance and removal of the problematic tree. The HOA’s demand that he handle the tree himself constituted, in his view, a violation of their duties.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

The case presented conflicting interpretations of the CC&Rs and opposing accounts of historical maintenance practices.

Petitioner’s Position (Travis Prall)

The Petitioner’s case was built on his interpretation of the CC&Rs and inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.

• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that his backyard is a “Public Yard” because, while enclosed by a four-foot wall (two-foot block plus two-foot aluminum fence), it is “generally visible from Neighboring Property” via a community walkway.

• Claim of Prior Maintenance: Testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA did provide landscaping maintenance for his backyard.

• Inferences about Original Landscaping:

◦ Posited that the large size of the tree in 2010 indicated it must have been planted by the original developer around 2000.

◦ Argued that the similar design of irrigation systems across the community suggested they were all installed during original construction, including those in backyards.

◦ Noted that the sprinkler system in his backyard wrapped around the tree, further suggesting they were installed together by the developer.

Respondent’s Position (Villas at Tierra Buena HOA)

The Respondent’s defense relied on its own interpretation of the CC&Rs, consistent historical practice, and direct testimony regarding the community’s development.

• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that an “enclosed” yard is, by definition, a “Private Yard,” making the homeowner responsible for its maintenance.

• Denial of Prior Maintenance: Stated unequivocally that it had never provided landscaping services for any resident’s backyard. Its responsibility is limited to front yards and common areas.

• Practical and Liability Concerns: Argued that it has no access to control backyard irrigation systems and that its workers entering enclosed yards would create liability issues, such as pets escaping.

• Crucial Rehearing Testimony: Presented testimony from Maureen Karpinski, the HOA Board President.

◦ Ms. Karpinski, a real estate agent, purchased her home from the developer in 2002 and was involved with the community during its construction phase.

◦ She testified with certainty that her backyard was “just dirt” with no landscaping or irrigation when she purchased it.

◦ She stated that, to the best of her knowledge, “none of the homes in Respondent’s community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the back yards and were just dirt.”

Interpretation of Governing CC&R Sections

The dispute revolved around the specific language in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements.

Section

Provision

Significance in the Case

The HOA must “Replace and maintain all landscaping and other Improvements as originally installed by Declarant on the Public Yards of Lots…“

This became the dispositive clause. The Petitioner’s entire claim depended on proving the tree was “originally installed by Declarant.”

“Private Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property. “Public Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is generally visible from Neighboring Property…

This created a central point of interpretive conflict. The Petitioner argued the clause meant “enclosed and not visible,” while the HOA argued it meant “enclosed or shielded.” The Judge ultimately did not rule on this ambiguity.

“Visible from Neighboring Property” means… visible to a person six feet tall standing on any part of such neighboring property…

This definition supported the Petitioner’s claim that his backyard was, in fact, “visible” from the common area walkway.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the Petitioner’s case in both the initial hearing and the rehearing, focusing on the burden of proof related to a single, critical phrase in the CC&Rs.

Initial Decision (September 24, 2018)

• Avoidance of Ambiguity: The ALJ acknowledged the potential merit of the Petitioner’s interpretation of “Public Yard,” stating “the language of the CC&Rs may lend itself to a reading that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the enclosed back yards of the interior homes.” However, the ALJ concluded the tribunal was “not required to reach that issue in this matter.”

• Focus on “Originally Installed by Declarant”: The decision hinged entirely on Section 7.1.4. The ALJ found that the “Petitioner failed to present any evidence that the tree at issue was originally installed by the Declarant.”

• Lack of Proof: The ALJ noted that the tree’s rapid regrowth from 2013 to 2018 made it impossible to conclude that the original tree must have been planted by the developer in 2000.

• Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof, and the petition was dismissed.

Rehearing Decision (January 31, 2019)

• Rejection of Petitioner’s Inferences: The ALJ characterized the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the tree’s age and the irrigation system as “suppositions and inferences.”

• Credibility of Respondent’s Testimony: In contrast, the ALJ found the testimony of HOA President Maureen Karpinski to be “the only credible evidence offered regarding the landscaping of the homes.”

• Definitive Factual Finding: Based on Ms. Karpinski’s testimony, the ALJ concluded there was “no evidence there was any landscaping or improvements originally installed by Declarant.”

• Final Conclusion: As the precondition of Section 7.1.4 (that landscaping be “originally installed by Declarant”) was not met, the HOA had no maintenance duty for the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner again failed to establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and the petition was dismissed with finality.


Patricia Davies-Brown vs. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818039-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-09-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Patricia Davies-Brown, Individually and as Trustee of the Trust; BART A. BROWN, JR.; SCOTT R. DAVIES Counsel —
Respondent Starwood Estates Homeowners Association Counsel Daniel Campbell & Kristopher L. Smith

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs; Bylaws; Architectural Guidelines

Outcome Summary

The Petitioners' request alleging that the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association violated community documents by approving a copper-colored metal roof was denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioners failed to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence, noting that the guidelines prohibiting reflective surfaces applied primarily to windows and doors, not roofs.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or Architectural Guidelines.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Exterior Appearance and Colors provisions regarding copper-colored metal roof approval

Petitioners alleged that the HOA improperly approved a copper-colored metal roof because it constituted a reflective surface and did not blend with the natural surroundings, violating the community documents. The ALJ denied the petition, finding Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its documents, noting the reflective surfaces ban applied to windows and doors, not roofs, and the roof's appearance was acceptable.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: architectural control, CC&Rs enforcement, metal roof approval, reflective surfaces, burden of proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818039-REL Decision – 653217.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:48 (41.6 KB)

18F-H1818039-REL Decision – 659968.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:48 (104.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818039-REL


Briefing Document: Davies-Brown v. Starwood Estates HOA

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and decision in case No. 18F-H1818039-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowners Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., and Scott R. Davies (the “Petitioners”) and the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association (the “Respondent”). The core of the dispute was the HOA Board of Directors’ 2013 approval of a copper-colored metal roof for homeowners Jeff and Karen Martin.

The Petitioners alleged this approval violated the community’s CC&Rs, Bylaws, and Architectural Guidelines. Their primary arguments were that the roof was an impermissible “reflective surface,” that it did not “blend with the natural surrounding and landscape,” and that the Board lacked the authority to approve it without prior review by the Architectural Committee (ACC) and without viewing a physical sample.

The Respondent defended the Board’s decision, arguing that the Board possessed the authority to grant such approvals. They contended the prohibition on reflective surfaces in the community guidelines applies specifically to windows and doors, not roofing. Furthermore, they asserted that the roof was aesthetically compliant and that other reflective metal roofs exist within the community.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Velva Moses-Thompson, ruled in favor of the Respondent. The decision, issued on September 14, 2018, denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioners failed to meet their burden of proof. The ALJ found that the Board had the authority to approve the roof, the ban on reflective surfaces did not apply to roofing, and the Petitioners did not establish that the roof failed to blend with its natural surroundings.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

• Case Name: Patricia Davies-Brown, et al. vs. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association

• Case Number: 18F-H1818039-REL

• Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Presiding Judge: Velva Moses-Thompson, Administrative Law Judge

• Hearing Dates: July 10, 2018, and August 13, 2018

• Final Decision Date: September 14, 2018

Key Parties and Representatives

Name(s)

Representation / Contact

Petitioners

Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., Scott R. Davies

Appeared on behalf of themselves
9777 E Dreyfus Ave., Scottsdale, AZ 85260
Pat.davies-brown@cox.net

Respondent

Starwood Estates Homeowners Association

Kristopher L. Smith, Esq.
O’Connor & Campbell, P.C.
7955 S Priest Dr., Tempe, AZ 85284
kris.smith@occlaw.com

Homeowners

Jeff and Karen Martin

Owners of the property with the disputed roof at 8500 Skywood Drive, Pinetop, Arizona (Lot 40 of Starwood Estates).

Core Dispute: The Martin Residence Roof

The central conflict originated in the summer of 2013 when the Starwood Estates Board of Directors approved a request from Jeff and Karen Martin to install a copper-colored metal roof on their home. The approval was passed by a 5-1 vote. Petitioner Scott R. Davies was the sole board member who voted against the approval at that time.

The Board reviewed a brochure containing the roof’s color before granting approval but did not observe a physical sample. However, one Board member, Pat Knight, was reportedly familiar with the appearance of such roofs from a previous home she owned nearby. The petition challenging this 2013 decision was filed on or about March 26, 2018.

Petitioners’ Allegations and Arguments

The Petitioners filed their petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the HOA violated community governing documents. Their case was built on three central questions:

1. Does the exterior appearance of the Martins’ aluminum copper-colored metal roof blend with the “natural surrounding and landscape” of Starwood Estates?

2. Does such roof constitute a “reflective surface”?

3. If the answer to (1) above is no and/or the answer to (2) above is yes, did the ACC and the Board of Starwood Estates erroneously violate the provisions of the CC&R’s and GUIDELINES in permitting the Martins to install such aluminum copper-colored metal roof…?

During the hearing, the Petitioners expanded on these points, arguing:

• Reflective Surface: The copper-colored roof was a prohibited reflective surface under the Architectural Guidelines.

• Aesthetic Incompatibility: The roof did not blend with the natural surroundings as required.

• Procedural Violations:

◦ The Board violated the CC&Rs by approving the roof without first viewing a physical sample of the material.

◦ The approval was invalid because it should have first been granted by the two-person Architectural Committee (ACC) appointed by the Board.

Respondent’s Defense and Arguments

The Starwood Estates HOA maintained that its approval of the Martin roof was proper and compliant with all governing documents. Their key arguments were:

• Board Authority: The HOA asserted that either the Board of Directors or the Architectural Committee had the authority to approve the roof.

• Interpretation of “Reflective Surfaces”: The Respondent argued that the prohibition on “reflective surfaces” within the Architectural Guidelines applies specifically to windows and doors, not to roofing, which is addressed in a separate section of the guidelines.

• Aesthetic Compliance: They contended the roof, while having a “shine,” was not a barred reflective surface and did blend in with the natural surroundings.

• Precedent: The HOA noted that several other metal roofs that are reflective had been previously approved in Starwood Estates. They submitted images of reflective green and red roofs in the Pinetop Country Club area as evidence.

Referenced Governing Documents

The decision cited specific sections from the HOA’s governing documents to adjudicate the dispute.

• Section 3.1.4: Requires prior written approval from the Architectural Committee for any work that alters the exterior appearance of a Lot.

• Section 5.2: States that approvals or actions to be taken by the Association “shall be valid if given or taken by the Board.”

• Article VII, Section A(2): Grants the Board authority to exercise all powers and duties vested in the Association unless reserved to the membership.

• Article VII, Section B: Empowers the Board to “Review and approve any architectural plan for the building of any improvements on any Lots.”

• Exterior Appearance and Colors: Mandates that exterior appearance “shall blend with the natural surroundings and landscape.” It also states, “Clear aluminum window and doorframes are not permitted, nor are reflective surfaces.” A note requires the owner to submit samples of materials for ACC approval.

• Roofs, Materials, and Pitches: Stipulates that “Metal roofs are permitted only with ACC approval” and that all pitched roof materials “shall promote a continuity of texture and color.”

Evidence Presented

• Petitioner’s Exhibit 13: A photograph of the Martins’ copper-colored roof. The ALJ’s decision noted that while the image showed a reflection, the photograph itself was “blurred.”

• Respondent’s Exhibit 26: The brochure containing the color of the copper-colored roof that the Board reviewed before its 2013 approval.

• Respondent’s Exhibit 7: Images of other reflective green and red metal roofs located in the Pinetop Country Club area, which were previously approved.

• Testimony: Board member Pat Knight’s familiarity with the appearance of copper-colored roofs was noted.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The petition was denied. The ALJ found that the Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or Architectural Guidelines.

Conclusions of Law

1. Burden of Proof: The Petitioners bore the burden of proving their claims by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not. They failed to meet this standard.

2. Board Authority: The ALJ concluded that the governing documents allowed for the roof to be approved by either the Architectural Committee or the Board of Directors. The Board’s action was therefore valid.

3. Interpretation of Reflective Surfaces: The evidence established that the prohibition on “reflective surfaces” in the Architectural Guidelines applies to windows and doors. Roofs are addressed in a separate section of the guidelines. The existence of other approved shiny metal roofs further supported this interpretation.

4. Aesthetic Compliance: The Petitioners did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the copper-colored roof failed to blend in with the natural surroundings.

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because Petitioners have not established that Respondent violated the Community Bylaws, Community CC&Rs, and the Community Architectural Guidelines when Respondent approved the Martins’ request to install the copper-colored roof.

The order was made binding unless a rehearing was requested within 30 days of service.


Patricia Davies-Brown vs. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818039-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-09-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Patricia Davies-Brown, Individually and as Trustee of the Trust; BART A. BROWN, JR.; SCOTT R. DAVIES Counsel —
Respondent Starwood Estates Homeowners Association Counsel Daniel Campbell & Kristopher L. Smith

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs; Bylaws; Architectural Guidelines

Outcome Summary

The Petitioners' request alleging that the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association violated community documents by approving a copper-colored metal roof was denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioners failed to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence, noting that the guidelines prohibiting reflective surfaces applied primarily to windows and doors, not roofs.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or Architectural Guidelines.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Exterior Appearance and Colors provisions regarding copper-colored metal roof approval

Petitioners alleged that the HOA improperly approved a copper-colored metal roof because it constituted a reflective surface and did not blend with the natural surroundings, violating the community documents. The ALJ denied the petition, finding Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its documents, noting the reflective surfaces ban applied to windows and doors, not roofs, and the roof's appearance was acceptable.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: architectural control, CC&Rs enforcement, metal roof approval, reflective surfaces, burden of proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818039-REL Decision – 653217.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:05:27 (41.6 KB)

18F-H1818039-REL Decision – 659968.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:05:28 (104.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818039-REL


Briefing Document: Davies-Brown v. Starwood Estates HOA

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and decision in case No. 18F-H1818039-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowners Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., and Scott R. Davies (the “Petitioners”) and the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association (the “Respondent”). The core of the dispute was the HOA Board of Directors’ 2013 approval of a copper-colored metal roof for homeowners Jeff and Karen Martin.

The Petitioners alleged this approval violated the community’s CC&Rs, Bylaws, and Architectural Guidelines. Their primary arguments were that the roof was an impermissible “reflective surface,” that it did not “blend with the natural surrounding and landscape,” and that the Board lacked the authority to approve it without prior review by the Architectural Committee (ACC) and without viewing a physical sample.

The Respondent defended the Board’s decision, arguing that the Board possessed the authority to grant such approvals. They contended the prohibition on reflective surfaces in the community guidelines applies specifically to windows and doors, not roofing. Furthermore, they asserted that the roof was aesthetically compliant and that other reflective metal roofs exist within the community.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Velva Moses-Thompson, ruled in favor of the Respondent. The decision, issued on September 14, 2018, denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioners failed to meet their burden of proof. The ALJ found that the Board had the authority to approve the roof, the ban on reflective surfaces did not apply to roofing, and the Petitioners did not establish that the roof failed to blend with its natural surroundings.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

• Case Name: Patricia Davies-Brown, et al. vs. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association

• Case Number: 18F-H1818039-REL

• Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Presiding Judge: Velva Moses-Thompson, Administrative Law Judge

• Hearing Dates: July 10, 2018, and August 13, 2018

• Final Decision Date: September 14, 2018

Key Parties and Representatives

Name(s)

Representation / Contact

Petitioners

Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., Scott R. Davies

Appeared on behalf of themselves
9777 E Dreyfus Ave., Scottsdale, AZ 85260
Pat.davies-brown@cox.net

Respondent

Starwood Estates Homeowners Association

Kristopher L. Smith, Esq.
O’Connor & Campbell, P.C.
7955 S Priest Dr., Tempe, AZ 85284
kris.smith@occlaw.com

Homeowners

Jeff and Karen Martin

Owners of the property with the disputed roof at 8500 Skywood Drive, Pinetop, Arizona (Lot 40 of Starwood Estates).

Core Dispute: The Martin Residence Roof

The central conflict originated in the summer of 2013 when the Starwood Estates Board of Directors approved a request from Jeff and Karen Martin to install a copper-colored metal roof on their home. The approval was passed by a 5-1 vote. Petitioner Scott R. Davies was the sole board member who voted against the approval at that time.

The Board reviewed a brochure containing the roof’s color before granting approval but did not observe a physical sample. However, one Board member, Pat Knight, was reportedly familiar with the appearance of such roofs from a previous home she owned nearby. The petition challenging this 2013 decision was filed on or about March 26, 2018.

Petitioners’ Allegations and Arguments

The Petitioners filed their petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the HOA violated community governing documents. Their case was built on three central questions:

1. Does the exterior appearance of the Martins’ aluminum copper-colored metal roof blend with the “natural surrounding and landscape” of Starwood Estates?

2. Does such roof constitute a “reflective surface”?

3. If the answer to (1) above is no and/or the answer to (2) above is yes, did the ACC and the Board of Starwood Estates erroneously violate the provisions of the CC&R’s and GUIDELINES in permitting the Martins to install such aluminum copper-colored metal roof…?

During the hearing, the Petitioners expanded on these points, arguing:

• Reflective Surface: The copper-colored roof was a prohibited reflective surface under the Architectural Guidelines.

• Aesthetic Incompatibility: The roof did not blend with the natural surroundings as required.

• Procedural Violations:

◦ The Board violated the CC&Rs by approving the roof without first viewing a physical sample of the material.

◦ The approval was invalid because it should have first been granted by the two-person Architectural Committee (ACC) appointed by the Board.

Respondent’s Defense and Arguments

The Starwood Estates HOA maintained that its approval of the Martin roof was proper and compliant with all governing documents. Their key arguments were:

• Board Authority: The HOA asserted that either the Board of Directors or the Architectural Committee had the authority to approve the roof.

• Interpretation of “Reflective Surfaces”: The Respondent argued that the prohibition on “reflective surfaces” within the Architectural Guidelines applies specifically to windows and doors, not to roofing, which is addressed in a separate section of the guidelines.

• Aesthetic Compliance: They contended the roof, while having a “shine,” was not a barred reflective surface and did blend in with the natural surroundings.

• Precedent: The HOA noted that several other metal roofs that are reflective had been previously approved in Starwood Estates. They submitted images of reflective green and red roofs in the Pinetop Country Club area as evidence.

Referenced Governing Documents

The decision cited specific sections from the HOA’s governing documents to adjudicate the dispute.

• Section 3.1.4: Requires prior written approval from the Architectural Committee for any work that alters the exterior appearance of a Lot.

• Section 5.2: States that approvals or actions to be taken by the Association “shall be valid if given or taken by the Board.”

• Article VII, Section A(2): Grants the Board authority to exercise all powers and duties vested in the Association unless reserved to the membership.

• Article VII, Section B: Empowers the Board to “Review and approve any architectural plan for the building of any improvements on any Lots.”

• Exterior Appearance and Colors: Mandates that exterior appearance “shall blend with the natural surroundings and landscape.” It also states, “Clear aluminum window and doorframes are not permitted, nor are reflective surfaces.” A note requires the owner to submit samples of materials for ACC approval.

• Roofs, Materials, and Pitches: Stipulates that “Metal roofs are permitted only with ACC approval” and that all pitched roof materials “shall promote a continuity of texture and color.”

Evidence Presented

• Petitioner’s Exhibit 13: A photograph of the Martins’ copper-colored roof. The ALJ’s decision noted that while the image showed a reflection, the photograph itself was “blurred.”

• Respondent’s Exhibit 26: The brochure containing the color of the copper-colored roof that the Board reviewed before its 2013 approval.

• Respondent’s Exhibit 7: Images of other reflective green and red metal roofs located in the Pinetop Country Club area, which were previously approved.

• Testimony: Board member Pat Knight’s familiarity with the appearance of copper-colored roofs was noted.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The petition was denied. The ALJ found that the Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or Architectural Guidelines.

Conclusions of Law

1. Burden of Proof: The Petitioners bore the burden of proving their claims by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not. They failed to meet this standard.

2. Board Authority: The ALJ concluded that the governing documents allowed for the roof to be approved by either the Architectural Committee or the Board of Directors. The Board’s action was therefore valid.

3. Interpretation of Reflective Surfaces: The evidence established that the prohibition on “reflective surfaces” in the Architectural Guidelines applies to windows and doors. Roofs are addressed in a separate section of the guidelines. The existence of other approved shiny metal roofs further supported this interpretation.

4. Aesthetic Compliance: The Petitioners did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the copper-colored roof failed to blend in with the natural surroundings.

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because Petitioners have not established that Respondent violated the Community Bylaws, Community CC&Rs, and the Community Architectural Guidelines when Respondent approved the Martins’ request to install the copper-colored roof.

The order was made binding unless a rehearing was requested within 30 days of service.


John L. Shields vs. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch

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Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717034-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-02-26
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John L. Shields Counsel —
Respondent Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Counsel Maria R. Kupillas

Alleged Violations

CC&R § 6.2(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated its CC&Rs by approving the wall extension, as the HOA’s approval duties were limited to aesthetic considerations under CC&R § 7.2 and did not extend to enforcing or ensuring adjoining owner approval required by CC&R § 6.2(A).

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent erroneously approved the proposal, as Respondent's duties under CC&R § 7.2 did not require considering adjoining neighbor approval specified in CC&R § 6.2(A).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs by HOA improperly approving a neighbor's block wall extension without adjoining owner's approval.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R § 6.2(A) by approving a neighbor's block wall extension that served as a party wall because Petitioner, the adjoining owner, had not approved the wall. Respondent argued their approval duties under CC&R § 7.2 only concerned aesthetics, not ensuring neighbor approval.

Orders: The petition is dismissed and no action is required of Respondent.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • CC&R § 6.2(A)
  • CC&R § 7.2

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Architectural Control Committee, Fence, Party Wall, Rehearing, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717034-REL-RHG Decision – 619560.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:27 (90.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717034-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Analysis of Administrative Law Judge Decision in Shields v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in Case No. 17F-H1717034-REL-RHG, dated February 26, 2018. The central issue was a petition filed by homeowner John L. Shields against the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Homeowners’ Association (HOA), alleging the HOA improperly approved a wall extension built by his neighbor, Joe Johnson, without Mr. Shields’ required consent.

The petition was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the petitioner, Mr. Shields, failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The decision rests on a critical distinction between the responsibilities of a homeowner and the responsibilities of the HOA under separate articles of the CC&Rs. The ALJ determined that the obligation to secure an adjoining neighbor’s approval for a wall alteration (under CC&R § 6.2) falls exclusively on the homeowner undertaking the project. In contrast, the HOA’s duty (under CC&R § 7.2) is limited to an aesthetic review of the proposed alteration, which it conducted appropriately. The HOA had no legal obligation to enforce or verify neighbor-to-neighbor approval.

I. Case Overview

Case Name

John L. Shields (Petitioner) vs. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch (Respondent)

Case Number

17F-H1717034-REL-RHG

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Date of Decision

February 26, 2018

Core Dispute

The petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R § 6.2(A) by approving a neighbor’s approximately 5’ x 6’ block wall extension without the petitioner’s consent.

Final Outcome

The petition was dismissed, with no action required of the respondent HOA.

II. Petitioner’s Claim and Arguments

John L. Shields, a homeowner at 20431 E. Bronco Drive within the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch development, filed a petition against the HOA concerning a wall extension built by his next-door neighbor, Joe Johnson.

• Core Allegation: After vacillating on the specifics of his complaint during the hearing, Mr. Shields firmly asserted that his single issue was that the HOA improperly approved Mr. Johnson’s proposal to build a block wall extension and move his gate forward.

• Basis of Claim: The petitioner argued that under CC&R § 6.2, the HOA should have withheld its approval because Mr. Johnson had not demonstrated that he had first obtained Mr. Shields’ approval for the wall extension between their properties.

• Evidence and Testimony: Mr. Shields denied ever having approved the wall. He submitted a photograph he had taken from his front porch and testified that the block wall extension “was an eyesore.”

III. Respondent’s Position and Evidence

The Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch HOA, represented by board president Kristi Hancock, denied all complaint items and argued its actions were consistent with the governing CC&Rs.

• Basis of Approval: The HOA contended that its approval was based solely on the criteria outlined in CC&R § 7.2. The board, acting as the Architectural Control Committee, reviewed Mr. Johnson’s proposal for its aesthetic qualities and consistency with other properties in the development.

• Aesthetic Review: Ms. Hancock testified that the board inspected other wall extensions and gates and found Mr. Johnson’s proposal to be “aesthetically pleasing and consistent with the other properties.”

• Neighbor Consent Issue: The HOA acknowledged its awareness of Mr. Shields’ objection to the wall after it was built. However, Ms. Hancock testified that the board’s understanding of whether Mr. Shields had approved the wall before construction was unclear. She stated that “at least four witnesses had stated that they heard Petitioner either actually approve of or fail to state an objection to the block wall extension while, in Petitioner’s presence, Mr. Johnson discussed having the block wall extension built.”

• Separation of Duties: The HOA’s position was that its duty under § 7.2 was distinct from the homeowner’s duty under § 6.2. The HOA was not responsible for obtaining or verifying neighbor approval.

IV. Chronology of Key Events

1. October 13, 2016 (approx.): Mr. Johnson has the block wall extension built without first obtaining approval from the HOA’s board or committee.

2. October 16, 2016 (approx.): Mr. Shields expresses his disapproval of the newly built wall to Mr. and Mrs. Johnson.

3. November 2, 2016 (approx.): Mr. Johnson retroactively submits his proposal for the wall extension and a plan to move his gate forward to the Architectural Control Committee for approval.

4. November 2016: The HOA’s newly elected board meets as the Committee and verbally approves Mr. Johnson’s wall but advises him that “he will need to seek neighboring property owner’s approval.”

5. January 2017: The board formally approves Mr. Johnson’s proposal for the wall extension and gate move.

6. May 3, 2017 (approx.): Mr. Shields files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

7. September 27, 2017: An initial hearing is held, and Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky dismisses the petition.

8. December 5, 2017: The Real Estate Commissioner grants Mr. Shields’ request for a rehearing based on his claims of legal errors and judicial misconduct.

9. February 5, 2018: A rehearing is held before Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

V. Analysis of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The judge’s decision hinged on the distinct and separate functions of two key CC&R sections.

This section governs alterations to shared fences and walls.

Such Party Walls and Fences shall not be altered, or changed in design, color, material or construction from the original installation made by the Developer without [the] approval of the adjoining Owner(s), if any, and the [Architectural Control] Committee.

• Interpretation: The ALJ interpreted this section as creating two separate approval requirements for the homeowner making the alteration: one from the adjoining owner and one from the Committee. It does not obligate the Committee to enforce the adjoining owner’s approval.

This section defines the scope and limits of the Architectural Control Committee’s power.

No . . . fences . . . shall be commenced [or] erected . . . until the plans and specifications showing the same shall have been submitted to and approved by the Committee. Approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. However, the Committee shall have the right to refuse to approve any Alteration which is not suitable or desirable in their opinion for aesthetic or other reasons…

• Interpretation: The ALJ found that this section limits the Committee’s review to specific criteria, including aesthetics, harmony with surroundings, and effect on neighboring property. It explicitly states that approval “shall not be unreasonably withheld” and does not require the Committee to verify compliance with other CC&Rs or city ordinances.

VI. Judge’s Conclusions of Law and Rationale for Dismissal

The ALJ’s decision to dismiss the petition was based on a clear legal interpretation of the CC&Rs and the petitioner’s failure to meet the burden of proof.

• Distinct and Separate Obligations: The core of the ruling is that the CC&Rs create parallel but separate responsibilities.

1. Homeowner’s Responsibility: The duty to obtain an adjoining neighbor’s approval for a shared wall alteration under § 6.2(A) rests solely with the homeowner performing the work (Mr. Johnson).

2. HOA’s Responsibility: The HOA’s duty under § 7.2 is limited to reviewing the project on its aesthetic merits and consistency within the community.

• Key Legal Finding: The decision explicitly states the separation of these duties:

• Scope of HOA Review: The ALJ affirmed that the HOA’s scope of review was properly limited.

• Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Because the HOA acted within the authority and limitations defined by CC&R § 7.2, the petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated its governing documents.

• Other Responsibilities: The decision also noted that the responsibility for ensuring compliance with City of Queen Creek ordinances (related to the gate move) ultimately rested with Mr. Johnson, not the HOA.

VII. Final Order

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the petition be dismissed.

• No action is required of the Respondent, Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch HOA.

• The decision, issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

• Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.