Michael Stoltenberg vs Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918038-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole D. Payne

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs §§ 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, and 14.2

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA acted in accordance with its governing documents (CC&Rs § 4.1) by imposing uniform assessments. The CC&Rs did not provide an exception for reduced assessments based on an owner's choice of landscaping (rock yard) or refusal of HOA maintenance services.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, as CC&R § 4.1 requires uniform assessment and no provision requires or allows Respondent to assess Petitioner less due to his rock yard and refusal of maintenance.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA Assessment Uniformity Requirement

Petitioner, who had rock landscaping and refused HOA maintenance, alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by assessing him uniform dues, arguing he should pay less since HOA expenditures on lawn maintenance were substantial and primarily benefited neighbors with grass yards.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs § 4.1
  • CC&Rs § 5.1(a)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment, Uniform Dues, CC&R Enforcement, Landscaping Maintenance
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918038-REL Decision – 698869.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:08:35 (141.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918038-REL


Briefing Document: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918038-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). The core conflict centered on Mr. Stoltenberg’s claim that he should pay lower HOA assessments because his property has rock landscaping, while his neighbors have grass yards requiring more costly maintenance by the HOA.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately denied the petition. The decision rested on an unambiguous interpretation of the HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Judge found that the CC&Rs explicitly obligate the HOA to maintain landscaping on all individual lots and, crucially, require assessments to be uniform for all members to cover these “common expenses.” The petitioner’s argument for a reduced assessment was unsupported by any provision in the governing documents. Furthermore, evidence showed that Mr. Stoltenberg had actively refused the HOA access to his property to install a community irrigation system and to perform the very landscaping maintenance that is a central component of the assessments.

Case Overview

Case Number: 19F-H1918038-REL

Parties Involved:

Petitioner: Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner at 11777 E. Calle Gaudi, Rancho Del Oro.

Respondent: Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA).

Hearing Date: March 19, 2019

Presiding Judge: Diane Mihalsky, Administrative Law Judge

Core Allegation: On December 29, 2018, the Petitioner filed a petition alleging the HOA violated multiple sections of its CC&Rs (§§ 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, and 14.2) by levying the same assessment fees on his property as on neighboring properties with grass lawns.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence (Michael Stoltenberg)

The Petitioner’s case was built on the argument of fairness, contending that his assessment should be lower because his property does not utilize the HOA’s most expensive landscaping services.

Primary Argument: It is inequitable for the HOA to charge him the same amount as neighbors with grass yards, given that his front yard is rock and does not receive the same level of maintenance.

Financial Evidence: The Petitioner testified that in 2016, the HOA spent $54,000 on lawn maintenance and landscaping, which constituted 39% of its total budget.

Refusal of Services: The Petitioner acknowledged that he refused to allow the HOA access to his property for two key purposes:

1. To install irrigation pipes connecting his lot to a new community well.

2. To perform any landscape maintenance on his front yard.

Justification for Refusal: The Petitioner accused the HOA of previously killing his trees during maintenance activities and stated that he now undertakes all maintenance of his own yard.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence (Rancho Del Oro HOA)

The HOA’s defense was grounded in its adherence to the plain language of its governing documents, arguing that its actions were not only permissible but mandated by the CC&Rs.

Primary Argument: The HOA is legally bound by its CC&Rs to levy uniform assessments on all members and is simultaneously obligated to maintain the landscaping on every individual lot.

Key Testimony (Diana Crites, Property Manager):

◦ CC&R § 5.1(a) explicitly requires the HOA to maintain the yards of its members.

◦ CC&R § 4.1 requires all owners to be assessed uniformly, without regard to the type of landscaping they have chosen or whether they permit the HOA to perform its maintenance duties.

◦ The Petitioner’s property is one of eight constructed by a different developer, who did not originally install grass or an irrigation system.

◦ The HOA has since drilled a community well to address water costs and has offered to remove rock and install grass for these properties, an offer the Petitioner could accept.

Supporting Evidence (Letter from Dawn Simpson, former bookkeeper):

◦ A 2013 HOA project was initiated to install a community well for landscaping and to connect all homes, including the Petitioner’s.

◦ The letter details an incident where the Petitioner “became very heated with [the] contractor” and “declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose.”

◦ This action directly halted all construction to connect his property to the irrigation system and ceased all landscaping services provided by the HOA.

Analysis of Governing Documents (CC&Rs)

The judge’s decision centered on the clear, unambiguous language of specific articles within the CC&Rs. The petitioner failed to identify any language that would permit or require a non-uniform assessment.

CC&R Section

Key Language

Implication & Ruling

Article IV, Section 4.1

Assessments “shall be used for the… common benefit… of the Owners” and “shall constitute common expenses for which the apartment owners shall be severally liable in proportion to their respective common interests.”

This establishes the principle of uniform, shared liability for common expenses, regardless of an individual owner’s specific use of a particular service.

Article V, Section 5.1(a)

“The Association shall maintain… landscaping… It shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.”

This article imposes a direct obligation on the HOA to maintain all members’ landscaping, not merely an optional service.

Legal Conclusions and Final Order

Burden of Proof: The decision established that the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, held the burden to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

Interpretation of Covenants: In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. The judge found the CC&Rs to be unambiguous, requiring a holistic interpretation. The documents clearly mandate that the HOA must maintain all yards and must assess all members equally to fund that maintenance.

Final Ruling: The Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof. He failed to point to any provision within the CC&Rs that “allows, much less requires, Respondent to assess Petitioner less because he has a rock yard and will not allow Respondent to maintain his yard.”

Order: The petition was denied. The HOA’s practice of charging uniform assessments was upheld as compliant with its governing documents.


Michael Stoltenberg vs Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918038-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole D. Payne

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs §§ 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, and 14.2

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA acted in accordance with its governing documents (CC&Rs § 4.1) by imposing uniform assessments. The CC&Rs did not provide an exception for reduced assessments based on an owner's choice of landscaping (rock yard) or refusal of HOA maintenance services.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, as CC&R § 4.1 requires uniform assessment and no provision requires or allows Respondent to assess Petitioner less due to his rock yard and refusal of maintenance.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA Assessment Uniformity Requirement

Petitioner, who had rock landscaping and refused HOA maintenance, alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by assessing him uniform dues, arguing he should pay less since HOA expenditures on lawn maintenance were substantial and primarily benefited neighbors with grass yards.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs § 4.1
  • CC&Rs § 5.1(a)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment, Uniform Dues, CC&R Enforcement, Landscaping Maintenance
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918038-REL Decision – 698869.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:59 (141.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918038-REL


Briefing Document: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918038-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). The core conflict centered on Mr. Stoltenberg’s claim that he should pay lower HOA assessments because his property has rock landscaping, while his neighbors have grass yards requiring more costly maintenance by the HOA.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately denied the petition. The decision rested on an unambiguous interpretation of the HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Judge found that the CC&Rs explicitly obligate the HOA to maintain landscaping on all individual lots and, crucially, require assessments to be uniform for all members to cover these “common expenses.” The petitioner’s argument for a reduced assessment was unsupported by any provision in the governing documents. Furthermore, evidence showed that Mr. Stoltenberg had actively refused the HOA access to his property to install a community irrigation system and to perform the very landscaping maintenance that is a central component of the assessments.

Case Overview

Case Number: 19F-H1918038-REL

Parties Involved:

Petitioner: Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner at 11777 E. Calle Gaudi, Rancho Del Oro.

Respondent: Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA).

Hearing Date: March 19, 2019

Presiding Judge: Diane Mihalsky, Administrative Law Judge

Core Allegation: On December 29, 2018, the Petitioner filed a petition alleging the HOA violated multiple sections of its CC&Rs (§§ 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, and 14.2) by levying the same assessment fees on his property as on neighboring properties with grass lawns.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence (Michael Stoltenberg)

The Petitioner’s case was built on the argument of fairness, contending that his assessment should be lower because his property does not utilize the HOA’s most expensive landscaping services.

Primary Argument: It is inequitable for the HOA to charge him the same amount as neighbors with grass yards, given that his front yard is rock and does not receive the same level of maintenance.

Financial Evidence: The Petitioner testified that in 2016, the HOA spent $54,000 on lawn maintenance and landscaping, which constituted 39% of its total budget.

Refusal of Services: The Petitioner acknowledged that he refused to allow the HOA access to his property for two key purposes:

1. To install irrigation pipes connecting his lot to a new community well.

2. To perform any landscape maintenance on his front yard.

Justification for Refusal: The Petitioner accused the HOA of previously killing his trees during maintenance activities and stated that he now undertakes all maintenance of his own yard.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence (Rancho Del Oro HOA)

The HOA’s defense was grounded in its adherence to the plain language of its governing documents, arguing that its actions were not only permissible but mandated by the CC&Rs.

Primary Argument: The HOA is legally bound by its CC&Rs to levy uniform assessments on all members and is simultaneously obligated to maintain the landscaping on every individual lot.

Key Testimony (Diana Crites, Property Manager):

◦ CC&R § 5.1(a) explicitly requires the HOA to maintain the yards of its members.

◦ CC&R § 4.1 requires all owners to be assessed uniformly, without regard to the type of landscaping they have chosen or whether they permit the HOA to perform its maintenance duties.

◦ The Petitioner’s property is one of eight constructed by a different developer, who did not originally install grass or an irrigation system.

◦ The HOA has since drilled a community well to address water costs and has offered to remove rock and install grass for these properties, an offer the Petitioner could accept.

Supporting Evidence (Letter from Dawn Simpson, former bookkeeper):

◦ A 2013 HOA project was initiated to install a community well for landscaping and to connect all homes, including the Petitioner’s.

◦ The letter details an incident where the Petitioner “became very heated with [the] contractor” and “declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose.”

◦ This action directly halted all construction to connect his property to the irrigation system and ceased all landscaping services provided by the HOA.

Analysis of Governing Documents (CC&Rs)

The judge’s decision centered on the clear, unambiguous language of specific articles within the CC&Rs. The petitioner failed to identify any language that would permit or require a non-uniform assessment.

CC&R Section

Key Language

Implication & Ruling

Article IV, Section 4.1

Assessments “shall be used for the… common benefit… of the Owners” and “shall constitute common expenses for which the apartment owners shall be severally liable in proportion to their respective common interests.”

This establishes the principle of uniform, shared liability for common expenses, regardless of an individual owner’s specific use of a particular service.

Article V, Section 5.1(a)

“The Association shall maintain… landscaping… It shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.”

This article imposes a direct obligation on the HOA to maintain all members’ landscaping, not merely an optional service.

Legal Conclusions and Final Order

Burden of Proof: The decision established that the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, held the burden to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

Interpretation of Covenants: In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. The judge found the CC&Rs to be unambiguous, requiring a holistic interpretation. The documents clearly mandate that the HOA must maintain all yards and must assess all members equally to fund that maintenance.

Final Ruling: The Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof. He failed to point to any provision within the CC&Rs that “allows, much less requires, Respondent to assess Petitioner less because he has a rock yard and will not allow Respondent to maintain his yard.”

Order: The petition was denied. The HOA’s practice of charging uniform assessments was upheld as compliant with its governing documents.


Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-01
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brad W. Stevens Counsel
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Greg Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A). The increase in the regular assessment (14.1%) was below the statutory 20% limit, and the overall increase included a special assessment which the statute does not cover.

Why this result: The Petitioner's definition of 'regular assessment' was rejected as not supported by statutory construction principles, and the issue was limited to the definition and application of ARS § 33-1803(A).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A) by increasing the regular assessment more than 20%.

Petitioner alleged that the HOA's total assessment increase of $325 (which was 39.4% over the previous assessment of $825) constituted an unlawful increase of the 'regular assessment' under ARS § 33-1803(A). The HOA argued the increase to the 'regular assessment' was only 14.1% ($116 increase), and the remaining $209 was a separate, one-time assessment.

Orders: Petitioner Brad W. Stevens’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment, Statutory Interpretation, Regular Assessment, Special Assessment, ARS 33-1803(A)
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 692388.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:21 (102.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the matter of Brad W. Stevens versus Mogollon Airpark, Inc., a case centered on the legality of a homeowner association (HOA) assessment increase. The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, ultimately dismissed the petition filed by Mr. Stevens, finding he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mogollon Airpark violated Arizona state law.

The core of the dispute was a $325 increase to the annual assessment for 2018, which represented a 39.4% increase over the previous year’s $825 fee. The petitioner alleged this violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), which prohibits HOAs from increasing a “regular assessment” by more than 20% without member approval. The respondent, Mogollon Airpark, argued the increase was composed of two distinct parts: a 14.1% ($116) increase to the regular assessment to cover a budget shortfall, and a separate $209 one-time “special assessment” to replenish a reserve fund.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a critical interpretation of statutory language, concluding that “regular assessments” and “special assessments” are legally distinct categories. The judge rejected the petitioner’s argument that “regular” refers to the process of an assessment rather than its type, deeming this interpretation contrary to principles of statutory construction and nonsensical. Furthermore, the judge found the petitioner’s legal citations to be inapplicable and confirmed that the scope of the hearing was limited strictly to the alleged violation of the 20% rule, not the HOA’s general authority to levy special assessments.

Case Background and Procedural History

Parties:

Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens

Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (HOA)

Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, on behalf of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

Timeline:

June 7, 2018: Mr. Stevens files a single-issue petition with the Department of Real Estate.

September 28, 2018: An initial hearing is conducted on the matter, consolidated with two others.

January 2, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Rehearing.

February 11, 2019: The rehearing is conducted.

March 1, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, dismissing the petition.

The matter came before the Office of Administrative Hearings for a rehearing after Mr. Stevens alleged errors of law and an abuse of discretion in the original hearing’s decision.

The Core Dispute: The 2018 Assessment Increase

The central facts of the case revolve around a decision made at a Mogollon Airpark board meeting in November 2017. To address a shortage in its operating budget and to replenish approximately $53,000 borrowed from its reserve fund, the Board approved a two-part increase to its annual fees.

Assessment Component

Previous Year (2017)

2018 Increase

Justification

Percentage Increase

Regular Assessment

+ $116

Cover operating budget shortfall

Special Assessment

+ $209

Replenish reserve fund

Total Assessment

+ $325

Total for 2018

This total 39.4% increase formed the basis of Mr. Stevens’s legal challenge under A.R.S. § 33-1803(A), which limits increases to “regular assessments” to 20% over the preceding fiscal year.

Analysis of Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Brad W. Stevens)

Mr. Stevens’s case was built on the assertion that the entire $325 increase constituted a single “regular assessment” and was therefore illegal. His key arguments were:

Definition of “Regular”: He contended that “regular” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created—i.e., one that is “according to rule.” He argued that it does not denote a type of assessment (e.g., recurring vs. one-time).

Lack of Authority for Special Assessments: Mr. Stevens argued that Mogollon Airpark has no authority to issue special assessments. Therefore, any assessment it imposes, regardless of its label, must legally be considered a “regular assessment.”

Legal Precedent: He cited Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona to define a “special assessment,” arguing that the $209 charge did not qualify because he received no “particularized benefit” as required by that case. He also presented definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary.

Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)

Mogollon Airpark’s defense was straightforward and relied on the distinction between the two components of the assessment increase:

Statutory Limitation: The respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.”

Compliance with Statute: The increase to the regular assessment was $116, a 14.1% rise over the previous year’s $825 fee. This amount is well within the 20% statutory limit.

Distinct Nature of Assessments: The $209 charge was a separate, one-time “special assessment” intended for a specific purpose (replenishing the reserve fund) and is not subject to the 20% limitation governing regular assessments.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ systematically dismantled the petitioner’s arguments, finding they were not supported by evidence or principles of statutory construction.

Rejection of Petitioner’s Statutory Interpretation

• The ALJ found that Mr. Stevens’s definition of “regular” as referring to the assessment process was an insupportable interpretation. If all validly passed assessments were “regular,” the word “regular” in the statute would be “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”

• To support this conclusion, the decision points to A.R.S. § 33-1806, where the legislature explicitly references “regular assessments” and “special assessment[s],” demonstrating a clear intent to treat them as different types of assessments.

• The judge characterized the petitioner’s logic as leading to a “nonsensical result.” Under Mr. Stevens’s reasoning, an unauthorized special assessment would become a valid regular assessment, a position deemed not to be a “sensible interpretation of the statute.” A more reasonable conclusion, the judge noted, would be that an unauthorized assessment is simply void.

Misapplication of Legal Precedent

• The petitioner’s reliance on Northwest Fire District was deemed “misplaced.” The judge clarified that this case applies to special taxing districts created under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 48, a legal framework that does not govern an HOA like Mogollon Airpark.

Scope of the Hearing and Burden of Proof

• The ALJ emphasized that the hearing was limited by the petitioner’s “single-issue petition.” The only question properly before the tribunal was whether A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) had been violated.

• Consequently, the broader question of whether Mogollon Airpark’s bylaws grant it the authority to impose special assessments was “not at issue.” This rendered the various definitions of “special assessment” offered by Mr. Stevens as having “no substantial probative value” to the case at hand.

• The final legal conclusion was that Mr. Stevens, who bore the burden of proof, failed to show by a “preponderance of the evidence” that Mogollon Airpark violated the statute.

Final Order and Disposition

Based on the findings and conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

Order: The petition of Brad W. Stevens is dismissed.

Prevailing Party: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. is deemed the prevailing party.

Binding Nature: The decision, issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

Appeal Process: Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.


Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-01
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brad W. Stevens Counsel
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Greg Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A). The increase in the regular assessment (14.1%) was below the statutory 20% limit, and the overall increase included a special assessment which the statute does not cover.

Why this result: The Petitioner's definition of 'regular assessment' was rejected as not supported by statutory construction principles, and the issue was limited to the definition and application of ARS § 33-1803(A).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A) by increasing the regular assessment more than 20%.

Petitioner alleged that the HOA's total assessment increase of $325 (which was 39.4% over the previous assessment of $825) constituted an unlawful increase of the 'regular assessment' under ARS § 33-1803(A). The HOA argued the increase to the 'regular assessment' was only 14.1% ($116 increase), and the remaining $209 was a separate, one-time assessment.

Orders: Petitioner Brad W. Stevens’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment, Statutory Interpretation, Regular Assessment, Special Assessment, ARS 33-1803(A)
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 692388.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:09 (102.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the matter of Brad W. Stevens versus Mogollon Airpark, Inc., a case centered on the legality of a homeowner association (HOA) assessment increase. The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, ultimately dismissed the petition filed by Mr. Stevens, finding he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mogollon Airpark violated Arizona state law.

The core of the dispute was a $325 increase to the annual assessment for 2018, which represented a 39.4% increase over the previous year’s $825 fee. The petitioner alleged this violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), which prohibits HOAs from increasing a “regular assessment” by more than 20% without member approval. The respondent, Mogollon Airpark, argued the increase was composed of two distinct parts: a 14.1% ($116) increase to the regular assessment to cover a budget shortfall, and a separate $209 one-time “special assessment” to replenish a reserve fund.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a critical interpretation of statutory language, concluding that “regular assessments” and “special assessments” are legally distinct categories. The judge rejected the petitioner’s argument that “regular” refers to the process of an assessment rather than its type, deeming this interpretation contrary to principles of statutory construction and nonsensical. Furthermore, the judge found the petitioner’s legal citations to be inapplicable and confirmed that the scope of the hearing was limited strictly to the alleged violation of the 20% rule, not the HOA’s general authority to levy special assessments.

Case Background and Procedural History

Parties:

Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens

Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (HOA)

Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, on behalf of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

Timeline:

June 7, 2018: Mr. Stevens files a single-issue petition with the Department of Real Estate.

September 28, 2018: An initial hearing is conducted on the matter, consolidated with two others.

January 2, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Rehearing.

February 11, 2019: The rehearing is conducted.

March 1, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, dismissing the petition.

The matter came before the Office of Administrative Hearings for a rehearing after Mr. Stevens alleged errors of law and an abuse of discretion in the original hearing’s decision.

The Core Dispute: The 2018 Assessment Increase

The central facts of the case revolve around a decision made at a Mogollon Airpark board meeting in November 2017. To address a shortage in its operating budget and to replenish approximately $53,000 borrowed from its reserve fund, the Board approved a two-part increase to its annual fees.

Assessment Component

Previous Year (2017)

2018 Increase

Justification

Percentage Increase

Regular Assessment

+ $116

Cover operating budget shortfall

Special Assessment

+ $209

Replenish reserve fund

Total Assessment

+ $325

Total for 2018

This total 39.4% increase formed the basis of Mr. Stevens’s legal challenge under A.R.S. § 33-1803(A), which limits increases to “regular assessments” to 20% over the preceding fiscal year.

Analysis of Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Brad W. Stevens)

Mr. Stevens’s case was built on the assertion that the entire $325 increase constituted a single “regular assessment” and was therefore illegal. His key arguments were:

Definition of “Regular”: He contended that “regular” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created—i.e., one that is “according to rule.” He argued that it does not denote a type of assessment (e.g., recurring vs. one-time).

Lack of Authority for Special Assessments: Mr. Stevens argued that Mogollon Airpark has no authority to issue special assessments. Therefore, any assessment it imposes, regardless of its label, must legally be considered a “regular assessment.”

Legal Precedent: He cited Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona to define a “special assessment,” arguing that the $209 charge did not qualify because he received no “particularized benefit” as required by that case. He also presented definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary.

Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)

Mogollon Airpark’s defense was straightforward and relied on the distinction between the two components of the assessment increase:

Statutory Limitation: The respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.”

Compliance with Statute: The increase to the regular assessment was $116, a 14.1% rise over the previous year’s $825 fee. This amount is well within the 20% statutory limit.

Distinct Nature of Assessments: The $209 charge was a separate, one-time “special assessment” intended for a specific purpose (replenishing the reserve fund) and is not subject to the 20% limitation governing regular assessments.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ systematically dismantled the petitioner’s arguments, finding they were not supported by evidence or principles of statutory construction.

Rejection of Petitioner’s Statutory Interpretation

• The ALJ found that Mr. Stevens’s definition of “regular” as referring to the assessment process was an insupportable interpretation. If all validly passed assessments were “regular,” the word “regular” in the statute would be “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”

• To support this conclusion, the decision points to A.R.S. § 33-1806, where the legislature explicitly references “regular assessments” and “special assessment[s],” demonstrating a clear intent to treat them as different types of assessments.

• The judge characterized the petitioner’s logic as leading to a “nonsensical result.” Under Mr. Stevens’s reasoning, an unauthorized special assessment would become a valid regular assessment, a position deemed not to be a “sensible interpretation of the statute.” A more reasonable conclusion, the judge noted, would be that an unauthorized assessment is simply void.

Misapplication of Legal Precedent

• The petitioner’s reliance on Northwest Fire District was deemed “misplaced.” The judge clarified that this case applies to special taxing districts created under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 48, a legal framework that does not govern an HOA like Mogollon Airpark.

Scope of the Hearing and Burden of Proof

• The ALJ emphasized that the hearing was limited by the petitioner’s “single-issue petition.” The only question properly before the tribunal was whether A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) had been violated.

• Consequently, the broader question of whether Mogollon Airpark’s bylaws grant it the authority to impose special assessments was “not at issue.” This rendered the various definitions of “special assessment” offered by Mr. Stevens as having “no substantial probative value” to the case at hand.

• The final legal conclusion was that Mr. Stevens, who bore the burden of proof, failed to show by a “preponderance of the evidence” that Mogollon Airpark violated the statute.

Final Order and Disposition

Based on the findings and conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

Order: The petition of Brad W. Stevens is dismissed.

Prevailing Party: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. is deemed the prevailing party.

Binding Nature: The decision, issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

Appeal Process: Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.