Case Summary
| Case ID | 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG |
|---|---|
| Agency | ADRE |
| Tribunal | OAH |
| Decision Date | 2018-09-25 |
| Administrative Law Judge | Tammy L. Eigenheer |
| Outcome | loss |
| Filing Fees Refunded | $0.00 |
| Civil Penalties | $0.00 |
Parties & Counsel
| Petitioner | Thomas P. Satterlee | Counsel | — |
|---|---|---|---|
| Respondent | Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association | Counsel | James A. Robles |
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition with prejudice, concluding that the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent HOA did not meet the definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to convince the ALJ that 'roadway,' as used in the governing statute, encompassed the entire 'right-of-way' or the landscaping maintained by the HOA.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether the Respondent is a 'planned community' subject to ADRE jurisdiction based on having a covenant to maintain 'roadways.'
The Petitioner claimed the HOA was a 'planned community' because it maintained landscaping at the entrance, arguing this constituted maintaining 'roadways' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The ALJ found that 'roadways' refers to the part of the road intended for vehicle travel, not surrounding landscaping, thus finding the Respondent was not a planned community and dismissing the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
- Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
- Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
- Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
- Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
- Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)
Analytics Highlights
- Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
- Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
- Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
- Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
- Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817022-REL-RHG Decision – 661827.pdf
Administrative Law Judge Decision Briefing: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA
Executive Summary
This document outlines the findings and decision in case number 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG, where a petition brought by Thomas P. Satterlee against the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association was dismissed with prejudice. The dismissal was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
The central issue was whether the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This determination hinged entirely on the interpretation of the statutory term “roadways.” The Petitioner argued that the association’s maintenance of landscaping at the community’s entrance constituted a “covenant to maintain roadways,” asserting that “roadway” should be interpreted broadly to mean the entire right-of-way, consistent with the modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets.”
The Administrative Law Judge rejected this broad interpretation, concluding that the plain meaning of “roadway” refers specifically to the part of a road used for vehicle travel. The decision was based on multiple dictionary definitions and the finding that several of the Petitioner’s own evidentiary documents contradicted his argument by making clear distinctions between a “roadway” and adjacent areas like landscaping or the broader “right-of-way.” Because the association’s maintenance activities did not involve “roadways” under this definition, it was ruled not to be a “planned community,” thereby stripping the administrative bodies of jurisdiction.
I. Case Background and Procedural History
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Thomas P. Satterlee
◦ Respondent: Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association
• Initial Action: On January 26, 2018, the Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the association was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).
• First Ruling: On March 15, 2018, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision agreeing with the Respondent, finding the association was not a “planned community” and that the OAH and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction.
• Rehearing: The Petitioner filed a Rehearing Request on April 10, 2018. The request was granted on May 3, 2018, leading to new oral arguments on the dispositive issue of jurisdiction on September 5, 2018.
• Final Decision: This briefing concerns the final Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on September 25, 2018, following the rehearing.
II. Central Legal Question: The Definition of a “Planned Community”
The jurisdiction of the OAH in this matter was entirely dependent on whether the Respondent met the statutory definition of a “planned community.”
• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) defines a “planned community” as:
• Statutory Amendment: The Respondent noted that the statute was amended in 2014 to add the clauses regarding an “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways.” Before this amendment, an association had to own real property to be considered a planned community.
III. Summary of Arguments
The dispute centered on the interpretation of a single word—”roadways”—within the statute.
Aspect of Argument
Petitioner (Thomas P. Satterlee)
Respondent (Property Owner’s Association)
Core Claim
The association’s maintenance of landscaping around the community entrance sign constitutes a “covenant to maintain roadways.”
Maintaining entrance landscaping does not constitute maintaining a “roadway.”
Interpretation of “Roadway”
“Roadway” should be interpreted broadly to mean the entire “right-of-way” or “roadway system,” including landscaping, sidewalks, etc.
“Roadway” has a narrow, plain-language meaning: the part of a road intended for vehicle traffic.
Primary Justification
The modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets,” which encompasses the entire right-of-way for all users. The term “roadway” is the new word for “street.”
The Arizona legislature’s deliberate choice of the specific term “roadway” in the 2014 amendment, despite the “Complete Streets” concept being well-known at the time.
Evidence Presented
– A letter from Pima County Transportation confirming the association’s maintenance of the landscaping.
– Numerous documents explaining the “Complete Streets” concept from sources like the USDOT and the Federal Highway Administration.
– Excerpts from the Pima County Roadway Design Manual (RDM) and county ordinances.
The language of the statute itself and the principle of statutory interpretation based on plain meaning.
IV. The Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision
The ALJ’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s argument by adhering to fundamental principles of statutory construction.
The ALJ found the Petitioner’s extensive evidence regarding the “Complete Streets” approach to be irrelevant to the legal question of statutory interpretation. The decision stated:
“Had the legislature intended to include associations such as Respondent in the definition of ‘planned community’ in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), it could have used the term ‘right-of-way’ or ‘Complete Streets’.”
The judge reasoned that the legislature’s choice to use the specific term “roadway” when broader terms were available was intentional and must be respected. The fact that the Petitioner needed a “stack of documents” to argue his interpretation demonstrated that it was not based on the plain meaning of the word.
The decision centered on the plain, common-sense meaning of the word “roadway.”
• Dictionary Definitions: The ALJ consulted six different dictionaries (including Oxford, Merriam-Webster, and Dictionary.com), all of which provided definitions consistent with the finding that a “roadway” is “the part of a road intended for vehicles” or “the part of the road on which vehicles drive.”
• Distinction from “Street”: While some definitions of “street” included references to adjacent sidewalks, the decision notes these are described as bordering the street, not being part of it, much like buildings are not considered part of the street they line.
The ALJ highlighted that several documents submitted by the Petitioner undermined his central claim that “roadway” and “right-of-way” are synonymous.
• Pima County Ordinance 10.56.020: This ordinance defines minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.” The ALJ found this language explicitly proves the two terms refer to different areas.
• Pima County Policy Number 54.1: A diagram in this policy document was titled “Landscape Improvements in Pima County Right-of-Way,” not “Roadway.”
• Pima County RDM: The RDM specified different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” and “Landscape Plans,” and stated that “installation of landscaping” begins after the completion of the “roadway project,” again treating them as distinct components.
V. Final Order
Based on the analysis, the Administrative Law Judge reached a definitive conclusion:
1. Conclusion of Law: The term “roadways” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) means the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel. The Respondent’s maintenance of landscaping does not constitute maintenance of “roadways.”
2. Jurisdictional Finding: Because the Respondent does not have a covenant to maintain roadways, it is not a “planned community” as defined by the statute.
3. Order: The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. The Petitioner’s petition was dismissed with prejudice on September 25, 2018.
4. Further Action: The decision noted that the Petitioner remains free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the community’s documents. The decision is binding, and any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days.