Tag Archives: jurisdiction

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

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Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-09-25
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas P. Satterlee Counsel —
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association Counsel James A. Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition with prejudice, concluding that the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent HOA did not meet the definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to convince the ALJ that 'roadway,' as used in the governing statute, encompassed the entire 'right-of-way' or the landscaping maintained by the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent is a 'planned community' subject to ADRE jurisdiction based on having a covenant to maintain 'roadways.'

The Petitioner claimed the HOA was a 'planned community' because it maintained landscaping at the entrance, arguing this constituted maintaining 'roadways' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The ALJ found that 'roadways' refers to the part of the road intended for vehicle travel, not surrounding landscaping, thus finding the Respondent was not a planned community and dismissing the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802, roadway definition, HOA dispute
Additional Citations:

  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817022-REL-RHG Decision – 661827.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:15 (130.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG


Administrative Law Judge Decision Briefing: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This document outlines the findings and decision in case number 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG, where a petition brought by Thomas P. Satterlee against the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association was dismissed with prejudice. The dismissal was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

The central issue was whether the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This determination hinged entirely on the interpretation of the statutory term “roadways.” The Petitioner argued that the association’s maintenance of landscaping at the community’s entrance constituted a “covenant to maintain roadways,” asserting that “roadway” should be interpreted broadly to mean the entire right-of-way, consistent with the modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets.”

The Administrative Law Judge rejected this broad interpretation, concluding that the plain meaning of “roadway” refers specifically to the part of a road used for vehicle travel. The decision was based on multiple dictionary definitions and the finding that several of the Petitioner’s own evidentiary documents contradicted his argument by making clear distinctions between a “roadway” and adjacent areas like landscaping or the broader “right-of-way.” Because the association’s maintenance activities did not involve “roadways” under this definition, it was ruled not to be a “planned community,” thereby stripping the administrative bodies of jurisdiction.

I. Case Background and Procedural History

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Thomas P. Satterlee

◦ Respondent: Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association

• Initial Action: On January 26, 2018, the Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the association was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

• First Ruling: On March 15, 2018, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision agreeing with the Respondent, finding the association was not a “planned community” and that the OAH and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction.

• Rehearing: The Petitioner filed a Rehearing Request on April 10, 2018. The request was granted on May 3, 2018, leading to new oral arguments on the dispositive issue of jurisdiction on September 5, 2018.

• Final Decision: This briefing concerns the final Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on September 25, 2018, following the rehearing.

II. Central Legal Question: The Definition of a “Planned Community”

The jurisdiction of the OAH in this matter was entirely dependent on whether the Respondent met the statutory definition of a “planned community.”

• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) defines a “planned community” as:

• Statutory Amendment: The Respondent noted that the statute was amended in 2014 to add the clauses regarding an “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways.” Before this amendment, an association had to own real property to be considered a planned community.

III. Summary of Arguments

The dispute centered on the interpretation of a single word—”roadways”—within the statute.

Aspect of Argument

Petitioner (Thomas P. Satterlee)

Respondent (Property Owner’s Association)

Core Claim

The association’s maintenance of landscaping around the community entrance sign constitutes a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

Maintaining entrance landscaping does not constitute maintaining a “roadway.”

Interpretation of “Roadway”

“Roadway” should be interpreted broadly to mean the entire “right-of-way” or “roadway system,” including landscaping, sidewalks, etc.

“Roadway” has a narrow, plain-language meaning: the part of a road intended for vehicle traffic.

Primary Justification

The modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets,” which encompasses the entire right-of-way for all users. The term “roadway” is the new word for “street.”

The Arizona legislature’s deliberate choice of the specific term “roadway” in the 2014 amendment, despite the “Complete Streets” concept being well-known at the time.

Evidence Presented

– A letter from Pima County Transportation confirming the association’s maintenance of the landscaping.
– Numerous documents explaining the “Complete Streets” concept from sources like the USDOT and the Federal Highway Administration.
– Excerpts from the Pima County Roadway Design Manual (RDM) and county ordinances.

The language of the statute itself and the principle of statutory interpretation based on plain meaning.

IV. The Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s argument by adhering to fundamental principles of statutory construction.

The ALJ found the Petitioner’s extensive evidence regarding the “Complete Streets” approach to be irrelevant to the legal question of statutory interpretation. The decision stated:

“Had the legislature intended to include associations such as Respondent in the definition of ‘planned community’ in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), it could have used the term ‘right-of-way’ or ‘Complete Streets’.”

The judge reasoned that the legislature’s choice to use the specific term “roadway” when broader terms were available was intentional and must be respected. The fact that the Petitioner needed a “stack of documents” to argue his interpretation demonstrated that it was not based on the plain meaning of the word.

The decision centered on the plain, common-sense meaning of the word “roadway.”

• Dictionary Definitions: The ALJ consulted six different dictionaries (including Oxford, Merriam-Webster, and Dictionary.com), all of which provided definitions consistent with the finding that a “roadway” is “the part of a road intended for vehicles” or “the part of the road on which vehicles drive.”

• Distinction from “Street”: While some definitions of “street” included references to adjacent sidewalks, the decision notes these are described as bordering the street, not being part of it, much like buildings are not considered part of the street they line.

The ALJ highlighted that several documents submitted by the Petitioner undermined his central claim that “roadway” and “right-of-way” are synonymous.

• Pima County Ordinance 10.56.020: This ordinance defines minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.” The ALJ found this language explicitly proves the two terms refer to different areas.

• Pima County Policy Number 54.1: A diagram in this policy document was titled “Landscape Improvements in Pima County Right-of-Way,” not “Roadway.”

• Pima County RDM: The RDM specified different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” and “Landscape Plans,” and stated that “installation of landscaping” begins after the completion of the “roadway project,” again treating them as distinct components.

V. Final Order

Based on the analysis, the Administrative Law Judge reached a definitive conclusion:

1. Conclusion of Law: The term “roadways” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) means the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel. The Respondent’s maintenance of landscaping does not constitute maintenance of “roadways.”

2. Jurisdictional Finding: Because the Respondent does not have a covenant to maintain roadways, it is not a “planned community” as defined by the statute.

3. Order: The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. The Petitioner’s petition was dismissed with prejudice on September 25, 2018.

4. Further Action: The decision noted that the Petitioner remains free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the community’s documents. The decision is binding, and any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days.


Dina R. Galassini v. Plaza Waterfront Condo Owners Association, Inc.

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Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-08-22
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Dina R. Galassini Counsel —
Respondent Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. Counsel —

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner’s petition for rehearing, concluding that the OAH has the authority, pursuant to statute and precedent, to resolve disputes involving the interpretation of condominium documents and related regulating statutes, rejecting Petitioner's constitutional claims regarding separation of powers. Respondent's request for attorney's fees was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's argument that the original ALJ decision was contrary to law due to separation of powers violation was dismissed, as the OAH confirmed its statutory authority (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) to interpret condominium documents and regulating statutes.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent Association correctly posted owner assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget

Petitioner sought rehearing arguing the ALJ lacked constitutional authority (separation of powers) to interpret condominium documents (contracts) and statutory definitions of common/limited common elements (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202) related to the posting of the 2018 parking lot budget assessment.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed. Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 67, 392 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2017)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Assessment, Jurisdiction, ALJ Authority, Condominium Documents, Separation of Powers
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 67, 392 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2017)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. CONST. Art. 3

Dina R. Galassini vs. Plaza Waterfront Condominiums Owners

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-08-22
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Dina R. Galassini Counsel —
Respondent Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. Counsel —

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner’s petition for rehearing, concluding that the OAH has the authority, pursuant to statute and precedent, to resolve disputes involving the interpretation of condominium documents and related regulating statutes, rejecting Petitioner's constitutional claims regarding separation of powers. Respondent's request for attorney's fees was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's argument that the original ALJ decision was contrary to law due to separation of powers violation was dismissed, as the OAH confirmed its statutory authority (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) to interpret condominium documents and regulating statutes.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent Association correctly posted owner assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget

Petitioner sought rehearing arguing the ALJ lacked constitutional authority (separation of powers) to interpret condominium documents (contracts) and statutory definitions of common/limited common elements (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202) related to the posting of the 2018 parking lot budget assessment.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed. Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 67, 392 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2017)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Assessment, Jurisdiction, ALJ Authority, Condominium Documents, Separation of Powers
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 67, 392 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2017)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. CONST. Art. 3

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818032-REL Decision – 655375.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:39 (65.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818032-REL


Briefing Document: Galassini v. Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG, which dismissed a petition filed by Dina R. Galassini against the Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. The central conflict revolved around the jurisdictional authority of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The Petitioner, Ms. Galassini, argued that the OAH, as part of the executive branch, violated the constitutional separation of powers by interpreting private condominium documents, a power she claimed was reserved exclusively for the judicial branch.

The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, rejected this argument and dismissed the petition as a matter of law. The decision affirms that the OAH is statutorily empowered by Arizona Revised Statutes to hear disputes concerning alleged violations of condominium documents. The ALJ’s rationale rests on established legal precedent, citing Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov to confirm that condominium documents are a contract and Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass’n v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs. to support an agency’s authority to take actions reasonably implied by its governing statutes. Consequently, the Petitioner’s core constitutional challenge was deemed “unfounded,” leading to the dismissal of her petition. While the petition was dismissed, the Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees was denied.

1. Case Background and Procedural History

The case involves a dispute between a condominium owner and a condominium association, brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Dina R. Galassini

◦ Respondent: Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc.

• Forum: Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

• Presiding Judge: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

• Decision Date: August 22, 2018

The matter arrived before Judge Shedden following a series of procedural steps initiated after an original ALJ decision.

• June 26, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.

• July 20, 2018: The Department of Real Estate issued an Order Granting Rehearing, based on the reasons outlined in the Petitioner’s request.

• August 15, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Vacate Rehearing, arguing the case could be resolved as a matter of law.

• August 21, 2018: The Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Respondent’s motion.

2. Core Dispute: Petitioner’s Jurisdictional Challenge

The Petitioner’s request for a rehearing was founded on a direct constitutional challenge to the authority of the Administrative Law Judge. The underlying substantive issue concerned the association’s handling of “owner assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget,” which turned on the interpretation of “common element” versus “limited common element.”

Petitioner’s Arguments

• Violation of Separation of Powers: The Petitioner contended that the original ALJ decision was “contrary to law” because it involved the interpretation of private contracts (the condominium documents). She argued this function is reserved exclusively for the judicial branch under Arizona’s Constitution, Article 3 (Separation of Powers).

• Due Process Violation: By interpreting the contract, the ALJ allegedly committed a “due process violation.” The Petitioner stated, “For the ALJ to definitively interpret actual contracts between two private parties is a due process violation (separation of powers).”

• Improper Delegation of Power: The Petitioner claimed the ALJ’s action “redistributed interpreted power from the Judiciary to the Executive and this is a congressional encroachment on my rights.”

3. The Administrative Law Judge’s Legal Rationale and Decision

The ALJ agreed with the Respondent that the case could be resolved as a matter of law, focusing entirely on the jurisdictional question raised by the Petitioner. The decision systematically refutes the Petitioner’s separation of powers argument by outlining the OAH’s legal authority.

Statutory Authority

The decision establishes the OAH’s jurisdiction through Arizona state law:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11: This statute describes the administrative process for referring disputes between owners and condominium associations to the OAH.

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A): This section specifically grants the OAH authority to conduct hearings for alleged “violations of condominium documents … or violations of the statutes that regulate condominiums….”

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202: The decision notes that analyzing the Petitioner’s claim inherently requires interpreting definitions found in the statutes that regulate condominiums, such as this section defining “common element” and “limited common element.”

Precedent from Case Law

The ALJ grounded the OAH’s interpretive authority in two key Arizona appellate court decisions:

1. Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007): This case is cited to establish the legal principle that “the condominium documents are a contract between the parties.” By defining the documents as a contract, the decision links the dispute directly to the type of documents the OAH is empowered to review.

2. Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass’n v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 392 P.3d 506 (App. 2017): This case is cited to support the broader principle of administrative authority. The ruling states, “[I]t is the law of this state that an agency may” take such action “which may be reasonably implied from ‘a consideration of the statutory scheme as a whole.’” This supports the conclusion that the OAH’s authority to hear disputes over condominium documents implies the authority to interpret them.

Conclusion of the Court

Based on the cited statutes and case law, the ALJ concluded that the OAH possesses the necessary authority to interpret both the condominium documents and the relevant state statutes. Therefore, the Petitioner’s central argument that the original decision was “contrary to law” was declared “unfounded,” and dismissing the matter was deemed appropriate.

4. Final Orders and Directives

The Administrative Law Judge issued the following final orders on August 22, 2018:

Outcome

Petitioner’s Petition

Dismissed

Respondent’s Request for Attorney’s Fees

Denied

The decision also included the following legally mandated notices for the parties:

• Binding Nature: The order is binding on the parties as a result of the rehearing, per ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B).

• Appeal Rights: A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five (35) days from the date the order was served. The appeal process is prescribed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. title 12, chapter 7, article 6 and § 12-904(A).


Dina R. Galassini vs. Plaza Waterfront Condominiums Owners

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-08-22
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Dina R. Galassini Counsel —
Respondent Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. Counsel —

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner’s petition for rehearing, concluding that the OAH has the authority, pursuant to statute and precedent, to resolve disputes involving the interpretation of condominium documents and related regulating statutes, rejecting Petitioner's constitutional claims regarding separation of powers. Respondent's request for attorney's fees was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's argument that the original ALJ decision was contrary to law due to separation of powers violation was dismissed, as the OAH confirmed its statutory authority (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) to interpret condominium documents and regulating statutes.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent Association correctly posted owner assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget

Petitioner sought rehearing arguing the ALJ lacked constitutional authority (separation of powers) to interpret condominium documents (contracts) and statutory definitions of common/limited common elements (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202) related to the posting of the 2018 parking lot budget assessment.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed. Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 67, 392 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2017)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Assessment, Jurisdiction, ALJ Authority, Condominium Documents, Separation of Powers
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 67, 392 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2017)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. CONST. Art. 3

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818032-REL Decision – 655375.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:05:06 (65.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818032-REL


Briefing Document: Galassini v. Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG, which dismissed a petition filed by Dina R. Galassini against the Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. The central conflict revolved around the jurisdictional authority of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The Petitioner, Ms. Galassini, argued that the OAH, as part of the executive branch, violated the constitutional separation of powers by interpreting private condominium documents, a power she claimed was reserved exclusively for the judicial branch.

The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, rejected this argument and dismissed the petition as a matter of law. The decision affirms that the OAH is statutorily empowered by Arizona Revised Statutes to hear disputes concerning alleged violations of condominium documents. The ALJ’s rationale rests on established legal precedent, citing Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov to confirm that condominium documents are a contract and Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass’n v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs. to support an agency’s authority to take actions reasonably implied by its governing statutes. Consequently, the Petitioner’s core constitutional challenge was deemed “unfounded,” leading to the dismissal of her petition. While the petition was dismissed, the Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees was denied.

1. Case Background and Procedural History

The case involves a dispute between a condominium owner and a condominium association, brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Dina R. Galassini

◦ Respondent: Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc.

• Forum: Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

• Presiding Judge: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

• Decision Date: August 22, 2018

The matter arrived before Judge Shedden following a series of procedural steps initiated after an original ALJ decision.

• June 26, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.

• July 20, 2018: The Department of Real Estate issued an Order Granting Rehearing, based on the reasons outlined in the Petitioner’s request.

• August 15, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Vacate Rehearing, arguing the case could be resolved as a matter of law.

• August 21, 2018: The Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Respondent’s motion.

2. Core Dispute: Petitioner’s Jurisdictional Challenge

The Petitioner’s request for a rehearing was founded on a direct constitutional challenge to the authority of the Administrative Law Judge. The underlying substantive issue concerned the association’s handling of “owner assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget,” which turned on the interpretation of “common element” versus “limited common element.”

Petitioner’s Arguments

• Violation of Separation of Powers: The Petitioner contended that the original ALJ decision was “contrary to law” because it involved the interpretation of private contracts (the condominium documents). She argued this function is reserved exclusively for the judicial branch under Arizona’s Constitution, Article 3 (Separation of Powers).

• Due Process Violation: By interpreting the contract, the ALJ allegedly committed a “due process violation.” The Petitioner stated, “For the ALJ to definitively interpret actual contracts between two private parties is a due process violation (separation of powers).”

• Improper Delegation of Power: The Petitioner claimed the ALJ’s action “redistributed interpreted power from the Judiciary to the Executive and this is a congressional encroachment on my rights.”

3. The Administrative Law Judge’s Legal Rationale and Decision

The ALJ agreed with the Respondent that the case could be resolved as a matter of law, focusing entirely on the jurisdictional question raised by the Petitioner. The decision systematically refutes the Petitioner’s separation of powers argument by outlining the OAH’s legal authority.

Statutory Authority

The decision establishes the OAH’s jurisdiction through Arizona state law:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11: This statute describes the administrative process for referring disputes between owners and condominium associations to the OAH.

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A): This section specifically grants the OAH authority to conduct hearings for alleged “violations of condominium documents … or violations of the statutes that regulate condominiums….”

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202: The decision notes that analyzing the Petitioner’s claim inherently requires interpreting definitions found in the statutes that regulate condominiums, such as this section defining “common element” and “limited common element.”

Precedent from Case Law

The ALJ grounded the OAH’s interpretive authority in two key Arizona appellate court decisions:

1. Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007): This case is cited to establish the legal principle that “the condominium documents are a contract between the parties.” By defining the documents as a contract, the decision links the dispute directly to the type of documents the OAH is empowered to review.

2. Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass’n v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 392 P.3d 506 (App. 2017): This case is cited to support the broader principle of administrative authority. The ruling states, “[I]t is the law of this state that an agency may” take such action “which may be reasonably implied from ‘a consideration of the statutory scheme as a whole.’” This supports the conclusion that the OAH’s authority to hear disputes over condominium documents implies the authority to interpret them.

Conclusion of the Court

Based on the cited statutes and case law, the ALJ concluded that the OAH possesses the necessary authority to interpret both the condominium documents and the relevant state statutes. Therefore, the Petitioner’s central argument that the original decision was “contrary to law” was declared “unfounded,” and dismissing the matter was deemed appropriate.

4. Final Orders and Directives

The Administrative Law Judge issued the following final orders on August 22, 2018:

Outcome

Petitioner’s Petition

Dismissed

Respondent’s Request for Attorney’s Fees

Denied

The decision also included the following legally mandated notices for the parties:

• Binding Nature: The order is binding on the parties as a result of the rehearing, per ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B).

• Appeal Rights: A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five (35) days from the date the order was served. The appeal process is prescribed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. title 12, chapter 7, article 6 and § 12-904(A).


Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716018-REL, 17F-H1716022-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-07
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas Satterlee Counsel —
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association Counsel James Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitions were dismissed with prejudice because the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), thereby denying the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the statutory definition of a 'planned community'.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction regarding definition of Planned Community

The Respondent moved to vacate claiming the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Association was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The Respondent did not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant. The ALJ agreed that OAH lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: The Petitions in these consolidated matters are recommended to be dismissed with prejudice. This recommendation was adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802(4), dismissal with prejudice
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 574052.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:11 (91.5 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 575056.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:11 (566.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716018-REL


Briefing Document: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee versus the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association (POA). The central issue was a successful jurisdictional challenge by the Respondent POA, leading to the dismissal of petitions filed by Mr. Satterlee.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent POA does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This definition requires an association to own and operate real estate or hold an easement or covenant to maintain roadways. Both parties agreed that the Respondent POA did not meet these criteria.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that jurisdiction should be inferred from a prior case and from the Respondent’s own community documents—were rejected. The ALJ’s decision emphasized the legal principle that subject matter jurisdiction is dictated by statute, cannot be waived by parties, and cannot be conferred by estoppel or prior administrative oversight. The petitions were ultimately dismissed with prejudice, with the Petitioner retaining the right to pursue action in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Overview

This matter involves consolidated petitions brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Parties and Legal Representation

Representation

Petitioner

Thomas Satterlee

Represented himself

Respondent

Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Represented by James Robles, Esq.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil

Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Commissioner Judy Lowe

Department of Real Estate

Note: The Petitioner argued that Mr. Robles was not authorized to represent the Respondent. The ALJ determined that the filing of a Notice of Appearance was sufficient for the proceeding and that concerns over the propriety of the representation could be addressed in another forum.

Case Identification

Identifier

Details

Consolidated OAH Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Docket Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Case Numbers

HO 17-16/022 & HO 17-16/018

Key Dates

• March 15, 2017: Respondent files a motion to vacate, challenging subject matter jurisdiction.

• June 27, 2017: Oral argument held on the jurisdictional motion.

• July 6, 2017: ALJ Suzanne Marwil issues a decision recommending dismissal.

• July 7, 2017: Commissioner Judy Lowe issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Jurisdictional Challenge and Arguments

The case pivoted from a substantive hearing to a dispositive oral argument focused exclusively on the OAH’s authority to hear the dispute.

Respondent’s Motion to Vacate

On March 15, 2017, the Respondent moved to vacate the proceedings, asserting that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The core of this argument was that the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA did not qualify as a “planned community” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The statute requires such a community’s association to either own and operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

During the oral argument on June 27, 2017, a critical fact was established: both the Petitioner and the Respondent agreed that the association did not currently own or operate real estate or possess a roadway easement or covenant.

Petitioner’s Arguments for Jurisdiction

Despite agreeing with the central fact, the Petitioner urged the OAH to exercise jurisdiction based on two main arguments:

1. Prior Precedent: A former Administrative Law Judge, Douglas, had previously exercised jurisdiction over a petition filed by Mr. Satterlee against the same Respondent in docket number 15F-H1515008-BFS.

2. Community Documents: The Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the laws governing planned communities, which, the Petitioner argued, should confer jurisdiction upon the OAH.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

ALJ Suzanne Marwil’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed that jurisdiction was statutorily barred.

Statutory Interpretation of “Planned Community”

The decision centered on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

• The Definition: The statute defines a “planned community” as a development where an association of owners owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing or improving the property.

• Statutory History: The statute was amended in 2014. The ALJ noted that prior to the amendment, the definition only required ownership of real estate. However, the Respondent association failed to meet the definition under either the pre- or post-2014 versions of the law.

• Rejection of Flexible Interpretation: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner’s invitation to use the statute’s introductory phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires,” to expand the definition. Citing the appellate case Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, the decision states that this phrase does not permit a court or agency to “disregard the language of a statute or the legislative intent embodied by that language.” Interpreting the statute to require ownership and operation of real property is “neither mechanical nor rigid” but simply an application of its plain meaning.

Rejection of Estoppel and Prior Case Jurisdiction

The ALJ addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the prior case and the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction.

• Analysis of Prior Decision: Upon reviewing the earlier decision by Judge Douglas (15F-1515008-BFS), ALJ Marwil found that while it contained “standard boilerplate language regarding jurisdiction,” the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never raised by any party and, therefore, was not considered by the judge.

• Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived: The decision strongly affirms a core legal doctrine: a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fatal flaw that cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked. The ALJ states, “Administrative decisions that reach beyond an agency’s statutory power are void.”

• Jurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred by Estoppel: Citing legal precedent (Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer), the decision clarifies that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court or agency by the estoppel of a party. The fact that the Respondent may have previously submitted to OAH jurisdiction does not grant the OAH authority where none exists by statute. As stated in the decision, “the statutes, not the parties, lay out the boundaries of administrative jurisdiction.”

Final Disposition and Order

Based on the finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction, the following actions were taken:

• Recommendation: That the consolidated petitions be dismissed with prejudice.

• Petitioner’s Recourse: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner “remains free, however, to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by Respondent’s community documents.”

• Effective Date: The order would become effective 40 days after certification by the Director of the OAH.

• Adoption of Decision: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision in full.

• Final Action: The Commissioner accepted the recommendation and ordered that the petitions be dismissed with prejudice. This order constituted a final administrative action and was effective immediately.

• Further Action: The Final Order specified that it was binding unless a party requested a rehearing within 30 days. It also informed the parties of their right to appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review, noting that the order would not be stayed unless a stay was granted by the reviewing court.


Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716018-REL, 17F-H1716022-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-07
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas Satterlee Counsel —
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association Counsel James Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitions were dismissed with prejudice because the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), thereby denying the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the statutory definition of a 'planned community'.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction regarding definition of Planned Community

The Respondent moved to vacate claiming the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Association was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The Respondent did not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant. The ALJ agreed that OAH lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: The Petitions in these consolidated matters are recommended to be dismissed with prejudice. This recommendation was adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802(4), dismissal with prejudice
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 574052.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:57 (91.5 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 575056.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:57 (566.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716018-REL


Briefing Document: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee versus the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association (POA). The central issue was a successful jurisdictional challenge by the Respondent POA, leading to the dismissal of petitions filed by Mr. Satterlee.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent POA does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This definition requires an association to own and operate real estate or hold an easement or covenant to maintain roadways. Both parties agreed that the Respondent POA did not meet these criteria.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that jurisdiction should be inferred from a prior case and from the Respondent’s own community documents—were rejected. The ALJ’s decision emphasized the legal principle that subject matter jurisdiction is dictated by statute, cannot be waived by parties, and cannot be conferred by estoppel or prior administrative oversight. The petitions were ultimately dismissed with prejudice, with the Petitioner retaining the right to pursue action in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Overview

This matter involves consolidated petitions brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Parties and Legal Representation

Representation

Petitioner

Thomas Satterlee

Represented himself

Respondent

Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Represented by James Robles, Esq.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil

Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Commissioner Judy Lowe

Department of Real Estate

Note: The Petitioner argued that Mr. Robles was not authorized to represent the Respondent. The ALJ determined that the filing of a Notice of Appearance was sufficient for the proceeding and that concerns over the propriety of the representation could be addressed in another forum.

Case Identification

Identifier

Details

Consolidated OAH Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Docket Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Case Numbers

HO 17-16/022 & HO 17-16/018

Key Dates

• March 15, 2017: Respondent files a motion to vacate, challenging subject matter jurisdiction.

• June 27, 2017: Oral argument held on the jurisdictional motion.

• July 6, 2017: ALJ Suzanne Marwil issues a decision recommending dismissal.

• July 7, 2017: Commissioner Judy Lowe issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Jurisdictional Challenge and Arguments

The case pivoted from a substantive hearing to a dispositive oral argument focused exclusively on the OAH’s authority to hear the dispute.

Respondent’s Motion to Vacate

On March 15, 2017, the Respondent moved to vacate the proceedings, asserting that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The core of this argument was that the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA did not qualify as a “planned community” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The statute requires such a community’s association to either own and operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

During the oral argument on June 27, 2017, a critical fact was established: both the Petitioner and the Respondent agreed that the association did not currently own or operate real estate or possess a roadway easement or covenant.

Petitioner’s Arguments for Jurisdiction

Despite agreeing with the central fact, the Petitioner urged the OAH to exercise jurisdiction based on two main arguments:

1. Prior Precedent: A former Administrative Law Judge, Douglas, had previously exercised jurisdiction over a petition filed by Mr. Satterlee against the same Respondent in docket number 15F-H1515008-BFS.

2. Community Documents: The Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the laws governing planned communities, which, the Petitioner argued, should confer jurisdiction upon the OAH.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

ALJ Suzanne Marwil’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed that jurisdiction was statutorily barred.

Statutory Interpretation of “Planned Community”

The decision centered on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

• The Definition: The statute defines a “planned community” as a development where an association of owners owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing or improving the property.

• Statutory History: The statute was amended in 2014. The ALJ noted that prior to the amendment, the definition only required ownership of real estate. However, the Respondent association failed to meet the definition under either the pre- or post-2014 versions of the law.

• Rejection of Flexible Interpretation: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner’s invitation to use the statute’s introductory phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires,” to expand the definition. Citing the appellate case Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, the decision states that this phrase does not permit a court or agency to “disregard the language of a statute or the legislative intent embodied by that language.” Interpreting the statute to require ownership and operation of real property is “neither mechanical nor rigid” but simply an application of its plain meaning.

Rejection of Estoppel and Prior Case Jurisdiction

The ALJ addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the prior case and the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction.

• Analysis of Prior Decision: Upon reviewing the earlier decision by Judge Douglas (15F-1515008-BFS), ALJ Marwil found that while it contained “standard boilerplate language regarding jurisdiction,” the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never raised by any party and, therefore, was not considered by the judge.

• Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived: The decision strongly affirms a core legal doctrine: a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fatal flaw that cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked. The ALJ states, “Administrative decisions that reach beyond an agency’s statutory power are void.”

• Jurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred by Estoppel: Citing legal precedent (Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer), the decision clarifies that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court or agency by the estoppel of a party. The fact that the Respondent may have previously submitted to OAH jurisdiction does not grant the OAH authority where none exists by statute. As stated in the decision, “the statutes, not the parties, lay out the boundaries of administrative jurisdiction.”

Final Disposition and Order

Based on the finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction, the following actions were taken:

• Recommendation: That the consolidated petitions be dismissed with prejudice.

• Petitioner’s Recourse: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner “remains free, however, to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by Respondent’s community documents.”

• Effective Date: The order would become effective 40 days after certification by the Director of the OAH.

• Adoption of Decision: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision in full.

• Final Action: The Commissioner accepted the recommendation and ordered that the petitions be dismissed with prejudice. This order constituted a final administrative action and was effective immediately.

• Further Action: The Final Order specified that it was binding unless a party requested a rehearing within 30 days. It also informed the parties of their right to appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review, noting that the order would not be stayed unless a stay was granted by the reviewing court.


Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716018-REL, 17F-H1716022-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-07
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas Satterlee Counsel —
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association Counsel James Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitions were dismissed with prejudice because the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), thereby denying the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the statutory definition of a 'planned community'.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction regarding definition of Planned Community

The Respondent moved to vacate claiming the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Association was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The Respondent did not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant. The ALJ agreed that OAH lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: The Petitions in these consolidated matters are recommended to be dismissed with prejudice. This recommendation was adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802(4), dismissal with prejudice
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 574052.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:06 (91.5 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 575056.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:07 (566.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716018-REL


Briefing Document: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee versus the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association (POA). The central issue was a successful jurisdictional challenge by the Respondent POA, leading to the dismissal of petitions filed by Mr. Satterlee.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent POA does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This definition requires an association to own and operate real estate or hold an easement or covenant to maintain roadways. Both parties agreed that the Respondent POA did not meet these criteria.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that jurisdiction should be inferred from a prior case and from the Respondent’s own community documents—were rejected. The ALJ’s decision emphasized the legal principle that subject matter jurisdiction is dictated by statute, cannot be waived by parties, and cannot be conferred by estoppel or prior administrative oversight. The petitions were ultimately dismissed with prejudice, with the Petitioner retaining the right to pursue action in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Overview

This matter involves consolidated petitions brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Parties and Legal Representation

Representation

Petitioner

Thomas Satterlee

Represented himself

Respondent

Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Represented by James Robles, Esq.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil

Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Commissioner Judy Lowe

Department of Real Estate

Note: The Petitioner argued that Mr. Robles was not authorized to represent the Respondent. The ALJ determined that the filing of a Notice of Appearance was sufficient for the proceeding and that concerns over the propriety of the representation could be addressed in another forum.

Case Identification

Identifier

Details

Consolidated OAH Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Docket Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Case Numbers

HO 17-16/022 & HO 17-16/018

Key Dates

• March 15, 2017: Respondent files a motion to vacate, challenging subject matter jurisdiction.

• June 27, 2017: Oral argument held on the jurisdictional motion.

• July 6, 2017: ALJ Suzanne Marwil issues a decision recommending dismissal.

• July 7, 2017: Commissioner Judy Lowe issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Jurisdictional Challenge and Arguments

The case pivoted from a substantive hearing to a dispositive oral argument focused exclusively on the OAH’s authority to hear the dispute.

Respondent’s Motion to Vacate

On March 15, 2017, the Respondent moved to vacate the proceedings, asserting that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The core of this argument was that the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA did not qualify as a “planned community” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The statute requires such a community’s association to either own and operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

During the oral argument on June 27, 2017, a critical fact was established: both the Petitioner and the Respondent agreed that the association did not currently own or operate real estate or possess a roadway easement or covenant.

Petitioner’s Arguments for Jurisdiction

Despite agreeing with the central fact, the Petitioner urged the OAH to exercise jurisdiction based on two main arguments:

1. Prior Precedent: A former Administrative Law Judge, Douglas, had previously exercised jurisdiction over a petition filed by Mr. Satterlee against the same Respondent in docket number 15F-H1515008-BFS.

2. Community Documents: The Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the laws governing planned communities, which, the Petitioner argued, should confer jurisdiction upon the OAH.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

ALJ Suzanne Marwil’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed that jurisdiction was statutorily barred.

Statutory Interpretation of “Planned Community”

The decision centered on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

• The Definition: The statute defines a “planned community” as a development where an association of owners owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing or improving the property.

• Statutory History: The statute was amended in 2014. The ALJ noted that prior to the amendment, the definition only required ownership of real estate. However, the Respondent association failed to meet the definition under either the pre- or post-2014 versions of the law.

• Rejection of Flexible Interpretation: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner’s invitation to use the statute’s introductory phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires,” to expand the definition. Citing the appellate case Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, the decision states that this phrase does not permit a court or agency to “disregard the language of a statute or the legislative intent embodied by that language.” Interpreting the statute to require ownership and operation of real property is “neither mechanical nor rigid” but simply an application of its plain meaning.

Rejection of Estoppel and Prior Case Jurisdiction

The ALJ addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the prior case and the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction.

• Analysis of Prior Decision: Upon reviewing the earlier decision by Judge Douglas (15F-1515008-BFS), ALJ Marwil found that while it contained “standard boilerplate language regarding jurisdiction,” the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never raised by any party and, therefore, was not considered by the judge.

• Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived: The decision strongly affirms a core legal doctrine: a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fatal flaw that cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked. The ALJ states, “Administrative decisions that reach beyond an agency’s statutory power are void.”

• Jurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred by Estoppel: Citing legal precedent (Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer), the decision clarifies that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court or agency by the estoppel of a party. The fact that the Respondent may have previously submitted to OAH jurisdiction does not grant the OAH authority where none exists by statute. As stated in the decision, “the statutes, not the parties, lay out the boundaries of administrative jurisdiction.”

Final Disposition and Order

Based on the finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction, the following actions were taken:

• Recommendation: That the consolidated petitions be dismissed with prejudice.

• Petitioner’s Recourse: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner “remains free, however, to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by Respondent’s community documents.”

• Effective Date: The order would become effective 40 days after certification by the Director of the OAH.

• Adoption of Decision: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision in full.

• Final Action: The Commissioner accepted the recommendation and ordered that the petitions be dismissed with prejudice. This order constituted a final administrative action and was effective immediately.

• Further Action: The Final Order specified that it was binding unless a party requested a rehearing within 30 days. It also informed the parties of their right to appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review, noting that the order would not be stayed unless a stay was granted by the reviewing court.


Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716018-REL, 17F-H1716022-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-07
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas Satterlee Counsel —
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association Counsel James Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitions were dismissed with prejudice because the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), thereby denying the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the statutory definition of a 'planned community'.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction regarding definition of Planned Community

The Respondent moved to vacate claiming the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Association was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The Respondent did not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant. The ALJ agreed that OAH lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: The Petitions in these consolidated matters are recommended to be dismissed with prejudice. This recommendation was adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802(4), dismissal with prejudice
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 574052.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:18 (91.5 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 575056.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:18 (566.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716018-REL


Briefing Document: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee versus the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association (POA). The central issue was a successful jurisdictional challenge by the Respondent POA, leading to the dismissal of petitions filed by Mr. Satterlee.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent POA does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This definition requires an association to own and operate real estate or hold an easement or covenant to maintain roadways. Both parties agreed that the Respondent POA did not meet these criteria.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that jurisdiction should be inferred from a prior case and from the Respondent’s own community documents—were rejected. The ALJ’s decision emphasized the legal principle that subject matter jurisdiction is dictated by statute, cannot be waived by parties, and cannot be conferred by estoppel or prior administrative oversight. The petitions were ultimately dismissed with prejudice, with the Petitioner retaining the right to pursue action in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Overview

This matter involves consolidated petitions brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Parties and Legal Representation

Representation

Petitioner

Thomas Satterlee

Represented himself

Respondent

Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Represented by James Robles, Esq.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil

Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Commissioner Judy Lowe

Department of Real Estate

Note: The Petitioner argued that Mr. Robles was not authorized to represent the Respondent. The ALJ determined that the filing of a Notice of Appearance was sufficient for the proceeding and that concerns over the propriety of the representation could be addressed in another forum.

Case Identification

Identifier

Details

Consolidated OAH Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Docket Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Case Numbers

HO 17-16/022 & HO 17-16/018

Key Dates

• March 15, 2017: Respondent files a motion to vacate, challenging subject matter jurisdiction.

• June 27, 2017: Oral argument held on the jurisdictional motion.

• July 6, 2017: ALJ Suzanne Marwil issues a decision recommending dismissal.

• July 7, 2017: Commissioner Judy Lowe issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Jurisdictional Challenge and Arguments

The case pivoted from a substantive hearing to a dispositive oral argument focused exclusively on the OAH’s authority to hear the dispute.

Respondent’s Motion to Vacate

On March 15, 2017, the Respondent moved to vacate the proceedings, asserting that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The core of this argument was that the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA did not qualify as a “planned community” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The statute requires such a community’s association to either own and operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

During the oral argument on June 27, 2017, a critical fact was established: both the Petitioner and the Respondent agreed that the association did not currently own or operate real estate or possess a roadway easement or covenant.

Petitioner’s Arguments for Jurisdiction

Despite agreeing with the central fact, the Petitioner urged the OAH to exercise jurisdiction based on two main arguments:

1. Prior Precedent: A former Administrative Law Judge, Douglas, had previously exercised jurisdiction over a petition filed by Mr. Satterlee against the same Respondent in docket number 15F-H1515008-BFS.

2. Community Documents: The Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the laws governing planned communities, which, the Petitioner argued, should confer jurisdiction upon the OAH.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

ALJ Suzanne Marwil’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed that jurisdiction was statutorily barred.

Statutory Interpretation of “Planned Community”

The decision centered on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

• The Definition: The statute defines a “planned community” as a development where an association of owners owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing or improving the property.

• Statutory History: The statute was amended in 2014. The ALJ noted that prior to the amendment, the definition only required ownership of real estate. However, the Respondent association failed to meet the definition under either the pre- or post-2014 versions of the law.

• Rejection of Flexible Interpretation: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner’s invitation to use the statute’s introductory phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires,” to expand the definition. Citing the appellate case Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, the decision states that this phrase does not permit a court or agency to “disregard the language of a statute or the legislative intent embodied by that language.” Interpreting the statute to require ownership and operation of real property is “neither mechanical nor rigid” but simply an application of its plain meaning.

Rejection of Estoppel and Prior Case Jurisdiction

The ALJ addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the prior case and the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction.

• Analysis of Prior Decision: Upon reviewing the earlier decision by Judge Douglas (15F-1515008-BFS), ALJ Marwil found that while it contained “standard boilerplate language regarding jurisdiction,” the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never raised by any party and, therefore, was not considered by the judge.

• Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived: The decision strongly affirms a core legal doctrine: a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fatal flaw that cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked. The ALJ states, “Administrative decisions that reach beyond an agency’s statutory power are void.”

• Jurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred by Estoppel: Citing legal precedent (Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer), the decision clarifies that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court or agency by the estoppel of a party. The fact that the Respondent may have previously submitted to OAH jurisdiction does not grant the OAH authority where none exists by statute. As stated in the decision, “the statutes, not the parties, lay out the boundaries of administrative jurisdiction.”

Final Disposition and Order

Based on the finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction, the following actions were taken:

• Recommendation: That the consolidated petitions be dismissed with prejudice.

• Petitioner’s Recourse: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner “remains free, however, to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by Respondent’s community documents.”

• Effective Date: The order would become effective 40 days after certification by the Director of the OAH.

• Adoption of Decision: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision in full.

• Final Action: The Commissioner accepted the recommendation and ordered that the petitions be dismissed with prejudice. This order constituted a final administrative action and was effective immediately.

• Further Action: The Final Order specified that it was binding unless a party requested a rehearing within 30 days. It also informed the parties of their right to appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review, noting that the order would not be stayed unless a stay was granted by the reviewing court.


Kurt Gronlund vs. Cottonfields Community Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716024-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-05-11
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Kurt Gronlund Counsel —
Respondent Cottonfields Community Association Counsel Troy B. Stratman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Outcome Summary

The Commissioner accepted the ALJ decision granting the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, recommending dismissal of the petition due to the Department's lack of statutory jurisdiction over the dispute, which involved a Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA) and the rights of a third-party Golf Course Owner.

Why this result: The Department lacked jurisdiction to resolve the dispute because the REMA was not considered a 'community document' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) and the requested relief implicated the rights of a non-party (the Golf Course Owner) over whom the Department has no jurisdiction.

Key Issues & Findings

Jurisdiction over REMA Amendment Dispute

Petitioner sought a finding that REMA Amendments 2 and 3 were void because the HOA board unilaterally amended the REMA without the required member vote (two-thirds majority) as specified in the CC&Rs and REMA, and sought an order for the removal of the amendments from the record.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge recommended granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing the Complaint.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(2)
  • CC&Rs 14.2
  • REMA Article 12

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, summary judgment, golf course, REMA, third party
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • CC&Rs 14.2
  • REMA 5.1
  • REMA Article 12

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716024-REL Decision – 563660.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:21 (99.8 KB)

17F-H1716024-REL Decision – 568840.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:21 (854.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716024-REL


Briefing Document: Gronlund vs. Cottonfields Community Association (Case No. 17F-H1716024-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and decision in the case of Kurt Gronlund versus the Cottonfields Community Association, adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute centers on the petitioner’s allegation that the Homeowners Association (HOA) board improperly amended a critical land-use agreement in 2011 without a required vote of the membership, ultimately enabling the commercial rezoning of an adjacent golf course.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted the HOA’s motion for summary judgment, and the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted this decision, dismissing the petition. The dismissal was not based on the merits of the petitioner’s claim but on a crucial lack of jurisdiction. The ALJ determined that the Department of Real Estate could not rule on the matter for two primary reasons:

1. The governing agreement in question (the REMA) is not a “community document” as defined by the relevant Arizona statute, placing it outside the Department’s purview.

2. The relief sought by the petitioner would directly implicate the property rights of a third party (the Golf Course Owner) and a prior legal settlement, which exceeds the Department’s statutory authority.

While acknowledging the petitioner’s concerns about the golf course development may be “well-founded,” the decision concluded that the petitioner’s available remedies lie in electing a new HOA board, filing a lawsuit in a judicial forum, or seeking legislative change.

Case Overview

This case involves a dispute between a homeowner and his HOA regarding the amendment of a land-use agreement governing a golf course property.

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Description

Petitioner

Kurt Gronlund

A homeowner within the Cottonfields community and a member of the Respondent association.

Respondent

Cottonfields Community Association

The Homeowners Association (HOA) for the Cottonfields development.

Third Party

The Golf Course Owner

A separate legal entity that owns the golf course property adjacent to the community.

Case Chronology

• December 11, 2001: The developer records both the Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA) and the community’s CC&Rs.

• March 2011: The Cottonfields HOA board votes 3-2 to amend the REMA.

• March 3 & May 16, 2011: Amendments 2 and 3 to the REMA, which alter the legal description of the golf course property, are officially recorded.

• 2014: Litigation (Case No. CV2014-000639) begins in Maricopa County Superior Court between the HOA and the Golf Course Owner regarding the REMA and its amendments.

• July 2015: The HOA and the Golf Course Owner execute a settlement agreement.

• August 7, 2015: The superior court lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice.

• October 5, 2016: The HOA president represents to the City Council that homeowners favor rezoning the golf course. The Council approves a rezone from “GC” (Golf Course) to Commercial, relying on the 2011 REMA amendments.

• February 3, 2017: Kurt Gronlund files a Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• April 27, 2017: The HOA files a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing a lack of jurisdiction.

• May 10, 2017: Oral arguments on the motion are held.

• May 11, 2017: The Administrative Law Judge issues a decision recommending dismissal.

• May 11, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision and dismissing the case.

Core Dispute: Unilateral Amendment of the REMA

The petitioner’s case is founded on the claim that the HOA board acted in violation of its own governing documents when it facilitated changes to the REMA without consulting the community’s homeowners.

Petitioner’s Allegations

On February 3, 2017, Kurt Gronlund filed a petition asserting that the HOA board’s actions in 2011 were illegal and directly led to the loss of protection for homeowner property values.

• The Unilateral Action: The petition states, “[In] March 2011 the HOA board voted 3-2 to unilaterally amend REMA 5.1’s use restriction on the golf course property without the required vote of the approximately 450 eligible class members…”

• The Consequence: These amendments were used as justification for the HOA president to support a commercial rezoning of the golf course property before the City Council on October 5, 2016. The petitioner argues this “stripped away that last layer of protection” for homeowners who believed the golf course could not be developed without their approval.

• Homeowner Reliance: During oral arguments, the petitioner testified that members relied on the protections within the CC&Rs and REMA when purchasing their homes, believing development required a two-thirds majority vote.

Petitioner’s Requested Relief

The petitioner respectfully requested that the Administrative Court issue the following orders:

1. Find that REMA Section 5.1 may not be amended without the member vote required by REMA Article 12 and CC&Rs Section 14.2.

2. Find that Amendments 2 and 3 to the REMA are void and unenforceable.

3. Order the HOA Board to remove Amendments 2 and 3 from the public record.

Analysis of Governing Document Provisions

The dispute hinges on the interpretation of and interaction between two key legal documents: the REMA and the HOA’s CC&Rs.

Document

Section

Description

Key Language

Section 5.1

Use Restriction: Restricts the golf course property’s use to either a golf course or open space.

“The Golf Course Property shall be used solely and exclusively for Golf Course Use or as open space, and for no other purposes.”

Article 12

Amendment Procedure: Stipulates that changes to Section 5.1 require the same member vote as an amendment to the HOA’s Declaration (CC&Rs).

“…no termination, cancellation, change, modification or amendment of paragraph 5.1… shall be made without the written approval thereof by the number of Members… required to amend the Declaration pursuant to Section 13.2 thereof.”

Section 14.2

Member Vote Requirement: Defines the threshold for amending the CC&Rs.

“…may be amended only by the affirmative vote (in person or by proxy) or written consent of: (a) Members holding not less than two-thirds (2/3) of all Class A votes then entitled to be cast; and (b) Members holding not less than two thirds (2/3) of all Class B votes…”

Section 14.17

Third-Party Rights: Protects the rights of the Golf Course Owner, stating that provisions benefiting them cannot be amended without their written consent.

“…no provision of this Declaration… which grants to or confers upon the Golf Course Owner or the Golf Course Property any rights… shall be modified, amended or revoked in any way without the express written consent of the Golf Course Owner.”

Jurisdictional Challenge and Legal Rationale for Dismissal

The HOA’s defense focused not on the factual allegations but on the argument that the Department of Real Estate was the improper forum for this dispute. The ALJ ultimately agreed with this position.

Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment

The Cottonfields Community Association argued that the Department could not grant the petitioner’s requested relief because:

1. The REMA is not a “community document” as defined under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)).

2. The Golf Course Owner is a third party over whom the Department lacks jurisdiction.

3. Any ruling would affect the rights of this third party and could impact the 2015 settlement agreement from the superior court case.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions of Law

The ALJ’s decision was based on a strict interpretation of the Department’s statutory authority.

• REMA is Not a “Community Document”: The judge found that although the REMA references the CC&Rs, it does not meet the legal definition of a community document under A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), which defines them as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.” The Department’s authority under A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) is limited to violations of these specific documents.

• Implication of Third-Party Rights: The decision states that the petitioner’s request to void the amendments “implicates the Golf Course Owner’s interests in its property and may affect the settlement that the Golf Course Owner entered into with Respondent.” The law does not grant the Department “jurisdiction over disputes that implicate the rights of third parties.”

• Petitioner’s Available Remedies: While validating the petitioner’s underlying worries, the judge outlined specific alternative courses of action. The decision states: “Petitioner’s concerns about development of the golf course may be well-founded. However, under applicable statutes, at this time, his available remedies are to elect a board that will better protect members’ interest in maintaining the golf course, to file suit in a judicial forum against Respondent and the Golf Course Owner, or to ask the legislature to amend A.R.S. §§ 33-1802(2) and 32-2199.01(A).”

Final Order and Disposition

Based on the legal conclusions regarding jurisdiction, the case was dismissed.

• ALJ Recommendation: On May 11, 2017, Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky recommended that the complaint be dismissed.

• Commissioner’s Final Order: On May 11, 2017, Judy Lowe, Commissioner for the Arizona Department of Real Estate, issued a Final Order stating: “The Commissioner accepts the ALJ decision that the petition in this matter be dismissed.”

• Further Action: The Final Order noted that a party may file for a rehearing or review within thirty days, or may appeal the final administrative decision by filing a complaint for judicial review.


Kurt Gronlund vs. Cottonfields Community Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716024-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-05-11
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Kurt Gronlund Counsel —
Respondent Cottonfields Community Association Counsel Troy B. Stratman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Outcome Summary

The Commissioner accepted the ALJ decision granting the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, recommending dismissal of the petition due to the Department's lack of statutory jurisdiction over the dispute, which involved a Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA) and the rights of a third-party Golf Course Owner.

Why this result: The Department lacked jurisdiction to resolve the dispute because the REMA was not considered a 'community document' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) and the requested relief implicated the rights of a non-party (the Golf Course Owner) over whom the Department has no jurisdiction.

Key Issues & Findings

Jurisdiction over REMA Amendment Dispute

Petitioner sought a finding that REMA Amendments 2 and 3 were void because the HOA board unilaterally amended the REMA without the required member vote (two-thirds majority) as specified in the CC&Rs and REMA, and sought an order for the removal of the amendments from the record.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge recommended granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing the Complaint.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(2)
  • CC&Rs 14.2
  • REMA Article 12

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, summary judgment, golf course, REMA, third party
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • CC&Rs 14.2
  • REMA 5.1
  • REMA Article 12

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716024-REL Decision – 563660.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:50:24 (99.8 KB)

17F-H1716024-REL Decision – 568840.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:50:25 (854.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716024-REL


Briefing Document: Gronlund vs. Cottonfields Community Association (Case No. 17F-H1716024-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and decision in the case of Kurt Gronlund versus the Cottonfields Community Association, adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute centers on the petitioner’s allegation that the Homeowners Association (HOA) board improperly amended a critical land-use agreement in 2011 without a required vote of the membership, ultimately enabling the commercial rezoning of an adjacent golf course.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted the HOA’s motion for summary judgment, and the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted this decision, dismissing the petition. The dismissal was not based on the merits of the petitioner’s claim but on a crucial lack of jurisdiction. The ALJ determined that the Department of Real Estate could not rule on the matter for two primary reasons:

1. The governing agreement in question (the REMA) is not a “community document” as defined by the relevant Arizona statute, placing it outside the Department’s purview.

2. The relief sought by the petitioner would directly implicate the property rights of a third party (the Golf Course Owner) and a prior legal settlement, which exceeds the Department’s statutory authority.

While acknowledging the petitioner’s concerns about the golf course development may be “well-founded,” the decision concluded that the petitioner’s available remedies lie in electing a new HOA board, filing a lawsuit in a judicial forum, or seeking legislative change.

Case Overview

This case involves a dispute between a homeowner and his HOA regarding the amendment of a land-use agreement governing a golf course property.

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Description

Petitioner

Kurt Gronlund

A homeowner within the Cottonfields community and a member of the Respondent association.

Respondent

Cottonfields Community Association

The Homeowners Association (HOA) for the Cottonfields development.

Third Party

The Golf Course Owner

A separate legal entity that owns the golf course property adjacent to the community.

Case Chronology

• December 11, 2001: The developer records both the Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA) and the community’s CC&Rs.

• March 2011: The Cottonfields HOA board votes 3-2 to amend the REMA.

• March 3 & May 16, 2011: Amendments 2 and 3 to the REMA, which alter the legal description of the golf course property, are officially recorded.

• 2014: Litigation (Case No. CV2014-000639) begins in Maricopa County Superior Court between the HOA and the Golf Course Owner regarding the REMA and its amendments.

• July 2015: The HOA and the Golf Course Owner execute a settlement agreement.

• August 7, 2015: The superior court lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice.

• October 5, 2016: The HOA president represents to the City Council that homeowners favor rezoning the golf course. The Council approves a rezone from “GC” (Golf Course) to Commercial, relying on the 2011 REMA amendments.

• February 3, 2017: Kurt Gronlund files a Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• April 27, 2017: The HOA files a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing a lack of jurisdiction.

• May 10, 2017: Oral arguments on the motion are held.

• May 11, 2017: The Administrative Law Judge issues a decision recommending dismissal.

• May 11, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision and dismissing the case.

Core Dispute: Unilateral Amendment of the REMA

The petitioner’s case is founded on the claim that the HOA board acted in violation of its own governing documents when it facilitated changes to the REMA without consulting the community’s homeowners.

Petitioner’s Allegations

On February 3, 2017, Kurt Gronlund filed a petition asserting that the HOA board’s actions in 2011 were illegal and directly led to the loss of protection for homeowner property values.

• The Unilateral Action: The petition states, “[In] March 2011 the HOA board voted 3-2 to unilaterally amend REMA 5.1’s use restriction on the golf course property without the required vote of the approximately 450 eligible class members…”

• The Consequence: These amendments were used as justification for the HOA president to support a commercial rezoning of the golf course property before the City Council on October 5, 2016. The petitioner argues this “stripped away that last layer of protection” for homeowners who believed the golf course could not be developed without their approval.

• Homeowner Reliance: During oral arguments, the petitioner testified that members relied on the protections within the CC&Rs and REMA when purchasing their homes, believing development required a two-thirds majority vote.

Petitioner’s Requested Relief

The petitioner respectfully requested that the Administrative Court issue the following orders:

1. Find that REMA Section 5.1 may not be amended without the member vote required by REMA Article 12 and CC&Rs Section 14.2.

2. Find that Amendments 2 and 3 to the REMA are void and unenforceable.

3. Order the HOA Board to remove Amendments 2 and 3 from the public record.

Analysis of Governing Document Provisions

The dispute hinges on the interpretation of and interaction between two key legal documents: the REMA and the HOA’s CC&Rs.

Document

Section

Description

Key Language

Section 5.1

Use Restriction: Restricts the golf course property’s use to either a golf course or open space.

“The Golf Course Property shall be used solely and exclusively for Golf Course Use or as open space, and for no other purposes.”

Article 12

Amendment Procedure: Stipulates that changes to Section 5.1 require the same member vote as an amendment to the HOA’s Declaration (CC&Rs).

“…no termination, cancellation, change, modification or amendment of paragraph 5.1… shall be made without the written approval thereof by the number of Members… required to amend the Declaration pursuant to Section 13.2 thereof.”

Section 14.2

Member Vote Requirement: Defines the threshold for amending the CC&Rs.

“…may be amended only by the affirmative vote (in person or by proxy) or written consent of: (a) Members holding not less than two-thirds (2/3) of all Class A votes then entitled to be cast; and (b) Members holding not less than two thirds (2/3) of all Class B votes…”

Section 14.17

Third-Party Rights: Protects the rights of the Golf Course Owner, stating that provisions benefiting them cannot be amended without their written consent.

“…no provision of this Declaration… which grants to or confers upon the Golf Course Owner or the Golf Course Property any rights… shall be modified, amended or revoked in any way without the express written consent of the Golf Course Owner.”

Jurisdictional Challenge and Legal Rationale for Dismissal

The HOA’s defense focused not on the factual allegations but on the argument that the Department of Real Estate was the improper forum for this dispute. The ALJ ultimately agreed with this position.

Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment

The Cottonfields Community Association argued that the Department could not grant the petitioner’s requested relief because:

1. The REMA is not a “community document” as defined under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)).

2. The Golf Course Owner is a third party over whom the Department lacks jurisdiction.

3. Any ruling would affect the rights of this third party and could impact the 2015 settlement agreement from the superior court case.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions of Law

The ALJ’s decision was based on a strict interpretation of the Department’s statutory authority.

• REMA is Not a “Community Document”: The judge found that although the REMA references the CC&Rs, it does not meet the legal definition of a community document under A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), which defines them as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.” The Department’s authority under A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) is limited to violations of these specific documents.

• Implication of Third-Party Rights: The decision states that the petitioner’s request to void the amendments “implicates the Golf Course Owner’s interests in its property and may affect the settlement that the Golf Course Owner entered into with Respondent.” The law does not grant the Department “jurisdiction over disputes that implicate the rights of third parties.”

• Petitioner’s Available Remedies: While validating the petitioner’s underlying worries, the judge outlined specific alternative courses of action. The decision states: “Petitioner’s concerns about development of the golf course may be well-founded. However, under applicable statutes, at this time, his available remedies are to elect a board that will better protect members’ interest in maintaining the golf course, to file suit in a judicial forum against Respondent and the Golf Course Owner, or to ask the legislature to amend A.R.S. §§ 33-1802(2) and 32-2199.01(A).”

Final Order and Disposition

Based on the legal conclusions regarding jurisdiction, the case was dismissed.

• ALJ Recommendation: On May 11, 2017, Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky recommended that the complaint be dismissed.

• Commissioner’s Final Order: On May 11, 2017, Judy Lowe, Commissioner for the Arizona Department of Real Estate, issued a Final Order stating: “The Commissioner accepts the ALJ decision that the petition in this matter be dismissed.”

• Further Action: The Final Order noted that a party may file for a rehearing or review within thirty days, or may appeal the final administrative decision by filing a complaint for judicial review.