Nancy Bender v. Foothills Townhomes Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121048-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-08-23
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Nancy Bender Counsel
Respondent Foothills Townhomes Association, Inc. Counsel Jason Smith, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Community Bylaws 3.03

Outcome Summary

The petition was denied because Petitioner failed to sustain her burden of proof that the Association violated Community Bylaws 3.03, as the issue regarding a special meeting was found to be unripe. Other alleged statutory violations were inapplicable.

Why this result: Petitioner did not sustain the burden of proof (preponderance of the evidence) on the Bylaws violation because the condition precedent (requesting or holding a special meeting) had not occurred, rendering the issue unripe. The statutory violations cited were inapplicable to the Association.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Foothills Townhomes Association, Inc. violated Community Bylaws 3.03 and ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1248(A), 33-1248(B), and 33-1261(D).

Petitioner alleged the Association violated Community Bylaws 3.03 when it drafted and posted a letter directed to Petitioner on its online platform, in response to private correspondence (a draft special meeting request) that had not yet been submitted to the Board, which Petitioner perceived as an attempt to dismantle a platform for discussion and retaliate against her.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • Community Bylaws 3.03
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1248(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1248(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1261(D)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Planned Community, Bylaws Violation, Jurisdiction, Unripe Issue, Special Meeting, Filing Fee Paid
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1248(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1248(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1261(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
  • Community Bylaws 3.03

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121048-REL Decision – 906190.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:37:08 (117.4 KB)

Clifford (Norm) Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-01-03
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes Counsel
Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel John Crotty

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the Petitioner's complaint, finding that the Respondent HOA did not violate the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) because the action was taken without a meeting via unanimous written consent as authorized by A.R.S. § 10-3821.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred, as the board acted without holding a formal meeting.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of open meeting law by taking action via unanimous written consent

Petitioner alleged that the Board of Directors violated the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) on May 3, 2020, by taking two actions using unanimous written consent of the Board members, which the Respondent claimed was permissible under A.R.S. § 10-3821 as action without a meeting.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Open Meeting Law, Unanimous Written Consent, Rehearing, Planned Community
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 41-1092.08
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3701(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3071

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 930803.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:37:15 (46.9 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 935756.pdf

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Magnus LD MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (ROOT)

Case Summary

Case ID No. 20F-H2019019-REL (Root), No. 20F-H2019034-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-07-28
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Magnus L.D. MacLeod Counsel Jeffrey M. Proper, Esq.
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), (A)(2)(a), and (A)(2)(b)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner MacLeod's challenge to the HOA's Amendment (Petition #19) was dismissed. The HOA's cross-petition (Petition #34) was partially affirmed, finding MacLeod in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar/home. The HOA (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.) was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions, and each party was ordered to bear its own filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner MacLeod failed to prove the Amendment was improperly adopted, and the HOA successfully proved MacLeod was in violation of the Amendment regarding full-time residency.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the proper adoption of the October 18, 2018 Amendment to the Declaration (Petition #19)

Petitioner MacLeod alleged that the Amendment substantially altering residential usage in Tract Hangar/Homes was improperly adopted because it applied to fewer than all lots and thus required unanimous approval under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2).

Orders: Petition #19 was dismissed because the Amendment was found to be properly adopted requiring 75% approval pursuant to the Declaration and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) [40, 44a].

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)(a)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)(b)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Amendment Validity, Planned Community, Homeowner Violation, Full-Time Residency, Hangar Home, Statutory Interpretation 33-1817, Cross-Petitions, Filing Fee Bear Own Costs
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019019-REL Decision – 810246.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:37 (188.3 KB)

Magnus LD MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (ROOT)

Case Summary

Case ID No. 20F-H2019019-REL (Root), No. 20F-H2019034-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-07-28
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Magnus L.D. MacLeod Counsel Jeffrey M. Proper, Esq.
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), (A)(2)(a), and (A)(2)(b)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner MacLeod's challenge to the HOA's Amendment (Petition #19) was dismissed. The HOA's cross-petition (Petition #34) was partially affirmed, finding MacLeod in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar/home. The HOA (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.) was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions, and each party was ordered to bear its own filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner MacLeod failed to prove the Amendment was improperly adopted, and the HOA successfully proved MacLeod was in violation of the Amendment regarding full-time residency.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the proper adoption of the October 18, 2018 Amendment to the Declaration (Petition #19)

Petitioner MacLeod alleged that the Amendment substantially altering residential usage in Tract Hangar/Homes was improperly adopted because it applied to fewer than all lots and thus required unanimous approval under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2).

Orders: Petition #19 was dismissed because the Amendment was found to be properly adopted requiring 75% approval pursuant to the Declaration and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) [40, 44a].

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)(a)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)(b)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Amendment Validity, Planned Community, Homeowner Violation, Full-Time Residency, Hangar Home, Statutory Interpretation 33-1817, Cross-Petitions, Filing Fee Bear Own Costs
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019019-REL Decision – 810246.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:10:15 (188.3 KB)

Loraine Brokaw vs. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918017-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-01
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Loraine Brokaw Counsel
Respondent Sin Vacas Property Owners Association Counsel Sean K Moynihan, Esq. and Jason E Smith, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803; Bylaws Article IV, Section 6

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's request, finding that the HOA's action to uniformly assess all CR-1 Lots (including Petitioner's two uncombined lots) adhered to the Association Bylaws, which require uniform rates, and did not violate ARS § 33-1803. The governing documents took precedence over any prior reduced assessment granted by a previous Board Order.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association’s interpretation of the Bylaws requiring uniform assessment for all CR-1 lots was incorrect or unlawful, as her lots remained separate parcels according to the county map.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent) arbitrarily and capriciously raised annual assessments for some homeowners and not others in contravention of decades of past board practice and contractual agreements.

Petitioner challenged the Association's decision to raise her assessment from 150% to 200% (full rate for two lots) based on the Association's interpretation that the Bylaws require uniform assessment rates for all CR-1 lots, arguing the new rate violated a long-standing prior Board Order (2003) granting her a reduced rate.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(4)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Bylaws Article IV, Covenant For Maintenance Assessments, Section 6

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment Dispute, Uniform Assessment Rate, Bylaws Interpretation, Planned Community, Governing Document Precedence
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(4)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918017-REL Decision – 698354.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:35 (137.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918017-REL


Briefing Document: Brokaw v. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Case No. 19F-H1918017-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and final order from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Loraine Brokaw (Petitioner) versus the Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent). The core dispute centered on the Association’s 2017 decision to increase the Petitioner’s annual property assessment from 150% to 200% of the standard rate for a single lot, thereby ending a practice that had been in place since 2003. The Petitioner owned a single residence constructed across two adjacent lots.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the Petitioner’s petition in its entirety. The central conclusion of the ruling is that the Association’s governing documents (CC&Rs) take legal precedence over any prior informal board decisions or long-standing practices. The CC&Rs mandate that assessments be fixed at a uniform rate for all lots of a specific type. Therefore, the Association’s action to charge the full assessment for each of the Petitioner’s two lots was not a violation, but rather a move to bring its billing practices into compliance with its own Declaration. The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to show that the Association’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of any community document or statute.

Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: Loraine Brokaw

Respondent: Sin Vacas Property Owners Association

Case Number: 19F-H1918017-REL

Tribunal: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge: Jenna Clark

Hearing Date: March 25, 2019

Decision Date: April 01, 2019

Issue Presented for Hearing

The central legal question addressed by the hearing was:

“Whether Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent) arbitrarily and capriciously raised annual assessments for some homeowners and not others in contravention of decades of past board practice and contractual agreements based on utterly flawed legal theory, which, in fact, changed from attorney to attorney.”

Petitioner’s Position and Testimony

The Petitioner, Loraine Brokaw, initiated the action following the Association’s decision to increase her annual assessment.

Core Complaint: The Petitioner alleged that the Association unlawfully and selectively raised her assessment for a single residence built across two adjacent lots (Lots 156 and 157), which she and her husband purchased in 1979 and 2003, respectively.

Historical Assessment Practice: She testified that since 2003, the Association had assessed her property at 150% of the standard rate (100% for a home on a single lot, plus 50% for the adjacent lot). This reduced rate was granted by a Board vote, and she received written confirmation of this decision on March 24, 2003.

The Assessment Change: On or around December 4, 2017, the Petitioner received a letter from the Association’s management company informing her that the Board had decided to increase her assessment to 200% (a full assessment for each lot) based on “advice of counsel.”

Rationale and Repercussions: The Petitioner stated she was given varying reasons for the increase, but was ultimately told it was because all plats needed to be assessed uniformly. To be assessed for a single lot, she was informed she would have to officially combine her lots on the county’s plat map, a process she claimed would cost between $3,000 and $10,000 and require the permission of every other homeowner in the subdivision.

Requested Relief: The Petitioner requested that the Board be compelled to reinstate the 150% assessment schedule and reimburse her for the costs associated with filing the petition.

Respondent’s Position

The Sin Vacas Property Owners Association did not present witnesses or exhibits but cross-examined the Petitioner.

Interpretation Dispute: The Association’s position at the hearing was that the matter stemmed from differing interpretations of the governing Bylaws.

Compliance with Ruling: The Respondent indicated it would resolve the matter according to the tribunal’s interpretation and decision. The judge’s findings established that the Association’s action was based on its new interpretation that the CC&Rs required uniform assessment for each individual CR-1 lot.

Analysis of Governing Documents (CC&Rs)

The decision rested heavily on the interpretation of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), recorded on April 13, 1978. The following articles were central to the case.

Article & Section

Provision

Relevance to Case

Article I, Section 5

Defines a “[Lot]” as “any numbered lot shown upon any recorded subdivision map.”

This established that the Petitioner’s two properties were legally distinct “Lots” according to the governing documents, despite having one home built across them.

Article IV, Section 6 (“Special Assessments”)

States that “Special assessments must be fixed and apportioned at a uniform rate for all CR-1 lots, SR lots, and each 20,000 square feet of TR lots.”

Although concerning special assessments, this clause was cited by the ALJ as clear evidence of the document’s intent for uniform apportionment, which was applied to the annual assessments.

Article IV, Section 7 (“Annual Assessments”)

States that “The Board of Directors shall fix the amount of the annual assessment against each Lot at least thirty (30) days in advance of each annual assessment period.”

This provision empowers the Board to set the annual assessment amount for each individual lot, reinforcing the principle of lot-by-lot assessment.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Ruling

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain her burden of proof and denied the petition based on a strict interpretation of the Association’s governing documents.

Key Findings of Fact

• It is undisputed that the Petitioner owns two separate CR-1 lots: Lot 156 and Lot 157.

• Her residence is constructed across both lots.

• The lots have never been legally combined or consolidated into a single lot on the Pima County Assessor’s plat map. The Petitioner testified they were legally combined but presented no documentation to substantiate this claim.

Conclusions of Law

1. Governing Documents Supersede Past Practice: The central legal conclusion was that the Association’s formal CC&Rs take precedence over any informal agreement or prior Board order, regardless of the duration of that practice. The 2003 Board decision to grant a 150% assessment was deemed an informal agreement that could not override the plain language of the recorded Declaration.

2. No Binding Contract: The ALJ noted that the 2003 reduced assessment did not constitute a binding contract, as the “Petitioner provided no proof of consideration tendered to the Association.”

3. Uniform Assessment is Required: The Declaration requires the Association to assess all developed CR-1 lots at a uniform rate. By assessing both of the Petitioner’s lots at the same full rate as every other developed CR-1 lot, the Association was acting in compliance with its governing documents.

4. No Unlawful Action: The Petitioner did not establish that her assessments were raised selectively or unlawfully. The evidence showed she owned two distinct lots that were previously assessed at a non-uniform rate, and the Board’s action was to correct this by applying the uniform rate to both lots as required by the CC&Rs. The Board’s new interpretation of the Declaration was not found to be in error or a violation of statute.

A key excerpt from the decision states:

“In this case the governing documents for the Association take precedent over any informal agreement Petitioner had with the Board, regardless of the duration of that agreement.”

Final Order

Based on the findings and conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order:

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition be denied.


Loraine Brokaw vs. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918017-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-01
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Loraine Brokaw Counsel
Respondent Sin Vacas Property Owners Association Counsel Sean K Moynihan, Esq. and Jason E Smith, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803; Bylaws Article IV, Section 6

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's request, finding that the HOA's action to uniformly assess all CR-1 Lots (including Petitioner's two uncombined lots) adhered to the Association Bylaws, which require uniform rates, and did not violate ARS § 33-1803. The governing documents took precedence over any prior reduced assessment granted by a previous Board Order.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association’s interpretation of the Bylaws requiring uniform assessment for all CR-1 lots was incorrect or unlawful, as her lots remained separate parcels according to the county map.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent) arbitrarily and capriciously raised annual assessments for some homeowners and not others in contravention of decades of past board practice and contractual agreements.

Petitioner challenged the Association's decision to raise her assessment from 150% to 200% (full rate for two lots) based on the Association's interpretation that the Bylaws require uniform assessment rates for all CR-1 lots, arguing the new rate violated a long-standing prior Board Order (2003) granting her a reduced rate.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(4)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Bylaws Article IV, Covenant For Maintenance Assessments, Section 6

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment Dispute, Uniform Assessment Rate, Bylaws Interpretation, Planned Community, Governing Document Precedence
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(4)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918017-REL Decision – 698354.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:07:24 (137.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918017-REL


Briefing Document: Brokaw v. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Case No. 19F-H1918017-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and final order from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Loraine Brokaw (Petitioner) versus the Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent). The core dispute centered on the Association’s 2017 decision to increase the Petitioner’s annual property assessment from 150% to 200% of the standard rate for a single lot, thereby ending a practice that had been in place since 2003. The Petitioner owned a single residence constructed across two adjacent lots.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the Petitioner’s petition in its entirety. The central conclusion of the ruling is that the Association’s governing documents (CC&Rs) take legal precedence over any prior informal board decisions or long-standing practices. The CC&Rs mandate that assessments be fixed at a uniform rate for all lots of a specific type. Therefore, the Association’s action to charge the full assessment for each of the Petitioner’s two lots was not a violation, but rather a move to bring its billing practices into compliance with its own Declaration. The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to show that the Association’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of any community document or statute.

Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: Loraine Brokaw

Respondent: Sin Vacas Property Owners Association

Case Number: 19F-H1918017-REL

Tribunal: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge: Jenna Clark

Hearing Date: March 25, 2019

Decision Date: April 01, 2019

Issue Presented for Hearing

The central legal question addressed by the hearing was:

“Whether Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent) arbitrarily and capriciously raised annual assessments for some homeowners and not others in contravention of decades of past board practice and contractual agreements based on utterly flawed legal theory, which, in fact, changed from attorney to attorney.”

Petitioner’s Position and Testimony

The Petitioner, Loraine Brokaw, initiated the action following the Association’s decision to increase her annual assessment.

Core Complaint: The Petitioner alleged that the Association unlawfully and selectively raised her assessment for a single residence built across two adjacent lots (Lots 156 and 157), which she and her husband purchased in 1979 and 2003, respectively.

Historical Assessment Practice: She testified that since 2003, the Association had assessed her property at 150% of the standard rate (100% for a home on a single lot, plus 50% for the adjacent lot). This reduced rate was granted by a Board vote, and she received written confirmation of this decision on March 24, 2003.

The Assessment Change: On or around December 4, 2017, the Petitioner received a letter from the Association’s management company informing her that the Board had decided to increase her assessment to 200% (a full assessment for each lot) based on “advice of counsel.”

Rationale and Repercussions: The Petitioner stated she was given varying reasons for the increase, but was ultimately told it was because all plats needed to be assessed uniformly. To be assessed for a single lot, she was informed she would have to officially combine her lots on the county’s plat map, a process she claimed would cost between $3,000 and $10,000 and require the permission of every other homeowner in the subdivision.

Requested Relief: The Petitioner requested that the Board be compelled to reinstate the 150% assessment schedule and reimburse her for the costs associated with filing the petition.

Respondent’s Position

The Sin Vacas Property Owners Association did not present witnesses or exhibits but cross-examined the Petitioner.

Interpretation Dispute: The Association’s position at the hearing was that the matter stemmed from differing interpretations of the governing Bylaws.

Compliance with Ruling: The Respondent indicated it would resolve the matter according to the tribunal’s interpretation and decision. The judge’s findings established that the Association’s action was based on its new interpretation that the CC&Rs required uniform assessment for each individual CR-1 lot.

Analysis of Governing Documents (CC&Rs)

The decision rested heavily on the interpretation of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), recorded on April 13, 1978. The following articles were central to the case.

Article & Section

Provision

Relevance to Case

Article I, Section 5

Defines a “[Lot]” as “any numbered lot shown upon any recorded subdivision map.”

This established that the Petitioner’s two properties were legally distinct “Lots” according to the governing documents, despite having one home built across them.

Article IV, Section 6 (“Special Assessments”)

States that “Special assessments must be fixed and apportioned at a uniform rate for all CR-1 lots, SR lots, and each 20,000 square feet of TR lots.”

Although concerning special assessments, this clause was cited by the ALJ as clear evidence of the document’s intent for uniform apportionment, which was applied to the annual assessments.

Article IV, Section 7 (“Annual Assessments”)

States that “The Board of Directors shall fix the amount of the annual assessment against each Lot at least thirty (30) days in advance of each annual assessment period.”

This provision empowers the Board to set the annual assessment amount for each individual lot, reinforcing the principle of lot-by-lot assessment.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Ruling

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain her burden of proof and denied the petition based on a strict interpretation of the Association’s governing documents.

Key Findings of Fact

• It is undisputed that the Petitioner owns two separate CR-1 lots: Lot 156 and Lot 157.

• Her residence is constructed across both lots.

• The lots have never been legally combined or consolidated into a single lot on the Pima County Assessor’s plat map. The Petitioner testified they were legally combined but presented no documentation to substantiate this claim.

Conclusions of Law

1. Governing Documents Supersede Past Practice: The central legal conclusion was that the Association’s formal CC&Rs take precedence over any informal agreement or prior Board order, regardless of the duration of that practice. The 2003 Board decision to grant a 150% assessment was deemed an informal agreement that could not override the plain language of the recorded Declaration.

2. No Binding Contract: The ALJ noted that the 2003 reduced assessment did not constitute a binding contract, as the “Petitioner provided no proof of consideration tendered to the Association.”

3. Uniform Assessment is Required: The Declaration requires the Association to assess all developed CR-1 lots at a uniform rate. By assessing both of the Petitioner’s lots at the same full rate as every other developed CR-1 lot, the Association was acting in compliance with its governing documents.

4. No Unlawful Action: The Petitioner did not establish that her assessments were raised selectively or unlawfully. The evidence showed she owned two distinct lots that were previously assessed at a non-uniform rate, and the Board’s action was to correct this by applying the uniform rate to both lots as required by the CC&Rs. The Board’s new interpretation of the Declaration was not found to be in error or a violation of statute.

A key excerpt from the decision states:

“In this case the governing documents for the Association take precedent over any informal agreement Petitioner had with the Board, regardless of the duration of that agreement.”

Final Order

Based on the findings and conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order:

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition be denied.


William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717032-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely provide access to association records

The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.

Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:05 (79.9 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:06 (726.4 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:06 (95.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717032-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.

The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.

Case Timeline and Factual Background

The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.

February 6, 2017

William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.

February 14, 2017

Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.

Post-Feb. 6, 2017

Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

April 13, 2017

The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.

May 2, 2017

Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

May 3, 2017

The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

June 26, 2017

The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.

July 14, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.

July 24, 2017

Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805

The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”

Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)

Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.

Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.

Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.

Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.

Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)

Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.

“Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.

Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine

The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:

“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”

Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.

The Correct Interpretation of the Law

The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:

“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”

Final Conclusion

The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:

1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.

2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.

3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.

Final Order and Mandates

The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.

The key directives of the order were:

Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.

Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.

Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.

No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.


William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717032-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely provide access to association records

The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.

Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:52 (79.9 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:53 (726.4 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:53 (95.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717032-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.

The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.

Case Timeline and Factual Background

The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.

February 6, 2017

William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.

February 14, 2017

Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.

Post-Feb. 6, 2017

Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

April 13, 2017

The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.

May 2, 2017

Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

May 3, 2017

The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

June 26, 2017

The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.

July 14, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.

July 24, 2017

Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805

The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”

Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)

Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.

Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.

Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.

Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.

Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)

Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.

“Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.

Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine

The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:

“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”

Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.

The Correct Interpretation of the Law

The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:

“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”

Final Conclusion

The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:

1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.

2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.

3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.

Final Order and Mandates

The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.

The key directives of the order were:

Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.

Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.

Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.

No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.


William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717032-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely provide access to association records

The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.

Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:05 (79.9 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:05 (726.4 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:06 (95.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717032-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.

The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.

Case Timeline and Factual Background

The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.

February 6, 2017

William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.

February 14, 2017

Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.

Post-Feb. 6, 2017

Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

April 13, 2017

The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.

May 2, 2017

Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

May 3, 2017

The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

June 26, 2017

The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.

July 14, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.

July 24, 2017

Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805

The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”

Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)

Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.

Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.

Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.

Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.

Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)

Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.

“Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.

Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine

The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:

“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”

Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.

The Correct Interpretation of the Law

The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:

“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”

Final Conclusion

The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:

1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.

2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.

3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.

Final Order and Mandates

The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.

The key directives of the order were:

Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.

Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.

Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.

No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.


William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717032-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely provide access to association records

The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.

Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:33 (79.9 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:34 (726.4 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:34 (95.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717032-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.

The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.

Case Timeline and Factual Background

The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.

February 6, 2017

William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.

February 14, 2017

Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.

Post-Feb. 6, 2017

Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

April 13, 2017

The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.

May 2, 2017

Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

May 3, 2017

The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

June 26, 2017

The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.

July 14, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.

July 24, 2017

Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805

The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”

Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)

Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.

Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.

Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.

Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.

Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)

Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.

“Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.

Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine

The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:

“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”

Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.

The Correct Interpretation of the Law

The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:

“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”

Final Conclusion

The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:

1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.

2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.

3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.

Final Order and Mandates

The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.

The key directives of the order were:

Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.

Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.

Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.

No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.