Victor L Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919047-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-06-05
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Victor L Pattarozzi Counsel
Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association Counsel Andrew Apodaca, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Architectural Committee meetings of the HOA were not 'regularly scheduled' within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, and therefore the HOA was not required to hold them open to association members.

Why this result: The petitioner failed to prove that the committee meetings met the requirement of being 'regularly scheduled' because the committee did not meet at fixed or uniform intervals, but rather considered applications as they were received.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Architectural Committee meetings are 'regularly scheduled' and thus required to be open to members.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated ARS 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings of its Architectural Committee (ARC). The ALJ found that because the ARC did not meet on a set schedule or at uniform intervals, it did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings as required by the statute, and thus was not required to be open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Architectural Review Committee, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919047-REL Decision – 713039.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:08:58 (89.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919047-REL


Administrative Law Judge Decision: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista HOA

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919047-REL, concerning a dispute between petitioner Victor L. Pattarozzi and the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (HOA). The central issue was whether the HOA’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) meetings were required to be open to all association members under Arizona state law.

The petitioner argued that the HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by not holding open meetings for its ARC. The HOA contended that its ARC meetings were not “regularly scheduled” and therefore were exempt from the open meeting requirement for committees under the statute.

The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, ruled in favor of the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, dismissing the petition. The decision hinged on the specific interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The judge concluded that the ARC, which considers applications on an as-needed basis rather than at fixed, uniform intervals, does not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings. Consequently, its meetings are not required to be open to the general membership of the association.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview

Case Number: 19F-H1919047-REL

Parties:

Petitioner: Victor L. Pattarozzi

Respondent: Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Presiding Judge: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date: May 16, 2019

Decision Date: June 5, 2019

Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee, also referred to as the Architectural Review Committee (ARC).

II. Positions of the Parties

A. Petitioner’s Argument (Victor L. Pattarozzi)

Mr. Pattarozzi’s case was predicated on the belief that all ARC meetings should be open to HOA members. His key arguments were:

Statutory Violation: The HOA’s practice of holding closed ARC meetings constituted a direct violation of the open meeting requirements outlined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804.

Definition of “Regularly”: To support his interpretation, Mr. Pattarozzi provided dictionary definitions for “regularly” and “regular”:

Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals.”

Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.”

Procedural Solution: He suggested that the HOA could comply with the law by scheduling ARC meetings on a weekly basis and simply canceling them if no applications were pending for review.

Policy of Openness: Mr. Pattarozzi contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as stated in subsection 33-1804(F), should be construed to require ARC meetings to be open to members.

B. Respondent’s Argument (Estrella Vista HOA)

The HOA, represented by Andrew Apodaca, Esq., with testimony from Board President Stuart Glenn, countered that its ARC meetings were not subject to the open meeting law.

Core Defense: The respondent’s primary position was that ARC meetings are not required to be open to members because they are not “regularly scheduled” as stipulated by the statute.

III. Key Findings of Fact

The Administrative Law Judge established the following facts based on the hearing:

ARC Composition and Schedule: The ARC consists of five members and does not meet on a set or recurring schedule. It considers applications as they are received.

Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing date, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019.

Application Processing:

◦ The HOA’s management company forwards applications to Board President Stuart Glenn.

◦ Mr. Glenn determines how each application is processed.

“Rubber Stamp” Process: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, specifically for solar panels and repainting using a preapproved color. These requests are approved without further review.

◦ Of the twelve applications received in 2019, eight were approved via this “rubber stamp” process.

Standard Review Process: For any application not meeting the “rubber stamp” criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards the application to the other four ARC members, who then individually “report back as to their agreement or disagreement with approving the application.”

IV. Legal Analysis and Rationale for Decision

The judge’s decision was based on a detailed interpretation of the relevant statute and legal principles.

A. Statutory Interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

The judge focused on the precise wording of subsection 33-1804(A): “all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”

The judge’s analysis highlighted a critical distinction made by the legislature:

Board/Association Meetings: The word “all” mandates that every meeting of the full association membership and the board of directors must be open.

Committee Meetings: The legislature added the qualifier “regularly scheduled,” which explicitly means that not all committee meetings must be open—only those that are regularly scheduled.

B. Defining “Regularly Scheduled”

The judge evaluated the dictionary definitions provided by Mr. Pattarozzi to determine the legislative intent behind the phrase.

Rejected Definition: The judge dismissed the first definition of “regular” (“done in conformity with the rules”). He reasoned that since all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, applying this definition would make the word “regular” in the statute “redundant or trivial.”

Accepted Definition: The judge found the second definition of “regular”—”recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”—to be the appropriate interpretation.

Application to the ARC: Based on this accepted definition, the judge concluded that only committee meetings scheduled on a recurring basis at uniform intervals are required to be open to members. The Estrella Vista HOA’s ARC, which meets on an as-needed basis, does not fit this definition.

C. Analysis of the Policy Statement

The judge also rejected Mr. Pattarozzi’s argument regarding the policy of openness declared in subsection 33-1804(F).

Statutory Limitation: The judge noted that the policy subsection explicitly references only “meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors.”

Omission of Committees: Because the policy statement does not mention committee meetings, the judge concluded that it could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

V. Final Order and Conclusion

Based on the preceding analysis, the Administrative Law Judge reached a definitive conclusion.

Conclusion of Law: The judge found that “Respondent’s Architectural Committee does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804.”

Final Ruling: As Mr. Pattarozzi had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the statute, his petition was ordered to be dismissed.

Notice of Rehearing: The decision included a formal notice that the order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.


Victor L Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919047-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-06-05
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Victor L Pattarozzi Counsel
Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association Counsel Andrew Apodaca, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Architectural Committee meetings of the HOA were not 'regularly scheduled' within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, and therefore the HOA was not required to hold them open to association members.

Why this result: The petitioner failed to prove that the committee meetings met the requirement of being 'regularly scheduled' because the committee did not meet at fixed or uniform intervals, but rather considered applications as they were received.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Architectural Committee meetings are 'regularly scheduled' and thus required to be open to members.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated ARS 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings of its Architectural Committee (ARC). The ALJ found that because the ARC did not meet on a set schedule or at uniform intervals, it did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings as required by the statute, and thus was not required to be open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Architectural Review Committee, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919047-REL Decision – 713039.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:08 (89.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919047-REL


Administrative Law Judge Decision: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista HOA

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919047-REL, concerning a dispute between petitioner Victor L. Pattarozzi and the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (HOA). The central issue was whether the HOA’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) meetings were required to be open to all association members under Arizona state law.

The petitioner argued that the HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by not holding open meetings for its ARC. The HOA contended that its ARC meetings were not “regularly scheduled” and therefore were exempt from the open meeting requirement for committees under the statute.

The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, ruled in favor of the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, dismissing the petition. The decision hinged on the specific interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The judge concluded that the ARC, which considers applications on an as-needed basis rather than at fixed, uniform intervals, does not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings. Consequently, its meetings are not required to be open to the general membership of the association.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview

Case Number: 19F-H1919047-REL

Parties:

Petitioner: Victor L. Pattarozzi

Respondent: Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Presiding Judge: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date: May 16, 2019

Decision Date: June 5, 2019

Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee, also referred to as the Architectural Review Committee (ARC).

II. Positions of the Parties

A. Petitioner’s Argument (Victor L. Pattarozzi)

Mr. Pattarozzi’s case was predicated on the belief that all ARC meetings should be open to HOA members. His key arguments were:

Statutory Violation: The HOA’s practice of holding closed ARC meetings constituted a direct violation of the open meeting requirements outlined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804.

Definition of “Regularly”: To support his interpretation, Mr. Pattarozzi provided dictionary definitions for “regularly” and “regular”:

Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals.”

Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.”

Procedural Solution: He suggested that the HOA could comply with the law by scheduling ARC meetings on a weekly basis and simply canceling them if no applications were pending for review.

Policy of Openness: Mr. Pattarozzi contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as stated in subsection 33-1804(F), should be construed to require ARC meetings to be open to members.

B. Respondent’s Argument (Estrella Vista HOA)

The HOA, represented by Andrew Apodaca, Esq., with testimony from Board President Stuart Glenn, countered that its ARC meetings were not subject to the open meeting law.

Core Defense: The respondent’s primary position was that ARC meetings are not required to be open to members because they are not “regularly scheduled” as stipulated by the statute.

III. Key Findings of Fact

The Administrative Law Judge established the following facts based on the hearing:

ARC Composition and Schedule: The ARC consists of five members and does not meet on a set or recurring schedule. It considers applications as they are received.

Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing date, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019.

Application Processing:

◦ The HOA’s management company forwards applications to Board President Stuart Glenn.

◦ Mr. Glenn determines how each application is processed.

“Rubber Stamp” Process: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, specifically for solar panels and repainting using a preapproved color. These requests are approved without further review.

◦ Of the twelve applications received in 2019, eight were approved via this “rubber stamp” process.

Standard Review Process: For any application not meeting the “rubber stamp” criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards the application to the other four ARC members, who then individually “report back as to their agreement or disagreement with approving the application.”

IV. Legal Analysis and Rationale for Decision

The judge’s decision was based on a detailed interpretation of the relevant statute and legal principles.

A. Statutory Interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

The judge focused on the precise wording of subsection 33-1804(A): “all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”

The judge’s analysis highlighted a critical distinction made by the legislature:

Board/Association Meetings: The word “all” mandates that every meeting of the full association membership and the board of directors must be open.

Committee Meetings: The legislature added the qualifier “regularly scheduled,” which explicitly means that not all committee meetings must be open—only those that are regularly scheduled.

B. Defining “Regularly Scheduled”

The judge evaluated the dictionary definitions provided by Mr. Pattarozzi to determine the legislative intent behind the phrase.

Rejected Definition: The judge dismissed the first definition of “regular” (“done in conformity with the rules”). He reasoned that since all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, applying this definition would make the word “regular” in the statute “redundant or trivial.”

Accepted Definition: The judge found the second definition of “regular”—”recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”—to be the appropriate interpretation.

Application to the ARC: Based on this accepted definition, the judge concluded that only committee meetings scheduled on a recurring basis at uniform intervals are required to be open to members. The Estrella Vista HOA’s ARC, which meets on an as-needed basis, does not fit this definition.

C. Analysis of the Policy Statement

The judge also rejected Mr. Pattarozzi’s argument regarding the policy of openness declared in subsection 33-1804(F).

Statutory Limitation: The judge noted that the policy subsection explicitly references only “meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors.”

Omission of Committees: Because the policy statement does not mention committee meetings, the judge concluded that it could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

V. Final Order and Conclusion

Based on the preceding analysis, the Administrative Law Judge reached a definitive conclusion.

Conclusion of Law: The judge found that “Respondent’s Architectural Committee does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804.”

Final Ruling: As Mr. Pattarozzi had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the statute, his petition was ordered to be dismissed.

Notice of Rehearing: The decision included a formal notice that the order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.


Gary W. Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gary W. Moselle Counsel
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Curtis Ekmark

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the respondent HOA did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1804 because the committee meeting in question was not a “regularly scheduled committee meeting” required to be open to all members.

Why this result: The specific language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) only requires 'regularly scheduled committee meetings' to be open, and the committee in question did not meet at regular intervals.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the DMMA Communications Committee meeting was subject to the open meetings law.

Petitioner, a member/homeowner, alleged the HOA violated the open meetings statute by closing a September 6, 2017, committee meeting. The ALJ determined the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings and thus was not subject to the open meetings law.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meetings Law, Committee Meetings, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes
  • Marsoner v. Pima County

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817005-REL-RHG Decision – 634096.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:03:13 (106.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA/Respondent). The central issue was whether a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee on September 6, 2017, violated Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The case hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Petitioner argued this meant any meeting scheduled in a normal fashion, while the Respondent contended it applied only to meetings occurring at fixed, regular intervals. The Respondent provided evidence that the committee in question met infrequently and without a set schedule.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent, concluding that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings held at regular intervals. The judge found that the specific language of the statute requiring only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings to be open superseded the statute’s general policy statement in favor of open meetings. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute originated from a petition filed by Gary W. Moselle with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the DMMA violated state law by holding a closed committee meeting. The case progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a successful request for a rehearing based on new evidence, and a final binding decision.

September 1, 2017

Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 5, 2017

The Department issues a notice to DMMA regarding the petition.

September 6, 2017

The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Moselle is not permitted to attend.

September 18, 2017

DMMA files an answer to the petition, denying all allegations.

November 17, 2017

The initial hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

December 7, 2017

The Administrative Law Judge issues an initial decision denying the petition.

January 4, 2018

Moselle files a request for a rehearing, citing newly discovered material evidence.

January 26, 2017

The Department grants the request for a rehearing.

April 20, 2018

A rehearing is conducted.

May 10, 2018

The Administrative Law Judge issues a final, binding decision denying the Petitioner’s petition.

The Central Legal Question: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The core of the dispute was the correct interpretation of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804(A), which governs open meetings for planned communities. The key statutory language under scrutiny was:

“…all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”

The case required the Administrative Law Judge to define the term “regularly scheduled” in the context of homeowners’ association committee meetings.

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)

The Petitioner’s case was built on a broad interpretation of the statute, emphasizing the legislative intent for transparency.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean “scheduled in a normal fashion,” rather than strictly meaning meetings held at fixed intervals (e.g., monthly or quarterly).

Legislative Policy: He pointed to A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which states a broad policy that “all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly.” He argued this policy statement should guide the interpretation of subsection (A) in favor of openness for all committee meetings.

Committee Practices: In his prehearing brief, Moselle asserted that five of the six “functioning DMMA committees” meet “at the request of the chair,” implying this was the normal scheduling method and should fall under the statute.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)

The Respondent advocated for a narrower, more literal interpretation of the statute.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA argued the phrase meant meetings that “occurred at regular intervals, such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”

Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: DMMA presented testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed interval. The committee held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017: two in April 2016, one in June 2017, and the contested meeting on September 6, 2017.

Lack of Board Action: To support the claim that the committee was not conducting core business of the Board, DMMA asserted that a recommendation made by the committee (to send an email blast) was not acted upon by the DMMA Board of Directors.

Judicial Findings and Legal Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, denied the petition, siding with the Respondent’s interpretation of the statute. The decision was based on principles of statutory construction and the evidence presented.

1. Statutory Interpretation and Plain Language

The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent by first looking at the plain language. The Judge concluded that the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) supports the interpretation that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” are those that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that the phrase could have multiple meanings, this did not preclude an interpretation based on its plain language.

2. Petitioner’s Contradictory Testimony

A key factor in the decision was the Petitioner’s own testimony during cross-examination. When asked about his assertion that five DMMA committees meet at the request of the chair, the Judge noted:

“Petitioner stated that five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page ‘meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.'” (Hearing record 30:52 – 31:15)

The Judge found that in this statement, the Petitioner himself used the phrase “not regularly scheduled” to describe meetings that were called as needed rather than held at fixed intervals, thereby undermining his own legal argument.

3. Specific Language Overrides General Policy

The Judge addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the statute’s broad policy statement in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)). The decision explicitly states:

“The general policy statement in favor of open meetings set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

This conclusion establishes that the specific qualifier “regularly scheduled” in subsection (A) creates a deliberate exception to the general policy for certain committee meetings.

Final Order and Implications

Order: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Conclusion: The Judge concluded that at the time of the September 6, 2017 meeting, the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings as defined by the statute. Therefore, the Respondent’s decision to hold a closed meeting was not a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

This decision, issued on May 10, 2018, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service.


Gary W. Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gary W. Moselle Counsel
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Curtis Ekmark

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the respondent HOA did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1804 because the committee meeting in question was not a “regularly scheduled committee meeting” required to be open to all members.

Why this result: The specific language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) only requires 'regularly scheduled committee meetings' to be open, and the committee in question did not meet at regular intervals.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the DMMA Communications Committee meeting was subject to the open meetings law.

Petitioner, a member/homeowner, alleged the HOA violated the open meetings statute by closing a September 6, 2017, committee meeting. The ALJ determined the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings and thus was not subject to the open meetings law.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meetings Law, Committee Meetings, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes
  • Marsoner v. Pima County

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817005-REL-RHG Decision – 634096.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:03 (106.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA/Respondent). The central issue was whether a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee on September 6, 2017, violated Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The case hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Petitioner argued this meant any meeting scheduled in a normal fashion, while the Respondent contended it applied only to meetings occurring at fixed, regular intervals. The Respondent provided evidence that the committee in question met infrequently and without a set schedule.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent, concluding that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings held at regular intervals. The judge found that the specific language of the statute requiring only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings to be open superseded the statute’s general policy statement in favor of open meetings. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute originated from a petition filed by Gary W. Moselle with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the DMMA violated state law by holding a closed committee meeting. The case progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a successful request for a rehearing based on new evidence, and a final binding decision.

September 1, 2017

Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 5, 2017

The Department issues a notice to DMMA regarding the petition.

September 6, 2017

The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Moselle is not permitted to attend.

September 18, 2017

DMMA files an answer to the petition, denying all allegations.

November 17, 2017

The initial hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

December 7, 2017

The Administrative Law Judge issues an initial decision denying the petition.

January 4, 2018

Moselle files a request for a rehearing, citing newly discovered material evidence.

January 26, 2017

The Department grants the request for a rehearing.

April 20, 2018

A rehearing is conducted.

May 10, 2018

The Administrative Law Judge issues a final, binding decision denying the Petitioner’s petition.

The Central Legal Question: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The core of the dispute was the correct interpretation of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804(A), which governs open meetings for planned communities. The key statutory language under scrutiny was:

“…all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”

The case required the Administrative Law Judge to define the term “regularly scheduled” in the context of homeowners’ association committee meetings.

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)

The Petitioner’s case was built on a broad interpretation of the statute, emphasizing the legislative intent for transparency.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean “scheduled in a normal fashion,” rather than strictly meaning meetings held at fixed intervals (e.g., monthly or quarterly).

Legislative Policy: He pointed to A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which states a broad policy that “all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly.” He argued this policy statement should guide the interpretation of subsection (A) in favor of openness for all committee meetings.

Committee Practices: In his prehearing brief, Moselle asserted that five of the six “functioning DMMA committees” meet “at the request of the chair,” implying this was the normal scheduling method and should fall under the statute.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)

The Respondent advocated for a narrower, more literal interpretation of the statute.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA argued the phrase meant meetings that “occurred at regular intervals, such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”

Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: DMMA presented testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed interval. The committee held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017: two in April 2016, one in June 2017, and the contested meeting on September 6, 2017.

Lack of Board Action: To support the claim that the committee was not conducting core business of the Board, DMMA asserted that a recommendation made by the committee (to send an email blast) was not acted upon by the DMMA Board of Directors.

Judicial Findings and Legal Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, denied the petition, siding with the Respondent’s interpretation of the statute. The decision was based on principles of statutory construction and the evidence presented.

1. Statutory Interpretation and Plain Language

The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent by first looking at the plain language. The Judge concluded that the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) supports the interpretation that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” are those that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that the phrase could have multiple meanings, this did not preclude an interpretation based on its plain language.

2. Petitioner’s Contradictory Testimony

A key factor in the decision was the Petitioner’s own testimony during cross-examination. When asked about his assertion that five DMMA committees meet at the request of the chair, the Judge noted:

“Petitioner stated that five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page ‘meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.'” (Hearing record 30:52 – 31:15)

The Judge found that in this statement, the Petitioner himself used the phrase “not regularly scheduled” to describe meetings that were called as needed rather than held at fixed intervals, thereby undermining his own legal argument.

3. Specific Language Overrides General Policy

The Judge addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the statute’s broad policy statement in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)). The decision explicitly states:

“The general policy statement in favor of open meetings set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

This conclusion establishes that the specific qualifier “regularly scheduled” in subsection (A) creates a deliberate exception to the general policy for certain committee meetings.

Final Order and Implications

Order: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Conclusion: The Judge concluded that at the time of the September 6, 2017 meeting, the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings as defined by the statute. Therefore, the Respondent’s decision to hold a closed meeting was not a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

This decision, issued on May 10, 2018, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service.


Gary W Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gary W. Moselle Counsel
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Curtis Ekmark

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the Petitioner's petition, concluding that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was not subject to the open meetings law because the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, as the committee meeting in question did not meet the definition of a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' required to be open to members.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent violated the open meeting statute by closing a committee meeting.

Petitioner alleged that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was improperly closed and subject to open meeting laws. The ALJ determined the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings (defined as meetings occurring at regular intervals) and was therefore not subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings Law, Committee Meeting, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817005-REL Decision – 634096.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:03:08 (106.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL


Briefing Document: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA/Respondent). The central issue was whether a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee on September 6, 2017, violated Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The case hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Petitioner argued this meant any meeting scheduled in a normal fashion, while the Respondent contended it applied only to meetings occurring at fixed, regular intervals. The Respondent provided evidence that the committee in question met infrequently and without a set schedule.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent, concluding that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings held at regular intervals. The judge found that the specific language of the statute requiring only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings to be open superseded the statute’s general policy statement in favor of open meetings. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute originated from a petition filed by Gary W. Moselle with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the DMMA violated state law by holding a closed committee meeting. The case progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a successful request for a rehearing based on new evidence, and a final binding decision.

September 1, 2017

Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 5, 2017

The Department issues a notice to DMMA regarding the petition.

September 6, 2017

The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Moselle is not permitted to attend.

September 18, 2017

DMMA files an answer to the petition, denying all allegations.

November 17, 2017

The initial hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

December 7, 2017

The Administrative Law Judge issues an initial decision denying the petition.

January 4, 2018

Moselle files a request for a rehearing, citing newly discovered material evidence.

January 26, 2017

The Department grants the request for a rehearing.

April 20, 2018

A rehearing is conducted.

May 10, 2018

The Administrative Law Judge issues a final, binding decision denying the Petitioner’s petition.

The Central Legal Question: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The core of the dispute was the correct interpretation of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804(A), which governs open meetings for planned communities. The key statutory language under scrutiny was:

“…all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”

The case required the Administrative Law Judge to define the term “regularly scheduled” in the context of homeowners’ association committee meetings.

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)

The Petitioner’s case was built on a broad interpretation of the statute, emphasizing the legislative intent for transparency.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean “scheduled in a normal fashion,” rather than strictly meaning meetings held at fixed intervals (e.g., monthly or quarterly).

Legislative Policy: He pointed to A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which states a broad policy that “all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly.” He argued this policy statement should guide the interpretation of subsection (A) in favor of openness for all committee meetings.

Committee Practices: In his prehearing brief, Moselle asserted that five of the six “functioning DMMA committees” meet “at the request of the chair,” implying this was the normal scheduling method and should fall under the statute.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)

The Respondent advocated for a narrower, more literal interpretation of the statute.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA argued the phrase meant meetings that “occurred at regular intervals, such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”

Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: DMMA presented testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed interval. The committee held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017: two in April 2016, one in June 2017, and the contested meeting on September 6, 2017.

Lack of Board Action: To support the claim that the committee was not conducting core business of the Board, DMMA asserted that a recommendation made by the committee (to send an email blast) was not acted upon by the DMMA Board of Directors.

Judicial Findings and Legal Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, denied the petition, siding with the Respondent’s interpretation of the statute. The decision was based on principles of statutory construction and the evidence presented.

1. Statutory Interpretation and Plain Language

The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent by first looking at the plain language. The Judge concluded that the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) supports the interpretation that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” are those that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that the phrase could have multiple meanings, this did not preclude an interpretation based on its plain language.

2. Petitioner’s Contradictory Testimony

A key factor in the decision was the Petitioner’s own testimony during cross-examination. When asked about his assertion that five DMMA committees meet at the request of the chair, the Judge noted:

“Petitioner stated that five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page ‘meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.'” (Hearing record 30:52 – 31:15)

The Judge found that in this statement, the Petitioner himself used the phrase “not regularly scheduled” to describe meetings that were called as needed rather than held at fixed intervals, thereby undermining his own legal argument.

3. Specific Language Overrides General Policy

The Judge addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the statute’s broad policy statement in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)). The decision explicitly states:

“The general policy statement in favor of open meetings set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

This conclusion establishes that the specific qualifier “regularly scheduled” in subsection (A) creates a deliberate exception to the general policy for certain committee meetings.

Final Order and Implications

Order: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Conclusion: The Judge concluded that at the time of the September 6, 2017 meeting, the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings as defined by the statute. Therefore, the Respondent’s decision to hold a closed meeting was not a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

This decision, issued on May 10, 2018, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service.


Gary W Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gary W. Moselle Counsel
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Curtis Ekmark

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the Petitioner's petition, concluding that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was not subject to the open meetings law because the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, as the committee meeting in question did not meet the definition of a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' required to be open to members.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent violated the open meeting statute by closing a committee meeting.

Petitioner alleged that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was improperly closed and subject to open meeting laws. The ALJ determined the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings (defined as meetings occurring at regular intervals) and was therefore not subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings Law, Committee Meeting, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817005-REL Decision – 634096.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:01 (106.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL


Briefing Document: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA/Respondent). The central issue was whether a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee on September 6, 2017, violated Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The case hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Petitioner argued this meant any meeting scheduled in a normal fashion, while the Respondent contended it applied only to meetings occurring at fixed, regular intervals. The Respondent provided evidence that the committee in question met infrequently and without a set schedule.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent, concluding that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings held at regular intervals. The judge found that the specific language of the statute requiring only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings to be open superseded the statute’s general policy statement in favor of open meetings. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute originated from a petition filed by Gary W. Moselle with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the DMMA violated state law by holding a closed committee meeting. The case progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a successful request for a rehearing based on new evidence, and a final binding decision.

September 1, 2017

Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 5, 2017

The Department issues a notice to DMMA regarding the petition.

September 6, 2017

The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Moselle is not permitted to attend.

September 18, 2017

DMMA files an answer to the petition, denying all allegations.

November 17, 2017

The initial hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

December 7, 2017

The Administrative Law Judge issues an initial decision denying the petition.

January 4, 2018

Moselle files a request for a rehearing, citing newly discovered material evidence.

January 26, 2017

The Department grants the request for a rehearing.

April 20, 2018

A rehearing is conducted.

May 10, 2018

The Administrative Law Judge issues a final, binding decision denying the Petitioner’s petition.

The Central Legal Question: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The core of the dispute was the correct interpretation of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804(A), which governs open meetings for planned communities. The key statutory language under scrutiny was:

“…all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”

The case required the Administrative Law Judge to define the term “regularly scheduled” in the context of homeowners’ association committee meetings.

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)

The Petitioner’s case was built on a broad interpretation of the statute, emphasizing the legislative intent for transparency.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean “scheduled in a normal fashion,” rather than strictly meaning meetings held at fixed intervals (e.g., monthly or quarterly).

Legislative Policy: He pointed to A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which states a broad policy that “all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly.” He argued this policy statement should guide the interpretation of subsection (A) in favor of openness for all committee meetings.

Committee Practices: In his prehearing brief, Moselle asserted that five of the six “functioning DMMA committees” meet “at the request of the chair,” implying this was the normal scheduling method and should fall under the statute.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)

The Respondent advocated for a narrower, more literal interpretation of the statute.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA argued the phrase meant meetings that “occurred at regular intervals, such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”

Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: DMMA presented testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed interval. The committee held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017: two in April 2016, one in June 2017, and the contested meeting on September 6, 2017.

Lack of Board Action: To support the claim that the committee was not conducting core business of the Board, DMMA asserted that a recommendation made by the committee (to send an email blast) was not acted upon by the DMMA Board of Directors.

Judicial Findings and Legal Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, denied the petition, siding with the Respondent’s interpretation of the statute. The decision was based on principles of statutory construction and the evidence presented.

1. Statutory Interpretation and Plain Language

The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent by first looking at the plain language. The Judge concluded that the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) supports the interpretation that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” are those that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that the phrase could have multiple meanings, this did not preclude an interpretation based on its plain language.

2. Petitioner’s Contradictory Testimony

A key factor in the decision was the Petitioner’s own testimony during cross-examination. When asked about his assertion that five DMMA committees meet at the request of the chair, the Judge noted:

“Petitioner stated that five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page ‘meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.'” (Hearing record 30:52 – 31:15)

The Judge found that in this statement, the Petitioner himself used the phrase “not regularly scheduled” to describe meetings that were called as needed rather than held at fixed intervals, thereby undermining his own legal argument.

3. Specific Language Overrides General Policy

The Judge addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the statute’s broad policy statement in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)). The decision explicitly states:

“The general policy statement in favor of open meetings set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

This conclusion establishes that the specific qualifier “regularly scheduled” in subsection (A) creates a deliberate exception to the general policy for certain committee meetings.

Final Order and Implications

Order: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Conclusion: The Judge concluded that at the time of the September 6, 2017 meeting, the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings as defined by the statute. Therefore, the Respondent’s decision to hold a closed meeting was not a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

This decision, issued on May 10, 2018, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service.