Tag Archives: statutory interpretation

Victor L Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Posted on June 5, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1919047-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-06-05
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Victor L Pattarozzi	Counsel	—
Respondent	Estrella Vista Homeowners Association	Counsel	Andrew Apodaca, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Architectural Committee meetings of the HOA were not 'regularly scheduled' within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, and therefore the HOA was not required to hold them open to association members.

Why this result: The petitioner failed to prove that the committee meetings met the requirement of being 'regularly scheduled' because the committee did not meet at fixed or uniform intervals, but rather considered applications as they were received.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Architectural Committee meetings are 'regularly scheduled' and thus required to be open to members.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated ARS 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings of its Architectural Committee (ARC). The ALJ found that because the ARC did not meet on a set schedule or at uniform intervals, it did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings as required by the statute, and thus was not required to be open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
• State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
• U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
• Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Architectural Review Committee, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
• State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
• U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
• Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919047-REL Decision – 713039.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:08:58 (89.8 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista HOA

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919047-REL, concerning a dispute between petitioner Victor L. Pattarozzi and the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (HOA). The central issue was whether the HOA’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) meetings were required to be open to all association members under Arizona state law.

The petitioner argued that the HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by not holding open meetings for its ARC. The HOA contended that its ARC meetings were not “regularly scheduled” and therefore were exempt from the open meeting requirement for committees under the statute.

The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, ruled in favor of the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, dismissing the petition. The decision hinged on the specific interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The judge concluded that the ARC, which considers applications on an as-needed basis rather than at fixed, uniform intervals, does not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings. Consequently, its meetings are not required to be open to the general membership of the association.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview

• Case Number: 19F-H1919047-REL

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Victor L. Pattarozzi

◦ Respondent: Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

• Presiding Judge: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

• Hearing Date: May 16, 2019

• Decision Date: June 5, 2019

• Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee, also referred to as the Architectural Review Committee (ARC).

II. Positions of the Parties

A. Petitioner’s Argument (Victor L. Pattarozzi)

Mr. Pattarozzi’s case was predicated on the belief that all ARC meetings should be open to HOA members. His key arguments were:

• Statutory Violation: The HOA’s practice of holding closed ARC meetings constituted a direct violation of the open meeting requirements outlined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804.

• Definition of “Regularly”: To support his interpretation, Mr. Pattarozzi provided dictionary definitions for “regularly” and “regular”:

◦ Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals.”

◦ Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.”

• Procedural Solution: He suggested that the HOA could comply with the law by scheduling ARC meetings on a weekly basis and simply canceling them if no applications were pending for review.

• Policy of Openness: Mr. Pattarozzi contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as stated in subsection 33-1804(F), should be construed to require ARC meetings to be open to members.

B. Respondent’s Argument (Estrella Vista HOA)

The HOA, represented by Andrew Apodaca, Esq., with testimony from Board President Stuart Glenn, countered that its ARC meetings were not subject to the open meeting law.

• Core Defense: The respondent’s primary position was that ARC meetings are not required to be open to members because they are not “regularly scheduled” as stipulated by the statute.

III. Key Findings of Fact

The Administrative Law Judge established the following facts based on the hearing:

• ARC Composition and Schedule: The ARC consists of five members and does not meet on a set or recurring schedule. It considers applications as they are received.

• Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing date, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019.

• Application Processing:

◦ The HOA’s management company forwards applications to Board President Stuart Glenn.

◦ Mr. Glenn determines how each application is processed.

• “Rubber Stamp” Process: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, specifically for solar panels and repainting using a preapproved color. These requests are approved without further review.

◦ Of the twelve applications received in 2019, eight were approved via this “rubber stamp” process.

• Standard Review Process: For any application not meeting the “rubber stamp” criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards the application to the other four ARC members, who then individually “report back as to their agreement or disagreement with approving the application.”

IV. Legal Analysis and Rationale for Decision

The judge’s decision was based on a detailed interpretation of the relevant statute and legal principles.

A. Statutory Interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

The judge focused on the precise wording of subsection 33-1804(A): “all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”

The judge’s analysis highlighted a critical distinction made by the legislature:

• Board/Association Meetings: The word “all” mandates that every meeting of the full association membership and the board of directors must be open.

• Committee Meetings: The legislature added the qualifier “regularly scheduled,” which explicitly means that not all committee meetings must be open—only those that are regularly scheduled.

B. Defining “Regularly Scheduled”

The judge evaluated the dictionary definitions provided by Mr. Pattarozzi to determine the legislative intent behind the phrase.

• Rejected Definition: The judge dismissed the first definition of “regular” (“done in conformity with the rules”). He reasoned that since all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, applying this definition would make the word “regular” in the statute “redundant or trivial.”

• Accepted Definition: The judge found the second definition of “regular”—”recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”—to be the appropriate interpretation.

• Application to the ARC: Based on this accepted definition, the judge concluded that only committee meetings scheduled on a recurring basis at uniform intervals are required to be open to members. The Estrella Vista HOA’s ARC, which meets on an as-needed basis, does not fit this definition.

C. Analysis of the Policy Statement

The judge also rejected Mr. Pattarozzi’s argument regarding the policy of openness declared in subsection 33-1804(F).

• Statutory Limitation: The judge noted that the policy subsection explicitly references only “meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors.”

• Omission of Committees: Because the policy statement does not mention committee meetings, the judge concluded that it could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

V. Final Order and Conclusion

Based on the preceding analysis, the Administrative Law Judge reached a definitive conclusion.

• Conclusion of Law: The judge found that “Respondent’s Architectural Committee does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804.”

• Final Ruling: As Mr. Pattarozzi had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the statute, his petition was ordered to be dismissed.

• Notice of Rehearing: The decision included a formal notice that the order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Victor L Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Posted on June 5, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1919047-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-06-05
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Victor L Pattarozzi	Counsel	—
Respondent	Estrella Vista Homeowners Association	Counsel	Andrew Apodaca, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Architectural Committee meetings of the HOA were not 'regularly scheduled' within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, and therefore the HOA was not required to hold them open to association members.

Why this result: The petitioner failed to prove that the committee meetings met the requirement of being 'regularly scheduled' because the committee did not meet at fixed or uniform intervals, but rather considered applications as they were received.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Architectural Committee meetings are 'regularly scheduled' and thus required to be open to members.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated ARS 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings of its Architectural Committee (ARC). The ALJ found that because the ARC did not meet on a set schedule or at uniform intervals, it did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings as required by the statute, and thus was not required to be open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
• State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
• U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
• Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Architectural Review Committee, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
• State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
• U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
• Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919047-REL Decision – 713039.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:08 (89.8 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista HOA

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919047-REL, concerning a dispute between petitioner Victor L. Pattarozzi and the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (HOA). The central issue was whether the HOA’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) meetings were required to be open to all association members under Arizona state law.

The petitioner argued that the HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by not holding open meetings for its ARC. The HOA contended that its ARC meetings were not “regularly scheduled” and therefore were exempt from the open meeting requirement for committees under the statute.

The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, ruled in favor of the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, dismissing the petition. The decision hinged on the specific interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The judge concluded that the ARC, which considers applications on an as-needed basis rather than at fixed, uniform intervals, does not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings. Consequently, its meetings are not required to be open to the general membership of the association.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview

• Case Number: 19F-H1919047-REL

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Victor L. Pattarozzi

◦ Respondent: Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

• Presiding Judge: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

• Hearing Date: May 16, 2019

• Decision Date: June 5, 2019

• Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee, also referred to as the Architectural Review Committee (ARC).

II. Positions of the Parties

A. Petitioner’s Argument (Victor L. Pattarozzi)

Mr. Pattarozzi’s case was predicated on the belief that all ARC meetings should be open to HOA members. His key arguments were:

• Statutory Violation: The HOA’s practice of holding closed ARC meetings constituted a direct violation of the open meeting requirements outlined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804.

• Definition of “Regularly”: To support his interpretation, Mr. Pattarozzi provided dictionary definitions for “regularly” and “regular”:

◦ Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals.”

◦ Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.”

• Procedural Solution: He suggested that the HOA could comply with the law by scheduling ARC meetings on a weekly basis and simply canceling them if no applications were pending for review.

• Policy of Openness: Mr. Pattarozzi contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as stated in subsection 33-1804(F), should be construed to require ARC meetings to be open to members.

B. Respondent’s Argument (Estrella Vista HOA)

The HOA, represented by Andrew Apodaca, Esq., with testimony from Board President Stuart Glenn, countered that its ARC meetings were not subject to the open meeting law.

• Core Defense: The respondent’s primary position was that ARC meetings are not required to be open to members because they are not “regularly scheduled” as stipulated by the statute.

III. Key Findings of Fact

The Administrative Law Judge established the following facts based on the hearing:

• ARC Composition and Schedule: The ARC consists of five members and does not meet on a set or recurring schedule. It considers applications as they are received.

• Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing date, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019.

• Application Processing:

◦ The HOA’s management company forwards applications to Board President Stuart Glenn.

◦ Mr. Glenn determines how each application is processed.

• “Rubber Stamp” Process: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, specifically for solar panels and repainting using a preapproved color. These requests are approved without further review.

◦ Of the twelve applications received in 2019, eight were approved via this “rubber stamp” process.

• Standard Review Process: For any application not meeting the “rubber stamp” criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards the application to the other four ARC members, who then individually “report back as to their agreement or disagreement with approving the application.”

IV. Legal Analysis and Rationale for Decision

The judge’s decision was based on a detailed interpretation of the relevant statute and legal principles.

A. Statutory Interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

The judge focused on the precise wording of subsection 33-1804(A): “all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”

The judge’s analysis highlighted a critical distinction made by the legislature:

• Board/Association Meetings: The word “all” mandates that every meeting of the full association membership and the board of directors must be open.

• Committee Meetings: The legislature added the qualifier “regularly scheduled,” which explicitly means that not all committee meetings must be open—only those that are regularly scheduled.

B. Defining “Regularly Scheduled”

The judge evaluated the dictionary definitions provided by Mr. Pattarozzi to determine the legislative intent behind the phrase.

• Rejected Definition: The judge dismissed the first definition of “regular” (“done in conformity with the rules”). He reasoned that since all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, applying this definition would make the word “regular” in the statute “redundant or trivial.”

• Accepted Definition: The judge found the second definition of “regular”—”recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”—to be the appropriate interpretation.

• Application to the ARC: Based on this accepted definition, the judge concluded that only committee meetings scheduled on a recurring basis at uniform intervals are required to be open to members. The Estrella Vista HOA’s ARC, which meets on an as-needed basis, does not fit this definition.

C. Analysis of the Policy Statement

The judge also rejected Mr. Pattarozzi’s argument regarding the policy of openness declared in subsection 33-1804(F).

• Statutory Limitation: The judge noted that the policy subsection explicitly references only “meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors.”

• Omission of Committees: Because the policy statement does not mention committee meetings, the judge concluded that it could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

V. Final Order and Conclusion

Based on the preceding analysis, the Administrative Law Judge reached a definitive conclusion.

• Conclusion of Law: The judge found that “Respondent’s Architectural Committee does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804.”

• Final Ruling: As Mr. Pattarozzi had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the statute, his petition was ordered to be dismissed.

• Notice of Rehearing: The decision included a formal notice that the order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Tom J Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Posted on April 26, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918022-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	respondent_win
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Tom J Martin	Counsel	—
Respondent	SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.	Counsel	Carolyn B. Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)

Outcome Summary

The case was dismissed because the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction, as the alleged violations (HOA website and policy BC-3) did not pertain to 'community documents' as defined by Arizona statute.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A) by alleging violations of documents (website, policy manual) that are not defined as 'community documents' under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2).

Key Issues & Findings

Jurisdiction based on alleged violations of non-community documents (HOA website and policy manual)

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its website and Policy BC-3 by failing to provide pickleball courts as advertised, requesting $463,112.00 in financial support or court construction. The ALJ found that neither the website nor Policy BC-3 are defined as 'community documents' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), thus denying jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A). The petition was dismissed.

Orders: Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-213
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Walker v. Scottsdale, 163 Ariz. 206, 786 P.2d 1057 (App. 1989)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, community_documents, dismissal, policy_manual, pickleball, statutory_interpretation

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-213
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.
• Walker v. Scottsdale

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG Decision – 704322.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:07:45 (89.7 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Martin v. SaddleBrooke HOA #1

Executive Summary

The petition filed by Tom J. Martin against the SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. was dismissed by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. The core of the decision rests on a strict interpretation of Arizona state law, which limits the hearing office’s authority to violations of formally defined “community documents.”

Mr. Martin’s primary grievance was the HOA’s alleged failure to provide and fund pickleball courts as advertised on its website and outlined in an internal policy document (Policy BC-3). However, the ALJ found that neither an HOA’s website nor its internal policies qualify as “community documents” under the statutory definition, which is restricted to the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, and rules. Mr. Martin’s attempt to equate “policy” with “rule” was deemed unpersuasive because the policy in question had not been formally adopted as a rule by the HOA.

Furthermore, the specific relief requested by Mr. Martin—a demand for $463,112.00, the construction of eight new courts, and mandated maintenance funding—was found to be outside the scope of the ALJ’s statutory authority to grant. The dismissal, issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

Case Background and Procedural History

This briefing document outlines the findings and decision in case number 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG, presided over by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden. The matter involved a dispute between Petitioner Tom J. Martin and Respondent SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

September 28, 2018

Mr. Martin filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 30, 2018

The HOA filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenging the Department’s jurisdiction.

December 4, 2018

Mr. Martin filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss.

December 12, 2018

An Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, ordering the petition be dismissed.

December 31, 2018

Mr. Martin filed a request for a rehearing.

April 16, 2019

The rehearing was conducted.

May 10, 2019

The final Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, dismissing the petition.

Petitioner’s Allegations and Requested Relief

Initial Petition Allegations

• The core of Mr. Martin’s petition, filed September 28, 2018, was the allegation that the SaddleBrooke HOA violated its website and its policy manual, specifically Policy Number BC-3.

• The central claim was that “the Association is in violation for not providing pickleball courts as advertised and marketed….”

• While Mr. Martin checked boxes on the petition form indicating violations of the CC&Rs and Bylaws, he did not identify any specific provisions of those documents in his initial filing.

Allegations on Rehearing

In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Martin attempted to amend his claim by alleging specific violations of formal community documents:

• He argued the HOA violated Bylaws article 4, section 6(3) by failing to implement policy BC-3.

• He alleged the HOA violated Articles of Incorporation Article XII by not providing pickleball as promised, which he tied back to the failure to implement policy BC-3.

Requested Relief

Mr. Martin sought significant remedies from the HOA, requesting that it either:

1. Provide financial support of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon; or

2. Provide eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year.

Additionally, he demanded that the HOA be held financially responsible for the maintenance of the pickleball courts in an amount equal to what it spent on eight tennis courts.

Respondent’s Jurisdictional Challenge

The SaddleBrooke HOA’s primary defense was a jurisdictional challenge, arguing that the petition fell outside the legal authority of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Limited Jurisdiction: The HOA contended that pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01, administrative hearings are limited to disputes regarding violations of “planned community documents” or applicable state statutes.

• Definition of “Community Documents”: The HOA cited ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2), which defines “community documents” as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.”

• Exclusion of Policies and Websites: Based on this statutory definition, the HOA argued that its website and Policy BC-3 are not “community documents,” and therefore any alleged violation of them cannot be adjudicated in this forum.

• Authority to Grant Relief: The HOA also argued that the specific financial and construction-related relief Mr. Martin sought was not within the tribunal’s authority to grant.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Legal Rationale

The ALJ ultimately sided with the Respondent HOA and ordered the petition dismissed. The decision was based on a strict application of Arizona statutes governing planned communities and the administrative hearing process.

Conclusions of Law

1. Statutory Limitations: The judge affirmed that hearings under A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) are restricted to alleged “violations of … planned community documents or violations of the statutes that regulate … planned communities.”

2. Definition of “Community Documents” is Controlling: The decision hinges on the explicit definition of “community documents” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2). The judge noted that the tribunal must follow definitions provided by the legislature. The finding states: “This definition does not include a planned community’s statements of policy, statements on its website, or advertising and marketing material.”

3. A “Policy” is Not a “Rule”: Mr. Martin’s argument that a “policy” should be interpreted as a “rule” was found to be “not persuasive.” The judge found that the HOA had not formally adopted Policy BC-3 as a rule under the authority granted in its CC&Rs (section 4.5). Therefore, the policy could not be treated as an enforceable “community document.”

4. Petition’s Failure to Meet Requirements: Because Mr. Martin’s original petition only alleged violations of the website and the policy manual—neither of which are legally defined as community documents—the petition “does not meet the requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01(A).”

5. Relief Outside of Authority: The ALJ also concluded that the requested relief was “not within the scope of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority” as prescribed by A.R.S. § 32-2199.02. The statute allows an ALJ to order a party to abide by the documents at issue and levy civil penalties, but not to order large monetary payments for construction or specific performance of capital projects.

Final Order

• “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.”

• The decision, being the result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

• Any party wishing to appeal must file for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service of the order.

Tom J Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Posted on April 26, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918022-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	respondent_win
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Tom J Martin	Counsel	—
Respondent	SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.	Counsel	Carolyn B. Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)

Outcome Summary

The case was dismissed because the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction, as the alleged violations (HOA website and policy BC-3) did not pertain to 'community documents' as defined by Arizona statute.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A) by alleging violations of documents (website, policy manual) that are not defined as 'community documents' under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2).

Key Issues & Findings

Jurisdiction based on alleged violations of non-community documents (HOA website and policy manual)

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its website and Policy BC-3 by failing to provide pickleball courts as advertised, requesting $463,112.00 in financial support or court construction. The ALJ found that neither the website nor Policy BC-3 are defined as 'community documents' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), thus denying jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A). The petition was dismissed.

Orders: Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-213
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Walker v. Scottsdale, 163 Ariz. 206, 786 P.2d 1057 (App. 1989)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, community_documents, dismissal, policy_manual, pickleball, statutory_interpretation

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-213
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.
• Walker v. Scottsdale

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG Decision – 704322.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:41 (89.7 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Martin v. SaddleBrooke HOA #1

Executive Summary

The petition filed by Tom J. Martin against the SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. was dismissed by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. The core of the decision rests on a strict interpretation of Arizona state law, which limits the hearing office’s authority to violations of formally defined “community documents.”

Mr. Martin’s primary grievance was the HOA’s alleged failure to provide and fund pickleball courts as advertised on its website and outlined in an internal policy document (Policy BC-3). However, the ALJ found that neither an HOA’s website nor its internal policies qualify as “community documents” under the statutory definition, which is restricted to the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, and rules. Mr. Martin’s attempt to equate “policy” with “rule” was deemed unpersuasive because the policy in question had not been formally adopted as a rule by the HOA.

Furthermore, the specific relief requested by Mr. Martin—a demand for $463,112.00, the construction of eight new courts, and mandated maintenance funding—was found to be outside the scope of the ALJ’s statutory authority to grant. The dismissal, issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

Case Background and Procedural History

This briefing document outlines the findings and decision in case number 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG, presided over by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden. The matter involved a dispute between Petitioner Tom J. Martin and Respondent SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

September 28, 2018

Mr. Martin filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 30, 2018

The HOA filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenging the Department’s jurisdiction.

December 4, 2018

Mr. Martin filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss.

December 12, 2018

An Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, ordering the petition be dismissed.

December 31, 2018

Mr. Martin filed a request for a rehearing.

April 16, 2019

The rehearing was conducted.

May 10, 2019

The final Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, dismissing the petition.

Petitioner’s Allegations and Requested Relief

Initial Petition Allegations

• The core of Mr. Martin’s petition, filed September 28, 2018, was the allegation that the SaddleBrooke HOA violated its website and its policy manual, specifically Policy Number BC-3.

• The central claim was that “the Association is in violation for not providing pickleball courts as advertised and marketed….”

• While Mr. Martin checked boxes on the petition form indicating violations of the CC&Rs and Bylaws, he did not identify any specific provisions of those documents in his initial filing.

Allegations on Rehearing

In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Martin attempted to amend his claim by alleging specific violations of formal community documents:

• He argued the HOA violated Bylaws article 4, section 6(3) by failing to implement policy BC-3.

• He alleged the HOA violated Articles of Incorporation Article XII by not providing pickleball as promised, which he tied back to the failure to implement policy BC-3.

Requested Relief

Mr. Martin sought significant remedies from the HOA, requesting that it either:

1. Provide financial support of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon; or

2. Provide eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year.

Additionally, he demanded that the HOA be held financially responsible for the maintenance of the pickleball courts in an amount equal to what it spent on eight tennis courts.

Respondent’s Jurisdictional Challenge

The SaddleBrooke HOA’s primary defense was a jurisdictional challenge, arguing that the petition fell outside the legal authority of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Limited Jurisdiction: The HOA contended that pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01, administrative hearings are limited to disputes regarding violations of “planned community documents” or applicable state statutes.

• Definition of “Community Documents”: The HOA cited ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2), which defines “community documents” as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.”

• Exclusion of Policies and Websites: Based on this statutory definition, the HOA argued that its website and Policy BC-3 are not “community documents,” and therefore any alleged violation of them cannot be adjudicated in this forum.

• Authority to Grant Relief: The HOA also argued that the specific financial and construction-related relief Mr. Martin sought was not within the tribunal’s authority to grant.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Legal Rationale

The ALJ ultimately sided with the Respondent HOA and ordered the petition dismissed. The decision was based on a strict application of Arizona statutes governing planned communities and the administrative hearing process.

Conclusions of Law

1. Statutory Limitations: The judge affirmed that hearings under A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) are restricted to alleged “violations of … planned community documents or violations of the statutes that regulate … planned communities.”

2. Definition of “Community Documents” is Controlling: The decision hinges on the explicit definition of “community documents” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2). The judge noted that the tribunal must follow definitions provided by the legislature. The finding states: “This definition does not include a planned community’s statements of policy, statements on its website, or advertising and marketing material.”

3. A “Policy” is Not a “Rule”: Mr. Martin’s argument that a “policy” should be interpreted as a “rule” was found to be “not persuasive.” The judge found that the HOA had not formally adopted Policy BC-3 as a rule under the authority granted in its CC&Rs (section 4.5). Therefore, the policy could not be treated as an enforceable “community document.”

4. Petition’s Failure to Meet Requirements: Because Mr. Martin’s original petition only alleged violations of the website and the policy manual—neither of which are legally defined as community documents—the petition “does not meet the requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01(A).”

5. Relief Outside of Authority: The ALJ also concluded that the requested relief was “not within the scope of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority” as prescribed by A.R.S. § 32-2199.02. The statute allows an ALJ to order a party to abide by the documents at issue and levy civil penalties, but not to order large monetary payments for construction or specific performance of capital projects.

Final Order

• “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.”

• The decision, being the result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

• Any party wishing to appeal must file for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service of the order.

Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Posted on March 1, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818054-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-03-01
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Brad W. Stevens	Counsel	—
Respondent	Mogollon Airpark, Inc.	Counsel	Greg Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A). The increase in the regular assessment (14.1%) was below the statutory 20% limit, and the overall increase included a special assessment which the statute does not cover.

Why this result: The Petitioner's definition of 'regular assessment' was rejected as not supported by statutory construction principles, and the issue was limited to the definition and application of ARS § 33-1803(A).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A) by increasing the regular assessment more than 20%.

Petitioner alleged that the HOA's total assessment increase of $325 (which was 39.4% over the previous assessment of $825) constituted an unlawful increase of the 'regular assessment' under ARS § 33-1803(A). The HOA argued the increase to the 'regular assessment' was only 14.1% ($116 increase), and the remaining $209 was a separate, one-time assessment.

Orders: Petitioner Brad W. Stevens’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
• Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
• Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
• State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
• Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment, Statutory Interpretation, Regular Assessment, Special Assessment, ARS 33-1803(A)

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
• Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
• Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
• State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
• Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 692388.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:21 (102.8 KB)

Briefing Document: Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the matter of Brad W. Stevens versus Mogollon Airpark, Inc., a case centered on the legality of a homeowner association (HOA) assessment increase. The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, ultimately dismissed the petition filed by Mr. Stevens, finding he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mogollon Airpark violated Arizona state law.

The core of the dispute was a $325 increase to the annual assessment for 2018, which represented a 39.4% increase over the previous year’s $825 fee. The petitioner alleged this violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), which prohibits HOAs from increasing a “regular assessment” by more than 20% without member approval. The respondent, Mogollon Airpark, argued the increase was composed of two distinct parts: a 14.1% ($116) increase to the regular assessment to cover a budget shortfall, and a separate $209 one-time “special assessment” to replenish a reserve fund.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a critical interpretation of statutory language, concluding that “regular assessments” and “special assessments” are legally distinct categories. The judge rejected the petitioner’s argument that “regular” refers to the process of an assessment rather than its type, deeming this interpretation contrary to principles of statutory construction and nonsensical. Furthermore, the judge found the petitioner’s legal citations to be inapplicable and confirmed that the scope of the hearing was limited strictly to the alleged violation of the 20% rule, not the HOA’s general authority to levy special assessments.

Case Background and Procedural History

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens

◦ Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (HOA)

• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, on behalf of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

• Timeline:

◦ June 7, 2018: Mr. Stevens files a single-issue petition with the Department of Real Estate.

◦ September 28, 2018: An initial hearing is conducted on the matter, consolidated with two others.

◦ January 2, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Rehearing.

◦ February 11, 2019: The rehearing is conducted.

◦ March 1, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, dismissing the petition.

The matter came before the Office of Administrative Hearings for a rehearing after Mr. Stevens alleged errors of law and an abuse of discretion in the original hearing’s decision.

The Core Dispute: The 2018 Assessment Increase

The central facts of the case revolve around a decision made at a Mogollon Airpark board meeting in November 2017. To address a shortage in its operating budget and to replenish approximately $53,000 borrowed from its reserve fund, the Board approved a two-part increase to its annual fees.

Assessment Component

Previous Year (2017)

2018 Increase

Justification

Percentage Increase

Regular Assessment

+ $116

Cover operating budget shortfall

Special Assessment

+ $209

Replenish reserve fund

Total Assessment

+ $325

Total for 2018

This total 39.4% increase formed the basis of Mr. Stevens’s legal challenge under A.R.S. § 33-1803(A), which limits increases to “regular assessments” to 20% over the preceding fiscal year.

Analysis of Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Brad W. Stevens)

Mr. Stevens’s case was built on the assertion that the entire $325 increase constituted a single “regular assessment” and was therefore illegal. His key arguments were:

• Definition of “Regular”: He contended that “regular” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created—i.e., one that is “according to rule.” He argued that it does not denote a type of assessment (e.g., recurring vs. one-time).

• Lack of Authority for Special Assessments: Mr. Stevens argued that Mogollon Airpark has no authority to issue special assessments. Therefore, any assessment it imposes, regardless of its label, must legally be considered a “regular assessment.”

• Legal Precedent: He cited Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona to define a “special assessment,” arguing that the $209 charge did not qualify because he received no “particularized benefit” as required by that case. He also presented definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary.

Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)

Mogollon Airpark’s defense was straightforward and relied on the distinction between the two components of the assessment increase:

• Statutory Limitation: The respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.”

• Compliance with Statute: The increase to the regular assessment was $116, a 14.1% rise over the previous year’s $825 fee. This amount is well within the 20% statutory limit.

• Distinct Nature of Assessments: The $209 charge was a separate, one-time “special assessment” intended for a specific purpose (replenishing the reserve fund) and is not subject to the 20% limitation governing regular assessments.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ systematically dismantled the petitioner’s arguments, finding they were not supported by evidence or principles of statutory construction.

Rejection of Petitioner’s Statutory Interpretation

• The ALJ found that Mr. Stevens’s definition of “regular” as referring to the assessment process was an insupportable interpretation. If all validly passed assessments were “regular,” the word “regular” in the statute would be “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”

• To support this conclusion, the decision points to A.R.S. § 33-1806, where the legislature explicitly references “regular assessments” and “special assessment[s],” demonstrating a clear intent to treat them as different types of assessments.

• The judge characterized the petitioner’s logic as leading to a “nonsensical result.” Under Mr. Stevens’s reasoning, an unauthorized special assessment would become a valid regular assessment, a position deemed not to be a “sensible interpretation of the statute.” A more reasonable conclusion, the judge noted, would be that an unauthorized assessment is simply void.

Misapplication of Legal Precedent

• The petitioner’s reliance on Northwest Fire District was deemed “misplaced.” The judge clarified that this case applies to special taxing districts created under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 48, a legal framework that does not govern an HOA like Mogollon Airpark.

Scope of the Hearing and Burden of Proof

• The ALJ emphasized that the hearing was limited by the petitioner’s “single-issue petition.” The only question properly before the tribunal was whether A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) had been violated.

• Consequently, the broader question of whether Mogollon Airpark’s bylaws grant it the authority to impose special assessments was “not at issue.” This rendered the various definitions of “special assessment” offered by Mr. Stevens as having “no substantial probative value” to the case at hand.

• The final legal conclusion was that Mr. Stevens, who bore the burden of proof, failed to show by a “preponderance of the evidence” that Mogollon Airpark violated the statute.

Final Order and Disposition

Based on the findings and conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

• Order: The petition of Brad W. Stevens is dismissed.

• Prevailing Party: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. is deemed the prevailing party.

• Binding Nature: The decision, issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

• Appeal Process: Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Posted on March 1, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818054-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-03-01
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Brad W. Stevens	Counsel	—
Respondent	Mogollon Airpark, Inc.	Counsel	Greg Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A). The increase in the regular assessment (14.1%) was below the statutory 20% limit, and the overall increase included a special assessment which the statute does not cover.

Why this result: The Petitioner's definition of 'regular assessment' was rejected as not supported by statutory construction principles, and the issue was limited to the definition and application of ARS § 33-1803(A).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A) by increasing the regular assessment more than 20%.

Petitioner alleged that the HOA's total assessment increase of $325 (which was 39.4% over the previous assessment of $825) constituted an unlawful increase of the 'regular assessment' under ARS § 33-1803(A). The HOA argued the increase to the 'regular assessment' was only 14.1% ($116 increase), and the remaining $209 was a separate, one-time assessment.

Orders: Petitioner Brad W. Stevens’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
• Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
• Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
• State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
• Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment, Statutory Interpretation, Regular Assessment, Special Assessment, ARS 33-1803(A)

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
• Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
• Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
• State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
• Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
• Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 692388.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:09 (102.8 KB)

Briefing Document: Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the matter of Brad W. Stevens versus Mogollon Airpark, Inc., a case centered on the legality of a homeowner association (HOA) assessment increase. The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, ultimately dismissed the petition filed by Mr. Stevens, finding he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mogollon Airpark violated Arizona state law.

The core of the dispute was a $325 increase to the annual assessment for 2018, which represented a 39.4% increase over the previous year’s $825 fee. The petitioner alleged this violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), which prohibits HOAs from increasing a “regular assessment” by more than 20% without member approval. The respondent, Mogollon Airpark, argued the increase was composed of two distinct parts: a 14.1% ($116) increase to the regular assessment to cover a budget shortfall, and a separate $209 one-time “special assessment” to replenish a reserve fund.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a critical interpretation of statutory language, concluding that “regular assessments” and “special assessments” are legally distinct categories. The judge rejected the petitioner’s argument that “regular” refers to the process of an assessment rather than its type, deeming this interpretation contrary to principles of statutory construction and nonsensical. Furthermore, the judge found the petitioner’s legal citations to be inapplicable and confirmed that the scope of the hearing was limited strictly to the alleged violation of the 20% rule, not the HOA’s general authority to levy special assessments.

Case Background and Procedural History

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens

◦ Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (HOA)

• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, on behalf of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

• Timeline:

◦ June 7, 2018: Mr. Stevens files a single-issue petition with the Department of Real Estate.

◦ September 28, 2018: An initial hearing is conducted on the matter, consolidated with two others.

◦ January 2, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Rehearing.

◦ February 11, 2019: The rehearing is conducted.

◦ March 1, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, dismissing the petition.

The matter came before the Office of Administrative Hearings for a rehearing after Mr. Stevens alleged errors of law and an abuse of discretion in the original hearing’s decision.

The Core Dispute: The 2018 Assessment Increase

The central facts of the case revolve around a decision made at a Mogollon Airpark board meeting in November 2017. To address a shortage in its operating budget and to replenish approximately $53,000 borrowed from its reserve fund, the Board approved a two-part increase to its annual fees.

Assessment Component

Previous Year (2017)

2018 Increase

Justification

Percentage Increase

Regular Assessment

+ $116

Cover operating budget shortfall

Special Assessment

+ $209

Replenish reserve fund

Total Assessment

+ $325

Total for 2018

This total 39.4% increase formed the basis of Mr. Stevens’s legal challenge under A.R.S. § 33-1803(A), which limits increases to “regular assessments” to 20% over the preceding fiscal year.

Analysis of Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Brad W. Stevens)

Mr. Stevens’s case was built on the assertion that the entire $325 increase constituted a single “regular assessment” and was therefore illegal. His key arguments were:

• Definition of “Regular”: He contended that “regular” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created—i.e., one that is “according to rule.” He argued that it does not denote a type of assessment (e.g., recurring vs. one-time).

• Lack of Authority for Special Assessments: Mr. Stevens argued that Mogollon Airpark has no authority to issue special assessments. Therefore, any assessment it imposes, regardless of its label, must legally be considered a “regular assessment.”

• Legal Precedent: He cited Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona to define a “special assessment,” arguing that the $209 charge did not qualify because he received no “particularized benefit” as required by that case. He also presented definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary.

Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)

Mogollon Airpark’s defense was straightforward and relied on the distinction between the two components of the assessment increase:

• Statutory Limitation: The respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.”

• Compliance with Statute: The increase to the regular assessment was $116, a 14.1% rise over the previous year’s $825 fee. This amount is well within the 20% statutory limit.

• Distinct Nature of Assessments: The $209 charge was a separate, one-time “special assessment” intended for a specific purpose (replenishing the reserve fund) and is not subject to the 20% limitation governing regular assessments.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ systematically dismantled the petitioner’s arguments, finding they were not supported by evidence or principles of statutory construction.

Rejection of Petitioner’s Statutory Interpretation

• The ALJ found that Mr. Stevens’s definition of “regular” as referring to the assessment process was an insupportable interpretation. If all validly passed assessments were “regular,” the word “regular” in the statute would be “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”

• To support this conclusion, the decision points to A.R.S. § 33-1806, where the legislature explicitly references “regular assessments” and “special assessment[s],” demonstrating a clear intent to treat them as different types of assessments.

• The judge characterized the petitioner’s logic as leading to a “nonsensical result.” Under Mr. Stevens’s reasoning, an unauthorized special assessment would become a valid regular assessment, a position deemed not to be a “sensible interpretation of the statute.” A more reasonable conclusion, the judge noted, would be that an unauthorized assessment is simply void.

Misapplication of Legal Precedent

• The petitioner’s reliance on Northwest Fire District was deemed “misplaced.” The judge clarified that this case applies to special taxing districts created under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 48, a legal framework that does not govern an HOA like Mogollon Airpark.

Scope of the Hearing and Burden of Proof

• The ALJ emphasized that the hearing was limited by the petitioner’s “single-issue petition.” The only question properly before the tribunal was whether A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) had been violated.

• Consequently, the broader question of whether Mogollon Airpark’s bylaws grant it the authority to impose special assessments was “not at issue.” This rendered the various definitions of “special assessment” offered by Mr. Stevens as having “no substantial probative value” to the case at hand.

• The final legal conclusion was that Mr. Stevens, who bore the burden of proof, failed to show by a “preponderance of the evidence” that Mogollon Airpark violated the statute.

Final Order and Disposition

Based on the findings and conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

• Order: The petition of Brad W. Stevens is dismissed.

• Prevailing Party: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. is deemed the prevailing party.

• Binding Nature: The decision, issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

• Appeal Process: Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

Nathan Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Posted on February 4, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918029-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-02-04
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Nathan Brown	Counsel	—
Respondent	Val Vista Lakes Community Association	Counsel	Clint Goodman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's claim that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) was dismissed, as the notice issued was determined to be a Notice of Non-Compliance (courtesy letter) and not a Notice of Violation required to carry the specific disclosure.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) by failing to include notice of the option to petition for an administrative hearing in a Notice of Non-Compliance.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent's Notice of Non-Compliance regarding dead vegetation was actually a Notice of Violation and lacked the statutory disclosure required by A.R.S. § 33-1803(E). The ALJ found the document was a courtesy letter and not a Notice of Violation, and even if it were, the statute did not require the disclosure in this context because the Petitioner filed the petition before Respondent took enforcement action or completed the statutory response exchange.

Orders: Petitioner Nathan Brown's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(D)
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11

Analytics Highlights

Topics: statutory interpretation, violation notice, non-compliance, courtesy letter, right to petition

Additional Citations:

• 33-1803(E)
• 32-2199.01
• 33-1803(C)
• 33-1803(D)
• R2-19-119

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918029-REL Decision – 686796.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:08:07 (88.4 KB)

Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association: Case Briefing

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, wherein Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition against the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was dismissed. The central issue was whether an initial “Notice of Non-Compliance” sent by the Association constituted a formal “Notice of Violation” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 33-1803(E), thereby requiring immediate disclosure of the member’s right to an administrative hearing.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent Association. The decision rested on two primary conclusions: First, a reasonable reading of the document in question showed it to be a preliminary “courtesy letter” and not a formal Notice of Violation, as it explicitly warned that a Notice of Violation would be issued later if the issue was not remedied. Second, the ALJ determined that even if the document were considered a Notice of Violation, a plain reading of the statute does not require the disclosure of hearing rights to be included in the initial notice itself. The statute allows for this information to be provided at a later stage in the process, specifically after the member has submitted a formal response. The Petitioner’s failure to follow the statutory response procedure was a key factor in the ruling that the Association had not yet been required to provide the disclosure. Ultimately, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and his petition was dismissed.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1918029-REL

Parties

Petitioner: Nathan Brown
Respondent: Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Hearing Date

January 16, 2019

Decision Date

February 4, 2019

Final Outcome

Petition Dismissed; Respondent deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Background and Timeline of Events

• October 18, 2018: The Val Vista Lakes Community Association mailed a “Notice of Non-Compliance” to Nathan Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard. The notice requested that the situation be remedied by November 1, 2018, and warned that failure to do so would result in the issuance of a “Notice of Violation that may involve fines.”

• October 24, 2018 (approx.): Mr. Brown filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal matter.

• November 11, 2018: The Association issued a formal “Notice of Violation” to Mr. Brown concerning the same issue raised in the initial notice.

• November 27, 2018: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing.

• January 16, 2019: An administrative hearing was held, with Mr. Brown representing himself and Clint Goodman, Esq. representing the Association. Testimony was heard from Mr. Brown and Simone McGinnis, the Association’s general manager.

• February 4, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a decision dismissing Mr. Brown’s petition.

——————————————————————————–

Core Legal Dispute and Arguments

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 33-1803, which governs the process for notifying homeowners of violations of community documents.

Petitioner’s Position (Nathan Brown)

• Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” received on October 18, 2018, was functionally and legally a “Notice of Violation.”

• Alleged Violation: The notice violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) because it failed to include “written notice of the member’s option to petition for an administrative hearing on the matter in the state real estate department.”

Respondent’s Position (Val Vista Lakes Community Association)

• Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” was not a formal “Notice of Violation” but rather a “courtesy letter,” which is a common industry practice permitted by the Association’s governing documents.

• Defense: Because the initial letter was not a statutory Notice of Violation, the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1803 were not applicable to that specific communication.

——————————————————————————–

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner, Mr. Brown, bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to meet that standard. The decision was based on a series of factual findings and legal conclusions drawn from a “fair and sensible” interpretation of the statute.

Key Findings of Fact

• The Association mailed Mr. Brown a Notice of Non-Compliance on October 18, 2018.

• This notice informed Mr. Brown of a CC&R violation (dead vegetation) and stated that a failure to remedy the issue would result in a subsequent “Notice of Violation” with potential fines.

• Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Association regarding the Notice of Non-Compliance, a step outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1803(C).

• Mr. Brown was later issued a formal Notice of Violation on November 11, 2018.

Conclusions of Law (Legal Rationale)

The ALJ’s decision to dismiss the petition was founded on three distinct legal interpretations:

1. Distinction Between Notices: The judge ruled that the initial communication was not a statutory Notice of Violation.

◦ The ruling states, “a reasonable reading of the Notice of Non-Compliance shows that it is not a Notice of Violation, because it informs Mr. Brown that a Notice of Violation would be issued if he did not appropriately address the ‘situation.'”

◦ This established the letter as a preliminary courtesy notice, distinct from the formal enforcement action that triggers statutory requirements.

2. Statutory Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1803: The judge concluded that even if the initial notice was a Notice of Violation, the Association still did not violate the statute.

◦ The decision notes, “a plain reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803 shows that a Notice of Violation is not required to include notice of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate because subsections D and E both show that any required notice can be given at other times.”

◦ The statute outlines a process where the member can respond via certified mail, and the Association’s duty to provide information about contesting the notice (including the right to a hearing) arises from that exchange.

3. Petitioner’s Procedural Failure: The judge found that the Association’s obligations under the statute were never triggered because Mr. Brown bypassed the prescribed process.

◦ The decision highlights that Mr. Brown did not file a written response with the Association but instead filed his petition with the Department just a few days after receiving the initial notice.

◦ The ruling concludes, “a sensible reading of the statute shows that the Respondent was not required to provide Mr. Brown with notice of a right to petition the Department at any time pertinent to this matter.”

——————————————————————————–

Final Order and Implications

• Order: The ALJ ordered that “Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition is dismissed.”

• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Val Vista Lakes Community Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• Further Action: The decision is binding unless a party files for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.02(B), 32-2199.04, and 41-1092.09.

Nathan Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Posted on February 4, 2019 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918029-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-02-04
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Nathan Brown	Counsel	—
Respondent	Val Vista Lakes Community Association	Counsel	Clint Goodman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's claim that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) was dismissed, as the notice issued was determined to be a Notice of Non-Compliance (courtesy letter) and not a Notice of Violation required to carry the specific disclosure.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) by failing to include notice of the option to petition for an administrative hearing in a Notice of Non-Compliance.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent's Notice of Non-Compliance regarding dead vegetation was actually a Notice of Violation and lacked the statutory disclosure required by A.R.S. § 33-1803(E). The ALJ found the document was a courtesy letter and not a Notice of Violation, and even if it were, the statute did not require the disclosure in this context because the Petitioner filed the petition before Respondent took enforcement action or completed the statutory response exchange.

Orders: Petitioner Nathan Brown's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(D)
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11

Analytics Highlights

Topics: statutory interpretation, violation notice, non-compliance, courtesy letter, right to petition

Additional Citations:

• 33-1803(E)
• 32-2199.01
• 33-1803(C)
• 33-1803(D)
• R2-19-119

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918029-REL Decision – 686796.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:49 (88.4 KB)

Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association: Case Briefing

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, wherein Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition against the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was dismissed. The central issue was whether an initial “Notice of Non-Compliance” sent by the Association constituted a formal “Notice of Violation” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 33-1803(E), thereby requiring immediate disclosure of the member’s right to an administrative hearing.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent Association. The decision rested on two primary conclusions: First, a reasonable reading of the document in question showed it to be a preliminary “courtesy letter” and not a formal Notice of Violation, as it explicitly warned that a Notice of Violation would be issued later if the issue was not remedied. Second, the ALJ determined that even if the document were considered a Notice of Violation, a plain reading of the statute does not require the disclosure of hearing rights to be included in the initial notice itself. The statute allows for this information to be provided at a later stage in the process, specifically after the member has submitted a formal response. The Petitioner’s failure to follow the statutory response procedure was a key factor in the ruling that the Association had not yet been required to provide the disclosure. Ultimately, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and his petition was dismissed.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1918029-REL

Parties

Petitioner: Nathan Brown
Respondent: Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Hearing Date

January 16, 2019

Decision Date

February 4, 2019

Final Outcome

Petition Dismissed; Respondent deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Background and Timeline of Events

• October 18, 2018: The Val Vista Lakes Community Association mailed a “Notice of Non-Compliance” to Nathan Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard. The notice requested that the situation be remedied by November 1, 2018, and warned that failure to do so would result in the issuance of a “Notice of Violation that may involve fines.”

• October 24, 2018 (approx.): Mr. Brown filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal matter.

• November 11, 2018: The Association issued a formal “Notice of Violation” to Mr. Brown concerning the same issue raised in the initial notice.

• November 27, 2018: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing.

• January 16, 2019: An administrative hearing was held, with Mr. Brown representing himself and Clint Goodman, Esq. representing the Association. Testimony was heard from Mr. Brown and Simone McGinnis, the Association’s general manager.

• February 4, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a decision dismissing Mr. Brown’s petition.

——————————————————————————–

Core Legal Dispute and Arguments

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 33-1803, which governs the process for notifying homeowners of violations of community documents.

Petitioner’s Position (Nathan Brown)

• Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” received on October 18, 2018, was functionally and legally a “Notice of Violation.”

• Alleged Violation: The notice violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) because it failed to include “written notice of the member’s option to petition for an administrative hearing on the matter in the state real estate department.”

Respondent’s Position (Val Vista Lakes Community Association)

• Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” was not a formal “Notice of Violation” but rather a “courtesy letter,” which is a common industry practice permitted by the Association’s governing documents.

• Defense: Because the initial letter was not a statutory Notice of Violation, the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1803 were not applicable to that specific communication.

——————————————————————————–

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner, Mr. Brown, bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to meet that standard. The decision was based on a series of factual findings and legal conclusions drawn from a “fair and sensible” interpretation of the statute.

Key Findings of Fact

• The Association mailed Mr. Brown a Notice of Non-Compliance on October 18, 2018.

• This notice informed Mr. Brown of a CC&R violation (dead vegetation) and stated that a failure to remedy the issue would result in a subsequent “Notice of Violation” with potential fines.

• Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Association regarding the Notice of Non-Compliance, a step outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1803(C).

• Mr. Brown was later issued a formal Notice of Violation on November 11, 2018.

Conclusions of Law (Legal Rationale)

The ALJ’s decision to dismiss the petition was founded on three distinct legal interpretations:

1. Distinction Between Notices: The judge ruled that the initial communication was not a statutory Notice of Violation.

◦ The ruling states, “a reasonable reading of the Notice of Non-Compliance shows that it is not a Notice of Violation, because it informs Mr. Brown that a Notice of Violation would be issued if he did not appropriately address the ‘situation.'”

◦ This established the letter as a preliminary courtesy notice, distinct from the formal enforcement action that triggers statutory requirements.

2. Statutory Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1803: The judge concluded that even if the initial notice was a Notice of Violation, the Association still did not violate the statute.

◦ The decision notes, “a plain reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803 shows that a Notice of Violation is not required to include notice of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate because subsections D and E both show that any required notice can be given at other times.”

◦ The statute outlines a process where the member can respond via certified mail, and the Association’s duty to provide information about contesting the notice (including the right to a hearing) arises from that exchange.

3. Petitioner’s Procedural Failure: The judge found that the Association’s obligations under the statute were never triggered because Mr. Brown bypassed the prescribed process.

◦ The decision highlights that Mr. Brown did not file a written response with the Association but instead filed his petition with the Department just a few days after receiving the initial notice.

◦ The ruling concludes, “a sensible reading of the statute shows that the Respondent was not required to provide Mr. Brown with notice of a right to petition the Department at any time pertinent to this matter.”

——————————————————————————–

Final Order and Implications

• Order: The ALJ ordered that “Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition is dismissed.”

• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Val Vista Lakes Community Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• Further Action: The decision is binding unless a party files for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.02(B), 32-2199.04, and 41-1092.09.

Warren R. Brown vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc(ROOT)

Posted on October 18, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818045-REL (Consolidated with 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG & 18F-H1818054-REL)
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-10-18
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	partial
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Warren R. Brown	Counsel	—
Respondent	Mogollon Airpark, Inc.	Counsel	Gregory A. Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner Brown prevailed in the 045 matter regarding the excessive late fee ($25 instead of $15 or 10%) in violation of ARS 33-1803(A). However, both petitioners (Brown in 029, Stevens in 054) failed to prove a violation of ARS 33-1803(A) regarding the overall 39.4% assessment increase, resulting in those petitions being dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioners lost the challenge to the assessment increase because their definition of “regular assessment” was not supported by principles of statutory construction, which would have rendered the word “regular” trivial or void in the statute.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA charging excessive late payment fees and interest.

Mogollon charged a $25 late fee, exceeding the statutory limit set in ARS 33-1803(A), which limits late charges to the greater of $15 or 10% of the unpaid assessment.

Orders: Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee assessed against Mr. Brown and must pay to Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA assessment increase, Late fees, Statutory interpretation, Regular vs Special assessment, Homeowner petition

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 666285.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:33 (151.9 KB)

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 672623.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:33 (144.6 KB)

Administrative Law Decision Briefing: Brown and Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision from October 18, 2018, concerning three consolidated petitions filed by homeowners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against their homeowners’ association (HOA), Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The core of the dispute centers on Mogollon’s 2018 financial actions, specifically a 39.4% increase in total annual assessments and the imposition of new late payment penalties.

The case produced a split decision. The ALJ ruled in favor of Mogollon Airpark on the primary issue of the assessment increase. The judge determined that the statutory 20% cap on annual increases, as defined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), applies exclusively to “regular assessments” and not to “special assessments.” Mogollon had structured its $325 increase as a combination of a compliant 14.1% regular assessment hike and a separate $209 special assessment, a practice the ALJ found permissible under the law.

Conversely, the ALJ ruled in favor of Petitioner Brown regarding the HOA’s $25 late fee. The judge found this fee to be in direct violation of § 33-1803(A), which limits such charges to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” The ALJ’s rationale was that this statutory limit applies to all “assessments” without qualification, not just regular ones.

While the hearing was limited to these specific statutory violations, the petitions were underpinned by serious allegations from Brown and Stevens of deceptive accounting practices and financial mismanagement by Mogollon’s leadership, intended to create a “fabricated shortfall” to justify the fee increases. These underlying allegations were not substantively addressed in the hearing.

Case Overview

This consolidated matter combines three separate petitions heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The hearing was conducted on September 28, 2018, with Thomas Shedden serving as the Administrative Law Judge.

• Petitioners: Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens.

• Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

• Docket Numbers:

◦ 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG (“029 matter”), Petitioner: Warren R. Brown

◦ 18F-H1818045-REL (“045 matter”), Petitioner: Warren R. Brown

◦ 18F-H1818054-REL (“054 matter”), Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens

Core Issues Contested

The dispute arose from Mogollon Airpark’s 2018 decision to increase assessments and institute new fees for late payments and past-due accounts.

1. The 2018 Assessment Increase

The central conflict involved the legality of a significant increase in annual homeowner assessments.

• Financial Details:

◦ Previous Year’s Assessment (2017): $825

◦ 2018 Total Increase: $325

◦ Total Percentage Increase: 39.4%

• Mogollon’s Breakdown of the Increase:

◦ Regular Assessment Increase: $116 (a 14.1% increase over $825)

◦ Special Assessment: $209

Argument on the Assessment Increase

Petitioners (Brown & Stevens)

Argued that the entire $325 increase constituted a single assessment action. Because the 39.4% increase exceeded the 20% annual cap stipulated in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), it was unlawful. They contended that the term “regular assessment” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created (i.e., by motion, second, and vote), not a specific type of assessment. They further alleged that Mogollon’s governing documents provided no authority to levy a “special assessment.”

Respondent (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)

Asserted that § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.” They argued that their regular assessment increase of $116 (14.1%) was well within the 20% limit. The $209 portion was a “special assessment,” which they described as a “term of art in the industry” not subject to the 20% cap. They cited the use of the term “special assessment” in another statute, § 33-1806, as evidence of legislative intent to differentiate between assessment types.

2. Late Payment Charges

Petitioner Brown separately challenged the legality of newly instituted penalties for late payments.

• Charges Implemented by Mogollon:

◦ A flat $25 fee for late payments.

◦ 18% interest on past-due accounts.

• Petitioner’s Argument (Brown): The $25 late fee violated the plain language of § 33-1803(A), which explicitly limits late payment charges to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” Brown provided an invoice showing he was charged a $25 late fee and $1.57 in interest.

• Respondent’s Argument (Mogollon): The HOA argued that the statutory limits on late fees did not apply in this case because the fee was charged on a special assessment, which they contended was outside the scope of § 33-1803(A).

Underlying Allegations of Financial Misconduct

Although the hearing was limited to the narrow legal questions above, the petitioners’ filings contained extensive allegations of financial impropriety against Mogollon’s treasurer and board. These claims formed the motive for the contested assessments.

• Core Allegation: The petitioners asserted that the HOA leadership engaged in “numerous accounting improprieties” and used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods, including keeping two sets of books.”

• Alleged Purpose: The goal was to create a “fabricated shortfall” and present an “inaccurate picture of the HOA finances.” This was done, according to Mr. Brown, “ostensibly to show that the 2016 board of directors left office showing a loss of funds,” when in fact they had improved the treasury by approximately $200,000.

• Justification for Increase: This artificially created financial need was then used “to convince the Board that a 39.4% increase in dues was required.”

• Evidence and Testimony: Mr. Stevens submitted a 45-page petition with over 600 pages of exhibits detailing the alleged accounting practices. He testified that Mogollon possessed over $1 million and did not need an assessment increase. He also stated his belief that the $209 special assessment was a “trial run” for future assessments for purposes not authorized by the governing documents.

• ALJ’s Position: The judge noted these underlying allegations but stated, “the substance of their allegations was not addressed in this hearing.” A footnote suggested that “the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ issued a split decision, ruling for the Respondent on the assessment increase and for the Petitioner on the late fee. The decision was based on established principles of statutory construction.

Legal Principles Applied

• Burden of Proof: Placed on Petitioners Brown and Stevens to prove their allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.

• Statutory Construction:

1. Statutes must be interpreted to yield a “fair and sensible result” and avoid “absurd and unreasonable construction.”

2. Every word and phrase in a statute must be given meaning so that no part is “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”

3. When a term is used in one part of a statute but omitted in another, it should not be read into the section where it is absent.

Conclusion on the Assessment Increase (Matters 029 & 054)

• Verdict: The petitions of Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens were dismissed. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. was deemed the prevailing party.

• Rationale: The ALJ rejected the petitioners’ definition of “regular assessment.” The judge reasoned that if “regular” simply meant passed by a regular process (motion, second, vote), then the word would be meaningless (“trivial or void”), as all assessments are assumed to follow that process. This would violate a core principle of statutory construction. Therefore, the legislature must have intended “regular assessment” to be a specific type of assessment, distinct from others like “special assessments.” Because the 20% cap in § 33-1803(A) explicitly applies only to regular assessments, Mogollon’s $209 special assessment was not subject to that limit.

Conclusion on the Late Fee (Matter 045)

• Verdict: Petitioner Warren R. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

• Rationale: The ALJ found that the statutory clause limiting late fees applies to “assessments” in general, not specifically to “regular assessments.” The legislature’s omission of the word “regular” in this part of the statute was deliberate. Mogollon’s argument that the limit only applied to regular assessments required reading a word into the statute that was not there, which “violates principles of statutory construction.” The $25 fee clearly exceeded the allowable limit.

Final Orders

The ALJ issued separate orders for each consolidated docket, reflecting the split decision.

Docket Number

Petitioner

Primary Issue

Outcome

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG

Warren R. Brown

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed. Mogollon deemed prevailing party.

18F-H1818054-REL

Brad W. Stevens

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed. Mogollon deemed prevailing party.

18F-H1818045-REL

Warren R. Brown

Late Fee Charge

Petitioner Deemed Prevailing Party. Mogollon ordered to rescind the $25 late fee and pay Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.

Warren R. Brown vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc(ROOT)

Posted on October 18, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818045-REL (Consolidated with 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG & 18F-H1818054-REL)
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-10-18
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	partial
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Warren R. Brown	Counsel	—
Respondent	Mogollon Airpark, Inc.	Counsel	Gregory A. Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner Brown prevailed in the 045 matter regarding the excessive late fee ($25 instead of $15 or 10%) in violation of ARS 33-1803(A). However, both petitioners (Brown in 029, Stevens in 054) failed to prove a violation of ARS 33-1803(A) regarding the overall 39.4% assessment increase, resulting in those petitions being dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioners lost the challenge to the assessment increase because their definition of “regular assessment” was not supported by principles of statutory construction, which would have rendered the word “regular” trivial or void in the statute.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA charging excessive late payment fees and interest.

Mogollon charged a $25 late fee, exceeding the statutory limit set in ARS 33-1803(A), which limits late charges to the greater of $15 or 10% of the unpaid assessment.

Orders: Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee assessed against Mr. Brown and must pay to Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA assessment increase, Late fees, Statutory interpretation, Regular vs Special assessment, Homeowner petition

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 666285.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:50 (151.9 KB)

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 672623.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:51 (144.6 KB)

Administrative Law Decision Briefing: Brown and Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision from October 18, 2018, concerning three consolidated petitions filed by homeowners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against their homeowners’ association (HOA), Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The core of the dispute centers on Mogollon’s 2018 financial actions, specifically a 39.4% increase in total annual assessments and the imposition of new late payment penalties.

The case produced a split decision. The ALJ ruled in favor of Mogollon Airpark on the primary issue of the assessment increase. The judge determined that the statutory 20% cap on annual increases, as defined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), applies exclusively to “regular assessments” and not to “special assessments.” Mogollon had structured its $325 increase as a combination of a compliant 14.1% regular assessment hike and a separate $209 special assessment, a practice the ALJ found permissible under the law.

Conversely, the ALJ ruled in favor of Petitioner Brown regarding the HOA’s $25 late fee. The judge found this fee to be in direct violation of § 33-1803(A), which limits such charges to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” The ALJ’s rationale was that this statutory limit applies to all “assessments” without qualification, not just regular ones.

While the hearing was limited to these specific statutory violations, the petitions were underpinned by serious allegations from Brown and Stevens of deceptive accounting practices and financial mismanagement by Mogollon’s leadership, intended to create a “fabricated shortfall” to justify the fee increases. These underlying allegations were not substantively addressed in the hearing.

Case Overview

This consolidated matter combines three separate petitions heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The hearing was conducted on September 28, 2018, with Thomas Shedden serving as the Administrative Law Judge.

• Petitioners: Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens.

• Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

• Docket Numbers:

◦ 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG (“029 matter”), Petitioner: Warren R. Brown

◦ 18F-H1818045-REL (“045 matter”), Petitioner: Warren R. Brown

◦ 18F-H1818054-REL (“054 matter”), Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens

Core Issues Contested

The dispute arose from Mogollon Airpark’s 2018 decision to increase assessments and institute new fees for late payments and past-due accounts.

1. The 2018 Assessment Increase

The central conflict involved the legality of a significant increase in annual homeowner assessments.

• Financial Details:

◦ Previous Year’s Assessment (2017): $825

◦ 2018 Total Increase: $325

◦ Total Percentage Increase: 39.4%

• Mogollon’s Breakdown of the Increase:

◦ Regular Assessment Increase: $116 (a 14.1% increase over $825)

◦ Special Assessment: $209

Argument on the Assessment Increase

Petitioners (Brown & Stevens)

Argued that the entire $325 increase constituted a single assessment action. Because the 39.4% increase exceeded the 20% annual cap stipulated in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), it was unlawful. They contended that the term “regular assessment” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created (i.e., by motion, second, and vote), not a specific type of assessment. They further alleged that Mogollon’s governing documents provided no authority to levy a “special assessment.”

Respondent (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)

Asserted that § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.” They argued that their regular assessment increase of $116 (14.1%) was well within the 20% limit. The $209 portion was a “special assessment,” which they described as a “term of art in the industry” not subject to the 20% cap. They cited the use of the term “special assessment” in another statute, § 33-1806, as evidence of legislative intent to differentiate between assessment types.

2. Late Payment Charges

Petitioner Brown separately challenged the legality of newly instituted penalties for late payments.

• Charges Implemented by Mogollon:

◦ A flat $25 fee for late payments.

◦ 18% interest on past-due accounts.

• Petitioner’s Argument (Brown): The $25 late fee violated the plain language of § 33-1803(A), which explicitly limits late payment charges to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” Brown provided an invoice showing he was charged a $25 late fee and $1.57 in interest.

• Respondent’s Argument (Mogollon): The HOA argued that the statutory limits on late fees did not apply in this case because the fee was charged on a special assessment, which they contended was outside the scope of § 33-1803(A).

Underlying Allegations of Financial Misconduct

Although the hearing was limited to the narrow legal questions above, the petitioners’ filings contained extensive allegations of financial impropriety against Mogollon’s treasurer and board. These claims formed the motive for the contested assessments.

• Core Allegation: The petitioners asserted that the HOA leadership engaged in “numerous accounting improprieties” and used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods, including keeping two sets of books.”

• Alleged Purpose: The goal was to create a “fabricated shortfall” and present an “inaccurate picture of the HOA finances.” This was done, according to Mr. Brown, “ostensibly to show that the 2016 board of directors left office showing a loss of funds,” when in fact they had improved the treasury by approximately $200,000.

• Justification for Increase: This artificially created financial need was then used “to convince the Board that a 39.4% increase in dues was required.”

• Evidence and Testimony: Mr. Stevens submitted a 45-page petition with over 600 pages of exhibits detailing the alleged accounting practices. He testified that Mogollon possessed over $1 million and did not need an assessment increase. He also stated his belief that the $209 special assessment was a “trial run” for future assessments for purposes not authorized by the governing documents.

• ALJ’s Position: The judge noted these underlying allegations but stated, “the substance of their allegations was not addressed in this hearing.” A footnote suggested that “the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ issued a split decision, ruling for the Respondent on the assessment increase and for the Petitioner on the late fee. The decision was based on established principles of statutory construction.

Legal Principles Applied

• Burden of Proof: Placed on Petitioners Brown and Stevens to prove their allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.

• Statutory Construction:

1. Statutes must be interpreted to yield a “fair and sensible result” and avoid “absurd and unreasonable construction.”

2. Every word and phrase in a statute must be given meaning so that no part is “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”

3. When a term is used in one part of a statute but omitted in another, it should not be read into the section where it is absent.

Conclusion on the Assessment Increase (Matters 029 & 054)

• Verdict: The petitions of Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens were dismissed. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. was deemed the prevailing party.

• Rationale: The ALJ rejected the petitioners’ definition of “regular assessment.” The judge reasoned that if “regular” simply meant passed by a regular process (motion, second, vote), then the word would be meaningless (“trivial or void”), as all assessments are assumed to follow that process. This would violate a core principle of statutory construction. Therefore, the legislature must have intended “regular assessment” to be a specific type of assessment, distinct from others like “special assessments.” Because the 20% cap in § 33-1803(A) explicitly applies only to regular assessments, Mogollon’s $209 special assessment was not subject to that limit.

Conclusion on the Late Fee (Matter 045)

• Verdict: Petitioner Warren R. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

• Rationale: The ALJ found that the statutory clause limiting late fees applies to “assessments” in general, not specifically to “regular assessments.” The legislature’s omission of the word “regular” in this part of the statute was deliberate. Mogollon’s argument that the limit only applied to regular assessments required reading a word into the statute that was not there, which “violates principles of statutory construction.” The $25 fee clearly exceeded the allowable limit.

Final Orders

The ALJ issued separate orders for each consolidated docket, reflecting the split decision.

Docket Number

Petitioner

Primary Issue

Outcome

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG

Warren R. Brown

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed. Mogollon deemed prevailing party.

18F-H1818054-REL

Brad W. Stevens

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed. Mogollon deemed prevailing party.

18F-H1818045-REL

Warren R. Brown

Late Fee Charge

Petitioner Deemed Prevailing Party. Mogollon ordered to rescind the $25 late fee and pay Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.