John Paul Holyoak vs. Camelback Country Club Estates I & II

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818030-REL, 18F-H1818031-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-25
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jon Paul Holyoak Counsel
Respondent Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association Counsel Diana J. Elston, J. Gary Linder

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Section 12

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition related to landscaping (18F-H1818030-REL), but deemed Petitioner the prevailing party and ordered the refund of the $500 filing fee regarding the petition concerning the additional mailbox (18F-H1818031-REL) because the HOA improperly based the fine on CC&R Section 12.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the olive tree was alive, and a dead tree could be reasonably considered a violation of CC&R Section 28 requiring neatly trimmed/properly cultivated plantings (Case 18F-H1818030-REL).

Key Issues & Findings

Improper fine regarding additional freestanding mailbox

Petitioner challenged fines for an additional mailbox lacking architectural approval. The ALJ found that CC&R Section 12 (related to 'building') could not be applied to a mailbox, rendering the fine imposed under that section a violation by the Respondent. Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party in this docket number (18F-H1818031-REL).

Orders: Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner $500.00 filing fee refund within thirty days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 8
  • CC&Rs Section 12
  • CC&Rs Section 27

Analytics Highlights

Topics: landscape_maintenance, architectural_review, fines, mailbox, ccrs, consolidated_cases, prevailing_party
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 8
  • CC&Rs Section 12
  • CC&Rs Section 27
  • CC&Rs Section 28

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818030-REL Decision – 636748.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:57 (130.5 KB)

18F-H1818030-REL Decision – 637227.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:57 (57.9 KB)

18F-H1818030-REL Decision – 637433.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:58 (56.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818030-REL


Briefing Document: Holyoak v. Camelback Country Club Estates HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from an Administrative Law Judge Decision concerning two consolidated petitions filed by homeowner Jon Paul Holyoak against the Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association (HOA). The disputes centered on HOA-issued violations for landscaping maintenance and the presence of a freestanding mailbox.

The final judgment produced a split decision. The Petitioner, Mr. Holyoak, failed to prove the HOA acted improperly in the landscaping case and his petition was denied. However, he was deemed the prevailing party in the mailbox case, with the judge concluding the HOA had violated its own community documents (CC&Rs) by imposing a fine based on an inapplicable section. As the prevailing party in one of the two matters, Mr. Holyoak was awarded his $500 filing fee, to be paid by the HOA. The initial decision document required two subsequent nunc pro tunc orders to correct typographical errors.

Key Takeaways:

Landscaping Petition (Denied): Mr. Holyoak was cited for failing to remove a “dead” olive tree. He argued the tree was merely “in distress.” The judge ruled that a reasonable person would consider the tree dead and that Mr. Holyoak failed to provide sufficient evidence to the contrary. A dead tree was found to be a potential violation of CC&R Section 28, which requires plantings to be “neatly trimmed” and “properly cultivated.”

Mailbox Petition (Upheld): Mr. Holyoak was cited for an “additional mailbox” that was present when he purchased the property in 2012. The judge found the HOA’s enforcement problematic for two primary reasons:

1. The HOA cited three different CC&R sections across multiple notices.

2. The fine was ultimately based on Section 12, which pertains to “buildings” and was deemed inapplicable to a mailbox.

Final Order: The HOA was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee. The decision is binding on the parties.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

The matter involves two petitions filed on February 2, 2018, by Petitioner Jon Paul Holyoak with the Arizona Department of Real Estate against the Respondent, Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association. The petitions alleged that the HOA had improperly cited Mr. Holyoak for violations of the community’s Conditions, Covenants, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The two cases were consolidated for a single hearing.

Detail

Information

Case Numbers

18F-H1818030-REL (Landscaping)
18F-H1818031-REL (Mailbox)

Petitioner

Jon Paul Holyoak

Respondent

Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association (represented by Gary Linder and Diana Elston)

Hearing Date

May 2, 2018

Decision Date

May 25, 2018

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Legal Framework

The Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated the community CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

——————————————————————————–

Petition 1: Landscaping Violations (Case No. 18F-H1818030-REL)

This petition alleged that the HOA improperly cited Mr. Holyoak for violating Section 28 of the CC&Rs, which governs landscape maintenance.

HOA Actions and Timeline

The HOA, through its inspection team Associa Arizona, issued a series of notices regarding the landscaping on Mr. Holyoak’s property.

Notice Type

Description

Oct 17, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“Please remove the dead foliage on your lot.”

Dec 13, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“Please remove the dead olive tree in the front yard.”

Dec 13, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“There are several other trees that need to be removed as they have dead branches including the cassia…”

Jan 25, 2018

Notice of Violation

“2nd notice…There are several other trees that need to be removed as they have dead branches…” (Included photo of backyard).

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Holyoak):

◦ The olive tree in the front yard was not “dead” but rather “in distress,” and he was actively trying to nurse it back to health. He eventually had the tree removed on April 25, 2018, after months of effort.

◦ Regarding the backyard photo attached to the fine notice, he argued that the olive tree visible was healthy and that no dead trees were depicted.

◦ He requested that the fine be abated.

Respondent’s Position (HOA):

◦ Board member Terry Rogers testified that the front yard olive tree had no leaves, appeared dead from the roadway, and was therefore not “properly trimmed” as required.

◦ He stated the backyard notice referred to a eucalyptus tree with several dead branches visible from the sidewalk bordering the property.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusion

The judge ruled in favor of the HOA in this matter.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence, beyond “his self-serving statements,” that the olive tree was alive.

Reasonable Interpretation: The judge concluded that “Any reasonable person viewing the olive tree, as depicted in the photographs presented, would understand the tree to be dead.”

Violation of CC&Rs: A dead tree could reasonably be considered as not being “neatly trimmed” or “properly cultivated” in accordance with Section 28.

Verdict: The Petitioner’s petition was denied. The judge found that the HOA had not improperly fined him for the landscaping violation.

——————————————————————————–

Petition 2: Unapproved Structure/Mailbox (Case No. 18F-H1818031-REL)

This petition alleged that the HOA improperly cited Mr. Holyoak for having an “additional mailbox” in violation of the CC&Rs.

HOA Actions and Timeline

The HOA’s notices for the mailbox cited three different sections of the CC&Rs over time.

Notice Type

Description

CC&R Section Cited

Oct 17, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“Please remove the additional mailbox on your lot.”

Section 27

Dec 14, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“…there is an additional mailbox on your lot. In research of our files, there is no architectural application on file for the modification.”

Section 12

Jan 25, 2018

Notice of Violation

“2nd notice…Please remove the mailbox or provide the approved architectural application.” (Mailbox was painted bright pink and yellow at this time).

Section 12

Jan 25, 2018¹

Notice of Violation

“3rd notice…Please remove the mailbox or provide the approved architectural application.”

Section 8

¹The decision document states this notice was sent on January 25, 2018, but references a violation noted on March 15, 2018. The judge’s conclusions later clarify a notice referencing Section 8 was issued April 11, 2018, and was not properly before the tribunal.

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Holyoak):

◦ The freestanding mailbox was already in place when he purchased the home in 2012.

◦ At the time of purchase, he received a statement that there were no known covenant violations on the property.

◦ He argued the mailbox is required by the United States Postal Service (USPS), which no longer provides walking delivery and requires mailboxes to be reachable from a vehicle. The home’s other mailbox, built into a monument, is approximately 15 feet from the curb.

◦ A USPS mail carrier had confirmed this delivery requirement.

Respondent’s Position (HOA):

◦ Board member Terry Rogers testified that the USPS mail carrier told him he would prefer to deliver to the permanent monument mailbox because the freestanding one was not secure.

◦ The mailbox had become an “eyesore,” as it was faded, peeling, and “listing to one side.”

◦ Of the 61 homes in the community, only three have freestanding mailboxes, and the Petitioner is the only one with two mailboxes.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusion

The judge ruled in favor of the Petitioner in this matter.

Inconsistent Enforcement: The judge found it “problematic” that the HOA relied on three different sections of the CC&Rs in its notices.

Pre-existing Structure: The Petitioner established that the mailbox was present at the time of his 2012 home purchase and that he was told of no existing violations. Therefore, the HOA’s argument regarding the lack of an architectural approval was “without merit.”

Inapplicable CC&R Section: The fine was imposed based on Section 12 of the CC&Rs. The judge determined the plain language of this section relates to a “building” and “cannot be read to apply to Petitioner’s mailbox.”

Violation by HOA: By imposing a fine based on an inapplicable section, the HOA was in violation of the CC&Rs.

Verdict: The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The judge noted that the HOA could potentially impose fines for failure to maintain the mailbox or for painting it without approval, but those specific violations were not before the court.

——————————————————————————–

Final Order and Subsequent Corrections

Order of May 25, 2018:

1. Petitioner’s petition in Case Number 18F-H1818030-REL (Landscaping) is denied.

2. Petitioner is deemed the prevailing party in Case Number 18F-H1818031-REL (Mailbox).

3. Respondent (HOA) is ordered to pay Petitioner his $500.00 filing fee within thirty days.

Order Nunc Pro Tunc of May 30, 2018:

◦ This order corrected a typographical error in the original decision. The original text mistakenly stated the petition for the mailbox case (31-REL) was denied.

Correction: The denial was correctly applied to the landscaping case: “it is ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition in Case Number 18F-H1818031-REL 18F-H1818030-REL is denied.”

Order Nunc Pro Tunc of May 31, 2018:

◦ This order corrected a typographical error in the May 30 order, which had misstated the date of the original decision.

Correction: “On April 26 May 25, 2018, the Administrative Law Judge issued the Administrative Law Judge Decision…”

——————————————————————————–

Key CC&R Sections Cited

Section 8 (Architectural Control): Requires written approval from the Committee before any “building or other structure” is erected, altered, or repaired. This includes exterior finish, color, and architectural style.

Section 12 (Buildings): States that “No building may be erected or maintained upon any Lot except one single family dwelling with private appurtenant garage and customary outbuildings” without prior written approval.

Section 27 (Maintenance): Prohibits any building or structure from falling into disrepair and requires owners to keep them in good condition and adequately painted.

Section 28 (Landscaping): Requires the owner of each lot to “at all times keep shrubs, trees, grass and plantings of every kind, on his lot mostly trimmed, properly cultivated, and free of trash, weeds and other unsightly material.”


John Paul Holyoak vs. Camelback Country Club Estates I & II

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818030-REL, 18F-H1818031-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-25
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jon Paul Holyoak Counsel
Respondent Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association Counsel Diana J. Elston, J. Gary Linder

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Section 12

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition related to landscaping (18F-H1818030-REL), but deemed Petitioner the prevailing party and ordered the refund of the $500 filing fee regarding the petition concerning the additional mailbox (18F-H1818031-REL) because the HOA improperly based the fine on CC&R Section 12.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the olive tree was alive, and a dead tree could be reasonably considered a violation of CC&R Section 28 requiring neatly trimmed/properly cultivated plantings (Case 18F-H1818030-REL).

Key Issues & Findings

Improper fine regarding additional freestanding mailbox

Petitioner challenged fines for an additional mailbox lacking architectural approval. The ALJ found that CC&R Section 12 (related to 'building') could not be applied to a mailbox, rendering the fine imposed under that section a violation by the Respondent. Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party in this docket number (18F-H1818031-REL).

Orders: Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner $500.00 filing fee refund within thirty days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 8
  • CC&Rs Section 12
  • CC&Rs Section 27

Analytics Highlights

Topics: landscape_maintenance, architectural_review, fines, mailbox, ccrs, consolidated_cases, prevailing_party
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 8
  • CC&Rs Section 12
  • CC&Rs Section 27
  • CC&Rs Section 28

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818030-REL Decision – 636748.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:37 (130.5 KB)

18F-H1818030-REL Decision – 637227.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:37 (57.9 KB)

18F-H1818030-REL Decision – 637433.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:37 (56.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818030-REL


Briefing Document: Holyoak v. Camelback Country Club Estates HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from an Administrative Law Judge Decision concerning two consolidated petitions filed by homeowner Jon Paul Holyoak against the Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association (HOA). The disputes centered on HOA-issued violations for landscaping maintenance and the presence of a freestanding mailbox.

The final judgment produced a split decision. The Petitioner, Mr. Holyoak, failed to prove the HOA acted improperly in the landscaping case and his petition was denied. However, he was deemed the prevailing party in the mailbox case, with the judge concluding the HOA had violated its own community documents (CC&Rs) by imposing a fine based on an inapplicable section. As the prevailing party in one of the two matters, Mr. Holyoak was awarded his $500 filing fee, to be paid by the HOA. The initial decision document required two subsequent nunc pro tunc orders to correct typographical errors.

Key Takeaways:

Landscaping Petition (Denied): Mr. Holyoak was cited for failing to remove a “dead” olive tree. He argued the tree was merely “in distress.” The judge ruled that a reasonable person would consider the tree dead and that Mr. Holyoak failed to provide sufficient evidence to the contrary. A dead tree was found to be a potential violation of CC&R Section 28, which requires plantings to be “neatly trimmed” and “properly cultivated.”

Mailbox Petition (Upheld): Mr. Holyoak was cited for an “additional mailbox” that was present when he purchased the property in 2012. The judge found the HOA’s enforcement problematic for two primary reasons:

1. The HOA cited three different CC&R sections across multiple notices.

2. The fine was ultimately based on Section 12, which pertains to “buildings” and was deemed inapplicable to a mailbox.

Final Order: The HOA was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee. The decision is binding on the parties.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

The matter involves two petitions filed on February 2, 2018, by Petitioner Jon Paul Holyoak with the Arizona Department of Real Estate against the Respondent, Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association. The petitions alleged that the HOA had improperly cited Mr. Holyoak for violations of the community’s Conditions, Covenants, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The two cases were consolidated for a single hearing.

Detail

Information

Case Numbers

18F-H1818030-REL (Landscaping)
18F-H1818031-REL (Mailbox)

Petitioner

Jon Paul Holyoak

Respondent

Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association (represented by Gary Linder and Diana Elston)

Hearing Date

May 2, 2018

Decision Date

May 25, 2018

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Legal Framework

The Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated the community CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

——————————————————————————–

Petition 1: Landscaping Violations (Case No. 18F-H1818030-REL)

This petition alleged that the HOA improperly cited Mr. Holyoak for violating Section 28 of the CC&Rs, which governs landscape maintenance.

HOA Actions and Timeline

The HOA, through its inspection team Associa Arizona, issued a series of notices regarding the landscaping on Mr. Holyoak’s property.

Notice Type

Description

Oct 17, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“Please remove the dead foliage on your lot.”

Dec 13, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“Please remove the dead olive tree in the front yard.”

Dec 13, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“There are several other trees that need to be removed as they have dead branches including the cassia…”

Jan 25, 2018

Notice of Violation

“2nd notice…There are several other trees that need to be removed as they have dead branches…” (Included photo of backyard).

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Holyoak):

◦ The olive tree in the front yard was not “dead” but rather “in distress,” and he was actively trying to nurse it back to health. He eventually had the tree removed on April 25, 2018, after months of effort.

◦ Regarding the backyard photo attached to the fine notice, he argued that the olive tree visible was healthy and that no dead trees were depicted.

◦ He requested that the fine be abated.

Respondent’s Position (HOA):

◦ Board member Terry Rogers testified that the front yard olive tree had no leaves, appeared dead from the roadway, and was therefore not “properly trimmed” as required.

◦ He stated the backyard notice referred to a eucalyptus tree with several dead branches visible from the sidewalk bordering the property.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusion

The judge ruled in favor of the HOA in this matter.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence, beyond “his self-serving statements,” that the olive tree was alive.

Reasonable Interpretation: The judge concluded that “Any reasonable person viewing the olive tree, as depicted in the photographs presented, would understand the tree to be dead.”

Violation of CC&Rs: A dead tree could reasonably be considered as not being “neatly trimmed” or “properly cultivated” in accordance with Section 28.

Verdict: The Petitioner’s petition was denied. The judge found that the HOA had not improperly fined him for the landscaping violation.

——————————————————————————–

Petition 2: Unapproved Structure/Mailbox (Case No. 18F-H1818031-REL)

This petition alleged that the HOA improperly cited Mr. Holyoak for having an “additional mailbox” in violation of the CC&Rs.

HOA Actions and Timeline

The HOA’s notices for the mailbox cited three different sections of the CC&Rs over time.

Notice Type

Description

CC&R Section Cited

Oct 17, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“Please remove the additional mailbox on your lot.”

Section 27

Dec 14, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“…there is an additional mailbox on your lot. In research of our files, there is no architectural application on file for the modification.”

Section 12

Jan 25, 2018

Notice of Violation

“2nd notice…Please remove the mailbox or provide the approved architectural application.” (Mailbox was painted bright pink and yellow at this time).

Section 12

Jan 25, 2018¹

Notice of Violation

“3rd notice…Please remove the mailbox or provide the approved architectural application.”

Section 8

¹The decision document states this notice was sent on January 25, 2018, but references a violation noted on March 15, 2018. The judge’s conclusions later clarify a notice referencing Section 8 was issued April 11, 2018, and was not properly before the tribunal.

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Holyoak):

◦ The freestanding mailbox was already in place when he purchased the home in 2012.

◦ At the time of purchase, he received a statement that there were no known covenant violations on the property.

◦ He argued the mailbox is required by the United States Postal Service (USPS), which no longer provides walking delivery and requires mailboxes to be reachable from a vehicle. The home’s other mailbox, built into a monument, is approximately 15 feet from the curb.

◦ A USPS mail carrier had confirmed this delivery requirement.

Respondent’s Position (HOA):

◦ Board member Terry Rogers testified that the USPS mail carrier told him he would prefer to deliver to the permanent monument mailbox because the freestanding one was not secure.

◦ The mailbox had become an “eyesore,” as it was faded, peeling, and “listing to one side.”

◦ Of the 61 homes in the community, only three have freestanding mailboxes, and the Petitioner is the only one with two mailboxes.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusion

The judge ruled in favor of the Petitioner in this matter.

Inconsistent Enforcement: The judge found it “problematic” that the HOA relied on three different sections of the CC&Rs in its notices.

Pre-existing Structure: The Petitioner established that the mailbox was present at the time of his 2012 home purchase and that he was told of no existing violations. Therefore, the HOA’s argument regarding the lack of an architectural approval was “without merit.”

Inapplicable CC&R Section: The fine was imposed based on Section 12 of the CC&Rs. The judge determined the plain language of this section relates to a “building” and “cannot be read to apply to Petitioner’s mailbox.”

Violation by HOA: By imposing a fine based on an inapplicable section, the HOA was in violation of the CC&Rs.

Verdict: The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The judge noted that the HOA could potentially impose fines for failure to maintain the mailbox or for painting it without approval, but those specific violations were not before the court.

——————————————————————————–

Final Order and Subsequent Corrections

Order of May 25, 2018:

1. Petitioner’s petition in Case Number 18F-H1818030-REL (Landscaping) is denied.

2. Petitioner is deemed the prevailing party in Case Number 18F-H1818031-REL (Mailbox).

3. Respondent (HOA) is ordered to pay Petitioner his $500.00 filing fee within thirty days.

Order Nunc Pro Tunc of May 30, 2018:

◦ This order corrected a typographical error in the original decision. The original text mistakenly stated the petition for the mailbox case (31-REL) was denied.

Correction: The denial was correctly applied to the landscaping case: “it is ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition in Case Number 18F-H1818031-REL 18F-H1818030-REL is denied.”

Order Nunc Pro Tunc of May 31, 2018:

◦ This order corrected a typographical error in the May 30 order, which had misstated the date of the original decision.

Correction: “On April 26 May 25, 2018, the Administrative Law Judge issued the Administrative Law Judge Decision…”

——————————————————————————–

Key CC&R Sections Cited

Section 8 (Architectural Control): Requires written approval from the Committee before any “building or other structure” is erected, altered, or repaired. This includes exterior finish, color, and architectural style.

Section 12 (Buildings): States that “No building may be erected or maintained upon any Lot except one single family dwelling with private appurtenant garage and customary outbuildings” without prior written approval.

Section 27 (Maintenance): Prohibits any building or structure from falling into disrepair and requires owners to keep them in good condition and adequately painted.

Section 28 (Landscaping): Requires the owner of each lot to “at all times keep shrubs, trees, grass and plantings of every kind, on his lot mostly trimmed, properly cultivated, and free of trash, weeds and other unsightly material.”


Gary W. Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gary W. Moselle Counsel
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Curtis Ekmark

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the respondent HOA did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1804 because the committee meeting in question was not a “regularly scheduled committee meeting” required to be open to all members.

Why this result: The specific language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) only requires 'regularly scheduled committee meetings' to be open, and the committee in question did not meet at regular intervals.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the DMMA Communications Committee meeting was subject to the open meetings law.

Petitioner, a member/homeowner, alleged the HOA violated the open meetings statute by closing a September 6, 2017, committee meeting. The ALJ determined the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings and thus was not subject to the open meetings law.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meetings Law, Committee Meetings, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes
  • Marsoner v. Pima County

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817005-REL-RHG Decision – 634096.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:03:13 (106.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA/Respondent). The central issue was whether a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee on September 6, 2017, violated Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The case hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Petitioner argued this meant any meeting scheduled in a normal fashion, while the Respondent contended it applied only to meetings occurring at fixed, regular intervals. The Respondent provided evidence that the committee in question met infrequently and without a set schedule.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent, concluding that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings held at regular intervals. The judge found that the specific language of the statute requiring only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings to be open superseded the statute’s general policy statement in favor of open meetings. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute originated from a petition filed by Gary W. Moselle with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the DMMA violated state law by holding a closed committee meeting. The case progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a successful request for a rehearing based on new evidence, and a final binding decision.

September 1, 2017

Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 5, 2017

The Department issues a notice to DMMA regarding the petition.

September 6, 2017

The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Moselle is not permitted to attend.

September 18, 2017

DMMA files an answer to the petition, denying all allegations.

November 17, 2017

The initial hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

December 7, 2017

The Administrative Law Judge issues an initial decision denying the petition.

January 4, 2018

Moselle files a request for a rehearing, citing newly discovered material evidence.

January 26, 2017

The Department grants the request for a rehearing.

April 20, 2018

A rehearing is conducted.

May 10, 2018

The Administrative Law Judge issues a final, binding decision denying the Petitioner’s petition.

The Central Legal Question: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The core of the dispute was the correct interpretation of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804(A), which governs open meetings for planned communities. The key statutory language under scrutiny was:

“…all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”

The case required the Administrative Law Judge to define the term “regularly scheduled” in the context of homeowners’ association committee meetings.

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)

The Petitioner’s case was built on a broad interpretation of the statute, emphasizing the legislative intent for transparency.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean “scheduled in a normal fashion,” rather than strictly meaning meetings held at fixed intervals (e.g., monthly or quarterly).

Legislative Policy: He pointed to A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which states a broad policy that “all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly.” He argued this policy statement should guide the interpretation of subsection (A) in favor of openness for all committee meetings.

Committee Practices: In his prehearing brief, Moselle asserted that five of the six “functioning DMMA committees” meet “at the request of the chair,” implying this was the normal scheduling method and should fall under the statute.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)

The Respondent advocated for a narrower, more literal interpretation of the statute.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA argued the phrase meant meetings that “occurred at regular intervals, such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”

Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: DMMA presented testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed interval. The committee held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017: two in April 2016, one in June 2017, and the contested meeting on September 6, 2017.

Lack of Board Action: To support the claim that the committee was not conducting core business of the Board, DMMA asserted that a recommendation made by the committee (to send an email blast) was not acted upon by the DMMA Board of Directors.

Judicial Findings and Legal Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, denied the petition, siding with the Respondent’s interpretation of the statute. The decision was based on principles of statutory construction and the evidence presented.

1. Statutory Interpretation and Plain Language

The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent by first looking at the plain language. The Judge concluded that the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) supports the interpretation that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” are those that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that the phrase could have multiple meanings, this did not preclude an interpretation based on its plain language.

2. Petitioner’s Contradictory Testimony

A key factor in the decision was the Petitioner’s own testimony during cross-examination. When asked about his assertion that five DMMA committees meet at the request of the chair, the Judge noted:

“Petitioner stated that five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page ‘meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.'” (Hearing record 30:52 – 31:15)

The Judge found that in this statement, the Petitioner himself used the phrase “not regularly scheduled” to describe meetings that were called as needed rather than held at fixed intervals, thereby undermining his own legal argument.

3. Specific Language Overrides General Policy

The Judge addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the statute’s broad policy statement in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)). The decision explicitly states:

“The general policy statement in favor of open meetings set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

This conclusion establishes that the specific qualifier “regularly scheduled” in subsection (A) creates a deliberate exception to the general policy for certain committee meetings.

Final Order and Implications

Order: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Conclusion: The Judge concluded that at the time of the September 6, 2017 meeting, the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings as defined by the statute. Therefore, the Respondent’s decision to hold a closed meeting was not a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

This decision, issued on May 10, 2018, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service.


Gary W. Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gary W. Moselle Counsel
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Curtis Ekmark

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the respondent HOA did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1804 because the committee meeting in question was not a “regularly scheduled committee meeting” required to be open to all members.

Why this result: The specific language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) only requires 'regularly scheduled committee meetings' to be open, and the committee in question did not meet at regular intervals.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the DMMA Communications Committee meeting was subject to the open meetings law.

Petitioner, a member/homeowner, alleged the HOA violated the open meetings statute by closing a September 6, 2017, committee meeting. The ALJ determined the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings and thus was not subject to the open meetings law.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meetings Law, Committee Meetings, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes
  • Marsoner v. Pima County

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817005-REL-RHG Decision – 634096.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:03 (106.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA/Respondent). The central issue was whether a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee on September 6, 2017, violated Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The case hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Petitioner argued this meant any meeting scheduled in a normal fashion, while the Respondent contended it applied only to meetings occurring at fixed, regular intervals. The Respondent provided evidence that the committee in question met infrequently and without a set schedule.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent, concluding that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings held at regular intervals. The judge found that the specific language of the statute requiring only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings to be open superseded the statute’s general policy statement in favor of open meetings. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute originated from a petition filed by Gary W. Moselle with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the DMMA violated state law by holding a closed committee meeting. The case progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a successful request for a rehearing based on new evidence, and a final binding decision.

September 1, 2017

Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 5, 2017

The Department issues a notice to DMMA regarding the petition.

September 6, 2017

The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Moselle is not permitted to attend.

September 18, 2017

DMMA files an answer to the petition, denying all allegations.

November 17, 2017

The initial hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

December 7, 2017

The Administrative Law Judge issues an initial decision denying the petition.

January 4, 2018

Moselle files a request for a rehearing, citing newly discovered material evidence.

January 26, 2017

The Department grants the request for a rehearing.

April 20, 2018

A rehearing is conducted.

May 10, 2018

The Administrative Law Judge issues a final, binding decision denying the Petitioner’s petition.

The Central Legal Question: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The core of the dispute was the correct interpretation of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804(A), which governs open meetings for planned communities. The key statutory language under scrutiny was:

“…all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”

The case required the Administrative Law Judge to define the term “regularly scheduled” in the context of homeowners’ association committee meetings.

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)

The Petitioner’s case was built on a broad interpretation of the statute, emphasizing the legislative intent for transparency.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean “scheduled in a normal fashion,” rather than strictly meaning meetings held at fixed intervals (e.g., monthly or quarterly).

Legislative Policy: He pointed to A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which states a broad policy that “all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly.” He argued this policy statement should guide the interpretation of subsection (A) in favor of openness for all committee meetings.

Committee Practices: In his prehearing brief, Moselle asserted that five of the six “functioning DMMA committees” meet “at the request of the chair,” implying this was the normal scheduling method and should fall under the statute.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)

The Respondent advocated for a narrower, more literal interpretation of the statute.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA argued the phrase meant meetings that “occurred at regular intervals, such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”

Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: DMMA presented testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed interval. The committee held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017: two in April 2016, one in June 2017, and the contested meeting on September 6, 2017.

Lack of Board Action: To support the claim that the committee was not conducting core business of the Board, DMMA asserted that a recommendation made by the committee (to send an email blast) was not acted upon by the DMMA Board of Directors.

Judicial Findings and Legal Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, denied the petition, siding with the Respondent’s interpretation of the statute. The decision was based on principles of statutory construction and the evidence presented.

1. Statutory Interpretation and Plain Language

The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent by first looking at the plain language. The Judge concluded that the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) supports the interpretation that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” are those that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that the phrase could have multiple meanings, this did not preclude an interpretation based on its plain language.

2. Petitioner’s Contradictory Testimony

A key factor in the decision was the Petitioner’s own testimony during cross-examination. When asked about his assertion that five DMMA committees meet at the request of the chair, the Judge noted:

“Petitioner stated that five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page ‘meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.'” (Hearing record 30:52 – 31:15)

The Judge found that in this statement, the Petitioner himself used the phrase “not regularly scheduled” to describe meetings that were called as needed rather than held at fixed intervals, thereby undermining his own legal argument.

3. Specific Language Overrides General Policy

The Judge addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the statute’s broad policy statement in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)). The decision explicitly states:

“The general policy statement in favor of open meetings set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

This conclusion establishes that the specific qualifier “regularly scheduled” in subsection (A) creates a deliberate exception to the general policy for certain committee meetings.

Final Order and Implications

Order: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Conclusion: The Judge concluded that at the time of the September 6, 2017 meeting, the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings as defined by the statute. Therefore, the Respondent’s decision to hold a closed meeting was not a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

This decision, issued on May 10, 2018, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service.


Rex E. Duffett vs. Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association (ROOT)

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818025-REL / 18F-H1818027-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-04-24
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Rex E. Duffett Counsel
Respondent Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner won the statutory claim regarding access to association documents (A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)) and was refunded the $500 filing fee. Petitioner lost the claim regarding the failure to maintain exterior walls (CC&Rs) due to insufficient evidence.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the maintenance issue by a preponderance of the evidence (for case 18F-H1818025-REL).

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to repair and maintain exterior walls

Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to repair damage (crack) to the exterior wall of his unit as required by the CC&Rs. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence (black and white photographs did not clearly show the damage) to establish a violation.

Orders: Petitioner's petition in Case Number 18F-H1818025-REL is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs
  • 5
  • 17

Failure to provide requested association records

Petitioner requested meeting notices and minutes in December 2017. Respondent's former management company failed to respond in a timely fashion. Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the statute.

Orders: Petitioner deemed the prevailing party in Case Number 18F-H1818027-REL. Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) in the future and pay Petitioner the filing fee of $500.00.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • 19
  • 20
  • 21
  • 22

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Document Request, Records Disclosure, Maintenance, CC&Rs, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • CC&Rs

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818025-REL Decision – 630610.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:34 (114.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818025-REL


Administrative Hearing Brief: Duffett vs. Suntech Patio Homes HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in two consolidated cases filed by homeowner Rex E. Duffett against the Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association (HOA). The ruling presents a split decision, with the petitioner prevailing on one claim while failing to provide sufficient evidence for the other.

The first petition, concerning the HOA’s alleged failure to repair exterior walls, was denied. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, as the submitted photographic evidence was unclear and did not sufficiently establish the existence or severity of the damage requiring immediate repair.

The second petition, concerning the HOA’s failure to provide association records upon request, was upheld. The judge found that the HOA, through its former management company, violated state law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)) by not responding to a formal document request within the mandated ten-business-day window.

As a result, Mr. Duffett was deemed the prevailing party in the records-request case. The HOA was ordered to pay his $500 filing fee and to ensure future compliance with the relevant statutes. The case highlights critical issues of evidence quality in homeowner disputes and demonstrates the legal liability an HOA retains for the failures of its management agents, particularly during periods of transition.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Numbers

18F-H1818025-REL and 18F-H1818027-REL (Consolidated)

Petitioner

Rex E. Duffett

Respondent

Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association

Hearing Date

April 4, 2018

Decision Date

April 24, 2018

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

The hearing addressed two separate petitions filed by Rex E. Duffett with the Arizona Department of Real Estate:

1. Petition 1 (18F-H1818025-REL): Alleged the HOA violated community CC&Rs by failing to repair exterior walls of the petitioner’s unit.

2. Petition 2 (18F-H1818027-REL): Alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide requested documents.

Petition 1: Failure to Repair Exterior Walls (Denied)

Petitioner’s Allegations and Evidence

Core Claim: The petitioner alleged the HOA failed its duty, as defined by a March 1993 amendment to the CC&Rs, to maintain the exterior walls of his unit. The CC&Rs state, “The Suntech Patio Homeowners Association shall be responsible for the painting and maintenance of the following: A) Exterior walls of all units . . . .”

Initial Request (July 14, 2017): Mr. Duffett faxed the HOA’s management company, The Management Trust, stating, “While inspecting the outside of my property I noticed a crack in the exterior wall. Please inspect, repair and paint the wall as soon as possible to prevent any damage which could result from rain water in the interior of the wall.”

Follow-Up Request (August 21, 2017): In a certified letter, Mr. Duffett provided more detail, identifying a crack in the entryway wall allowing “rain water to seep into the interior wall,” a “bare concrete” area on the garage, and a previously cracked garage wall that had been repaired by a roofing company but not painted.

Hearing Testimony: Mr. Duffett testified that a roofing company he hired to find a leak in his garage ceiling determined the source was not the roof but a crack in the exterior wall.

Submitted Evidence: The petitioner submitted five black-and-white photographs of his home’s exterior across his two communications.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence

Management Transition: Pride Community Management took over from The Management Trust on February 1, 2018. The new manager, Rebecca Stowers, and owner, Frank Peake, testified to a difficult transition where The Management Trust initially provided only one box of records, later discovering seven or eight more boxes in storage. Mr. Peake stated that Pride had not seen the petitioner’s communications regarding the damage until the hearing.

Inspection: Ms. Stowers testified that she inspected the petitioner’s home on March 27, 2018. While she noted “a missing area of stucco on the front of the garage that needed to be repaired,” she “denied being able to identify a crack in the stucco anywhere else on the front of the house.”

Community-Wide Repair Plan: Ms. Stowers stated that the HOA intended to repair the stucco and paint all exterior walls in the community during the 2018 calendar year at a projected cost of $46,000, to be funded potentially through a special assessment due to the HOA being underfunded.

Conclusion of Law and Ruling

Burden of Proof: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the petitioner bore the burden of proving his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

Evidence Failure: The ALJ found the submitted evidence insufficient. The decision states: “The black and white photographs submitted at hearing did not clearly show the crack Petitioner alleged existed on the exterior wall of his unit… The Administrative Law Judge was unable to identify the location or severity of the alleged crack, and therefore, cannot conclude that such a crack exists and/or that it is necessary to be repaired immediately.”

Final Ruling: The petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof. The petition in Case Number 18F-H1818025-REL was denied.

Petition 2: Failure to Provide Association Records (Upheld)

Petitioner’s Allegations and Evidence

Core Claim: The petitioner alleged that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), which requires an association to fulfill a request for records within ten business days.

The Request (December 22, 2017): Mr. Duffett faxed The Management Trust a request for specific documents, citing a statement made by the HOA in a separate case. He requested copies of:

◦ Meeting notices and minutes for all meetings where “rules and regulations were discussed” in August/September 2017.

◦ Meeting notices and minutes for meetings where the last HOA dues increase was discussed.

◦ A copy of the notice for the last association rate increase.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence

Lack of Awareness: The HOA’s initial response on January 29, 2018, indicated it had only become aware of the request upon receiving notice of the petition. The current management company, Pride, testified they had not seen the original communication from the petitioner.

Vagueness of Request: Frank Peake of Pride testified that the request for minutes of meetings “where the rules and regulations were discussed” was unclear “because rules and regulations are discussed in some form at virtually every meeting of the association.”

Claim of Privilege: The initial response from The Management Trust on January 29, 2018, claimed that the requested minutes were for “closed executive meetings and were only available to Board members.”

Conclusion of Law and Ruling

Statutory Violation: The ALJ concluded that the petitioner clearly made a request for documents and that the HOA, via its former management company, failed to act as required by law.

Failure of Former Management: The decision explicitly faults the prior management company: “The Management Trust should have responded or requested additional clarification of what documents Petitioner was requesting as it was the management company during the ten day window Respondent had to respond pursuant to the statute.”

Final Ruling: The petitioner successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). Mr. Duffett was deemed the prevailing party in Case Number 18F-H1818027-REL.

Final Order and Implications

The Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders based on the conclusions of law:

Case Number

Subject

Ruling

18F-H1818025-REL

Exterior Wall Repairs

Petition Denied

18F-H1818027-REL

Document Request

Petitioner Deemed Prevailing Party

Directives to the Respondent (Suntech Patio Homes HOA):

1. Future Compliance: The HOA must comply with the provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) going forward.

2. Payment of Filing Fee: The HOA must pay the petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.

This order is considered binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted.


Rex E. Duffett vs. Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association (ROOT)

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818025-REL / 18F-H1818027-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-04-24
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Rex E. Duffett Counsel
Respondent Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner won the statutory claim regarding access to association documents (A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)) and was refunded the $500 filing fee. Petitioner lost the claim regarding the failure to maintain exterior walls (CC&Rs) due to insufficient evidence.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the maintenance issue by a preponderance of the evidence (for case 18F-H1818025-REL).

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to repair and maintain exterior walls

Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to repair damage (crack) to the exterior wall of his unit as required by the CC&Rs. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence (black and white photographs did not clearly show the damage) to establish a violation.

Orders: Petitioner's petition in Case Number 18F-H1818025-REL is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs
  • 5
  • 17

Failure to provide requested association records

Petitioner requested meeting notices and minutes in December 2017. Respondent's former management company failed to respond in a timely fashion. Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the statute.

Orders: Petitioner deemed the prevailing party in Case Number 18F-H1818027-REL. Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) in the future and pay Petitioner the filing fee of $500.00.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • 19
  • 20
  • 21
  • 22

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Document Request, Records Disclosure, Maintenance, CC&Rs, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • CC&Rs

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818025-REL Decision – 630610.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:28 (114.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818025-REL


Administrative Hearing Brief: Duffett vs. Suntech Patio Homes HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in two consolidated cases filed by homeowner Rex E. Duffett against the Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association (HOA). The ruling presents a split decision, with the petitioner prevailing on one claim while failing to provide sufficient evidence for the other.

The first petition, concerning the HOA’s alleged failure to repair exterior walls, was denied. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, as the submitted photographic evidence was unclear and did not sufficiently establish the existence or severity of the damage requiring immediate repair.

The second petition, concerning the HOA’s failure to provide association records upon request, was upheld. The judge found that the HOA, through its former management company, violated state law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)) by not responding to a formal document request within the mandated ten-business-day window.

As a result, Mr. Duffett was deemed the prevailing party in the records-request case. The HOA was ordered to pay his $500 filing fee and to ensure future compliance with the relevant statutes. The case highlights critical issues of evidence quality in homeowner disputes and demonstrates the legal liability an HOA retains for the failures of its management agents, particularly during periods of transition.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Numbers

18F-H1818025-REL and 18F-H1818027-REL (Consolidated)

Petitioner

Rex E. Duffett

Respondent

Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association

Hearing Date

April 4, 2018

Decision Date

April 24, 2018

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

The hearing addressed two separate petitions filed by Rex E. Duffett with the Arizona Department of Real Estate:

1. Petition 1 (18F-H1818025-REL): Alleged the HOA violated community CC&Rs by failing to repair exterior walls of the petitioner’s unit.

2. Petition 2 (18F-H1818027-REL): Alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide requested documents.

Petition 1: Failure to Repair Exterior Walls (Denied)

Petitioner’s Allegations and Evidence

Core Claim: The petitioner alleged the HOA failed its duty, as defined by a March 1993 amendment to the CC&Rs, to maintain the exterior walls of his unit. The CC&Rs state, “The Suntech Patio Homeowners Association shall be responsible for the painting and maintenance of the following: A) Exterior walls of all units . . . .”

Initial Request (July 14, 2017): Mr. Duffett faxed the HOA’s management company, The Management Trust, stating, “While inspecting the outside of my property I noticed a crack in the exterior wall. Please inspect, repair and paint the wall as soon as possible to prevent any damage which could result from rain water in the interior of the wall.”

Follow-Up Request (August 21, 2017): In a certified letter, Mr. Duffett provided more detail, identifying a crack in the entryway wall allowing “rain water to seep into the interior wall,” a “bare concrete” area on the garage, and a previously cracked garage wall that had been repaired by a roofing company but not painted.

Hearing Testimony: Mr. Duffett testified that a roofing company he hired to find a leak in his garage ceiling determined the source was not the roof but a crack in the exterior wall.

Submitted Evidence: The petitioner submitted five black-and-white photographs of his home’s exterior across his two communications.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence

Management Transition: Pride Community Management took over from The Management Trust on February 1, 2018. The new manager, Rebecca Stowers, and owner, Frank Peake, testified to a difficult transition where The Management Trust initially provided only one box of records, later discovering seven or eight more boxes in storage. Mr. Peake stated that Pride had not seen the petitioner’s communications regarding the damage until the hearing.

Inspection: Ms. Stowers testified that she inspected the petitioner’s home on March 27, 2018. While she noted “a missing area of stucco on the front of the garage that needed to be repaired,” she “denied being able to identify a crack in the stucco anywhere else on the front of the house.”

Community-Wide Repair Plan: Ms. Stowers stated that the HOA intended to repair the stucco and paint all exterior walls in the community during the 2018 calendar year at a projected cost of $46,000, to be funded potentially through a special assessment due to the HOA being underfunded.

Conclusion of Law and Ruling

Burden of Proof: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the petitioner bore the burden of proving his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

Evidence Failure: The ALJ found the submitted evidence insufficient. The decision states: “The black and white photographs submitted at hearing did not clearly show the crack Petitioner alleged existed on the exterior wall of his unit… The Administrative Law Judge was unable to identify the location or severity of the alleged crack, and therefore, cannot conclude that such a crack exists and/or that it is necessary to be repaired immediately.”

Final Ruling: The petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof. The petition in Case Number 18F-H1818025-REL was denied.

Petition 2: Failure to Provide Association Records (Upheld)

Petitioner’s Allegations and Evidence

Core Claim: The petitioner alleged that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), which requires an association to fulfill a request for records within ten business days.

The Request (December 22, 2017): Mr. Duffett faxed The Management Trust a request for specific documents, citing a statement made by the HOA in a separate case. He requested copies of:

◦ Meeting notices and minutes for all meetings where “rules and regulations were discussed” in August/September 2017.

◦ Meeting notices and minutes for meetings where the last HOA dues increase was discussed.

◦ A copy of the notice for the last association rate increase.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence

Lack of Awareness: The HOA’s initial response on January 29, 2018, indicated it had only become aware of the request upon receiving notice of the petition. The current management company, Pride, testified they had not seen the original communication from the petitioner.

Vagueness of Request: Frank Peake of Pride testified that the request for minutes of meetings “where the rules and regulations were discussed” was unclear “because rules and regulations are discussed in some form at virtually every meeting of the association.”

Claim of Privilege: The initial response from The Management Trust on January 29, 2018, claimed that the requested minutes were for “closed executive meetings and were only available to Board members.”

Conclusion of Law and Ruling

Statutory Violation: The ALJ concluded that the petitioner clearly made a request for documents and that the HOA, via its former management company, failed to act as required by law.

Failure of Former Management: The decision explicitly faults the prior management company: “The Management Trust should have responded or requested additional clarification of what documents Petitioner was requesting as it was the management company during the ten day window Respondent had to respond pursuant to the statute.”

Final Ruling: The petitioner successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). Mr. Duffett was deemed the prevailing party in Case Number 18F-H1818027-REL.

Final Order and Implications

The Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders based on the conclusions of law:

Case Number

Subject

Ruling

18F-H1818025-REL

Exterior Wall Repairs

Petition Denied

18F-H1818027-REL

Document Request

Petitioner Deemed Prevailing Party

Directives to the Respondent (Suntech Patio Homes HOA):

1. Future Compliance: The HOA must comply with the provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) going forward.

2. Payment of Filing Fee: The HOA must pay the petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.

This order is considered binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted.


Jerry L. Webster v. Mountain Rose Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-02-09
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome total_loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry L. Webster Counsel
Respondent Mountain Rose Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article 10, Section 10.8

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's claim that the HOA violated CC&Rs Article 10.8 (Notice of Violation) was dismissed because the Article governs only recorded notices, and the Petitioner did not prove the notices in question were recorded.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mountain Rose violated its CC&Rs Article 10.8, because that provision applies only to recorded notices, and the notices issued to the Petitioner were not recorded.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&R notice requirements regarding clarity and completeness of violation notices.

The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs Article 10.8 because the violation notices sent to him failed to include five mandatory pieces of information required by that section of the CC&Rs. The Petitioner also sought the refund of $175 in fines.

Orders: Petitioners' petition in this matter is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Notice of Violation, Recording
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817019-REL Decision – 620124.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:00 (78.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817019-REL


Case Briefing: Webster v. Mountain Rose Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817019-REL, wherein Petitioner Jerry L. Webster’s complaint against the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association was dismissed. The central issue revolved around Mr. Webster’s claim that the HOA engaged in a pattern of harassment by issuing vague and improper violation notices that failed to comply with Article 10.8 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The case was decided on a critical legal interpretation of the CC&Rs. The presiding judge determined that the specific requirements of Article 10.8, which Mr. Webster cited as being violated, apply exclusively to violation notices that are formally “Recorded” with the Maricopa County Recorder’s office. The petitioner failed to provide any evidence, or even make the claim, that the notices he received had been recorded. Consequently, Mr. Webster did not meet his burden of proof to demonstrate that the HOA had violated the cited article. The dismissal of the petition was based entirely on this procedural and definitional distinction, without a ruling on the petitioner’s underlying allegations of harassment or selective enforcement.

Case Background

Parties:

Petitioner: Jerry L. Webster, a homeowner and member of the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association.

Respondent: Mountain Rose Homeowners Association (“Mountain Rose”), located in Scottsdale, Arizona.

Adjudicating Body:

◦ The Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix, Arizona.

Administrative Law Judge: Velva Moses-Thompson.

Key Dates:

2016–2017: Mountain Rose issues a series of violation notices to Mr. Webster regarding tree trimming and debris cleanup.

December 6, 2017: Mr. Webster files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

February 9, 2018: A hearing is held.

February 9, 2018: The Administrative Law Judge issues the decision dismissing the petition.

Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

Mr. Webster’s petition centered on the claim that the HOA’s actions constituted harassment and violated specific provisions of the governing documents.

Core Claim: Violation of CC&Rs Article 10.8

Mr. Webster contended that the violation notices he received from Mountain Rose were invalid because they failed to contain information mandated by Article 10.8 (“Notice of Violation”) of the CC&Rs. Specifically, he alleged the notices omitted the following required elements:

(ii) The legal description of the lot against which the notice is being Recorded.

(iii) A brief description of the nature of the violation.

(iv) A statement that the notice is being Recorded by the Association pursuant to the Declaration.

(v) A statement of the specific steps which must be taken by the Owner or occupant to cure the violation.

Allegations of Harassment and Prejudicial Treatment

In his petition, Mr. Webster framed the HOA’s actions as a targeted and unfair campaign against him.

Stated Intent: “The intent of this action is to stop the HOA from violating our civil rights by prejudicially harassing us with unclear and unwarranted violation notices.”

History of Conflict: He alleged that “The HOA has harassed us for over 10 years with vague violation notices.”

Lack of Communication: He claimed that his “Numerous requests were made for clarification…which were ignored.”

Financial Penalties: Mr. Webster stated he was recently fined three times for a total of $175, which he sought to have refunded.

Alleged Bias: To demonstrate selective enforcement, Mr. Webster noted that a review of the neighborhood revealed “22 trees touching dwellings, including ours,” and stated, “It is very doubtful any other member received notices or fines for identical circumstances.”

Supporting Evidence: Mr. Webster submitted an aerial photo from 2012 showing the tree in a similar condition, a 2017 photo of another home with a tree touching the dwelling, and a 2017 photo of HOA-maintained trees.

Respondent’s Position

The Mountain Rose HOA, represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq., presented a focused defense based on the specific language of the CC&Rs.

Central Argument: The HOA contended that the violation notices issued to Mr. Webster were not recorded with the Maricopa County Recorder.

Legal Position: Because the notices were not recorded, the stringent requirements outlined in Article 10.8 did not apply to them.

Additional Detail: The HOA also argued that it had previously communicated the necessary corrective action to Mr. Webster, stating that “his tree needed to be trimmed 8 feet above the ground.”

The Decisive Legal Interpretation and Ruling

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the precise definition and application of “Recording” as established within the Mountain Rose CC&Rs.

The Definition of “Recording”

Article 1.33 of the CC&Rs provides the controlling definition:

“Recording” means placing an instrument of public record in the office of County Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona, and “Recorded” means having been so placed of public record.

Application of Law to Facts

The Judge concluded that Mr. Webster’s entire case rested on a misapplication of Article 10.8.

Limited Scope of Article 10.8: The ruling states, “Mountain Rose CC&Rs Article 10.8. applies to the recording of notices and recorded notices.”

Burden of Proof: Under Arizona law (A.A.C. R2-19-119), the burden of proof fell to the petitioner, Mr. Webster, to demonstrate his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

Crucial Factual Finding: The decision explicitly states, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the notices issued to Mr. Webster were recorded.

Petitioner’s Failure to Allege: The Judge further noted, “Mr. Webster did not even contend that Mountain Rose recorded the notices issued to him.”

Conclusion of Law

Based on the evidence and the plain language of the CC&Rs, the Judge found that Mr. Webster failed to make his case.

“Mr. Webster failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mountain Rose violated its CC&Rs as described above.”

Final Order and Disposition

The petition was summarily dismissed based on the failure to prove that the relevant CC&R article was applicable to the facts presented.

Order:

“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition in this matter is dismissed.”

The order was dated February 9, 2018, and transmitted to the parties on February 28, 2018.


Jerry L. Webster v. Mountain Rose Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-02-09
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome total_loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry L. Webster Counsel
Respondent Mountain Rose Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article 10, Section 10.8

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's claim that the HOA violated CC&Rs Article 10.8 (Notice of Violation) was dismissed because the Article governs only recorded notices, and the Petitioner did not prove the notices in question were recorded.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mountain Rose violated its CC&Rs Article 10.8, because that provision applies only to recorded notices, and the notices issued to the Petitioner were not recorded.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&R notice requirements regarding clarity and completeness of violation notices.

The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs Article 10.8 because the violation notices sent to him failed to include five mandatory pieces of information required by that section of the CC&Rs. The Petitioner also sought the refund of $175 in fines.

Orders: Petitioners' petition in this matter is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Notice of Violation, Recording
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817019-REL Decision – 620124.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:17 (78.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817019-REL


Case Briefing: Webster v. Mountain Rose Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817019-REL, wherein Petitioner Jerry L. Webster’s complaint against the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association was dismissed. The central issue revolved around Mr. Webster’s claim that the HOA engaged in a pattern of harassment by issuing vague and improper violation notices that failed to comply with Article 10.8 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The case was decided on a critical legal interpretation of the CC&Rs. The presiding judge determined that the specific requirements of Article 10.8, which Mr. Webster cited as being violated, apply exclusively to violation notices that are formally “Recorded” with the Maricopa County Recorder’s office. The petitioner failed to provide any evidence, or even make the claim, that the notices he received had been recorded. Consequently, Mr. Webster did not meet his burden of proof to demonstrate that the HOA had violated the cited article. The dismissal of the petition was based entirely on this procedural and definitional distinction, without a ruling on the petitioner’s underlying allegations of harassment or selective enforcement.

Case Background

Parties:

Petitioner: Jerry L. Webster, a homeowner and member of the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association.

Respondent: Mountain Rose Homeowners Association (“Mountain Rose”), located in Scottsdale, Arizona.

Adjudicating Body:

◦ The Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix, Arizona.

Administrative Law Judge: Velva Moses-Thompson.

Key Dates:

2016–2017: Mountain Rose issues a series of violation notices to Mr. Webster regarding tree trimming and debris cleanup.

December 6, 2017: Mr. Webster files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

February 9, 2018: A hearing is held.

February 9, 2018: The Administrative Law Judge issues the decision dismissing the petition.

Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

Mr. Webster’s petition centered on the claim that the HOA’s actions constituted harassment and violated specific provisions of the governing documents.

Core Claim: Violation of CC&Rs Article 10.8

Mr. Webster contended that the violation notices he received from Mountain Rose were invalid because they failed to contain information mandated by Article 10.8 (“Notice of Violation”) of the CC&Rs. Specifically, he alleged the notices omitted the following required elements:

(ii) The legal description of the lot against which the notice is being Recorded.

(iii) A brief description of the nature of the violation.

(iv) A statement that the notice is being Recorded by the Association pursuant to the Declaration.

(v) A statement of the specific steps which must be taken by the Owner or occupant to cure the violation.

Allegations of Harassment and Prejudicial Treatment

In his petition, Mr. Webster framed the HOA’s actions as a targeted and unfair campaign against him.

Stated Intent: “The intent of this action is to stop the HOA from violating our civil rights by prejudicially harassing us with unclear and unwarranted violation notices.”

History of Conflict: He alleged that “The HOA has harassed us for over 10 years with vague violation notices.”

Lack of Communication: He claimed that his “Numerous requests were made for clarification…which were ignored.”

Financial Penalties: Mr. Webster stated he was recently fined three times for a total of $175, which he sought to have refunded.

Alleged Bias: To demonstrate selective enforcement, Mr. Webster noted that a review of the neighborhood revealed “22 trees touching dwellings, including ours,” and stated, “It is very doubtful any other member received notices or fines for identical circumstances.”

Supporting Evidence: Mr. Webster submitted an aerial photo from 2012 showing the tree in a similar condition, a 2017 photo of another home with a tree touching the dwelling, and a 2017 photo of HOA-maintained trees.

Respondent’s Position

The Mountain Rose HOA, represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq., presented a focused defense based on the specific language of the CC&Rs.

Central Argument: The HOA contended that the violation notices issued to Mr. Webster were not recorded with the Maricopa County Recorder.

Legal Position: Because the notices were not recorded, the stringent requirements outlined in Article 10.8 did not apply to them.

Additional Detail: The HOA also argued that it had previously communicated the necessary corrective action to Mr. Webster, stating that “his tree needed to be trimmed 8 feet above the ground.”

The Decisive Legal Interpretation and Ruling

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the precise definition and application of “Recording” as established within the Mountain Rose CC&Rs.

The Definition of “Recording”

Article 1.33 of the CC&Rs provides the controlling definition:

“Recording” means placing an instrument of public record in the office of County Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona, and “Recorded” means having been so placed of public record.

Application of Law to Facts

The Judge concluded that Mr. Webster’s entire case rested on a misapplication of Article 10.8.

Limited Scope of Article 10.8: The ruling states, “Mountain Rose CC&Rs Article 10.8. applies to the recording of notices and recorded notices.”

Burden of Proof: Under Arizona law (A.A.C. R2-19-119), the burden of proof fell to the petitioner, Mr. Webster, to demonstrate his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

Crucial Factual Finding: The decision explicitly states, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the notices issued to Mr. Webster were recorded.

Petitioner’s Failure to Allege: The Judge further noted, “Mr. Webster did not even contend that Mountain Rose recorded the notices issued to him.”

Conclusion of Law

Based on the evidence and the plain language of the CC&Rs, the Judge found that Mr. Webster failed to make his case.

“Mr. Webster failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mountain Rose violated its CC&Rs as described above.”

Final Order and Disposition

The petition was summarily dismissed based on the failure to prove that the relevant CC&R article was applicable to the facts presented.

Order:

“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition in this matter is dismissed.”

The order was dated February 9, 2018, and transmitted to the parties on February 28, 2018.


Gary W Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gary W. Moselle Counsel
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Curtis Ekmark

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the Petitioner's petition, concluding that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was not subject to the open meetings law because the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, as the committee meeting in question did not meet the definition of a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' required to be open to members.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent violated the open meeting statute by closing a committee meeting.

Petitioner alleged that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was improperly closed and subject to open meeting laws. The ALJ determined the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings (defined as meetings occurring at regular intervals) and was therefore not subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings Law, Committee Meeting, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817005-REL Decision – 634096.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:03:08 (106.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL


Briefing Document: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA/Respondent). The central issue was whether a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee on September 6, 2017, violated Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The case hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Petitioner argued this meant any meeting scheduled in a normal fashion, while the Respondent contended it applied only to meetings occurring at fixed, regular intervals. The Respondent provided evidence that the committee in question met infrequently and without a set schedule.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent, concluding that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings held at regular intervals. The judge found that the specific language of the statute requiring only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings to be open superseded the statute’s general policy statement in favor of open meetings. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute originated from a petition filed by Gary W. Moselle with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the DMMA violated state law by holding a closed committee meeting. The case progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a successful request for a rehearing based on new evidence, and a final binding decision.

September 1, 2017

Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 5, 2017

The Department issues a notice to DMMA regarding the petition.

September 6, 2017

The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Moselle is not permitted to attend.

September 18, 2017

DMMA files an answer to the petition, denying all allegations.

November 17, 2017

The initial hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

December 7, 2017

The Administrative Law Judge issues an initial decision denying the petition.

January 4, 2018

Moselle files a request for a rehearing, citing newly discovered material evidence.

January 26, 2017

The Department grants the request for a rehearing.

April 20, 2018

A rehearing is conducted.

May 10, 2018

The Administrative Law Judge issues a final, binding decision denying the Petitioner’s petition.

The Central Legal Question: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The core of the dispute was the correct interpretation of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804(A), which governs open meetings for planned communities. The key statutory language under scrutiny was:

“…all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”

The case required the Administrative Law Judge to define the term “regularly scheduled” in the context of homeowners’ association committee meetings.

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)

The Petitioner’s case was built on a broad interpretation of the statute, emphasizing the legislative intent for transparency.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean “scheduled in a normal fashion,” rather than strictly meaning meetings held at fixed intervals (e.g., monthly or quarterly).

Legislative Policy: He pointed to A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which states a broad policy that “all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly.” He argued this policy statement should guide the interpretation of subsection (A) in favor of openness for all committee meetings.

Committee Practices: In his prehearing brief, Moselle asserted that five of the six “functioning DMMA committees” meet “at the request of the chair,” implying this was the normal scheduling method and should fall under the statute.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)

The Respondent advocated for a narrower, more literal interpretation of the statute.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA argued the phrase meant meetings that “occurred at regular intervals, such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”

Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: DMMA presented testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed interval. The committee held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017: two in April 2016, one in June 2017, and the contested meeting on September 6, 2017.

Lack of Board Action: To support the claim that the committee was not conducting core business of the Board, DMMA asserted that a recommendation made by the committee (to send an email blast) was not acted upon by the DMMA Board of Directors.

Judicial Findings and Legal Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, denied the petition, siding with the Respondent’s interpretation of the statute. The decision was based on principles of statutory construction and the evidence presented.

1. Statutory Interpretation and Plain Language

The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent by first looking at the plain language. The Judge concluded that the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) supports the interpretation that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” are those that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that the phrase could have multiple meanings, this did not preclude an interpretation based on its plain language.

2. Petitioner’s Contradictory Testimony

A key factor in the decision was the Petitioner’s own testimony during cross-examination. When asked about his assertion that five DMMA committees meet at the request of the chair, the Judge noted:

“Petitioner stated that five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page ‘meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.'” (Hearing record 30:52 – 31:15)

The Judge found that in this statement, the Petitioner himself used the phrase “not regularly scheduled” to describe meetings that were called as needed rather than held at fixed intervals, thereby undermining his own legal argument.

3. Specific Language Overrides General Policy

The Judge addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the statute’s broad policy statement in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)). The decision explicitly states:

“The general policy statement in favor of open meetings set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

This conclusion establishes that the specific qualifier “regularly scheduled” in subsection (A) creates a deliberate exception to the general policy for certain committee meetings.

Final Order and Implications

Order: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Conclusion: The Judge concluded that at the time of the September 6, 2017 meeting, the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings as defined by the statute. Therefore, the Respondent’s decision to hold a closed meeting was not a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

This decision, issued on May 10, 2018, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service.


Gary W Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gary W. Moselle Counsel
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Curtis Ekmark

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the Petitioner's petition, concluding that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was not subject to the open meetings law because the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, as the committee meeting in question did not meet the definition of a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' required to be open to members.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent violated the open meeting statute by closing a committee meeting.

Petitioner alleged that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was improperly closed and subject to open meeting laws. The ALJ determined the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings (defined as meetings occurring at regular intervals) and was therefore not subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings Law, Committee Meeting, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817005-REL Decision – 634096.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:01 (106.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL


Briefing Document: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA/Respondent). The central issue was whether a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee on September 6, 2017, violated Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The case hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Petitioner argued this meant any meeting scheduled in a normal fashion, while the Respondent contended it applied only to meetings occurring at fixed, regular intervals. The Respondent provided evidence that the committee in question met infrequently and without a set schedule.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent, concluding that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings held at regular intervals. The judge found that the specific language of the statute requiring only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings to be open superseded the statute’s general policy statement in favor of open meetings. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute originated from a petition filed by Gary W. Moselle with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the DMMA violated state law by holding a closed committee meeting. The case progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a successful request for a rehearing based on new evidence, and a final binding decision.

September 1, 2017

Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 5, 2017

The Department issues a notice to DMMA regarding the petition.

September 6, 2017

The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Moselle is not permitted to attend.

September 18, 2017

DMMA files an answer to the petition, denying all allegations.

November 17, 2017

The initial hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

December 7, 2017

The Administrative Law Judge issues an initial decision denying the petition.

January 4, 2018

Moselle files a request for a rehearing, citing newly discovered material evidence.

January 26, 2017

The Department grants the request for a rehearing.

April 20, 2018

A rehearing is conducted.

May 10, 2018

The Administrative Law Judge issues a final, binding decision denying the Petitioner’s petition.

The Central Legal Question: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The core of the dispute was the correct interpretation of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804(A), which governs open meetings for planned communities. The key statutory language under scrutiny was:

“…all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”

The case required the Administrative Law Judge to define the term “regularly scheduled” in the context of homeowners’ association committee meetings.

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)

The Petitioner’s case was built on a broad interpretation of the statute, emphasizing the legislative intent for transparency.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean “scheduled in a normal fashion,” rather than strictly meaning meetings held at fixed intervals (e.g., monthly or quarterly).

Legislative Policy: He pointed to A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which states a broad policy that “all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly.” He argued this policy statement should guide the interpretation of subsection (A) in favor of openness for all committee meetings.

Committee Practices: In his prehearing brief, Moselle asserted that five of the six “functioning DMMA committees” meet “at the request of the chair,” implying this was the normal scheduling method and should fall under the statute.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)

The Respondent advocated for a narrower, more literal interpretation of the statute.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA argued the phrase meant meetings that “occurred at regular intervals, such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”

Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: DMMA presented testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed interval. The committee held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017: two in April 2016, one in June 2017, and the contested meeting on September 6, 2017.

Lack of Board Action: To support the claim that the committee was not conducting core business of the Board, DMMA asserted that a recommendation made by the committee (to send an email blast) was not acted upon by the DMMA Board of Directors.

Judicial Findings and Legal Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, denied the petition, siding with the Respondent’s interpretation of the statute. The decision was based on principles of statutory construction and the evidence presented.

1. Statutory Interpretation and Plain Language

The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent by first looking at the plain language. The Judge concluded that the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) supports the interpretation that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” are those that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that the phrase could have multiple meanings, this did not preclude an interpretation based on its plain language.

2. Petitioner’s Contradictory Testimony

A key factor in the decision was the Petitioner’s own testimony during cross-examination. When asked about his assertion that five DMMA committees meet at the request of the chair, the Judge noted:

“Petitioner stated that five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page ‘meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.'” (Hearing record 30:52 – 31:15)

The Judge found that in this statement, the Petitioner himself used the phrase “not regularly scheduled” to describe meetings that were called as needed rather than held at fixed intervals, thereby undermining his own legal argument.

3. Specific Language Overrides General Policy

The Judge addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the statute’s broad policy statement in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)). The decision explicitly states:

“The general policy statement in favor of open meetings set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

This conclusion establishes that the specific qualifier “regularly scheduled” in subsection (A) creates a deliberate exception to the general policy for certain committee meetings.

Final Order and Implications

Order: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Conclusion: The Judge concluded that at the time of the September 6, 2017 meeting, the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings as defined by the statute. Therefore, the Respondent’s decision to hold a closed meeting was not a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

This decision, issued on May 10, 2018, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service.