Allan, Joseph P v. The Springs Condominiums Association

Case Summary

Case ID 25F-H018-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2025-03-31
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Joseph P. Allan Counsel
Respondent The Springs Condominiums Association Counsel

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioner met his burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258(A). Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party, and Respondent was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee and comply with the statute in the future.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide access to financial and other records within ten business days.

Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) by failing to allow Petitioner to examine original invoices for May 2024 (requested July 9, 2024) and bank statements from four accounts (requested September 23, 2024) within the required ten business days, despite receiving the requests through board members.

Orders: Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days and is directed to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) going forward. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, records request, A.R.S. 33-1258, prevailing party, condominium association
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Decision Documents

25F-H018-REL Decision – 1263777.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:44:43 (48.3 KB)

25F-H018-REL Decision – 1288586.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:44:44 (105.9 KB)

Clifford S Burnes V. Saguaro Crest Homeowners’ Association

Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H038-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-04-20
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $1,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Clifford S. Burnes Counsel
Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association Counsel John T. Crotty, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

Petitioner prevailed on the allegation that Respondent failed to provide notice of the board meeting in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804, resulting in a refund of $500.00. Respondent prevailed on the allegation that the board meeting was required to be open, as the meeting was properly closed to receive legal advice under a statutory exception.

Why this result: Petitioner lost the open meeting claim because the meeting was protected by the legal advice exception under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1).

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide notice of board meeting to members.

Petitioner alleged Respondent conducted an unnoticed board meeting regarding obtaining legal advice. Respondent conceded the meeting was unnoticed. The ALJ concluded Respondent was required to provide notice to members that it would be conducting a board meeting to consider legal advice from an attorney that would be closed to members, and failed to do so.

Orders: Respondent must pay Petitioner the filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days. Respondent is directed to comply with the notice requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(D)

Board meeting was not open to all members of the association.

Petitioner alleged the meeting, attended by two board members and an attorney, should have been open. Respondent contended the meeting was a permitted closed session to consider legal advice from an attorney regarding reorganization/disbanding, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1). The ALJ concluded the meeting was not required to be open because the board members were solely receiving legal advice from an attorney.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Open Meetings, Notice Requirement, Legal Advice Exception, Planned Communities Act
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(C)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(D)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

23F-H038-REL Decision – 1036995.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:41:10 (52.7 KB)

23F-H038-REL Decision – 1050950.pdf

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Deborah Masear v. Paradise Park Condominiums Phase II Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2222057-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-10-05
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Deborah Mesear Counsel
Respondent Paradise Park Condominiums Phase II Homeowners Association Counsel Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1243(J)

Outcome Summary

The petition filed by the homeowner against the HOA was dismissed because the homeowner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1243(J) regarding financial reporting.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to establish that the Association violated the applicable statute by a preponderance of the evidence, resulting in the dismissal of the petition.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of HOA statutory duty to provide annual financial reports (audit, review, or compilation)

Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to share an annual audit/compilation for 2017-2021. The ALJ found the HOA provided financial compilations for 2017-2020 after the petition was filed. The claim regarding 2021 was found to be premature because the financial compilation was not yet due when the petition was filed on May 29, 2022.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1243(J)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1810

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominium Act, Financial Records, Compilation, Statutory Compliance, HOA Management
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1243(J)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1810
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2222057-REL Decision – 1003891.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:39:30 (95.1 KB)

22F-H2222057-REL Decision – 988206.pdf

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22F-H2222057-REL Decision – 989133.pdf

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22F-H2222057-REL Decision – 994978.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:39:30 (50.8 KB)

Brian D Sopatyk v. Xanadu Lake Resort Condominium, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121065-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-11-01
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $1,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk Counsel Jacob A. Kubert, Esq.
Respondent Xanadu Lake Resort Condominium, Inc. Counsel Penny L. Koepke, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 2 § 3(a)(2)
CC&R Article 3 § 3(d)(1)
CC&R Article 6 § 2(a)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding Issues 1 and 3, while Respondent was deemed the prevailing party regarding Issue 2. Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00. No civil penalty was found appropriate.

Why this result: Petitioner lost Issue 2 because he failed to prove the Respondent's no-pet policy was arbitrarily or unreasonably applied.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&R Article 2 § 3(a)(2)

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that screen doors are not permitted in Xanadu under CC&R Article 2 § 3(a)(2), and CC&R Article 7 (Architectural Committee authority) does not override this explicit prohibition.

Orders: Respondent is directed to comply with the requirements of CC&R Article 2 § 3(a)(2) going forward.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • CC&R Article 2 § 3(a)(2)
  • CC&R Article 7

Alleged violation of CC&R Article 3 § 3(d)(1)

Petitioner alleged violation concerning the 'no-pet' policy. The ALJ concluded that Respondent is not required to allow pets, but may allow them with Board approval, and the Petitioner did not establish that the policy was arbitrarily or unreasonably applied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&R Article 3 § 3(d)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 12-548

Alleged violation of CC&R Article 6 § 2(a)

The ALJ concluded that the marquee is common area, and the Association was not authorized under CC&R Article 6 § 2(a) to charge a separate assessment or rental fee for its use. Furthermore, there was no evidence the $50 assessment complied with CC&R Article 6 § 5 (special assessment requirements).

Orders: Respondent is directed to comply with the requirements of CC&R Article 6 § 2(a) going forward.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • CC&R Article 6 § 2(a)
  • CC&R Article 6 § 5
  • A.R.S. § 12-548

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Governance, Condominium, CC&R Violation, Assessment Dispute, Architectural Control, Pet Policy, Statute of Limitations Defense
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.R.S. § 12-548
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • CC&R Article 2 § 3(a)(2)
  • CC&R Article 3 § 3(d)(1)
  • CC&R Article 6 § 2(a)
  • CC&R Article 6 § 5
  • CC&R Article 7

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121065-REL Decision – 913797.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:37:45 (41.8 KB)

21F-H2121065-REL Decision – 913859.pdf

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21F-H2121065-REL Decision – 921820.pdf

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21F-H2121065-REL Decision – 921823.pdf

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Lee & Kim Edwards v. Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120028-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-07-28
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lee & Kim Edwards Counsel Terry Foster, Esq.
Respondent Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association Counsel

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1255

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or A.R.S. § 33-1255, ruling that the statute was inapplicable due to the specific provisions in the Declaration regarding the 1/26 assessment calculation.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the ALJ determined A.R.S. § 33-1255 was superseded by the Declaration, which mandated assessments based on the undivided 1/26 interest in the common elements.

Key Issues & Findings

Assessment calculation based on undivided interest in common areas

Petitioner challenged the Association's decision to change assessments from a historical square footage basis to a 1/26 interest calculation, arguing that this method violates A.R.S. § 33-1255 by charging for limited common elements (patios/parking).

Orders: The petition of Lee & Kim Edwards is dismissed; Respondent is deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1255
  • Declaration Article I, Section 5
  • Declaration Article II, Section 5
  • Declaration Article II, Section 7
  • Declaration Article IV, Section 4
  • Declaration Article VI, Section 9

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, assessment, cc&r, statutory interpretation, common elements, limited common elements
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1255
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120028-REL-RHG Decision – 899379.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:36:39 (123.6 KB)

Lee & Kim Edwards v. Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120028-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-07-28
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lee & Kim Edwards Counsel Terry Foster, Esq.
Respondent Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association Counsel

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1255

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or A.R.S. § 33-1255, ruling that the statute was inapplicable due to the specific provisions in the Declaration regarding the 1/26 assessment calculation.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the ALJ determined A.R.S. § 33-1255 was superseded by the Declaration, which mandated assessments based on the undivided 1/26 interest in the common elements.

Key Issues & Findings

Assessment calculation based on undivided interest in common areas

Petitioner challenged the Association's decision to change assessments from a historical square footage basis to a 1/26 interest calculation, arguing that this method violates A.R.S. § 33-1255 by charging for limited common elements (patios/parking).

Orders: The petition of Lee & Kim Edwards is dismissed; Respondent is deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1255
  • Declaration Article I, Section 5
  • Declaration Article II, Section 5
  • Declaration Article II, Section 7
  • Declaration Article IV, Section 4
  • Declaration Article VI, Section 9

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, assessment, cc&r, statutory interpretation, common elements, limited common elements
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1255
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120028-REL Decision – 899379.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:36:38 (123.6 KB)

John W. Gray vs. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918004-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-11-30
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome win
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John W. Gray Counsel
Respondent Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association Counsel Austin Baillio, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to enforce parking rules (vehicle limits, garage use, inoperable vehicles)

Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.

Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • MCIII Rules and Regulations #2 and #3
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.12
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.13
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.14

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, Parking Rules, Filing Fee Refund, Inoperable Vehicle, CC&R Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918004-REL Decision – 674057.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:41 (139.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918004-REL


Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.

The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.

Case Overview

Parties Involved:

Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.

Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.

Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.

Decision Date: November 30, 2018.

Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.

Background and Timeline of the Dispute

The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).

Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):

◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.

◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.

◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.

◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.

May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:

◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.

◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.

◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.

MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.

July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.

MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.

July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.

July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.

Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)

The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”

Specific Violations Alleged:

Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.

Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.

Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.

Evidence Presented at Hearing:

Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.

Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).

Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.

Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.

Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)

The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.

Core Arguments:

Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.

Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.

Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.

Actions Taken by MCIII:

Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.

Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.

Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.

Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.

Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.

Governing Rules and CC&Rs

The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.

Document

Article/Rule

Provision

Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)

Rule 3

Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.12

Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.13

States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.14

Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.

Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.

Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.

◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.

◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”

◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.

◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.

Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.

Final Order

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:

1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.


John W. Gray vs. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918004-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-11-30
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome win
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John W. Gray Counsel
Respondent Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association Counsel Austin Baillio, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to enforce parking rules (vehicle limits, garage use, inoperable vehicles)

Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.

Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • MCIII Rules and Regulations #2 and #3
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.12
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.13
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.14

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, Parking Rules, Filing Fee Refund, Inoperable Vehicle, CC&R Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918004-REL Decision – 674057.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:18 (139.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918004-REL


Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.

The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.

Case Overview

Parties Involved:

Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.

Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.

Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.

Decision Date: November 30, 2018.

Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.

Background and Timeline of the Dispute

The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).

Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):

◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.

◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.

◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.

◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.

May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:

◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.

◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.

◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.

MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.

July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.

MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.

July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.

July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.

Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)

The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”

Specific Violations Alleged:

Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.

Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.

Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.

Evidence Presented at Hearing:

Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.

Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).

Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.

Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.

Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)

The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.

Core Arguments:

Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.

Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.

Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.

Actions Taken by MCIII:

Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.

Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.

Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.

Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.

Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.

Governing Rules and CC&Rs

The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.

Document

Article/Rule

Provision

Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)

Rule 3

Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.12

Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.13

States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.14

Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.

Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.

Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.

◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.

◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”

◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.

◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.

Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.

Final Order

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:

1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.


Peter Biondi, Jr. vs. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818048-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-08-21
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Peter Biondi, Jr. Counsel
Respondent Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association Counsel Maria R. Kupillas

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1242, 33-1243, Respondent’s Bylaw Article II, Section 3 and Article III, Sections 2 and 3, and Respondent’s CC&Rs Section 8.13

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition, finding that the HOA's remaining Director acted permissibly and reasonably upon legal advice in refusing to defend a previous legal action, as the initial Board decision to remove fellow directors was contrary to mandatory statutory procedures outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1243, which requires removal by unit owners, not by the board.

Why this result: The Board's previous action of removing directors was illegal under A.R.S. § 33-1243 because director removal must be performed by a member vote. Because the HOA lacked a legal defense to the directors' challenge, the current petition failed to prove a violation when the sole remaining Director chose not to incur unnecessary fees contesting an unwinnable case, which was permissive under A.R.S. § 33-1242.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged failure of the sole remaining Director to defend a prior petition challenging the board's removal of two directors.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated governing documents and statutes when the remaining Director chose not to contest a prior Department petition filed by two removed Directors, resulting in their reinstatement. The ALJ found that the initial removal of the Directors by fellow Directors was illegal under A.R.S. § 33-1243(B) and (H), which reserves removal power to members. Because the HOA lacked a good legal defense, the remaining Director's decision not to defend the prior petition, based on legal advice, was permissive under A.R.S. § 33-1242 and not a violation.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1243
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominium, HOA Director Removal, Board Authority, Condo Bylaws
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1243
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818048-REL Decision – 654904.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:05:54 (155.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818048-REL


Briefing Document: Analysis of Administrative Law Judge Decision in Biondi v. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the key findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in Case No. 18F-H1818048-REL, involving Petitioner Peter Biondi, Jr., and Respondent Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association (HOA). The ALJ ultimately denied the petition, concluding that the HOA’s actions were legally sound.

The core of the dispute centered on the decision by the HOA’s sole remaining director, Bonnie Henden, to reinstate two board members, Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier, who had been removed by their fellow directors for alleged violations of the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The petitioner argued that Ms. Henden’s refusal to defend the Board’s removal action in a subsequent legal challenge constituted a violation of the HOA’s governing documents and state law.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a critical legal principle: the supremacy of Arizona state law over an association’s internal bylaws. The dispositive finding was that the initial removal of Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier by their fellow board members was legally improper. Under Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1243, the power to remove a director is reserved exclusively for the association’s unit owners through a formal petition and voting process; a board of directors cannot remove its own members.

Consequently, Ms. Henden’s decision not to defend an indefensible action was deemed a prudent and permissible business judgment. Relying on legal advice from three separate attorneys and the permissive language of A.R.S. § 33-1242, which does not mandate a defense in litigation, her actions were found to have correctly avoided wasting the association’s funds on a legal case it was certain to lose.

Case Overview

Case Name: Peter Biondi, Jr., vs. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association

Case Number: 18F-H1818048-REL

Adjudicating Body: Office of Administrative Hearings, State of Arizona

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky

Date of Decision: August 21, 2018

Summary of Petition

On May 9, 2018, Petitioner Peter Biondi, Jr., a member of the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs HOA, filed a petition alleging that the HOA violated state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1242 and 33-1243) and its own Bylaws and CC&Rs. The alleged violation occurred when the Board’s sole remaining member, Bonnie Henden, refused to defend the HOA against a petition filed by two former directors, Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier, who were contesting their removal from the Board. Instead of defending the removal, Ms. Henden reinstated them.

Background and Sequence of Events

1. Initial Complaint: Prior to January 2018, complaints were made that two serving directors, Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier, were violating Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs by renting their units as short-term Vacation Rental By Owner (“VRBOs”). This section mandates a minimum lease period of six months.

2. Board Action and Removal: The Board concluded that the two directors had violated the CC&Rs. At a contentious executive session on January 4, 2018, a majority of the five other directors voted to remove or disqualify Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier from their positions on the Board.

3. Legal Challenge: Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier filed a complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to protest their removal.

4. Board Collapse: Following the removal, the Board’s composition changed dramatically. The petitioner and another director, Jeffrey Washburn, resigned “to restore calm in the community.” A third director was removed or resigned for non-payment of assessments. By March or April 2018, this series of departures left Bonnie Henden as the sole remaining director.

5. Henden’s Legal Consultation: As the sole director, Ms. Henden consulted the HOA’s attorney regarding the petition filed by Luzzis and Dubasquier. After this attorney learned that other board members had also potentially used their units as short-term rentals, he withdrew from representing the HOA. Ms. Henden subsequently retained new counsel and consulted a total of three different attorneys.

6. Decision Not to Defend: Based on the legal advice she received, Ms. Henden chose not to file an answer on behalf of the HOA to the petition filed by Luzzis and Dubasquier.

7. Reinstatement of Directors: The Department of Real Estate issued a decision in favor of Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier, ordering the HOA to pay their filing fee. Ms. Henden then officially reinstated them to the Board to complete their elected terms and cancelled the election that had been scheduled to choose their successors.

Dispositive Legal Analysis and Key Findings

The ALJ determined that the central issue was not the factual question of whether the directors had violated the CC&Rs, but the overriding legal question of whether the Board had the authority to remove them.

“The dispositive issue is not the factual issue of whether Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier violated CC&R Section 8.13 by using their units as short-term VRBOs, but the legal issue of whether the other directors on Respondent’s Board properly removed them from the Board…”

Supremacy of State Statute over Association Bylaws

The case highlighted a direct conflict between the HOA’s governing documents and Arizona state law. While the HOA’s bylaws suggested the Board could deem a director ineligible for violating governing documents, this provision was rendered void by state statute.

A.R.S. § 33-1243 (Director Removal): This statute was the cornerstone of the ALJ’s decision. Its provisions unequivocally establish the process for director removal:

Subsection (B): Explicitly prohibits a board of directors from acting on behalf of the association to “determine the qualifications, powers and duties or terms of office of board of directors members.”

Subsection (H): States that its provisions apply “notwithstanding any provision of the declaration or bylaws to the contrary.” It specifies that only “unit owners who are eligible to vote” may remove a board member, and only by a “majority vote of those voting on the matter at a meeting of the unit owners.” It further details a petition process required to call such a special meeting.

ALJ Conclusion on Removal: The Board’s action to remove Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier was a direct violation of A.R.S. § 33-1243. The Board did not follow the specific and unequivocal statutory requirements, which mandate that only the members who elected a director can remove that director. As such, the HOA “lacked any good legal defense to Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier’s challenge to their removal.”

Validation of Henden’s Actions

The ALJ found Ms. Henden’s decision not to defend the HOA was legally justified and prudent.

A.R.S. § 33-1242 (Duty to Defend): This statute governs the powers of an association. It states that an association “may… defend or intervene in litigation or administrative proceedings.” The ALJ focused on the word “may,” interpreting it according to established legal precedent.

Permissive, Not Mandatory: The use of “may” indicates permissive intent. Therefore, Ms. Henden was not statutorily required to contest the petition filed by Luzzis and Dubasquier.

Prudent Business Judgment: Having consulted three attorneys who advised her that the HOA would likely not prevail due to the clear language of A.R.S. § 33-1243, her decision was deemed a reasonable measure to protect the association from incurring unnecessary legal fees for a losing cause. The judge noted:

“No statute requires a condominium association or a director to take an ill-advised act or to mount a defense of a previously taken ill-advised act that likely will fail on its merits.”

Final Order and Conclusion

Based on the finding that the original removal of the directors was illegal and that the subsequent decision not to defend the action was permissible, the judge issued a final, binding order.

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.

The ultimate conclusion of this case establishes a critical precedent for HOA governance in Arizona: a condominium association’s Board of Directors has no authority to remove its own members. That power is reserved exclusively for the unit owners through a specific, statutorily defined process. Any attempt by a board to circumvent this process is legally invalid, and an officer’s decision to avoid defending such an improper action in court is a justifiable exercise of their duties.


Peter Biondi, Jr. vs. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818048-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-08-21
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Peter Biondi, Jr. Counsel
Respondent Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association Counsel Maria R. Kupillas

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1242, 33-1243, Respondent’s Bylaw Article II, Section 3 and Article III, Sections 2 and 3, and Respondent’s CC&Rs Section 8.13

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition, finding that the HOA's remaining Director acted permissibly and reasonably upon legal advice in refusing to defend a previous legal action, as the initial Board decision to remove fellow directors was contrary to mandatory statutory procedures outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1243, which requires removal by unit owners, not by the board.

Why this result: The Board's previous action of removing directors was illegal under A.R.S. § 33-1243 because director removal must be performed by a member vote. Because the HOA lacked a legal defense to the directors' challenge, the current petition failed to prove a violation when the sole remaining Director chose not to incur unnecessary fees contesting an unwinnable case, which was permissive under A.R.S. § 33-1242.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged failure of the sole remaining Director to defend a prior petition challenging the board's removal of two directors.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated governing documents and statutes when the remaining Director chose not to contest a prior Department petition filed by two removed Directors, resulting in their reinstatement. The ALJ found that the initial removal of the Directors by fellow Directors was illegal under A.R.S. § 33-1243(B) and (H), which reserves removal power to members. Because the HOA lacked a good legal defense, the remaining Director's decision not to defend the prior petition, based on legal advice, was permissive under A.R.S. § 33-1242 and not a violation.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1243
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominium, HOA Director Removal, Board Authority, Condo Bylaws
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1243
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818048-REL Decision – 654904.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:58 (155.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818048-REL


Briefing Document: Analysis of Administrative Law Judge Decision in Biondi v. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the key findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in Case No. 18F-H1818048-REL, involving Petitioner Peter Biondi, Jr., and Respondent Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association (HOA). The ALJ ultimately denied the petition, concluding that the HOA’s actions were legally sound.

The core of the dispute centered on the decision by the HOA’s sole remaining director, Bonnie Henden, to reinstate two board members, Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier, who had been removed by their fellow directors for alleged violations of the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The petitioner argued that Ms. Henden’s refusal to defend the Board’s removal action in a subsequent legal challenge constituted a violation of the HOA’s governing documents and state law.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a critical legal principle: the supremacy of Arizona state law over an association’s internal bylaws. The dispositive finding was that the initial removal of Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier by their fellow board members was legally improper. Under Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1243, the power to remove a director is reserved exclusively for the association’s unit owners through a formal petition and voting process; a board of directors cannot remove its own members.

Consequently, Ms. Henden’s decision not to defend an indefensible action was deemed a prudent and permissible business judgment. Relying on legal advice from three separate attorneys and the permissive language of A.R.S. § 33-1242, which does not mandate a defense in litigation, her actions were found to have correctly avoided wasting the association’s funds on a legal case it was certain to lose.

Case Overview

Case Name: Peter Biondi, Jr., vs. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association

Case Number: 18F-H1818048-REL

Adjudicating Body: Office of Administrative Hearings, State of Arizona

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky

Date of Decision: August 21, 2018

Summary of Petition

On May 9, 2018, Petitioner Peter Biondi, Jr., a member of the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs HOA, filed a petition alleging that the HOA violated state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1242 and 33-1243) and its own Bylaws and CC&Rs. The alleged violation occurred when the Board’s sole remaining member, Bonnie Henden, refused to defend the HOA against a petition filed by two former directors, Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier, who were contesting their removal from the Board. Instead of defending the removal, Ms. Henden reinstated them.

Background and Sequence of Events

1. Initial Complaint: Prior to January 2018, complaints were made that two serving directors, Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier, were violating Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs by renting their units as short-term Vacation Rental By Owner (“VRBOs”). This section mandates a minimum lease period of six months.

2. Board Action and Removal: The Board concluded that the two directors had violated the CC&Rs. At a contentious executive session on January 4, 2018, a majority of the five other directors voted to remove or disqualify Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier from their positions on the Board.

3. Legal Challenge: Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier filed a complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to protest their removal.

4. Board Collapse: Following the removal, the Board’s composition changed dramatically. The petitioner and another director, Jeffrey Washburn, resigned “to restore calm in the community.” A third director was removed or resigned for non-payment of assessments. By March or April 2018, this series of departures left Bonnie Henden as the sole remaining director.

5. Henden’s Legal Consultation: As the sole director, Ms. Henden consulted the HOA’s attorney regarding the petition filed by Luzzis and Dubasquier. After this attorney learned that other board members had also potentially used their units as short-term rentals, he withdrew from representing the HOA. Ms. Henden subsequently retained new counsel and consulted a total of three different attorneys.

6. Decision Not to Defend: Based on the legal advice she received, Ms. Henden chose not to file an answer on behalf of the HOA to the petition filed by Luzzis and Dubasquier.

7. Reinstatement of Directors: The Department of Real Estate issued a decision in favor of Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier, ordering the HOA to pay their filing fee. Ms. Henden then officially reinstated them to the Board to complete their elected terms and cancelled the election that had been scheduled to choose their successors.

Dispositive Legal Analysis and Key Findings

The ALJ determined that the central issue was not the factual question of whether the directors had violated the CC&Rs, but the overriding legal question of whether the Board had the authority to remove them.

“The dispositive issue is not the factual issue of whether Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier violated CC&R Section 8.13 by using their units as short-term VRBOs, but the legal issue of whether the other directors on Respondent’s Board properly removed them from the Board…”

Supremacy of State Statute over Association Bylaws

The case highlighted a direct conflict between the HOA’s governing documents and Arizona state law. While the HOA’s bylaws suggested the Board could deem a director ineligible for violating governing documents, this provision was rendered void by state statute.

A.R.S. § 33-1243 (Director Removal): This statute was the cornerstone of the ALJ’s decision. Its provisions unequivocally establish the process for director removal:

Subsection (B): Explicitly prohibits a board of directors from acting on behalf of the association to “determine the qualifications, powers and duties or terms of office of board of directors members.”

Subsection (H): States that its provisions apply “notwithstanding any provision of the declaration or bylaws to the contrary.” It specifies that only “unit owners who are eligible to vote” may remove a board member, and only by a “majority vote of those voting on the matter at a meeting of the unit owners.” It further details a petition process required to call such a special meeting.

ALJ Conclusion on Removal: The Board’s action to remove Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier was a direct violation of A.R.S. § 33-1243. The Board did not follow the specific and unequivocal statutory requirements, which mandate that only the members who elected a director can remove that director. As such, the HOA “lacked any good legal defense to Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier’s challenge to their removal.”

Validation of Henden’s Actions

The ALJ found Ms. Henden’s decision not to defend the HOA was legally justified and prudent.

A.R.S. § 33-1242 (Duty to Defend): This statute governs the powers of an association. It states that an association “may… defend or intervene in litigation or administrative proceedings.” The ALJ focused on the word “may,” interpreting it according to established legal precedent.

Permissive, Not Mandatory: The use of “may” indicates permissive intent. Therefore, Ms. Henden was not statutorily required to contest the petition filed by Luzzis and Dubasquier.

Prudent Business Judgment: Having consulted three attorneys who advised her that the HOA would likely not prevail due to the clear language of A.R.S. § 33-1243, her decision was deemed a reasonable measure to protect the association from incurring unnecessary legal fees for a losing cause. The judge noted:

“No statute requires a condominium association or a director to take an ill-advised act or to mount a defense of a previously taken ill-advised act that likely will fail on its merits.”

Final Order and Conclusion

Based on the finding that the original removal of the directors was illegal and that the subsequent decision not to defend the action was permissible, the judge issued a final, binding order.

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.

The ultimate conclusion of this case establishes a critical precedent for HOA governance in Arizona: a condominium association’s Board of Directors has no authority to remove its own members. That power is reserved exclusively for the unit owners through a specific, statutorily defined process. Any attempt by a board to circumvent this process is legally invalid, and an officer’s decision to avoid defending such an improper action in court is a justifiable exercise of their duties.