Tag Archives: A.R.S. § 33-1805

Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-09-12
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Barrs Counsel Jonathan A. Dessaules
Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to provide the full requested documentation relating to EDC actions and communications. The Petitioner's request for relief was granted, resulting in the reimbursement of the $500 filing fee and the imposition of a $500 civil penalty against the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request.

The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fully comply with Petitioner's specific request for EDC records (submissions, requests, and approvals) by providing only a summary table instead of the totality of requested communications within the statutory deadline.

Orders: Petitioner's petition granted. Respondent ordered to reimburse Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) and tender a $500.00 civil penalty to the Department (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)).

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, HOA Violation, Civil Penalty, Filing Fee Reimbursement
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-243
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-107
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918037-REL-RHG Decision – 737525.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:57 (176.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decisions concerning a records request dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent). The central issue was whether the Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1805 by failing to adequately fulfill a records request submitted by the Petitioner on November 1, 2018.

The initial hearing on March 21, 2019, resulted in an April 10, 2019, decision in favor of the Association. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request to all members of the Association’s Board, and thus the Association’s partial response (a summary table) did not constitute a statutory violation.

Following a successful appeal by the Petitioner, a rehearing was held on August 27, 2019. New evidence demonstrated that the Petitioner had followed prior express instructions from the Association regarding who to contact for records requests. Consequently, the ALJ issued a new decision on September 12, 2019, reversing the original order. The final ruling found the Association in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee and was assessed a civil penalty of $500.

Case Overview

Case Numbers

No. 19F-H1918037-REL (Initial Decision)
No. 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG (Rehearing Decision)

Petitioner

Tom Barrs, a property owner and member of the Association.

Respondent

Desert Ranch Homeowners Association, Scottsdale, Arizona.

Central Issue

Whether the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request for Environmental Design Committee (EDC) actions, requests, and approvals.

Initial Petition

Filed by Tom Barrs on December 17, 2018.

Initial Hearing

March 21, 2019, before ALJ Jenna Clark.

Rehearing

August 27, 2019, before ALJ Jenna Clark.

Final Outcome

Petition granted in favor of Tom Barrs. The Association was found in violation of state law, ordered to reimburse the filing fee, and fined.

Key Individuals and Entities

Role / Affiliation

Tom Barrs

Petitioner; homeowner in the Desert Ranch subdivision.

Desert Ranch HOA

Respondent; homeowners’ association.

Jenna Clark

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Brian Schoeffler

Chairman of the Association’s Environmental Design Committee (EDC); appeared on behalf of the Association.

Catherine Overby

President of the Association’s Board of Directors.

Lori Loch-Lee

Vice President of Client Services at Associated Asset Management (AAM), the Association’s accounting/management company.

Jonathan Dessaules, Esq.

Attorney who appeared on behalf of the Petitioner at the rehearing.

The Records Request and Subsequent Dispute

The Initial Request

On November 1, 2018, at 9:40 p.m., Petitioner submitted an electronic records request to Catherine Overby, Brian Schoeffler, and Lori Loch-Lee. The text of the request was as follows:

“Pursuant to ARS 33-1805, I am requesting a copy of all EDC actions, written requests, and written approvals from October 2017 through October 2018. Soft copies via return email are preferable; otherwise, please let me know when hard copies are available for pickup.”

The Association’s Response and Petitioner’s Follow-Up

• November 2, 2018: Lori Loch-Lee from AAM notified the Petitioner she would forward his request to all Board members, noting that AAM was only the Association’s accounting firm.

• November 18, 2018: The Petitioner received a summary table listing some EDC actions, not the complete set of communications and documents requested. At this time, he was advised by Brian Schoeffler that he “needed to copy all Board members on records requests.”

• March 6, 2019: The Petitioner sent a follow-up email, accusing the Association of willful failure and clarifying the specific records he sought beyond the summary table, including “copies of the communications (letters, emails, and application forms) relating to Environmental Design Review (EDC) submissions, requests, complaints and approvals (or denials).”

• March 11, 2019: Mr. Schoeffler replied, arguing that the request had been complied with on November 18, 2018, and directed the Petitioner to “submit a new request” for the additional information.

• March 17, 2019: Mr. Schoeffler reiterated that the original request was only sent to two of four Board members and stated that providing additional documents could be “interpreted as an admission of guilt.”

As of the rehearing date (August 27, 2019), the Petitioner had still not received all the documentation requested on November 1, 2018.

Legal Proceedings and Rulings

Initial Hearing and Decision (April 10, 2019)

In the first hearing, the dispute centered on the validity of the request submission and the adequacy of the Association’s response.

Arguments:

• Petitioner (Barrs): Argued the Association acted in bad faith and willfully failed to fulfill the request, noting a similar dispute had been previously adjudicated. He was concerned with the completeness of the response, not its timeliness.

• Respondent (HOA): Argued it had complied with the request by providing a summary table, consistent with its handling of a previous dispute with the Petitioner. Mr. Schoeffler testified that the response was untimely (provided on the 11th business day) but asserted it was otherwise sufficient.

ALJ Conclusion: The Judge ruled in favor of the Association, denying the Petitioner’s petition. The key finding was that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request.

“Because the credible evidence of record reflects that Petitioner failed to properly submit his records request to the Board, Petitioner has failed established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 for providing him with a summary table on November 18, 2018.”

The decision also noted that the statute does not legally obligate an HOA to email copies of records.

Rehearing and Final Decision (September 12, 2019)

After the Petitioner’s appeal was granted, a rehearing introduced new evidence that fundamentally changed the outcome.

New Evidence and Concessions:

• July 19, 2017 Instruction: Evidence showed Association President Catherine Overby had previously appointed Brian Schoeffler as the Petitioner’s “primary records request contact.”

• July 18, 2018 Instruction: Evidence showed Ms. Overby had also instructed the Petitioner to direct requests to the management company, AAM.

• Association Concessions: The Respondent conceded that its governing documents do not require all Board members to be copied on records requests and that its own bylaws regarding submission forms are not adhered to or enforced.

ALJ’s Reversed Conclusion: The Judge reversed the prior decision and granted the Petitioner’s petition. The new evidence proved the Petitioner had followed express instructions from the Association.

“Petitioner’s November 01, 2018, records request was not required to be sent to all members of the Association’s Board, as Petitioner had expressly been instructed to only send his records requests to the Association’s EDC Chairman, Mr. Schoeffler, which he did.”

The Judge concluded that the partial response was a clear violation of the law.

“Petitioner is correct that the Association did not fully comply with his specific request, and has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the summary table provided by the Association was a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.”

Final Order and Penalties

The Administrative Law Judge’s Final Order on September 12, 2019, which is binding on the parties, mandated the following:

1. Petition Granted: The Petitioner’s petition was granted.

2. Filing Fee Reimbursement: The Respondent (Desert Ranch HOA) was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

3. Civil Penalty: The Respondent was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.


Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-09-12
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Barrs Counsel Jonathan A. Dessaules
Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to provide the full requested documentation relating to EDC actions and communications. The Petitioner's request for relief was granted, resulting in the reimbursement of the $500 filing fee and the imposition of a $500 civil penalty against the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request.

The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fully comply with Petitioner's specific request for EDC records (submissions, requests, and approvals) by providing only a summary table instead of the totality of requested communications within the statutory deadline.

Orders: Petitioner's petition granted. Respondent ordered to reimburse Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) and tender a $500.00 civil penalty to the Department (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)).

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, HOA Violation, Civil Penalty, Filing Fee Reimbursement
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-243
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-107
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918037-REL Decision – 700566.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:08:27 (149.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918037-REL


Briefing Document: Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decisions concerning a records request dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent). The central issue was whether the Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1805 by failing to adequately fulfill a records request submitted by the Petitioner on November 1, 2018.

The initial hearing on March 21, 2019, resulted in an April 10, 2019, decision in favor of the Association. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request to all members of the Association’s Board, and thus the Association’s partial response (a summary table) did not constitute a statutory violation.

Following a successful appeal by the Petitioner, a rehearing was held on August 27, 2019. New evidence demonstrated that the Petitioner had followed prior express instructions from the Association regarding who to contact for records requests. Consequently, the ALJ issued a new decision on September 12, 2019, reversing the original order. The final ruling found the Association in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee and was assessed a civil penalty of $500.

Case Overview

Case Numbers

No. 19F-H1918037-REL (Initial Decision)
No. 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG (Rehearing Decision)

Petitioner

Tom Barrs, a property owner and member of the Association.

Respondent

Desert Ranch Homeowners Association, Scottsdale, Arizona.

Central Issue

Whether the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request for Environmental Design Committee (EDC) actions, requests, and approvals.

Initial Petition

Filed by Tom Barrs on December 17, 2018.

Initial Hearing

March 21, 2019, before ALJ Jenna Clark.

Rehearing

August 27, 2019, before ALJ Jenna Clark.

Final Outcome

Petition granted in favor of Tom Barrs. The Association was found in violation of state law, ordered to reimburse the filing fee, and fined.

Key Individuals and Entities

Role / Affiliation

Tom Barrs

Petitioner; homeowner in the Desert Ranch subdivision.

Desert Ranch HOA

Respondent; homeowners’ association.

Jenna Clark

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Brian Schoeffler

Chairman of the Association’s Environmental Design Committee (EDC); appeared on behalf of the Association.

Catherine Overby

President of the Association’s Board of Directors.

Lori Loch-Lee

Vice President of Client Services at Associated Asset Management (AAM), the Association’s accounting/management company.

Jonathan Dessaules, Esq.

Attorney who appeared on behalf of the Petitioner at the rehearing.

The Records Request and Subsequent Dispute

The Initial Request

On November 1, 2018, at 9:40 p.m., Petitioner submitted an electronic records request to Catherine Overby, Brian Schoeffler, and Lori Loch-Lee. The text of the request was as follows:

“Pursuant to ARS 33-1805, I am requesting a copy of all EDC actions, written requests, and written approvals from October 2017 through October 2018. Soft copies via return email are preferable; otherwise, please let me know when hard copies are available for pickup.”

The Association’s Response and Petitioner’s Follow-Up

• November 2, 2018: Lori Loch-Lee from AAM notified the Petitioner she would forward his request to all Board members, noting that AAM was only the Association’s accounting firm.

• November 18, 2018: The Petitioner received a summary table listing some EDC actions, not the complete set of communications and documents requested. At this time, he was advised by Brian Schoeffler that he “needed to copy all Board members on records requests.”

• March 6, 2019: The Petitioner sent a follow-up email, accusing the Association of willful failure and clarifying the specific records he sought beyond the summary table, including “copies of the communications (letters, emails, and application forms) relating to Environmental Design Review (EDC) submissions, requests, complaints and approvals (or denials).”

• March 11, 2019: Mr. Schoeffler replied, arguing that the request had been complied with on November 18, 2018, and directed the Petitioner to “submit a new request” for the additional information.

• March 17, 2019: Mr. Schoeffler reiterated that the original request was only sent to two of four Board members and stated that providing additional documents could be “interpreted as an admission of guilt.”

As of the rehearing date (August 27, 2019), the Petitioner had still not received all the documentation requested on November 1, 2018.

Legal Proceedings and Rulings

Initial Hearing and Decision (April 10, 2019)

In the first hearing, the dispute centered on the validity of the request submission and the adequacy of the Association’s response.

Arguments:

• Petitioner (Barrs): Argued the Association acted in bad faith and willfully failed to fulfill the request, noting a similar dispute had been previously adjudicated. He was concerned with the completeness of the response, not its timeliness.

• Respondent (HOA): Argued it had complied with the request by providing a summary table, consistent with its handling of a previous dispute with the Petitioner. Mr. Schoeffler testified that the response was untimely (provided on the 11th business day) but asserted it was otherwise sufficient.

ALJ Conclusion: The Judge ruled in favor of the Association, denying the Petitioner’s petition. The key finding was that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request.

“Because the credible evidence of record reflects that Petitioner failed to properly submit his records request to the Board, Petitioner has failed established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 for providing him with a summary table on November 18, 2018.”

The decision also noted that the statute does not legally obligate an HOA to email copies of records.

Rehearing and Final Decision (September 12, 2019)

After the Petitioner’s appeal was granted, a rehearing introduced new evidence that fundamentally changed the outcome.

New Evidence and Concessions:

• July 19, 2017 Instruction: Evidence showed Association President Catherine Overby had previously appointed Brian Schoeffler as the Petitioner’s “primary records request contact.”

• July 18, 2018 Instruction: Evidence showed Ms. Overby had also instructed the Petitioner to direct requests to the management company, AAM.

• Association Concessions: The Respondent conceded that its governing documents do not require all Board members to be copied on records requests and that its own bylaws regarding submission forms are not adhered to or enforced.

ALJ’s Reversed Conclusion: The Judge reversed the prior decision and granted the Petitioner’s petition. The new evidence proved the Petitioner had followed express instructions from the Association.

“Petitioner’s November 01, 2018, records request was not required to be sent to all members of the Association’s Board, as Petitioner had expressly been instructed to only send his records requests to the Association’s EDC Chairman, Mr. Schoeffler, which he did.”

The Judge concluded that the partial response was a clear violation of the law.

“Petitioner is correct that the Association did not fully comply with his specific request, and has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the summary table provided by the Association was a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.”

Final Order and Penalties

The Administrative Law Judge’s Final Order on September 12, 2019, which is binding on the parties, mandated the following:

1. Petition Granted: The Petitioner’s petition was granted.

2. Filing Fee Reimbursement: The Respondent (Desert Ranch HOA) was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

3. Civil Penalty: The Respondent was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.


Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-09-12
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Barrs Counsel Jonathan A. Dessaules
Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to provide the full requested documentation relating to EDC actions and communications. The Petitioner's request for relief was granted, resulting in the reimbursement of the $500 filing fee and the imposition of a $500 civil penalty against the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request.

The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fully comply with Petitioner's specific request for EDC records (submissions, requests, and approvals) by providing only a summary table instead of the totality of requested communications within the statutory deadline.

Orders: Petitioner's petition granted. Respondent ordered to reimburse Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) and tender a $500.00 civil penalty to the Department (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)).

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, HOA Violation, Civil Penalty, Filing Fee Reimbursement
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-243
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-107
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918037-REL Decision – 700566.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:55 (149.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918037-REL


Briefing Document: Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decisions concerning a records request dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent). The central issue was whether the Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1805 by failing to adequately fulfill a records request submitted by the Petitioner on November 1, 2018.

The initial hearing on March 21, 2019, resulted in an April 10, 2019, decision in favor of the Association. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request to all members of the Association’s Board, and thus the Association’s partial response (a summary table) did not constitute a statutory violation.

Following a successful appeal by the Petitioner, a rehearing was held on August 27, 2019. New evidence demonstrated that the Petitioner had followed prior express instructions from the Association regarding who to contact for records requests. Consequently, the ALJ issued a new decision on September 12, 2019, reversing the original order. The final ruling found the Association in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee and was assessed a civil penalty of $500.

Case Overview

Case Numbers

No. 19F-H1918037-REL (Initial Decision)
No. 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG (Rehearing Decision)

Petitioner

Tom Barrs, a property owner and member of the Association.

Respondent

Desert Ranch Homeowners Association, Scottsdale, Arizona.

Central Issue

Whether the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request for Environmental Design Committee (EDC) actions, requests, and approvals.

Initial Petition

Filed by Tom Barrs on December 17, 2018.

Initial Hearing

March 21, 2019, before ALJ Jenna Clark.

Rehearing

August 27, 2019, before ALJ Jenna Clark.

Final Outcome

Petition granted in favor of Tom Barrs. The Association was found in violation of state law, ordered to reimburse the filing fee, and fined.

Key Individuals and Entities

Role / Affiliation

Tom Barrs

Petitioner; homeowner in the Desert Ranch subdivision.

Desert Ranch HOA

Respondent; homeowners’ association.

Jenna Clark

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Brian Schoeffler

Chairman of the Association’s Environmental Design Committee (EDC); appeared on behalf of the Association.

Catherine Overby

President of the Association’s Board of Directors.

Lori Loch-Lee

Vice President of Client Services at Associated Asset Management (AAM), the Association’s accounting/management company.

Jonathan Dessaules, Esq.

Attorney who appeared on behalf of the Petitioner at the rehearing.

The Records Request and Subsequent Dispute

The Initial Request

On November 1, 2018, at 9:40 p.m., Petitioner submitted an electronic records request to Catherine Overby, Brian Schoeffler, and Lori Loch-Lee. The text of the request was as follows:

“Pursuant to ARS 33-1805, I am requesting a copy of all EDC actions, written requests, and written approvals from October 2017 through October 2018. Soft copies via return email are preferable; otherwise, please let me know when hard copies are available for pickup.”

The Association’s Response and Petitioner’s Follow-Up

• November 2, 2018: Lori Loch-Lee from AAM notified the Petitioner she would forward his request to all Board members, noting that AAM was only the Association’s accounting firm.

• November 18, 2018: The Petitioner received a summary table listing some EDC actions, not the complete set of communications and documents requested. At this time, he was advised by Brian Schoeffler that he “needed to copy all Board members on records requests.”

• March 6, 2019: The Petitioner sent a follow-up email, accusing the Association of willful failure and clarifying the specific records he sought beyond the summary table, including “copies of the communications (letters, emails, and application forms) relating to Environmental Design Review (EDC) submissions, requests, complaints and approvals (or denials).”

• March 11, 2019: Mr. Schoeffler replied, arguing that the request had been complied with on November 18, 2018, and directed the Petitioner to “submit a new request” for the additional information.

• March 17, 2019: Mr. Schoeffler reiterated that the original request was only sent to two of four Board members and stated that providing additional documents could be “interpreted as an admission of guilt.”

As of the rehearing date (August 27, 2019), the Petitioner had still not received all the documentation requested on November 1, 2018.

Legal Proceedings and Rulings

Initial Hearing and Decision (April 10, 2019)

In the first hearing, the dispute centered on the validity of the request submission and the adequacy of the Association’s response.

Arguments:

• Petitioner (Barrs): Argued the Association acted in bad faith and willfully failed to fulfill the request, noting a similar dispute had been previously adjudicated. He was concerned with the completeness of the response, not its timeliness.

• Respondent (HOA): Argued it had complied with the request by providing a summary table, consistent with its handling of a previous dispute with the Petitioner. Mr. Schoeffler testified that the response was untimely (provided on the 11th business day) but asserted it was otherwise sufficient.

ALJ Conclusion: The Judge ruled in favor of the Association, denying the Petitioner’s petition. The key finding was that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request.

“Because the credible evidence of record reflects that Petitioner failed to properly submit his records request to the Board, Petitioner has failed established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 for providing him with a summary table on November 18, 2018.”

The decision also noted that the statute does not legally obligate an HOA to email copies of records.

Rehearing and Final Decision (September 12, 2019)

After the Petitioner’s appeal was granted, a rehearing introduced new evidence that fundamentally changed the outcome.

New Evidence and Concessions:

• July 19, 2017 Instruction: Evidence showed Association President Catherine Overby had previously appointed Brian Schoeffler as the Petitioner’s “primary records request contact.”

• July 18, 2018 Instruction: Evidence showed Ms. Overby had also instructed the Petitioner to direct requests to the management company, AAM.

• Association Concessions: The Respondent conceded that its governing documents do not require all Board members to be copied on records requests and that its own bylaws regarding submission forms are not adhered to or enforced.

ALJ’s Reversed Conclusion: The Judge reversed the prior decision and granted the Petitioner’s petition. The new evidence proved the Petitioner had followed express instructions from the Association.

“Petitioner’s November 01, 2018, records request was not required to be sent to all members of the Association’s Board, as Petitioner had expressly been instructed to only send his records requests to the Association’s EDC Chairman, Mr. Schoeffler, which he did.”

The Judge concluded that the partial response was a clear violation of the law.

“Petitioner is correct that the Association did not fully comply with his specific request, and has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the summary table provided by the Association was a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.”

Final Order and Penalties

The Administrative Law Judge’s Final Order on September 12, 2019, which is binding on the parties, mandated the following:

1. Petition Granted: The Petitioner’s petition was granted.

2. Filing Fee Reimbursement: The Respondent (Desert Ranch HOA) was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

3. Civil Penalty: The Respondent was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.


Michelle Ruffo vs. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michelle Ruffo Counsel —
Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1242, 33-1248, 33-1803(A), 33-1803(B), 33-1805; CC&Rs §§ 1.36, 1.38, 4.7, 2.8.3

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated the governing documents or relevant statutes in assessing fines for unauthorized parking.

Why this result: Petitioner continually violated CC&R § 4.7 and failed to prove Respondent violated any CC&R or statute, particularly as A.R.S. § 33-1242 did not apply to disputes concerning the use of limited common elements.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA violation of CC&Rs and Statutes by imposing parking fines

Petitioner challenged the HOA's decision to assess continuous fines against her account totaling $2,544.00 for repeatedly parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit 52, arguing the fines and enforcement lacked proper statutory process and violated CC&Rs. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof and that the statute cited (A.R.S. § 33-1242) concerning property condition notices did not apply to this dispute regarding limited common elements (parking spaces).

Orders: Petitioner Michelle Ruffo’s petition against Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • CC&R § 4.7
  • CC&R § 2.8.3

Analytics Highlights

Topics: parking violation, fines, HOA enforcement, limited common elements, due process, Arizona Department of Real Estate
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 12-349
  • CC&R § 4.7
  • CC&R § 2.8.3

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818044-REL Decision – 663567.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:05:38 (270.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818044-REL


Briefing Document: Ruffo v. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818044-REL, involving Petitioner Michelle Ruffo and Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association. The core of the dispute centers on a series of fines levied by the Association against Ms. Ruffo for repeatedly parking in condominium parking spaces not assigned to her unit.

The Petitioner argued that she had informal written permission from other residents to use their spaces, that the Association’s notices of violation were procedurally flawed, that she was the victim of retaliatory harassment, and that her own assigned space was frequently occupied by others. The Respondent maintained that its actions were in strict accordance with the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which unambiguously require owners to use only their assigned parking spaces and outline a formal process for reallocating them, a process the Petitioner did not follow.

The ALJ ultimately denied the petition, finding that Ms. Ruffo failed to meet her burden of proof. The decision concluded that the Association acted within its rights, that its enforcement actions were consistent with its governing documents, and that the Petitioner’s reliance on informal agreements represented the very “evils that the CC&Rs were designed to prevent.” As of the hearing date, the outstanding balance of fines, interest, and fees on the Petitioner’s account totaled $2,544.00.

Case Background

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Representation / Key Details

Petitioner

Michelle Ruffo

Owner of unit 52, assigned parking space #131. Appeared on her own behalf.

Respondent

Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Assoc.

The condominium unit owners’ association. Represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq. of Brown Olcott, PLLC.

Adjudicator

Diane Mihalsky

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Witnesses

Carol Lundberg

Testified for the Petitioner.

Vanessa Chapman Lubinsky & Gabino Trejo

Former and current property managers, respectively, who testified for the Respondent.

Core Dispute

The central issue is the Association’s imposition of fines against Ms. Ruffo for violating the community’s parking regulations. On or about April 17, 2018, Ms. Ruffo filed a petition alleging the Association violated its CC&Rs and several Arizona statutes by fining her for parking in spaces #38 and #40, which were not assigned to her unit #52. The Association denied any violation, asserting it was enforcing valid community rules.

Chronology of the Dispute

The conflict escalated over a period of approximately two years, marked by a series of notices, fines, and failed attempts at resolution.

• August 2, 2016: The Association sends a “Friendly Reminder” to Ms. Ruffo to cease parking in space #40 and use her assigned space, #131.

• August 5, 2016: A “Notice of Violation” is sent for the same issue, serving as a second warning.

• March 14, 2017: A “Final Non-Compliance Notice” is issued, noting violations in both space #40 and #38. The notice informs Ms. Ruffo of her right to a hearing with the Board of Directors if requested within 14 days.

• March 30, 2017: The first fine of $50.00 is assessed after Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle is again observed in space #38.

• April 17, 2017: Ms. Ruffo responds in writing, claiming she has permission to use the spaces and requests the fine be waived.

• April 27, 2017: The Association’s Board reviews and denies the waiver request. Ms. Ruffo was invited to address the Board but did not attend.

• June 6, 2017: A $200.00 fine is assessed for two observed violations in space #40.

• June 26, 2017: Another $200.00 fine is assessed for violations in spaces #40 and #38.

• July 11, 2017: The Association warns that access to community amenities (pool, fitness room) will be denied if fines remain unpaid. This action is later taken.

• August 31, 2017: A Board meeting is scheduled for Ms. Ruffo and her attorney, Mark F. Williman, to attend. Neither party attends, and they fail to provide advance notice. The Association incurs a $200 legal fee for its attorney’s attendance.

• September 25, 2017: Fines totaling $1,400.00 are assessed for multiple observed violations.

• September 27, 2017: The Association attempts to tow Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle. The attempt is aborted after she refuses to exit the vehicle and calls the Pima County Sheriff’s Office.

• October 4, 2017: The Association’s attorney informs Ms. Ruffo that another hearing will not be scheduled until she reimburses the Association for the $200 legal fee from the missed August 31 meeting.

• October 2017 – January 2018: A series of additional fines are assessed for ongoing violations, and Ms. Ruffo sends multiple letters requesting a hearing and protesting the fines and the $200 reimbursement requirement.

• April 17, 2018: Ms. Ruffo files the formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• September 18, 2018: The evidentiary hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Michelle Ruffo)

Ms. Ruffo’s defense was multi-faceted, based on claims of permission, procedural errors by the Association, and alleged harassment.

• Claim of Permission: Ms. Ruffo testified that since 2005, she had been parking in spaces #38 and #40 with written permission. She claimed a 2006 agreement with the Morleys, then owners of unit #56, for space #40. She also submitted a 2018 email from Julie Ruiz, a tenant in unit #53, granting permission to use space #38.

• Allegations of Improper Notices: She argued the Association’s notices violated A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) because they did not always identify the person who observed the violation or provide photographic evidence.

• Allegations of Harassment and Retaliation: Through an attorney, Ms. Ruffo alleged she was being “unlawfully discriminated against and harassed in retaliation for her role related to allegations that HOA President Mitch Treese misappropriated HOA funds.” The ALJ noted that no evidence was submitted at the hearing to support this claim.

• Counter-Evidence: Ms. Ruffo submitted photographs dated from October 2016 to July 2017 showing other vehicles, including those of Associa maintenance and a landscaping contractor, parked in her assigned space #131.

• Dispute over Hearing Preconditions: She argued that the Association’s demand for a $200 reimbursement for its attorney’s fees as a condition for a new hearing was unlawful and not permitted under the CC&Rs.

Respondent’s Position (The Association)

The Association’s case rested on the explicit language of its governing documents and its adherence to established enforcement procedures.

• Primacy of the CC&Rs: The Association argued that its governing documents are unambiguous. Section 4.7 explicitly forbids owners from parking in any space other than the one assigned to their unit as a Limited Common Element.

• Formal Reallocation Process: Per Section 2.8.3, reallocating a Limited Common Element like a parking space requires a formal, written amendment executed by the unit owners involved and submitted to the Board for approval. Ms. Ruffo never followed this procedure.

• Rejection of Informal Agreements: The property manager testified that such private agreements are not legally binding or enforceable by the Association and create confusion, as evidenced by complaints from subsequent owners and tenants who were unable to use their assigned spaces.

• Adherence to Enforcement Policy: The Association followed its documented Violation Enforcement Policy, starting with a friendly reminder and escalating to formal notices and fines for continued non-compliance.

• Opportunity to Be Heard: Ms. Ruffo was provided opportunities to address the Board on April 27, 2017, and August 31, 2017. She failed to attend either meeting, and her failure to provide notice for the latter caused the Association to incur unnecessary legal fees.

• Witness Testimony: The former property manager, Ms. Chapman, testified that she had personally witnessed all the charged violations.

Governing Documents and Statutes

The case hinged on the interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs and relevant Arizona state law.

Key CC&R Provisions

Section

Provision

Relevance

Motor Vehicles: “no Owner, Lessee or Occupant may park any . . . motor vehicle . . . in any Parking Spaces other than the Parking Space assigned to the Unit as a Limited Common Element.”

The central rule that the Petitioner was found to have repeatedly violated.

§ 2.8.3

Reallocation of Limited Common Elements: A reallocation requires a formal, recorded amendment executed by the owners and submitted to the Board.

The official procedure for changing parking space assignments, which the Petitioner did not follow for her informal agreements.

§ 13.1

Enforcement: Grants the Association the right to impose monetary penalties, suspend an owner’s right to use facilities, and tow vehicles in violation of the rules, after notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Provides the legal authority within the governing documents for the Association’s actions (fines, suspension of amenity access, attempted tow).

§ 1.36

“Parking Space” Definition: Defines a parking space as a portion of the Limited Common Elements.

Legally classifies the disputed parking spaces, making them subject to the rules governing Limited Common Elements.

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

The Petitioner cited A.R.S. § 33-1242(C), which requires an association, upon written request from an owner, to provide details of an alleged violation, including the observer’s name and the date. The ALJ determined this statute was inapplicable to the dispute. The judge’s reasoning was that the statute applies specifically to notices regarding the “condition of the property owned by the unit owner” (i.e., her physical condo unit #52), not her use of Limited Common Elements like parking spaces, which she does not own.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision was a conclusive denial of the petition, siding entirely with the Association.

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Michelle Ruffo’s petition against Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association is denied because Petitioner has not established that Respondent violated the CC&Rs or any statute in assessing fines against her for her repeated violations of CC&R § 4.7 by parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit #52.”

Key Legal Conclusions

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving her claims by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to do so.

• Unambiguous Covenants: The CC&Rs regarding parking are unambiguous and must be enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. CC&R § 4.7 clearly requires owners to park in their assigned spaces.

• Invalidity of Informal Agreements: The ALJ found that the Petitioner’s reliance on informal agreements illustrated “the evils that the CC&Rs were designed to prevent.” These undocumented side deals create instability and conflict when properties are sold or new tenants arrive, undermining the security and order of the community’s parking plan.

• Respondent’s Proper Conduct: The Association was found to have followed its own enforcement policy and provided the Petitioner with opportunities to be heard.

• Attorney’s Fee Condition: While the CC&Rs do not explicitly authorize charging an owner for attorney’s fees as a precondition for a hearing, the ALJ noted that A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(18) allows an association to “exercise any . . . powers necessary and proper for the governance and operation.” Furthermore, civil statutes often require a party to pay for fees they cause an opponent to incur unnecessarily.

• Futility of a Board Hearing: The ALJ concluded that, in light of the Petitioner’s arguments and her “continued violation of Respondent’s parking policy over nearly two years,” a hearing before the Association’s Board would not have changed her behavior or the outcome of the matter.

Financial Implications

The conflict resulted in significant financial penalties for the Petitioner. The fines were assessed on an escalating basis for continued violations.

• March 30, 2017: $50.00

• June 6, 2017: $200.00

• June 26, 2017: $200.00

• August 9, 2017: $200.00

• September 25, 2017: $1,400.00

• October 17, 2017: $100.00

• November 6, 2017: $100.00

As of the hearing on September 18, 2018, the total outstanding balance on Ms. Ruffo’s account, including interest and certified letter fees, was $2,544.00.


Michelle Ruffo vs. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michelle Ruffo Counsel —
Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1242, 33-1248, 33-1803(A), 33-1803(B), 33-1805; CC&Rs §§ 1.36, 1.38, 4.7, 2.8.3

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated the governing documents or relevant statutes in assessing fines for unauthorized parking.

Why this result: Petitioner continually violated CC&R § 4.7 and failed to prove Respondent violated any CC&R or statute, particularly as A.R.S. § 33-1242 did not apply to disputes concerning the use of limited common elements.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA violation of CC&Rs and Statutes by imposing parking fines

Petitioner challenged the HOA's decision to assess continuous fines against her account totaling $2,544.00 for repeatedly parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit 52, arguing the fines and enforcement lacked proper statutory process and violated CC&Rs. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof and that the statute cited (A.R.S. § 33-1242) concerning property condition notices did not apply to this dispute regarding limited common elements (parking spaces).

Orders: Petitioner Michelle Ruffo’s petition against Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • CC&R § 4.7
  • CC&R § 2.8.3

Analytics Highlights

Topics: parking violation, fines, HOA enforcement, limited common elements, due process, Arizona Department of Real Estate
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 12-349
  • CC&R § 4.7
  • CC&R § 2.8.3

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818044-REL Decision – 663567.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:52 (270.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818044-REL


Briefing Document: Ruffo v. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818044-REL, involving Petitioner Michelle Ruffo and Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association. The core of the dispute centers on a series of fines levied by the Association against Ms. Ruffo for repeatedly parking in condominium parking spaces not assigned to her unit.

The Petitioner argued that she had informal written permission from other residents to use their spaces, that the Association’s notices of violation were procedurally flawed, that she was the victim of retaliatory harassment, and that her own assigned space was frequently occupied by others. The Respondent maintained that its actions were in strict accordance with the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which unambiguously require owners to use only their assigned parking spaces and outline a formal process for reallocating them, a process the Petitioner did not follow.

The ALJ ultimately denied the petition, finding that Ms. Ruffo failed to meet her burden of proof. The decision concluded that the Association acted within its rights, that its enforcement actions were consistent with its governing documents, and that the Petitioner’s reliance on informal agreements represented the very “evils that the CC&Rs were designed to prevent.” As of the hearing date, the outstanding balance of fines, interest, and fees on the Petitioner’s account totaled $2,544.00.

Case Background

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Representation / Key Details

Petitioner

Michelle Ruffo

Owner of unit 52, assigned parking space #131. Appeared on her own behalf.

Respondent

Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Assoc.

The condominium unit owners’ association. Represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq. of Brown Olcott, PLLC.

Adjudicator

Diane Mihalsky

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Witnesses

Carol Lundberg

Testified for the Petitioner.

Vanessa Chapman Lubinsky & Gabino Trejo

Former and current property managers, respectively, who testified for the Respondent.

Core Dispute

The central issue is the Association’s imposition of fines against Ms. Ruffo for violating the community’s parking regulations. On or about April 17, 2018, Ms. Ruffo filed a petition alleging the Association violated its CC&Rs and several Arizona statutes by fining her for parking in spaces #38 and #40, which were not assigned to her unit #52. The Association denied any violation, asserting it was enforcing valid community rules.

Chronology of the Dispute

The conflict escalated over a period of approximately two years, marked by a series of notices, fines, and failed attempts at resolution.

• August 2, 2016: The Association sends a “Friendly Reminder” to Ms. Ruffo to cease parking in space #40 and use her assigned space, #131.

• August 5, 2016: A “Notice of Violation” is sent for the same issue, serving as a second warning.

• March 14, 2017: A “Final Non-Compliance Notice” is issued, noting violations in both space #40 and #38. The notice informs Ms. Ruffo of her right to a hearing with the Board of Directors if requested within 14 days.

• March 30, 2017: The first fine of $50.00 is assessed after Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle is again observed in space #38.

• April 17, 2017: Ms. Ruffo responds in writing, claiming she has permission to use the spaces and requests the fine be waived.

• April 27, 2017: The Association’s Board reviews and denies the waiver request. Ms. Ruffo was invited to address the Board but did not attend.

• June 6, 2017: A $200.00 fine is assessed for two observed violations in space #40.

• June 26, 2017: Another $200.00 fine is assessed for violations in spaces #40 and #38.

• July 11, 2017: The Association warns that access to community amenities (pool, fitness room) will be denied if fines remain unpaid. This action is later taken.

• August 31, 2017: A Board meeting is scheduled for Ms. Ruffo and her attorney, Mark F. Williman, to attend. Neither party attends, and they fail to provide advance notice. The Association incurs a $200 legal fee for its attorney’s attendance.

• September 25, 2017: Fines totaling $1,400.00 are assessed for multiple observed violations.

• September 27, 2017: The Association attempts to tow Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle. The attempt is aborted after she refuses to exit the vehicle and calls the Pima County Sheriff’s Office.

• October 4, 2017: The Association’s attorney informs Ms. Ruffo that another hearing will not be scheduled until she reimburses the Association for the $200 legal fee from the missed August 31 meeting.

• October 2017 – January 2018: A series of additional fines are assessed for ongoing violations, and Ms. Ruffo sends multiple letters requesting a hearing and protesting the fines and the $200 reimbursement requirement.

• April 17, 2018: Ms. Ruffo files the formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• September 18, 2018: The evidentiary hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Michelle Ruffo)

Ms. Ruffo’s defense was multi-faceted, based on claims of permission, procedural errors by the Association, and alleged harassment.

• Claim of Permission: Ms. Ruffo testified that since 2005, she had been parking in spaces #38 and #40 with written permission. She claimed a 2006 agreement with the Morleys, then owners of unit #56, for space #40. She also submitted a 2018 email from Julie Ruiz, a tenant in unit #53, granting permission to use space #38.

• Allegations of Improper Notices: She argued the Association’s notices violated A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) because they did not always identify the person who observed the violation or provide photographic evidence.

• Allegations of Harassment and Retaliation: Through an attorney, Ms. Ruffo alleged she was being “unlawfully discriminated against and harassed in retaliation for her role related to allegations that HOA President Mitch Treese misappropriated HOA funds.” The ALJ noted that no evidence was submitted at the hearing to support this claim.

• Counter-Evidence: Ms. Ruffo submitted photographs dated from October 2016 to July 2017 showing other vehicles, including those of Associa maintenance and a landscaping contractor, parked in her assigned space #131.

• Dispute over Hearing Preconditions: She argued that the Association’s demand for a $200 reimbursement for its attorney’s fees as a condition for a new hearing was unlawful and not permitted under the CC&Rs.

Respondent’s Position (The Association)

The Association’s case rested on the explicit language of its governing documents and its adherence to established enforcement procedures.

• Primacy of the CC&Rs: The Association argued that its governing documents are unambiguous. Section 4.7 explicitly forbids owners from parking in any space other than the one assigned to their unit as a Limited Common Element.

• Formal Reallocation Process: Per Section 2.8.3, reallocating a Limited Common Element like a parking space requires a formal, written amendment executed by the unit owners involved and submitted to the Board for approval. Ms. Ruffo never followed this procedure.

• Rejection of Informal Agreements: The property manager testified that such private agreements are not legally binding or enforceable by the Association and create confusion, as evidenced by complaints from subsequent owners and tenants who were unable to use their assigned spaces.

• Adherence to Enforcement Policy: The Association followed its documented Violation Enforcement Policy, starting with a friendly reminder and escalating to formal notices and fines for continued non-compliance.

• Opportunity to Be Heard: Ms. Ruffo was provided opportunities to address the Board on April 27, 2017, and August 31, 2017. She failed to attend either meeting, and her failure to provide notice for the latter caused the Association to incur unnecessary legal fees.

• Witness Testimony: The former property manager, Ms. Chapman, testified that she had personally witnessed all the charged violations.

Governing Documents and Statutes

The case hinged on the interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs and relevant Arizona state law.

Key CC&R Provisions

Section

Provision

Relevance

Motor Vehicles: “no Owner, Lessee or Occupant may park any . . . motor vehicle . . . in any Parking Spaces other than the Parking Space assigned to the Unit as a Limited Common Element.”

The central rule that the Petitioner was found to have repeatedly violated.

§ 2.8.3

Reallocation of Limited Common Elements: A reallocation requires a formal, recorded amendment executed by the owners and submitted to the Board.

The official procedure for changing parking space assignments, which the Petitioner did not follow for her informal agreements.

§ 13.1

Enforcement: Grants the Association the right to impose monetary penalties, suspend an owner’s right to use facilities, and tow vehicles in violation of the rules, after notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Provides the legal authority within the governing documents for the Association’s actions (fines, suspension of amenity access, attempted tow).

§ 1.36

“Parking Space” Definition: Defines a parking space as a portion of the Limited Common Elements.

Legally classifies the disputed parking spaces, making them subject to the rules governing Limited Common Elements.

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

The Petitioner cited A.R.S. § 33-1242(C), which requires an association, upon written request from an owner, to provide details of an alleged violation, including the observer’s name and the date. The ALJ determined this statute was inapplicable to the dispute. The judge’s reasoning was that the statute applies specifically to notices regarding the “condition of the property owned by the unit owner” (i.e., her physical condo unit #52), not her use of Limited Common Elements like parking spaces, which she does not own.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision was a conclusive denial of the petition, siding entirely with the Association.

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Michelle Ruffo’s petition against Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association is denied because Petitioner has not established that Respondent violated the CC&Rs or any statute in assessing fines against her for her repeated violations of CC&R § 4.7 by parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit #52.”

Key Legal Conclusions

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving her claims by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to do so.

• Unambiguous Covenants: The CC&Rs regarding parking are unambiguous and must be enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. CC&R § 4.7 clearly requires owners to park in their assigned spaces.

• Invalidity of Informal Agreements: The ALJ found that the Petitioner’s reliance on informal agreements illustrated “the evils that the CC&Rs were designed to prevent.” These undocumented side deals create instability and conflict when properties are sold or new tenants arrive, undermining the security and order of the community’s parking plan.

• Respondent’s Proper Conduct: The Association was found to have followed its own enforcement policy and provided the Petitioner with opportunities to be heard.

• Attorney’s Fee Condition: While the CC&Rs do not explicitly authorize charging an owner for attorney’s fees as a precondition for a hearing, the ALJ noted that A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(18) allows an association to “exercise any . . . powers necessary and proper for the governance and operation.” Furthermore, civil statutes often require a party to pay for fees they cause an opponent to incur unnecessarily.

• Futility of a Board Hearing: The ALJ concluded that, in light of the Petitioner’s arguments and her “continued violation of Respondent’s parking policy over nearly two years,” a hearing before the Association’s Board would not have changed her behavior or the outcome of the matter.

Financial Implications

The conflict resulted in significant financial penalties for the Petitioner. The fines were assessed on an escalating basis for continued violations.

• March 30, 2017: $50.00

• June 6, 2017: $200.00

• June 26, 2017: $200.00

• August 9, 2017: $200.00

• September 25, 2017: $1,400.00

• October 17, 2017: $100.00

• November 6, 2017: $100.00

As of the hearing on September 18, 2018, the total outstanding balance on Ms. Ruffo’s account, including interest and certified letter fees, was $2,544.00.


William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717032-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel —
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely provide access to association records

The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.

Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:33 (79.9 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:34 (726.4 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:34 (95.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717032-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.

The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.

Case Timeline and Factual Background

The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.

February 6, 2017

William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.

February 14, 2017

Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.

Post-Feb. 6, 2017

Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

April 13, 2017

The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.

May 2, 2017

Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

May 3, 2017

The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

June 26, 2017

The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.

July 14, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.

July 24, 2017

Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805

The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”

Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)

Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.

• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.

• Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.

• Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.

• Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.

Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)

Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.

• “Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.

• Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine

The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:

“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”

Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.

The Correct Interpretation of the Law

The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:

“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”

Final Conclusion

The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:

1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.

2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.

3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.

Final Order and Mandates

The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.

The key directives of the order were:

• Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.

• Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.

• Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.

• No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.


William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717032-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel —
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely provide access to association records

The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.

Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:05 (79.9 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:06 (726.4 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:06 (95.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717032-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.

The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.

Case Timeline and Factual Background

The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.

February 6, 2017

William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.

February 14, 2017

Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.

Post-Feb. 6, 2017

Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

April 13, 2017

The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.

May 2, 2017

Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

May 3, 2017

The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

June 26, 2017

The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.

July 14, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.

July 24, 2017

Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805

The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”

Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)

Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.

• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.

• Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.

• Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.

• Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.

Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)

Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.

• “Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.

• Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine

The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:

“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”

Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.

The Correct Interpretation of the Law

The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:

“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”

Final Conclusion

The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:

1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.

2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.

3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.

Final Order and Mandates

The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.

The key directives of the order were:

• Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.

• Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.

• Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.

• No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.


William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717032-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel —
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely provide access to association records

The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.

Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:52 (79.9 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:53 (726.4 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:53 (95.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717032-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.

The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.

Case Timeline and Factual Background

The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.

February 6, 2017

William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.

February 14, 2017

Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.

Post-Feb. 6, 2017

Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

April 13, 2017

The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.

May 2, 2017

Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

May 3, 2017

The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

June 26, 2017

The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.

July 14, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.

July 24, 2017

Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805

The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”

Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)

Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.

• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.

• Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.

• Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.

• Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.

Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)

Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.

• “Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.

• Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine

The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:

“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”

Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.

The Correct Interpretation of the Law

The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:

“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”

Final Conclusion

The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:

1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.

2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.

3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.

Final Order and Mandates

The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.

The key directives of the order were:

• Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.

• Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.

• Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.

• No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.


William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717032-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel —
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely provide access to association records

The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.

Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:05 (79.9 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:05 (726.4 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:06 (95.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717032-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.

The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.

Case Timeline and Factual Background

The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.

February 6, 2017

William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.

February 14, 2017

Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.

Post-Feb. 6, 2017

Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

April 13, 2017

The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.

May 2, 2017

Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

May 3, 2017

The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

June 26, 2017

The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.

July 14, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.

July 24, 2017

Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805

The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”

Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)

Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.

• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.

• Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.

• Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.

• Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.

Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)

Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.

• “Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.

• Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine

The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:

“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”

Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.

The Correct Interpretation of the Law

The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:

“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”

Final Conclusion

The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:

1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.

2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.

3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.

Final Order and Mandates

The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.

The key directives of the order were:

• Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.

• Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.

• Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.

• No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.


William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

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Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716005-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-10
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel —
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after the Tribunal concluded that the Respondent, Terravita Country Club, Inc., violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to timely provide access to records within the mandated 10 business days. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute and refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was imposed.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely respond to records request

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to timely respond to his July 30, 2016 records request, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The Tribunal found that Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent failed to fulfill the request for examination of records within 10 business days, violating A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Orders: Respondent is ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request for records within 10 days of the Order. Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records Request, Failure to Respond, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 574630.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:03 (87.9 KB)

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 575115.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:03 (789.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716005-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and final order in the case of William M. Brown (Petitioner) versus Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Respondent), Case No. 17F-H1716005-REL. The central issue was Terravita’s failure to respond to a member’s request for records within the 10-business-day timeframe mandated by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the Petitioner’s testimony and evidence to be credible, establishing that Mr. Brown submitted a valid records request via e-mail on July 30, 2016, to which Terravita did not timely respond. The ALJ found the testimony of Terravita’s key witness to be unreliable and rejected Terravita’s defenses, which included claims of non-receipt, improper submission procedure, and falsified evidence.

Ultimately, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner, concluding that Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The recommended order, which was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, mandated that Terravita comply with the records request, reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee, and deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party. No civil penalty was assessed.

Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

17F-H1716005-REL (OAH) / HO 17-16/005 (DRE)

Petitioner

William M. Brown (Appeared on behalf of himself)

Respondent

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Represented by Joshua Bolen, Esq.)

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Adopting Authority

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Commissioner

Judy Lowe

Hearing Date

June 19, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

July 10, 2017

Final Order Date

July 11, 2017

Chronology of Events

• February 12, 2016: Anita Bell requests records from Terravita via Mr. Brown’s e-mail account. The request is forwarded to General Manager Tom Forbes.

• February 19, 2016: Mr. Forbes informs Ms. Bell that the records will be ready on February 22.

• March 14, 2016: Ms. Bell submits another records request from Mr. Brown’s e-mail account.

• March 18, 2016: Cici Rausch, Terravita’s Director of Administration, informs Ms. Bell when the records can be retrieved.

• July 29, 2016: Date of the records request at the center of the legal dispute.

• July 30, 2016: Mr. Brown e-mails the records request to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley. On the same day, he separately requests records from the Terravita Community Association, Inc. (TCA).

• August 6, 2016: Mr. Brown sends another records request to Ms. Wiley.

• August 8, 2016: TCA responds to Mr. Brown’s July 30 request.

• August 12, 2016: Terravita responds to Mr. Brown’s August 6 request.

• August 18, 2016: Mr. Brown files a Petition for Hearing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond to his July 30 request.

• September 9, 2016: Terravita files a response, alleging it did not receive the July 30 records request.

• June 19, 2017: The administrative hearing is held.

• July 10, 2017: The ALJ issues a decision finding in favor of Mr. Brown.

• July 11, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepts the ALJ’s decision and issues a Final Order.

Analysis of the Central Dispute

The core of the case revolved around whether Terravita violated its statutory duty to respond to Mr. Brown’s records request dated July 29, 2016, which he e-mailed on July 30, 2016.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence

• Core Allegation: Mr. Brown testified that he sent the records request via e-mail to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley, on July 30, 2016, and that Terravita failed to respond within the 10-business-day period mandated by law.

• Evidence: Mr. Brown submitted an August 12, 2016 forwarded e-mail (Exhibit P2) that contained the original July 30, 2016 e-mail sent to Ms. Wiley.

• Judicial Finding: The ALJ found Mr. Brown’s testimony to be “credible.”

Respondent’s Defenses and the Court’s Findings

Terravita presented several arguments to contest the allegation, all of which were ultimately unpersuasive to the court.

1. Claim of Non-Receipt: Terravita contended it never received the July 30, 2016 request. Ms. Wiley testified she did not receive a request from Mr. Brown on July 29 or July 30.

◦ Court’s Finding: The ALJ found Ms. Wiley’s testimony to be “unreliable.” The decision noted that Ms. Wiley testified that Terravita was “indirectly” informed around August 5 that “perhaps Mr. Brown had made the request,” which undermined the claim of complete non-awareness.

2. Use of an Incorrect E-mail Address: Ms. Wiley testified that she did not use the e-mail address to which Mr. Brown sent the request for Terravita affairs, claiming she used a different one in her official capacity as Secretary.

◦ Court’s Finding: This argument was implicitly rejected, as the ALJ concluded that Mr. Brown had successfully proven he submitted the request “to its Secretary, Ms. Wiley.”

3. Allegation of Falsified Evidence: Terravita contended that the forwarded e-mail evidence offered by Mr. Brown was falsified.

◦ Court’s Finding: The ALJ noted an inconsistency in Terravita’s position, stating, “Terravita did not contend that the written evidence of Mr. Brown’s August 5, 2016 records request, sent by e-mail to Ms. Wiley, was falsified.” This weakened the credibility of the falsification claim against the July 30 e-mail.

4. Non-Compliance with Internal Policy: Terravita argued that its own Rules, Policies, and Procedures required members to submit records requests to the General Manager and/or Director of Administration, not the Secretary.

◦ Court’s Finding: The decision focused entirely on the violation of the state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1805, indicating that the statutory obligation superseded the association’s internal procedural preferences.

Legal Framework and Conclusions of Law

• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) mandates that a homeowners’ association “shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination” of its financial and other records by a member.

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioner was required to prove the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that Mr. Brown successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1. He submitted a request for records to Terravita’s Secretary via e-mail on July 30, 2016.

2. Terravita failed to fulfill this request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

• Final Judgment: The Tribunal concluded that “Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.” It was also noted that Terravita did not contend that any of the statutory exceptions to disclosure, such as privileged communication or pending litigation, applied.

Final Order and Directives

The ALJ’s decision was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on July 11, 2017, making it a Final Order with the following mandates:

• Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

• Compliance with Request: Terravita was ordered to “comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request of Terravita’s records” within 10 days of the Order.

• Reimbursement of Filing Fee: Terravita was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 directly to him within thirty (30) days.

• Civil Penalty: The court determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

• Effective Date: The Order was made effective five (5) days from the date of its certification. The Final Order itself is effective immediately from the date of service, July 11, 2017.