Jerry and Patricia Gravelle vs. Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716008-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-01-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry and Patricia Gravelle Counsel
Respondent Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu Counsel Kenneth E. Moyer

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.3 and 11.7.6

Outcome Summary

The Department adopted the ALJ's recommendation to dismiss the petition. The ALJ found that the HOA's insurance policy and CC&Rs did not require coverage for damage to the Petitioners' individual unit (finished surfaces and personal property) resulting from a sewer backup. The HOA was only responsible for common elements.

Why this result: The CC&Rs explicitly state that the Association is not required to insure personal property within an individual unit and that owners are responsible for their own unit coverage. The ALJ found that past minor payments by the Board for similar damages did not amend the governing documents.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide insurance coverage for unit damages

Petitioners alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by failing to provide insurance coverage for damages to their unit (interior/personal property) caused by a sewer backup, requesting $6,697.70 reimbursement.

Orders: The petition is dismissed; no action is required of Respondent.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)
  • CC&Rs Article 11 Section 11.7.3
  • CC&Rs Article 11 Section 11.7.6

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 528194.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:06 (58.8 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 528432.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:06 (63.1 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 535933.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:06 (131.6 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 539997.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:06 (1010.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716008-REL


Briefing: Gravelle v. Village Parc Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the key findings and legal determinations from an administrative case between homeowners Jerry and Patricia Gravelle and the Village Parc Homeowners Association of Havasu (HOA). The dispute centered on liability for damages within the Gravelles’ condominium unit caused by a sewer backup.

The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded, and the Department Commissioner affirmed, that the HOA’s governing documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—unambiguously place the responsibility for insuring the interior of an individual unit on the unit owner, not the HOA.

The ruling established that the HOA’s master insurance policy, provided by Travelers, was only obligated to cover what the CC&Rs required. Arguments based on the HOA’s past payments for minor damages in other units, an erroneous initial statement by an insurance adjuster on a prior claim, and the HOA Board’s own mistaken interpretation of its duties were all found to be insufficient to override the plain written language of the governing documents. The final decision reinforces the principle that unit owners are responsible for understanding their CC&Rs and securing adequate personal insurance for their property.

I. Case Overview and Final Disposition

Case Identification: No. 17F-H1716008-REL

Parties:

Petitioners: Jerry and Patricia Gravelle, owners of Unit 14 in the Village Parc development.

Respondent: Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu (“the Association”).

Adjudicating Body: The case was heard in the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Diane Mihalsky. The final order was issued by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Key Dates:

Hearing Date: November 10, 2016

ALJ Decision: December 22, 2016

Final Order: January 3, 2017

Final Disposition: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s recommendation and ordered that the petition be dismissed. This constituted a final administrative action, effective immediately. Parties were advised of their right to file for rehearing or appeal for judicial review.

II. The Core Dispute: Insurance for Sewer Backup Damage

On or about October 23, 2015, the Petitioners’ condominium (Unit 14), along with two other units, suffered damage from a sewer backup. The central conflict arose from determining which party was financially responsible for the repairs inside the Petitioners’ unit.

Petitioners’ Claim: The Gravelles filed a petition on August 31, 2016, alleging the Association violated Articles 11.7.3 and 11.7.6 of the CC&Rs by failing to provide insurance coverage for the full extent of the damages. Their personal insurance policy did not cover sewer backups. They requested the Association pay $6,697.70 to reimburse them for the loss that the Association’s insurer, Travelers, declined to cover.

Insurance Claim Outcome:

◦ The Association submitted a claim for the sewer backup damages to its insurer, Travelers.

◦ Travelers determined that its policy covered damages to the common elements associated with the unit and issued a check to the Petitioners for $338.64.

◦ Travelers concluded there was no coverage under the policy for damage to the interior of the Petitioners’ unit. This denial was based on the CC&Rs, which establish that the unit owner is responsible for the finished surfaces and personal property within their unit.

III. Analysis of Governing Documents and Legal Framework

The ALJ’s decision was grounded in a strict interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs, its insurance contract, and the Arizona Condominium Act.

Document / Statute

Key Provisions and Implications

Village Parc CC&Rs

Unit Definition (Sec. 2.2.1): A unit is defined as the space “bounded by and contained within the interior finished surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors and ceilings.”

Insurance Responsibility (Sec. 11.7.3): The Association’s master policy is explicitly “not be required to insure the personal property within any individual Unit, which insurance shall be the responsibility and risk of the Unit Owners.”

Liability Limitation (Sec. 11.7.5): The Association is not liable to any owner “if any risk or hazard is not covered by insurance or the amount is inadequate.” It places the burden on each owner to ascertain the Association’s coverage and procure their own additional insurance.

Travelers Insurance Policy

Conditional Coverage Endorsement: The policy covers certain property (fixtures, alterations, appliances) contained within a unit, but only “if your Condominium Association Agreement requires you to insure it.” Since the CC&Rs do not require the Association to insure unit interiors, this coverage was not triggered.

Primary Insurance: The policy states it is “intended to be primary, and not to contribute with such other insurance” a unit-owner may have.

Arizona Condominium Act

Unit Definition (A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)): Reinforces the CC&Rs by defining finished surfaces—”lath, furring, wallboard… tiles, wallpaper, paint, finished flooring”—as part of the unit. All other portions of walls, floors, or ceilings are common elements.

Maintenance Responsibility (A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)): The law specifies that “the association is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the common elements and each unit owner is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the unit.”

IV. Petitioners’ Arguments and the ALJ’s Rejection

The Petitioners presented evidence of past practices by both the Association and Travelers, arguing these created an expectation of coverage. The ALJ systematically rejected these arguments.

Argument 1: The Association’s Past Payments for Unit Repairs

Petitioners’ Evidence: The Association had authorized payments for repairs inside other units on prior occasions:

June 2011: $153.74, $75.00, and $296.11 for damage to Units 3 and 5 from a broken shower drain.

January 2012: $449.45 to repair kitchen cabinets in Unit 6 damaged by a broken roof vent.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The fact that the Association’s Board made “actual payments of small amounts for damages to individually owned units” does not legally amend the plain language of the CC&Rs. Notably, the Association did not submit these prior incidents to its insurer.

Argument 2: Travelers’ Prior Actions

Petitioners’ Evidence: In a 2014 claim, a Travelers adjuster initially determined that the policy did provide coverage for damage done to a unit, not just limited common elements.

ALJ’s Conclusion: Travelers later stated the adjuster had erred and confirmed no claim for unit damage was ultimately paid. The ALJ found that the “adjuster’s initial error in the 2014 claim does not estop Travelers from denying the claim for damages to Petitioners’ unit” in 2015.

Argument 3: The Association Board’s Own Interpretation

Petitioners’ Evidence: At a November 2015 board meeting, where Mr. Gravelle served as secretary/treasurer, the Board itself determined that the CC&Rs did require the Association to provide insurance coverage for all damages to Unit 14.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The Board’s “erroneous opinion” does not have the legal power to amend the CC&Rs or the binding terms of the Travelers insurance policy.

V. Core Legal Principles and Final Decision

The dismissal of the petition was based on several foundational legal principles.

Primacy of Written Documents: The decision gave superior weight to the “plain language” of the CC&Rs and the insurance contract over inconsistent past practices or mistaken interpretations.

Burden of Proof: As the filing party, the Petitioners had the burden to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Association violated the CC&Rs. The ALJ determined they failed to meet this standard.

Clear Delineation of Responsibility: Both the CC&Rs and Arizona state law create a clear separation of financial and maintenance responsibilities: the Association is responsible for common elements, while individual owners are responsible for their units.

Presumption of Knowledge: The decision cited the legal principle that “Everyone is presumed to know the law.” The CC&Rs put the Petitioners on constructive notice that they were responsible for insuring their individual unit against risks like a sewer backup. Their failure to procure such coverage was their own responsibility.






Study Guide – 17F-H1716008-REL


Study Guide: Gravelle v. Village Parc Homeowners Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case No. 17F-H1716008-REL, involving Jerry and Patricia Gravelle and the Village Parc Homeowners Association of Havasu. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final decision presented in the case documents.

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in case No. 17F-H1716008-REL, and what were their official roles?

2. What specific event on October 23, 2015, initiated the dispute between the parties?

3. What was the total monetary amount the Petitioners requested, and for what purpose?

4. According to the Travelers insurance policy held by the Association, what property inside a unit could be covered, and under what specific condition?

5. How did the Arizona Condominium Act (A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)) and the CC&Rs define the boundaries and components of an individual “Unit”?

6. What was the key reasoning provided by Travelers for denying coverage for the interior damage to the Petitioners’ unit?

7. The Petitioners cited past instances where the Respondent paid for repairs in other units. Why did the Administrative Law Judge rule that these “past practices” did not legally bind the Respondent in this case?

8. What is the definition of “preponderance of the evidence” as cited in the legal decision?

9. What was the final, official outcome of the case as determined by the Administrative Law Judge and adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate?

10. According to Section 11.7.5 of the CC&Rs, who is ultimately responsible for procuring additional insurance coverage if the Association’s policy is deemed inadequate?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jerry and Patricia Gravelle, who were designated as the “Petitioners,” and the Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu, which was the “Respondent.” The Petitioners owned a condominium unit and were members of the Respondent homeowners’ association.

2. On or about October 23, 2015, the Petitioners’ Unit 14, as well as Units 15 and 16, suffered damage from a sewer backup. The Petitioners discovered that their personal insurance policy did not provide coverage for this type of damage, leading them to seek coverage under the Respondent’s policy.

3. The Petitioners requested that the Respondent pay $6,697.70. This amount was to reimburse them for the loss that the insurance company, Travelers, refused to cover for the damages inside their unit caused by the sewer backup.

4. The Travelers policy endorsement stated it could cover property contained within a unit, regardless of ownership, under one specific condition: if the “Condominium Association Agreement requires you to insure it.” This included fixtures, improvements, alterations, and certain appliances.

5. The CC&Rs (Section 2.2.1) and the Arizona Condominium Act defined a unit as being bounded by the interior finished surfaces of its perimeter walls, floors, and ceilings. The Act specifies that materials like tiles, paint, finished flooring, and wallpaper are part of the unit, while other portions of the walls, floors, or ceilings are part of the common elements.

6. Travelers concluded there was no coverage for the interior damage because the CC&Rs make the unit owner responsible for damages within a unit. The policy was intended to cover common elements and structural damage, not the finished surfaces and personal property that constitute the interior of the unit.

7. The judge ruled that the Board’s past payments for small damages and its erroneous opinion that the policy should cover the damage did not amend the plain language of the CC&Rs. The legally binding CC&Rs put Petitioners on notice about insurance requirements, and these past actions were not sufficient to override the written documents.

8. “A preponderance of the evidence” is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” It is also described as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

9. The Administrative Law Judge issued a Recommended Order that the petition be dismissed and that no action was required of the Respondent. This recommendation was accepted and adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate in a Final Order dated January 3, 2017.

10. Section 11.7.5 of the CC&Rs explicitly states that “Each Owner is responsible for ascertaining the Association’s coverage and for procuring such additional coverage as such owner deems necessary.” It also shields the Association from liability if a risk is not covered or the insurance amount is inadequate.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each question based on the provided source materials.

1. Analyze the role of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) in this case. How did specific sections of the CC&Rs support the Respondent’s position and ultimately lead to the dismissal of the petition?

2. The Petitioners argued that the Respondent’s “past practices” and an initial, erroneous determination by a Travelers adjuster should have set a precedent. Explain what the legal concept of “estoppel” means in this context and detail the judge’s reasoning for why it did not apply to the Gravelles’ situation.

3. Discuss the division of responsibility for maintenance and insurance as defined by the Arizona Condominium Act and the Village Parc CC&Rs. How does this case illustrate the critical distinction between “Common Elements,” “Limited Common Elements,” and the “Unit” itself?

4. Trace the procedural path of this dispute, from the initial petition filing to the Final Order. Identify the key government bodies involved (e.g., Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings) and the roles they played in adjudicating the case.

5. Imagine you are advising a new condominium owner at Village Parc. Based on the outcome and reasoning of this case, what advice would you give them regarding insurance policies and understanding their responsibilities versus those of the Homeowners Association?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official (Diane Mihalsky) from the Office of Administrative Hearings who conducted the hearing, analyzed the evidence and legal arguments, and issued a recommended decision in the case.

Arizona Condominium Act

A set of Arizona state statutes that define legal terms and responsibilities related to condominiums. In this case, it was used to define the boundaries of a “unit” versus “common elements” (A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)) and to assign responsibility for their maintenance (A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)).

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents for the Village Parc development. These documents define the rights and obligations of the unit owners and the homeowners’ association, including insurance requirements.

Common Elements

Portions of the condominium project designated for common ownership by all unit owners. Under the Arizona Condominium Act, portions of walls, floors, or ceilings that are not part of the finished surfaces of a unit are considered common elements.

Estoppel

A legal principle defined in the case as meaning “that a party is prevented by his own acts from claiming a right to detriment of other party who was entitled to rely on such conduct and has acted accordingly.” The judge ruled it did not apply because the plain language of the CC&Rs prevented the Petitioners from claiming they reasonably relied on the Board’s or Travelers’ past practices.

Limited Common Elements

A portion of the Common Elements allocated for the exclusive use of one or more, but fewer than all, of the Units. An example given is a “chute, flue, duct, wire, conduit… [that] serve only that Unit.”

Petitioner

The party that filed the petition initiating the legal action. In this case, Jerry and Patricia Gravelle, owners of Unit 14.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required for the Petitioners to win their case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with the “most convincing force.”

Project

As defined in Section 1.27 of the CC&Rs, this refers to “the entire Property… portions of which are designated for separate ownership and the remainder of which are designated for common ownership solely by the owners of the Units therein.”

Respondent

The party against whom the petition was filed. In this case, the Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu (“the Association”).

As defined in the CC&Rs, “the elements of an individual unit… which are not owned in common with the Owners of other Condominium Units.” Its physical boundaries are defined as the interior finished surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors, and ceilings.






Blog Post – 17F-H1716008-REL


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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jerry Gravelle (petitioner)
    Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu
    Homeowner; also served as Secretary/Treasurer on the Board in Nov 2015
  • Patricia Gravelle (petitioner)
    Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu
    Homeowner

Respondent Side

  • Kenneth E. Moyer (attorney)
    Law Offices of Kenneth E. Moyer, PLLC
    Attorney for Respondent
  • Gary Himango (affiant)
    Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu
    Submitted affidavit for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • M. Aguirre (clerk)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Transmitted documents
  • L. Dettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient (LDettorre@azre.gov)
  • D. Jones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient (djones@azre.gov)
  • J. Marshall (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient (jmarshall@azre.gov)
  • N. Cano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient (ncano@azre.gov)

Jerry and Patricia Gravelle vs. Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716008-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-01-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry and Patricia Gravelle Counsel
Respondent Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu Counsel Kenneth E. Moyer

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.3 and 11.7.6

Outcome Summary

The Department adopted the ALJ's recommendation to dismiss the petition. The ALJ found that the HOA's insurance policy and CC&Rs did not require coverage for damage to the Petitioners' individual unit (finished surfaces and personal property) resulting from a sewer backup. The HOA was only responsible for common elements.

Why this result: The CC&Rs explicitly state that the Association is not required to insure personal property within an individual unit and that owners are responsible for their own unit coverage. The ALJ found that past minor payments by the Board for similar damages did not amend the governing documents.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide insurance coverage for unit damages

Petitioners alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by failing to provide insurance coverage for damages to their unit (interior/personal property) caused by a sewer backup, requesting $6,697.70 reimbursement.

Orders: The petition is dismissed; no action is required of Respondent.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)
  • CC&Rs Article 11 Section 11.7.3
  • CC&Rs Article 11 Section 11.7.6

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 528194.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:18:03 (58.8 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 528432.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:18:10 (63.1 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 535933.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:18:15 (131.6 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 539997.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:18:22 (1010.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716008-REL


Briefing: Gravelle v. Village Parc Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the key findings and legal determinations from an administrative case between homeowners Jerry and Patricia Gravelle and the Village Parc Homeowners Association of Havasu (HOA). The dispute centered on liability for damages within the Gravelles’ condominium unit caused by a sewer backup.

The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded, and the Department Commissioner affirmed, that the HOA’s governing documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—unambiguously place the responsibility for insuring the interior of an individual unit on the unit owner, not the HOA.

The ruling established that the HOA’s master insurance policy, provided by Travelers, was only obligated to cover what the CC&Rs required. Arguments based on the HOA’s past payments for minor damages in other units, an erroneous initial statement by an insurance adjuster on a prior claim, and the HOA Board’s own mistaken interpretation of its duties were all found to be insufficient to override the plain written language of the governing documents. The final decision reinforces the principle that unit owners are responsible for understanding their CC&Rs and securing adequate personal insurance for their property.

I. Case Overview and Final Disposition

Case Identification: No. 17F-H1716008-REL

Parties:

Petitioners: Jerry and Patricia Gravelle, owners of Unit 14 in the Village Parc development.

Respondent: Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu (“the Association”).

Adjudicating Body: The case was heard in the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Diane Mihalsky. The final order was issued by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Key Dates:

Hearing Date: November 10, 2016

ALJ Decision: December 22, 2016

Final Order: January 3, 2017

Final Disposition: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s recommendation and ordered that the petition be dismissed. This constituted a final administrative action, effective immediately. Parties were advised of their right to file for rehearing or appeal for judicial review.

II. The Core Dispute: Insurance for Sewer Backup Damage

On or about October 23, 2015, the Petitioners’ condominium (Unit 14), along with two other units, suffered damage from a sewer backup. The central conflict arose from determining which party was financially responsible for the repairs inside the Petitioners’ unit.

Petitioners’ Claim: The Gravelles filed a petition on August 31, 2016, alleging the Association violated Articles 11.7.3 and 11.7.6 of the CC&Rs by failing to provide insurance coverage for the full extent of the damages. Their personal insurance policy did not cover sewer backups. They requested the Association pay $6,697.70 to reimburse them for the loss that the Association’s insurer, Travelers, declined to cover.

Insurance Claim Outcome:

◦ The Association submitted a claim for the sewer backup damages to its insurer, Travelers.

◦ Travelers determined that its policy covered damages to the common elements associated with the unit and issued a check to the Petitioners for $338.64.

◦ Travelers concluded there was no coverage under the policy for damage to the interior of the Petitioners’ unit. This denial was based on the CC&Rs, which establish that the unit owner is responsible for the finished surfaces and personal property within their unit.

III. Analysis of Governing Documents and Legal Framework

The ALJ’s decision was grounded in a strict interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs, its insurance contract, and the Arizona Condominium Act.

Document / Statute

Key Provisions and Implications

Village Parc CC&Rs

Unit Definition (Sec. 2.2.1): A unit is defined as the space “bounded by and contained within the interior finished surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors and ceilings.”

Insurance Responsibility (Sec. 11.7.3): The Association’s master policy is explicitly “not be required to insure the personal property within any individual Unit, which insurance shall be the responsibility and risk of the Unit Owners.”

Liability Limitation (Sec. 11.7.5): The Association is not liable to any owner “if any risk or hazard is not covered by insurance or the amount is inadequate.” It places the burden on each owner to ascertain the Association’s coverage and procure their own additional insurance.

Travelers Insurance Policy

Conditional Coverage Endorsement: The policy covers certain property (fixtures, alterations, appliances) contained within a unit, but only “if your Condominium Association Agreement requires you to insure it.” Since the CC&Rs do not require the Association to insure unit interiors, this coverage was not triggered.

Primary Insurance: The policy states it is “intended to be primary, and not to contribute with such other insurance” a unit-owner may have.

Arizona Condominium Act

Unit Definition (A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)): Reinforces the CC&Rs by defining finished surfaces—”lath, furring, wallboard… tiles, wallpaper, paint, finished flooring”—as part of the unit. All other portions of walls, floors, or ceilings are common elements.

Maintenance Responsibility (A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)): The law specifies that “the association is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the common elements and each unit owner is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the unit.”

IV. Petitioners’ Arguments and the ALJ’s Rejection

The Petitioners presented evidence of past practices by both the Association and Travelers, arguing these created an expectation of coverage. The ALJ systematically rejected these arguments.

Argument 1: The Association’s Past Payments for Unit Repairs

Petitioners’ Evidence: The Association had authorized payments for repairs inside other units on prior occasions:

June 2011: $153.74, $75.00, and $296.11 for damage to Units 3 and 5 from a broken shower drain.

January 2012: $449.45 to repair kitchen cabinets in Unit 6 damaged by a broken roof vent.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The fact that the Association’s Board made “actual payments of small amounts for damages to individually owned units” does not legally amend the plain language of the CC&Rs. Notably, the Association did not submit these prior incidents to its insurer.

Argument 2: Travelers’ Prior Actions

Petitioners’ Evidence: In a 2014 claim, a Travelers adjuster initially determined that the policy did provide coverage for damage done to a unit, not just limited common elements.

ALJ’s Conclusion: Travelers later stated the adjuster had erred and confirmed no claim for unit damage was ultimately paid. The ALJ found that the “adjuster’s initial error in the 2014 claim does not estop Travelers from denying the claim for damages to Petitioners’ unit” in 2015.

Argument 3: The Association Board’s Own Interpretation

Petitioners’ Evidence: At a November 2015 board meeting, where Mr. Gravelle served as secretary/treasurer, the Board itself determined that the CC&Rs did require the Association to provide insurance coverage for all damages to Unit 14.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The Board’s “erroneous opinion” does not have the legal power to amend the CC&Rs or the binding terms of the Travelers insurance policy.

V. Core Legal Principles and Final Decision

The dismissal of the petition was based on several foundational legal principles.

Primacy of Written Documents: The decision gave superior weight to the “plain language” of the CC&Rs and the insurance contract over inconsistent past practices or mistaken interpretations.

Burden of Proof: As the filing party, the Petitioners had the burden to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Association violated the CC&Rs. The ALJ determined they failed to meet this standard.

Clear Delineation of Responsibility: Both the CC&Rs and Arizona state law create a clear separation of financial and maintenance responsibilities: the Association is responsible for common elements, while individual owners are responsible for their units.

Presumption of Knowledge: The decision cited the legal principle that “Everyone is presumed to know the law.” The CC&Rs put the Petitioners on constructive notice that they were responsible for insuring their individual unit against risks like a sewer backup. Their failure to procure such coverage was their own responsibility.






Study Guide – 17F-H1716008-REL


Study Guide: Gravelle v. Village Parc Homeowners Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case No. 17F-H1716008-REL, involving Jerry and Patricia Gravelle and the Village Parc Homeowners Association of Havasu. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final decision presented in the case documents.

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in case No. 17F-H1716008-REL, and what were their official roles?

2. What specific event on October 23, 2015, initiated the dispute between the parties?

3. What was the total monetary amount the Petitioners requested, and for what purpose?

4. According to the Travelers insurance policy held by the Association, what property inside a unit could be covered, and under what specific condition?

5. How did the Arizona Condominium Act (A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)) and the CC&Rs define the boundaries and components of an individual “Unit”?

6. What was the key reasoning provided by Travelers for denying coverage for the interior damage to the Petitioners’ unit?

7. The Petitioners cited past instances where the Respondent paid for repairs in other units. Why did the Administrative Law Judge rule that these “past practices” did not legally bind the Respondent in this case?

8. What is the definition of “preponderance of the evidence” as cited in the legal decision?

9. What was the final, official outcome of the case as determined by the Administrative Law Judge and adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate?

10. According to Section 11.7.5 of the CC&Rs, who is ultimately responsible for procuring additional insurance coverage if the Association’s policy is deemed inadequate?

——————————————————————————–

Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jerry and Patricia Gravelle, who were designated as the “Petitioners,” and the Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu, which was the “Respondent.” The Petitioners owned a condominium unit and were members of the Respondent homeowners’ association.

2. On or about October 23, 2015, the Petitioners’ Unit 14, as well as Units 15 and 16, suffered damage from a sewer backup. The Petitioners discovered that their personal insurance policy did not provide coverage for this type of damage, leading them to seek coverage under the Respondent’s policy.

3. The Petitioners requested that the Respondent pay $6,697.70. This amount was to reimburse them for the loss that the insurance company, Travelers, refused to cover for the damages inside their unit caused by the sewer backup.

4. The Travelers policy endorsement stated it could cover property contained within a unit, regardless of ownership, under one specific condition: if the “Condominium Association Agreement requires you to insure it.” This included fixtures, improvements, alterations, and certain appliances.

5. The CC&Rs (Section 2.2.1) and the Arizona Condominium Act defined a unit as being bounded by the interior finished surfaces of its perimeter walls, floors, and ceilings. The Act specifies that materials like tiles, paint, finished flooring, and wallpaper are part of the unit, while other portions of the walls, floors, or ceilings are part of the common elements.

6. Travelers concluded there was no coverage for the interior damage because the CC&Rs make the unit owner responsible for damages within a unit. The policy was intended to cover common elements and structural damage, not the finished surfaces and personal property that constitute the interior of the unit.

7. The judge ruled that the Board’s past payments for small damages and its erroneous opinion that the policy should cover the damage did not amend the plain language of the CC&Rs. The legally binding CC&Rs put Petitioners on notice about insurance requirements, and these past actions were not sufficient to override the written documents.

8. “A preponderance of the evidence” is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” It is also described as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

9. The Administrative Law Judge issued a Recommended Order that the petition be dismissed and that no action was required of the Respondent. This recommendation was accepted and adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate in a Final Order dated January 3, 2017.

10. Section 11.7.5 of the CC&Rs explicitly states that “Each Owner is responsible for ascertaining the Association’s coverage and for procuring such additional coverage as such owner deems necessary.” It also shields the Association from liability if a risk is not covered or the insurance amount is inadequate.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each question based on the provided source materials.

1. Analyze the role of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) in this case. How did specific sections of the CC&Rs support the Respondent’s position and ultimately lead to the dismissal of the petition?

2. The Petitioners argued that the Respondent’s “past practices” and an initial, erroneous determination by a Travelers adjuster should have set a precedent. Explain what the legal concept of “estoppel” means in this context and detail the judge’s reasoning for why it did not apply to the Gravelles’ situation.

3. Discuss the division of responsibility for maintenance and insurance as defined by the Arizona Condominium Act and the Village Parc CC&Rs. How does this case illustrate the critical distinction between “Common Elements,” “Limited Common Elements,” and the “Unit” itself?

4. Trace the procedural path of this dispute, from the initial petition filing to the Final Order. Identify the key government bodies involved (e.g., Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings) and the roles they played in adjudicating the case.

5. Imagine you are advising a new condominium owner at Village Parc. Based on the outcome and reasoning of this case, what advice would you give them regarding insurance policies and understanding their responsibilities versus those of the Homeowners Association?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official (Diane Mihalsky) from the Office of Administrative Hearings who conducted the hearing, analyzed the evidence and legal arguments, and issued a recommended decision in the case.

Arizona Condominium Act

A set of Arizona state statutes that define legal terms and responsibilities related to condominiums. In this case, it was used to define the boundaries of a “unit” versus “common elements” (A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)) and to assign responsibility for their maintenance (A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)).

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents for the Village Parc development. These documents define the rights and obligations of the unit owners and the homeowners’ association, including insurance requirements.

Common Elements

Portions of the condominium project designated for common ownership by all unit owners. Under the Arizona Condominium Act, portions of walls, floors, or ceilings that are not part of the finished surfaces of a unit are considered common elements.

Estoppel

A legal principle defined in the case as meaning “that a party is prevented by his own acts from claiming a right to detriment of other party who was entitled to rely on such conduct and has acted accordingly.” The judge ruled it did not apply because the plain language of the CC&Rs prevented the Petitioners from claiming they reasonably relied on the Board’s or Travelers’ past practices.

Limited Common Elements

A portion of the Common Elements allocated for the exclusive use of one or more, but fewer than all, of the Units. An example given is a “chute, flue, duct, wire, conduit… [that] serve only that Unit.”

Petitioner

The party that filed the petition initiating the legal action. In this case, Jerry and Patricia Gravelle, owners of Unit 14.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required for the Petitioners to win their case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with the “most convincing force.”

Project

As defined in Section 1.27 of the CC&Rs, this refers to “the entire Property… portions of which are designated for separate ownership and the remainder of which are designated for common ownership solely by the owners of the Units therein.”

Respondent

The party against whom the petition was filed. In this case, the Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu (“the Association”).

As defined in the CC&Rs, “the elements of an individual unit… which are not owned in common with the Owners of other Condominium Units.” Its physical boundaries are defined as the interior finished surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors, and ceilings.






Blog Post – 17F-H1716008-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “17F-H1716008-REL”, “case_title”: “Jerry and Patricia Gravelle v. Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu”, “decision_date”: “2017-01-03”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “individuals”: [ { “name”: “Jerry Gravelle”, “role”: “petitioner”, “side”: “petitioner”, “affiliation”: “Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu”, “notes”: “Homeowner; also served as Secretary/Treasurer on the Board in Nov 2015” }, { “name”: “Patricia Gravelle”, “role”: “petitioner”, “side”: “petitioner”, “affiliation”: “Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu”, “notes”: “Homeowner” }, { “name”: “Kenneth E. Moyer”, “role”: “attorney”, “side”: “respondent”, “affiliation”: “Law Offices of Kenneth E. Moyer, PLLC”, “notes”: “Attorney for Respondent” }, { “name”: “Gary Himango”, “role”: “affiant”, “side”: “respondent”, “affiliation”: “Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu”, “notes”: “Submitted affidavit for Respondent” }, { “name”: “Diane Mihalsky”, “role”: “ALJ”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: “Office of Administrative Hearings”, “notes”: “Administrative Law Judge” }, { “name”: “Judy Lowe”, “role”: “Commissioner”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”, “notes”: null }, { “name”: “Abby Hansen”, “role”: “HOA Coordinator”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”, “notes”: null }, { “name”: “M. Aguirre”, “role”: “clerk”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: “Office of Administrative Hearings”, “notes”: “Transmitted documents” }, { “name”: “L. Dettorre”, “role”: “ADRE staff”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”, “notes”: “Email recipient (LDettorre@azre.gov)” }, { “name”: “D. Jones”, “role”: “ADRE staff”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”, “notes”: “Email recipient (djones@azre.gov)” }, { “name”: “J. Marshall”, “role”: “ADRE staff”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”, “notes”: “Email recipient (jmarshall@azre.gov)” }, { “name”: “N. Cano”, “role”: “ADRE staff”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”, “notes”: “Email recipient (ncano@azre.gov)” } ] }


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jerry Gravelle (petitioner)
    Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu
    Homeowner; also served as Secretary/Treasurer on the Board in Nov 2015
  • Patricia Gravelle (petitioner)
    Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu
    Homeowner

Respondent Side

  • Kenneth E. Moyer (attorney)
    Law Offices of Kenneth E. Moyer, PLLC
    Attorney for Respondent
  • Gary Himango (affiant)
    Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu
    Submitted affidavit for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • M. Aguirre (clerk)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Transmitted documents
  • L. Dettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient (LDettorre@azre.gov)
  • D. Jones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient (djones@azre.gov)
  • J. Marshall (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient (jmarshall@azre.gov)
  • N. Cano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient (ncano@azre.gov)

Jerry and Patricia Gravelle vs. Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716008-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-01-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry and Patricia Gravelle Counsel
Respondent Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu Counsel Kenneth E. Moyer, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.3; CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.6

Outcome Summary

The Commissioner adopted the ALJ's recommendation to dismiss the petition, finding that the HOA was not required by the governing documents (CC&Rs) or state law (Arizona Condominium Act) to insure against damages to the interior finished surfaces of the petitioners' individual condominium unit.

Why this result: The CC&Rs put Petitioners on notice that Respondent was not required to provide insurance coverage for damages to their individual unit, and Petitioners did not establish that Respondent was responsible for the damages.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA responsibility to insure unit interior damages caused by sewer backup

Petitioners claimed Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs (specifically Sections 11.7.3 and 11.7.6) by not providing insurance coverage for $6,697.70 in damages to the interior of their individual unit caused by a sewer backup. The HOA contended the CC&Rs and Arizona Condominium Act place this responsibility on the unit owner.

Orders: The petition was dismissed, and no action was required of the Respondent.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominiums, Insurance Coverage, CC&Rs Interpretation, Unit Boundaries, Maintenance Responsibility
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.3
  • CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.6

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 528194.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:55 (58.8 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 528432.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:56 (63.1 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 535933.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:56 (131.6 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 539997.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:57 (1010.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716008-REL


Briefing: Gravelle v. Village Parc Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the key findings and legal determinations from an administrative case between homeowners Jerry and Patricia Gravelle and the Village Parc Homeowners Association of Havasu (HOA). The dispute centered on liability for damages within the Gravelles’ condominium unit caused by a sewer backup.

The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded, and the Department Commissioner affirmed, that the HOA’s governing documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—unambiguously place the responsibility for insuring the interior of an individual unit on the unit owner, not the HOA.

The ruling established that the HOA’s master insurance policy, provided by Travelers, was only obligated to cover what the CC&Rs required. Arguments based on the HOA’s past payments for minor damages in other units, an erroneous initial statement by an insurance adjuster on a prior claim, and the HOA Board’s own mistaken interpretation of its duties were all found to be insufficient to override the plain written language of the governing documents. The final decision reinforces the principle that unit owners are responsible for understanding their CC&Rs and securing adequate personal insurance for their property.

I. Case Overview and Final Disposition

Case Identification: No. 17F-H1716008-REL

Parties:

Petitioners: Jerry and Patricia Gravelle, owners of Unit 14 in the Village Parc development.

Respondent: Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu (“the Association”).

Adjudicating Body: The case was heard in the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Diane Mihalsky. The final order was issued by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Key Dates:

Hearing Date: November 10, 2016

ALJ Decision: December 22, 2016

Final Order: January 3, 2017

Final Disposition: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s recommendation and ordered that the petition be dismissed. This constituted a final administrative action, effective immediately. Parties were advised of their right to file for rehearing or appeal for judicial review.

II. The Core Dispute: Insurance for Sewer Backup Damage

On or about October 23, 2015, the Petitioners’ condominium (Unit 14), along with two other units, suffered damage from a sewer backup. The central conflict arose from determining which party was financially responsible for the repairs inside the Petitioners’ unit.

Petitioners’ Claim: The Gravelles filed a petition on August 31, 2016, alleging the Association violated Articles 11.7.3 and 11.7.6 of the CC&Rs by failing to provide insurance coverage for the full extent of the damages. Their personal insurance policy did not cover sewer backups. They requested the Association pay $6,697.70 to reimburse them for the loss that the Association’s insurer, Travelers, declined to cover.

Insurance Claim Outcome:

◦ The Association submitted a claim for the sewer backup damages to its insurer, Travelers.

◦ Travelers determined that its policy covered damages to the common elements associated with the unit and issued a check to the Petitioners for $338.64.

◦ Travelers concluded there was no coverage under the policy for damage to the interior of the Petitioners’ unit. This denial was based on the CC&Rs, which establish that the unit owner is responsible for the finished surfaces and personal property within their unit.

III. Analysis of Governing Documents and Legal Framework

The ALJ’s decision was grounded in a strict interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs, its insurance contract, and the Arizona Condominium Act.

Document / Statute

Key Provisions and Implications

Village Parc CC&Rs

Unit Definition (Sec. 2.2.1): A unit is defined as the space “bounded by and contained within the interior finished surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors and ceilings.”

Insurance Responsibility (Sec. 11.7.3): The Association’s master policy is explicitly “not be required to insure the personal property within any individual Unit, which insurance shall be the responsibility and risk of the Unit Owners.”

Liability Limitation (Sec. 11.7.5): The Association is not liable to any owner “if any risk or hazard is not covered by insurance or the amount is inadequate.” It places the burden on each owner to ascertain the Association’s coverage and procure their own additional insurance.

Travelers Insurance Policy

Conditional Coverage Endorsement: The policy covers certain property (fixtures, alterations, appliances) contained within a unit, but only “if your Condominium Association Agreement requires you to insure it.” Since the CC&Rs do not require the Association to insure unit interiors, this coverage was not triggered.

Primary Insurance: The policy states it is “intended to be primary, and not to contribute with such other insurance” a unit-owner may have.

Arizona Condominium Act

Unit Definition (A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)): Reinforces the CC&Rs by defining finished surfaces—”lath, furring, wallboard… tiles, wallpaper, paint, finished flooring”—as part of the unit. All other portions of walls, floors, or ceilings are common elements.

Maintenance Responsibility (A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)): The law specifies that “the association is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the common elements and each unit owner is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the unit.”

IV. Petitioners’ Arguments and the ALJ’s Rejection

The Petitioners presented evidence of past practices by both the Association and Travelers, arguing these created an expectation of coverage. The ALJ systematically rejected these arguments.

Argument 1: The Association’s Past Payments for Unit Repairs

Petitioners’ Evidence: The Association had authorized payments for repairs inside other units on prior occasions:

June 2011: $153.74, $75.00, and $296.11 for damage to Units 3 and 5 from a broken shower drain.

January 2012: $449.45 to repair kitchen cabinets in Unit 6 damaged by a broken roof vent.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The fact that the Association’s Board made “actual payments of small amounts for damages to individually owned units” does not legally amend the plain language of the CC&Rs. Notably, the Association did not submit these prior incidents to its insurer.

Argument 2: Travelers’ Prior Actions

Petitioners’ Evidence: In a 2014 claim, a Travelers adjuster initially determined that the policy did provide coverage for damage done to a unit, not just limited common elements.

ALJ’s Conclusion: Travelers later stated the adjuster had erred and confirmed no claim for unit damage was ultimately paid. The ALJ found that the “adjuster’s initial error in the 2014 claim does not estop Travelers from denying the claim for damages to Petitioners’ unit” in 2015.

Argument 3: The Association Board’s Own Interpretation

Petitioners’ Evidence: At a November 2015 board meeting, where Mr. Gravelle served as secretary/treasurer, the Board itself determined that the CC&Rs did require the Association to provide insurance coverage for all damages to Unit 14.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The Board’s “erroneous opinion” does not have the legal power to amend the CC&Rs or the binding terms of the Travelers insurance policy.

V. Core Legal Principles and Final Decision

The dismissal of the petition was based on several foundational legal principles.

Primacy of Written Documents: The decision gave superior weight to the “plain language” of the CC&Rs and the insurance contract over inconsistent past practices or mistaken interpretations.

Burden of Proof: As the filing party, the Petitioners had the burden to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Association violated the CC&Rs. The ALJ determined they failed to meet this standard.

Clear Delineation of Responsibility: Both the CC&Rs and Arizona state law create a clear separation of financial and maintenance responsibilities: the Association is responsible for common elements, while individual owners are responsible for their units.

Presumption of Knowledge: The decision cited the legal principle that “Everyone is presumed to know the law.” The CC&Rs put the Petitioners on constructive notice that they were responsible for insuring their individual unit against risks like a sewer backup. Their failure to procure such coverage was their own responsibility.


Jerry and Patricia Gravelle vs. Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716008-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-01-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry and Patricia Gravelle Counsel
Respondent Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu Counsel Kenneth E. Moyer, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.3; CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.6

Outcome Summary

The Commissioner adopted the ALJ's recommendation to dismiss the petition, finding that the HOA was not required by the governing documents (CC&Rs) or state law (Arizona Condominium Act) to insure against damages to the interior finished surfaces of the petitioners' individual condominium unit.

Why this result: The CC&Rs put Petitioners on notice that Respondent was not required to provide insurance coverage for damages to their individual unit, and Petitioners did not establish that Respondent was responsible for the damages.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA responsibility to insure unit interior damages caused by sewer backup

Petitioners claimed Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs (specifically Sections 11.7.3 and 11.7.6) by not providing insurance coverage for $6,697.70 in damages to the interior of their individual unit caused by a sewer backup. The HOA contended the CC&Rs and Arizona Condominium Act place this responsibility on the unit owner.

Orders: The petition was dismissed, and no action was required of the Respondent.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominiums, Insurance Coverage, CC&Rs Interpretation, Unit Boundaries, Maintenance Responsibility
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.3
  • CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.6

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 528194.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:04 (58.8 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 528432.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:04 (63.1 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 535933.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:05 (131.6 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 539997.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:07 (1010.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716008-REL


Briefing: Gravelle v. Village Parc Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the key findings and legal determinations from an administrative case between homeowners Jerry and Patricia Gravelle and the Village Parc Homeowners Association of Havasu (HOA). The dispute centered on liability for damages within the Gravelles’ condominium unit caused by a sewer backup.

The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded, and the Department Commissioner affirmed, that the HOA’s governing documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—unambiguously place the responsibility for insuring the interior of an individual unit on the unit owner, not the HOA.

The ruling established that the HOA’s master insurance policy, provided by Travelers, was only obligated to cover what the CC&Rs required. Arguments based on the HOA’s past payments for minor damages in other units, an erroneous initial statement by an insurance adjuster on a prior claim, and the HOA Board’s own mistaken interpretation of its duties were all found to be insufficient to override the plain written language of the governing documents. The final decision reinforces the principle that unit owners are responsible for understanding their CC&Rs and securing adequate personal insurance for their property.

I. Case Overview and Final Disposition

Case Identification: No. 17F-H1716008-REL

Parties:

Petitioners: Jerry and Patricia Gravelle, owners of Unit 14 in the Village Parc development.

Respondent: Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu (“the Association”).

Adjudicating Body: The case was heard in the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Diane Mihalsky. The final order was issued by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Key Dates:

Hearing Date: November 10, 2016

ALJ Decision: December 22, 2016

Final Order: January 3, 2017

Final Disposition: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s recommendation and ordered that the petition be dismissed. This constituted a final administrative action, effective immediately. Parties were advised of their right to file for rehearing or appeal for judicial review.

II. The Core Dispute: Insurance for Sewer Backup Damage

On or about October 23, 2015, the Petitioners’ condominium (Unit 14), along with two other units, suffered damage from a sewer backup. The central conflict arose from determining which party was financially responsible for the repairs inside the Petitioners’ unit.

Petitioners’ Claim: The Gravelles filed a petition on August 31, 2016, alleging the Association violated Articles 11.7.3 and 11.7.6 of the CC&Rs by failing to provide insurance coverage for the full extent of the damages. Their personal insurance policy did not cover sewer backups. They requested the Association pay $6,697.70 to reimburse them for the loss that the Association’s insurer, Travelers, declined to cover.

Insurance Claim Outcome:

◦ The Association submitted a claim for the sewer backup damages to its insurer, Travelers.

◦ Travelers determined that its policy covered damages to the common elements associated with the unit and issued a check to the Petitioners for $338.64.

◦ Travelers concluded there was no coverage under the policy for damage to the interior of the Petitioners’ unit. This denial was based on the CC&Rs, which establish that the unit owner is responsible for the finished surfaces and personal property within their unit.

III. Analysis of Governing Documents and Legal Framework

The ALJ’s decision was grounded in a strict interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs, its insurance contract, and the Arizona Condominium Act.

Document / Statute

Key Provisions and Implications

Village Parc CC&Rs

Unit Definition (Sec. 2.2.1): A unit is defined as the space “bounded by and contained within the interior finished surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors and ceilings.”

Insurance Responsibility (Sec. 11.7.3): The Association’s master policy is explicitly “not be required to insure the personal property within any individual Unit, which insurance shall be the responsibility and risk of the Unit Owners.”

Liability Limitation (Sec. 11.7.5): The Association is not liable to any owner “if any risk or hazard is not covered by insurance or the amount is inadequate.” It places the burden on each owner to ascertain the Association’s coverage and procure their own additional insurance.

Travelers Insurance Policy

Conditional Coverage Endorsement: The policy covers certain property (fixtures, alterations, appliances) contained within a unit, but only “if your Condominium Association Agreement requires you to insure it.” Since the CC&Rs do not require the Association to insure unit interiors, this coverage was not triggered.

Primary Insurance: The policy states it is “intended to be primary, and not to contribute with such other insurance” a unit-owner may have.

Arizona Condominium Act

Unit Definition (A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)): Reinforces the CC&Rs by defining finished surfaces—”lath, furring, wallboard… tiles, wallpaper, paint, finished flooring”—as part of the unit. All other portions of walls, floors, or ceilings are common elements.

Maintenance Responsibility (A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)): The law specifies that “the association is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the common elements and each unit owner is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the unit.”

IV. Petitioners’ Arguments and the ALJ’s Rejection

The Petitioners presented evidence of past practices by both the Association and Travelers, arguing these created an expectation of coverage. The ALJ systematically rejected these arguments.

Argument 1: The Association’s Past Payments for Unit Repairs

Petitioners’ Evidence: The Association had authorized payments for repairs inside other units on prior occasions:

June 2011: $153.74, $75.00, and $296.11 for damage to Units 3 and 5 from a broken shower drain.

January 2012: $449.45 to repair kitchen cabinets in Unit 6 damaged by a broken roof vent.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The fact that the Association’s Board made “actual payments of small amounts for damages to individually owned units” does not legally amend the plain language of the CC&Rs. Notably, the Association did not submit these prior incidents to its insurer.

Argument 2: Travelers’ Prior Actions

Petitioners’ Evidence: In a 2014 claim, a Travelers adjuster initially determined that the policy did provide coverage for damage done to a unit, not just limited common elements.

ALJ’s Conclusion: Travelers later stated the adjuster had erred and confirmed no claim for unit damage was ultimately paid. The ALJ found that the “adjuster’s initial error in the 2014 claim does not estop Travelers from denying the claim for damages to Petitioners’ unit” in 2015.

Argument 3: The Association Board’s Own Interpretation

Petitioners’ Evidence: At a November 2015 board meeting, where Mr. Gravelle served as secretary/treasurer, the Board itself determined that the CC&Rs did require the Association to provide insurance coverage for all damages to Unit 14.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The Board’s “erroneous opinion” does not have the legal power to amend the CC&Rs or the binding terms of the Travelers insurance policy.

V. Core Legal Principles and Final Decision

The dismissal of the petition was based on several foundational legal principles.

Primacy of Written Documents: The decision gave superior weight to the “plain language” of the CC&Rs and the insurance contract over inconsistent past practices or mistaken interpretations.

Burden of Proof: As the filing party, the Petitioners had the burden to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Association violated the CC&Rs. The ALJ determined they failed to meet this standard.

Clear Delineation of Responsibility: Both the CC&Rs and Arizona state law create a clear separation of financial and maintenance responsibilities: the Association is responsible for common elements, while individual owners are responsible for their units.

Presumption of Knowledge: The decision cited the legal principle that “Everyone is presumed to know the law.” The CC&Rs put the Petitioners on constructive notice that they were responsible for insuring their individual unit against risks like a sewer backup. Their failure to procure such coverage was their own responsibility.


Brian Sopatk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc., Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews, Esq. and Jill Kennedy, Esq.
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show a statutory violation because the fee in question was a valid working capital fee collected under the CC&Rs, not an illegal transfer fee under A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Petitioner alleged the Association charged a $660 transfer fee, plus a $30 statement fee, violating A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits aggregate fees for resale disclosure and transfer services to $400. The ALJ found the $660 fee was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a statutory disclosure fee, despite being mislabeled by the Association.

Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 1-243

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:50 (67.9 KB)

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:51 (154.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

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Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

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Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

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Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

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Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.






Study Guide – 17f-H1716004-REL


Study Guide: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided case documents. Each answer should be two to three sentences in length.

1. What specific Arizona Revised Statute did petitioner Brian Sopatyk allege that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated, and what is the core requirement of that statute?

2. Identify the two fees charged in connection with Mr. Sopatyk’s unit purchase, the amount of each fee, and how they were documented on the HUD-1 disclosure statement.

3. What was the Association’s central argument for why the $660 fee did not violate the statute in question?

4. Who was the Association’s manager, and what explanation did she provide for the labeling of the $660 fee?

5. According to the Association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs), what is the purpose of the fee outlined in section 8.13?

6. What was the outcome of the initial administrative hearing held on November 14, 2016?

7. During the rehearing, a discrepancy was noted between Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn petition and his testimony regarding the payment of the $660 fee. What was this discrepancy?

8. What corrective actions did the Association’s Board vote to take during its meeting on May 18, 2016, after Mr. Sopatyk raised the issue?

9. What is the standard of proof the petitioner was required to meet in this case, and did the Administrative Law Judge find that he met it?

10. What was the final, certified administrative decision in this matter after the rehearing on June 9, 2017?

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Answer Key

1. Brian Sopatyk alleged a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260. This statute requires a condominium association to provide specific disclosure documents to a prospective purchaser and limits the aggregate fee for preparing these documents and other related services to no more than four hundred dollars.

2. The two fees were a $660 “Transfer Fee” and a $30 “Resale Statement Fee.” The HUD-1 disclosure statement shows the $660 fee was split, with $330 paid by the borrower (Sopatyk) and $330 paid by the seller, while the seller alone paid the $30 fee.

3. The Association’s central argument was that the $660 fee was not a transfer fee for disclosure services but was actually a “working capital fee” collected pursuant to section 8.13 of its CC&Rs. They contended that the fee had been incorrectly labeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error.

4. The Association’s manager was Amy Telnes. She testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly told the working capital fee was the transfer fee, and these fees had been mislabeled since that time.

5. According to CC&R section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”), each new unit owner is to be assessed a fee of at least twice the average monthly assessment. These fees are to be deposited into the working capital fund, which the Association refers to as its Reserve Fund.

6. Following the initial hearing, Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden found that Mr. Sopatyk had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the statute. The Judge’s decision was to dismiss Mr. Sopatyk’s petition, and this decision was adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate.

7. In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated that the $660 fee was split between him and the seller. However, at the hearing, he testified that he had in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit, meaning one of his statements had to be false.

8. The Board directed Ms. Telnes to account for all working capital fees and transfer them to the Reserve Account to correct the error. The Board also determined its system was confusing and voted to assess a single transfer fee of $400 (and no other fees) on all future transactions.

9. The petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, bore the burden of proof and was required to meet the standard of a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Administrative Law Judge concluded in both hearings that Mr. Sopatyk did not meet this burden.

10. The final decision was that Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed again. On August 10, 2017, the Administrative Law Judge’s decision from the rehearing was certified as the final administrative decision of the Department of Real Estate because the Department took no action to reject or modify it.

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Suggested Essay Questions

1. Analyze the legal concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain in detail why the evidence presented by the Association was deemed to have greater convincing force than the evidence presented by the Petitioner, leading to the dismissal of his petition.

2. Discuss the critical role of the Association’s governing documents, specifically CC&R section 8.13, in its successful defense. How did the language of this section allow the Association to re-characterize the disputed $660 fee and differentiate it from the fees regulated by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1260?

3. Trace the procedural history of case No. 17F-H1716004-REL, from the filing of the petition to the final certified order. Identify the key dates, participants (judges, legal counsel, witnesses), and the function of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate in the process.

4. Examine the actions taken by the Association’s Board during its May 18, 2016, meeting. Evaluate whether these actions demonstrated good-faith governance and a proactive attempt to correct a procedural error, and discuss how the minutes from this meeting were used as evidence in the hearing.

5. Despite losing the case, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition prompted significant changes in the Association’s fee structure. Argue whether the petitioner’s actions ultimately served the public interest for future condominium purchasers in the Lakeshore Village community, even though he did not prevail in his specific legal claim.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision based on the evidence presented.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1260

The Arizona statute that requires a condominium association to furnish a prospective purchaser with disclosure documents and other information. It explicitly limits the fee an association can charge for these services to “no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars.”

Burden of Proof

The responsibility of a party in a legal case to prove their claims. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the petitioner, Brian Sopatyk.

The Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, which are the governing documents for the condominium association. Section 8.13 of the Lakeshore Village CC&Rs authorizes the collection of a fee for a working capital fund.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Brian Sopatyk.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party defending against a petition. In this case, The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Reserve Fund

The account into which the Association deposits its working capital fees. It is also referred to as the Working Capital Fund.

Statement Fee / Resale Statement Fee

A $30 fee, separate from the disputed $660, that was paid by the seller to the Association for the preparation of the resale statement. This fee was considered part of the allowable charges under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1260.

Transfer Fee

The label erroneously applied to the $660 fee on the disclosure statement and HUD-1 form. The central dispute of the case was whether this was a true transfer fee subject to the statutory cap or a mislabeled working capital fee.

Working Capital Fee

A fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13 to be assessed from each new unit owner for the purpose of funding the Association’s working capital fund (Reserve Fund). The Association successfully argued the $660 charge was this type of fee.






Blog Post – 17f-H1716004-REL


How a $660 Fee Sparked a Legal Showdown: 5 Surprising Lessons from a Homeowner vs. HOA Dispute

We sign, we initial, we pay—assuming every line item on our closing documents is gospel. When buying a home in a condominium association, the stack of paperwork and list of fees can feel overwhelming. But what if one of those “standard” fees wasn’t standard at all?

For homeowner Brian Sopatyk, a single $660 charge from The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association wasn’t just a number; it was a thread he pulled that unraveled a surprising story of HOA governance, legal strategy, and the power of asking “why?” This post breaks down the five most impactful takeaways from a seemingly minor dispute that went all the way through a formal hearing and re-hearing.

1. A Simple Label Can Ignite a Legal Firestorm

A clerical error triggers a full-blown legal dispute.

The entire case hinged on a single, crucial mistake: the HOA mislabeled a “working capital fee” as a “transfer fee” on its disclosure forms.

Why was this one word so important? Because Mr. Sopatyk’s formal petition alleged that by charging a “$660 transfer fee,” the HOA violated Arizona statute 33-1260, which caps fees for resale disclosure services at a maximum of $400. On its face, the $660 charge looked like a clear violation of state law.

The Association’s manager, Amy Telnes, testified that when she took over her position, she was given erroneous information that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. As a result, the charge had been incorrectly labeled ever since. This simple administrative error was enough to trigger a formal petition to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, a full administrative hearing, and eventually, a re-hearing, proving how a small clerical mistake can escalate into a significant legal conflict.

2. In the Eyes of the Law, Substance Can Trump Form

Why the fee’s purpose mattered more than its name.

The Association’s core defense was that while the name of the fee was wrong, its purpose and authority were legitimate. The $660 charge, they argued, wasn’t for resale documents (the service capped by state law), but was a “working capital fee” authorized by an entirely different rule: the Association’s own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Specifically, Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs allowed for this assessment, with the funds designated for the Association’s reserve fund. This working capital fee, in contrast, was an assessment on the new owner as mandated by the CC&Rs to ensure the association’s financial health. The actual fee for the statutory disclosure documents was a separate, compliant $30 “Resale Statement Fee,” which was paid by the seller.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately agreed. The fee’s underlying purpose and the HOA’s authority to collect it (its substance) were deemed more important than its incorrect name on the form (its form). This is a crucial lesson for any homeowner challenging an HOA: it’s not enough to find a mistake on a form. You must be prepared to argue against the underlying authority and purpose of the action itself.

3. You Can Lose the Battle but Win the War

How a dismissed case led to a major policy victory.

Perhaps the most counter-intuitive outcome is that although Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed, his actions were the direct catalyst for a significant and positive policy change by the HOA.

In a summary of the Association’s May 18, 2016, Board Meeting, which was entered as evidence, the judge noted that the Board reviewed the very issue Mr. Sopatyk had raised. Under the pressure of his legal challenge, they came to a powerful conclusion about their own system, determining it was “confusing and unfair.”

As a direct result of this internal review prompted by the dispute, the Board voted to simplify its process. It resolved to assess a single, clear transfer fee of $400 on all future transactions, eliminating the other confusing fees. This proves that even an unsuccessful legal challenge can be a powerful tool, forcing an organization to confront and correct its own problematic practices for the benefit of all future members.

4. The ‘Burden of Proof’ Is More Than Just a Phrase

What it really means to have to prove your case.

In both the original decision and the re-hearing, the judge repeatedly stated that Mr. Sopatyk, as the petitioner, bore the “burden of proof.” This legal standard was critical to the outcome. It meant he had to prove his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which the court documents defined as:

The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

In this case, it meant Mr. Sopatyk’s job was to prove that the $660 fee was, more likely than not, an illegal charge for resale documents. The HOA’s defense—that it was a legally separate “working capital fee” that was simply mislabeled—created enough doubt that he couldn’t clear this hurdle.

5. A Small Contradiction Can Damage Credibility

When every word you say (and write) is on the record.

A fascinating detail appeared in the re-hearing decision, highlighting how every word matters in a legal proceeding.

There was a discrepancy in Mr. Sopatyk’s statements. His sworn petition, filed on August 9, 2016, stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660.”

The judge noted this contradiction directly in footnote 3 of the re-hearing decision, stating: “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.” While not the deciding factor, this kind of inconsistency can subtly erode a petitioner’s standing. Remember the “burden of proof” from Takeaway 4? It requires convincing a judge to “incline a fair and impartial mind” to your side. Contradictions, even small ones, make that inclination much harder to achieve.

Conclusion: The Devil Is in the Details

This case is the perfect microcosm of community association disputes. It began with a clerical error (form), was adjudicated on intent (substance), was lost on a technicality (the burden of proof), yet resulted in a victory for transparency. Mr. Sopatyk may not have won his case, but he won a better system for his neighbors.

The ultimate lesson? In an HOA, the most powerful tool isn’t always a lawsuit—sometimes, it’s a magnifying glass. It leaves us with a thought-provoking question: When is it worth challenging the system for clarity and fairness, even if the outcome isn’t a clear ‘win’ on paper?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Brian Sopatyk (petitioner)
  • Nathan Andrews (petitioner attorney)
    ASU Alumni Law Group
  • Jill M. Kennedy (petitioner attorney)
    ASU Alumni Law Group
  • Chance Peterson (petitioner attorney)
    ASU Alumni Law Group
  • Judy Sopatyk (party)
    Wife of petitioner and co-purchaser of the unit

Respondent Side

  • Bradley R. Jardine (HOA attorney)
    Jardine Baker Hickman & Houston
    Attorney for Respondent
  • Amy Telnes (property manager/witness)
    The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
    Association manager who testified
  • Michael Cibellis (association president/witness)
    The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
    Association president who testified at rehearing

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner
  • Greg Hanchett (Interim Director)
    OAH
    Signed Certification of Decision
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    ADRE
    Administrative contact for rehearing requests
  • Rosella J. Rodriguez (administrative staff)
    Involved in copy mailing/distribution

Brian Sopatk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc., Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews, Esq. and Jill Kennedy, Esq.
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show a statutory violation because the fee in question was a valid working capital fee collected under the CC&Rs, not an illegal transfer fee under A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Petitioner alleged the Association charged a $660 transfer fee, plus a $30 statement fee, violating A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits aggregate fees for resale disclosure and transfer services to $400. The ALJ found the $660 fee was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a statutory disclosure fee, despite being mislabeled by the Association.

Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 1-243

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:51 (67.9 KB)

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:51 (154.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

——————————————————————————–

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.


Brian Sopatk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc., Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews, Esq. and Jill Kennedy, Esq.
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show a statutory violation because the fee in question was a valid working capital fee collected under the CC&Rs, not an illegal transfer fee under A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Petitioner alleged the Association charged a $660 transfer fee, plus a $30 statement fee, violating A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits aggregate fees for resale disclosure and transfer services to $400. The ALJ found the $660 fee was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a statutory disclosure fee, despite being mislabeled by the Association.

Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 1-243

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:58:23 (67.9 KB)

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:58:24 (154.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

——————————————————————————–

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.


Brian Sopatk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc., Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews, Esq. and Jill Kennedy, Esq.
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show a statutory violation because the fee in question was a valid working capital fee collected under the CC&Rs, not an illegal transfer fee under A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Petitioner alleged the Association charged a $660 transfer fee, plus a $30 statement fee, violating A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits aggregate fees for resale disclosure and transfer services to $400. The ALJ found the $660 fee was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a statutory disclosure fee, despite being mislabeled by the Association.

Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 1-243

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:39 (67.9 KB)

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:40 (154.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

——————————————————————————–

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.


Barbara Printy vs. Olive Grove Village Association Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 16F-H1616010-BFS
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2016-11-14
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome yes
Filing Fees Refunded $750.00
Civil Penalties $5,000.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Barbara Printy Counsel Phil Whitaker
Respondent Olive Grove Village Association Inc. Counsel Jonathan Ebertshauser

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1243(J)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1243(J) and governing documents by failing to complete the required 2014 audit by March 31, 2015. The audit was not completed until October 2016. The ALJ imposed a $5,000 civil penalty due to the ongoing refusal to comply.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to obtain annual financial audit

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to obtain an audit of the 2014 financials. Respondent's fiscal year ended Dec 31, 2014. The audit was not received until Oct 11, 2016, despite multiple requests by Petitioner. ALJ found Respondent violated statute and governing documents.

Orders: Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner $750.00 filing fee and pay Department $5,000.00 civil penalty.

Filing fee: $750.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $5,000.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1243(J)

Video Overview

Decision Documents

16F-H1616010-BFS Decision – 528449.pdf

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16F-H1616010-BFS Decision – 538188.pdf

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16F-H1616010-BFS Decision – 540732.pdf

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16F-H1616010-BFS Decision – 562623.pdf

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16F-H1616010-BFS Decision – 564331.pdf

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16F-H1616010-BFS Decision – 564332.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 16F-H1616010-BFS


Administrative Decision Briefing: Printy v. Olive Grove Village Association Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the administrative law proceedings and final decision regarding the dispute between Barbara Printy (Petitioner) and the Olive Grove Village Association Inc. (Respondent). The central conflict involved the Respondent’s failure to conduct a timely financial audit for the 2014 fiscal year, as mandated by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) and the Association’s own governing documents.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the Respondent committed a clear violation of A.R.S. § 33-1243(J). Despite multiple requests from the Petitioner starting in early 2015, the Association did not receive the required audit until October 2016—nearly eighteen months past the deadline set in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Consequently, the Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $750 filing fee and pay a civil penalty of $5,000 to the Department of Real Estate.

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Factual Background and Parties

The dispute involves the following entities and legal context:

Petitioner: Barbara Printy, a condominium owner within the Association.

Respondent: Olive Grove Village Association Inc., a condominium owners association located in Phoenix, Arizona.

Subject Matter: Failure to provide a required financial audit for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2014.

Jurisdiction: Originally filed with the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety, the matter was transferred to the Department of Real Estate on July 1, 2016, under the authority of A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

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Governing Regulatory Framework

The ALJ’s decision was based on three distinct but overlapping requirements for financial transparency and reporting:

Authority

Requirement

Deadline

A.R.S. § 33-1243(J)

Annual financial audit, review, or compilation must be completed.

No later than 180 days after fiscal year-end.

Association CC&Rs

Books and records must be audited by an independent auditor.

Results submitted to Owners within 90 days of fiscal year-end.

Association By-Laws

Treasurer must cause an audit by a CPA.

Complete audit in even-numbered years; review allowed in odd years.

While the state statute allows up to 180 days for a financial review, the Association’s CC&Rs established a stricter 90-day deadline for a full audit. The 2014 fiscal year audit was therefore legally due by March 31, 2015.

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Chronology of Non-Compliance

The Petitioner made repeated attempts to obtain the 2014 audit, which were met with delays and conflicting information from the Association:

1. April 15, 2015: Petitioner requested the audit at an Association meeting. She was informed it would be ready by June.

2. October 15, 2015: Petitioner submitted a formal written request.

3. October 21, 2015: At a meeting, the Association directed the Petitioner to contact the management company for the information.

4. March 17, 2016: The Association informed homeowners that they would be charged $35.00 each for a copy of the audit.

5. March 23, 2016: The Petitioner filed a formal Petition with the state, paying a $750.00 filing fee.

6. August 2016: The Respondent finally engaged a CPA to perform the 2014 audit.

7. October 11, 2016: The Respondent received the audit report, one day before the scheduled administrative hearing.

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Legal Analysis and Conclusions

Violation of Statutory and Governing Documents

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1243(J). The Association admitted that an audit was required for the 2014 financials under both the CC&Rs and the By-Laws.

Defense and Rebuttal

Respondent’s Defense: The Association argued that inconsistencies between the CC&Rs and By-Laws caused confusion regarding the level of review required. They also argued against a civil penalty, suggesting the cost would ultimately be passed on to homeowners via assessments.

Petitioner’s Evidence: The Petitioner testified to the ongoing and “flagrant refusal” of the Association to comply with its governing documents. She further noted that the audit received on the eve of the hearing revealed discrepancies in financial records when compared to previously received compilations.

Final Ruling

The ALJ found that the audit should have been completed by March 31, 2015. The Respondent’s failure to engage a CPA until August 2016 constituted a clear breach of duty.

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Sanctions and Orders

The ALJ issued a Recommended Order, which was subsequently certified as the final administrative decision:

Filing Fee Reimbursement: The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner $750.00 within 30 days of the order’s effective date.

Civil Penalty: Due to the nature of the violation, the ALJ imposed a civil penalty of $5,000.00, payable to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

Method of Payment: The civil penalty must be paid via cashier’s check or money order.

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Administrative Certification and Finality

The decision-making process followed a strictly defined administrative timeline:

1. November 14, 2016: ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer issued the initial decision.

2. December 20, 2016: Deadline for the Department of Real Estate to accept, reject, or modify the decision. Since no action was taken by the Department, the ALJ decision was certified as final per A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(D).

3. January 9, 2017: A “Nunc Pro Tunc” order was issued by Interim Director Greg Hanchett to correct the date of issuance of the certification to January 9, 2017.

Notice to Parties: The final decision includes the right to request a rehearing from the Department of Real Estate or seek judicial review through the Superior Court, provided such actions are taken within the statutory timeframes. Failure to act in a timely manner results in the loss of these rights.






Study Guide – 16F-H1616010-BFS


Study Guide: Barbara Printy v. Olive Grove Village Association Inc.

This study guide reviews the administrative legal proceedings regarding the dispute between a condominium owner and her homeowners association. It focuses on the statutory requirements for financial audits, the hierarchy of governing documents, and the administrative process for resolving such disputes in Arizona.

Part 1: Short-Answer Quiz

1. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner against Olive Grove Village Association Inc.?

2. According to A.R.S. § 33-1243(J), what are the default requirements for an association’s annual financial report if the condominium documents do not specify an audit by a CPA?

3. How did the Respondent’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) differ from the state statute regarding the timing of the audit?

4. What inconsistency existed between the Association’s CC&Rs and its By-Laws regarding financial reviews?

5. Describe the progression of the Petitioner’s requests for the audit from April 2015 to March 2016.

6. When did the Respondent finally engage a CPA, and when was the audit eventually received?

7. What is the legal definition of “preponderance of the evidence” as used in this administrative proceeding?

8. What was the Respondent’s primary argument against the imposition of a civil penalty?

9. Which state departments have held jurisdiction over disputes between property owners and condominium associations according to the source?

10. What was the purpose of the “Order Nunc Pro Tunc” issued on January 9, 2017?

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Part 2: Answer Key

1. The Core Allegation: The Petitioner, Barbara Printy, alleged that the Olive Grove Village Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1243(J) by failing to obtain a required audit of the 2014 financials. She claimed the Association failed to complete this audit within the 90-day timeframe mandated by its own governing documents.

2. Statutory Requirements: In the absence of stricter requirements in condominium documents, the board must provide for an annual financial audit, review, or compilation. This must be completed within 180 days of the fiscal year’s end and made available to owners within 30 days of request following its completion.

3. CC&R vs. Statute Timing: While the state statute allows up to 180 days for a financial report, the Association’s CC&Rs specifically required the audit to be completed and submitted to owners within 90 days after the end of the fiscal year. This established a more stringent deadline of March 31, 2015, for the 2014 fiscal year.

4. Governing Document Inconsistency: The CC&Rs mandated an audit by an independent auditor at the close of every fiscal year. However, the By-Laws suggested a “complete August” (audit) was only required in even-numbered years, while a review could be conducted in odd-numbered years.

5. Progression of Requests: Printy first requested the audit at a meeting in April 2015, followed by a written request in October 2015 and further verbal requests in October 2015 and March 2016. Throughout this period, she was told various things, including that the information was with the CPA, that she should contact the management company, or that she would be charged $35.00 for the audit.

6. Timeline of Compliance: Despite the audit being due in early 2015, the Respondent did not engage a CPA to perform the work until August 2016. The Association did not actually receive a copy of the completed audit until October 11, 2016, which was the eve of the administrative hearing.

7. Preponderance of the Evidence: This legal standard requires that the evidence presented is of greater weight or more convincing than the opposing evidence. It means that the facts sought to be proved are shown to be “more probable than not.”

8. Argument Against Penalties: The Respondent argued that a civil penalty was inappropriate because the CC&Rs and By-Laws were inconsistent, leading to confusion regarding the necessary level of review. Furthermore, they contended that any penalty would ultimately be a burden on the homeowners themselves through increased assessments.

9. Jurisdictional Departments: Originally, the matter was filed with the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety. As of July 1, 2016, jurisdiction over these disputes was transferred to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

10. Order Nunc Pro Tunc: This order was issued to correct a clerical error regarding the date of the decision’s certification. It retroactively established January 9, 2017, as the official date of issuance for the certification of the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.

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Part 3: Essay Questions

1. The Hierarchy of Governing Documents: Analyze how the conflict between the CC&Rs and the By-Laws impacted the Association’s compliance. Discuss the legal implications when internal documents provide conflicting instructions for fiduciary duties like financial audits.

2. Fiduciary Transparency and Homeowner Rights: Evaluate the Association’s conduct in responding to the Petitioner’s repeated requests for financial records. Discuss whether the Association’s suggestions—such as charging $35 for a copy of the audit—align with the statutory requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1243(J).

3. Administrative Law Processes: Explain the process by which an Administrative Law Judge’s decision becomes a final agency action. Refer specifically to the role of the Department of Real Estate in accepting, rejecting, or modifying a decision within the statutory 30-day window.

4. The Significance of Civil Penalties: Assess the ALJ’s decision to impose a $5,000 civil penalty. Consider the Petitioner’s claim of “ongoing and flagrant refusal” versus the Respondent’s claim that penalties harm innocent homeowners.

5. Financial Discrepancies and Audit Importance: The Petitioner testified that the final audit showed discrepancies compared to previous financial compilations. Discuss why an independent audit is a critical tool for condominium associations compared to simpler financial “compilations” or “reviews.”

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Part 4: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A presiding officer who conducts hearings and issues recommendations or decisions in disputes involving government agencies.

A.R.S. § 33-1243(J)

The Arizona Revised Statute governing the financial reporting and audit requirements for condominium associations.

An official examination and verification of financial accounts and records by an independent certified public accountant (CPA).

By-Laws

The internal rules and regulations that govern the administration and management of an association.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

Legal documents that lay out the rules of a community or condominium and are binding on all property owners within that association.

Civil Penalty

A financial punishment imposed by a government agency or court for a violation of laws or regulations, distinct from criminal fines.

Compilation

A basic financial report that organizes an association’s financial data into financial statement format without providing any assurance or auditing.

Nunc Pro Tunc

A Latin legal phrase meaning “now for then,” used to correct an order retroactively to correct a previous clerical error or omission.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal proceeding or petition, in this case, the homeowner Barbara Printy.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning the evidence shows that a claim is more likely to be true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a legal petition is filed, in this case, Olive Grove Village Association Inc.

Review

A financial reporting service that is more analytical than a compilation but less thorough than a full audit.






Blog Post – 16F-H1616010-BFS


{ “case”: { “agency”: “ADRE”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “docket_no”: “16F-H1616010-BFS”, “case_title”: “Barbara Printy v. Olive Grove Village Association Inc.”, “decision_date”: “2016-11-14”, “alj_name”: “Tammy L. Eigenheer” }, “parties”: [ { “party_id”: “P1”, “role”: “petitioner”, “name”: “Barbara Printy”, “party_type”: “homeowner”, “email”: null, “phone”: null, “attorney_name”: “Phil Whitaker”, “attorney_firm”: “STEGALL KATZ & WHITAKER P.C.”, “attorney_email”: null, “attorney_phone”: null }, { “party_id”: “R1”, “role”: “respondent”, “name”: “Olive Grove Village Association Inc.”, “party_type”: “HOA”, “email”: null, “phone”: null, “attorney_name”: “Jonathan Ebertshauser”, “attorney_firm”: “Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC”, “attorney_email”: null, “attorney_phone”: null } ], “issues”: [ { “issue_id”: “ISS-001”, “type”: “statute”, “citation”: “A.R.S. § 33-1243(J)”, “caption”: “Failure to obtain annual financial audit”, “violation(s)”: “Failure to complete 2014 financial audit within 90 days (CC&Rs) or 180 days (Statute) of fiscal year end.”, “summary”: “Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to obtain an audit of the 2014 financials. Respondent’s fiscal year ended Dec 31, 2014. The audit was not received until Oct 11, 2016, despite multiple requests by Petitioner. ALJ found Respondent violated statute and governing documents.”, “outcome”: “petitioner_win”, “filing_fee_paid”: 750.0, “filing_fee_refunded”: true, “civil_penalty_amount”: 5000.0, “orders_summary”: “Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner $750.00 filing fee and pay Department $5,000.00 civil penalty.”, “why_the_loss”: null, “cited”: [ “A.R.S. § 33-1243(J)” ] } ], “money_summary”: { “issues_count”: 1, “total_filing_fees_paid”: 750.0, “total_filing_fees_refunded”: 750.0, “total_civil_penalties”: 5000.0 }, “outcomes”: { “petitioner_is_hoa”: false, “petitioner_win”: “yes”, “summarize_judgement”: “The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1243(J) and governing documents by failing to complete the required 2014 audit by March 31, 2015. The audit was not completed until October 2016. The ALJ imposed a $5,000 civil penalty due to the ongoing refusal to comply.”, “why_the_loss”: null, “tags”: [ “audit”, “financial records”, “civil penalty”, “untimely performance” ] } }


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Barbara Printy (Petitioner)
  • Phil Whitaker (Petitioner's Attorney)
    Stegall Katz & Whitaker P.C.
    Also listed as Philip B. Whitaker

Respondent Side

  • Olive Grove Village Association Inc. (Respondent)
    Association of condominium owners
  • Jonathan Ebertshauser (Respondent's Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC
    Affiliation inferred from mailing list address for Respondent's counsel

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Greg Hanchett (Interim Director)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Signed Certification of Decision
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission
  • Rosella J. Rodriguez (Clerk)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Signed mailing/transmission certification

Paul Gounder vs. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-12
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Paul Gounder Counsel
Respondent Royal Riviera Condominium Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner achieved a partial win. The Respondent HOA was found to have violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using substantively different ballots which impaired the voting rights of absentee members. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee, but no other relief was granted.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Key Issues & Findings

Denial of right to vote for or against each proposed action due to substantively different ballots.

The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using two substantively different ballots for the 2016 election. The meeting ballot included a seventh candidate whose name was not on the mail-in ballot, denying members who did not attend the meeting the opportunity to vote for or against all proposed candidates.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition is granted. Respondent must reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days. No other relief is available to Petitioner.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Absentee Ballot Requirements (Received-by date and advance delivery)

The ALJ concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4). While the meeting ballot lacked the statutory requirements listed in C(4), those requirements apply primarily to absentee ballots, and a meeting ballot does not need to comply if it is substantively the same as the compliant absentee ballot.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Absentee Voting, Ballot Differences, Statutory Violation, Condominium Association, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • Section 10-3708

Decision Documents

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 564851.pdf

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17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 567887.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:07 (79.0 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 575055.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:07 (689.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716002-REL


Briefing Document: Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the key events, arguments, and legal conclusions from the administrative case of Paul Gounder versus the Royal Riviera Condominium Association (Case No. 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG). The central issue revolved around the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots for its March 14, 2016, board member election.

The Petitioner, Paul Gounder, alleged that the use of a separate mail-in ballot and an in-person meeting ballot, which contained different candidate lists, violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2). Specifically, the ballot distributed at the meeting included the name of a seventh candidate, Eric Thompson, who was not listed on the mail-in ballot, thereby denying absentee voters the opportunity to vote for all candidates.

After an initial hearing resulted in a recommended dismissal, a rehearing was granted. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Suzanne Marwil ultimately concluded that the Association’s actions constituted a statutory violation. The Judge found that because members voting by mail were not informed of Mr. Thompson’s candidacy, they were denied their right to vote “for or against each proposed action.” The Respondent’s argument that the matter was moot due to a subsequent election was rejected.

The Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order on June 12, 2017. The Order granted the petition and required the Royal Riviera Condominium Association to reimburse Mr. Gounder’s $500.00 filing fee. The ruling establishes that while election ballots are not required to be identical, any substantive changes must be presented to all members to ensure an equal opportunity to vote.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview and Background

This matter was brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Petitioner: Paul Gounder, a condominium owner and member of the Association.

Respondent: Royal Riviera Condominium Association, a homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 32 condominiums.

Initial Petition: Filed on or about June 23, 2016.

Core Allegation: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and its own CC&Rs by using two substantively different ballots to elect Board members at its March 14, 2016, annual meeting.

II. Procedural History

1. Initial Hearing (October 17, 2016): A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

2. Recommended Dismissal (October 18, 2016): Judge Mihalsky recommended the petition be dismissed, concluding:

3. Rehearing Granted (February 17, 2017): The Petitioner requested a rehearing, which the Department of Real Estate granted. The Department’s order specifically requested a review of A.R.S. § 33-1250, with a focus on subsection (C)(4).

4. Rehearing (May 17, 2017): A rehearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. At this hearing, the Respondent raised a procedural question regarding the correct statutory subsection for review, leading to a temporary order holding the record open until May 24, 2017, for clarification.

5. ALJ Decision (June 2, 2017): Judge Marwil issued a decision finding that the Respondent had committed a statutory violation.

6. Final Order (June 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s decision and issued a Final Order making the decision binding.

III. The Core Dispute: The Two-Ballot System

The parties stipulated that two different ballots were used for the March 14, 2016, board election, which had seven open positions. The key differences are outlined below.

Feature

Mail Ballot (Absentee)

Meeting Ballot (In-Person)

“Mail Ballot”

“Ballot”

Candidates Listed

Six names

Seven names (added Eric Thompson)

Write-in Option

Included a blank line for a write-in candidate

No space provided for write-in candidates

Distribution

Distributed at least seven days before the meeting

Handed out to members attending the meeting

Return Deadline

Specified the date by which it had to be returned

Did not specify when it needed to be returned

IV. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner’s Position (Paul Gounder)

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2): The addition of Eric Thompson’s name to the meeting ballot deprived members who voted by mail of their right “to vote for or against each proposed action,” as they had no opportunity to vote for Mr. Thompson.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4): The meeting ballot violated this subsection because it was not mailed to all members at least seven days in advance of the meeting and did not provide a date by which it had to be received to be counted.

B. Respondent’s Position (Royal Riviera Condominium Association)

No Violation: The statutes do not explicitly require the use of identical ballots for an election.

Common Practice: It is a common practice for homeowners’ associations to use a different absentee ballot and meeting ballot.

Mootness: The issue is moot because the Association had already held another election in 2017 and seated a new board, which included the Petitioner’s wife as a member.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

In her June 2, 2017 decision, ALJ Suzanne Marwil made the following key legal conclusions:

The ALJ found that the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots did violate this statute.

Reasoning: Members who did not attend the meeting in person were not notified of Mr. Thompson’s willingness to run for the board. As a result, “these members did not have the opportunity to vote for him and hence were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot.”

Clarification: The ruling explicitly states that this finding does not impose a requirement that all ballots must be identical; however, it establishes that “substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.”

The ALJ concluded that no violation of this subsection occurred.

Reasoning: The Petitioner conceded that the absentee ballot itself complied with the statutory requirements (e.g., being mailed seven days in advance with a return-by date). The judge reasoned that a meeting ballot handed out in person would not need to contain this information if it were “substantively the same as the absentee ballot.” The legal problem arose not from a failure to mail the second ballot, but from the substantive difference between the two.

The ALJ determined that the matter was not rendered moot by the 2017 election and the seating of a new board. The Judge affirmed that the tribunal “can and does find that Respondent committed a statutory violation in the course of holding its 2016 election.”

VI. Final Order and Outcome

ALJ Recommended Order (June 2, 2017):

◦ The Petitioner’s petition should be granted.

◦ The Respondent must reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee.

◦ No other relief was available to the Petitioner.

Department of Real Estate Final Order (June 12, 2017):

◦ The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision.

◦ The Order is a final administrative action, effective immediately.

◦ The Royal Riviera Condominium Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

◦ The parties were notified that the Order could be appealed via a complaint for judicial review.