Tag Archives: 2018

John W. Gray vs. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association

Posted on November 30, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918004-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-11-30
Administrative Law Judge	Kay Abramsohn
Outcome	win
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	John W. Gray	Counsel	—
Respondent	Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association	Counsel	Austin Baillio, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to enforce parking rules (vehicle limits, garage use, inoperable vehicles)

Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.

Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 33-1258
• MCIII Rules and Regulations #2 and #3
• MCIII CC&Rs 4.12
• MCIII CC&Rs 4.13
• MCIII CC&Rs 4.14

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, Parking Rules, Filing Fee Refund, Inoperable Vehicle, CC&R Violation

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 33-1258
• A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
• A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918004-REL Decision – 674057.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:41 (139.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.

The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.

Case Overview

• Parties Involved:

◦ Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.

◦ Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.

• Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.

• Decision Date: November 30, 2018.

• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.

Background and Timeline of the Dispute

The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).

• Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):

◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.

◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.

◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.

◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.

• May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:

◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.

◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.

◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.

• MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.

• July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.

• MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.

• July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.

• July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.

Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)

The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”

• Specific Violations Alleged:

◦ Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.

◦ Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.

◦ Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.

• Evidence Presented at Hearing:

◦ Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.

◦ Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).

◦ Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.

◦ Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.

Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)

The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.

• Core Arguments:

◦ Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.

◦ Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.

◦ Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.

• Actions Taken by MCIII:

◦ Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.

◦ Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.

◦ Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.

◦ Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.

◦ Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.

Governing Rules and CC&Rs

The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.

Document

Article/Rule

Provision

Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)

Rule 3

Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.12

Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.13

States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.14

Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.

• Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.

• Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.

◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.

◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”

◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.

◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.

• Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.

Final Order

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:

1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.

John W. Gray vs. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association

Posted on November 30, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918004-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-11-30
Administrative Law Judge	Kay Abramsohn
Outcome	win
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	John W. Gray	Counsel	—
Respondent	Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association	Counsel	Austin Baillio, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to enforce parking rules (vehicle limits, garage use, inoperable vehicles)

Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.

Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 33-1258
• MCIII Rules and Regulations #2 and #3
• MCIII CC&Rs 4.12
• MCIII CC&Rs 4.13
• MCIII CC&Rs 4.14

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, Parking Rules, Filing Fee Refund, Inoperable Vehicle, CC&R Violation

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 33-1258
• A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
• A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918004-REL Decision – 674057.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:18 (139.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.

The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.

Case Overview

• Parties Involved:

◦ Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.

◦ Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.

• Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.

• Decision Date: November 30, 2018.

• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.

Background and Timeline of the Dispute

The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).

• Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):

◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.

◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.

◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.

◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.

• May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:

◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.

◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.

◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.

• MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.

• July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.

• MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.

• July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.

• July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.

Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)

The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”

• Specific Violations Alleged:

◦ Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.

◦ Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.

◦ Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.

• Evidence Presented at Hearing:

◦ Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.

◦ Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).

◦ Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.

◦ Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.

Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)

The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.

• Core Arguments:

◦ Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.

◦ Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.

◦ Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.

• Actions Taken by MCIII:

◦ Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.

◦ Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.

◦ Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.

◦ Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.

◦ Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.

Governing Rules and CC&Rs

The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.

Document

Article/Rule

Provision

Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)

Rule 3

Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.12

Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.13

States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.14

Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.

• Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.

• Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.

◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.

◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”

◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.

◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.

• Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.

Final Order

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:

1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.

Rogelio A. Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Posted on November 19, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-03-04
Administrative Law Judge	Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Rogelio A. Garcia	Counsel	—
Respondent	Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association	Counsel	Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition for rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the statutory details or the notice of the right to petition ADRE because the Petitioner failed to submit a written response by certified mail within 21 days of the violation notices.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the information listed in A.R.S. § 33-1242 (C) or the notice of right to petition in (D) because the Petitioner did not submit a written response by certified mail within twenty-one days, which is the triggering requirement for those obligations.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory requirements for homeowner association violation notices.

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 requirements regarding violation notices. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to establish the violation because he did not respond by certified mail within the 21-day statutory period, meaning the HOA was not triggered to fulfill its obligations under § 33-1242(C) and (D).

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Notice Violation, A.R.S. 33-1242, Statutory Construction, Homeowner Petition Dismissed

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• Home Builders Association of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 187 Ariz. 479, 483, 930 P.2d 993, 997(1997)
• Canon School Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Constr. Co., 177 Ariz. 526, 529, 869 P.2d 500, 503 (1994)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918009-REL Decision – 671673.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:57 (85.4 KB)

Rogelio A. Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Posted on November 19, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-03-04
Administrative Law Judge	Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Rogelio A. Garcia	Counsel	—
Respondent	Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association	Counsel	Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition for rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the statutory details or the notice of the right to petition ADRE because the Petitioner failed to submit a written response by certified mail within 21 days of the violation notices.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the information listed in A.R.S. § 33-1242 (C) or the notice of right to petition in (D) because the Petitioner did not submit a written response by certified mail within twenty-one days, which is the triggering requirement for those obligations.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory requirements for homeowner association violation notices.

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 requirements regarding violation notices. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to establish the violation because he did not respond by certified mail within the 21-day statutory period, meaning the HOA was not triggered to fulfill its obligations under § 33-1242(C) and (D).

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Notice Violation, A.R.S. 33-1242, Statutory Construction, Homeowner Petition Dismissed

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• Home Builders Association of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 187 Ariz. 479, 483, 930 P.2d 993, 997(1997)
• Canon School Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Constr. Co., 177 Ariz. 526, 529, 869 P.2d 500, 503 (1994)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918009-REL Decision – 671673.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:23 (85.4 KB)

Charles P Mandela vs. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of

Posted on November 6, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918006-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-02-28
Administrative Law Judge	Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome	none
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Charles P. Mandela	Counsel	—
Respondent	Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County Homeowners' Association	Counsel	Paul K. Frame, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.1(a)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition in its entirety, finding the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) when denying the construction of a cedar patio structure.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that the HOA violated CC&R 3.1(a). The proposed structure was found to be a second detached structure and/or a temporary structure barred by the community documents, and the Petitioner had previously failed to submit sufficient information for an attached structure proposal.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by denying request for patio structure while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly denied his request for a detached cedar patio structure (150 sq ft) based on CC&R § 3.1(A) which limits properties to one detached structure (Petitioner already had a tool shed). The ALJ found Petitioner failed to establish the violation, concluding the proposed structure was a second barred detached structure or a temporary structure (as concrete pavers were not equivalent to a required cement/block foundation). Petitioner also failed to provide sufficient architectural details for an attached structure request.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
• CC&R § 3.1(a)
• Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA rules enforcement, architectural review, detached structures, temporary structures, rehearing

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
• CC&R § 3.1(a)
• Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918006-REL Decision – 669528.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:49 (91.9 KB)

Charles P Mandela vs. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of

Posted on November 6, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918006-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-02-28
Administrative Law Judge	Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome	none
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Charles P. Mandela	Counsel	—
Respondent	Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County Homeowners' Association	Counsel	Paul K. Frame, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.1(a)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition in its entirety, finding the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) when denying the construction of a cedar patio structure.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that the HOA violated CC&R 3.1(a). The proposed structure was found to be a second detached structure and/or a temporary structure barred by the community documents, and the Petitioner had previously failed to submit sufficient information for an attached structure proposal.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by denying request for patio structure while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly denied his request for a detached cedar patio structure (150 sq ft) based on CC&R § 3.1(A) which limits properties to one detached structure (Petitioner already had a tool shed). The ALJ found Petitioner failed to establish the violation, concluding the proposed structure was a second barred detached structure or a temporary structure (as concrete pavers were not equivalent to a required cement/block foundation). Petitioner also failed to provide sufficient architectural details for an attached structure request.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
• CC&R § 3.1(a)
• Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA rules enforcement, architectural review, detached structures, temporary structures, rehearing

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
• CC&R § 3.1(a)
• Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918006-REL Decision – 669528.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:20 (91.9 KB)

Warren R. Brown vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc(ROOT)

Posted on October 18, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818045-REL (Consolidated with 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG & 18F-H1818054-REL)
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-10-18
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	partial
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Warren R. Brown	Counsel	—
Respondent	Mogollon Airpark, Inc.	Counsel	Gregory A. Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner Brown prevailed in the 045 matter regarding the excessive late fee ($25 instead of $15 or 10%) in violation of ARS 33-1803(A). However, both petitioners (Brown in 029, Stevens in 054) failed to prove a violation of ARS 33-1803(A) regarding the overall 39.4% assessment increase, resulting in those petitions being dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioners lost the challenge to the assessment increase because their definition of “regular assessment” was not supported by principles of statutory construction, which would have rendered the word “regular” trivial or void in the statute.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA charging excessive late payment fees and interest.

Mogollon charged a $25 late fee, exceeding the statutory limit set in ARS 33-1803(A), which limits late charges to the greater of $15 or 10% of the unpaid assessment.

Orders: Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee assessed against Mr. Brown and must pay to Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA assessment increase, Late fees, Statutory interpretation, Regular vs Special assessment, Homeowner petition

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 666285.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:50 (151.9 KB)

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 672623.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:51 (144.6 KB)

Administrative Law Decision Briefing: Brown and Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision from October 18, 2018, concerning three consolidated petitions filed by homeowners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against their homeowners’ association (HOA), Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The core of the dispute centers on Mogollon’s 2018 financial actions, specifically a 39.4% increase in total annual assessments and the imposition of new late payment penalties.

The case produced a split decision. The ALJ ruled in favor of Mogollon Airpark on the primary issue of the assessment increase. The judge determined that the statutory 20% cap on annual increases, as defined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), applies exclusively to “regular assessments” and not to “special assessments.” Mogollon had structured its $325 increase as a combination of a compliant 14.1% regular assessment hike and a separate $209 special assessment, a practice the ALJ found permissible under the law.

Conversely, the ALJ ruled in favor of Petitioner Brown regarding the HOA’s $25 late fee. The judge found this fee to be in direct violation of § 33-1803(A), which limits such charges to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” The ALJ’s rationale was that this statutory limit applies to all “assessments” without qualification, not just regular ones.

While the hearing was limited to these specific statutory violations, the petitions were underpinned by serious allegations from Brown and Stevens of deceptive accounting practices and financial mismanagement by Mogollon’s leadership, intended to create a “fabricated shortfall” to justify the fee increases. These underlying allegations were not substantively addressed in the hearing.

Case Overview

This consolidated matter combines three separate petitions heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The hearing was conducted on September 28, 2018, with Thomas Shedden serving as the Administrative Law Judge.

• Petitioners: Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens.

• Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

• Docket Numbers:

◦ 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG (“029 matter”), Petitioner: Warren R. Brown

◦ 18F-H1818045-REL (“045 matter”), Petitioner: Warren R. Brown

◦ 18F-H1818054-REL (“054 matter”), Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens

Core Issues Contested

The dispute arose from Mogollon Airpark’s 2018 decision to increase assessments and institute new fees for late payments and past-due accounts.

1. The 2018 Assessment Increase

The central conflict involved the legality of a significant increase in annual homeowner assessments.

• Financial Details:

◦ Previous Year’s Assessment (2017): $825

◦ 2018 Total Increase: $325

◦ Total Percentage Increase: 39.4%

• Mogollon’s Breakdown of the Increase:

◦ Regular Assessment Increase: $116 (a 14.1% increase over $825)

◦ Special Assessment: $209

Argument on the Assessment Increase

Petitioners (Brown & Stevens)

Argued that the entire $325 increase constituted a single assessment action. Because the 39.4% increase exceeded the 20% annual cap stipulated in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), it was unlawful. They contended that the term “regular assessment” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created (i.e., by motion, second, and vote), not a specific type of assessment. They further alleged that Mogollon’s governing documents provided no authority to levy a “special assessment.”

Respondent (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)

Asserted that § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.” They argued that their regular assessment increase of $116 (14.1%) was well within the 20% limit. The $209 portion was a “special assessment,” which they described as a “term of art in the industry” not subject to the 20% cap. They cited the use of the term “special assessment” in another statute, § 33-1806, as evidence of legislative intent to differentiate between assessment types.

2. Late Payment Charges

Petitioner Brown separately challenged the legality of newly instituted penalties for late payments.

• Charges Implemented by Mogollon:

◦ A flat $25 fee for late payments.

◦ 18% interest on past-due accounts.

• Petitioner’s Argument (Brown): The $25 late fee violated the plain language of § 33-1803(A), which explicitly limits late payment charges to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” Brown provided an invoice showing he was charged a $25 late fee and $1.57 in interest.

• Respondent’s Argument (Mogollon): The HOA argued that the statutory limits on late fees did not apply in this case because the fee was charged on a special assessment, which they contended was outside the scope of § 33-1803(A).

Underlying Allegations of Financial Misconduct

Although the hearing was limited to the narrow legal questions above, the petitioners’ filings contained extensive allegations of financial impropriety against Mogollon’s treasurer and board. These claims formed the motive for the contested assessments.

• Core Allegation: The petitioners asserted that the HOA leadership engaged in “numerous accounting improprieties” and used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods, including keeping two sets of books.”

• Alleged Purpose: The goal was to create a “fabricated shortfall” and present an “inaccurate picture of the HOA finances.” This was done, according to Mr. Brown, “ostensibly to show that the 2016 board of directors left office showing a loss of funds,” when in fact they had improved the treasury by approximately $200,000.

• Justification for Increase: This artificially created financial need was then used “to convince the Board that a 39.4% increase in dues was required.”

• Evidence and Testimony: Mr. Stevens submitted a 45-page petition with over 600 pages of exhibits detailing the alleged accounting practices. He testified that Mogollon possessed over $1 million and did not need an assessment increase. He also stated his belief that the $209 special assessment was a “trial run” for future assessments for purposes not authorized by the governing documents.

• ALJ’s Position: The judge noted these underlying allegations but stated, “the substance of their allegations was not addressed in this hearing.” A footnote suggested that “the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ issued a split decision, ruling for the Respondent on the assessment increase and for the Petitioner on the late fee. The decision was based on established principles of statutory construction.

Legal Principles Applied

• Burden of Proof: Placed on Petitioners Brown and Stevens to prove their allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.

• Statutory Construction:

1. Statutes must be interpreted to yield a “fair and sensible result” and avoid “absurd and unreasonable construction.”

2. Every word and phrase in a statute must be given meaning so that no part is “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”

3. When a term is used in one part of a statute but omitted in another, it should not be read into the section where it is absent.

Conclusion on the Assessment Increase (Matters 029 & 054)

• Verdict: The petitions of Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens were dismissed. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. was deemed the prevailing party.

• Rationale: The ALJ rejected the petitioners’ definition of “regular assessment.” The judge reasoned that if “regular” simply meant passed by a regular process (motion, second, vote), then the word would be meaningless (“trivial or void”), as all assessments are assumed to follow that process. This would violate a core principle of statutory construction. Therefore, the legislature must have intended “regular assessment” to be a specific type of assessment, distinct from others like “special assessments.” Because the 20% cap in § 33-1803(A) explicitly applies only to regular assessments, Mogollon’s $209 special assessment was not subject to that limit.

Conclusion on the Late Fee (Matter 045)

• Verdict: Petitioner Warren R. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

• Rationale: The ALJ found that the statutory clause limiting late fees applies to “assessments” in general, not specifically to “regular assessments.” The legislature’s omission of the word “regular” in this part of the statute was deliberate. Mogollon’s argument that the limit only applied to regular assessments required reading a word into the statute that was not there, which “violates principles of statutory construction.” The $25 fee clearly exceeded the allowable limit.

Final Orders

The ALJ issued separate orders for each consolidated docket, reflecting the split decision.

Docket Number

Petitioner

Primary Issue

Outcome

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG

Warren R. Brown

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed. Mogollon deemed prevailing party.

18F-H1818054-REL

Brad W. Stevens

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed. Mogollon deemed prevailing party.

18F-H1818045-REL

Warren R. Brown

Late Fee Charge

Petitioner Deemed Prevailing Party. Mogollon ordered to rescind the $25 late fee and pay Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.

Warren R. Brown vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc(ROOT)

Posted on October 18, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818045-REL (Consolidated with 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG & 18F-H1818054-REL)
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-10-18
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	partial
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Warren R. Brown	Counsel	—
Respondent	Mogollon Airpark, Inc.	Counsel	Gregory A. Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner Brown prevailed in the 045 matter regarding the excessive late fee ($25 instead of $15 or 10%) in violation of ARS 33-1803(A). However, both petitioners (Brown in 029, Stevens in 054) failed to prove a violation of ARS 33-1803(A) regarding the overall 39.4% assessment increase, resulting in those petitions being dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioners lost the challenge to the assessment increase because their definition of “regular assessment” was not supported by principles of statutory construction, which would have rendered the word “regular” trivial or void in the statute.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA charging excessive late payment fees and interest.

Mogollon charged a $25 late fee, exceeding the statutory limit set in ARS 33-1803(A), which limits late charges to the greater of $15 or 10% of the unpaid assessment.

Orders: Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee assessed against Mr. Brown and must pay to Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA assessment increase, Late fees, Statutory interpretation, Regular vs Special assessment, Homeowner petition

Additional Citations:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
• ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
• McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 666285.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:33 (151.9 KB)

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 672623.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:33 (144.6 KB)

Administrative Law Decision Briefing: Brown and Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision from October 18, 2018, concerning three consolidated petitions filed by homeowners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against their homeowners’ association (HOA), Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The core of the dispute centers on Mogollon’s 2018 financial actions, specifically a 39.4% increase in total annual assessments and the imposition of new late payment penalties.

The case produced a split decision. The ALJ ruled in favor of Mogollon Airpark on the primary issue of the assessment increase. The judge determined that the statutory 20% cap on annual increases, as defined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), applies exclusively to “regular assessments” and not to “special assessments.” Mogollon had structured its $325 increase as a combination of a compliant 14.1% regular assessment hike and a separate $209 special assessment, a practice the ALJ found permissible under the law.

Conversely, the ALJ ruled in favor of Petitioner Brown regarding the HOA’s $25 late fee. The judge found this fee to be in direct violation of § 33-1803(A), which limits such charges to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” The ALJ’s rationale was that this statutory limit applies to all “assessments” without qualification, not just regular ones.

While the hearing was limited to these specific statutory violations, the petitions were underpinned by serious allegations from Brown and Stevens of deceptive accounting practices and financial mismanagement by Mogollon’s leadership, intended to create a “fabricated shortfall” to justify the fee increases. These underlying allegations were not substantively addressed in the hearing.

Case Overview

This consolidated matter combines three separate petitions heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The hearing was conducted on September 28, 2018, with Thomas Shedden serving as the Administrative Law Judge.

• Petitioners: Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens.

• Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

• Docket Numbers:

◦ 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG (“029 matter”), Petitioner: Warren R. Brown

◦ 18F-H1818045-REL (“045 matter”), Petitioner: Warren R. Brown

◦ 18F-H1818054-REL (“054 matter”), Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens

Core Issues Contested

The dispute arose from Mogollon Airpark’s 2018 decision to increase assessments and institute new fees for late payments and past-due accounts.

1. The 2018 Assessment Increase

The central conflict involved the legality of a significant increase in annual homeowner assessments.

• Financial Details:

◦ Previous Year’s Assessment (2017): $825

◦ 2018 Total Increase: $325

◦ Total Percentage Increase: 39.4%

• Mogollon’s Breakdown of the Increase:

◦ Regular Assessment Increase: $116 (a 14.1% increase over $825)

◦ Special Assessment: $209

Argument on the Assessment Increase

Petitioners (Brown & Stevens)

Argued that the entire $325 increase constituted a single assessment action. Because the 39.4% increase exceeded the 20% annual cap stipulated in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), it was unlawful. They contended that the term “regular assessment” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created (i.e., by motion, second, and vote), not a specific type of assessment. They further alleged that Mogollon’s governing documents provided no authority to levy a “special assessment.”

Respondent (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)

Asserted that § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.” They argued that their regular assessment increase of $116 (14.1%) was well within the 20% limit. The $209 portion was a “special assessment,” which they described as a “term of art in the industry” not subject to the 20% cap. They cited the use of the term “special assessment” in another statute, § 33-1806, as evidence of legislative intent to differentiate between assessment types.

2. Late Payment Charges

Petitioner Brown separately challenged the legality of newly instituted penalties for late payments.

• Charges Implemented by Mogollon:

◦ A flat $25 fee for late payments.

◦ 18% interest on past-due accounts.

• Petitioner’s Argument (Brown): The $25 late fee violated the plain language of § 33-1803(A), which explicitly limits late payment charges to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” Brown provided an invoice showing he was charged a $25 late fee and $1.57 in interest.

• Respondent’s Argument (Mogollon): The HOA argued that the statutory limits on late fees did not apply in this case because the fee was charged on a special assessment, which they contended was outside the scope of § 33-1803(A).

Underlying Allegations of Financial Misconduct

Although the hearing was limited to the narrow legal questions above, the petitioners’ filings contained extensive allegations of financial impropriety against Mogollon’s treasurer and board. These claims formed the motive for the contested assessments.

• Core Allegation: The petitioners asserted that the HOA leadership engaged in “numerous accounting improprieties” and used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods, including keeping two sets of books.”

• Alleged Purpose: The goal was to create a “fabricated shortfall” and present an “inaccurate picture of the HOA finances.” This was done, according to Mr. Brown, “ostensibly to show that the 2016 board of directors left office showing a loss of funds,” when in fact they had improved the treasury by approximately $200,000.

• Justification for Increase: This artificially created financial need was then used “to convince the Board that a 39.4% increase in dues was required.”

• Evidence and Testimony: Mr. Stevens submitted a 45-page petition with over 600 pages of exhibits detailing the alleged accounting practices. He testified that Mogollon possessed over $1 million and did not need an assessment increase. He also stated his belief that the $209 special assessment was a “trial run” for future assessments for purposes not authorized by the governing documents.

• ALJ’s Position: The judge noted these underlying allegations but stated, “the substance of their allegations was not addressed in this hearing.” A footnote suggested that “the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ issued a split decision, ruling for the Respondent on the assessment increase and for the Petitioner on the late fee. The decision was based on established principles of statutory construction.

Legal Principles Applied

• Burden of Proof: Placed on Petitioners Brown and Stevens to prove their allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.

• Statutory Construction:

1. Statutes must be interpreted to yield a “fair and sensible result” and avoid “absurd and unreasonable construction.”

2. Every word and phrase in a statute must be given meaning so that no part is “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”

3. When a term is used in one part of a statute but omitted in another, it should not be read into the section where it is absent.

Conclusion on the Assessment Increase (Matters 029 & 054)

• Verdict: The petitions of Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens were dismissed. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. was deemed the prevailing party.

• Rationale: The ALJ rejected the petitioners’ definition of “regular assessment.” The judge reasoned that if “regular” simply meant passed by a regular process (motion, second, vote), then the word would be meaningless (“trivial or void”), as all assessments are assumed to follow that process. This would violate a core principle of statutory construction. Therefore, the legislature must have intended “regular assessment” to be a specific type of assessment, distinct from others like “special assessments.” Because the 20% cap in § 33-1803(A) explicitly applies only to regular assessments, Mogollon’s $209 special assessment was not subject to that limit.

Conclusion on the Late Fee (Matter 045)

• Verdict: Petitioner Warren R. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

• Rationale: The ALJ found that the statutory clause limiting late fees applies to “assessments” in general, not specifically to “regular assessments.” The legislature’s omission of the word “regular” in this part of the statute was deliberate. Mogollon’s argument that the limit only applied to regular assessments required reading a word into the statute that was not there, which “violates principles of statutory construction.” The $25 fee clearly exceeded the allowable limit.

Final Orders

The ALJ issued separate orders for each consolidated docket, reflecting the split decision.

Docket Number

Petitioner

Primary Issue

Outcome

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG

Warren R. Brown

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed. Mogollon deemed prevailing party.

18F-H1818054-REL

Brad W. Stevens

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed. Mogollon deemed prevailing party.

18F-H1818045-REL

Warren R. Brown

Late Fee Charge

Petitioner Deemed Prevailing Party. Mogollon ordered to rescind the $25 late fee and pay Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.

Brent J Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association

Posted on October 9, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818050-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-10-11
Administrative Law Judge	Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Brent J. Mathews	Counsel	—
Respondent	American Ranch Community Association	Counsel	Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik

Alleged Violations

American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.

Why this result: The Board was authorized to grant a variance to the CC&Rs regarding the well on Lot 2, a power delegated to the Association, meaning the Board did not exceed its authority under the Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, when the Board entered into the 'Well Agreement' (Well Agreement 2).

Petitioner asserted that the Board violated the Bylaws by entering into Well Agreement 2, claiming the Board lacked the authority to grant exceptions or variances to the CC&Rs regarding the use of a private water well on Lot 2. The Board agreed the well existed in violation of CC&Rs Section 3.26, but argued Well Agreement 2 constituted a variance, not an amendment.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA authority, Bylaws 3.11, CC&Rs, Variance, Amendment, Well Agreement, Burden of Proof, Dismissal

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818050-REL Decision – 664186.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:00 (112.4 KB)

Briefing Document: Analysis of Administrative Law Judge Decision in Mathews vs. American Ranch Community Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818050-REL, a dispute between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and the Respondent, American Ranch Community Association. The petition, filed on May 16, 2018, was ultimately dismissed by the ALJ on October 11, 2018.

The core of the dispute was the American Ranch Board of Directors’ authority to enter into a “Well Agreement” on August 9, 2016, with the owners of Lot 2. This agreement permitted the continued use of a private well for irrigation, an activity explicitly prohibited by the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Petitioner argued that this agreement constituted an unauthorized amendment to the CC&Rs, an action requiring a 75% vote of the membership, and therefore violated the Board’s powers as defined in the community’s Bylaws.

The ALJ’s decision hinged on the critical legal distinction between a “variance” and an “amendment.” The Judge concluded that the Board’s action was not an amendment but a variance granted to an individual owner. The ruling established that the community’s governing documents delegate the power to grant variances to the Architectural Review Committee. According to the Bylaws, the Board of Directors is empowered to exercise any authority delegated to the Association that is not exclusively reserved for the membership. As the power to grant variances was not reserved for the membership, the Board acted within its authority. Consequently, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, leading to the dismissal of the case.

Case Overview

Case Name

Brent J. Mathews vs. American Ranch Community Association

Case Number

18F-H1818050-REL

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Petitioner

Brent J. Mathews (representing himself)

Respondent

American Ranch Community Association (represented by Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik)

Hearing Date

September 21, 2018

Decision Date

October 11, 2018

Final Ruling

The Petition is dismissed.

The Central Dispute: The Well Agreement for Lot 2

The conflict originated from a water well installed on Lot 2 of the American Ranch community around 2007. This installation was in direct violation of the CC&Rs.

• CC&R Section 3.26 (Water Wells): This section explicitly states, “The placement, drilling and operation of water wells is prohibited on all Lots except Equestrian Lots.” The use of any approved well on an Equestrian Lot is further restricted to irrigating pasture land and providing drinking water for horses.

To address the existing violation, the Association’s Board entered into two separate agreements over several years.

1. Well Agreement 1 (June 2011): The Board and the then-owners of Lot 2 entered into an agreement that allowed the continued use of the well for irrigation. A key provision required the owners to install a water meter and pay the Association a per-gallon charge equivalent to the local water district’s rate. The Board later determined it lacked the authority to bill homeowners for water from a private well, viewing this function as the responsibility of the water district, which rendered this agreement problematic.

2. Well Agreement 2 (August 9, 2016): This agreement, the subject of the legal dispute, was executed with new prospective buyers, Mark and Diane Kaplan. The Kaplans, upon discovering Well Agreement 1 during escrow, expressed concerns and stated they would be “unable to proceed with the purchase” without clarification. Under time pressure, the Board executed Well Agreement 2, which invalidated the first agreement. The new agreement permitted the well’s continued use for irrigation purposes but stipulated that “the owners would not be billed for the water used.”

Petitioner’s Position and Arguments

After initially alleging multiple violations, including an “Open Meeting Violation,” Petitioner Brent J. Mathews was directed to clarify his claim to a single issue. His final argument focused on a specific alleged violation of the Association’s governing documents.

• Clarified Single Issue: The Petitioner asserted that the Board violated American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, which outlines the Board’s powers and duties. His formal clarification stated: “When the Board entered into the ‘Well Agreement’ they may have assumed they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. The American Ranch Community Association Bylaws do not empower the Board to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s.”

• Core Argument: The Petitioner contended that Well Agreement 2 was not merely an exception but an effective amendment of the CC&Rs.

• Supporting Rationale: Citing CC&R Section 9.3.1, which requires the “written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners” to amend the CC&Rs, the Petitioner argued the Board acted unilaterally and without the necessary membership approval.

• Conclusion: By entering into the agreement without a membership vote, the Board exceeded the powers granted to it by the Bylaws.

Respondent’s Position and Justification

The American Ranch Community Association presented its actions as a necessary and reasonable response to a complex situation, grounded in its interpretation of its duties and authority.

• Immediate Justification: The Board’s decision was prompted by an urgent request from the Kaplans on July 30, 2016. The pending sale of Lot 2 was at risk due to concerns over the validity of Well Agreement 1.

• Rationale for New Agreement: The Board determined that Well Agreement 1 was likely unenforceable because the Association lacked the “ability or authority to bill the owners of the lot for water used.” The Board concluded that entering into a new agreement to invalidate the first one was the “best course of action.”

• Nature of the Action: The Respondent’s defense implicitly framed Well Agreement 2 not as a permanent change to the community rules (an amendment), but as a specific, situational resolution (a variance) to a long-standing issue inherited from a previous Board.

The Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision provides a clear legal analysis that ultimately led to the petition’s dismissal. The ruling affirmed the Board’s authority by interpreting the Well Agreement as a variance rather than an amendment.

The decision first established that the Petitioner “bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.” The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet this standard.

The central point of the ruling was the rejection of the Petitioner’s primary argument. The Judge found the argument that the agreement constituted an amendment to be “faulty.”

• Direct Ruling on the Issue: “A variance granted to an individual owner from a restriction under the CC&Rs does not constitute an amendment of the CC&Rs.”

The ALJ outlined a clear hierarchy of power derived from the Association’s own governing documents to demonstrate that the Board acted within its purview.

1. Power to Grant Variances: CC&R Section 3.31 explicitly grants the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) the authority to grant variances from restrictions in “extenuating circumstances” if the variance does not have a “substantial adverse effect on the Owners.”

2. Delegation of Power to the Board: Bylaw Section 3.11, and specifically Section 3.11.8, grants the Board the power to “exercise for the Association all powers, duties and authority vested in or delegated to the Association and not reserved to the membership.”

3. Conclusion on Authority: The ALJ connected these two provisions directly, stating: “As the power to grant variances was delegated to the Architectural Review Committee and was not reserved to the membership, the Board had the authority to grant such a variance.”

Based on this legal reasoning, the ALJ issued a definitive order.

• Final Conclusion: “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into Well Agreement 2. Thus, Petitioner failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation of Section 3.11 of the Bylaws.”

• Order: “In view of the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition be dismissed.”

Brent J Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association

Posted on October 9, 2018 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818050-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-10-11
Administrative Law Judge	Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Brent J. Mathews	Counsel	—
Respondent	American Ranch Community Association	Counsel	Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik

Alleged Violations

American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.

Why this result: The Board was authorized to grant a variance to the CC&Rs regarding the well on Lot 2, a power delegated to the Association, meaning the Board did not exceed its authority under the Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, when the Board entered into the 'Well Agreement' (Well Agreement 2).

Petitioner asserted that the Board violated the Bylaws by entering into Well Agreement 2, claiming the Board lacked the authority to grant exceptions or variances to the CC&Rs regarding the use of a private water well on Lot 2. The Board agreed the well existed in violation of CC&Rs Section 3.26, but argued Well Agreement 2 constituted a variance, not an amendment.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

• A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA authority, Bylaws 3.11, CC&Rs, Variance, Amendment, Well Agreement, Burden of Proof, Dismissal

Additional Citations:

• A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
• A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
• A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
• A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818050-REL Decision – 664186.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:00 (112.4 KB)

Briefing Document: Analysis of Administrative Law Judge Decision in Mathews vs. American Ranch Community Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818050-REL, a dispute between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and the Respondent, American Ranch Community Association. The petition, filed on May 16, 2018, was ultimately dismissed by the ALJ on October 11, 2018.

The core of the dispute was the American Ranch Board of Directors’ authority to enter into a “Well Agreement” on August 9, 2016, with the owners of Lot 2. This agreement permitted the continued use of a private well for irrigation, an activity explicitly prohibited by the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Petitioner argued that this agreement constituted an unauthorized amendment to the CC&Rs, an action requiring a 75% vote of the membership, and therefore violated the Board’s powers as defined in the community’s Bylaws.

The ALJ’s decision hinged on the critical legal distinction between a “variance” and an “amendment.” The Judge concluded that the Board’s action was not an amendment but a variance granted to an individual owner. The ruling established that the community’s governing documents delegate the power to grant variances to the Architectural Review Committee. According to the Bylaws, the Board of Directors is empowered to exercise any authority delegated to the Association that is not exclusively reserved for the membership. As the power to grant variances was not reserved for the membership, the Board acted within its authority. Consequently, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, leading to the dismissal of the case.

Case Overview

Case Name

Brent J. Mathews vs. American Ranch Community Association

Case Number

18F-H1818050-REL

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Petitioner

Brent J. Mathews (representing himself)

Respondent

American Ranch Community Association (represented by Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik)

Hearing Date

September 21, 2018

Decision Date

October 11, 2018

Final Ruling

The Petition is dismissed.

The Central Dispute: The Well Agreement for Lot 2

The conflict originated from a water well installed on Lot 2 of the American Ranch community around 2007. This installation was in direct violation of the CC&Rs.

• CC&R Section 3.26 (Water Wells): This section explicitly states, “The placement, drilling and operation of water wells is prohibited on all Lots except Equestrian Lots.” The use of any approved well on an Equestrian Lot is further restricted to irrigating pasture land and providing drinking water for horses.

To address the existing violation, the Association’s Board entered into two separate agreements over several years.

1. Well Agreement 1 (June 2011): The Board and the then-owners of Lot 2 entered into an agreement that allowed the continued use of the well for irrigation. A key provision required the owners to install a water meter and pay the Association a per-gallon charge equivalent to the local water district’s rate. The Board later determined it lacked the authority to bill homeowners for water from a private well, viewing this function as the responsibility of the water district, which rendered this agreement problematic.

2. Well Agreement 2 (August 9, 2016): This agreement, the subject of the legal dispute, was executed with new prospective buyers, Mark and Diane Kaplan. The Kaplans, upon discovering Well Agreement 1 during escrow, expressed concerns and stated they would be “unable to proceed with the purchase” without clarification. Under time pressure, the Board executed Well Agreement 2, which invalidated the first agreement. The new agreement permitted the well’s continued use for irrigation purposes but stipulated that “the owners would not be billed for the water used.”

Petitioner’s Position and Arguments

After initially alleging multiple violations, including an “Open Meeting Violation,” Petitioner Brent J. Mathews was directed to clarify his claim to a single issue. His final argument focused on a specific alleged violation of the Association’s governing documents.

• Clarified Single Issue: The Petitioner asserted that the Board violated American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, which outlines the Board’s powers and duties. His formal clarification stated: “When the Board entered into the ‘Well Agreement’ they may have assumed they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. The American Ranch Community Association Bylaws do not empower the Board to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s.”

• Core Argument: The Petitioner contended that Well Agreement 2 was not merely an exception but an effective amendment of the CC&Rs.

• Supporting Rationale: Citing CC&R Section 9.3.1, which requires the “written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners” to amend the CC&Rs, the Petitioner argued the Board acted unilaterally and without the necessary membership approval.

• Conclusion: By entering into the agreement without a membership vote, the Board exceeded the powers granted to it by the Bylaws.

Respondent’s Position and Justification

The American Ranch Community Association presented its actions as a necessary and reasonable response to a complex situation, grounded in its interpretation of its duties and authority.

• Immediate Justification: The Board’s decision was prompted by an urgent request from the Kaplans on July 30, 2016. The pending sale of Lot 2 was at risk due to concerns over the validity of Well Agreement 1.

• Rationale for New Agreement: The Board determined that Well Agreement 1 was likely unenforceable because the Association lacked the “ability or authority to bill the owners of the lot for water used.” The Board concluded that entering into a new agreement to invalidate the first one was the “best course of action.”

• Nature of the Action: The Respondent’s defense implicitly framed Well Agreement 2 not as a permanent change to the community rules (an amendment), but as a specific, situational resolution (a variance) to a long-standing issue inherited from a previous Board.

The Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision provides a clear legal analysis that ultimately led to the petition’s dismissal. The ruling affirmed the Board’s authority by interpreting the Well Agreement as a variance rather than an amendment.

The decision first established that the Petitioner “bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.” The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet this standard.

The central point of the ruling was the rejection of the Petitioner’s primary argument. The Judge found the argument that the agreement constituted an amendment to be “faulty.”

• Direct Ruling on the Issue: “A variance granted to an individual owner from a restriction under the CC&Rs does not constitute an amendment of the CC&Rs.”

The ALJ outlined a clear hierarchy of power derived from the Association’s own governing documents to demonstrate that the Board acted within its purview.

1. Power to Grant Variances: CC&R Section 3.31 explicitly grants the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) the authority to grant variances from restrictions in “extenuating circumstances” if the variance does not have a “substantial adverse effect on the Owners.”

2. Delegation of Power to the Board: Bylaw Section 3.11, and specifically Section 3.11.8, grants the Board the power to “exercise for the Association all powers, duties and authority vested in or delegated to the Association and not reserved to the membership.”

3. Conclusion on Authority: The ALJ connected these two provisions directly, stating: “As the power to grant variances was delegated to the Architectural Review Committee and was not reserved to the membership, the Board had the authority to grant such a variance.”

Based on this legal reasoning, the ALJ issued a definitive order.

• Final Conclusion: “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into Well Agreement 2. Thus, Petitioner failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation of Section 3.11 of the Bylaws.”

• Order: “In view of the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition be dismissed.”