Michelle Ruffo vs. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michelle Ruffo Counsel
Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1242, 33-1248, 33-1803(A), 33-1803(B), 33-1805; CC&Rs §§ 1.36, 1.38, 4.7, 2.8.3

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated the governing documents or relevant statutes in assessing fines for unauthorized parking.

Why this result: Petitioner continually violated CC&R § 4.7 and failed to prove Respondent violated any CC&R or statute, particularly as A.R.S. § 33-1242 did not apply to disputes concerning the use of limited common elements.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA violation of CC&Rs and Statutes by imposing parking fines

Petitioner challenged the HOA's decision to assess continuous fines against her account totaling $2,544.00 for repeatedly parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit 52, arguing the fines and enforcement lacked proper statutory process and violated CC&Rs. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof and that the statute cited (A.R.S. § 33-1242) concerning property condition notices did not apply to this dispute regarding limited common elements (parking spaces).

Orders: Petitioner Michelle Ruffo’s petition against Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • CC&R § 4.7
  • CC&R § 2.8.3

Analytics Highlights

Topics: parking violation, fines, HOA enforcement, limited common elements, due process, Arizona Department of Real Estate
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 12-349
  • CC&R § 4.7
  • CC&R § 2.8.3

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818044-REL Decision – 663567.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:05:38 (270.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818044-REL


Briefing Document: Ruffo v. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818044-REL, involving Petitioner Michelle Ruffo and Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association. The core of the dispute centers on a series of fines levied by the Association against Ms. Ruffo for repeatedly parking in condominium parking spaces not assigned to her unit.

The Petitioner argued that she had informal written permission from other residents to use their spaces, that the Association’s notices of violation were procedurally flawed, that she was the victim of retaliatory harassment, and that her own assigned space was frequently occupied by others. The Respondent maintained that its actions were in strict accordance with the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which unambiguously require owners to use only their assigned parking spaces and outline a formal process for reallocating them, a process the Petitioner did not follow.

The ALJ ultimately denied the petition, finding that Ms. Ruffo failed to meet her burden of proof. The decision concluded that the Association acted within its rights, that its enforcement actions were consistent with its governing documents, and that the Petitioner’s reliance on informal agreements represented the very “evils that the CC&Rs were designed to prevent.” As of the hearing date, the outstanding balance of fines, interest, and fees on the Petitioner’s account totaled $2,544.00.

Case Background

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Representation / Key Details

Petitioner

Michelle Ruffo

Owner of unit 52, assigned parking space #131. Appeared on her own behalf.

Respondent

Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Assoc.

The condominium unit owners’ association. Represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq. of Brown Olcott, PLLC.

Adjudicator

Diane Mihalsky

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Witnesses

Carol Lundberg

Testified for the Petitioner.

Vanessa Chapman Lubinsky & Gabino Trejo

Former and current property managers, respectively, who testified for the Respondent.

Core Dispute

The central issue is the Association’s imposition of fines against Ms. Ruffo for violating the community’s parking regulations. On or about April 17, 2018, Ms. Ruffo filed a petition alleging the Association violated its CC&Rs and several Arizona statutes by fining her for parking in spaces #38 and #40, which were not assigned to her unit #52. The Association denied any violation, asserting it was enforcing valid community rules.

Chronology of the Dispute

The conflict escalated over a period of approximately two years, marked by a series of notices, fines, and failed attempts at resolution.

August 2, 2016: The Association sends a “Friendly Reminder” to Ms. Ruffo to cease parking in space #40 and use her assigned space, #131.

August 5, 2016: A “Notice of Violation” is sent for the same issue, serving as a second warning.

March 14, 2017: A “Final Non-Compliance Notice” is issued, noting violations in both space #40 and #38. The notice informs Ms. Ruffo of her right to a hearing with the Board of Directors if requested within 14 days.

March 30, 2017: The first fine of $50.00 is assessed after Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle is again observed in space #38.

April 17, 2017: Ms. Ruffo responds in writing, claiming she has permission to use the spaces and requests the fine be waived.

April 27, 2017: The Association’s Board reviews and denies the waiver request. Ms. Ruffo was invited to address the Board but did not attend.

June 6, 2017: A $200.00 fine is assessed for two observed violations in space #40.

June 26, 2017: Another $200.00 fine is assessed for violations in spaces #40 and #38.

July 11, 2017: The Association warns that access to community amenities (pool, fitness room) will be denied if fines remain unpaid. This action is later taken.

August 31, 2017: A Board meeting is scheduled for Ms. Ruffo and her attorney, Mark F. Williman, to attend. Neither party attends, and they fail to provide advance notice. The Association incurs a $200 legal fee for its attorney’s attendance.

September 25, 2017: Fines totaling $1,400.00 are assessed for multiple observed violations.

September 27, 2017: The Association attempts to tow Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle. The attempt is aborted after she refuses to exit the vehicle and calls the Pima County Sheriff’s Office.

October 4, 2017: The Association’s attorney informs Ms. Ruffo that another hearing will not be scheduled until she reimburses the Association for the $200 legal fee from the missed August 31 meeting.

October 2017 – January 2018: A series of additional fines are assessed for ongoing violations, and Ms. Ruffo sends multiple letters requesting a hearing and protesting the fines and the $200 reimbursement requirement.

April 17, 2018: Ms. Ruffo files the formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 18, 2018: The evidentiary hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Michelle Ruffo)

Ms. Ruffo’s defense was multi-faceted, based on claims of permission, procedural errors by the Association, and alleged harassment.

Claim of Permission: Ms. Ruffo testified that since 2005, she had been parking in spaces #38 and #40 with written permission. She claimed a 2006 agreement with the Morleys, then owners of unit #56, for space #40. She also submitted a 2018 email from Julie Ruiz, a tenant in unit #53, granting permission to use space #38.

Allegations of Improper Notices: She argued the Association’s notices violated A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) because they did not always identify the person who observed the violation or provide photographic evidence.

Allegations of Harassment and Retaliation: Through an attorney, Ms. Ruffo alleged she was being “unlawfully discriminated against and harassed in retaliation for her role related to allegations that HOA President Mitch Treese misappropriated HOA funds.” The ALJ noted that no evidence was submitted at the hearing to support this claim.

Counter-Evidence: Ms. Ruffo submitted photographs dated from October 2016 to July 2017 showing other vehicles, including those of Associa maintenance and a landscaping contractor, parked in her assigned space #131.

Dispute over Hearing Preconditions: She argued that the Association’s demand for a $200 reimbursement for its attorney’s fees as a condition for a new hearing was unlawful and not permitted under the CC&Rs.

Respondent’s Position (The Association)

The Association’s case rested on the explicit language of its governing documents and its adherence to established enforcement procedures.

Primacy of the CC&Rs: The Association argued that its governing documents are unambiguous. Section 4.7 explicitly forbids owners from parking in any space other than the one assigned to their unit as a Limited Common Element.

Formal Reallocation Process: Per Section 2.8.3, reallocating a Limited Common Element like a parking space requires a formal, written amendment executed by the unit owners involved and submitted to the Board for approval. Ms. Ruffo never followed this procedure.

Rejection of Informal Agreements: The property manager testified that such private agreements are not legally binding or enforceable by the Association and create confusion, as evidenced by complaints from subsequent owners and tenants who were unable to use their assigned spaces.

Adherence to Enforcement Policy: The Association followed its documented Violation Enforcement Policy, starting with a friendly reminder and escalating to formal notices and fines for continued non-compliance.

Opportunity to Be Heard: Ms. Ruffo was provided opportunities to address the Board on April 27, 2017, and August 31, 2017. She failed to attend either meeting, and her failure to provide notice for the latter caused the Association to incur unnecessary legal fees.

Witness Testimony: The former property manager, Ms. Chapman, testified that she had personally witnessed all the charged violations.

Governing Documents and Statutes

The case hinged on the interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs and relevant Arizona state law.

Key CC&R Provisions

Section

Provision

Relevance

Motor Vehicles: “no Owner, Lessee or Occupant may park any . . . motor vehicle . . . in any Parking Spaces other than the Parking Space assigned to the Unit as a Limited Common Element.”

The central rule that the Petitioner was found to have repeatedly violated.

§ 2.8.3

Reallocation of Limited Common Elements: A reallocation requires a formal, recorded amendment executed by the owners and submitted to the Board.

The official procedure for changing parking space assignments, which the Petitioner did not follow for her informal agreements.

§ 13.1

Enforcement: Grants the Association the right to impose monetary penalties, suspend an owner’s right to use facilities, and tow vehicles in violation of the rules, after notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Provides the legal authority within the governing documents for the Association’s actions (fines, suspension of amenity access, attempted tow).

§ 1.36

“Parking Space” Definition: Defines a parking space as a portion of the Limited Common Elements.

Legally classifies the disputed parking spaces, making them subject to the rules governing Limited Common Elements.

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

The Petitioner cited A.R.S. § 33-1242(C), which requires an association, upon written request from an owner, to provide details of an alleged violation, including the observer’s name and the date. The ALJ determined this statute was inapplicable to the dispute. The judge’s reasoning was that the statute applies specifically to notices regarding the “condition of the property owned by the unit owner” (i.e., her physical condo unit #52), not her use of Limited Common Elements like parking spaces, which she does not own.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision was a conclusive denial of the petition, siding entirely with the Association.

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Michelle Ruffo’s petition against Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association is denied because Petitioner has not established that Respondent violated the CC&Rs or any statute in assessing fines against her for her repeated violations of CC&R § 4.7 by parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit #52.”

Key Legal Conclusions

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving her claims by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to do so.

Unambiguous Covenants: The CC&Rs regarding parking are unambiguous and must be enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. CC&R § 4.7 clearly requires owners to park in their assigned spaces.

Invalidity of Informal Agreements: The ALJ found that the Petitioner’s reliance on informal agreements illustrated “the evils that the CC&Rs were designed to prevent.” These undocumented side deals create instability and conflict when properties are sold or new tenants arrive, undermining the security and order of the community’s parking plan.

Respondent’s Proper Conduct: The Association was found to have followed its own enforcement policy and provided the Petitioner with opportunities to be heard.

Attorney’s Fee Condition: While the CC&Rs do not explicitly authorize charging an owner for attorney’s fees as a precondition for a hearing, the ALJ noted that A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(18) allows an association to “exercise any . . . powers necessary and proper for the governance and operation.” Furthermore, civil statutes often require a party to pay for fees they cause an opponent to incur unnecessarily.

Futility of a Board Hearing: The ALJ concluded that, in light of the Petitioner’s arguments and her “continued violation of Respondent’s parking policy over nearly two years,” a hearing before the Association’s Board would not have changed her behavior or the outcome of the matter.

Financial Implications

The conflict resulted in significant financial penalties for the Petitioner. The fines were assessed on an escalating basis for continued violations.

March 30, 2017: $50.00

June 6, 2017: $200.00

June 26, 2017: $200.00

August 9, 2017: $200.00

September 25, 2017: $1,400.00

October 17, 2017: $100.00

November 6, 2017: $100.00

As of the hearing on September 18, 2018, the total outstanding balance on Ms. Ruffo’s account, including interest and certified letter fees, was $2,544.00.


Michelle Ruffo vs. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michelle Ruffo Counsel
Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1242, 33-1248, 33-1803(A), 33-1803(B), 33-1805; CC&Rs §§ 1.36, 1.38, 4.7, 2.8.3

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated the governing documents or relevant statutes in assessing fines for unauthorized parking.

Why this result: Petitioner continually violated CC&R § 4.7 and failed to prove Respondent violated any CC&R or statute, particularly as A.R.S. § 33-1242 did not apply to disputes concerning the use of limited common elements.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA violation of CC&Rs and Statutes by imposing parking fines

Petitioner challenged the HOA's decision to assess continuous fines against her account totaling $2,544.00 for repeatedly parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit 52, arguing the fines and enforcement lacked proper statutory process and violated CC&Rs. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof and that the statute cited (A.R.S. § 33-1242) concerning property condition notices did not apply to this dispute regarding limited common elements (parking spaces).

Orders: Petitioner Michelle Ruffo’s petition against Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • CC&R § 4.7
  • CC&R § 2.8.3

Analytics Highlights

Topics: parking violation, fines, HOA enforcement, limited common elements, due process, Arizona Department of Real Estate
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 12-349
  • CC&R § 4.7
  • CC&R § 2.8.3

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818044-REL Decision – 663567.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:52 (270.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818044-REL


Briefing Document: Ruffo v. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818044-REL, involving Petitioner Michelle Ruffo and Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association. The core of the dispute centers on a series of fines levied by the Association against Ms. Ruffo for repeatedly parking in condominium parking spaces not assigned to her unit.

The Petitioner argued that she had informal written permission from other residents to use their spaces, that the Association’s notices of violation were procedurally flawed, that she was the victim of retaliatory harassment, and that her own assigned space was frequently occupied by others. The Respondent maintained that its actions were in strict accordance with the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which unambiguously require owners to use only their assigned parking spaces and outline a formal process for reallocating them, a process the Petitioner did not follow.

The ALJ ultimately denied the petition, finding that Ms. Ruffo failed to meet her burden of proof. The decision concluded that the Association acted within its rights, that its enforcement actions were consistent with its governing documents, and that the Petitioner’s reliance on informal agreements represented the very “evils that the CC&Rs were designed to prevent.” As of the hearing date, the outstanding balance of fines, interest, and fees on the Petitioner’s account totaled $2,544.00.

Case Background

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Representation / Key Details

Petitioner

Michelle Ruffo

Owner of unit 52, assigned parking space #131. Appeared on her own behalf.

Respondent

Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Assoc.

The condominium unit owners’ association. Represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq. of Brown Olcott, PLLC.

Adjudicator

Diane Mihalsky

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Witnesses

Carol Lundberg

Testified for the Petitioner.

Vanessa Chapman Lubinsky & Gabino Trejo

Former and current property managers, respectively, who testified for the Respondent.

Core Dispute

The central issue is the Association’s imposition of fines against Ms. Ruffo for violating the community’s parking regulations. On or about April 17, 2018, Ms. Ruffo filed a petition alleging the Association violated its CC&Rs and several Arizona statutes by fining her for parking in spaces #38 and #40, which were not assigned to her unit #52. The Association denied any violation, asserting it was enforcing valid community rules.

Chronology of the Dispute

The conflict escalated over a period of approximately two years, marked by a series of notices, fines, and failed attempts at resolution.

August 2, 2016: The Association sends a “Friendly Reminder” to Ms. Ruffo to cease parking in space #40 and use her assigned space, #131.

August 5, 2016: A “Notice of Violation” is sent for the same issue, serving as a second warning.

March 14, 2017: A “Final Non-Compliance Notice” is issued, noting violations in both space #40 and #38. The notice informs Ms. Ruffo of her right to a hearing with the Board of Directors if requested within 14 days.

March 30, 2017: The first fine of $50.00 is assessed after Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle is again observed in space #38.

April 17, 2017: Ms. Ruffo responds in writing, claiming she has permission to use the spaces and requests the fine be waived.

April 27, 2017: The Association’s Board reviews and denies the waiver request. Ms. Ruffo was invited to address the Board but did not attend.

June 6, 2017: A $200.00 fine is assessed for two observed violations in space #40.

June 26, 2017: Another $200.00 fine is assessed for violations in spaces #40 and #38.

July 11, 2017: The Association warns that access to community amenities (pool, fitness room) will be denied if fines remain unpaid. This action is later taken.

August 31, 2017: A Board meeting is scheduled for Ms. Ruffo and her attorney, Mark F. Williman, to attend. Neither party attends, and they fail to provide advance notice. The Association incurs a $200 legal fee for its attorney’s attendance.

September 25, 2017: Fines totaling $1,400.00 are assessed for multiple observed violations.

September 27, 2017: The Association attempts to tow Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle. The attempt is aborted after she refuses to exit the vehicle and calls the Pima County Sheriff’s Office.

October 4, 2017: The Association’s attorney informs Ms. Ruffo that another hearing will not be scheduled until she reimburses the Association for the $200 legal fee from the missed August 31 meeting.

October 2017 – January 2018: A series of additional fines are assessed for ongoing violations, and Ms. Ruffo sends multiple letters requesting a hearing and protesting the fines and the $200 reimbursement requirement.

April 17, 2018: Ms. Ruffo files the formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 18, 2018: The evidentiary hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Michelle Ruffo)

Ms. Ruffo’s defense was multi-faceted, based on claims of permission, procedural errors by the Association, and alleged harassment.

Claim of Permission: Ms. Ruffo testified that since 2005, she had been parking in spaces #38 and #40 with written permission. She claimed a 2006 agreement with the Morleys, then owners of unit #56, for space #40. She also submitted a 2018 email from Julie Ruiz, a tenant in unit #53, granting permission to use space #38.

Allegations of Improper Notices: She argued the Association’s notices violated A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) because they did not always identify the person who observed the violation or provide photographic evidence.

Allegations of Harassment and Retaliation: Through an attorney, Ms. Ruffo alleged she was being “unlawfully discriminated against and harassed in retaliation for her role related to allegations that HOA President Mitch Treese misappropriated HOA funds.” The ALJ noted that no evidence was submitted at the hearing to support this claim.

Counter-Evidence: Ms. Ruffo submitted photographs dated from October 2016 to July 2017 showing other vehicles, including those of Associa maintenance and a landscaping contractor, parked in her assigned space #131.

Dispute over Hearing Preconditions: She argued that the Association’s demand for a $200 reimbursement for its attorney’s fees as a condition for a new hearing was unlawful and not permitted under the CC&Rs.

Respondent’s Position (The Association)

The Association’s case rested on the explicit language of its governing documents and its adherence to established enforcement procedures.

Primacy of the CC&Rs: The Association argued that its governing documents are unambiguous. Section 4.7 explicitly forbids owners from parking in any space other than the one assigned to their unit as a Limited Common Element.

Formal Reallocation Process: Per Section 2.8.3, reallocating a Limited Common Element like a parking space requires a formal, written amendment executed by the unit owners involved and submitted to the Board for approval. Ms. Ruffo never followed this procedure.

Rejection of Informal Agreements: The property manager testified that such private agreements are not legally binding or enforceable by the Association and create confusion, as evidenced by complaints from subsequent owners and tenants who were unable to use their assigned spaces.

Adherence to Enforcement Policy: The Association followed its documented Violation Enforcement Policy, starting with a friendly reminder and escalating to formal notices and fines for continued non-compliance.

Opportunity to Be Heard: Ms. Ruffo was provided opportunities to address the Board on April 27, 2017, and August 31, 2017. She failed to attend either meeting, and her failure to provide notice for the latter caused the Association to incur unnecessary legal fees.

Witness Testimony: The former property manager, Ms. Chapman, testified that she had personally witnessed all the charged violations.

Governing Documents and Statutes

The case hinged on the interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs and relevant Arizona state law.

Key CC&R Provisions

Section

Provision

Relevance

Motor Vehicles: “no Owner, Lessee or Occupant may park any . . . motor vehicle . . . in any Parking Spaces other than the Parking Space assigned to the Unit as a Limited Common Element.”

The central rule that the Petitioner was found to have repeatedly violated.

§ 2.8.3

Reallocation of Limited Common Elements: A reallocation requires a formal, recorded amendment executed by the owners and submitted to the Board.

The official procedure for changing parking space assignments, which the Petitioner did not follow for her informal agreements.

§ 13.1

Enforcement: Grants the Association the right to impose monetary penalties, suspend an owner’s right to use facilities, and tow vehicles in violation of the rules, after notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Provides the legal authority within the governing documents for the Association’s actions (fines, suspension of amenity access, attempted tow).

§ 1.36

“Parking Space” Definition: Defines a parking space as a portion of the Limited Common Elements.

Legally classifies the disputed parking spaces, making them subject to the rules governing Limited Common Elements.

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

The Petitioner cited A.R.S. § 33-1242(C), which requires an association, upon written request from an owner, to provide details of an alleged violation, including the observer’s name and the date. The ALJ determined this statute was inapplicable to the dispute. The judge’s reasoning was that the statute applies specifically to notices regarding the “condition of the property owned by the unit owner” (i.e., her physical condo unit #52), not her use of Limited Common Elements like parking spaces, which she does not own.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision was a conclusive denial of the petition, siding entirely with the Association.

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Michelle Ruffo’s petition against Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association is denied because Petitioner has not established that Respondent violated the CC&Rs or any statute in assessing fines against her for her repeated violations of CC&R § 4.7 by parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit #52.”

Key Legal Conclusions

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving her claims by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to do so.

Unambiguous Covenants: The CC&Rs regarding parking are unambiguous and must be enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. CC&R § 4.7 clearly requires owners to park in their assigned spaces.

Invalidity of Informal Agreements: The ALJ found that the Petitioner’s reliance on informal agreements illustrated “the evils that the CC&Rs were designed to prevent.” These undocumented side deals create instability and conflict when properties are sold or new tenants arrive, undermining the security and order of the community’s parking plan.

Respondent’s Proper Conduct: The Association was found to have followed its own enforcement policy and provided the Petitioner with opportunities to be heard.

Attorney’s Fee Condition: While the CC&Rs do not explicitly authorize charging an owner for attorney’s fees as a precondition for a hearing, the ALJ noted that A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(18) allows an association to “exercise any . . . powers necessary and proper for the governance and operation.” Furthermore, civil statutes often require a party to pay for fees they cause an opponent to incur unnecessarily.

Futility of a Board Hearing: The ALJ concluded that, in light of the Petitioner’s arguments and her “continued violation of Respondent’s parking policy over nearly two years,” a hearing before the Association’s Board would not have changed her behavior or the outcome of the matter.

Financial Implications

The conflict resulted in significant financial penalties for the Petitioner. The fines were assessed on an escalating basis for continued violations.

March 30, 2017: $50.00

June 6, 2017: $200.00

June 26, 2017: $200.00

August 9, 2017: $200.00

September 25, 2017: $1,400.00

October 17, 2017: $100.00

November 6, 2017: $100.00

As of the hearing on September 18, 2018, the total outstanding balance on Ms. Ruffo’s account, including interest and certified letter fees, was $2,544.00.


Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-09-25
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas P. Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association Counsel James A. Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition with prejudice, concluding that the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent HOA did not meet the definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to convince the ALJ that 'roadway,' as used in the governing statute, encompassed the entire 'right-of-way' or the landscaping maintained by the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent is a 'planned community' subject to ADRE jurisdiction based on having a covenant to maintain 'roadways.'

The Petitioner claimed the HOA was a 'planned community' because it maintained landscaping at the entrance, arguing this constituted maintaining 'roadways' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The ALJ found that 'roadways' refers to the part of the road intended for vehicle travel, not surrounding landscaping, thus finding the Respondent was not a planned community and dismissing the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802, roadway definition, HOA dispute
Additional Citations:

  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817022-REL-RHG Decision – 661827.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:15 (130.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG


Administrative Law Judge Decision Briefing: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This document outlines the findings and decision in case number 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG, where a petition brought by Thomas P. Satterlee against the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association was dismissed with prejudice. The dismissal was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

The central issue was whether the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This determination hinged entirely on the interpretation of the statutory term “roadways.” The Petitioner argued that the association’s maintenance of landscaping at the community’s entrance constituted a “covenant to maintain roadways,” asserting that “roadway” should be interpreted broadly to mean the entire right-of-way, consistent with the modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets.”

The Administrative Law Judge rejected this broad interpretation, concluding that the plain meaning of “roadway” refers specifically to the part of a road used for vehicle travel. The decision was based on multiple dictionary definitions and the finding that several of the Petitioner’s own evidentiary documents contradicted his argument by making clear distinctions between a “roadway” and adjacent areas like landscaping or the broader “right-of-way.” Because the association’s maintenance activities did not involve “roadways” under this definition, it was ruled not to be a “planned community,” thereby stripping the administrative bodies of jurisdiction.

I. Case Background and Procedural History

Parties:

Petitioner: Thomas P. Satterlee

Respondent: Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association

Initial Action: On January 26, 2018, the Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the association was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

First Ruling: On March 15, 2018, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision agreeing with the Respondent, finding the association was not a “planned community” and that the OAH and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction.

Rehearing: The Petitioner filed a Rehearing Request on April 10, 2018. The request was granted on May 3, 2018, leading to new oral arguments on the dispositive issue of jurisdiction on September 5, 2018.

Final Decision: This briefing concerns the final Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on September 25, 2018, following the rehearing.

II. Central Legal Question: The Definition of a “Planned Community”

The jurisdiction of the OAH in this matter was entirely dependent on whether the Respondent met the statutory definition of a “planned community.”

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) defines a “planned community” as:

Statutory Amendment: The Respondent noted that the statute was amended in 2014 to add the clauses regarding an “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways.” Before this amendment, an association had to own real property to be considered a planned community.

III. Summary of Arguments

The dispute centered on the interpretation of a single word—”roadways”—within the statute.

Aspect of Argument

Petitioner (Thomas P. Satterlee)

Respondent (Property Owner’s Association)

Core Claim

The association’s maintenance of landscaping around the community entrance sign constitutes a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

Maintaining entrance landscaping does not constitute maintaining a “roadway.”

Interpretation of “Roadway”

“Roadway” should be interpreted broadly to mean the entire “right-of-way” or “roadway system,” including landscaping, sidewalks, etc.

“Roadway” has a narrow, plain-language meaning: the part of a road intended for vehicle traffic.

Primary Justification

The modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets,” which encompasses the entire right-of-way for all users. The term “roadway” is the new word for “street.”

The Arizona legislature’s deliberate choice of the specific term “roadway” in the 2014 amendment, despite the “Complete Streets” concept being well-known at the time.

Evidence Presented

– A letter from Pima County Transportation confirming the association’s maintenance of the landscaping.
– Numerous documents explaining the “Complete Streets” concept from sources like the USDOT and the Federal Highway Administration.
– Excerpts from the Pima County Roadway Design Manual (RDM) and county ordinances.

The language of the statute itself and the principle of statutory interpretation based on plain meaning.

IV. The Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s argument by adhering to fundamental principles of statutory construction.

The ALJ found the Petitioner’s extensive evidence regarding the “Complete Streets” approach to be irrelevant to the legal question of statutory interpretation. The decision stated:

“Had the legislature intended to include associations such as Respondent in the definition of ‘planned community’ in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), it could have used the term ‘right-of-way’ or ‘Complete Streets’.”

The judge reasoned that the legislature’s choice to use the specific term “roadway” when broader terms were available was intentional and must be respected. The fact that the Petitioner needed a “stack of documents” to argue his interpretation demonstrated that it was not based on the plain meaning of the word.

The decision centered on the plain, common-sense meaning of the word “roadway.”

Dictionary Definitions: The ALJ consulted six different dictionaries (including Oxford, Merriam-Webster, and Dictionary.com), all of which provided definitions consistent with the finding that a “roadway” is “the part of a road intended for vehicles” or “the part of the road on which vehicles drive.”

Distinction from “Street”: While some definitions of “street” included references to adjacent sidewalks, the decision notes these are described as bordering the street, not being part of it, much like buildings are not considered part of the street they line.

The ALJ highlighted that several documents submitted by the Petitioner undermined his central claim that “roadway” and “right-of-way” are synonymous.

Pima County Ordinance 10.56.020: This ordinance defines minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.” The ALJ found this language explicitly proves the two terms refer to different areas.

Pima County Policy Number 54.1: A diagram in this policy document was titled “Landscape Improvements in Pima County Right-of-Way,” not “Roadway.”

Pima County RDM: The RDM specified different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” and “Landscape Plans,” and stated that “installation of landscaping” begins after the completion of the “roadway project,” again treating them as distinct components.

V. Final Order

Based on the analysis, the Administrative Law Judge reached a definitive conclusion:

1. Conclusion of Law: The term “roadways” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) means the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel. The Respondent’s maintenance of landscaping does not constitute maintenance of “roadways.”

2. Jurisdictional Finding: Because the Respondent does not have a covenant to maintain roadways, it is not a “planned community” as defined by the statute.

3. Order: The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. The Petitioner’s petition was dismissed with prejudice on September 25, 2018.

4. Further Action: The decision noted that the Petitioner remains free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the community’s documents. The decision is binding, and any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days.


Travis Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818053-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-31
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Travis Prall Counsel
Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners Association Counsel Lydia Pierce Linsmeier

Alleged Violations

Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition following a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs because there was no credible evidence that the disputed landscaping (tree) had been originally installed by the developer.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the landscaping was originally installed by the Declarant, which was a prerequisite for HOA maintenance responsibility under the relevant CC&R section.

Key Issues & Findings

Neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R Section 7.1.4 by failing to maintain a tree in his back yard, arguing the back yard qualified as a 'Public Yard' and the tree was originally installed by the Declarant.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA maintenance, CC&R interpretation, burden of proof, landscaping
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 661820.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:14 (107.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818053-REL


Briefing: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA Dispute

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the findings and legal rationale from a homeowners’ association dispute between Petitioner Travis Prall and Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena HOA. The case centered on whether the HOA was responsible for maintaining a tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by neglecting maintenance in what he defined as a “Public Yard.”

The dispute was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, resulting in two decisions, an initial ruling and a subsequent ruling on rehearing, both of which dismissed the Petitioner’s case. The critical takeaway is that the case was decided not on the ambiguous definition of “Public” versus “Private” yards, but on a crucial qualifying clause in the CC&Rs. Section 7.1.4 obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping only “as originally installed by Declarant.”

The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that the tree in question was part of the original developer’s landscaping. Conversely, the HOA presented credible testimony from an early homeowner and board member stating that all backyards in the community were sold as “just dirt,” with no developer-installed landscaping or irrigation. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Petitioner’s arguments were based on “suppositions and inferences” and did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required to prove his claim.

Case Overview

This dispute was initiated by a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The core issue was the interpretation of HOA maintenance responsibilities as defined in the community’s governing documents.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

18F-H1818053-REL

Petitioner

Travis Prall

Respondent

Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Initial Hearing

September 4, 2018

Initial Decision

September 24, 2018 (Petition Dismissed)

Rehearing

January 11, 2019

Final Decision

January 31, 2019 (Petition Dismissed)

Timeline of Key Events

2010: Petitioner Travis Prall purchases his home, an “interior” unit, and believes the HOA is responsible for both front and backyard maintenance.

July 26, 2014: A storm knocks over a large tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. He pays for its removal while asserting it was the HOA’s responsibility.

Post-2014: The tree regrows from its remaining trunk.

2018: The HOA observes that the regrown tree’s roots are causing a “pony wall” to buckle and hires Sun King Fencing & Gates to perform repairs. The repair company recommends removing the tree to prevent recurrence.

May 3, 2018: The HOA issues a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, requesting he “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”

June 4, 2018: In response, the Petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal proceedings.

Central Allegation and Dispute

The Petitioner alleged that the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of its CC&Rs by “neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards.” His central claim was that his backyard, though enclosed, qualifies as a “Public Yard” under the CC&Rs and that the HOA was therefore responsible for the maintenance and removal of the problematic tree. The HOA’s demand that he handle the tree himself constituted, in his view, a violation of their duties.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

The case presented conflicting interpretations of the CC&Rs and opposing accounts of historical maintenance practices.

Petitioner’s Position (Travis Prall)

The Petitioner’s case was built on his interpretation of the CC&Rs and inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.

CC&R Interpretation: Argued that his backyard is a “Public Yard” because, while enclosed by a four-foot wall (two-foot block plus two-foot aluminum fence), it is “generally visible from Neighboring Property” via a community walkway.

Claim of Prior Maintenance: Testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA did provide landscaping maintenance for his backyard.

Inferences about Original Landscaping:

◦ Posited that the large size of the tree in 2010 indicated it must have been planted by the original developer around 2000.

◦ Argued that the similar design of irrigation systems across the community suggested they were all installed during original construction, including those in backyards.

◦ Noted that the sprinkler system in his backyard wrapped around the tree, further suggesting they were installed together by the developer.

Respondent’s Position (Villas at Tierra Buena HOA)

The Respondent’s defense relied on its own interpretation of the CC&Rs, consistent historical practice, and direct testimony regarding the community’s development.

CC&R Interpretation: Argued that an “enclosed” yard is, by definition, a “Private Yard,” making the homeowner responsible for its maintenance.

Denial of Prior Maintenance: Stated unequivocally that it had never provided landscaping services for any resident’s backyard. Its responsibility is limited to front yards and common areas.

Practical and Liability Concerns: Argued that it has no access to control backyard irrigation systems and that its workers entering enclosed yards would create liability issues, such as pets escaping.

Crucial Rehearing Testimony: Presented testimony from Maureen Karpinski, the HOA Board President.

◦ Ms. Karpinski, a real estate agent, purchased her home from the developer in 2002 and was involved with the community during its construction phase.

◦ She testified with certainty that her backyard was “just dirt” with no landscaping or irrigation when she purchased it.

◦ She stated that, to the best of her knowledge, “none of the homes in Respondent’s community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the back yards and were just dirt.”

Interpretation of Governing CC&R Sections

The dispute revolved around the specific language in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements.

Section

Provision

Significance in the Case

The HOA must “Replace and maintain all landscaping and other Improvements as originally installed by Declarant on the Public Yards of Lots…

This became the dispositive clause. The Petitioner’s entire claim depended on proving the tree was “originally installed by Declarant.”

“Private Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property. “Public Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is generally visible from Neighboring Property

This created a central point of interpretive conflict. The Petitioner argued the clause meant “enclosed and not visible,” while the HOA argued it meant “enclosed or shielded.” The Judge ultimately did not rule on this ambiguity.

“Visible from Neighboring Property” means… visible to a person six feet tall standing on any part of such neighboring property…

This definition supported the Petitioner’s claim that his backyard was, in fact, “visible” from the common area walkway.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the Petitioner’s case in both the initial hearing and the rehearing, focusing on the burden of proof related to a single, critical phrase in the CC&Rs.

Initial Decision (September 24, 2018)

Avoidance of Ambiguity: The ALJ acknowledged the potential merit of the Petitioner’s interpretation of “Public Yard,” stating “the language of the CC&Rs may lend itself to a reading that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the enclosed back yards of the interior homes.” However, the ALJ concluded the tribunal was “not required to reach that issue in this matter.”

Focus on “Originally Installed by Declarant”: The decision hinged entirely on Section 7.1.4. The ALJ found that the “Petitioner failed to present any evidence that the tree at issue was originally installed by the Declarant.”

Lack of Proof: The ALJ noted that the tree’s rapid regrowth from 2013 to 2018 made it impossible to conclude that the original tree must have been planted by the developer in 2000.

Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof, and the petition was dismissed.

Rehearing Decision (January 31, 2019)

Rejection of Petitioner’s Inferences: The ALJ characterized the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the tree’s age and the irrigation system as “suppositions and inferences.”

Credibility of Respondent’s Testimony: In contrast, the ALJ found the testimony of HOA President Maureen Karpinski to be “the only credible evidence offered regarding the landscaping of the homes.”

Definitive Factual Finding: Based on Ms. Karpinski’s testimony, the ALJ concluded there was “no evidence there was any landscaping or improvements originally installed by Declarant.”

Final Conclusion: As the precondition of Section 7.1.4 (that landscaping be “originally installed by Declarant”) was not met, the HOA had no maintenance duty for the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner again failed to establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and the petition was dismissed with finality.


Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-09-25
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas P. Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association Counsel James A. Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition with prejudice, concluding that the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent HOA did not meet the definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to convince the ALJ that 'roadway,' as used in the governing statute, encompassed the entire 'right-of-way' or the landscaping maintained by the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent is a 'planned community' subject to ADRE jurisdiction based on having a covenant to maintain 'roadways.'

The Petitioner claimed the HOA was a 'planned community' because it maintained landscaping at the entrance, arguing this constituted maintaining 'roadways' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The ALJ found that 'roadways' refers to the part of the road intended for vehicle travel, not surrounding landscaping, thus finding the Respondent was not a planned community and dismissing the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802, roadway definition, HOA dispute
Additional Citations:

  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817022-REL-RHG Decision – 661827.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:22 (130.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG


Administrative Law Judge Decision Briefing: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This document outlines the findings and decision in case number 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG, where a petition brought by Thomas P. Satterlee against the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association was dismissed with prejudice. The dismissal was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

The central issue was whether the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This determination hinged entirely on the interpretation of the statutory term “roadways.” The Petitioner argued that the association’s maintenance of landscaping at the community’s entrance constituted a “covenant to maintain roadways,” asserting that “roadway” should be interpreted broadly to mean the entire right-of-way, consistent with the modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets.”

The Administrative Law Judge rejected this broad interpretation, concluding that the plain meaning of “roadway” refers specifically to the part of a road used for vehicle travel. The decision was based on multiple dictionary definitions and the finding that several of the Petitioner’s own evidentiary documents contradicted his argument by making clear distinctions between a “roadway” and adjacent areas like landscaping or the broader “right-of-way.” Because the association’s maintenance activities did not involve “roadways” under this definition, it was ruled not to be a “planned community,” thereby stripping the administrative bodies of jurisdiction.

I. Case Background and Procedural History

Parties:

Petitioner: Thomas P. Satterlee

Respondent: Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association

Initial Action: On January 26, 2018, the Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the association was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

First Ruling: On March 15, 2018, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision agreeing with the Respondent, finding the association was not a “planned community” and that the OAH and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction.

Rehearing: The Petitioner filed a Rehearing Request on April 10, 2018. The request was granted on May 3, 2018, leading to new oral arguments on the dispositive issue of jurisdiction on September 5, 2018.

Final Decision: This briefing concerns the final Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on September 25, 2018, following the rehearing.

II. Central Legal Question: The Definition of a “Planned Community”

The jurisdiction of the OAH in this matter was entirely dependent on whether the Respondent met the statutory definition of a “planned community.”

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) defines a “planned community” as:

Statutory Amendment: The Respondent noted that the statute was amended in 2014 to add the clauses regarding an “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways.” Before this amendment, an association had to own real property to be considered a planned community.

III. Summary of Arguments

The dispute centered on the interpretation of a single word—”roadways”—within the statute.

Aspect of Argument

Petitioner (Thomas P. Satterlee)

Respondent (Property Owner’s Association)

Core Claim

The association’s maintenance of landscaping around the community entrance sign constitutes a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

Maintaining entrance landscaping does not constitute maintaining a “roadway.”

Interpretation of “Roadway”

“Roadway” should be interpreted broadly to mean the entire “right-of-way” or “roadway system,” including landscaping, sidewalks, etc.

“Roadway” has a narrow, plain-language meaning: the part of a road intended for vehicle traffic.

Primary Justification

The modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets,” which encompasses the entire right-of-way for all users. The term “roadway” is the new word for “street.”

The Arizona legislature’s deliberate choice of the specific term “roadway” in the 2014 amendment, despite the “Complete Streets” concept being well-known at the time.

Evidence Presented

– A letter from Pima County Transportation confirming the association’s maintenance of the landscaping.
– Numerous documents explaining the “Complete Streets” concept from sources like the USDOT and the Federal Highway Administration.
– Excerpts from the Pima County Roadway Design Manual (RDM) and county ordinances.

The language of the statute itself and the principle of statutory interpretation based on plain meaning.

IV. The Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s argument by adhering to fundamental principles of statutory construction.

The ALJ found the Petitioner’s extensive evidence regarding the “Complete Streets” approach to be irrelevant to the legal question of statutory interpretation. The decision stated:

“Had the legislature intended to include associations such as Respondent in the definition of ‘planned community’ in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), it could have used the term ‘right-of-way’ or ‘Complete Streets’.”

The judge reasoned that the legislature’s choice to use the specific term “roadway” when broader terms were available was intentional and must be respected. The fact that the Petitioner needed a “stack of documents” to argue his interpretation demonstrated that it was not based on the plain meaning of the word.

The decision centered on the plain, common-sense meaning of the word “roadway.”

Dictionary Definitions: The ALJ consulted six different dictionaries (including Oxford, Merriam-Webster, and Dictionary.com), all of which provided definitions consistent with the finding that a “roadway” is “the part of a road intended for vehicles” or “the part of the road on which vehicles drive.”

Distinction from “Street”: While some definitions of “street” included references to adjacent sidewalks, the decision notes these are described as bordering the street, not being part of it, much like buildings are not considered part of the street they line.

The ALJ highlighted that several documents submitted by the Petitioner undermined his central claim that “roadway” and “right-of-way” are synonymous.

Pima County Ordinance 10.56.020: This ordinance defines minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.” The ALJ found this language explicitly proves the two terms refer to different areas.

Pima County Policy Number 54.1: A diagram in this policy document was titled “Landscape Improvements in Pima County Right-of-Way,” not “Roadway.”

Pima County RDM: The RDM specified different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” and “Landscape Plans,” and stated that “installation of landscaping” begins after the completion of the “roadway project,” again treating them as distinct components.

V. Final Order

Based on the analysis, the Administrative Law Judge reached a definitive conclusion:

1. Conclusion of Law: The term “roadways” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) means the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel. The Respondent’s maintenance of landscaping does not constitute maintenance of “roadways.”

2. Jurisdictional Finding: Because the Respondent does not have a covenant to maintain roadways, it is not a “planned community” as defined by the statute.

3. Order: The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. The Petitioner’s petition was dismissed with prejudice on September 25, 2018.

4. Further Action: The decision noted that the Petitioner remains free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the community’s documents. The decision is binding, and any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days.


Jay A. Janicek vs. Sycamore Vista NO. 8 Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918001-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-25
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $250.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jay A. Janicek Counsel Jake Kubert, Esq.
Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association Counsel Evan Thompson, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the petition, finding that the HOA Board violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) and the Association Bylaws by amending the Bylaws on November 20, 2017, without a quorum of Association members voting in favor and without proper notice. The amendment was invalidated, and the HOA was fined $250.00 and ordered to refund the Petitioner's filing fee.

Why this result: The Board lacked the authority to amend the Bylaws without the vote of the Association membership, and failed to provide required notice for the proposed amendment, violating ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) and the Association Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association violated Association Bylaws Article III, Sections 3 & 4 and Article VIII, Section 1 in an action taken by the board on November 20, 2017.

The Respondent HOA Board amended Association Bylaws on November 20, 2017, without proper notice to the members and without a vote by a majority of Association members, which violated the statutory notice requirement and the Bylaws. The Board action was consequently invalidated.

Orders: The Petitioner's petition was granted. The Respondent's third amendment to the Association Bylaws, dated November 20, 2017, was invalidated. Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner's filing fee and pay a civil penalty of $250.00 to the Planned Community Hearing Office Fund.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $250.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 125 P.3d 373, 374 (Ariz. 2006)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Mail Boxes v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 181 Ariz. 119, 122, 888 P.2d 777, 780 (1995)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meeting Law, Bylaw Amendment, Notice Violation, Membership Vote, HOA Governance
Additional Citations:

  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 125 P.3d 373, 374 (Ariz. 2006)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Mail Boxes v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 181 Ariz. 119, 122, 888 P.2d 777, 780 (1995)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918001-REL Decision – 696205.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:32 (169.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918001-REL


Briefing Document: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 19F-H1918001-REL-RHG, concerning a dispute between homeowner Jay Janicek (“Petitioner”) and the Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (“Respondent”). The central conflict revolved around the HOA Board of Directors’ unilateral amendment of the Association’s Bylaws on November 20, 2017, without a vote of the general membership.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Petitioner, invalidating the Board’s amendment. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the word “members” in Article XIII of the Bylaws, which governs amendments. The ALJ concluded that “members” unambiguously refers to the homeowners who constitute the Association, not the members of the Board of Directors. Consequently, the Board’s action was found to be outside its authority as defined in the governing documents.

Furthermore, the ALJ determined that the Board’s action violated Arizona’s Open Meeting Law, specifically ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B), because the required notice for a proposed bylaw amendment was not provided to the Association’s membership. The Respondent’s arguments were found to be unpersuasive. As a result of the ruling, the amendment was nullified, and the HOA was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee and a civil penalty of $250.

1. Case Overview

Case Number: 19F-H1918001-REL-RHG

Petitioner: Jay Janicek, a property owner and member of the Association.

Respondent: Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (“the Association”).

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark.

Central Issue: “Whether Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (Respondent) violated Association Bylaws Article III, Sections 3 & 4 and Article VIII, Section 1 in an action taken by the board on November 20, 2017.”

2. Procedural History and Timeline

July 25, 2018: Petitioner Jay Janicek filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 5, 2018: An initial evidentiary hearing was held at the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

September 25, 2018: The OAH issued an initial ALJ Decision in favor of the Petitioner.

October 23, 2018: Respondent submitted a Request for Rehearing.

November 7, 2018: The Department granted the Respondent’s request for a rehearing.

March 5, 2019: A rehearing was held. Per a stipulated agreement, no new evidence was presented; instead, counsel for both parties submitted legal briefs and presented closing arguments.

March 25, 2019: The final ALJ Decision was issued, reaffirming the initial ruling in favor of the Petitioner.

3. The Disputed Action of November 20, 2017

At a regular Board of Directors meeting held on November 20, 2017, the Association’s Board voted to approve a third amendment to the Association Bylaws. The amendment altered Article VIII Section 6(d), which pertains to the Association’s financial oversight.

Original Clause: Required the Board to “cause an annual audit of the Association books to be made by a public accountant at the completion of each fiscal year.”

Amended Clause: Changed the requirement to “cause an annual audit, review, or compilation of the Associations financial records to be made by a public accountant within 180 days after the end of the HOA’s fiscal year.”

The Petitioner argued that while he had not been directly impacted, he could be in the future, as the amendment modified a prior third-party audit requirement. He asserted an interest as a homeowner in ensuring the Association’s financials were correct and not subject to self-auditing.

4. Analysis of Core Arguments

The case centered on the conflicting interpretations of the Association’s governing documents, particularly the clause authorizing Bylaw amendments.

4.1. Petitioner’s Position (Jay Janicek)

The Petitioner contended that any amendment to the Bylaws required a vote by the general membership of the Association, not just the Board of Directors.

Textual Interpretation: Petitioner focused on Bylaws Article XIII, Section 1, which states: “These Bylaws may be amended at a regular or special meeting of the Board of Directors of the Association by a vote of a majority of a quorum of members present in person or by proxy.” He argued “members” refers to homeowners as defined in the Association’s Declaration, not Board members.

Use of “Proxy”: The inclusion of the term “proxy” was cited as evidence supporting this interpretation, as Board members are not permitted to vote by proxy, whereas Association members are.

Delineation of Powers: Petitioner noted that Article VII, which outlines the “Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors,” does not grant the Board the authority to amend the Bylaws.

Intent of the Drafter: The argument was made that the Bylaws’ drafters intentionally used the words “directors” and “members” distinctly throughout the document, indicating that the use of “members” in the amendment clause was a deliberate choice to refer to the homeowners.

Statutory Violation: The Petitioner argued the Board’s action violated Arizona’s Open Meeting Law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804), which requires specific notice to members between 10 and 50 days in advance of any meeting where a Bylaw amendment is proposed.

Legal Precedent: The Petitioner cited Powell v. Washburn, which holds that restrictive covenants should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties as determined from the language of the entire document.

4.2. Respondent’s Position (Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA)

The Association argued that the Board of Directors possessed the authority to amend the Bylaws during a properly convened Board meeting.

Board Authority: Respondent cited Article IV of the Bylaws, which states that the “affairs of this Association shall be managed by a Board.”

Meeting Protocol: The action took place at a regular monthly Board meeting, as permitted by Article VI. The meeting on November 20, 2017, had three Board members present, constituting a quorum as required by the Bylaws.

Interpretation of “Members”: The Respondent’s central argument was that the phrase “a quorum of members” in Article XIII referred to the members of the Board of Directors, thereby empowering them to pass the amendment.

Compliance with Open Meeting Law: The Association argued its conduct was not a violation of the law because a necessary quorum of directors was present for the vote.

5. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ found the Petitioner’s arguments convincing and concluded that he had sustained his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The Respondent’s closing arguments were described as not persuasive.

Violation of Statute: The Judge determined that the Board’s action violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) because “there was no notice of the proposed amendment” provided to the Association members. The conduct was described as going “against the spirit of the legislative intent” of the statute due to a lack of transparency.

Interpretation of Governing Documents: The decision firmly established the correct interpretation of the Bylaws.

◦ The terms “members” and “directors” are clearly and intentionally differentiated throughout the document. “Members” refers to the body of homeowners, while “directors” refers to the elected Board.

◦ The conclusion states: “The voices of few cannot speak for all, unless all have bestowed those few with the power and authority to speak on their behalf.”

◦ It was concluded that the Board “does not have power to act where authority is expressly delegated to the membership of the Association.”

Invalidation of Board Action: The ALJ concluded that the Board’s action on November 20, 2017, was invalid because it was taken “in the absence of a quorum of Association members whereby a majority of said members voted in favor of the proposed third amendment.”

6. Final Order and Penalties

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders:

1. Petition Granted: The Petitioner’s petition was granted.

2. Amendment Invalidated: The “third amendment to the Association Bylaws, as taken on November 20, 2017, is invalidated.”

3. Fees and Penalties: The Respondent (HOA) was ordered to:

◦ Pay the Petitioner the filing fee.

◦ Pay a civil penalty of $250.00 to the Planned Community Hearing Office Fund.

The decision, having been issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.


Travis Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818053-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-31
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Travis Prall Counsel
Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners Association Counsel Lydia Pierce Linsmeier

Alleged Violations

Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition following a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs because there was no credible evidence that the disputed landscaping (tree) had been originally installed by the developer.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the landscaping was originally installed by the Declarant, which was a prerequisite for HOA maintenance responsibility under the relevant CC&R section.

Key Issues & Findings

Neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R Section 7.1.4 by failing to maintain a tree in his back yard, arguing the back yard qualified as a 'Public Yard' and the tree was originally installed by the Declarant.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA maintenance, CC&R interpretation, burden of proof, landscaping
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 661820.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:06 (107.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818053-REL


Briefing: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA Dispute

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the findings and legal rationale from a homeowners’ association dispute between Petitioner Travis Prall and Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena HOA. The case centered on whether the HOA was responsible for maintaining a tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by neglecting maintenance in what he defined as a “Public Yard.”

The dispute was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, resulting in two decisions, an initial ruling and a subsequent ruling on rehearing, both of which dismissed the Petitioner’s case. The critical takeaway is that the case was decided not on the ambiguous definition of “Public” versus “Private” yards, but on a crucial qualifying clause in the CC&Rs. Section 7.1.4 obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping only “as originally installed by Declarant.”

The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that the tree in question was part of the original developer’s landscaping. Conversely, the HOA presented credible testimony from an early homeowner and board member stating that all backyards in the community were sold as “just dirt,” with no developer-installed landscaping or irrigation. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Petitioner’s arguments were based on “suppositions and inferences” and did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required to prove his claim.

Case Overview

This dispute was initiated by a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The core issue was the interpretation of HOA maintenance responsibilities as defined in the community’s governing documents.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

18F-H1818053-REL

Petitioner

Travis Prall

Respondent

Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Initial Hearing

September 4, 2018

Initial Decision

September 24, 2018 (Petition Dismissed)

Rehearing

January 11, 2019

Final Decision

January 31, 2019 (Petition Dismissed)

Timeline of Key Events

2010: Petitioner Travis Prall purchases his home, an “interior” unit, and believes the HOA is responsible for both front and backyard maintenance.

July 26, 2014: A storm knocks over a large tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. He pays for its removal while asserting it was the HOA’s responsibility.

Post-2014: The tree regrows from its remaining trunk.

2018: The HOA observes that the regrown tree’s roots are causing a “pony wall” to buckle and hires Sun King Fencing & Gates to perform repairs. The repair company recommends removing the tree to prevent recurrence.

May 3, 2018: The HOA issues a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, requesting he “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”

June 4, 2018: In response, the Petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal proceedings.

Central Allegation and Dispute

The Petitioner alleged that the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of its CC&Rs by “neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards.” His central claim was that his backyard, though enclosed, qualifies as a “Public Yard” under the CC&Rs and that the HOA was therefore responsible for the maintenance and removal of the problematic tree. The HOA’s demand that he handle the tree himself constituted, in his view, a violation of their duties.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

The case presented conflicting interpretations of the CC&Rs and opposing accounts of historical maintenance practices.

Petitioner’s Position (Travis Prall)

The Petitioner’s case was built on his interpretation of the CC&Rs and inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.

CC&R Interpretation: Argued that his backyard is a “Public Yard” because, while enclosed by a four-foot wall (two-foot block plus two-foot aluminum fence), it is “generally visible from Neighboring Property” via a community walkway.

Claim of Prior Maintenance: Testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA did provide landscaping maintenance for his backyard.

Inferences about Original Landscaping:

◦ Posited that the large size of the tree in 2010 indicated it must have been planted by the original developer around 2000.

◦ Argued that the similar design of irrigation systems across the community suggested they were all installed during original construction, including those in backyards.

◦ Noted that the sprinkler system in his backyard wrapped around the tree, further suggesting they were installed together by the developer.

Respondent’s Position (Villas at Tierra Buena HOA)

The Respondent’s defense relied on its own interpretation of the CC&Rs, consistent historical practice, and direct testimony regarding the community’s development.

CC&R Interpretation: Argued that an “enclosed” yard is, by definition, a “Private Yard,” making the homeowner responsible for its maintenance.

Denial of Prior Maintenance: Stated unequivocally that it had never provided landscaping services for any resident’s backyard. Its responsibility is limited to front yards and common areas.

Practical and Liability Concerns: Argued that it has no access to control backyard irrigation systems and that its workers entering enclosed yards would create liability issues, such as pets escaping.

Crucial Rehearing Testimony: Presented testimony from Maureen Karpinski, the HOA Board President.

◦ Ms. Karpinski, a real estate agent, purchased her home from the developer in 2002 and was involved with the community during its construction phase.

◦ She testified with certainty that her backyard was “just dirt” with no landscaping or irrigation when she purchased it.

◦ She stated that, to the best of her knowledge, “none of the homes in Respondent’s community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the back yards and were just dirt.”

Interpretation of Governing CC&R Sections

The dispute revolved around the specific language in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements.

Section

Provision

Significance in the Case

The HOA must “Replace and maintain all landscaping and other Improvements as originally installed by Declarant on the Public Yards of Lots…

This became the dispositive clause. The Petitioner’s entire claim depended on proving the tree was “originally installed by Declarant.”

“Private Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property. “Public Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is generally visible from Neighboring Property

This created a central point of interpretive conflict. The Petitioner argued the clause meant “enclosed and not visible,” while the HOA argued it meant “enclosed or shielded.” The Judge ultimately did not rule on this ambiguity.

“Visible from Neighboring Property” means… visible to a person six feet tall standing on any part of such neighboring property…

This definition supported the Petitioner’s claim that his backyard was, in fact, “visible” from the common area walkway.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the Petitioner’s case in both the initial hearing and the rehearing, focusing on the burden of proof related to a single, critical phrase in the CC&Rs.

Initial Decision (September 24, 2018)

Avoidance of Ambiguity: The ALJ acknowledged the potential merit of the Petitioner’s interpretation of “Public Yard,” stating “the language of the CC&Rs may lend itself to a reading that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the enclosed back yards of the interior homes.” However, the ALJ concluded the tribunal was “not required to reach that issue in this matter.”

Focus on “Originally Installed by Declarant”: The decision hinged entirely on Section 7.1.4. The ALJ found that the “Petitioner failed to present any evidence that the tree at issue was originally installed by the Declarant.”

Lack of Proof: The ALJ noted that the tree’s rapid regrowth from 2013 to 2018 made it impossible to conclude that the original tree must have been planted by the developer in 2000.

Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof, and the petition was dismissed.

Rehearing Decision (January 31, 2019)

Rejection of Petitioner’s Inferences: The ALJ characterized the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the tree’s age and the irrigation system as “suppositions and inferences.”

Credibility of Respondent’s Testimony: In contrast, the ALJ found the testimony of HOA President Maureen Karpinski to be “the only credible evidence offered regarding the landscaping of the homes.”

Definitive Factual Finding: Based on Ms. Karpinski’s testimony, the ALJ concluded there was “no evidence there was any landscaping or improvements originally installed by Declarant.”

Final Conclusion: As the precondition of Section 7.1.4 (that landscaping be “originally installed by Declarant”) was not met, the HOA had no maintenance duty for the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner again failed to establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and the petition was dismissed with finality.


Jay A. Janicek vs. Sycamore Vista NO. 8 Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918001-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-25
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $250.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jay A. Janicek Counsel Jake Kubert, Esq.
Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association Counsel Evan Thompson, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the petition, finding that the HOA Board violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) and the Association Bylaws by amending the Bylaws on November 20, 2017, without a quorum of Association members voting in favor and without proper notice. The amendment was invalidated, and the HOA was fined $250.00 and ordered to refund the Petitioner's filing fee.

Why this result: The Board lacked the authority to amend the Bylaws without the vote of the Association membership, and failed to provide required notice for the proposed amendment, violating ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) and the Association Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association violated Association Bylaws Article III, Sections 3 & 4 and Article VIII, Section 1 in an action taken by the board on November 20, 2017.

The Respondent HOA Board amended Association Bylaws on November 20, 2017, without proper notice to the members and without a vote by a majority of Association members, which violated the statutory notice requirement and the Bylaws. The Board action was consequently invalidated.

Orders: The Petitioner's petition was granted. The Respondent's third amendment to the Association Bylaws, dated November 20, 2017, was invalidated. Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner's filing fee and pay a civil penalty of $250.00 to the Planned Community Hearing Office Fund.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $250.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 125 P.3d 373, 374 (Ariz. 2006)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Mail Boxes v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 181 Ariz. 119, 122, 888 P.2d 777, 780 (1995)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meeting Law, Bylaw Amendment, Notice Violation, Membership Vote, HOA Governance
Additional Citations:

  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 125 P.3d 373, 374 (Ariz. 2006)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Mail Boxes v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 181 Ariz. 119, 122, 888 P.2d 777, 780 (1995)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918001-REL Decision – 696205.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:14 (169.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918001-REL


Briefing Document: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 19F-H1918001-REL-RHG, concerning a dispute between homeowner Jay Janicek (“Petitioner”) and the Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (“Respondent”). The central conflict revolved around the HOA Board of Directors’ unilateral amendment of the Association’s Bylaws on November 20, 2017, without a vote of the general membership.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Petitioner, invalidating the Board’s amendment. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the word “members” in Article XIII of the Bylaws, which governs amendments. The ALJ concluded that “members” unambiguously refers to the homeowners who constitute the Association, not the members of the Board of Directors. Consequently, the Board’s action was found to be outside its authority as defined in the governing documents.

Furthermore, the ALJ determined that the Board’s action violated Arizona’s Open Meeting Law, specifically ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B), because the required notice for a proposed bylaw amendment was not provided to the Association’s membership. The Respondent’s arguments were found to be unpersuasive. As a result of the ruling, the amendment was nullified, and the HOA was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee and a civil penalty of $250.

1. Case Overview

Case Number: 19F-H1918001-REL-RHG

Petitioner: Jay Janicek, a property owner and member of the Association.

Respondent: Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (“the Association”).

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark.

Central Issue: “Whether Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (Respondent) violated Association Bylaws Article III, Sections 3 & 4 and Article VIII, Section 1 in an action taken by the board on November 20, 2017.”

2. Procedural History and Timeline

July 25, 2018: Petitioner Jay Janicek filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 5, 2018: An initial evidentiary hearing was held at the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

September 25, 2018: The OAH issued an initial ALJ Decision in favor of the Petitioner.

October 23, 2018: Respondent submitted a Request for Rehearing.

November 7, 2018: The Department granted the Respondent’s request for a rehearing.

March 5, 2019: A rehearing was held. Per a stipulated agreement, no new evidence was presented; instead, counsel for both parties submitted legal briefs and presented closing arguments.

March 25, 2019: The final ALJ Decision was issued, reaffirming the initial ruling in favor of the Petitioner.

3. The Disputed Action of November 20, 2017

At a regular Board of Directors meeting held on November 20, 2017, the Association’s Board voted to approve a third amendment to the Association Bylaws. The amendment altered Article VIII Section 6(d), which pertains to the Association’s financial oversight.

Original Clause: Required the Board to “cause an annual audit of the Association books to be made by a public accountant at the completion of each fiscal year.”

Amended Clause: Changed the requirement to “cause an annual audit, review, or compilation of the Associations financial records to be made by a public accountant within 180 days after the end of the HOA’s fiscal year.”

The Petitioner argued that while he had not been directly impacted, he could be in the future, as the amendment modified a prior third-party audit requirement. He asserted an interest as a homeowner in ensuring the Association’s financials were correct and not subject to self-auditing.

4. Analysis of Core Arguments

The case centered on the conflicting interpretations of the Association’s governing documents, particularly the clause authorizing Bylaw amendments.

4.1. Petitioner’s Position (Jay Janicek)

The Petitioner contended that any amendment to the Bylaws required a vote by the general membership of the Association, not just the Board of Directors.

Textual Interpretation: Petitioner focused on Bylaws Article XIII, Section 1, which states: “These Bylaws may be amended at a regular or special meeting of the Board of Directors of the Association by a vote of a majority of a quorum of members present in person or by proxy.” He argued “members” refers to homeowners as defined in the Association’s Declaration, not Board members.

Use of “Proxy”: The inclusion of the term “proxy” was cited as evidence supporting this interpretation, as Board members are not permitted to vote by proxy, whereas Association members are.

Delineation of Powers: Petitioner noted that Article VII, which outlines the “Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors,” does not grant the Board the authority to amend the Bylaws.

Intent of the Drafter: The argument was made that the Bylaws’ drafters intentionally used the words “directors” and “members” distinctly throughout the document, indicating that the use of “members” in the amendment clause was a deliberate choice to refer to the homeowners.

Statutory Violation: The Petitioner argued the Board’s action violated Arizona’s Open Meeting Law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804), which requires specific notice to members between 10 and 50 days in advance of any meeting where a Bylaw amendment is proposed.

Legal Precedent: The Petitioner cited Powell v. Washburn, which holds that restrictive covenants should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties as determined from the language of the entire document.

4.2. Respondent’s Position (Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA)

The Association argued that the Board of Directors possessed the authority to amend the Bylaws during a properly convened Board meeting.

Board Authority: Respondent cited Article IV of the Bylaws, which states that the “affairs of this Association shall be managed by a Board.”

Meeting Protocol: The action took place at a regular monthly Board meeting, as permitted by Article VI. The meeting on November 20, 2017, had three Board members present, constituting a quorum as required by the Bylaws.

Interpretation of “Members”: The Respondent’s central argument was that the phrase “a quorum of members” in Article XIII referred to the members of the Board of Directors, thereby empowering them to pass the amendment.

Compliance with Open Meeting Law: The Association argued its conduct was not a violation of the law because a necessary quorum of directors was present for the vote.

5. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ found the Petitioner’s arguments convincing and concluded that he had sustained his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The Respondent’s closing arguments were described as not persuasive.

Violation of Statute: The Judge determined that the Board’s action violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) because “there was no notice of the proposed amendment” provided to the Association members. The conduct was described as going “against the spirit of the legislative intent” of the statute due to a lack of transparency.

Interpretation of Governing Documents: The decision firmly established the correct interpretation of the Bylaws.

◦ The terms “members” and “directors” are clearly and intentionally differentiated throughout the document. “Members” refers to the body of homeowners, while “directors” refers to the elected Board.

◦ The conclusion states: “The voices of few cannot speak for all, unless all have bestowed those few with the power and authority to speak on their behalf.”

◦ It was concluded that the Board “does not have power to act where authority is expressly delegated to the membership of the Association.”

Invalidation of Board Action: The ALJ concluded that the Board’s action on November 20, 2017, was invalid because it was taken “in the absence of a quorum of Association members whereby a majority of said members voted in favor of the proposed third amendment.”

6. Final Order and Penalties

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders:

1. Petition Granted: The Petitioner’s petition was granted.

2. Amendment Invalidated: The “third amendment to the Association Bylaws, as taken on November 20, 2017, is invalidated.”

3. Fees and Penalties: The Respondent (HOA) was ordered to:

◦ Pay the Petitioner the filing fee.

◦ Pay a civil penalty of $250.00 to the Planned Community Hearing Office Fund.

The decision, having been issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.


Patricia Davies-Brown vs. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818039-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-09-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Patricia Davies-Brown, Individually and as Trustee of the Trust; BART A. BROWN, JR.; SCOTT R. DAVIES Counsel
Respondent Starwood Estates Homeowners Association Counsel Daniel Campbell & Kristopher L. Smith

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs; Bylaws; Architectural Guidelines

Outcome Summary

The Petitioners' request alleging that the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association violated community documents by approving a copper-colored metal roof was denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioners failed to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence, noting that the guidelines prohibiting reflective surfaces applied primarily to windows and doors, not roofs.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or Architectural Guidelines.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Exterior Appearance and Colors provisions regarding copper-colored metal roof approval

Petitioners alleged that the HOA improperly approved a copper-colored metal roof because it constituted a reflective surface and did not blend with the natural surroundings, violating the community documents. The ALJ denied the petition, finding Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its documents, noting the reflective surfaces ban applied to windows and doors, not roofs, and the roof's appearance was acceptable.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: architectural control, CC&Rs enforcement, metal roof approval, reflective surfaces, burden of proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818039-REL Decision – 653217.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:48 (41.6 KB)

18F-H1818039-REL Decision – 659968.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:48 (104.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818039-REL


Briefing Document: Davies-Brown v. Starwood Estates HOA

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and decision in case No. 18F-H1818039-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowners Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., and Scott R. Davies (the “Petitioners”) and the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association (the “Respondent”). The core of the dispute was the HOA Board of Directors’ 2013 approval of a copper-colored metal roof for homeowners Jeff and Karen Martin.

The Petitioners alleged this approval violated the community’s CC&Rs, Bylaws, and Architectural Guidelines. Their primary arguments were that the roof was an impermissible “reflective surface,” that it did not “blend with the natural surrounding and landscape,” and that the Board lacked the authority to approve it without prior review by the Architectural Committee (ACC) and without viewing a physical sample.

The Respondent defended the Board’s decision, arguing that the Board possessed the authority to grant such approvals. They contended the prohibition on reflective surfaces in the community guidelines applies specifically to windows and doors, not roofing. Furthermore, they asserted that the roof was aesthetically compliant and that other reflective metal roofs exist within the community.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Velva Moses-Thompson, ruled in favor of the Respondent. The decision, issued on September 14, 2018, denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioners failed to meet their burden of proof. The ALJ found that the Board had the authority to approve the roof, the ban on reflective surfaces did not apply to roofing, and the Petitioners did not establish that the roof failed to blend with its natural surroundings.

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Case Overview

Case Name: Patricia Davies-Brown, et al. vs. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association

Case Number: 18F-H1818039-REL

Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge: Velva Moses-Thompson, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Dates: July 10, 2018, and August 13, 2018

Final Decision Date: September 14, 2018

Key Parties and Representatives

Name(s)

Representation / Contact

Petitioners

Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., Scott R. Davies

Appeared on behalf of themselves
9777 E Dreyfus Ave., Scottsdale, AZ 85260
Pat.davies-brown@cox.net

Respondent

Starwood Estates Homeowners Association

Kristopher L. Smith, Esq.
O’Connor & Campbell, P.C.
7955 S Priest Dr., Tempe, AZ 85284
kris.smith@occlaw.com

Homeowners

Jeff and Karen Martin

Owners of the property with the disputed roof at 8500 Skywood Drive, Pinetop, Arizona (Lot 40 of Starwood Estates).

Core Dispute: The Martin Residence Roof

The central conflict originated in the summer of 2013 when the Starwood Estates Board of Directors approved a request from Jeff and Karen Martin to install a copper-colored metal roof on their home. The approval was passed by a 5-1 vote. Petitioner Scott R. Davies was the sole board member who voted against the approval at that time.

The Board reviewed a brochure containing the roof’s color before granting approval but did not observe a physical sample. However, one Board member, Pat Knight, was reportedly familiar with the appearance of such roofs from a previous home she owned nearby. The petition challenging this 2013 decision was filed on or about March 26, 2018.

Petitioners’ Allegations and Arguments

The Petitioners filed their petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the HOA violated community governing documents. Their case was built on three central questions:

1. Does the exterior appearance of the Martins’ aluminum copper-colored metal roof blend with the “natural surrounding and landscape” of Starwood Estates?

2. Does such roof constitute a “reflective surface”?

3. If the answer to (1) above is no and/or the answer to (2) above is yes, did the ACC and the Board of Starwood Estates erroneously violate the provisions of the CC&R’s and GUIDELINES in permitting the Martins to install such aluminum copper-colored metal roof…?

During the hearing, the Petitioners expanded on these points, arguing:

Reflective Surface: The copper-colored roof was a prohibited reflective surface under the Architectural Guidelines.

Aesthetic Incompatibility: The roof did not blend with the natural surroundings as required.

Procedural Violations:

◦ The Board violated the CC&Rs by approving the roof without first viewing a physical sample of the material.

◦ The approval was invalid because it should have first been granted by the two-person Architectural Committee (ACC) appointed by the Board.

Respondent’s Defense and Arguments

The Starwood Estates HOA maintained that its approval of the Martin roof was proper and compliant with all governing documents. Their key arguments were:

Board Authority: The HOA asserted that either the Board of Directors or the Architectural Committee had the authority to approve the roof.

Interpretation of “Reflective Surfaces”: The Respondent argued that the prohibition on “reflective surfaces” within the Architectural Guidelines applies specifically to windows and doors, not to roofing, which is addressed in a separate section of the guidelines.

Aesthetic Compliance: They contended the roof, while having a “shine,” was not a barred reflective surface and did blend in with the natural surroundings.

Precedent: The HOA noted that several other metal roofs that are reflective had been previously approved in Starwood Estates. They submitted images of reflective green and red roofs in the Pinetop Country Club area as evidence.

Referenced Governing Documents

The decision cited specific sections from the HOA’s governing documents to adjudicate the dispute.

Section 3.1.4: Requires prior written approval from the Architectural Committee for any work that alters the exterior appearance of a Lot.

Section 5.2: States that approvals or actions to be taken by the Association “shall be valid if given or taken by the Board.”

Article VII, Section A(2): Grants the Board authority to exercise all powers and duties vested in the Association unless reserved to the membership.

Article VII, Section B: Empowers the Board to “Review and approve any architectural plan for the building of any improvements on any Lots.”

Exterior Appearance and Colors: Mandates that exterior appearance “shall blend with the natural surroundings and landscape.” It also states, “Clear aluminum window and doorframes are not permitted, nor are reflective surfaces.” A note requires the owner to submit samples of materials for ACC approval.

Roofs, Materials, and Pitches: Stipulates that “Metal roofs are permitted only with ACC approval” and that all pitched roof materials “shall promote a continuity of texture and color.”

Evidence Presented

Petitioner’s Exhibit 13: A photograph of the Martins’ copper-colored roof. The ALJ’s decision noted that while the image showed a reflection, the photograph itself was “blurred.”

Respondent’s Exhibit 26: The brochure containing the color of the copper-colored roof that the Board reviewed before its 2013 approval.

Respondent’s Exhibit 7: Images of other reflective green and red metal roofs located in the Pinetop Country Club area, which were previously approved.

Testimony: Board member Pat Knight’s familiarity with the appearance of copper-colored roofs was noted.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The petition was denied. The ALJ found that the Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or Architectural Guidelines.

Conclusions of Law

1. Burden of Proof: The Petitioners bore the burden of proving their claims by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not. They failed to meet this standard.

2. Board Authority: The ALJ concluded that the governing documents allowed for the roof to be approved by either the Architectural Committee or the Board of Directors. The Board’s action was therefore valid.

3. Interpretation of Reflective Surfaces: The evidence established that the prohibition on “reflective surfaces” in the Architectural Guidelines applies to windows and doors. Roofs are addressed in a separate section of the guidelines. The existence of other approved shiny metal roofs further supported this interpretation.

4. Aesthetic Compliance: The Petitioners did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the copper-colored roof failed to blend in with the natural surroundings.

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because Petitioners have not established that Respondent violated the Community Bylaws, Community CC&Rs, and the Community Architectural Guidelines when Respondent approved the Martins’ request to install the copper-colored roof.

The order was made binding unless a rehearing was requested within 30 days of service.


Lawrence M. Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-17
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart Counsel
Respondent Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel Nicolas C. S. Nogami

Alleged Violations

Association Bylaws section 5.4

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart's petition and deemed the Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., to be the prevailing party.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4 or acted unreasonably or in bad faith when denying his request for a variance. The Bylaw section cited was determined to be a liability shield for the Board, not a source of duty owed to the homeowner.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged failure of HOA Board to act in good faith when denying Petitioner's request for a variance for unauthorized common area changes

Petitioner made changes to the common area without permission and the Board denied his subsequent request for a variance. Petitioner alleged the Board violated Bylaws Section 5.4 by failing to act in good faith and showing bias. The ALJ found that Section 5.4 is a liability shield for the Board, not a duty imposed upon them, and Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show bad faith or unreasonableness.

Orders: Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, variance denial, common area modifications, good faith requirement, board liability shield, prevailing party
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818052-REL Decision – 660026.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:05 (91.5 KB)

18F-H1818052-REL Decision – 720468.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:06 (103.5 KB)