Jason West vs. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919065-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-10-01
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jason West Counsel
Respondent Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association Counsel Bradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and Bylaw 1.5

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's request for a hearing was denied and the petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove the Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) or its Bylaw 1.5 by refusing to place a proposed bylaw amendment on the meeting agenda or ballot.

Why this result: The relevant statute and HOA bylaws do not mandate that the Board add a member-proposed amendment to the agenda; the member has the independent recourse of gathering member support (25% or 1/4 of votes) to call a special meeting, a route the Petitioner was aware of but did not pursue.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to place a proposed bylaw amendment on the agenda of the annual meeting

Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and Bylaw 1.5 by refusing to place his proposed bylaw amendment (Bylaw 3.13, concerning banning directors whose actions resulted in a paid claim) on the agenda or ballot for the annual meeting.

Orders: Petition denied because Petitioner did not establish that Respondent violated the cited statute or bylaw by declining to add the proposed amendment to the agenda or ballot.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
  • Bylaw 1.5
  • Bylaw 2.2

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaw Amendment, Meeting Agenda, Director liability, Statute interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • Respondent’s Bylaw 1.5
  • Respondent’s Bylaw 2.2

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919065-REL Decision – 742075.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:09:28 (159.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919065-REL


Briefing Document: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919065-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the matter of Jason West (Petitioner) versus the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (Respondent), Case No. 19F-H1919065-REL, decided on October 1, 2019. The Petitioner’s case was denied in its entirety.

The central issue was the Petitioner’s allegation that the Respondent HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and its own Bylaw 1.5 by refusing to place his proposed bylaw amendment on the agenda of the annual members’ meeting. The proposed amendment sought to ban any director from serving for five years if their actions resulted in a paid claim against the HOA.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a clear interpretation of the relevant statute and bylaws. The ruling concluded that the Petitioner failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA Board was legally obligated to add a member-initiated item to a Board-scheduled meeting agenda. The decision affirmed that the proper procedure for a member to compel consideration of a bylaw amendment is to call a special meeting, which requires the support of at least 25% of the association’s members as stipulated in both A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and the HOA’s Bylaw 2.2. Evidence showed the Petitioner was aware of this option but did not utilize it. The Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees was also denied, as the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) is not statutorily empowered to grant such awards in these proceedings.

Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: Jason West, a homeowner within the Desert Sage Two development and a member of the Respondent association.

Respondent: Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (HOA), represented by Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

Hearing Date: September 26, 2019.

Core Allegation: The Petitioner filed a single-issue petition on May 20, 2019, alleging the HOA Board improperly refused to add his proposed bylaw amendment, Bylaw 3.13, to the agenda and ballot for the annual meeting.

The Proposed Bylaw Amendment: Bylaw 3.13

The Petitioner proposed the addition of a new bylaw intended to “reduce liability to the Association.” The full text of the proposed amendment is as follows:

Directors whose actions result in a paid claim In an effort to reduce liability to the Association, any current or former director whose actions have resulted in a paid claim by the Association or its insurance carrier, is banned from serving as a director for a period of five years from the date of the final payment. This five year directorship ban also applies to any other individual co-owning an Association lot with the director. This Amendment is retroactive.

Central Arguments and Positions

Petitioner’s Position

The Petitioner argued that the HOA’s refusal to place his proposed bylaw on the annual meeting agenda was a violation of state law and the association’s own governing documents.

Legal Basis:

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B): This statute governs HOA meetings and requires that the notice for any meeting state its purpose, including “the general nature of any proposed amendment to the… bylaws.”

Bylaw 1.5: This bylaw states that bylaws “may be amended, at a regular or special meeting of the Members, by a vote of the Members having a majority (more than 50%) of the votes…”

Respondent’s Position

The HOA denied any violation, asserting that its Board of Directors acted appropriately and upon the advice of legal counsel and its property management company.

Legal Basis and Defense:

◦ The Board is not obligated by statute or its bylaws to add agenda items at the request of a single member for a Board-scheduled meeting.

◦ The proper and available remedy for the Petitioner was to utilize Bylaw 2.2, which allows members to call a special meeting directly.

Bylaw 2.2 (“Special Meetings”): States that special meetings may be called “upon written request signed by Members having at least one-fourth (1/4) of the authorized votes… which request shall be delivered to the President or Secretary.”

◦ The Petitioner acknowledged his awareness of this procedure in a January 4, 2019 email, where he stated, “I can also force the Board to call a Special Meeting of the Members at any time with 10 signatures from members of our Association.” Despite this knowledge, he did not pursue this option.

Historical Context and Previous Litigation

The dispute did not occur in isolation. The decision references a history of interactions between the Petitioner and the HOA.

Petitioner’s Prior Board Service: Jason West was elected to the HOA Board in August 2016 but subsequently resigned.

Previous Bylaw Amendment (2017): In April 2017, the Petitioner successfully proposed a different amendment (Bylaw 3.12) which banned directors who resign or are removed from serving for one year. At that time, the Board agreed to submit it for a membership vote, and it passed.

Previous Petition (2017): In April 2017, the Petitioner filed a petition (OAH Case No. 17F-H1716031-REL) against the HOA regarding the Board’s failure to fill vacant positions.

Outcome: The petition was dismissed on June 28, 2017. The presiding ALJ concluded that the Board had done all it could to fill vacancies and noted that the Petitioner’s own “obstructionist tactics” were partly to blame for members being unwilling to serve.

Motivation for Current Bylaw: The current HOA Board members were first elected in July 2017. The ALJ decision notes that some of these members may have been on the Board when the HOA’s insurance carrier paid costs related to the Petitioner’s previous petition and other potential litigation, suggesting a motive for the proposed retroactive ban.

Key Testimony and Findings of Fact

The ALJ decision was informed by testimony from the Petitioner, HOA Board members, and property management personnel.

Witness

Key Testimony

Joanelize Morales

Current Property Manager

Testified that she prepares meeting agendas based on the Board’s instructions. Confirmed that the Petitioner attended a May 14, 2019 Board meeting and threatened to file a petition if his proposal was not added to the agenda. Confirmed the Petitioner had not attempted to use Bylaw 2.2 to call a special meeting.

Michael (“Mickey”) Latz

Owner, Property Mgmt. Co.

Testified that agenda-setting is a decision for the entire Board, not the secretary. Stated that legal counsel advised the Board it was not obligated to add the Petitioner’s item. Confirmed he repeatedly informed the Petitioner that Bylaw 2.2 was the available option for members to call meetings directly.

Bryan Selna (VP)
David Epstein (Pres.)
Linda Seidler (Sec.)

HOA Board Members

All testified that their decision not to add the Petitioner’s proposed amendment to the agenda was based on advice received from the HOA’s attorneys and property management company.

ALJ Conclusions of Law and Final Order

The ALJ’s legal analysis led to a definitive ruling in favor of the Respondent HOA.

1. Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving his allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not.

2. Statutory Interpretation (A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)): The ALJ found the statute’s language to be “clear and unambiguous.” Nothing in the text requires an HOA Board to add an item to an agenda at a single member’s request. It merely provides the mechanism for 25% of members to call a special meeting themselves.

3. Bylaw Interpretation (Bylaw 1.5 & 2.2): The analysis of the bylaws yielded a similar conclusion.

Bylaw 1.5 permits bylaws to be amended at a regular or special meeting but does not compel the Board to add a member’s proposal to the ballot.

Bylaw 2.2 explicitly provides the method for a member to call a meeting for their own purposes, provided they have sufficient support from their neighbors.

4. Final Ruling: Because the Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent violated any statute or bylaw, his petition was ordered to be denied and dismissed.

5. Attorney’s Fees: The Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees was denied. The decision cited case law establishing that the OAH is not empowered by the legislature to award attorney’s fees in administrative proceedings of this nature.

——————————————————————————–

NOTICE: As stated in the decision, this order is binding unless a rehearing is granted pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04. A request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.


Jason West vs. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919065-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-10-01
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jason West Counsel
Respondent Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association Counsel Bradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and Bylaw 1.5

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's request for a hearing was denied and the petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove the Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) or its Bylaw 1.5 by refusing to place a proposed bylaw amendment on the meeting agenda or ballot.

Why this result: The relevant statute and HOA bylaws do not mandate that the Board add a member-proposed amendment to the agenda; the member has the independent recourse of gathering member support (25% or 1/4 of votes) to call a special meeting, a route the Petitioner was aware of but did not pursue.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to place a proposed bylaw amendment on the agenda of the annual meeting

Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and Bylaw 1.5 by refusing to place his proposed bylaw amendment (Bylaw 3.13, concerning banning directors whose actions resulted in a paid claim) on the agenda or ballot for the annual meeting.

Orders: Petition denied because Petitioner did not establish that Respondent violated the cited statute or bylaw by declining to add the proposed amendment to the agenda or ballot.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
  • Bylaw 1.5
  • Bylaw 2.2

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaw Amendment, Meeting Agenda, Director liability, Statute interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • Respondent’s Bylaw 1.5
  • Respondent’s Bylaw 2.2

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919065-REL Decision – 742075.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:19 (159.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919065-REL


Briefing Document: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919065-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the matter of Jason West (Petitioner) versus the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (Respondent), Case No. 19F-H1919065-REL, decided on October 1, 2019. The Petitioner’s case was denied in its entirety.

The central issue was the Petitioner’s allegation that the Respondent HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and its own Bylaw 1.5 by refusing to place his proposed bylaw amendment on the agenda of the annual members’ meeting. The proposed amendment sought to ban any director from serving for five years if their actions resulted in a paid claim against the HOA.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a clear interpretation of the relevant statute and bylaws. The ruling concluded that the Petitioner failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA Board was legally obligated to add a member-initiated item to a Board-scheduled meeting agenda. The decision affirmed that the proper procedure for a member to compel consideration of a bylaw amendment is to call a special meeting, which requires the support of at least 25% of the association’s members as stipulated in both A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and the HOA’s Bylaw 2.2. Evidence showed the Petitioner was aware of this option but did not utilize it. The Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees was also denied, as the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) is not statutorily empowered to grant such awards in these proceedings.

Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: Jason West, a homeowner within the Desert Sage Two development and a member of the Respondent association.

Respondent: Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (HOA), represented by Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

Hearing Date: September 26, 2019.

Core Allegation: The Petitioner filed a single-issue petition on May 20, 2019, alleging the HOA Board improperly refused to add his proposed bylaw amendment, Bylaw 3.13, to the agenda and ballot for the annual meeting.

The Proposed Bylaw Amendment: Bylaw 3.13

The Petitioner proposed the addition of a new bylaw intended to “reduce liability to the Association.” The full text of the proposed amendment is as follows:

Directors whose actions result in a paid claim In an effort to reduce liability to the Association, any current or former director whose actions have resulted in a paid claim by the Association or its insurance carrier, is banned from serving as a director for a period of five years from the date of the final payment. This five year directorship ban also applies to any other individual co-owning an Association lot with the director. This Amendment is retroactive.

Central Arguments and Positions

Petitioner’s Position

The Petitioner argued that the HOA’s refusal to place his proposed bylaw on the annual meeting agenda was a violation of state law and the association’s own governing documents.

Legal Basis:

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B): This statute governs HOA meetings and requires that the notice for any meeting state its purpose, including “the general nature of any proposed amendment to the… bylaws.”

Bylaw 1.5: This bylaw states that bylaws “may be amended, at a regular or special meeting of the Members, by a vote of the Members having a majority (more than 50%) of the votes…”

Respondent’s Position

The HOA denied any violation, asserting that its Board of Directors acted appropriately and upon the advice of legal counsel and its property management company.

Legal Basis and Defense:

◦ The Board is not obligated by statute or its bylaws to add agenda items at the request of a single member for a Board-scheduled meeting.

◦ The proper and available remedy for the Petitioner was to utilize Bylaw 2.2, which allows members to call a special meeting directly.

Bylaw 2.2 (“Special Meetings”): States that special meetings may be called “upon written request signed by Members having at least one-fourth (1/4) of the authorized votes… which request shall be delivered to the President or Secretary.”

◦ The Petitioner acknowledged his awareness of this procedure in a January 4, 2019 email, where he stated, “I can also force the Board to call a Special Meeting of the Members at any time with 10 signatures from members of our Association.” Despite this knowledge, he did not pursue this option.

Historical Context and Previous Litigation

The dispute did not occur in isolation. The decision references a history of interactions between the Petitioner and the HOA.

Petitioner’s Prior Board Service: Jason West was elected to the HOA Board in August 2016 but subsequently resigned.

Previous Bylaw Amendment (2017): In April 2017, the Petitioner successfully proposed a different amendment (Bylaw 3.12) which banned directors who resign or are removed from serving for one year. At that time, the Board agreed to submit it for a membership vote, and it passed.

Previous Petition (2017): In April 2017, the Petitioner filed a petition (OAH Case No. 17F-H1716031-REL) against the HOA regarding the Board’s failure to fill vacant positions.

Outcome: The petition was dismissed on June 28, 2017. The presiding ALJ concluded that the Board had done all it could to fill vacancies and noted that the Petitioner’s own “obstructionist tactics” were partly to blame for members being unwilling to serve.

Motivation for Current Bylaw: The current HOA Board members were first elected in July 2017. The ALJ decision notes that some of these members may have been on the Board when the HOA’s insurance carrier paid costs related to the Petitioner’s previous petition and other potential litigation, suggesting a motive for the proposed retroactive ban.

Key Testimony and Findings of Fact

The ALJ decision was informed by testimony from the Petitioner, HOA Board members, and property management personnel.

Witness

Key Testimony

Joanelize Morales

Current Property Manager

Testified that she prepares meeting agendas based on the Board’s instructions. Confirmed that the Petitioner attended a May 14, 2019 Board meeting and threatened to file a petition if his proposal was not added to the agenda. Confirmed the Petitioner had not attempted to use Bylaw 2.2 to call a special meeting.

Michael (“Mickey”) Latz

Owner, Property Mgmt. Co.

Testified that agenda-setting is a decision for the entire Board, not the secretary. Stated that legal counsel advised the Board it was not obligated to add the Petitioner’s item. Confirmed he repeatedly informed the Petitioner that Bylaw 2.2 was the available option for members to call meetings directly.

Bryan Selna (VP)
David Epstein (Pres.)
Linda Seidler (Sec.)

HOA Board Members

All testified that their decision not to add the Petitioner’s proposed amendment to the agenda was based on advice received from the HOA’s attorneys and property management company.

ALJ Conclusions of Law and Final Order

The ALJ’s legal analysis led to a definitive ruling in favor of the Respondent HOA.

1. Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving his allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not.

2. Statutory Interpretation (A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)): The ALJ found the statute’s language to be “clear and unambiguous.” Nothing in the text requires an HOA Board to add an item to an agenda at a single member’s request. It merely provides the mechanism for 25% of members to call a special meeting themselves.

3. Bylaw Interpretation (Bylaw 1.5 & 2.2): The analysis of the bylaws yielded a similar conclusion.

Bylaw 1.5 permits bylaws to be amended at a regular or special meeting but does not compel the Board to add a member’s proposal to the ballot.

Bylaw 2.2 explicitly provides the method for a member to call a meeting for their own purposes, provided they have sufficient support from their neighbors.

4. Final Ruling: Because the Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent violated any statute or bylaw, his petition was ordered to be denied and dismissed.

5. Attorney’s Fees: The Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees was denied. The decision cited case law establishing that the OAH is not empowered by the legislature to award attorney’s fees in administrative proceedings of this nature.

——————————————————————————–

NOTICE: As stated in the decision, this order is binding unless a rehearing is granted pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04. A request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.


Brian Sopatyk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The ALJ found that the $660 charge was a working capital fee authorized by the CC&Rs and was not subject to the statutory fee cap for disclosure documents.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the fee in dispute was deemed a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a resale disclosure fee capped by A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum transfer/disclosure fee

Petitioner alleged the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging a $660 transfer fee, exceeding the $400 statutory maximum for disclosure documents. The Association argued the $660 was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, which had been mislabeled.

Orders: The petition was dismissed. Petitioner's request for orders requiring compliance, refunds, and civil penalties was denied. The Association was deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory limit, mislabeled fee, ARS 33-1260
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 571793.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:20 (96.8 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 580965.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:20 (61.2 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593042.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:21 (100.9 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:21 (59.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

——————————————————————————–

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.


Brian Sopatyk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The ALJ found that the $660 charge was a working capital fee authorized by the CC&Rs and was not subject to the statutory fee cap for disclosure documents.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the fee in dispute was deemed a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a resale disclosure fee capped by A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum transfer/disclosure fee

Petitioner alleged the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging a $660 transfer fee, exceeding the $400 statutory maximum for disclosure documents. The Association argued the $660 was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, which had been mislabeled.

Orders: The petition was dismissed. Petitioner's request for orders requiring compliance, refunds, and civil penalties was denied. The Association was deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory limit, mislabeled fee, ARS 33-1260
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 571793.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:43 (96.8 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 580965.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:43 (61.2 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593042.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:44 (100.9 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:44 (59.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

——————————————————————————–

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.


Brian Sopatyk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The ALJ found that the $660 charge was a working capital fee authorized by the CC&Rs and was not subject to the statutory fee cap for disclosure documents.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the fee in dispute was deemed a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a resale disclosure fee capped by A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum transfer/disclosure fee

Petitioner alleged the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging a $660 transfer fee, exceeding the $400 statutory maximum for disclosure documents. The Association argued the $660 was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, which had been mislabeled.

Orders: The petition was dismissed. Petitioner's request for orders requiring compliance, refunds, and civil penalties was denied. The Association was deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory limit, mislabeled fee, ARS 33-1260
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 571793.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:50 (96.8 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 580965.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:51 (61.2 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593042.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:51 (100.9 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:52 (59.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

——————————————————————————–

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.


Brian Sopatyk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The ALJ found that the $660 charge was a working capital fee authorized by the CC&Rs and was not subject to the statutory fee cap for disclosure documents.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the fee in dispute was deemed a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a resale disclosure fee capped by A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum transfer/disclosure fee

Petitioner alleged the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging a $660 transfer fee, exceeding the $400 statutory maximum for disclosure documents. The Association argued the $660 was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, which had been mislabeled.

Orders: The petition was dismissed. Petitioner's request for orders requiring compliance, refunds, and civil penalties was denied. The Association was deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory limit, mislabeled fee, ARS 33-1260
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 571793.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:30:59 (96.8 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 580965.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:30:59 (61.2 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593042.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:30:59 (100.9 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:00 (59.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

——————————————————————————–

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.