Tag Archives: notice

The Gregory M and Donna P Hulbert Family Trust dated May 25, 1995 v.

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Case Summary

Case ID 24F-H049-REL, 24F-H055-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2025-01-21
Administrative Law Judge Samuel Fox
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $2,500.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner The Gregory M and Donna P Hulbert Family Trust dated May 25, 1995 Counsel —
Respondent The Summit at Copper Square Condominium Association Counsel Daryl Wilson

Alleged Violations

Declaration §§ 7.1, 7.12, 7.14
Declaration §§ 4.6.1, 4.6.2
Declaration §§ 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.13
A.R.S. § 33-1248(E), (F)
Declaration § 5.1

Outcome Summary

Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding issues 2 (Puppy Potty) and 4 (Notice/Agenda). Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner a filing fee refund of $1,000 and a Civil Penalty of $500 for Issue 2. Respondent prevailed on Issues 1, 3, and 5.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof on Issues 1, 3, and 5, often due to the Board's discretion being upheld (budget, maintenance pace) or failure to establish the circumstances constituted an actionable nuisance (news crew).

Key Issues & Findings

Inadequate budget and funding of reserves; improper withdrawal of reserve funds.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly borrowed reserves (~$390k) for operating expenses and failed to adopt an adequate budget for reserves. The Tribunal found the budget practices required only a reasonable estimate and that the reserve contributions had exceeded recommended levels as of July 2024.

Orders: Petitioner's claim denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Declaration § 7.1
  • Declaration § 7.12
  • Declaration § 7.14

Installation of 'puppy potty' on common elements.

Petitioner sought removal of a puppy potty installed on the roof (a common element) arguing it violated rules prohibiting pet structures on common elements and constituted a nuisance. The Tribunal found the puppy potty was a structure for the care of pets on common elements, violating Section 4.6.2.

Orders: Respondent is directed to remove the puppy potty structure, and a Civil Penalty of $500 is imposed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • Declaration § 4.6.1
  • Declaration § 4.6.2

Allowing news crew use of common area.

Petitioner contested the HOA allowing a news crew in the common pool area during the 2023 baseball post-season. The Tribunal found the Declaration permits invitees (guests) and failed to establish the presence of the news crew was unreasonable, offensive, or infringed upon owner easements.

Orders: Petitioner's claim denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Declaration § 3.3.1
  • Declaration § 3.3.2
  • Declaration § 4.13

Failure to provide required notice and adequate information in agendas.

Petitioner alleged the HOA agendas failed to provide adequate information for meaningful resident comments, specifically concerning non-emergency topics like purchasing patio furniture. The Tribunal found evidence that the Board failed to include at least one non-emergency topic on the agenda.

Orders: Respondent is directed to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1248 and its Community Documents going forward.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1248(E)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248(F)

Failure to maintain, repair, and replace Common Elements (structural damage/garage cracks).

Petitioner sought enforcement of maintenance obligations due to perceived slow pace (years of delay) in addressing structural cracks and water infiltration in the garage ceiling. The Tribunal acknowledged delays but noted the Board had engaged experts and was following their recommendations for monitoring and testing before the decision date.

Orders: Petitioner's claim denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Declaration § 5.1

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Condo, Reserves, Budget, Pets, Common Elements, Board Meetings, Notice, Structural Integrity
Additional Citations:

  • Declaration § 7.1
  • Declaration § 7.12
  • Declaration § 7.14
  • Declaration § 4.6.1
  • Declaration § 4.6.2
  • Declaration § 3.3.1
  • Declaration § 3.3.2
  • Declaration § 4.13
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248(E)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248(F)
  • Declaration § 5.1

Decision Documents

24F-H049-REL Decision – 1214040.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:44:15 (45.7 KB)

24F-H049-REL Decision – 1218977.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:44:15 (46.3 KB)

24F-H049-REL Decision – 1218981.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:44:16 (5.9 KB)

24F-H049-REL Decision – 1219895.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:44:16 (40.5 KB)

24F-H049-REL Decision – 1235253.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:44:16 (47.1 KB)

24F-H049-REL Decision – 1264402.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:44:16 (277.9 KB)

Samuel T Paparazzo v. Coronado Ranch Community Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020061-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-03
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Samuel T Paparazzo Counsel —
Respondent Coronado Ranch Community Association Counsel Mark Stahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1804(A), 33-1804(B), 33-1804(F), and Association bylaws 2.3, 2.7, and 3.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Respondent HOA acted within the scope of its statutory authority during its April 02, 2020, annual meeting and elections, and denied the Petitioner's petition for failure to sustain the burden of proof regarding alleged statutory and bylaw violations.

Why this result: The ALJ found that notice of the meeting modification (to an online platform due to COVID-19) was timely and proper, and Petitioner's claimed denial of the right to speak was the result of user error of the online platform, not action by the Association. Furthermore, the decision to hold elections for all five open Board positions was deemed appropriate due to carryover vacancies resulting from a lack of quorum in the prior year (2019).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violations regarding Annual Meeting notice (change in venue), right to speak, proper call to order, and staggered board voting.

Petitioner filed a quadruple-issue petition alleging the Association violated statutes and bylaws concerning the April 02, 2020, annual meeting, specifically regarding insufficient notice for the venue change (due to COVID-19), denial of the right to speak (via online chat), improper chair delegation, and failure to stagger Board elections.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $2,000.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R4-9-117
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Analytics Highlights

Topics: COVID-19, Virtual Meeting, Notice, Right to Speak, Elections, Bylaws, Quorum, User Error
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R4-9-117

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020061-REL Decision – 819907.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:12:36 (149.3 KB)

Samuel T Paparazzo v. Coronado Ranch Community Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020061-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-03
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Samuel T Paparazzo Counsel —
Respondent Coronado Ranch Community Association Counsel Mark Stahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1804(A), 33-1804(B), 33-1804(F), and Association bylaws 2.3, 2.7, and 3.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Respondent HOA acted within the scope of its statutory authority during its April 02, 2020, annual meeting and elections, and denied the Petitioner's petition for failure to sustain the burden of proof regarding alleged statutory and bylaw violations.

Why this result: The ALJ found that notice of the meeting modification (to an online platform due to COVID-19) was timely and proper, and Petitioner's claimed denial of the right to speak was the result of user error of the online platform, not action by the Association. Furthermore, the decision to hold elections for all five open Board positions was deemed appropriate due to carryover vacancies resulting from a lack of quorum in the prior year (2019).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violations regarding Annual Meeting notice (change in venue), right to speak, proper call to order, and staggered board voting.

Petitioner filed a quadruple-issue petition alleging the Association violated statutes and bylaws concerning the April 02, 2020, annual meeting, specifically regarding insufficient notice for the venue change (due to COVID-19), denial of the right to speak (via online chat), improper chair delegation, and failure to stagger Board elections.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $2,000.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R4-9-117
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Analytics Highlights

Topics: COVID-19, Virtual Meeting, Notice, Right to Speak, Elections, Bylaws, Quorum, User Error
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R4-9-117

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020061-REL Decision – 819907.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:29 (149.3 KB)

William P Lee v vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel —
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809; CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited governing documents (CC&Rs/Rules) or state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning street parking and contracting for vehicle booting/towing.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding violations of CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. The ALJ found the July 2018 revised Rules, which banned parking, were controlling.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation regarding banning parking and use of towing/booting company.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly banned street parking and contracted with a towing/booting company, arguing this violated specific CC&R amendments, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. He also claimed the 2018 revised Rules were invalid due to improper electronic notice instead of personal delivery or mail.

Orders: Petitioners’ petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Notice, Towing, Booting, A.R.S. 33-1803, A.R.S. 33-1809
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:07:43 (110.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Administrative Hearing Briefing: William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG, where Petitioner William P. Lee’s complaint against the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (Greenlaw) was denied. Mr. Lee, a homeowner, alleged that Greenlaw’s complete ban on street parking and its contract with a towing company to enforce the ban violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Lee failed to meet the required burden of proof. The central conclusion was that Greenlaw’s revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, are the controlling authority and explicitly permit a total ban on street parking. The ALJ determined that the specific parking prohibitions detailed in the CC&R amendments—concerning fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles—do not preclude the association from enacting a more comprehensive ban via its rules. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that Greenlaw had actually taken the alleged enforcement actions (booting or towing) against any member’s vehicle.

Case Overview

Detail

Information

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

William P. Lee (Homeowner)

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Homeowners Association)

Hearing Date

April 1, 2019 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

April 22, 2019

Final Order

Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Presiding ALJ

Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Arguments

William P. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, centered on the claim that Greenlaw acted outside its authority by banning all street parking and contracting with a towing company for enforcement. His arguments were:

• Violation of CC&Rs: The total parking ban directly contradicted CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. Mr. Lee contended these amendments established an exhaustive list of permissible parking restrictions, limited to:

◦ Designated fire lanes (Amendment #1).

◦ Periods of snow removal (Amendment #2).

◦ Vehicles in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours (Amendment #3).

• Invalidity of Revised Rules: Mr. Lee argued that the July 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which contain the parking ban, were not valid or controlling due to improper notification.

◦ He contended that Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required that such notices be delivered personally or by postal mail.

◦ He received notice only via a July 6, 2018 email, which he claimed did not clearly indicate that the rules had been substantively changed.

• Improper Motive: Mr. Lee contended that “the only reason that the Association banned parking was to please Barbara, a board member who did not want anyone to park behind her property.”

Respondent’s Defense

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two asserted that its actions were proper and within the scope of its authority as an HOA. Its defense included the following points:

• Controlling Authority: Greenlaw maintained that its revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, were the controlling documents governing parking.

• Notice Protocol: The association contended that the Bylaw provision requiring personal or postal mail notice applies only to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs. Greenlaw argued there is no such requirement for providing notice of amendments to the Rules and Regulations.

• Sufficient Notice: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee received actual notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

Analysis of Key Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between several of Greenlaw’s governing documents.

Document

Key Provision / Content

Relevance to Case

CC&R Amendments 1, 2, & 3

These amendments, added to Article II (Permitted Uses), establish specific, conditional parking prohibitions related to fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles.

The petitioner argued these amendments represented the only circumstances under which parking could be banned. The ALJ found they were not an exhaustive list.

Bylaws, Article V, Section 1

“Notices to directors and lot owners shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.”

The petitioner cited this to argue that the email notice for the revised rules was improper, thus invalidating the rules. The ALJ sided with the Respondent’s interpretation.

Rules and Regulations (July 2018), Section 8

“Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time… cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.” The rule specifies that the streets (Eva, Heidi, Jeffrey Loops) are private and owned by the HOA.

This document contains the explicit, total parking ban at the heart of the dispute. The ALJ found this rule to be the valid and controlling authority.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision was based on a comprehensive review of the evidence and legal standards, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.

Burden of Proof

The decision established that Mr. Lee bore the burden of proof “to establish that Greenlaw violated amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, and the Greenlaw Rules and Regulations by a preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Validity of the 2018 Rules: The ALJ concluded that “the weight of the evidence presented at hearing shows that Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations were revised effective July 2018 and are the controlling Rules and Regulations of Greenlaw.” Mr. Lee failed to establish that any prior version remained in effect.

2. Scope of CC&R Amendments: The decision found that the CC&R amendments only “provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” They do not restrict the association from implementing a broader ban through its Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the total ban did not violate the CC&Rs.

3. No Violation of Rules: Because the July 2018 rules were found to be controlling, and they explicitly authorize a total parking ban, the ALJ concluded that Greenlaw’s decision did not violate its own Rules and Regulations.

4. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: A critical failure in the petitioner’s case was the lack of evidence.

◦ The decision notes, “Mr. Lee provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.”

◦ His testimony about observing a booted jeep was dismissed as insufficient, as he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” The Greenlaw manager’s subsequent comment was not found to be an admission of responsibility.

◦ Mr. Lee did not allege that any of his own vehicles had been booted or towed.

5. No Statutory Violation: The judge found that Mr. Lee failed to establish any violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 33-1803 and 33-1809.

Final Order and Implications

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order.

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

• Appeal Process: As the order resulted from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal must seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.


William P Lee v vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel —
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809; CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited governing documents (CC&Rs/Rules) or state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning street parking and contracting for vehicle booting/towing.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding violations of CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. The ALJ found the July 2018 revised Rules, which banned parking, were controlling.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation regarding banning parking and use of towing/booting company.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly banned street parking and contracted with a towing/booting company, arguing this violated specific CC&R amendments, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. He also claimed the 2018 revised Rules were invalid due to improper electronic notice instead of personal delivery or mail.

Orders: Petitioners’ petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Notice, Towing, Booting, A.R.S. 33-1803, A.R.S. 33-1809
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:39 (110.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Administrative Hearing Briefing: William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG, where Petitioner William P. Lee’s complaint against the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (Greenlaw) was denied. Mr. Lee, a homeowner, alleged that Greenlaw’s complete ban on street parking and its contract with a towing company to enforce the ban violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Lee failed to meet the required burden of proof. The central conclusion was that Greenlaw’s revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, are the controlling authority and explicitly permit a total ban on street parking. The ALJ determined that the specific parking prohibitions detailed in the CC&R amendments—concerning fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles—do not preclude the association from enacting a more comprehensive ban via its rules. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that Greenlaw had actually taken the alleged enforcement actions (booting or towing) against any member’s vehicle.

Case Overview

Detail

Information

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

William P. Lee (Homeowner)

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Homeowners Association)

Hearing Date

April 1, 2019 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

April 22, 2019

Final Order

Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Presiding ALJ

Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Arguments

William P. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, centered on the claim that Greenlaw acted outside its authority by banning all street parking and contracting with a towing company for enforcement. His arguments were:

• Violation of CC&Rs: The total parking ban directly contradicted CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. Mr. Lee contended these amendments established an exhaustive list of permissible parking restrictions, limited to:

◦ Designated fire lanes (Amendment #1).

◦ Periods of snow removal (Amendment #2).

◦ Vehicles in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours (Amendment #3).

• Invalidity of Revised Rules: Mr. Lee argued that the July 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which contain the parking ban, were not valid or controlling due to improper notification.

◦ He contended that Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required that such notices be delivered personally or by postal mail.

◦ He received notice only via a July 6, 2018 email, which he claimed did not clearly indicate that the rules had been substantively changed.

• Improper Motive: Mr. Lee contended that “the only reason that the Association banned parking was to please Barbara, a board member who did not want anyone to park behind her property.”

Respondent’s Defense

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two asserted that its actions were proper and within the scope of its authority as an HOA. Its defense included the following points:

• Controlling Authority: Greenlaw maintained that its revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, were the controlling documents governing parking.

• Notice Protocol: The association contended that the Bylaw provision requiring personal or postal mail notice applies only to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs. Greenlaw argued there is no such requirement for providing notice of amendments to the Rules and Regulations.

• Sufficient Notice: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee received actual notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

Analysis of Key Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between several of Greenlaw’s governing documents.

Document

Key Provision / Content

Relevance to Case

CC&R Amendments 1, 2, & 3

These amendments, added to Article II (Permitted Uses), establish specific, conditional parking prohibitions related to fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles.

The petitioner argued these amendments represented the only circumstances under which parking could be banned. The ALJ found they were not an exhaustive list.

Bylaws, Article V, Section 1

“Notices to directors and lot owners shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.”

The petitioner cited this to argue that the email notice for the revised rules was improper, thus invalidating the rules. The ALJ sided with the Respondent’s interpretation.

Rules and Regulations (July 2018), Section 8

“Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time… cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.” The rule specifies that the streets (Eva, Heidi, Jeffrey Loops) are private and owned by the HOA.

This document contains the explicit, total parking ban at the heart of the dispute. The ALJ found this rule to be the valid and controlling authority.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision was based on a comprehensive review of the evidence and legal standards, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.

Burden of Proof

The decision established that Mr. Lee bore the burden of proof “to establish that Greenlaw violated amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, and the Greenlaw Rules and Regulations by a preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Validity of the 2018 Rules: The ALJ concluded that “the weight of the evidence presented at hearing shows that Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations were revised effective July 2018 and are the controlling Rules and Regulations of Greenlaw.” Mr. Lee failed to establish that any prior version remained in effect.

2. Scope of CC&R Amendments: The decision found that the CC&R amendments only “provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” They do not restrict the association from implementing a broader ban through its Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the total ban did not violate the CC&Rs.

3. No Violation of Rules: Because the July 2018 rules were found to be controlling, and they explicitly authorize a total parking ban, the ALJ concluded that Greenlaw’s decision did not violate its own Rules and Regulations.

4. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: A critical failure in the petitioner’s case was the lack of evidence.

◦ The decision notes, “Mr. Lee provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.”

◦ His testimony about observing a booted jeep was dismissed as insufficient, as he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” The Greenlaw manager’s subsequent comment was not found to be an admission of responsibility.

◦ Mr. Lee did not allege that any of his own vehicles had been booted or towed.

5. No Statutory Violation: The judge found that Mr. Lee failed to establish any violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 33-1803 and 33-1809.

Final Order and Implications

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order.

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

• Appeal Process: As the order resulted from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal must seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.


William P Lee vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel —
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809; CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited governing documents (CC&Rs/Rules) or state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning street parking and contracting for vehicle booting/towing.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding violations of CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. The ALJ found the July 2018 revised Rules, which banned parking, were controlling.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation regarding banning parking and use of towing/booting company.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly banned street parking and contracted with a towing/booting company, arguing this violated specific CC&R amendments, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. He also claimed the 2018 revised Rules were invalid due to improper electronic notice instead of personal delivery or mail.

Orders: Petitioners’ petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Notice, Towing, Booting, A.R.S. 33-1803, A.R.S. 33-1809
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:07:35 (110.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918019-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG, where Petitioner William P. Lee’s complaint against the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (Greenlaw) was denied. Mr. Lee, a homeowner, alleged that Greenlaw’s complete ban on street parking and its contract with a towing company to enforce the ban violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Lee failed to meet the required burden of proof. The central conclusion was that Greenlaw’s revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, are the controlling authority and explicitly permit a total ban on street parking. The ALJ determined that the specific parking prohibitions detailed in the CC&R amendments—concerning fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles—do not preclude the association from enacting a more comprehensive ban via its rules. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that Greenlaw had actually taken the alleged enforcement actions (booting or towing) against any member’s vehicle.

Case Overview

Detail

Information

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

William P. Lee (Homeowner)

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Homeowners Association)

Hearing Date

April 1, 2019 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

April 22, 2019

Final Order

Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Presiding ALJ

Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Arguments

William P. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, centered on the claim that Greenlaw acted outside its authority by banning all street parking and contracting with a towing company for enforcement. His arguments were:

• Violation of CC&Rs: The total parking ban directly contradicted CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. Mr. Lee contended these amendments established an exhaustive list of permissible parking restrictions, limited to:

◦ Designated fire lanes (Amendment #1).

◦ Periods of snow removal (Amendment #2).

◦ Vehicles in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours (Amendment #3).

• Invalidity of Revised Rules: Mr. Lee argued that the July 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which contain the parking ban, were not valid or controlling due to improper notification.

◦ He contended that Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required that such notices be delivered personally or by postal mail.

◦ He received notice only via a July 6, 2018 email, which he claimed did not clearly indicate that the rules had been substantively changed.

• Improper Motive: Mr. Lee contended that “the only reason that the Association banned parking was to please Barbara, a board member who did not want anyone to park behind her property.”

Respondent’s Defense

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two asserted that its actions were proper and within the scope of its authority as an HOA. Its defense included the following points:

• Controlling Authority: Greenlaw maintained that its revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, were the controlling documents governing parking.

• Notice Protocol: The association contended that the Bylaw provision requiring personal or postal mail notice applies only to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs. Greenlaw argued there is no such requirement for providing notice of amendments to the Rules and Regulations.

• Sufficient Notice: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee received actual notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

Analysis of Key Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between several of Greenlaw’s governing documents.

Document

Key Provision / Content

Relevance to Case

CC&R Amendments 1, 2, & 3

These amendments, added to Article II (Permitted Uses), establish specific, conditional parking prohibitions related to fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles.

The petitioner argued these amendments represented the only circumstances under which parking could be banned. The ALJ found they were not an exhaustive list.

Bylaws, Article V, Section 1

“Notices to directors and lot owners shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.”

The petitioner cited this to argue that the email notice for the revised rules was improper, thus invalidating the rules. The ALJ sided with the Respondent’s interpretation.

Rules and Regulations (July 2018), Section 8

“Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time… cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.” The rule specifies that the streets (Eva, Heidi, Jeffrey Loops) are private and owned by the HOA.

This document contains the explicit, total parking ban at the heart of the dispute. The ALJ found this rule to be the valid and controlling authority.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision was based on a comprehensive review of the evidence and legal standards, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.

Burden of Proof

The decision established that Mr. Lee bore the burden of proof “to establish that Greenlaw violated amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, and the Greenlaw Rules and Regulations by a preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Validity of the 2018 Rules: The ALJ concluded that “the weight of the evidence presented at hearing shows that Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations were revised effective July 2018 and are the controlling Rules and Regulations of Greenlaw.” Mr. Lee failed to establish that any prior version remained in effect.

2. Scope of CC&R Amendments: The decision found that the CC&R amendments only “provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” They do not restrict the association from implementing a broader ban through its Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the total ban did not violate the CC&Rs.

3. No Violation of Rules: Because the July 2018 rules were found to be controlling, and they explicitly authorize a total parking ban, the ALJ concluded that Greenlaw’s decision did not violate its own Rules and Regulations.

4. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: A critical failure in the petitioner’s case was the lack of evidence.

◦ The decision notes, “Mr. Lee provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.”

◦ His testimony about observing a booted jeep was dismissed as insufficient, as he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” The Greenlaw manager’s subsequent comment was not found to be an admission of responsibility.

◦ Mr. Lee did not allege that any of his own vehicles had been booted or towed.

5. No Statutory Violation: The judge found that Mr. Lee failed to establish any violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 33-1803 and 33-1809.

Final Order and Implications

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order.

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

• Appeal Process: As the order resulted from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal must seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.


William P Lee vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel —
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809; CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited governing documents (CC&Rs/Rules) or state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning street parking and contracting for vehicle booting/towing.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding violations of CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. The ALJ found the July 2018 revised Rules, which banned parking, were controlling.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation regarding banning parking and use of towing/booting company.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly banned street parking and contracted with a towing/booting company, arguing this violated specific CC&R amendments, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. He also claimed the 2018 revised Rules were invalid due to improper electronic notice instead of personal delivery or mail.

Orders: Petitioners’ petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Notice, Towing, Booting, A.R.S. 33-1803, A.R.S. 33-1809
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:37 (110.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918019-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG, where Petitioner William P. Lee’s complaint against the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (Greenlaw) was denied. Mr. Lee, a homeowner, alleged that Greenlaw’s complete ban on street parking and its contract with a towing company to enforce the ban violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Lee failed to meet the required burden of proof. The central conclusion was that Greenlaw’s revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, are the controlling authority and explicitly permit a total ban on street parking. The ALJ determined that the specific parking prohibitions detailed in the CC&R amendments—concerning fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles—do not preclude the association from enacting a more comprehensive ban via its rules. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that Greenlaw had actually taken the alleged enforcement actions (booting or towing) against any member’s vehicle.

Case Overview

Detail

Information

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

William P. Lee (Homeowner)

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Homeowners Association)

Hearing Date

April 1, 2019 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

April 22, 2019

Final Order

Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Presiding ALJ

Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Arguments

William P. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, centered on the claim that Greenlaw acted outside its authority by banning all street parking and contracting with a towing company for enforcement. His arguments were:

• Violation of CC&Rs: The total parking ban directly contradicted CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. Mr. Lee contended these amendments established an exhaustive list of permissible parking restrictions, limited to:

◦ Designated fire lanes (Amendment #1).

◦ Periods of snow removal (Amendment #2).

◦ Vehicles in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours (Amendment #3).

• Invalidity of Revised Rules: Mr. Lee argued that the July 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which contain the parking ban, were not valid or controlling due to improper notification.

◦ He contended that Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required that such notices be delivered personally or by postal mail.

◦ He received notice only via a July 6, 2018 email, which he claimed did not clearly indicate that the rules had been substantively changed.

• Improper Motive: Mr. Lee contended that “the only reason that the Association banned parking was to please Barbara, a board member who did not want anyone to park behind her property.”

Respondent’s Defense

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two asserted that its actions were proper and within the scope of its authority as an HOA. Its defense included the following points:

• Controlling Authority: Greenlaw maintained that its revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, were the controlling documents governing parking.

• Notice Protocol: The association contended that the Bylaw provision requiring personal or postal mail notice applies only to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs. Greenlaw argued there is no such requirement for providing notice of amendments to the Rules and Regulations.

• Sufficient Notice: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee received actual notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

Analysis of Key Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between several of Greenlaw’s governing documents.

Document

Key Provision / Content

Relevance to Case

CC&R Amendments 1, 2, & 3

These amendments, added to Article II (Permitted Uses), establish specific, conditional parking prohibitions related to fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles.

The petitioner argued these amendments represented the only circumstances under which parking could be banned. The ALJ found they were not an exhaustive list.

Bylaws, Article V, Section 1

“Notices to directors and lot owners shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.”

The petitioner cited this to argue that the email notice for the revised rules was improper, thus invalidating the rules. The ALJ sided with the Respondent’s interpretation.

Rules and Regulations (July 2018), Section 8

“Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time… cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.” The rule specifies that the streets (Eva, Heidi, Jeffrey Loops) are private and owned by the HOA.

This document contains the explicit, total parking ban at the heart of the dispute. The ALJ found this rule to be the valid and controlling authority.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision was based on a comprehensive review of the evidence and legal standards, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.

Burden of Proof

The decision established that Mr. Lee bore the burden of proof “to establish that Greenlaw violated amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, and the Greenlaw Rules and Regulations by a preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Validity of the 2018 Rules: The ALJ concluded that “the weight of the evidence presented at hearing shows that Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations were revised effective July 2018 and are the controlling Rules and Regulations of Greenlaw.” Mr. Lee failed to establish that any prior version remained in effect.

2. Scope of CC&R Amendments: The decision found that the CC&R amendments only “provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” They do not restrict the association from implementing a broader ban through its Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the total ban did not violate the CC&Rs.

3. No Violation of Rules: Because the July 2018 rules were found to be controlling, and they explicitly authorize a total parking ban, the ALJ concluded that Greenlaw’s decision did not violate its own Rules and Regulations.

4. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: A critical failure in the petitioner’s case was the lack of evidence.

◦ The decision notes, “Mr. Lee provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.”

◦ His testimony about observing a booted jeep was dismissed as insufficient, as he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” The Greenlaw manager’s subsequent comment was not found to be an admission of responsibility.

◦ Mr. Lee did not allege that any of his own vehicles had been booted or towed.

5. No Statutory Violation: The judge found that Mr. Lee failed to establish any violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 33-1803 and 33-1809.

Final Order and Implications

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order.

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

• Appeal Process: As the order resulted from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal must seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.


William Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1717041-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-10-11
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William Brown Counsel —
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Dax R. Watson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's request, finding that the Respondent HOA did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) because the Petitioner received constructive notice of the infraction committee meeting before the penalties and suspension were imposed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove that the notice required by A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) must be 'actual notice,' and the evidence supported a finding that Petitioner received constructive notice.

Key Issues & Findings

Prior to imposing reasonable monetary penalties on Petitioner for violations of the declaration, bylaws and rules of the association, Respondent failed to provide Petitioner proper notice in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1803(B).

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) by failing to provide proper notice before imposing penalties ($2,500 fine and $5,000 recoupment of expenses) and indefinitely suspending his membership privileges. The ALJ found that Petitioner received constructive notice of the hearing and that Respondent did not violate the statute.

Orders: Petitioner's petition in this matter is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: notice, constructive notice, monetary penalties, suspension, certified mail, HOA violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1717041-REL Decision – 593953.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:50 (83.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1717041-REL


Administrative Law Judge Decision Analysis: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in case number 18F-H1717041-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner William Brown (Petitioner) and the Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Respondent). The ALJ ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent, denying the Petitioner’s claim that the homeowners association violated Arizona state law regarding notification procedures before imposing penalties.

The central issue revolved around the interpretation of “notice” as required by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1803(B). The Petitioner argued that the statute requires “actual notice”—proof of personal receipt of a notification—which he claimed he never received for a critical disciplinary hearing. The ALJ rejected this argument, establishing that “constructive notice” is legally sufficient. Constructive notice was deemed to have been achieved through the Respondent’s documented efforts to deliver notice via both certified and first-class mail.

A key factor in the decision was the ALJ’s finding that the Petitioner’s testimony was “not credible” regarding his claim that the United States Postal Service (USPS) failed to notify him of a certified letter. The decision upholds the sanctions imposed by the association, which include an indefinite suspension of membership privileges, a $2,500 fine, and the recoupment of $5,000 in related expenses.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute originated from an incident on November 29, 2016, where Petitioner William Brown was alleged to have left a box of matches at the Respondent’s clubhouse containing papers listing several club properties. This act was interpreted as a threat, leading the Terravita Country Club to initiate disciplinary proceedings. Mr. Brown subsequently filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on June 28, 2017, alleging the club failed to provide proper notice before taking action.

Nov 29, 2016

William Brown allegedly leaves a box of matches and notes at the clubhouse.

Dec 2, 2016

The club’s General Manager sends a letter to Brown notifying him of an immediate suspension pending a review.

Dec 8, 2016

Brown signs for and receives the certified mail delivery of the December 2 suspension letter.

Dec 14, 2016

The club sends a letter via first-class and certified mail notifying Brown of a January 9, 2017, Infractions Committee hearing.

Dec 24, 2016

USPS tracking shows the December 14 certified letter is “out for delivery” at Brown’s temporary address in Coldspring, Texas.

Jan 9, 2017

The Infractions Committee meets; Brown does not attend. The Committee sends a letter recommending indefinite suspension and fines.

Jan 12, 2017

The unclaimed December 14 certified letter is returned by the USPS to the club.

Jan 31, 2017

The club’s Board of Directors meets; Brown does not attend. The Board ratifies the sanctions.

Jan 31, 2017

The Board sends a letter to Brown detailing its decision: indefinite suspension, a $2,500 fine, and $5,000 in expense recoupment.

Jun 28, 2017

Brown files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1803.

Sep 22, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings holds a hearing on the matter.

Oct 11, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer issues the decision, denying Brown’s petition.

Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Notice”

The core of the legal dispute was the interpretation of the notice requirement within A.R.S. § 33-1803(B), which states, in part:

“After notice and an opportunity to be heard, the board of directors may impose reasonable monetary penalties on members for violations of the declaration, bylaws and rules of the association.”

The Petitioner argued that this statute requires “actual notice,” defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “[n]otice given directly to, or received personally by, a party.” Because there was no evidence he personally received the December 14, 2016, letter notifying him of the initial hearing, he contended that all subsequent actions by the club were invalid.

The ALJ rejected this interpretation for two primary reasons:

1. Statutory Silence: The governing statute, A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, does not define the term “notice” or specify that it must be “actual notice.”

2. Legal Precedent and Practicality: The ALJ reasoned that requiring actual notice would create an unworkable loophole. A homeowner could “avoid receiving ‘actual notice’ by simply refusing to sign for a certified mailing,” thereby thwarting any disciplinary process.

Instead, the ALJ determined that “constructive notice” was sufficient. Constructive notice is defined as “notice arising by presumption of law from the existence of facts and circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of.” The Respondent’s actions of sending notice via multiple methods met this standard.

Key Findings and Rulings

The ALJ made several critical findings of fact and conclusions of law that led to the denial of the petition.

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioner, William Brown, bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated the statute. The ALJ concluded he failed to meet this burden.

• Finding on Credibility: The ALJ explicitly stated that the Petitioner’s assertion was not credible. The decision notes: “Petitioner’s assertion that the USPS failed to notify him of the certified letter at any time between December 24, 2016, and January 12, 2017, was not credible.”

• Ruling on Constructive Notice: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner received constructive notice of the January 9, 2017, Infractions Committee meeting through two distinct actions taken by the Respondent:

1. The certified mailing of the December 14, 2016, letter, for which USPS tracking showed an attempted delivery and which the Petitioner was deemed to have refused.

2. The simultaneous first-class mailing of the same letter, which was “presumably delivered to his temporary address in Coldspring, Texas.”

• Notice for Subsequent Meetings: The ALJ further presumed that the first-class mailing of the January 9, 2017, letter—notifying the Petitioner of the Board of Directors meeting—was also delivered, thus satisfying notice requirements for the final decision-making body.

Final Decision and Sanctions

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The ruling affirmed that Terravita Country Club, Inc. did not violate the provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1803(B).

This decision effectively upholds the sanctions imposed by the club’s Board of Directors on January 31, 2017, which include:

• Indefinite suspension of membership privileges.

• A fine of $2,500.00.

• Recoupment of expenses incurred related to the infraction, totaling $5,000.00.

The order is binding on both parties unless a rehearing is granted pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04.


William Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1717041-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-10-11
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William Brown Counsel —
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Dax R. Watson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's request, finding that the Respondent HOA did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) because the Petitioner received constructive notice of the infraction committee meeting before the penalties and suspension were imposed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove that the notice required by A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) must be 'actual notice,' and the evidence supported a finding that Petitioner received constructive notice.

Key Issues & Findings

Prior to imposing reasonable monetary penalties on Petitioner for violations of the declaration, bylaws and rules of the association, Respondent failed to provide Petitioner proper notice in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1803(B).

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) by failing to provide proper notice before imposing penalties ($2,500 fine and $5,000 recoupment of expenses) and indefinitely suspending his membership privileges. The ALJ found that Petitioner received constructive notice of the hearing and that Respondent did not violate the statute.

Orders: Petitioner's petition in this matter is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: notice, constructive notice, monetary penalties, suspension, certified mail, HOA violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1717041-REL Decision – 593953.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:56 (83.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1717041-REL


Administrative Law Judge Decision Analysis: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in case number 18F-H1717041-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner William Brown (Petitioner) and the Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Respondent). The ALJ ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent, denying the Petitioner’s claim that the homeowners association violated Arizona state law regarding notification procedures before imposing penalties.

The central issue revolved around the interpretation of “notice” as required by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1803(B). The Petitioner argued that the statute requires “actual notice”—proof of personal receipt of a notification—which he claimed he never received for a critical disciplinary hearing. The ALJ rejected this argument, establishing that “constructive notice” is legally sufficient. Constructive notice was deemed to have been achieved through the Respondent’s documented efforts to deliver notice via both certified and first-class mail.

A key factor in the decision was the ALJ’s finding that the Petitioner’s testimony was “not credible” regarding his claim that the United States Postal Service (USPS) failed to notify him of a certified letter. The decision upholds the sanctions imposed by the association, which include an indefinite suspension of membership privileges, a $2,500 fine, and the recoupment of $5,000 in related expenses.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute originated from an incident on November 29, 2016, where Petitioner William Brown was alleged to have left a box of matches at the Respondent’s clubhouse containing papers listing several club properties. This act was interpreted as a threat, leading the Terravita Country Club to initiate disciplinary proceedings. Mr. Brown subsequently filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on June 28, 2017, alleging the club failed to provide proper notice before taking action.

Nov 29, 2016

William Brown allegedly leaves a box of matches and notes at the clubhouse.

Dec 2, 2016

The club’s General Manager sends a letter to Brown notifying him of an immediate suspension pending a review.

Dec 8, 2016

Brown signs for and receives the certified mail delivery of the December 2 suspension letter.

Dec 14, 2016

The club sends a letter via first-class and certified mail notifying Brown of a January 9, 2017, Infractions Committee hearing.

Dec 24, 2016

USPS tracking shows the December 14 certified letter is “out for delivery” at Brown’s temporary address in Coldspring, Texas.

Jan 9, 2017

The Infractions Committee meets; Brown does not attend. The Committee sends a letter recommending indefinite suspension and fines.

Jan 12, 2017

The unclaimed December 14 certified letter is returned by the USPS to the club.

Jan 31, 2017

The club’s Board of Directors meets; Brown does not attend. The Board ratifies the sanctions.

Jan 31, 2017

The Board sends a letter to Brown detailing its decision: indefinite suspension, a $2,500 fine, and $5,000 in expense recoupment.

Jun 28, 2017

Brown files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1803.

Sep 22, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings holds a hearing on the matter.

Oct 11, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer issues the decision, denying Brown’s petition.

Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Notice”

The core of the legal dispute was the interpretation of the notice requirement within A.R.S. § 33-1803(B), which states, in part:

“After notice and an opportunity to be heard, the board of directors may impose reasonable monetary penalties on members for violations of the declaration, bylaws and rules of the association.”

The Petitioner argued that this statute requires “actual notice,” defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “[n]otice given directly to, or received personally by, a party.” Because there was no evidence he personally received the December 14, 2016, letter notifying him of the initial hearing, he contended that all subsequent actions by the club were invalid.

The ALJ rejected this interpretation for two primary reasons:

1. Statutory Silence: The governing statute, A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, does not define the term “notice” or specify that it must be “actual notice.”

2. Legal Precedent and Practicality: The ALJ reasoned that requiring actual notice would create an unworkable loophole. A homeowner could “avoid receiving ‘actual notice’ by simply refusing to sign for a certified mailing,” thereby thwarting any disciplinary process.

Instead, the ALJ determined that “constructive notice” was sufficient. Constructive notice is defined as “notice arising by presumption of law from the existence of facts and circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of.” The Respondent’s actions of sending notice via multiple methods met this standard.

Key Findings and Rulings

The ALJ made several critical findings of fact and conclusions of law that led to the denial of the petition.

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioner, William Brown, bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated the statute. The ALJ concluded he failed to meet this burden.

• Finding on Credibility: The ALJ explicitly stated that the Petitioner’s assertion was not credible. The decision notes: “Petitioner’s assertion that the USPS failed to notify him of the certified letter at any time between December 24, 2016, and January 12, 2017, was not credible.”

• Ruling on Constructive Notice: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner received constructive notice of the January 9, 2017, Infractions Committee meeting through two distinct actions taken by the Respondent:

1. The certified mailing of the December 14, 2016, letter, for which USPS tracking showed an attempted delivery and which the Petitioner was deemed to have refused.

2. The simultaneous first-class mailing of the same letter, which was “presumably delivered to his temporary address in Coldspring, Texas.”

• Notice for Subsequent Meetings: The ALJ further presumed that the first-class mailing of the January 9, 2017, letter—notifying the Petitioner of the Board of Directors meeting—was also delivered, thus satisfying notice requirements for the final decision-making body.

Final Decision and Sanctions

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The ruling affirmed that Terravita Country Club, Inc. did not violate the provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1803(B).

This decision effectively upholds the sanctions imposed by the club’s Board of Directors on January 31, 2017, which include:

• Indefinite suspension of membership privileges.

• A fine of $2,500.00.

• Recoupment of expenses incurred related to the infraction, totaling $5,000.00.

The order is binding on both parties unless a rehearing is granted pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04.