William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716005-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-10
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after the Tribunal concluded that the Respondent, Terravita Country Club, Inc., violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to timely provide access to records within the mandated 10 business days. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute and refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was imposed.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely respond to records request

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to timely respond to his July 30, 2016 records request, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The Tribunal found that Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent failed to fulfill the request for examination of records within 10 business days, violating A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Orders: Respondent is ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request for records within 10 days of the Order. Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records Request, Failure to Respond, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 574630.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:51 (87.9 KB)

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 575115.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:51 (789.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716005-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and final order in the case of William M. Brown (Petitioner) versus Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Respondent), Case No. 17F-H1716005-REL. The central issue was Terravita’s failure to respond to a member’s request for records within the 10-business-day timeframe mandated by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the Petitioner’s testimony and evidence to be credible, establishing that Mr. Brown submitted a valid records request via e-mail on July 30, 2016, to which Terravita did not timely respond. The ALJ found the testimony of Terravita’s key witness to be unreliable and rejected Terravita’s defenses, which included claims of non-receipt, improper submission procedure, and falsified evidence.

Ultimately, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner, concluding that Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The recommended order, which was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, mandated that Terravita comply with the records request, reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee, and deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party. No civil penalty was assessed.

Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

17F-H1716005-REL (OAH) / HO 17-16/005 (DRE)

Petitioner

William M. Brown (Appeared on behalf of himself)

Respondent

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Represented by Joshua Bolen, Esq.)

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Adopting Authority

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Commissioner

Judy Lowe

Hearing Date

June 19, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

July 10, 2017

Final Order Date

July 11, 2017

Chronology of Events

February 12, 2016: Anita Bell requests records from Terravita via Mr. Brown’s e-mail account. The request is forwarded to General Manager Tom Forbes.

February 19, 2016: Mr. Forbes informs Ms. Bell that the records will be ready on February 22.

March 14, 2016: Ms. Bell submits another records request from Mr. Brown’s e-mail account.

March 18, 2016: Cici Rausch, Terravita’s Director of Administration, informs Ms. Bell when the records can be retrieved.

July 29, 2016: Date of the records request at the center of the legal dispute.

July 30, 2016: Mr. Brown e-mails the records request to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley. On the same day, he separately requests records from the Terravita Community Association, Inc. (TCA).

August 6, 2016: Mr. Brown sends another records request to Ms. Wiley.

August 8, 2016: TCA responds to Mr. Brown’s July 30 request.

August 12, 2016: Terravita responds to Mr. Brown’s August 6 request.

August 18, 2016: Mr. Brown files a Petition for Hearing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond to his July 30 request.

September 9, 2016: Terravita files a response, alleging it did not receive the July 30 records request.

June 19, 2017: The administrative hearing is held.

July 10, 2017: The ALJ issues a decision finding in favor of Mr. Brown.

July 11, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepts the ALJ’s decision and issues a Final Order.

Analysis of the Central Dispute

The core of the case revolved around whether Terravita violated its statutory duty to respond to Mr. Brown’s records request dated July 29, 2016, which he e-mailed on July 30, 2016.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence

Core Allegation: Mr. Brown testified that he sent the records request via e-mail to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley, on July 30, 2016, and that Terravita failed to respond within the 10-business-day period mandated by law.

Evidence: Mr. Brown submitted an August 12, 2016 forwarded e-mail (Exhibit P2) that contained the original July 30, 2016 e-mail sent to Ms. Wiley.

Judicial Finding: The ALJ found Mr. Brown’s testimony to be “credible.”

Respondent’s Defenses and the Court’s Findings

Terravita presented several arguments to contest the allegation, all of which were ultimately unpersuasive to the court.

1. Claim of Non-Receipt: Terravita contended it never received the July 30, 2016 request. Ms. Wiley testified she did not receive a request from Mr. Brown on July 29 or July 30.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ found Ms. Wiley’s testimony to be “unreliable.” The decision noted that Ms. Wiley testified that Terravita was “indirectly” informed around August 5 that “perhaps Mr. Brown had made the request,” which undermined the claim of complete non-awareness.

2. Use of an Incorrect E-mail Address: Ms. Wiley testified that she did not use the e-mail address to which Mr. Brown sent the request for Terravita affairs, claiming she used a different one in her official capacity as Secretary.

Court’s Finding: This argument was implicitly rejected, as the ALJ concluded that Mr. Brown had successfully proven he submitted the request “to its Secretary, Ms. Wiley.”

3. Allegation of Falsified Evidence: Terravita contended that the forwarded e-mail evidence offered by Mr. Brown was falsified.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ noted an inconsistency in Terravita’s position, stating, “Terravita did not contend that the written evidence of Mr. Brown’s August 5, 2016 records request, sent by e-mail to Ms. Wiley, was falsified.” This weakened the credibility of the falsification claim against the July 30 e-mail.

4. Non-Compliance with Internal Policy: Terravita argued that its own Rules, Policies, and Procedures required members to submit records requests to the General Manager and/or Director of Administration, not the Secretary.

Court’s Finding: The decision focused entirely on the violation of the state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1805, indicating that the statutory obligation superseded the association’s internal procedural preferences.

Legal Framework and Conclusions of Law

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) mandates that a homeowners’ association “shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination” of its financial and other records by a member.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner was required to prove the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that Mr. Brown successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1. He submitted a request for records to Terravita’s Secretary via e-mail on July 30, 2016.

2. Terravita failed to fulfill this request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

Final Judgment: The Tribunal concluded that “Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.” It was also noted that Terravita did not contend that any of the statutory exceptions to disclosure, such as privileged communication or pending litigation, applied.

Final Order and Directives

The ALJ’s decision was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on July 11, 2017, making it a Final Order with the following mandates:

Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

Compliance with Request: Terravita was ordered to “comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request of Terravita’s records” within 10 days of the Order.

Reimbursement of Filing Fee: Terravita was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 directly to him within thirty (30) days.

Civil Penalty: The court determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

Effective Date: The Order was made effective five (5) days from the date of its certification. The Final Order itself is effective immediately from the date of service, July 11, 2017.


William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716005-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-10
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after the Tribunal concluded that the Respondent, Terravita Country Club, Inc., violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to timely provide access to records within the mandated 10 business days. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute and refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was imposed.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely respond to records request

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to timely respond to his July 30, 2016 records request, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The Tribunal found that Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent failed to fulfill the request for examination of records within 10 business days, violating A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Orders: Respondent is ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request for records within 10 days of the Order. Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records Request, Failure to Respond, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 574630.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:58 (87.9 KB)

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 575115.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:00 (789.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716005-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and final order in the case of William M. Brown (Petitioner) versus Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Respondent), Case No. 17F-H1716005-REL. The central issue was Terravita’s failure to respond to a member’s request for records within the 10-business-day timeframe mandated by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the Petitioner’s testimony and evidence to be credible, establishing that Mr. Brown submitted a valid records request via e-mail on July 30, 2016, to which Terravita did not timely respond. The ALJ found the testimony of Terravita’s key witness to be unreliable and rejected Terravita’s defenses, which included claims of non-receipt, improper submission procedure, and falsified evidence.

Ultimately, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner, concluding that Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The recommended order, which was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, mandated that Terravita comply with the records request, reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee, and deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party. No civil penalty was assessed.

Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

17F-H1716005-REL (OAH) / HO 17-16/005 (DRE)

Petitioner

William M. Brown (Appeared on behalf of himself)

Respondent

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Represented by Joshua Bolen, Esq.)

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Adopting Authority

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Commissioner

Judy Lowe

Hearing Date

June 19, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

July 10, 2017

Final Order Date

July 11, 2017

Chronology of Events

February 12, 2016: Anita Bell requests records from Terravita via Mr. Brown’s e-mail account. The request is forwarded to General Manager Tom Forbes.

February 19, 2016: Mr. Forbes informs Ms. Bell that the records will be ready on February 22.

March 14, 2016: Ms. Bell submits another records request from Mr. Brown’s e-mail account.

March 18, 2016: Cici Rausch, Terravita’s Director of Administration, informs Ms. Bell when the records can be retrieved.

July 29, 2016: Date of the records request at the center of the legal dispute.

July 30, 2016: Mr. Brown e-mails the records request to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley. On the same day, he separately requests records from the Terravita Community Association, Inc. (TCA).

August 6, 2016: Mr. Brown sends another records request to Ms. Wiley.

August 8, 2016: TCA responds to Mr. Brown’s July 30 request.

August 12, 2016: Terravita responds to Mr. Brown’s August 6 request.

August 18, 2016: Mr. Brown files a Petition for Hearing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond to his July 30 request.

September 9, 2016: Terravita files a response, alleging it did not receive the July 30 records request.

June 19, 2017: The administrative hearing is held.

July 10, 2017: The ALJ issues a decision finding in favor of Mr. Brown.

July 11, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepts the ALJ’s decision and issues a Final Order.

Analysis of the Central Dispute

The core of the case revolved around whether Terravita violated its statutory duty to respond to Mr. Brown’s records request dated July 29, 2016, which he e-mailed on July 30, 2016.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence

Core Allegation: Mr. Brown testified that he sent the records request via e-mail to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley, on July 30, 2016, and that Terravita failed to respond within the 10-business-day period mandated by law.

Evidence: Mr. Brown submitted an August 12, 2016 forwarded e-mail (Exhibit P2) that contained the original July 30, 2016 e-mail sent to Ms. Wiley.

Judicial Finding: The ALJ found Mr. Brown’s testimony to be “credible.”

Respondent’s Defenses and the Court’s Findings

Terravita presented several arguments to contest the allegation, all of which were ultimately unpersuasive to the court.

1. Claim of Non-Receipt: Terravita contended it never received the July 30, 2016 request. Ms. Wiley testified she did not receive a request from Mr. Brown on July 29 or July 30.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ found Ms. Wiley’s testimony to be “unreliable.” The decision noted that Ms. Wiley testified that Terravita was “indirectly” informed around August 5 that “perhaps Mr. Brown had made the request,” which undermined the claim of complete non-awareness.

2. Use of an Incorrect E-mail Address: Ms. Wiley testified that she did not use the e-mail address to which Mr. Brown sent the request for Terravita affairs, claiming she used a different one in her official capacity as Secretary.

Court’s Finding: This argument was implicitly rejected, as the ALJ concluded that Mr. Brown had successfully proven he submitted the request “to its Secretary, Ms. Wiley.”

3. Allegation of Falsified Evidence: Terravita contended that the forwarded e-mail evidence offered by Mr. Brown was falsified.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ noted an inconsistency in Terravita’s position, stating, “Terravita did not contend that the written evidence of Mr. Brown’s August 5, 2016 records request, sent by e-mail to Ms. Wiley, was falsified.” This weakened the credibility of the falsification claim against the July 30 e-mail.

4. Non-Compliance with Internal Policy: Terravita argued that its own Rules, Policies, and Procedures required members to submit records requests to the General Manager and/or Director of Administration, not the Secretary.

Court’s Finding: The decision focused entirely on the violation of the state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1805, indicating that the statutory obligation superseded the association’s internal procedural preferences.

Legal Framework and Conclusions of Law

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) mandates that a homeowners’ association “shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination” of its financial and other records by a member.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner was required to prove the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that Mr. Brown successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1. He submitted a request for records to Terravita’s Secretary via e-mail on July 30, 2016.

2. Terravita failed to fulfill this request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

Final Judgment: The Tribunal concluded that “Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.” It was also noted that Terravita did not contend that any of the statutory exceptions to disclosure, such as privileged communication or pending litigation, applied.

Final Order and Directives

The ALJ’s decision was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on July 11, 2017, making it a Final Order with the following mandates:

Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

Compliance with Request: Terravita was ordered to “comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request of Terravita’s records” within 10 days of the Order.

Reimbursement of Filing Fee: Terravita was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 directly to him within thirty (30) days.

Civil Penalty: The court determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

Effective Date: The Order was made effective five (5) days from the date of its certification. The Final Order itself is effective immediately from the date of service, July 11, 2017.


William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716005-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-10
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after the Tribunal concluded that the Respondent, Terravita Country Club, Inc., violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to timely provide access to records within the mandated 10 business days. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute and refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was imposed.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely respond to records request

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to timely respond to his July 30, 2016 records request, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The Tribunal found that Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent failed to fulfill the request for examination of records within 10 business days, violating A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Orders: Respondent is ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request for records within 10 days of the Order. Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records Request, Failure to Respond, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 574630.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:03 (87.9 KB)

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 575115.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:03 (789.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716005-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and final order in the case of William M. Brown (Petitioner) versus Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Respondent), Case No. 17F-H1716005-REL. The central issue was Terravita’s failure to respond to a member’s request for records within the 10-business-day timeframe mandated by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the Petitioner’s testimony and evidence to be credible, establishing that Mr. Brown submitted a valid records request via e-mail on July 30, 2016, to which Terravita did not timely respond. The ALJ found the testimony of Terravita’s key witness to be unreliable and rejected Terravita’s defenses, which included claims of non-receipt, improper submission procedure, and falsified evidence.

Ultimately, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner, concluding that Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The recommended order, which was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, mandated that Terravita comply with the records request, reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee, and deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party. No civil penalty was assessed.

Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

17F-H1716005-REL (OAH) / HO 17-16/005 (DRE)

Petitioner

William M. Brown (Appeared on behalf of himself)

Respondent

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Represented by Joshua Bolen, Esq.)

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Adopting Authority

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Commissioner

Judy Lowe

Hearing Date

June 19, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

July 10, 2017

Final Order Date

July 11, 2017

Chronology of Events

February 12, 2016: Anita Bell requests records from Terravita via Mr. Brown’s e-mail account. The request is forwarded to General Manager Tom Forbes.

February 19, 2016: Mr. Forbes informs Ms. Bell that the records will be ready on February 22.

March 14, 2016: Ms. Bell submits another records request from Mr. Brown’s e-mail account.

March 18, 2016: Cici Rausch, Terravita’s Director of Administration, informs Ms. Bell when the records can be retrieved.

July 29, 2016: Date of the records request at the center of the legal dispute.

July 30, 2016: Mr. Brown e-mails the records request to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley. On the same day, he separately requests records from the Terravita Community Association, Inc. (TCA).

August 6, 2016: Mr. Brown sends another records request to Ms. Wiley.

August 8, 2016: TCA responds to Mr. Brown’s July 30 request.

August 12, 2016: Terravita responds to Mr. Brown’s August 6 request.

August 18, 2016: Mr. Brown files a Petition for Hearing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond to his July 30 request.

September 9, 2016: Terravita files a response, alleging it did not receive the July 30 records request.

June 19, 2017: The administrative hearing is held.

July 10, 2017: The ALJ issues a decision finding in favor of Mr. Brown.

July 11, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepts the ALJ’s decision and issues a Final Order.

Analysis of the Central Dispute

The core of the case revolved around whether Terravita violated its statutory duty to respond to Mr. Brown’s records request dated July 29, 2016, which he e-mailed on July 30, 2016.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence

Core Allegation: Mr. Brown testified that he sent the records request via e-mail to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley, on July 30, 2016, and that Terravita failed to respond within the 10-business-day period mandated by law.

Evidence: Mr. Brown submitted an August 12, 2016 forwarded e-mail (Exhibit P2) that contained the original July 30, 2016 e-mail sent to Ms. Wiley.

Judicial Finding: The ALJ found Mr. Brown’s testimony to be “credible.”

Respondent’s Defenses and the Court’s Findings

Terravita presented several arguments to contest the allegation, all of which were ultimately unpersuasive to the court.

1. Claim of Non-Receipt: Terravita contended it never received the July 30, 2016 request. Ms. Wiley testified she did not receive a request from Mr. Brown on July 29 or July 30.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ found Ms. Wiley’s testimony to be “unreliable.” The decision noted that Ms. Wiley testified that Terravita was “indirectly” informed around August 5 that “perhaps Mr. Brown had made the request,” which undermined the claim of complete non-awareness.

2. Use of an Incorrect E-mail Address: Ms. Wiley testified that she did not use the e-mail address to which Mr. Brown sent the request for Terravita affairs, claiming she used a different one in her official capacity as Secretary.

Court’s Finding: This argument was implicitly rejected, as the ALJ concluded that Mr. Brown had successfully proven he submitted the request “to its Secretary, Ms. Wiley.”

3. Allegation of Falsified Evidence: Terravita contended that the forwarded e-mail evidence offered by Mr. Brown was falsified.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ noted an inconsistency in Terravita’s position, stating, “Terravita did not contend that the written evidence of Mr. Brown’s August 5, 2016 records request, sent by e-mail to Ms. Wiley, was falsified.” This weakened the credibility of the falsification claim against the July 30 e-mail.

4. Non-Compliance with Internal Policy: Terravita argued that its own Rules, Policies, and Procedures required members to submit records requests to the General Manager and/or Director of Administration, not the Secretary.

Court’s Finding: The decision focused entirely on the violation of the state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1805, indicating that the statutory obligation superseded the association’s internal procedural preferences.

Legal Framework and Conclusions of Law

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) mandates that a homeowners’ association “shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination” of its financial and other records by a member.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner was required to prove the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that Mr. Brown successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1. He submitted a request for records to Terravita’s Secretary via e-mail on July 30, 2016.

2. Terravita failed to fulfill this request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

Final Judgment: The Tribunal concluded that “Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.” It was also noted that Terravita did not contend that any of the statutory exceptions to disclosure, such as privileged communication or pending litigation, applied.

Final Order and Directives

The ALJ’s decision was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on July 11, 2017, making it a Final Order with the following mandates:

Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

Compliance with Request: Terravita was ordered to “comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request of Terravita’s records” within 10 days of the Order.

Reimbursement of Filing Fee: Terravita was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 directly to him within thirty (30) days.

Civil Penalty: The court determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

Effective Date: The Order was made effective five (5) days from the date of its certification. The Final Order itself is effective immediately from the date of service, July 11, 2017.


William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716005-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-10
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after the Tribunal concluded that the Respondent, Terravita Country Club, Inc., violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to timely provide access to records within the mandated 10 business days. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute and refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was imposed.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely respond to records request

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to timely respond to his July 30, 2016 records request, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The Tribunal found that Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent failed to fulfill the request for examination of records within 10 business days, violating A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Orders: Respondent is ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request for records within 10 days of the Order. Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records Request, Failure to Respond, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.01

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 574630.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:32 (87.9 KB)

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 575115.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:33 (789.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716005-REL


Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and final order in the case of William M. Brown (Petitioner) versus Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Respondent), Case No. 17F-H1716005-REL. The central issue was Terravita’s failure to respond to a member’s request for records within the 10-business-day timeframe mandated by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the Petitioner’s testimony and evidence to be credible, establishing that Mr. Brown submitted a valid records request via e-mail on July 30, 2016, to which Terravita did not timely respond. The ALJ found the testimony of Terravita’s key witness to be unreliable and rejected Terravita’s defenses, which included claims of non-receipt, improper submission procedure, and falsified evidence.

Ultimately, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner, concluding that Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The recommended order, which was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, mandated that Terravita comply with the records request, reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee, and deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party. No civil penalty was assessed.

Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

17F-H1716005-REL (OAH) / HO 17-16/005 (DRE)

Petitioner

William M. Brown (Appeared on behalf of himself)

Respondent

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Represented by Joshua Bolen, Esq.)

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Adopting Authority

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Commissioner

Judy Lowe

Hearing Date

June 19, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

July 10, 2017

Final Order Date

July 11, 2017

Chronology of Events

February 12, 2016: Anita Bell requests records from Terravita via Mr. Brown’s e-mail account. The request is forwarded to General Manager Tom Forbes.

February 19, 2016: Mr. Forbes informs Ms. Bell that the records will be ready on February 22.

March 14, 2016: Ms. Bell submits another records request from Mr. Brown’s e-mail account.

March 18, 2016: Cici Rausch, Terravita’s Director of Administration, informs Ms. Bell when the records can be retrieved.

July 29, 2016: Date of the records request at the center of the legal dispute.

July 30, 2016: Mr. Brown e-mails the records request to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley. On the same day, he separately requests records from the Terravita Community Association, Inc. (TCA).

August 6, 2016: Mr. Brown sends another records request to Ms. Wiley.

August 8, 2016: TCA responds to Mr. Brown’s July 30 request.

August 12, 2016: Terravita responds to Mr. Brown’s August 6 request.

August 18, 2016: Mr. Brown files a Petition for Hearing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond to his July 30 request.

September 9, 2016: Terravita files a response, alleging it did not receive the July 30 records request.

June 19, 2017: The administrative hearing is held.

July 10, 2017: The ALJ issues a decision finding in favor of Mr. Brown.

July 11, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepts the ALJ’s decision and issues a Final Order.

Analysis of the Central Dispute

The core of the case revolved around whether Terravita violated its statutory duty to respond to Mr. Brown’s records request dated July 29, 2016, which he e-mailed on July 30, 2016.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence

Core Allegation: Mr. Brown testified that he sent the records request via e-mail to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley, on July 30, 2016, and that Terravita failed to respond within the 10-business-day period mandated by law.

Evidence: Mr. Brown submitted an August 12, 2016 forwarded e-mail (Exhibit P2) that contained the original July 30, 2016 e-mail sent to Ms. Wiley.

Judicial Finding: The ALJ found Mr. Brown’s testimony to be “credible.”

Respondent’s Defenses and the Court’s Findings

Terravita presented several arguments to contest the allegation, all of which were ultimately unpersuasive to the court.

1. Claim of Non-Receipt: Terravita contended it never received the July 30, 2016 request. Ms. Wiley testified she did not receive a request from Mr. Brown on July 29 or July 30.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ found Ms. Wiley’s testimony to be “unreliable.” The decision noted that Ms. Wiley testified that Terravita was “indirectly” informed around August 5 that “perhaps Mr. Brown had made the request,” which undermined the claim of complete non-awareness.

2. Use of an Incorrect E-mail Address: Ms. Wiley testified that she did not use the e-mail address to which Mr. Brown sent the request for Terravita affairs, claiming she used a different one in her official capacity as Secretary.

Court’s Finding: This argument was implicitly rejected, as the ALJ concluded that Mr. Brown had successfully proven he submitted the request “to its Secretary, Ms. Wiley.”

3. Allegation of Falsified Evidence: Terravita contended that the forwarded e-mail evidence offered by Mr. Brown was falsified.

Court’s Finding: The ALJ noted an inconsistency in Terravita’s position, stating, “Terravita did not contend that the written evidence of Mr. Brown’s August 5, 2016 records request, sent by e-mail to Ms. Wiley, was falsified.” This weakened the credibility of the falsification claim against the July 30 e-mail.

4. Non-Compliance with Internal Policy: Terravita argued that its own Rules, Policies, and Procedures required members to submit records requests to the General Manager and/or Director of Administration, not the Secretary.

Court’s Finding: The decision focused entirely on the violation of the state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1805, indicating that the statutory obligation superseded the association’s internal procedural preferences.

Legal Framework and Conclusions of Law

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) mandates that a homeowners’ association “shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination” of its financial and other records by a member.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner was required to prove the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that Mr. Brown successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1. He submitted a request for records to Terravita’s Secretary via e-mail on July 30, 2016.

2. Terravita failed to fulfill this request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

Final Judgment: The Tribunal concluded that “Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.” It was also noted that Terravita did not contend that any of the statutory exceptions to disclosure, such as privileged communication or pending litigation, applied.

Final Order and Directives

The ALJ’s decision was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on July 11, 2017, making it a Final Order with the following mandates:

Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

Compliance with Request: Terravita was ordered to “comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request of Terravita’s records” within 10 days of the Order.

Reimbursement of Filing Fee: Terravita was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 directly to him within thirty (30) days.

Civil Penalty: The court determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

Effective Date: The Order was made effective five (5) days from the date of its certification. The Final Order itself is effective immediately from the date of service, July 11, 2017.


Jay Janicek vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-03-14
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jay Janicek Counsel
Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA Counsel Evan Thomson, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition was granted. The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by invalidly adopting the 'Declaration of Scrivener's Error' (Exhibit C) as an amendment without the required lot owner vote. However, the $10.00 annual increased assessment that Petitioner objected to was permitted to stand because the authority for differential assessments was established by the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, independent of the invalid Exhibit C. The HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500 filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner objected to the increased assessment resulting from Exhibit C, but the Tribunal determined that Respondent had the right to impose the increased assessment pursuant to the language of Section 6.8 in the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, regardless of the invalidity of Exhibit C.

Key Issues & Findings

Improper Amendment of Declaration (Declaration of Scrivener's Error)

Petitioner claimed Respondent HOA improperly adopted a Declaration of Scrivener's Error (Exhibit C) to revise the definition of developed/undeveloped lots, arguing it was a substantive amendment requiring a 75% lot owner vote, which Respondent failed to obtain.

Orders: The Tribunal found that Exhibit C constituted an amendment and Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by adopting it without a vote. Exhibit C was deemed invalid, but this invalidity did not nullify the subsequent assessment increase, which was authorized by a prior, valid declaration amendment. Respondent was ordered to refund the filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Declaration Amendment, Scrivener's Error, Assessments, Statutory Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 551057.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:11 (83.7 KB)

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 559875.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:12 (794.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716019-REL


Briefing Document: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal dispute between petitioner Jay Janicek and respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (HOA), culminating in the case No. 17F-H1716019-REL. The core of the conflict was the HOA Board’s attempt to amend its governing Declaration via a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” without the required 75% vote from lot owners. This action was intended to reinsert a definition of “Completed Lots” that had been omitted from a 2009 amendment and was followed by a $10 annual assessment increase on developed lots.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioner, granting his petition and invalidating the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error.” The judge found that the change was a substantive amendment, not a correction of a clerical error, and the Board’s unilateral action violated Arizona state law (A.R.S. § 33-1817). However, in a critical distinction, the ALJ ruled that the $10 assessment increase on developed lots was permissible and should stand, as the authority to set different rates for completed and uncompleted lots was already established in the valid 2009 First Amendment to the Declaration.

The judge also rejected the petitioner’s conflict of interest claim against three Board members with financial ties to the developer, deeming the petitioner’s interpretation of the relevant statute (A.R.S. § 33-1811) to be overbroad. The final order, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner, required the HOA to pay the petitioner’s $500 filing fee and to comply with state statutes regarding amendments and conflicts of interest in the future.

Case Details

Details

Case Name

Jay Janicek, Petitioner, vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, Respondent

Case Number

HO 17-16/019

Docket Number

17F-H1716019-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings / Arizona Department of Real Estate

Petitioner

Jay Janicek (appeared personally)

Respondent

Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA (represented by Evan Thomson, Esq.)

Administrative Law Judge

Suzanne Marwil

Hearing Date

March 2, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

March 14, 2017

Final Order Date

March 16, 2017

Commissioner

Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Background and Core Dispute

The conflict originated from changes to the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (Declaration).

2005 Declaration: The original “2005 Amended and Restated Declaration” contained Section 6.8, which established a uniform assessment rate for all lots. Crucially, it exempted the Declarant and Developer from payments on any property except for “Completed Lots.” This section provided a specific definition for “Completed Lots,” describing them as any lot with a dwelling unit ready for occupancy.

2009 First Amendment: On December 4, 2008, after securing a vote from 75% of lot owners, the HOA adopted the “First Amendment to the 2005 Declaration.” This amendment deleted the original Section 6.8 in its entirety and replaced it with new language stating: “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots.” This amendment, however, omitted the definition of a “Completed Lot” that was present in the 2005 version.

Seven-Year Period: For seven years following the 2009 amendment, the revised Section 6.8 remained unchanged, without the specific definition.

The “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error”

In June or July 2016, the HOA Board proposed a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” to address the omitted definition.

Board’s Position: The Respondent, represented by its president Steven Russo, argued that the purpose of the declaration was simply to correct a clerical error by reinserting the definition of a developed versus undeveloped lot, which was “inadvertently omitted” from the 2009 First Amendment. The Board stated it was acting on the advice of its legal counsel.

Petitioner’s Position: Mr. Janicek contended that this declaration was not a correction of a minor error but was a substantive change to the Declaration. As such, he argued it required the approval of 75% of the lot owners, a process that was not followed.

Adoption: On August 3, 2016, the Board adopted the Declaration of Scrivener’s Error by a 3-2 vote. Petitioner Janicek and another Board member representing developed lot owners voted against the measure.

Immediate Consequence: Following the adoption, the Board voted to increase the annual assessment for developed lot owners by $10.00, while the assessment for undeveloped lots remained unchanged. This action prompted Mr. Janicek to file his petition.

Allegations of Fiduciary Duty and Conflict of Interest

Petitioner Janicek accused the Respondent of a violation of its fiduciary duty and a conflict of interest. He noted that three members of the Board had a financial interest in NT Properties, the company that owned the community’s undeveloped lots. These lots directly benefited from the assessment structure that placed a higher burden on developed lots.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision, issued on March 14, 2017, contained three central conclusions of law that addressed the distinct issues raised in the petition.

1. The “Scrivener’s Error” was an Invalid Amendment

The judge found decisively in favor of the petitioner on the core issue of the amendment process.

Substantive Change, Not Clerical Error: The Tribunal found that the change constituted an amendment to the Declaration, not a correction of a simple clerical error.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1817: The judge ruled that the procedure for amending the Declaration requires a vote by the lot owners, as specified in the Declaration and state law. The HOA violated this statute by attempting to amend the document via a simple Board vote.

Key Judicial Reasoning: The judge noted that the same section had been properly amended by a homeowner vote in 2009. The ruling states, “after a period of seven years, it defies logic to suggest that a further change to section was simply a clerical error.”

Conclusion: The Declaration of Scrivener’s Error (Exhibit C) was declared invalid and could not operate to amend the Declaration.

2. The Assessment Increase Was Valid

Despite invalidating the method used by the Board, the judge upheld the Board’s right to implement the assessment increase.

Existing Authority: The ruling stated that the invalidity of Exhibit C “does not implicate Respondent’s right to impose an increased assessment on the developed lots.”

Basis in 2009 Amendment: The judge found that the language of the valid 2009 First Amendment—which expressly states that “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots”—provided the Board with sufficient authority to set differential rates.

Conclusion: The raised assessment was allowed to stand.

3. Conflict of Interest Claim Rejected

The Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s argument that Board members with ties to NT Properties had a conflict of interest under A.R.S. § 33-1811.

“Overbroad” Interpretation: The judge found the petitioner’s interpretation of the conflict-of-interest statute to be “overbroad.”

Rationale: The ruling stated that this interpretation “ignores that make-up of the Board as outlined in the Declaration and disregards the express language permitting the Board to assess annual dues.”

Conclusion: The Board members were not required to declare a conflict of interest and were permitted to vote on the issue.

Final Order

The petition filed by Jay Janicek was granted. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was officially adopted by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate in a Final Order dated March 16, 2017. The final order mandated the following:

• The Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA must pay the petitioner, Jay Janicek, the $500.00 filing fee.

• The HOA must comply with the applicable provisions of Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1817 (regarding the proper procedure for amending a declaration) and § 33-1811 (regarding conflicts of interest) in the future.


Jay Janicek vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-03-14
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jay Janicek Counsel
Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA Counsel Evan Thomson, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition was granted. The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by invalidly adopting the 'Declaration of Scrivener's Error' (Exhibit C) as an amendment without the required lot owner vote. However, the $10.00 annual increased assessment that Petitioner objected to was permitted to stand because the authority for differential assessments was established by the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, independent of the invalid Exhibit C. The HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500 filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner objected to the increased assessment resulting from Exhibit C, but the Tribunal determined that Respondent had the right to impose the increased assessment pursuant to the language of Section 6.8 in the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, regardless of the invalidity of Exhibit C.

Key Issues & Findings

Improper Amendment of Declaration (Declaration of Scrivener's Error)

Petitioner claimed Respondent HOA improperly adopted a Declaration of Scrivener's Error (Exhibit C) to revise the definition of developed/undeveloped lots, arguing it was a substantive amendment requiring a 75% lot owner vote, which Respondent failed to obtain.

Orders: The Tribunal found that Exhibit C constituted an amendment and Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by adopting it without a vote. Exhibit C was deemed invalid, but this invalidity did not nullify the subsequent assessment increase, which was authorized by a prior, valid declaration amendment. Respondent was ordered to refund the filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Declaration Amendment, Scrivener's Error, Assessments, Statutory Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 551057.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:23 (83.7 KB)

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 559875.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:24 (794.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716019-REL


Briefing Document: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal dispute between petitioner Jay Janicek and respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (HOA), culminating in the case No. 17F-H1716019-REL. The core of the conflict was the HOA Board’s attempt to amend its governing Declaration via a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” without the required 75% vote from lot owners. This action was intended to reinsert a definition of “Completed Lots” that had been omitted from a 2009 amendment and was followed by a $10 annual assessment increase on developed lots.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioner, granting his petition and invalidating the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error.” The judge found that the change was a substantive amendment, not a correction of a clerical error, and the Board’s unilateral action violated Arizona state law (A.R.S. § 33-1817). However, in a critical distinction, the ALJ ruled that the $10 assessment increase on developed lots was permissible and should stand, as the authority to set different rates for completed and uncompleted lots was already established in the valid 2009 First Amendment to the Declaration.

The judge also rejected the petitioner’s conflict of interest claim against three Board members with financial ties to the developer, deeming the petitioner’s interpretation of the relevant statute (A.R.S. § 33-1811) to be overbroad. The final order, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner, required the HOA to pay the petitioner’s $500 filing fee and to comply with state statutes regarding amendments and conflicts of interest in the future.

Case Details

Details

Case Name

Jay Janicek, Petitioner, vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, Respondent

Case Number

HO 17-16/019

Docket Number

17F-H1716019-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings / Arizona Department of Real Estate

Petitioner

Jay Janicek (appeared personally)

Respondent

Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA (represented by Evan Thomson, Esq.)

Administrative Law Judge

Suzanne Marwil

Hearing Date

March 2, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

March 14, 2017

Final Order Date

March 16, 2017

Commissioner

Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Background and Core Dispute

The conflict originated from changes to the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (Declaration).

2005 Declaration: The original “2005 Amended and Restated Declaration” contained Section 6.8, which established a uniform assessment rate for all lots. Crucially, it exempted the Declarant and Developer from payments on any property except for “Completed Lots.” This section provided a specific definition for “Completed Lots,” describing them as any lot with a dwelling unit ready for occupancy.

2009 First Amendment: On December 4, 2008, after securing a vote from 75% of lot owners, the HOA adopted the “First Amendment to the 2005 Declaration.” This amendment deleted the original Section 6.8 in its entirety and replaced it with new language stating: “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots.” This amendment, however, omitted the definition of a “Completed Lot” that was present in the 2005 version.

Seven-Year Period: For seven years following the 2009 amendment, the revised Section 6.8 remained unchanged, without the specific definition.

The “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error”

In June or July 2016, the HOA Board proposed a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” to address the omitted definition.

Board’s Position: The Respondent, represented by its president Steven Russo, argued that the purpose of the declaration was simply to correct a clerical error by reinserting the definition of a developed versus undeveloped lot, which was “inadvertently omitted” from the 2009 First Amendment. The Board stated it was acting on the advice of its legal counsel.

Petitioner’s Position: Mr. Janicek contended that this declaration was not a correction of a minor error but was a substantive change to the Declaration. As such, he argued it required the approval of 75% of the lot owners, a process that was not followed.

Adoption: On August 3, 2016, the Board adopted the Declaration of Scrivener’s Error by a 3-2 vote. Petitioner Janicek and another Board member representing developed lot owners voted against the measure.

Immediate Consequence: Following the adoption, the Board voted to increase the annual assessment for developed lot owners by $10.00, while the assessment for undeveloped lots remained unchanged. This action prompted Mr. Janicek to file his petition.

Allegations of Fiduciary Duty and Conflict of Interest

Petitioner Janicek accused the Respondent of a violation of its fiduciary duty and a conflict of interest. He noted that three members of the Board had a financial interest in NT Properties, the company that owned the community’s undeveloped lots. These lots directly benefited from the assessment structure that placed a higher burden on developed lots.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision, issued on March 14, 2017, contained three central conclusions of law that addressed the distinct issues raised in the petition.

1. The “Scrivener’s Error” was an Invalid Amendment

The judge found decisively in favor of the petitioner on the core issue of the amendment process.

Substantive Change, Not Clerical Error: The Tribunal found that the change constituted an amendment to the Declaration, not a correction of a simple clerical error.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1817: The judge ruled that the procedure for amending the Declaration requires a vote by the lot owners, as specified in the Declaration and state law. The HOA violated this statute by attempting to amend the document via a simple Board vote.

Key Judicial Reasoning: The judge noted that the same section had been properly amended by a homeowner vote in 2009. The ruling states, “after a period of seven years, it defies logic to suggest that a further change to section was simply a clerical error.”

Conclusion: The Declaration of Scrivener’s Error (Exhibit C) was declared invalid and could not operate to amend the Declaration.

2. The Assessment Increase Was Valid

Despite invalidating the method used by the Board, the judge upheld the Board’s right to implement the assessment increase.

Existing Authority: The ruling stated that the invalidity of Exhibit C “does not implicate Respondent’s right to impose an increased assessment on the developed lots.”

Basis in 2009 Amendment: The judge found that the language of the valid 2009 First Amendment—which expressly states that “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots”—provided the Board with sufficient authority to set differential rates.

Conclusion: The raised assessment was allowed to stand.

3. Conflict of Interest Claim Rejected

The Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s argument that Board members with ties to NT Properties had a conflict of interest under A.R.S. § 33-1811.

“Overbroad” Interpretation: The judge found the petitioner’s interpretation of the conflict-of-interest statute to be “overbroad.”

Rationale: The ruling stated that this interpretation “ignores that make-up of the Board as outlined in the Declaration and disregards the express language permitting the Board to assess annual dues.”

Conclusion: The Board members were not required to declare a conflict of interest and were permitted to vote on the issue.

Final Order

The petition filed by Jay Janicek was granted. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was officially adopted by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate in a Final Order dated March 16, 2017. The final order mandated the following:

• The Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA must pay the petitioner, Jay Janicek, the $500.00 filing fee.

• The HOA must comply with the applicable provisions of Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1817 (regarding the proper procedure for amending a declaration) and § 33-1811 (regarding conflicts of interest) in the future.


Jay Janicek vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-03-14
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jay Janicek Counsel
Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA Counsel Evan Thomson, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition was granted. The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by invalidly adopting the 'Declaration of Scrivener's Error' (Exhibit C) as an amendment without the required lot owner vote. However, the $10.00 annual increased assessment that Petitioner objected to was permitted to stand because the authority for differential assessments was established by the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, independent of the invalid Exhibit C. The HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500 filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner objected to the increased assessment resulting from Exhibit C, but the Tribunal determined that Respondent had the right to impose the increased assessment pursuant to the language of Section 6.8 in the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, regardless of the invalidity of Exhibit C.

Key Issues & Findings

Improper Amendment of Declaration (Declaration of Scrivener's Error)

Petitioner claimed Respondent HOA improperly adopted a Declaration of Scrivener's Error (Exhibit C) to revise the definition of developed/undeveloped lots, arguing it was a substantive amendment requiring a 75% lot owner vote, which Respondent failed to obtain.

Orders: The Tribunal found that Exhibit C constituted an amendment and Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by adopting it without a vote. Exhibit C was deemed invalid, but this invalidity did not nullify the subsequent assessment increase, which was authorized by a prior, valid declaration amendment. Respondent was ordered to refund the filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Declaration Amendment, Scrivener's Error, Assessments, Statutory Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 551057.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:13 (83.7 KB)

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 559875.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:13 (794.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716019-REL


Briefing Document: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal dispute between petitioner Jay Janicek and respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (HOA), culminating in the case No. 17F-H1716019-REL. The core of the conflict was the HOA Board’s attempt to amend its governing Declaration via a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” without the required 75% vote from lot owners. This action was intended to reinsert a definition of “Completed Lots” that had been omitted from a 2009 amendment and was followed by a $10 annual assessment increase on developed lots.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioner, granting his petition and invalidating the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error.” The judge found that the change was a substantive amendment, not a correction of a clerical error, and the Board’s unilateral action violated Arizona state law (A.R.S. § 33-1817). However, in a critical distinction, the ALJ ruled that the $10 assessment increase on developed lots was permissible and should stand, as the authority to set different rates for completed and uncompleted lots was already established in the valid 2009 First Amendment to the Declaration.

The judge also rejected the petitioner’s conflict of interest claim against three Board members with financial ties to the developer, deeming the petitioner’s interpretation of the relevant statute (A.R.S. § 33-1811) to be overbroad. The final order, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner, required the HOA to pay the petitioner’s $500 filing fee and to comply with state statutes regarding amendments and conflicts of interest in the future.

Case Details

Details

Case Name

Jay Janicek, Petitioner, vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, Respondent

Case Number

HO 17-16/019

Docket Number

17F-H1716019-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings / Arizona Department of Real Estate

Petitioner

Jay Janicek (appeared personally)

Respondent

Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA (represented by Evan Thomson, Esq.)

Administrative Law Judge

Suzanne Marwil

Hearing Date

March 2, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

March 14, 2017

Final Order Date

March 16, 2017

Commissioner

Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Background and Core Dispute

The conflict originated from changes to the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (Declaration).

2005 Declaration: The original “2005 Amended and Restated Declaration” contained Section 6.8, which established a uniform assessment rate for all lots. Crucially, it exempted the Declarant and Developer from payments on any property except for “Completed Lots.” This section provided a specific definition for “Completed Lots,” describing them as any lot with a dwelling unit ready for occupancy.

2009 First Amendment: On December 4, 2008, after securing a vote from 75% of lot owners, the HOA adopted the “First Amendment to the 2005 Declaration.” This amendment deleted the original Section 6.8 in its entirety and replaced it with new language stating: “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots.” This amendment, however, omitted the definition of a “Completed Lot” that was present in the 2005 version.

Seven-Year Period: For seven years following the 2009 amendment, the revised Section 6.8 remained unchanged, without the specific definition.

The “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error”

In June or July 2016, the HOA Board proposed a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” to address the omitted definition.

Board’s Position: The Respondent, represented by its president Steven Russo, argued that the purpose of the declaration was simply to correct a clerical error by reinserting the definition of a developed versus undeveloped lot, which was “inadvertently omitted” from the 2009 First Amendment. The Board stated it was acting on the advice of its legal counsel.

Petitioner’s Position: Mr. Janicek contended that this declaration was not a correction of a minor error but was a substantive change to the Declaration. As such, he argued it required the approval of 75% of the lot owners, a process that was not followed.

Adoption: On August 3, 2016, the Board adopted the Declaration of Scrivener’s Error by a 3-2 vote. Petitioner Janicek and another Board member representing developed lot owners voted against the measure.

Immediate Consequence: Following the adoption, the Board voted to increase the annual assessment for developed lot owners by $10.00, while the assessment for undeveloped lots remained unchanged. This action prompted Mr. Janicek to file his petition.

Allegations of Fiduciary Duty and Conflict of Interest

Petitioner Janicek accused the Respondent of a violation of its fiduciary duty and a conflict of interest. He noted that three members of the Board had a financial interest in NT Properties, the company that owned the community’s undeveloped lots. These lots directly benefited from the assessment structure that placed a higher burden on developed lots.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision, issued on March 14, 2017, contained three central conclusions of law that addressed the distinct issues raised in the petition.

1. The “Scrivener’s Error” was an Invalid Amendment

The judge found decisively in favor of the petitioner on the core issue of the amendment process.

Substantive Change, Not Clerical Error: The Tribunal found that the change constituted an amendment to the Declaration, not a correction of a simple clerical error.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1817: The judge ruled that the procedure for amending the Declaration requires a vote by the lot owners, as specified in the Declaration and state law. The HOA violated this statute by attempting to amend the document via a simple Board vote.

Key Judicial Reasoning: The judge noted that the same section had been properly amended by a homeowner vote in 2009. The ruling states, “after a period of seven years, it defies logic to suggest that a further change to section was simply a clerical error.”

Conclusion: The Declaration of Scrivener’s Error (Exhibit C) was declared invalid and could not operate to amend the Declaration.

2. The Assessment Increase Was Valid

Despite invalidating the method used by the Board, the judge upheld the Board’s right to implement the assessment increase.

Existing Authority: The ruling stated that the invalidity of Exhibit C “does not implicate Respondent’s right to impose an increased assessment on the developed lots.”

Basis in 2009 Amendment: The judge found that the language of the valid 2009 First Amendment—which expressly states that “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots”—provided the Board with sufficient authority to set differential rates.

Conclusion: The raised assessment was allowed to stand.

3. Conflict of Interest Claim Rejected

The Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s argument that Board members with ties to NT Properties had a conflict of interest under A.R.S. § 33-1811.

“Overbroad” Interpretation: The judge found the petitioner’s interpretation of the conflict-of-interest statute to be “overbroad.”

Rationale: The ruling stated that this interpretation “ignores that make-up of the Board as outlined in the Declaration and disregards the express language permitting the Board to assess annual dues.”

Conclusion: The Board members were not required to declare a conflict of interest and were permitted to vote on the issue.

Final Order

The petition filed by Jay Janicek was granted. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was officially adopted by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate in a Final Order dated March 16, 2017. The final order mandated the following:

• The Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA must pay the petitioner, Jay Janicek, the $500.00 filing fee.

• The HOA must comply with the applicable provisions of Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1817 (regarding the proper procedure for amending a declaration) and § 33-1811 (regarding conflicts of interest) in the future.


Jay Janicek vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-03-14
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jay Janicek Counsel
Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA Counsel Evan Thomson, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition was granted. The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by invalidly adopting the 'Declaration of Scrivener's Error' (Exhibit C) as an amendment without the required lot owner vote. However, the $10.00 annual increased assessment that Petitioner objected to was permitted to stand because the authority for differential assessments was established by the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, independent of the invalid Exhibit C. The HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500 filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner objected to the increased assessment resulting from Exhibit C, but the Tribunal determined that Respondent had the right to impose the increased assessment pursuant to the language of Section 6.8 in the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, regardless of the invalidity of Exhibit C.

Key Issues & Findings

Improper Amendment of Declaration (Declaration of Scrivener's Error)

Petitioner claimed Respondent HOA improperly adopted a Declaration of Scrivener's Error (Exhibit C) to revise the definition of developed/undeveloped lots, arguing it was a substantive amendment requiring a 75% lot owner vote, which Respondent failed to obtain.

Orders: The Tribunal found that Exhibit C constituted an amendment and Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by adopting it without a vote. Exhibit C was deemed invalid, but this invalidity did not nullify the subsequent assessment increase, which was authorized by a prior, valid declaration amendment. Respondent was ordered to refund the filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Declaration Amendment, Scrivener's Error, Assessments, Statutory Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 551057.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:50:04 (83.7 KB)

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 559875.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:50:05 (794.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716019-REL


Briefing Document: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal dispute between petitioner Jay Janicek and respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (HOA), culminating in the case No. 17F-H1716019-REL. The core of the conflict was the HOA Board’s attempt to amend its governing Declaration via a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” without the required 75% vote from lot owners. This action was intended to reinsert a definition of “Completed Lots” that had been omitted from a 2009 amendment and was followed by a $10 annual assessment increase on developed lots.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioner, granting his petition and invalidating the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error.” The judge found that the change was a substantive amendment, not a correction of a clerical error, and the Board’s unilateral action violated Arizona state law (A.R.S. § 33-1817). However, in a critical distinction, the ALJ ruled that the $10 assessment increase on developed lots was permissible and should stand, as the authority to set different rates for completed and uncompleted lots was already established in the valid 2009 First Amendment to the Declaration.

The judge also rejected the petitioner’s conflict of interest claim against three Board members with financial ties to the developer, deeming the petitioner’s interpretation of the relevant statute (A.R.S. § 33-1811) to be overbroad. The final order, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner, required the HOA to pay the petitioner’s $500 filing fee and to comply with state statutes regarding amendments and conflicts of interest in the future.

Case Details

Details

Case Name

Jay Janicek, Petitioner, vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, Respondent

Case Number

HO 17-16/019

Docket Number

17F-H1716019-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings / Arizona Department of Real Estate

Petitioner

Jay Janicek (appeared personally)

Respondent

Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA (represented by Evan Thomson, Esq.)

Administrative Law Judge

Suzanne Marwil

Hearing Date

March 2, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

March 14, 2017

Final Order Date

March 16, 2017

Commissioner

Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Background and Core Dispute

The conflict originated from changes to the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (Declaration).

2005 Declaration: The original “2005 Amended and Restated Declaration” contained Section 6.8, which established a uniform assessment rate for all lots. Crucially, it exempted the Declarant and Developer from payments on any property except for “Completed Lots.” This section provided a specific definition for “Completed Lots,” describing them as any lot with a dwelling unit ready for occupancy.

2009 First Amendment: On December 4, 2008, after securing a vote from 75% of lot owners, the HOA adopted the “First Amendment to the 2005 Declaration.” This amendment deleted the original Section 6.8 in its entirety and replaced it with new language stating: “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots.” This amendment, however, omitted the definition of a “Completed Lot” that was present in the 2005 version.

Seven-Year Period: For seven years following the 2009 amendment, the revised Section 6.8 remained unchanged, without the specific definition.

The “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error”

In June or July 2016, the HOA Board proposed a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” to address the omitted definition.

Board’s Position: The Respondent, represented by its president Steven Russo, argued that the purpose of the declaration was simply to correct a clerical error by reinserting the definition of a developed versus undeveloped lot, which was “inadvertently omitted” from the 2009 First Amendment. The Board stated it was acting on the advice of its legal counsel.

Petitioner’s Position: Mr. Janicek contended that this declaration was not a correction of a minor error but was a substantive change to the Declaration. As such, he argued it required the approval of 75% of the lot owners, a process that was not followed.

Adoption: On August 3, 2016, the Board adopted the Declaration of Scrivener’s Error by a 3-2 vote. Petitioner Janicek and another Board member representing developed lot owners voted against the measure.

Immediate Consequence: Following the adoption, the Board voted to increase the annual assessment for developed lot owners by $10.00, while the assessment for undeveloped lots remained unchanged. This action prompted Mr. Janicek to file his petition.

Allegations of Fiduciary Duty and Conflict of Interest

Petitioner Janicek accused the Respondent of a violation of its fiduciary duty and a conflict of interest. He noted that three members of the Board had a financial interest in NT Properties, the company that owned the community’s undeveloped lots. These lots directly benefited from the assessment structure that placed a higher burden on developed lots.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision, issued on March 14, 2017, contained three central conclusions of law that addressed the distinct issues raised in the petition.

1. The “Scrivener’s Error” was an Invalid Amendment

The judge found decisively in favor of the petitioner on the core issue of the amendment process.

Substantive Change, Not Clerical Error: The Tribunal found that the change constituted an amendment to the Declaration, not a correction of a simple clerical error.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1817: The judge ruled that the procedure for amending the Declaration requires a vote by the lot owners, as specified in the Declaration and state law. The HOA violated this statute by attempting to amend the document via a simple Board vote.

Key Judicial Reasoning: The judge noted that the same section had been properly amended by a homeowner vote in 2009. The ruling states, “after a period of seven years, it defies logic to suggest that a further change to section was simply a clerical error.”

Conclusion: The Declaration of Scrivener’s Error (Exhibit C) was declared invalid and could not operate to amend the Declaration.

2. The Assessment Increase Was Valid

Despite invalidating the method used by the Board, the judge upheld the Board’s right to implement the assessment increase.

Existing Authority: The ruling stated that the invalidity of Exhibit C “does not implicate Respondent’s right to impose an increased assessment on the developed lots.”

Basis in 2009 Amendment: The judge found that the language of the valid 2009 First Amendment—which expressly states that “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots”—provided the Board with sufficient authority to set differential rates.

Conclusion: The raised assessment was allowed to stand.

3. Conflict of Interest Claim Rejected

The Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s argument that Board members with ties to NT Properties had a conflict of interest under A.R.S. § 33-1811.

“Overbroad” Interpretation: The judge found the petitioner’s interpretation of the conflict-of-interest statute to be “overbroad.”

Rationale: The ruling stated that this interpretation “ignores that make-up of the Board as outlined in the Declaration and disregards the express language permitting the Board to assess annual dues.”

Conclusion: The Board members were not required to declare a conflict of interest and were permitted to vote on the issue.

Final Order

The petition filed by Jay Janicek was granted. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was officially adopted by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate in a Final Order dated March 16, 2017. The final order mandated the following:

• The Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA must pay the petitioner, Jay Janicek, the $500.00 filing fee.

• The HOA must comply with the applicable provisions of Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1817 (regarding the proper procedure for amending a declaration) and § 33-1811 (regarding conflicts of interest) in the future.


Paul Gounder vs. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-12
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Paul Gounder Counsel
Respondent Royal Riviera Condominium Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner achieved a partial win. The Respondent HOA was found to have violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using substantively different ballots which impaired the voting rights of absentee members. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee, but no other relief was granted.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Key Issues & Findings

Denial of right to vote for or against each proposed action due to substantively different ballots.

The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using two substantively different ballots for the 2016 election. The meeting ballot included a seventh candidate whose name was not on the mail-in ballot, denying members who did not attend the meeting the opportunity to vote for or against all proposed candidates.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition is granted. Respondent must reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days. No other relief is available to Petitioner.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Absentee Ballot Requirements (Received-by date and advance delivery)

The ALJ concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4). While the meeting ballot lacked the statutory requirements listed in C(4), those requirements apply primarily to absentee ballots, and a meeting ballot does not need to comply if it is substantively the same as the compliant absentee ballot.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Absentee Voting, Ballot Differences, Statutory Violation, Condominium Association, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • Section 10-3708

Decision Documents

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 564851.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:33 (44.2 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 567887.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:34 (79.0 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 575055.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:34 (689.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716002-REL


Briefing Document: Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the key events, arguments, and legal conclusions from the administrative case of Paul Gounder versus the Royal Riviera Condominium Association (Case No. 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG). The central issue revolved around the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots for its March 14, 2016, board member election.

The Petitioner, Paul Gounder, alleged that the use of a separate mail-in ballot and an in-person meeting ballot, which contained different candidate lists, violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2). Specifically, the ballot distributed at the meeting included the name of a seventh candidate, Eric Thompson, who was not listed on the mail-in ballot, thereby denying absentee voters the opportunity to vote for all candidates.

After an initial hearing resulted in a recommended dismissal, a rehearing was granted. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Suzanne Marwil ultimately concluded that the Association’s actions constituted a statutory violation. The Judge found that because members voting by mail were not informed of Mr. Thompson’s candidacy, they were denied their right to vote “for or against each proposed action.” The Respondent’s argument that the matter was moot due to a subsequent election was rejected.

The Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order on June 12, 2017. The Order granted the petition and required the Royal Riviera Condominium Association to reimburse Mr. Gounder’s $500.00 filing fee. The ruling establishes that while election ballots are not required to be identical, any substantive changes must be presented to all members to ensure an equal opportunity to vote.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview and Background

This matter was brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Petitioner: Paul Gounder, a condominium owner and member of the Association.

Respondent: Royal Riviera Condominium Association, a homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 32 condominiums.

Initial Petition: Filed on or about June 23, 2016.

Core Allegation: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and its own CC&Rs by using two substantively different ballots to elect Board members at its March 14, 2016, annual meeting.

II. Procedural History

1. Initial Hearing (October 17, 2016): A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

2. Recommended Dismissal (October 18, 2016): Judge Mihalsky recommended the petition be dismissed, concluding:

3. Rehearing Granted (February 17, 2017): The Petitioner requested a rehearing, which the Department of Real Estate granted. The Department’s order specifically requested a review of A.R.S. § 33-1250, with a focus on subsection (C)(4).

4. Rehearing (May 17, 2017): A rehearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. At this hearing, the Respondent raised a procedural question regarding the correct statutory subsection for review, leading to a temporary order holding the record open until May 24, 2017, for clarification.

5. ALJ Decision (June 2, 2017): Judge Marwil issued a decision finding that the Respondent had committed a statutory violation.

6. Final Order (June 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s decision and issued a Final Order making the decision binding.

III. The Core Dispute: The Two-Ballot System

The parties stipulated that two different ballots were used for the March 14, 2016, board election, which had seven open positions. The key differences are outlined below.

Feature

Mail Ballot (Absentee)

Meeting Ballot (In-Person)

“Mail Ballot”

“Ballot”

Candidates Listed

Six names

Seven names (added Eric Thompson)

Write-in Option

Included a blank line for a write-in candidate

No space provided for write-in candidates

Distribution

Distributed at least seven days before the meeting

Handed out to members attending the meeting

Return Deadline

Specified the date by which it had to be returned

Did not specify when it needed to be returned

IV. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner’s Position (Paul Gounder)

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2): The addition of Eric Thompson’s name to the meeting ballot deprived members who voted by mail of their right “to vote for or against each proposed action,” as they had no opportunity to vote for Mr. Thompson.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4): The meeting ballot violated this subsection because it was not mailed to all members at least seven days in advance of the meeting and did not provide a date by which it had to be received to be counted.

B. Respondent’s Position (Royal Riviera Condominium Association)

No Violation: The statutes do not explicitly require the use of identical ballots for an election.

Common Practice: It is a common practice for homeowners’ associations to use a different absentee ballot and meeting ballot.

Mootness: The issue is moot because the Association had already held another election in 2017 and seated a new board, which included the Petitioner’s wife as a member.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

In her June 2, 2017 decision, ALJ Suzanne Marwil made the following key legal conclusions:

The ALJ found that the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots did violate this statute.

Reasoning: Members who did not attend the meeting in person were not notified of Mr. Thompson’s willingness to run for the board. As a result, “these members did not have the opportunity to vote for him and hence were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot.”

Clarification: The ruling explicitly states that this finding does not impose a requirement that all ballots must be identical; however, it establishes that “substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.”

The ALJ concluded that no violation of this subsection occurred.

Reasoning: The Petitioner conceded that the absentee ballot itself complied with the statutory requirements (e.g., being mailed seven days in advance with a return-by date). The judge reasoned that a meeting ballot handed out in person would not need to contain this information if it were “substantively the same as the absentee ballot.” The legal problem arose not from a failure to mail the second ballot, but from the substantive difference between the two.

The ALJ determined that the matter was not rendered moot by the 2017 election and the seating of a new board. The Judge affirmed that the tribunal “can and does find that Respondent committed a statutory violation in the course of holding its 2016 election.”

VI. Final Order and Outcome

ALJ Recommended Order (June 2, 2017):

◦ The Petitioner’s petition should be granted.

◦ The Respondent must reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee.

◦ No other relief was available to the Petitioner.

Department of Real Estate Final Order (June 12, 2017):

◦ The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision.

◦ The Order is a final administrative action, effective immediately.

◦ The Royal Riviera Condominium Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

◦ The parties were notified that the Order could be appealed via a complaint for judicial review.


Paul Gounder vs. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-12
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Paul Gounder Counsel
Respondent Royal Riviera Condominium Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner achieved a partial win. The Respondent HOA was found to have violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using substantively different ballots which impaired the voting rights of absentee members. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee, but no other relief was granted.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Key Issues & Findings

Denial of right to vote for or against each proposed action due to substantively different ballots.

The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using two substantively different ballots for the 2016 election. The meeting ballot included a seventh candidate whose name was not on the mail-in ballot, denying members who did not attend the meeting the opportunity to vote for or against all proposed candidates.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition is granted. Respondent must reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days. No other relief is available to Petitioner.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Absentee Ballot Requirements (Received-by date and advance delivery)

The ALJ concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4). While the meeting ballot lacked the statutory requirements listed in C(4), those requirements apply primarily to absentee ballots, and a meeting ballot does not need to comply if it is substantively the same as the compliant absentee ballot.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Absentee Voting, Ballot Differences, Statutory Violation, Condominium Association, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • Section 10-3708

Decision Documents

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 564851.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:38 (44.2 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 567887.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:39 (79.0 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 575055.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716002-REL


Briefing Document: Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the key events, arguments, and legal conclusions from the administrative case of Paul Gounder versus the Royal Riviera Condominium Association (Case No. 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG). The central issue revolved around the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots for its March 14, 2016, board member election.

The Petitioner, Paul Gounder, alleged that the use of a separate mail-in ballot and an in-person meeting ballot, which contained different candidate lists, violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2). Specifically, the ballot distributed at the meeting included the name of a seventh candidate, Eric Thompson, who was not listed on the mail-in ballot, thereby denying absentee voters the opportunity to vote for all candidates.

After an initial hearing resulted in a recommended dismissal, a rehearing was granted. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Suzanne Marwil ultimately concluded that the Association’s actions constituted a statutory violation. The Judge found that because members voting by mail were not informed of Mr. Thompson’s candidacy, they were denied their right to vote “for or against each proposed action.” The Respondent’s argument that the matter was moot due to a subsequent election was rejected.

The Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order on June 12, 2017. The Order granted the petition and required the Royal Riviera Condominium Association to reimburse Mr. Gounder’s $500.00 filing fee. The ruling establishes that while election ballots are not required to be identical, any substantive changes must be presented to all members to ensure an equal opportunity to vote.

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I. Case Overview and Background

This matter was brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Petitioner: Paul Gounder, a condominium owner and member of the Association.

Respondent: Royal Riviera Condominium Association, a homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 32 condominiums.

Initial Petition: Filed on or about June 23, 2016.

Core Allegation: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and its own CC&Rs by using two substantively different ballots to elect Board members at its March 14, 2016, annual meeting.

II. Procedural History

1. Initial Hearing (October 17, 2016): A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

2. Recommended Dismissal (October 18, 2016): Judge Mihalsky recommended the petition be dismissed, concluding:

3. Rehearing Granted (February 17, 2017): The Petitioner requested a rehearing, which the Department of Real Estate granted. The Department’s order specifically requested a review of A.R.S. § 33-1250, with a focus on subsection (C)(4).

4. Rehearing (May 17, 2017): A rehearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. At this hearing, the Respondent raised a procedural question regarding the correct statutory subsection for review, leading to a temporary order holding the record open until May 24, 2017, for clarification.

5. ALJ Decision (June 2, 2017): Judge Marwil issued a decision finding that the Respondent had committed a statutory violation.

6. Final Order (June 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s decision and issued a Final Order making the decision binding.

III. The Core Dispute: The Two-Ballot System

The parties stipulated that two different ballots were used for the March 14, 2016, board election, which had seven open positions. The key differences are outlined below.

Feature

Mail Ballot (Absentee)

Meeting Ballot (In-Person)

“Mail Ballot”

“Ballot”

Candidates Listed

Six names

Seven names (added Eric Thompson)

Write-in Option

Included a blank line for a write-in candidate

No space provided for write-in candidates

Distribution

Distributed at least seven days before the meeting

Handed out to members attending the meeting

Return Deadline

Specified the date by which it had to be returned

Did not specify when it needed to be returned

IV. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner’s Position (Paul Gounder)

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2): The addition of Eric Thompson’s name to the meeting ballot deprived members who voted by mail of their right “to vote for or against each proposed action,” as they had no opportunity to vote for Mr. Thompson.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4): The meeting ballot violated this subsection because it was not mailed to all members at least seven days in advance of the meeting and did not provide a date by which it had to be received to be counted.

B. Respondent’s Position (Royal Riviera Condominium Association)

No Violation: The statutes do not explicitly require the use of identical ballots for an election.

Common Practice: It is a common practice for homeowners’ associations to use a different absentee ballot and meeting ballot.

Mootness: The issue is moot because the Association had already held another election in 2017 and seated a new board, which included the Petitioner’s wife as a member.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

In her June 2, 2017 decision, ALJ Suzanne Marwil made the following key legal conclusions:

The ALJ found that the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots did violate this statute.

Reasoning: Members who did not attend the meeting in person were not notified of Mr. Thompson’s willingness to run for the board. As a result, “these members did not have the opportunity to vote for him and hence were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot.”

Clarification: The ruling explicitly states that this finding does not impose a requirement that all ballots must be identical; however, it establishes that “substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.”

The ALJ concluded that no violation of this subsection occurred.

Reasoning: The Petitioner conceded that the absentee ballot itself complied with the statutory requirements (e.g., being mailed seven days in advance with a return-by date). The judge reasoned that a meeting ballot handed out in person would not need to contain this information if it were “substantively the same as the absentee ballot.” The legal problem arose not from a failure to mail the second ballot, but from the substantive difference between the two.

The ALJ determined that the matter was not rendered moot by the 2017 election and the seating of a new board. The Judge affirmed that the tribunal “can and does find that Respondent committed a statutory violation in the course of holding its 2016 election.”

VI. Final Order and Outcome

ALJ Recommended Order (June 2, 2017):

◦ The Petitioner’s petition should be granted.

◦ The Respondent must reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee.

◦ No other relief was available to the Petitioner.

Department of Real Estate Final Order (June 12, 2017):

◦ The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision.

◦ The Order is a final administrative action, effective immediately.

◦ The Royal Riviera Condominium Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

◦ The parties were notified that the Order could be appealed via a complaint for judicial review.