Jerry and Patricia Gravelle vs. Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716008-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-01-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry and Patricia Gravelle Counsel
Respondent Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu Counsel Kenneth E. Moyer, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.3; CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.6

Outcome Summary

The Commissioner adopted the ALJ's recommendation to dismiss the petition, finding that the HOA was not required by the governing documents (CC&Rs) or state law (Arizona Condominium Act) to insure against damages to the interior finished surfaces of the petitioners' individual condominium unit.

Why this result: The CC&Rs put Petitioners on notice that Respondent was not required to provide insurance coverage for damages to their individual unit, and Petitioners did not establish that Respondent was responsible for the damages.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA responsibility to insure unit interior damages caused by sewer backup

Petitioners claimed Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs (specifically Sections 11.7.3 and 11.7.6) by not providing insurance coverage for $6,697.70 in damages to the interior of their individual unit caused by a sewer backup. The HOA contended the CC&Rs and Arizona Condominium Act place this responsibility on the unit owner.

Orders: The petition was dismissed, and no action was required of the Respondent.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominiums, Insurance Coverage, CC&Rs Interpretation, Unit Boundaries, Maintenance Responsibility
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.3
  • CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.6

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 528194.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:06 (58.8 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 528432.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:06 (63.1 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 535933.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:06 (131.6 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 539997.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:06 (1010.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716008-REL


Briefing: Gravelle v. Village Parc Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the key findings and legal determinations from an administrative case between homeowners Jerry and Patricia Gravelle and the Village Parc Homeowners Association of Havasu (HOA). The dispute centered on liability for damages within the Gravelles’ condominium unit caused by a sewer backup.

The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded, and the Department Commissioner affirmed, that the HOA’s governing documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—unambiguously place the responsibility for insuring the interior of an individual unit on the unit owner, not the HOA.

The ruling established that the HOA’s master insurance policy, provided by Travelers, was only obligated to cover what the CC&Rs required. Arguments based on the HOA’s past payments for minor damages in other units, an erroneous initial statement by an insurance adjuster on a prior claim, and the HOA Board’s own mistaken interpretation of its duties were all found to be insufficient to override the plain written language of the governing documents. The final decision reinforces the principle that unit owners are responsible for understanding their CC&Rs and securing adequate personal insurance for their property.

I. Case Overview and Final Disposition

Case Identification: No. 17F-H1716008-REL

Parties:

Petitioners: Jerry and Patricia Gravelle, owners of Unit 14 in the Village Parc development.

Respondent: Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu (“the Association”).

Adjudicating Body: The case was heard in the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Diane Mihalsky. The final order was issued by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Key Dates:

Hearing Date: November 10, 2016

ALJ Decision: December 22, 2016

Final Order: January 3, 2017

Final Disposition: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s recommendation and ordered that the petition be dismissed. This constituted a final administrative action, effective immediately. Parties were advised of their right to file for rehearing or appeal for judicial review.

II. The Core Dispute: Insurance for Sewer Backup Damage

On or about October 23, 2015, the Petitioners’ condominium (Unit 14), along with two other units, suffered damage from a sewer backup. The central conflict arose from determining which party was financially responsible for the repairs inside the Petitioners’ unit.

Petitioners’ Claim: The Gravelles filed a petition on August 31, 2016, alleging the Association violated Articles 11.7.3 and 11.7.6 of the CC&Rs by failing to provide insurance coverage for the full extent of the damages. Their personal insurance policy did not cover sewer backups. They requested the Association pay $6,697.70 to reimburse them for the loss that the Association’s insurer, Travelers, declined to cover.

Insurance Claim Outcome:

◦ The Association submitted a claim for the sewer backup damages to its insurer, Travelers.

◦ Travelers determined that its policy covered damages to the common elements associated with the unit and issued a check to the Petitioners for $338.64.

◦ Travelers concluded there was no coverage under the policy for damage to the interior of the Petitioners’ unit. This denial was based on the CC&Rs, which establish that the unit owner is responsible for the finished surfaces and personal property within their unit.

III. Analysis of Governing Documents and Legal Framework

The ALJ’s decision was grounded in a strict interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs, its insurance contract, and the Arizona Condominium Act.

Document / Statute

Key Provisions and Implications

Village Parc CC&Rs

Unit Definition (Sec. 2.2.1): A unit is defined as the space “bounded by and contained within the interior finished surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors and ceilings.”

Insurance Responsibility (Sec. 11.7.3): The Association’s master policy is explicitly “not be required to insure the personal property within any individual Unit, which insurance shall be the responsibility and risk of the Unit Owners.”

Liability Limitation (Sec. 11.7.5): The Association is not liable to any owner “if any risk or hazard is not covered by insurance or the amount is inadequate.” It places the burden on each owner to ascertain the Association’s coverage and procure their own additional insurance.

Travelers Insurance Policy

Conditional Coverage Endorsement: The policy covers certain property (fixtures, alterations, appliances) contained within a unit, but only “if your Condominium Association Agreement requires you to insure it.” Since the CC&Rs do not require the Association to insure unit interiors, this coverage was not triggered.

Primary Insurance: The policy states it is “intended to be primary, and not to contribute with such other insurance” a unit-owner may have.

Arizona Condominium Act

Unit Definition (A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)): Reinforces the CC&Rs by defining finished surfaces—”lath, furring, wallboard… tiles, wallpaper, paint, finished flooring”—as part of the unit. All other portions of walls, floors, or ceilings are common elements.

Maintenance Responsibility (A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)): The law specifies that “the association is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the common elements and each unit owner is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the unit.”

IV. Petitioners’ Arguments and the ALJ’s Rejection

The Petitioners presented evidence of past practices by both the Association and Travelers, arguing these created an expectation of coverage. The ALJ systematically rejected these arguments.

Argument 1: The Association’s Past Payments for Unit Repairs

Petitioners’ Evidence: The Association had authorized payments for repairs inside other units on prior occasions:

June 2011: $153.74, $75.00, and $296.11 for damage to Units 3 and 5 from a broken shower drain.

January 2012: $449.45 to repair kitchen cabinets in Unit 6 damaged by a broken roof vent.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The fact that the Association’s Board made “actual payments of small amounts for damages to individually owned units” does not legally amend the plain language of the CC&Rs. Notably, the Association did not submit these prior incidents to its insurer.

Argument 2: Travelers’ Prior Actions

Petitioners’ Evidence: In a 2014 claim, a Travelers adjuster initially determined that the policy did provide coverage for damage done to a unit, not just limited common elements.

ALJ’s Conclusion: Travelers later stated the adjuster had erred and confirmed no claim for unit damage was ultimately paid. The ALJ found that the “adjuster’s initial error in the 2014 claim does not estop Travelers from denying the claim for damages to Petitioners’ unit” in 2015.

Argument 3: The Association Board’s Own Interpretation

Petitioners’ Evidence: At a November 2015 board meeting, where Mr. Gravelle served as secretary/treasurer, the Board itself determined that the CC&Rs did require the Association to provide insurance coverage for all damages to Unit 14.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The Board’s “erroneous opinion” does not have the legal power to amend the CC&Rs or the binding terms of the Travelers insurance policy.

V. Core Legal Principles and Final Decision

The dismissal of the petition was based on several foundational legal principles.

Primacy of Written Documents: The decision gave superior weight to the “plain language” of the CC&Rs and the insurance contract over inconsistent past practices or mistaken interpretations.

Burden of Proof: As the filing party, the Petitioners had the burden to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Association violated the CC&Rs. The ALJ determined they failed to meet this standard.

Clear Delineation of Responsibility: Both the CC&Rs and Arizona state law create a clear separation of financial and maintenance responsibilities: the Association is responsible for common elements, while individual owners are responsible for their units.

Presumption of Knowledge: The decision cited the legal principle that “Everyone is presumed to know the law.” The CC&Rs put the Petitioners on constructive notice that they were responsible for insuring their individual unit against risks like a sewer backup. Their failure to procure such coverage was their own responsibility.


Jerry and Patricia Gravelle vs. Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716008-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-01-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry and Patricia Gravelle Counsel
Respondent Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu Counsel Kenneth E. Moyer, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.3; CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.6

Outcome Summary

The Commissioner adopted the ALJ's recommendation to dismiss the petition, finding that the HOA was not required by the governing documents (CC&Rs) or state law (Arizona Condominium Act) to insure against damages to the interior finished surfaces of the petitioners' individual condominium unit.

Why this result: The CC&Rs put Petitioners on notice that Respondent was not required to provide insurance coverage for damages to their individual unit, and Petitioners did not establish that Respondent was responsible for the damages.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA responsibility to insure unit interior damages caused by sewer backup

Petitioners claimed Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs (specifically Sections 11.7.3 and 11.7.6) by not providing insurance coverage for $6,697.70 in damages to the interior of their individual unit caused by a sewer backup. The HOA contended the CC&Rs and Arizona Condominium Act place this responsibility on the unit owner.

Orders: The petition was dismissed, and no action was required of the Respondent.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominiums, Insurance Coverage, CC&Rs Interpretation, Unit Boundaries, Maintenance Responsibility
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.3
  • CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.6

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 528194.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:39 (58.8 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 528432.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:40 (63.1 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 535933.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:40 (131.6 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 539997.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:41 (1010.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716008-REL


Briefing: Gravelle v. Village Parc Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the key findings and legal determinations from an administrative case between homeowners Jerry and Patricia Gravelle and the Village Parc Homeowners Association of Havasu (HOA). The dispute centered on liability for damages within the Gravelles’ condominium unit caused by a sewer backup.

The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded, and the Department Commissioner affirmed, that the HOA’s governing documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—unambiguously place the responsibility for insuring the interior of an individual unit on the unit owner, not the HOA.

The ruling established that the HOA’s master insurance policy, provided by Travelers, was only obligated to cover what the CC&Rs required. Arguments based on the HOA’s past payments for minor damages in other units, an erroneous initial statement by an insurance adjuster on a prior claim, and the HOA Board’s own mistaken interpretation of its duties were all found to be insufficient to override the plain written language of the governing documents. The final decision reinforces the principle that unit owners are responsible for understanding their CC&Rs and securing adequate personal insurance for their property.

I. Case Overview and Final Disposition

Case Identification: No. 17F-H1716008-REL

Parties:

Petitioners: Jerry and Patricia Gravelle, owners of Unit 14 in the Village Parc development.

Respondent: Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu (“the Association”).

Adjudicating Body: The case was heard in the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Diane Mihalsky. The final order was issued by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Key Dates:

Hearing Date: November 10, 2016

ALJ Decision: December 22, 2016

Final Order: January 3, 2017

Final Disposition: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s recommendation and ordered that the petition be dismissed. This constituted a final administrative action, effective immediately. Parties were advised of their right to file for rehearing or appeal for judicial review.

II. The Core Dispute: Insurance for Sewer Backup Damage

On or about October 23, 2015, the Petitioners’ condominium (Unit 14), along with two other units, suffered damage from a sewer backup. The central conflict arose from determining which party was financially responsible for the repairs inside the Petitioners’ unit.

Petitioners’ Claim: The Gravelles filed a petition on August 31, 2016, alleging the Association violated Articles 11.7.3 and 11.7.6 of the CC&Rs by failing to provide insurance coverage for the full extent of the damages. Their personal insurance policy did not cover sewer backups. They requested the Association pay $6,697.70 to reimburse them for the loss that the Association’s insurer, Travelers, declined to cover.

Insurance Claim Outcome:

◦ The Association submitted a claim for the sewer backup damages to its insurer, Travelers.

◦ Travelers determined that its policy covered damages to the common elements associated with the unit and issued a check to the Petitioners for $338.64.

◦ Travelers concluded there was no coverage under the policy for damage to the interior of the Petitioners’ unit. This denial was based on the CC&Rs, which establish that the unit owner is responsible for the finished surfaces and personal property within their unit.

III. Analysis of Governing Documents and Legal Framework

The ALJ’s decision was grounded in a strict interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs, its insurance contract, and the Arizona Condominium Act.

Document / Statute

Key Provisions and Implications

Village Parc CC&Rs

Unit Definition (Sec. 2.2.1): A unit is defined as the space “bounded by and contained within the interior finished surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors and ceilings.”

Insurance Responsibility (Sec. 11.7.3): The Association’s master policy is explicitly “not be required to insure the personal property within any individual Unit, which insurance shall be the responsibility and risk of the Unit Owners.”

Liability Limitation (Sec. 11.7.5): The Association is not liable to any owner “if any risk or hazard is not covered by insurance or the amount is inadequate.” It places the burden on each owner to ascertain the Association’s coverage and procure their own additional insurance.

Travelers Insurance Policy

Conditional Coverage Endorsement: The policy covers certain property (fixtures, alterations, appliances) contained within a unit, but only “if your Condominium Association Agreement requires you to insure it.” Since the CC&Rs do not require the Association to insure unit interiors, this coverage was not triggered.

Primary Insurance: The policy states it is “intended to be primary, and not to contribute with such other insurance” a unit-owner may have.

Arizona Condominium Act

Unit Definition (A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)): Reinforces the CC&Rs by defining finished surfaces—”lath, furring, wallboard… tiles, wallpaper, paint, finished flooring”—as part of the unit. All other portions of walls, floors, or ceilings are common elements.

Maintenance Responsibility (A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)): The law specifies that “the association is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the common elements and each unit owner is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the unit.”

IV. Petitioners’ Arguments and the ALJ’s Rejection

The Petitioners presented evidence of past practices by both the Association and Travelers, arguing these created an expectation of coverage. The ALJ systematically rejected these arguments.

Argument 1: The Association’s Past Payments for Unit Repairs

Petitioners’ Evidence: The Association had authorized payments for repairs inside other units on prior occasions:

June 2011: $153.74, $75.00, and $296.11 for damage to Units 3 and 5 from a broken shower drain.

January 2012: $449.45 to repair kitchen cabinets in Unit 6 damaged by a broken roof vent.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The fact that the Association’s Board made “actual payments of small amounts for damages to individually owned units” does not legally amend the plain language of the CC&Rs. Notably, the Association did not submit these prior incidents to its insurer.

Argument 2: Travelers’ Prior Actions

Petitioners’ Evidence: In a 2014 claim, a Travelers adjuster initially determined that the policy did provide coverage for damage done to a unit, not just limited common elements.

ALJ’s Conclusion: Travelers later stated the adjuster had erred and confirmed no claim for unit damage was ultimately paid. The ALJ found that the “adjuster’s initial error in the 2014 claim does not estop Travelers from denying the claim for damages to Petitioners’ unit” in 2015.

Argument 3: The Association Board’s Own Interpretation

Petitioners’ Evidence: At a November 2015 board meeting, where Mr. Gravelle served as secretary/treasurer, the Board itself determined that the CC&Rs did require the Association to provide insurance coverage for all damages to Unit 14.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The Board’s “erroneous opinion” does not have the legal power to amend the CC&Rs or the binding terms of the Travelers insurance policy.

V. Core Legal Principles and Final Decision

The dismissal of the petition was based on several foundational legal principles.

Primacy of Written Documents: The decision gave superior weight to the “plain language” of the CC&Rs and the insurance contract over inconsistent past practices or mistaken interpretations.

Burden of Proof: As the filing party, the Petitioners had the burden to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Association violated the CC&Rs. The ALJ determined they failed to meet this standard.

Clear Delineation of Responsibility: Both the CC&Rs and Arizona state law create a clear separation of financial and maintenance responsibilities: the Association is responsible for common elements, while individual owners are responsible for their units.

Presumption of Knowledge: The decision cited the legal principle that “Everyone is presumed to know the law.” The CC&Rs put the Petitioners on constructive notice that they were responsible for insuring their individual unit against risks like a sewer backup. Their failure to procure such coverage was their own responsibility.


Jerry and Patricia Gravelle vs. Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716008-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-01-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry and Patricia Gravelle Counsel
Respondent Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu Counsel Kenneth E. Moyer, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.3; CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.6

Outcome Summary

The Commissioner adopted the ALJ's recommendation to dismiss the petition, finding that the HOA was not required by the governing documents (CC&Rs) or state law (Arizona Condominium Act) to insure against damages to the interior finished surfaces of the petitioners' individual condominium unit.

Why this result: The CC&Rs put Petitioners on notice that Respondent was not required to provide insurance coverage for damages to their individual unit, and Petitioners did not establish that Respondent was responsible for the damages.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA responsibility to insure unit interior damages caused by sewer backup

Petitioners claimed Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs (specifically Sections 11.7.3 and 11.7.6) by not providing insurance coverage for $6,697.70 in damages to the interior of their individual unit caused by a sewer backup. The HOA contended the CC&Rs and Arizona Condominium Act place this responsibility on the unit owner.

Orders: The petition was dismissed, and no action was required of the Respondent.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominiums, Insurance Coverage, CC&Rs Interpretation, Unit Boundaries, Maintenance Responsibility
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.3
  • CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.6

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 528194.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:55 (58.8 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 528432.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:56 (63.1 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 535933.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:56 (131.6 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 539997.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:57 (1010.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716008-REL


Briefing: Gravelle v. Village Parc Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the key findings and legal determinations from an administrative case between homeowners Jerry and Patricia Gravelle and the Village Parc Homeowners Association of Havasu (HOA). The dispute centered on liability for damages within the Gravelles’ condominium unit caused by a sewer backup.

The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded, and the Department Commissioner affirmed, that the HOA’s governing documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—unambiguously place the responsibility for insuring the interior of an individual unit on the unit owner, not the HOA.

The ruling established that the HOA’s master insurance policy, provided by Travelers, was only obligated to cover what the CC&Rs required. Arguments based on the HOA’s past payments for minor damages in other units, an erroneous initial statement by an insurance adjuster on a prior claim, and the HOA Board’s own mistaken interpretation of its duties were all found to be insufficient to override the plain written language of the governing documents. The final decision reinforces the principle that unit owners are responsible for understanding their CC&Rs and securing adequate personal insurance for their property.

I. Case Overview and Final Disposition

Case Identification: No. 17F-H1716008-REL

Parties:

Petitioners: Jerry and Patricia Gravelle, owners of Unit 14 in the Village Parc development.

Respondent: Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu (“the Association”).

Adjudicating Body: The case was heard in the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Diane Mihalsky. The final order was issued by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Key Dates:

Hearing Date: November 10, 2016

ALJ Decision: December 22, 2016

Final Order: January 3, 2017

Final Disposition: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s recommendation and ordered that the petition be dismissed. This constituted a final administrative action, effective immediately. Parties were advised of their right to file for rehearing or appeal for judicial review.

II. The Core Dispute: Insurance for Sewer Backup Damage

On or about October 23, 2015, the Petitioners’ condominium (Unit 14), along with two other units, suffered damage from a sewer backup. The central conflict arose from determining which party was financially responsible for the repairs inside the Petitioners’ unit.

Petitioners’ Claim: The Gravelles filed a petition on August 31, 2016, alleging the Association violated Articles 11.7.3 and 11.7.6 of the CC&Rs by failing to provide insurance coverage for the full extent of the damages. Their personal insurance policy did not cover sewer backups. They requested the Association pay $6,697.70 to reimburse them for the loss that the Association’s insurer, Travelers, declined to cover.

Insurance Claim Outcome:

◦ The Association submitted a claim for the sewer backup damages to its insurer, Travelers.

◦ Travelers determined that its policy covered damages to the common elements associated with the unit and issued a check to the Petitioners for $338.64.

◦ Travelers concluded there was no coverage under the policy for damage to the interior of the Petitioners’ unit. This denial was based on the CC&Rs, which establish that the unit owner is responsible for the finished surfaces and personal property within their unit.

III. Analysis of Governing Documents and Legal Framework

The ALJ’s decision was grounded in a strict interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs, its insurance contract, and the Arizona Condominium Act.

Document / Statute

Key Provisions and Implications

Village Parc CC&Rs

Unit Definition (Sec. 2.2.1): A unit is defined as the space “bounded by and contained within the interior finished surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors and ceilings.”

Insurance Responsibility (Sec. 11.7.3): The Association’s master policy is explicitly “not be required to insure the personal property within any individual Unit, which insurance shall be the responsibility and risk of the Unit Owners.”

Liability Limitation (Sec. 11.7.5): The Association is not liable to any owner “if any risk or hazard is not covered by insurance or the amount is inadequate.” It places the burden on each owner to ascertain the Association’s coverage and procure their own additional insurance.

Travelers Insurance Policy

Conditional Coverage Endorsement: The policy covers certain property (fixtures, alterations, appliances) contained within a unit, but only “if your Condominium Association Agreement requires you to insure it.” Since the CC&Rs do not require the Association to insure unit interiors, this coverage was not triggered.

Primary Insurance: The policy states it is “intended to be primary, and not to contribute with such other insurance” a unit-owner may have.

Arizona Condominium Act

Unit Definition (A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)): Reinforces the CC&Rs by defining finished surfaces—”lath, furring, wallboard… tiles, wallpaper, paint, finished flooring”—as part of the unit. All other portions of walls, floors, or ceilings are common elements.

Maintenance Responsibility (A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)): The law specifies that “the association is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the common elements and each unit owner is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the unit.”

IV. Petitioners’ Arguments and the ALJ’s Rejection

The Petitioners presented evidence of past practices by both the Association and Travelers, arguing these created an expectation of coverage. The ALJ systematically rejected these arguments.

Argument 1: The Association’s Past Payments for Unit Repairs

Petitioners’ Evidence: The Association had authorized payments for repairs inside other units on prior occasions:

June 2011: $153.74, $75.00, and $296.11 for damage to Units 3 and 5 from a broken shower drain.

January 2012: $449.45 to repair kitchen cabinets in Unit 6 damaged by a broken roof vent.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The fact that the Association’s Board made “actual payments of small amounts for damages to individually owned units” does not legally amend the plain language of the CC&Rs. Notably, the Association did not submit these prior incidents to its insurer.

Argument 2: Travelers’ Prior Actions

Petitioners’ Evidence: In a 2014 claim, a Travelers adjuster initially determined that the policy did provide coverage for damage done to a unit, not just limited common elements.

ALJ’s Conclusion: Travelers later stated the adjuster had erred and confirmed no claim for unit damage was ultimately paid. The ALJ found that the “adjuster’s initial error in the 2014 claim does not estop Travelers from denying the claim for damages to Petitioners’ unit” in 2015.

Argument 3: The Association Board’s Own Interpretation

Petitioners’ Evidence: At a November 2015 board meeting, where Mr. Gravelle served as secretary/treasurer, the Board itself determined that the CC&Rs did require the Association to provide insurance coverage for all damages to Unit 14.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The Board’s “erroneous opinion” does not have the legal power to amend the CC&Rs or the binding terms of the Travelers insurance policy.

V. Core Legal Principles and Final Decision

The dismissal of the petition was based on several foundational legal principles.

Primacy of Written Documents: The decision gave superior weight to the “plain language” of the CC&Rs and the insurance contract over inconsistent past practices or mistaken interpretations.

Burden of Proof: As the filing party, the Petitioners had the burden to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Association violated the CC&Rs. The ALJ determined they failed to meet this standard.

Clear Delineation of Responsibility: Both the CC&Rs and Arizona state law create a clear separation of financial and maintenance responsibilities: the Association is responsible for common elements, while individual owners are responsible for their units.

Presumption of Knowledge: The decision cited the legal principle that “Everyone is presumed to know the law.” The CC&Rs put the Petitioners on constructive notice that they were responsible for insuring their individual unit against risks like a sewer backup. Their failure to procure such coverage was their own responsibility.


Jerry and Patricia Gravelle vs. Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716008-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-01-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry and Patricia Gravelle Counsel
Respondent Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu Counsel Kenneth E. Moyer, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.3; CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.6

Outcome Summary

The Commissioner adopted the ALJ's recommendation to dismiss the petition, finding that the HOA was not required by the governing documents (CC&Rs) or state law (Arizona Condominium Act) to insure against damages to the interior finished surfaces of the petitioners' individual condominium unit.

Why this result: The CC&Rs put Petitioners on notice that Respondent was not required to provide insurance coverage for damages to their individual unit, and Petitioners did not establish that Respondent was responsible for the damages.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA responsibility to insure unit interior damages caused by sewer backup

Petitioners claimed Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs (specifically Sections 11.7.3 and 11.7.6) by not providing insurance coverage for $6,697.70 in damages to the interior of their individual unit caused by a sewer backup. The HOA contended the CC&Rs and Arizona Condominium Act place this responsibility on the unit owner.

Orders: The petition was dismissed, and no action was required of the Respondent.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominiums, Insurance Coverage, CC&Rs Interpretation, Unit Boundaries, Maintenance Responsibility
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.3
  • CC&Rs Article 11, Section 11.7.6

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 528194.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:04 (58.8 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 528432.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:04 (63.1 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 535933.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:05 (131.6 KB)

17F-H1716008-REL Decision – 539997.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:07 (1010.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716008-REL


Briefing: Gravelle v. Village Parc Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the key findings and legal determinations from an administrative case between homeowners Jerry and Patricia Gravelle and the Village Parc Homeowners Association of Havasu (HOA). The dispute centered on liability for damages within the Gravelles’ condominium unit caused by a sewer backup.

The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded, and the Department Commissioner affirmed, that the HOA’s governing documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—unambiguously place the responsibility for insuring the interior of an individual unit on the unit owner, not the HOA.

The ruling established that the HOA’s master insurance policy, provided by Travelers, was only obligated to cover what the CC&Rs required. Arguments based on the HOA’s past payments for minor damages in other units, an erroneous initial statement by an insurance adjuster on a prior claim, and the HOA Board’s own mistaken interpretation of its duties were all found to be insufficient to override the plain written language of the governing documents. The final decision reinforces the principle that unit owners are responsible for understanding their CC&Rs and securing adequate personal insurance for their property.

I. Case Overview and Final Disposition

Case Identification: No. 17F-H1716008-REL

Parties:

Petitioners: Jerry and Patricia Gravelle, owners of Unit 14 in the Village Parc development.

Respondent: Village Parc Homeowners Assoc. of Havasu (“the Association”).

Adjudicating Body: The case was heard in the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Diane Mihalsky. The final order was issued by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Key Dates:

Hearing Date: November 10, 2016

ALJ Decision: December 22, 2016

Final Order: January 3, 2017

Final Disposition: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s recommendation and ordered that the petition be dismissed. This constituted a final administrative action, effective immediately. Parties were advised of their right to file for rehearing or appeal for judicial review.

II. The Core Dispute: Insurance for Sewer Backup Damage

On or about October 23, 2015, the Petitioners’ condominium (Unit 14), along with two other units, suffered damage from a sewer backup. The central conflict arose from determining which party was financially responsible for the repairs inside the Petitioners’ unit.

Petitioners’ Claim: The Gravelles filed a petition on August 31, 2016, alleging the Association violated Articles 11.7.3 and 11.7.6 of the CC&Rs by failing to provide insurance coverage for the full extent of the damages. Their personal insurance policy did not cover sewer backups. They requested the Association pay $6,697.70 to reimburse them for the loss that the Association’s insurer, Travelers, declined to cover.

Insurance Claim Outcome:

◦ The Association submitted a claim for the sewer backup damages to its insurer, Travelers.

◦ Travelers determined that its policy covered damages to the common elements associated with the unit and issued a check to the Petitioners for $338.64.

◦ Travelers concluded there was no coverage under the policy for damage to the interior of the Petitioners’ unit. This denial was based on the CC&Rs, which establish that the unit owner is responsible for the finished surfaces and personal property within their unit.

III. Analysis of Governing Documents and Legal Framework

The ALJ’s decision was grounded in a strict interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs, its insurance contract, and the Arizona Condominium Act.

Document / Statute

Key Provisions and Implications

Village Parc CC&Rs

Unit Definition (Sec. 2.2.1): A unit is defined as the space “bounded by and contained within the interior finished surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors and ceilings.”

Insurance Responsibility (Sec. 11.7.3): The Association’s master policy is explicitly “not be required to insure the personal property within any individual Unit, which insurance shall be the responsibility and risk of the Unit Owners.”

Liability Limitation (Sec. 11.7.5): The Association is not liable to any owner “if any risk or hazard is not covered by insurance or the amount is inadequate.” It places the burden on each owner to ascertain the Association’s coverage and procure their own additional insurance.

Travelers Insurance Policy

Conditional Coverage Endorsement: The policy covers certain property (fixtures, alterations, appliances) contained within a unit, but only “if your Condominium Association Agreement requires you to insure it.” Since the CC&Rs do not require the Association to insure unit interiors, this coverage was not triggered.

Primary Insurance: The policy states it is “intended to be primary, and not to contribute with such other insurance” a unit-owner may have.

Arizona Condominium Act

Unit Definition (A.R.S. § 33-1212(1)): Reinforces the CC&Rs by defining finished surfaces—”lath, furring, wallboard… tiles, wallpaper, paint, finished flooring”—as part of the unit. All other portions of walls, floors, or ceilings are common elements.

Maintenance Responsibility (A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)): The law specifies that “the association is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the common elements and each unit owner is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the unit.”

IV. Petitioners’ Arguments and the ALJ’s Rejection

The Petitioners presented evidence of past practices by both the Association and Travelers, arguing these created an expectation of coverage. The ALJ systematically rejected these arguments.

Argument 1: The Association’s Past Payments for Unit Repairs

Petitioners’ Evidence: The Association had authorized payments for repairs inside other units on prior occasions:

June 2011: $153.74, $75.00, and $296.11 for damage to Units 3 and 5 from a broken shower drain.

January 2012: $449.45 to repair kitchen cabinets in Unit 6 damaged by a broken roof vent.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The fact that the Association’s Board made “actual payments of small amounts for damages to individually owned units” does not legally amend the plain language of the CC&Rs. Notably, the Association did not submit these prior incidents to its insurer.

Argument 2: Travelers’ Prior Actions

Petitioners’ Evidence: In a 2014 claim, a Travelers adjuster initially determined that the policy did provide coverage for damage done to a unit, not just limited common elements.

ALJ’s Conclusion: Travelers later stated the adjuster had erred and confirmed no claim for unit damage was ultimately paid. The ALJ found that the “adjuster’s initial error in the 2014 claim does not estop Travelers from denying the claim for damages to Petitioners’ unit” in 2015.

Argument 3: The Association Board’s Own Interpretation

Petitioners’ Evidence: At a November 2015 board meeting, where Mr. Gravelle served as secretary/treasurer, the Board itself determined that the CC&Rs did require the Association to provide insurance coverage for all damages to Unit 14.

ALJ’s Conclusion: The Board’s “erroneous opinion” does not have the legal power to amend the CC&Rs or the binding terms of the Travelers insurance policy.

V. Core Legal Principles and Final Decision

The dismissal of the petition was based on several foundational legal principles.

Primacy of Written Documents: The decision gave superior weight to the “plain language” of the CC&Rs and the insurance contract over inconsistent past practices or mistaken interpretations.

Burden of Proof: As the filing party, the Petitioners had the burden to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Association violated the CC&Rs. The ALJ determined they failed to meet this standard.

Clear Delineation of Responsibility: Both the CC&Rs and Arizona state law create a clear separation of financial and maintenance responsibilities: the Association is responsible for common elements, while individual owners are responsible for their units.

Presumption of Knowledge: The decision cited the legal principle that “Everyone is presumed to know the law.” The CC&Rs put the Petitioners on constructive notice that they were responsible for insuring their individual unit against risks like a sewer backup. Their failure to procure such coverage was their own responsibility.


Brian Sopatk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc., Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews, Esq. and Jill Kennedy, Esq.
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show a statutory violation because the fee in question was a valid working capital fee collected under the CC&Rs, not an illegal transfer fee under A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Petitioner alleged the Association charged a $660 transfer fee, plus a $30 statement fee, violating A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits aggregate fees for resale disclosure and transfer services to $400. The ALJ found the $660 fee was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a statutory disclosure fee, despite being mislabeled by the Association.

Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 1-243

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:39 (67.9 KB)

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:40 (154.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

——————————————————————————–

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.


Brian Sopatk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc., Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews, Esq. and Jill Kennedy, Esq.
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show a statutory violation because the fee in question was a valid working capital fee collected under the CC&Rs, not an illegal transfer fee under A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Petitioner alleged the Association charged a $660 transfer fee, plus a $30 statement fee, violating A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits aggregate fees for resale disclosure and transfer services to $400. The ALJ found the $660 fee was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a statutory disclosure fee, despite being mislabeled by the Association.

Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 1-243

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:50 (67.9 KB)

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:51 (154.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

——————————————————————————–

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.


Brian Sopatk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc., Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews, Esq. and Jill Kennedy, Esq.
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show a statutory violation because the fee in question was a valid working capital fee collected under the CC&Rs, not an illegal transfer fee under A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Petitioner alleged the Association charged a $660 transfer fee, plus a $30 statement fee, violating A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits aggregate fees for resale disclosure and transfer services to $400. The ALJ found the $660 fee was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a statutory disclosure fee, despite being mislabeled by the Association.

Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 1-243

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:51 (67.9 KB)

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:51 (154.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

——————————————————————————–

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.


Brian Sopatk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc., Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews, Esq. and Jill Kennedy, Esq.
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show a statutory violation because the fee in question was a valid working capital fee collected under the CC&Rs, not an illegal transfer fee under A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Petitioner alleged the Association charged a $660 transfer fee, plus a $30 statement fee, violating A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits aggregate fees for resale disclosure and transfer services to $400. The ALJ found the $660 fee was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a statutory disclosure fee, despite being mislabeled by the Association.

Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 1-243

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:58:23 (67.9 KB)

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:58:24 (154.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

——————————————————————————–

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.


Paul Gounder vs. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-12
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Paul Gounder Counsel
Respondent Royal Riviera Condominium Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner achieved a partial win. The Respondent HOA was found to have violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using substantively different ballots which impaired the voting rights of absentee members. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee, but no other relief was granted.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Key Issues & Findings

Denial of right to vote for or against each proposed action due to substantively different ballots.

The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using two substantively different ballots for the 2016 election. The meeting ballot included a seventh candidate whose name was not on the mail-in ballot, denying members who did not attend the meeting the opportunity to vote for or against all proposed candidates.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition is granted. Respondent must reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days. No other relief is available to Petitioner.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Absentee Ballot Requirements (Received-by date and advance delivery)

The ALJ concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4). While the meeting ballot lacked the statutory requirements listed in C(4), those requirements apply primarily to absentee ballots, and a meeting ballot does not need to comply if it is substantively the same as the compliant absentee ballot.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Absentee Voting, Ballot Differences, Statutory Violation, Condominium Association, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • Section 10-3708

Video Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 564851.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:30:55 (44.2 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 567887.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:30:55 (79.0 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 575055.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:30:55 (689.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716002-REL


Briefing Document: Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the key events, arguments, and legal conclusions from the administrative case of Paul Gounder versus the Royal Riviera Condominium Association (Case No. 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG). The central issue revolved around the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots for its March 14, 2016, board member election.

The Petitioner, Paul Gounder, alleged that the use of a separate mail-in ballot and an in-person meeting ballot, which contained different candidate lists, violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2). Specifically, the ballot distributed at the meeting included the name of a seventh candidate, Eric Thompson, who was not listed on the mail-in ballot, thereby denying absentee voters the opportunity to vote for all candidates.

After an initial hearing resulted in a recommended dismissal, a rehearing was granted. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Suzanne Marwil ultimately concluded that the Association’s actions constituted a statutory violation. The Judge found that because members voting by mail were not informed of Mr. Thompson’s candidacy, they were denied their right to vote “for or against each proposed action.” The Respondent’s argument that the matter was moot due to a subsequent election was rejected.

The Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order on June 12, 2017. The Order granted the petition and required the Royal Riviera Condominium Association to reimburse Mr. Gounder’s $500.00 filing fee. The ruling establishes that while election ballots are not required to be identical, any substantive changes must be presented to all members to ensure an equal opportunity to vote.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview and Background

This matter was brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Petitioner: Paul Gounder, a condominium owner and member of the Association.

Respondent: Royal Riviera Condominium Association, a homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 32 condominiums.

Initial Petition: Filed on or about June 23, 2016.

Core Allegation: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and its own CC&Rs by using two substantively different ballots to elect Board members at its March 14, 2016, annual meeting.

II. Procedural History

1. Initial Hearing (October 17, 2016): A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

2. Recommended Dismissal (October 18, 2016): Judge Mihalsky recommended the petition be dismissed, concluding:

3. Rehearing Granted (February 17, 2017): The Petitioner requested a rehearing, which the Department of Real Estate granted. The Department’s order specifically requested a review of A.R.S. § 33-1250, with a focus on subsection (C)(4).

4. Rehearing (May 17, 2017): A rehearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. At this hearing, the Respondent raised a procedural question regarding the correct statutory subsection for review, leading to a temporary order holding the record open until May 24, 2017, for clarification.

5. ALJ Decision (June 2, 2017): Judge Marwil issued a decision finding that the Respondent had committed a statutory violation.

6. Final Order (June 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s decision and issued a Final Order making the decision binding.

III. The Core Dispute: The Two-Ballot System

The parties stipulated that two different ballots were used for the March 14, 2016, board election, which had seven open positions. The key differences are outlined below.

Feature

Mail Ballot (Absentee)

Meeting Ballot (In-Person)

“Mail Ballot”

“Ballot”

Candidates Listed

Six names

Seven names (added Eric Thompson)

Write-in Option

Included a blank line for a write-in candidate

No space provided for write-in candidates

Distribution

Distributed at least seven days before the meeting

Handed out to members attending the meeting

Return Deadline

Specified the date by which it had to be returned

Did not specify when it needed to be returned

IV. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner’s Position (Paul Gounder)

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2): The addition of Eric Thompson’s name to the meeting ballot deprived members who voted by mail of their right “to vote for or against each proposed action,” as they had no opportunity to vote for Mr. Thompson.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4): The meeting ballot violated this subsection because it was not mailed to all members at least seven days in advance of the meeting and did not provide a date by which it had to be received to be counted.

B. Respondent’s Position (Royal Riviera Condominium Association)

No Violation: The statutes do not explicitly require the use of identical ballots for an election.

Common Practice: It is a common practice for homeowners’ associations to use a different absentee ballot and meeting ballot.

Mootness: The issue is moot because the Association had already held another election in 2017 and seated a new board, which included the Petitioner’s wife as a member.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

In her June 2, 2017 decision, ALJ Suzanne Marwil made the following key legal conclusions:

The ALJ found that the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots did violate this statute.

Reasoning: Members who did not attend the meeting in person were not notified of Mr. Thompson’s willingness to run for the board. As a result, “these members did not have the opportunity to vote for him and hence were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot.”

Clarification: The ruling explicitly states that this finding does not impose a requirement that all ballots must be identical; however, it establishes that “substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.”

The ALJ concluded that no violation of this subsection occurred.

Reasoning: The Petitioner conceded that the absentee ballot itself complied with the statutory requirements (e.g., being mailed seven days in advance with a return-by date). The judge reasoned that a meeting ballot handed out in person would not need to contain this information if it were “substantively the same as the absentee ballot.” The legal problem arose not from a failure to mail the second ballot, but from the substantive difference between the two.

The ALJ determined that the matter was not rendered moot by the 2017 election and the seating of a new board. The Judge affirmed that the tribunal “can and does find that Respondent committed a statutory violation in the course of holding its 2016 election.”

VI. Final Order and Outcome

ALJ Recommended Order (June 2, 2017):

◦ The Petitioner’s petition should be granted.

◦ The Respondent must reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee.

◦ No other relief was available to the Petitioner.

Department of Real Estate Final Order (June 12, 2017):

◦ The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision.

◦ The Order is a final administrative action, effective immediately.

◦ The Royal Riviera Condominium Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

◦ The parties were notified that the Order could be appealed via a complaint for judicial review.


Paul Gounder vs. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-12
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Paul Gounder Counsel
Respondent Royal Riviera Condominium Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner achieved a partial win. The Respondent HOA was found to have violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using substantively different ballots which impaired the voting rights of absentee members. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee, but no other relief was granted.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Key Issues & Findings

Denial of right to vote for or against each proposed action due to substantively different ballots.

The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using two substantively different ballots for the 2016 election. The meeting ballot included a seventh candidate whose name was not on the mail-in ballot, denying members who did not attend the meeting the opportunity to vote for or against all proposed candidates.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition is granted. Respondent must reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days. No other relief is available to Petitioner.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Absentee Ballot Requirements (Received-by date and advance delivery)

The ALJ concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4). While the meeting ballot lacked the statutory requirements listed in C(4), those requirements apply primarily to absentee ballots, and a meeting ballot does not need to comply if it is substantively the same as the compliant absentee ballot.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Absentee Voting, Ballot Differences, Statutory Violation, Condominium Association, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • Section 10-3708

Decision Documents

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 564851.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:06 (44.2 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 567887.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:07 (79.0 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 575055.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:07 (689.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716002-REL


Briefing Document: Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the key events, arguments, and legal conclusions from the administrative case of Paul Gounder versus the Royal Riviera Condominium Association (Case No. 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG). The central issue revolved around the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots for its March 14, 2016, board member election.

The Petitioner, Paul Gounder, alleged that the use of a separate mail-in ballot and an in-person meeting ballot, which contained different candidate lists, violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2). Specifically, the ballot distributed at the meeting included the name of a seventh candidate, Eric Thompson, who was not listed on the mail-in ballot, thereby denying absentee voters the opportunity to vote for all candidates.

After an initial hearing resulted in a recommended dismissal, a rehearing was granted. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Suzanne Marwil ultimately concluded that the Association’s actions constituted a statutory violation. The Judge found that because members voting by mail were not informed of Mr. Thompson’s candidacy, they were denied their right to vote “for or against each proposed action.” The Respondent’s argument that the matter was moot due to a subsequent election was rejected.

The Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order on June 12, 2017. The Order granted the petition and required the Royal Riviera Condominium Association to reimburse Mr. Gounder’s $500.00 filing fee. The ruling establishes that while election ballots are not required to be identical, any substantive changes must be presented to all members to ensure an equal opportunity to vote.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview and Background

This matter was brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Petitioner: Paul Gounder, a condominium owner and member of the Association.

Respondent: Royal Riviera Condominium Association, a homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 32 condominiums.

Initial Petition: Filed on or about June 23, 2016.

Core Allegation: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and its own CC&Rs by using two substantively different ballots to elect Board members at its March 14, 2016, annual meeting.

II. Procedural History

1. Initial Hearing (October 17, 2016): A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

2. Recommended Dismissal (October 18, 2016): Judge Mihalsky recommended the petition be dismissed, concluding:

3. Rehearing Granted (February 17, 2017): The Petitioner requested a rehearing, which the Department of Real Estate granted. The Department’s order specifically requested a review of A.R.S. § 33-1250, with a focus on subsection (C)(4).

4. Rehearing (May 17, 2017): A rehearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. At this hearing, the Respondent raised a procedural question regarding the correct statutory subsection for review, leading to a temporary order holding the record open until May 24, 2017, for clarification.

5. ALJ Decision (June 2, 2017): Judge Marwil issued a decision finding that the Respondent had committed a statutory violation.

6. Final Order (June 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s decision and issued a Final Order making the decision binding.

III. The Core Dispute: The Two-Ballot System

The parties stipulated that two different ballots were used for the March 14, 2016, board election, which had seven open positions. The key differences are outlined below.

Feature

Mail Ballot (Absentee)

Meeting Ballot (In-Person)

“Mail Ballot”

“Ballot”

Candidates Listed

Six names

Seven names (added Eric Thompson)

Write-in Option

Included a blank line for a write-in candidate

No space provided for write-in candidates

Distribution

Distributed at least seven days before the meeting

Handed out to members attending the meeting

Return Deadline

Specified the date by which it had to be returned

Did not specify when it needed to be returned

IV. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner’s Position (Paul Gounder)

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2): The addition of Eric Thompson’s name to the meeting ballot deprived members who voted by mail of their right “to vote for or against each proposed action,” as they had no opportunity to vote for Mr. Thompson.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4): The meeting ballot violated this subsection because it was not mailed to all members at least seven days in advance of the meeting and did not provide a date by which it had to be received to be counted.

B. Respondent’s Position (Royal Riviera Condominium Association)

No Violation: The statutes do not explicitly require the use of identical ballots for an election.

Common Practice: It is a common practice for homeowners’ associations to use a different absentee ballot and meeting ballot.

Mootness: The issue is moot because the Association had already held another election in 2017 and seated a new board, which included the Petitioner’s wife as a member.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

In her June 2, 2017 decision, ALJ Suzanne Marwil made the following key legal conclusions:

The ALJ found that the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots did violate this statute.

Reasoning: Members who did not attend the meeting in person were not notified of Mr. Thompson’s willingness to run for the board. As a result, “these members did not have the opportunity to vote for him and hence were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot.”

Clarification: The ruling explicitly states that this finding does not impose a requirement that all ballots must be identical; however, it establishes that “substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.”

The ALJ concluded that no violation of this subsection occurred.

Reasoning: The Petitioner conceded that the absentee ballot itself complied with the statutory requirements (e.g., being mailed seven days in advance with a return-by date). The judge reasoned that a meeting ballot handed out in person would not need to contain this information if it were “substantively the same as the absentee ballot.” The legal problem arose not from a failure to mail the second ballot, but from the substantive difference between the two.

The ALJ determined that the matter was not rendered moot by the 2017 election and the seating of a new board. The Judge affirmed that the tribunal “can and does find that Respondent committed a statutory violation in the course of holding its 2016 election.”

VI. Final Order and Outcome

ALJ Recommended Order (June 2, 2017):

◦ The Petitioner’s petition should be granted.

◦ The Respondent must reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee.

◦ No other relief was available to the Petitioner.

Department of Real Estate Final Order (June 12, 2017):

◦ The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision.

◦ The Order is a final administrative action, effective immediately.

◦ The Royal Riviera Condominium Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

◦ The parties were notified that the Order could be appealed via a complaint for judicial review.