Brian Sopatk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc., Inc.

Posted on November 29, 2016 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	none
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Brian Sopatyk	Counsel	Nathan Andrews, Esq. and Jill Kennedy, Esq.
Respondent	The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.	Counsel	Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show a statutory violation because the fee in question was a valid working capital fee collected under the CC&Rs, not an illegal transfer fee under A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Petitioner alleged the Association charged a $660 transfer fee, plus a $30 statement fee, violating A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits aggregate fees for resale disclosure and transfer services to $400. The ALJ found the $660 fee was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a statutory disclosure fee, despite being mislabeled by the Association.

Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure

Additional Citations:

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.R.S. § 1-243

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:50 (67.9 KB)

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:51 (154.0 KB)

Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL

Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

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Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

• Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

• Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

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Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

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Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

• Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

• Evidence Presented:

◦ March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

◦ HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

• Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

• Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

• Evidence and Testimony:

◦ CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

◦ Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

◦ May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

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Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

• Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

• Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

• Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

• Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

• Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.

Study Guide – 17f-H1716004-REL

Study Guide: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided case documents. Each answer should be two to three sentences in length.

1. What specific Arizona Revised Statute did petitioner Brian Sopatyk allege that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated, and what is the core requirement of that statute?

2. Identify the two fees charged in connection with Mr. Sopatyk’s unit purchase, the amount of each fee, and how they were documented on the HUD-1 disclosure statement.

3. What was the Association’s central argument for why the $660 fee did not violate the statute in question?

4. Who was the Association’s manager, and what explanation did she provide for the labeling of the $660 fee?

5. According to the Association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs), what is the purpose of the fee outlined in section 8.13?

6. What was the outcome of the initial administrative hearing held on November 14, 2016?

7. During the rehearing, a discrepancy was noted between Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn petition and his testimony regarding the payment of the $660 fee. What was this discrepancy?

8. What corrective actions did the Association’s Board vote to take during its meeting on May 18, 2016, after Mr. Sopatyk raised the issue?

9. What is the standard of proof the petitioner was required to meet in this case, and did the Administrative Law Judge find that he met it?

10. What was the final, certified administrative decision in this matter after the rehearing on June 9, 2017?

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Answer Key

1. Brian Sopatyk alleged a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260. This statute requires a condominium association to provide specific disclosure documents to a prospective purchaser and limits the aggregate fee for preparing these documents and other related services to no more than four hundred dollars.

2. The two fees were a $660 “Transfer Fee” and a $30 “Resale Statement Fee.” The HUD-1 disclosure statement shows the $660 fee was split, with $330 paid by the borrower (Sopatyk) and $330 paid by the seller, while the seller alone paid the $30 fee.

3. The Association’s central argument was that the $660 fee was not a transfer fee for disclosure services but was actually a “working capital fee” collected pursuant to section 8.13 of its CC&Rs. They contended that the fee had been incorrectly labeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error.

4. The Association’s manager was Amy Telnes. She testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly told the working capital fee was the transfer fee, and these fees had been mislabeled since that time.

5. According to CC&R section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”), each new unit owner is to be assessed a fee of at least twice the average monthly assessment. These fees are to be deposited into the working capital fund, which the Association refers to as its Reserve Fund.

6. Following the initial hearing, Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden found that Mr. Sopatyk had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the statute. The Judge’s decision was to dismiss Mr. Sopatyk’s petition, and this decision was adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate.

7. In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated that the $660 fee was split between him and the seller. However, at the hearing, he testified that he had in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit, meaning one of his statements had to be false.

8. The Board directed Ms. Telnes to account for all working capital fees and transfer them to the Reserve Account to correct the error. The Board also determined its system was confusing and voted to assess a single transfer fee of $400 (and no other fees) on all future transactions.

9. The petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, bore the burden of proof and was required to meet the standard of a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Administrative Law Judge concluded in both hearings that Mr. Sopatyk did not meet this burden.

10. The final decision was that Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed again. On August 10, 2017, the Administrative Law Judge’s decision from the rehearing was certified as the final administrative decision of the Department of Real Estate because the Department took no action to reject or modify it.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision based on the evidence presented.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1260

The Arizona statute that requires a condominium association to furnish a prospective purchaser with disclosure documents and other information. It explicitly limits the fee an association can charge for these services to “no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars.”

Burden of Proof

The responsibility of a party in a legal case to prove their claims. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the petitioner, Brian Sopatyk.

The Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, which are the governing documents for the condominium association. Section 8.13 of the Lakeshore Village CC&Rs authorizes the collection of a fee for a working capital fund.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Brian Sopatyk.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party defending against a petition. In this case, The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Reserve Fund

The account into which the Association deposits its working capital fees. It is also referred to as the Working Capital Fund.

Statement Fee / Resale Statement Fee

A $30 fee, separate from the disputed $660, that was paid by the seller to the Association for the preparation of the resale statement. This fee was considered part of the allowable charges under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1260.

Transfer Fee

The label erroneously applied to the $660 fee on the disclosure statement and HUD-1 form. The central dispute of the case was whether this was a true transfer fee subject to the statutory cap or a mislabeled working capital fee.

Working Capital Fee

A fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13 to be assessed from each new unit owner for the purpose of funding the Association’s working capital fund (Reserve Fund). The Association successfully argued the $660 charge was this type of fee.

Blog Post – 17f-H1716004-REL

How a $660 Fee Sparked a Legal Showdown: 5 Surprising Lessons from a Homeowner vs. HOA Dispute

We sign, we initial, we pay—assuming every line item on our closing documents is gospel. When buying a home in a condominium association, the stack of paperwork and list of fees can feel overwhelming. But what if one of those “standard” fees wasn’t standard at all?

For homeowner Brian Sopatyk, a single $660 charge from The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association wasn’t just a number; it was a thread he pulled that unraveled a surprising story of HOA governance, legal strategy, and the power of asking “why?” This post breaks down the five most impactful takeaways from a seemingly minor dispute that went all the way through a formal hearing and re-hearing.

1. A Simple Label Can Ignite a Legal Firestorm

A clerical error triggers a full-blown legal dispute.

The entire case hinged on a single, crucial mistake: the HOA mislabeled a “working capital fee” as a “transfer fee” on its disclosure forms.

Why was this one word so important? Because Mr. Sopatyk’s formal petition alleged that by charging a “$660 transfer fee,” the HOA violated Arizona statute 33-1260, which caps fees for resale disclosure services at a maximum of $400. On its face, the $660 charge looked like a clear violation of state law.

The Association’s manager, Amy Telnes, testified that when she took over her position, she was given erroneous information that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. As a result, the charge had been incorrectly labeled ever since. This simple administrative error was enough to trigger a formal petition to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, a full administrative hearing, and eventually, a re-hearing, proving how a small clerical mistake can escalate into a significant legal conflict.

2. In the Eyes of the Law, Substance Can Trump Form

Why the fee’s purpose mattered more than its name.

The Association’s core defense was that while the name of the fee was wrong, its purpose and authority were legitimate. The $660 charge, they argued, wasn’t for resale documents (the service capped by state law), but was a “working capital fee” authorized by an entirely different rule: the Association’s own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Specifically, Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs allowed for this assessment, with the funds designated for the Association’s reserve fund. This working capital fee, in contrast, was an assessment on the new owner as mandated by the CC&Rs to ensure the association’s financial health. The actual fee for the statutory disclosure documents was a separate, compliant $30 “Resale Statement Fee,” which was paid by the seller.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately agreed. The fee’s underlying purpose and the HOA’s authority to collect it (its substance) were deemed more important than its incorrect name on the form (its form). This is a crucial lesson for any homeowner challenging an HOA: it’s not enough to find a mistake on a form. You must be prepared to argue against the underlying authority and purpose of the action itself.

3. You Can Lose the Battle but Win the War

How a dismissed case led to a major policy victory.

Perhaps the most counter-intuitive outcome is that although Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed, his actions were the direct catalyst for a significant and positive policy change by the HOA.

In a summary of the Association’s May 18, 2016, Board Meeting, which was entered as evidence, the judge noted that the Board reviewed the very issue Mr. Sopatyk had raised. Under the pressure of his legal challenge, they came to a powerful conclusion about their own system, determining it was “confusing and unfair.”

As a direct result of this internal review prompted by the dispute, the Board voted to simplify its process. It resolved to assess a single, clear transfer fee of $400 on all future transactions, eliminating the other confusing fees. This proves that even an unsuccessful legal challenge can be a powerful tool, forcing an organization to confront and correct its own problematic practices for the benefit of all future members.

4. The ‘Burden of Proof’ Is More Than Just a Phrase

What it really means to have to prove your case.

In both the original decision and the re-hearing, the judge repeatedly stated that Mr. Sopatyk, as the petitioner, bore the “burden of proof.” This legal standard was critical to the outcome. It meant he had to prove his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which the court documents defined as:

The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

In this case, it meant Mr. Sopatyk’s job was to prove that the $660 fee was, more likely than not, an illegal charge for resale documents. The HOA’s defense—that it was a legally separate “working capital fee” that was simply mislabeled—created enough doubt that he couldn’t clear this hurdle.

5. A Small Contradiction Can Damage Credibility

When every word you say (and write) is on the record.

A fascinating detail appeared in the re-hearing decision, highlighting how every word matters in a legal proceeding.

There was a discrepancy in Mr. Sopatyk’s statements. His sworn petition, filed on August 9, 2016, stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660.”

The judge noted this contradiction directly in footnote 3 of the re-hearing decision, stating: “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.” While not the deciding factor, this kind of inconsistency can subtly erode a petitioner’s standing. Remember the “burden of proof” from Takeaway 4? It requires convincing a judge to “incline a fair and impartial mind” to your side. Contradictions, even small ones, make that inclination much harder to achieve.

Conclusion: The Devil Is in the Details

This case is the perfect microcosm of community association disputes. It began with a clerical error (form), was adjudicated on intent (substance), was lost on a technicality (the burden of proof), yet resulted in a victory for transparency. Mr. Sopatyk may not have won his case, but he won a better system for his neighbors.

The ultimate lesson? In an HOA, the most powerful tool isn’t always a lawsuit—sometimes, it’s a magnifying glass. It leaves us with a thought-provoking question: When is it worth challenging the system for clarity and fairness, even if the outcome isn’t a clear ‘win’ on paper?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Brian Sopatyk (petitioner)
Nathan Andrews (petitioner attorney)
ASU Alumni Law Group
Jill M. Kennedy (petitioner attorney)
ASU Alumni Law Group
Chance Peterson (petitioner attorney)
ASU Alumni Law Group
Judy Sopatyk (party)
Wife of petitioner and co-purchaser of the unit

Respondent Side

Bradley R. Jardine (HOA attorney)
Jardine Baker Hickman & Houston
Attorney for Respondent
Amy Telnes (property manager/witness)
The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
Association manager who testified
Michael Cibellis (association president/witness)
The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
Association president who testified at rehearing

Neutral Parties

Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
ADRE
Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner
Greg Hanchett (Interim Director)
OAH
Signed Certification of Decision
Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
ADRE
Administrative contact for rehearing requests
Rosella J. Rodriguez (administrative staff)
Involved in copy mailing/distribution

Brian Sopatk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc., Inc.

Posted on November 29, 2016 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	none
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Brian Sopatyk	Counsel	Nathan Andrews, Esq. and Jill Kennedy, Esq.
Respondent	The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.	Counsel	Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure

Additional Citations:

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.R.S. § 1-243

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:51 (67.9 KB)

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:51 (154.0 KB)

Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL

Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

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Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

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Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

• Evidence Presented:

◦ March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

• Evidence and Testimony:

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Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

• Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

• Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

• Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

Brian Sopatk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc., Inc.

Posted on November 29, 2016 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	none
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Brian Sopatyk	Counsel	Nathan Andrews, Esq. and Jill Kennedy, Esq.
Respondent	The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.	Counsel	Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure

Additional Citations:

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.R.S. § 1-243

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

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17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL

Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

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Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

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Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

• Evidence Presented:

◦ March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

• Evidence and Testimony:

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Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

• Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

• Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

• Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

Barbara Printy vs. Olive Grove Village Association Inc.

Posted on November 14, 2016 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	16F-H1616010-BFS
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2016-11-14
Administrative Law Judge	Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome	yes
Filing Fees Refunded	$750.00
Civil Penalties	$5,000.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Barbara Printy	Counsel	Phil Whitaker
Respondent	Olive Grove Village Association Inc.	Counsel	Jonathan Ebertshauser

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1243(J)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1243(J) and governing documents by failing to complete the required 2014 audit by March 31, 2015. The audit was not completed until October 2016. The ALJ imposed a $5,000 civil penalty due to the ongoing refusal to comply.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to obtain annual financial audit

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to obtain an audit of the 2014 financials. Respondent's fiscal year ended Dec 31, 2014. The audit was not received until Oct 11, 2016, despite multiple requests by Petitioner. ALJ found Respondent violated statute and governing documents.

Orders: Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner $750.00 filing fee and pay Department $5,000.00 civil penalty.

Filing fee: $750.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $5,000.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1243(J)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

16F-H1616010-BFS Decision – 528449.pdf

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16F-H1616010-BFS Decision – 538188.pdf

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16F-H1616010-BFS Decision – 540732.pdf

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16F-H1616010-BFS Decision – 562623.pdf

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16F-H1616010-BFS Decision – 564331.pdf

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16F-H1616010-BFS Decision – 564332.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 16F-H1616010-BFS

Administrative Decision Briefing: Printy v. Olive Grove Village Association Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the administrative law proceedings and final decision regarding the dispute between Barbara Printy (Petitioner) and the Olive Grove Village Association Inc. (Respondent). The central conflict involved the Respondent’s failure to conduct a timely financial audit for the 2014 fiscal year, as mandated by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) and the Association’s own governing documents.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the Respondent committed a clear violation of A.R.S. § 33-1243(J). Despite multiple requests from the Petitioner starting in early 2015, the Association did not receive the required audit until October 2016—nearly eighteen months past the deadline set in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Consequently, the Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $750 filing fee and pay a civil penalty of $5,000 to the Department of Real Estate.

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Factual Background and Parties

The dispute involves the following entities and legal context:

• Petitioner: Barbara Printy, a condominium owner within the Association.

• Respondent: Olive Grove Village Association Inc., a condominium owners association located in Phoenix, Arizona.

• Subject Matter: Failure to provide a required financial audit for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2014.

• Jurisdiction: Originally filed with the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety, the matter was transferred to the Department of Real Estate on July 1, 2016, under the authority of A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

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Governing Regulatory Framework

The ALJ’s decision was based on three distinct but overlapping requirements for financial transparency and reporting:

Authority

Requirement

Deadline

A.R.S. § 33-1243(J)

Annual financial audit, review, or compilation must be completed.

No later than 180 days after fiscal year-end.

Association CC&Rs

Books and records must be audited by an independent auditor.

Results submitted to Owners within 90 days of fiscal year-end.

Association By-Laws

Treasurer must cause an audit by a CPA.

Complete audit in even-numbered years; review allowed in odd years.

While the state statute allows up to 180 days for a financial review, the Association’s CC&Rs established a stricter 90-day deadline for a full audit. The 2014 fiscal year audit was therefore legally due by March 31, 2015.

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Chronology of Non-Compliance

The Petitioner made repeated attempts to obtain the 2014 audit, which were met with delays and conflicting information from the Association:

1. April 15, 2015: Petitioner requested the audit at an Association meeting. She was informed it would be ready by June.

2. October 15, 2015: Petitioner submitted a formal written request.

3. October 21, 2015: At a meeting, the Association directed the Petitioner to contact the management company for the information.

4. March 17, 2016: The Association informed homeowners that they would be charged $35.00 each for a copy of the audit.

5. March 23, 2016: The Petitioner filed a formal Petition with the state, paying a $750.00 filing fee.

6. August 2016: The Respondent finally engaged a CPA to perform the 2014 audit.

7. October 11, 2016: The Respondent received the audit report, one day before the scheduled administrative hearing.

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Legal Analysis and Conclusions

Violation of Statutory and Governing Documents

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1243(J). The Association admitted that an audit was required for the 2014 financials under both the CC&Rs and the By-Laws.

Defense and Rebuttal

• Respondent’s Defense: The Association argued that inconsistencies between the CC&Rs and By-Laws caused confusion regarding the level of review required. They also argued against a civil penalty, suggesting the cost would ultimately be passed on to homeowners via assessments.

• Petitioner’s Evidence: The Petitioner testified to the ongoing and “flagrant refusal” of the Association to comply with its governing documents. She further noted that the audit received on the eve of the hearing revealed discrepancies in financial records when compared to previously received compilations.

Final Ruling

The ALJ found that the audit should have been completed by March 31, 2015. The Respondent’s failure to engage a CPA until August 2016 constituted a clear breach of duty.

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Sanctions and Orders

The ALJ issued a Recommended Order, which was subsequently certified as the final administrative decision:

• Filing Fee Reimbursement: The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner $750.00 within 30 days of the order’s effective date.

• Civil Penalty: Due to the nature of the violation, the ALJ imposed a civil penalty of $5,000.00, payable to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

• Method of Payment: The civil penalty must be paid via cashier’s check or money order.

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Administrative Certification and Finality

The decision-making process followed a strictly defined administrative timeline:

1. November 14, 2016: ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer issued the initial decision.

2. December 20, 2016: Deadline for the Department of Real Estate to accept, reject, or modify the decision. Since no action was taken by the Department, the ALJ decision was certified as final per A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(D).

3. January 9, 2017: A “Nunc Pro Tunc” order was issued by Interim Director Greg Hanchett to correct the date of issuance of the certification to January 9, 2017.

Notice to Parties: The final decision includes the right to request a rehearing from the Department of Real Estate or seek judicial review through the Superior Court, provided such actions are taken within the statutory timeframes. Failure to act in a timely manner results in the loss of these rights.

Study Guide – 16F-H1616010-BFS

Study Guide: Barbara Printy v. Olive Grove Village Association Inc.

This study guide reviews the administrative legal proceedings regarding the dispute between a condominium owner and her homeowners association. It focuses on the statutory requirements for financial audits, the hierarchy of governing documents, and the administrative process for resolving such disputes in Arizona.

Part 1: Short-Answer Quiz

1. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner against Olive Grove Village Association Inc.?

2. According to A.R.S. § 33-1243(J), what are the default requirements for an association’s annual financial report if the condominium documents do not specify an audit by a CPA?

3. How did the Respondent’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) differ from the state statute regarding the timing of the audit?

4. What inconsistency existed between the Association’s CC&Rs and its By-Laws regarding financial reviews?

5. Describe the progression of the Petitioner’s requests for the audit from April 2015 to March 2016.

6. When did the Respondent finally engage a CPA, and when was the audit eventually received?

7. What is the legal definition of “preponderance of the evidence” as used in this administrative proceeding?

8. What was the Respondent’s primary argument against the imposition of a civil penalty?

9. Which state departments have held jurisdiction over disputes between property owners and condominium associations according to the source?

10. What was the purpose of the “Order Nunc Pro Tunc” issued on January 9, 2017?

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Part 2: Answer Key

1. The Core Allegation: The Petitioner, Barbara Printy, alleged that the Olive Grove Village Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1243(J) by failing to obtain a required audit of the 2014 financials. She claimed the Association failed to complete this audit within the 90-day timeframe mandated by its own governing documents.

2. Statutory Requirements: In the absence of stricter requirements in condominium documents, the board must provide for an annual financial audit, review, or compilation. This must be completed within 180 days of the fiscal year’s end and made available to owners within 30 days of request following its completion.

3. CC&R vs. Statute Timing: While the state statute allows up to 180 days for a financial report, the Association’s CC&Rs specifically required the audit to be completed and submitted to owners within 90 days after the end of the fiscal year. This established a more stringent deadline of March 31, 2015, for the 2014 fiscal year.

4. Governing Document Inconsistency: The CC&Rs mandated an audit by an independent auditor at the close of every fiscal year. However, the By-Laws suggested a “complete August” (audit) was only required in even-numbered years, while a review could be conducted in odd-numbered years.

5. Progression of Requests: Printy first requested the audit at a meeting in April 2015, followed by a written request in October 2015 and further verbal requests in October 2015 and March 2016. Throughout this period, she was told various things, including that the information was with the CPA, that she should contact the management company, or that she would be charged $35.00 for the audit.

6. Timeline of Compliance: Despite the audit being due in early 2015, the Respondent did not engage a CPA to perform the work until August 2016. The Association did not actually receive a copy of the completed audit until October 11, 2016, which was the eve of the administrative hearing.

7. Preponderance of the Evidence: This legal standard requires that the evidence presented is of greater weight or more convincing than the opposing evidence. It means that the facts sought to be proved are shown to be “more probable than not.”

8. Argument Against Penalties: The Respondent argued that a civil penalty was inappropriate because the CC&Rs and By-Laws were inconsistent, leading to confusion regarding the necessary level of review. Furthermore, they contended that any penalty would ultimately be a burden on the homeowners themselves through increased assessments.

9. Jurisdictional Departments: Originally, the matter was filed with the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety. As of July 1, 2016, jurisdiction over these disputes was transferred to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

10. Order Nunc Pro Tunc: This order was issued to correct a clerical error regarding the date of the decision’s certification. It retroactively established January 9, 2017, as the official date of issuance for the certification of the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.

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Part 3: Essay Questions

1. The Hierarchy of Governing Documents: Analyze how the conflict between the CC&Rs and the By-Laws impacted the Association’s compliance. Discuss the legal implications when internal documents provide conflicting instructions for fiduciary duties like financial audits.

2. Fiduciary Transparency and Homeowner Rights: Evaluate the Association’s conduct in responding to the Petitioner’s repeated requests for financial records. Discuss whether the Association’s suggestions—such as charging $35 for a copy of the audit—align with the statutory requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1243(J).

3. Administrative Law Processes: Explain the process by which an Administrative Law Judge’s decision becomes a final agency action. Refer specifically to the role of the Department of Real Estate in accepting, rejecting, or modifying a decision within the statutory 30-day window.

4. The Significance of Civil Penalties: Assess the ALJ’s decision to impose a $5,000 civil penalty. Consider the Petitioner’s claim of “ongoing and flagrant refusal” versus the Respondent’s claim that penalties harm innocent homeowners.

5. Financial Discrepancies and Audit Importance: The Petitioner testified that the final audit showed discrepancies compared to previous financial compilations. Discuss why an independent audit is a critical tool for condominium associations compared to simpler financial “compilations” or “reviews.”

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Part 4: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A presiding officer who conducts hearings and issues recommendations or decisions in disputes involving government agencies.

A.R.S. § 33-1243(J)

The Arizona Revised Statute governing the financial reporting and audit requirements for condominium associations.

An official examination and verification of financial accounts and records by an independent certified public accountant (CPA).

By-Laws

The internal rules and regulations that govern the administration and management of an association.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

Legal documents that lay out the rules of a community or condominium and are binding on all property owners within that association.

Civil Penalty

A financial punishment imposed by a government agency or court for a violation of laws or regulations, distinct from criminal fines.

Compilation

A basic financial report that organizes an association’s financial data into financial statement format without providing any assurance or auditing.

Nunc Pro Tunc

A Latin legal phrase meaning “now for then,” used to correct an order retroactively to correct a previous clerical error or omission.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal proceeding or petition, in this case, the homeowner Barbara Printy.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning the evidence shows that a claim is more likely to be true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a legal petition is filed, in this case, Olive Grove Village Association Inc.

Review

A financial reporting service that is more analytical than a compilation but less thorough than a full audit.

Case

Agency

ADRE

Tribunal

OAH

Docket No

16F-H1616010-BFS

Case Title

Barbara Printy v. Olive Grove Village Association Inc.

Decision Date

2016-11-14

Alj Name

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Parties

Party Id

Role

petitioner

Name

Barbara Printy

Party Type

homeowner

Attorney Name

Phil Whitaker

Attorney Firm

STEGALL KATZ & WHITAKER P.C.

Party Id

Role

respondent

Name

Olive Grove Village Association Inc.

Party Type

HOA

Attorney Name

Jonathan Ebertshauser

Attorney Firm

Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC

Issues

Summary

Issue Id

ISS-001

Type

statute

Citation

A.R.S. § 33-1243(J)

Caption

Failure to obtain annual financial audit

Violation(S)

Failure to complete 2014 financial audit within 90 days (CC&Rs) or 180 days (Statute) of fiscal year end.

Outcome

petitioner_win

Filing Fee Paid

750.0

Filing Fee Refunded

True

Civil Penalty Amount

5000.0

Orders Summary

Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner $750.00 filing fee and pay Department $5,000.00 civil penalty.

Cited

A.R.S. § 33-1243(J)

Money Summary

Issues Count

Total Filing Fees Paid

750.0

Total Filing Fees Refunded

750.0

Total Civil Penalties

5000.0

Outcomes

Petitioner Is Hoa

False

Petitioner Win

yes

Summarize Judgement

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Barbara Printy (Petitioner)
Phil Whitaker (Petitioner's Attorney)
Stegall Katz & Whitaker P.C.
Also listed as Philip B. Whitaker

Respondent Side

Olive Grove Village Association Inc. (Respondent)
Association of condominium owners
Jonathan Ebertshauser (Respondent's Attorney)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC
Affiliation inferred from mailing list address for Respondent's counsel

Neutral Parties

Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judge
Greg Hanchett (Interim Director)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Signed Certification of Decision
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of decision transmission
Rosella J. Rodriguez (Clerk)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Signed mailing/transmission certification

Paul Gounder vs. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Posted on October 18, 2016 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1716002-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-06-12
Administrative Law Judge	Suzanne Marwil
Outcome	partial
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Paul Gounder	Counsel	—
Respondent	Royal Riviera Condominium Association	Counsel	Mark Kristopher Sahl

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge found Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using two substantively different ballots during the 2016 board election,. Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee,. The Administrative Law Judge concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4),.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4), which specifies timing requirements for ballots; the ALJ noted that a meeting ballot did not need to contain a received-by date or be mailed seven days in advance if it had been substantively the same as the compliant absentee ballot,,,.

Key Issues & Findings

Ballot must provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.

The use of two substantively different ballots in the March 2016 election violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) because members who did not attend the meeting were unaware of an additional candidate (Eric Thompson) listed on the meeting ballot, thereby denying those members the opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot,. This finding does not require ballots to be identical, but substantive changes must be presented to all members,,.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition was granted, and Respondent was ordered to reimburse Petitioner's filing fee of $500.00,. No other relief was available.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Condominium, Board Election, Absentee Ballot, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Reimbursement

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
Article VII CC&Rs

Video Overview

https://youtu.be/0-3GaFWuqA8

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 523915.pdf

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17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 564851.pdf

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17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 567887.pdf

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17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 575055.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716002-REL

Briefing Document: Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the key events, arguments, and legal conclusions from the administrative case of Paul Gounder versus the Royal Riviera Condominium Association (Case No. 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG). The central issue revolved around the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots for its March 14, 2016, board member election.

The Petitioner, Paul Gounder, alleged that the use of a separate mail-in ballot and an in-person meeting ballot, which contained different candidate lists, violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2). Specifically, the ballot distributed at the meeting included the name of a seventh candidate, Eric Thompson, who was not listed on the mail-in ballot, thereby denying absentee voters the opportunity to vote for all candidates.

After an initial hearing resulted in a recommended dismissal, a rehearing was granted. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Suzanne Marwil ultimately concluded that the Association’s actions constituted a statutory violation. The Judge found that because members voting by mail were not informed of Mr. Thompson’s candidacy, they were denied their right to vote “for or against each proposed action.” The Respondent’s argument that the matter was moot due to a subsequent election was rejected.

The Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order on June 12, 2017. The Order granted the petition and required the Royal Riviera Condominium Association to reimburse Mr. Gounder’s $500.00 filing fee. The ruling establishes that while election ballots are not required to be identical, any substantive changes must be presented to all members to ensure an equal opportunity to vote.

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I. Case Overview and Background

This matter was brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Petitioner: Paul Gounder, a condominium owner and member of the Association.

• Respondent: Royal Riviera Condominium Association, a homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 32 condominiums.

• Initial Petition: Filed on or about June 23, 2016.

• Core Allegation: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and its own CC&Rs by using two substantively different ballots to elect Board members at its March 14, 2016, annual meeting.

II. Procedural History

1. Initial Hearing (October 17, 2016): A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

2. Recommended Dismissal (October 18, 2016): Judge Mihalsky recommended the petition be dismissed, concluding:

3. Rehearing Granted (February 17, 2017): The Petitioner requested a rehearing, which the Department of Real Estate granted. The Department’s order specifically requested a review of A.R.S. § 33-1250, with a focus on subsection (C)(4).

4. Rehearing (May 17, 2017): A rehearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. At this hearing, the Respondent raised a procedural question regarding the correct statutory subsection for review, leading to a temporary order holding the record open until May 24, 2017, for clarification.

5. ALJ Decision (June 2, 2017): Judge Marwil issued a decision finding that the Respondent had committed a statutory violation.

6. Final Order (June 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s decision and issued a Final Order making the decision binding.

III. The Core Dispute: The Two-Ballot System

The parties stipulated that two different ballots were used for the March 14, 2016, board election, which had seven open positions. The key differences are outlined below.

Feature

Mail Ballot (Absentee)

Meeting Ballot (In-Person)

“Mail Ballot”

“Ballot”

Candidates Listed

Six names

Seven names (added Eric Thompson)

Write-in Option

Included a blank line for a write-in candidate

No space provided for write-in candidates

Distribution

Distributed at least seven days before the meeting

Handed out to members attending the meeting

Return Deadline

Specified the date by which it had to be returned

Did not specify when it needed to be returned

IV. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner’s Position (Paul Gounder)

• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2): The addition of Eric Thompson’s name to the meeting ballot deprived members who voted by mail of their right “to vote for or against each proposed action,” as they had no opportunity to vote for Mr. Thompson.

• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4): The meeting ballot violated this subsection because it was not mailed to all members at least seven days in advance of the meeting and did not provide a date by which it had to be received to be counted.

B. Respondent’s Position (Royal Riviera Condominium Association)

• No Violation: The statutes do not explicitly require the use of identical ballots for an election.

• Common Practice: It is a common practice for homeowners’ associations to use a different absentee ballot and meeting ballot.

• Mootness: The issue is moot because the Association had already held another election in 2017 and seated a new board, which included the Petitioner’s wife as a member.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

In her June 2, 2017 decision, ALJ Suzanne Marwil made the following key legal conclusions:

The ALJ found that the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots did violate this statute.

• Reasoning: Members who did not attend the meeting in person were not notified of Mr. Thompson’s willingness to run for the board. As a result, “these members did not have the opportunity to vote for him and hence were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot.”

• Clarification: The ruling explicitly states that this finding does not impose a requirement that all ballots must be identical; however, it establishes that “substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.”

The ALJ concluded that no violation of this subsection occurred.

• Reasoning: The Petitioner conceded that the absentee ballot itself complied with the statutory requirements (e.g., being mailed seven days in advance with a return-by date). The judge reasoned that a meeting ballot handed out in person would not need to contain this information if it were “substantively the same as the absentee ballot.” The legal problem arose not from a failure to mail the second ballot, but from the substantive difference between the two.

The ALJ determined that the matter was not rendered moot by the 2017 election and the seating of a new board. The Judge affirmed that the tribunal “can and does find that Respondent committed a statutory violation in the course of holding its 2016 election.”

VI. Final Order and Outcome

• ALJ Recommended Order (June 2, 2017):

◦ The Petitioner’s petition should be granted.

◦ The Respondent must reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee.

◦ No other relief was available to the Petitioner.

• Department of Real Estate Final Order (June 12, 2017):

◦ The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision.

◦ The Order is a final administrative action, effective immediately.

◦ The Royal Riviera Condominium Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

◦ The parties were notified that the Order could be appealed via a complaint for judicial review.

Study Guide – 17F-H1716002-REL

Study Guide: Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case Paul Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association, Case No. 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal documents.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information in the case documents.

1. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner, Paul Gounder, in his initial petition?

2. Describe the two different ballots used by the Royal Riviera Condominium Association for its March 14, 2016, board election.

3. What were the two primary legal arguments made by the Respondent, Royal Riviera Condominium Association, to defend its actions?

4. What was the initial outcome of the hearing held on October 17, 2016, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky?

5. What was Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil’s final conclusion regarding the alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)?

6. How did Judge Marwil explain her finding that A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4), which deals with ballot delivery timelines, was not violated?

7. How did the Respondent argue that the case was moot, and why did Judge Marwil reject this argument?

8. According to the Final Order issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, what specific relief was granted to the Petitioner?

9. What is the standard of proof in this matter, and which party has the burden of proof?

10. What specific action did the Department of Real Estate request be reviewed when it granted the request for a rehearing?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner, Paul Gounder, alleged that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and its own CC&Rs. The violation occurred by using two substantively different ballots for the election of Board members at the annual meeting on March 14, 2016.

2. The first ballot was an absentee “Mail Ballot” with six candidate names and a blank line for a write-in. The second ballot, handed out at the meeting, was titled “Ballot” and included the names of seven candidates (adding Eric Thompson) but had no space for a write-in candidate.

3. The Respondent argued that it committed no violation because the statutes do not explicitly require the use of identical ballots and that using different absentee and meeting ballots is common practice. It also maintained that the matter was moot because a new election had already occurred in 2017.

4. Following the initial hearing, Judge Diane Mihalsky recommended the dismissal of the Petition on October 18, 2016. She concluded that no statute or bylaw prevented the Respondent from adding the names of willing members to the ballot used at the annual election.

5. Judge Suzanne Marwil found that the use of two substantively different ballots did violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2). Because members voting by mail were not informed of Eric Thompson’s candidacy, they were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action.

6. Judge Marwil concluded A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4) was not violated because the absentee ballot itself complied with the statute’s requirements for delivery timelines. She reasoned that a meeting ballot would not need to meet these requirements if it were substantively the same as the compliant absentee ballot; the problem arose only because the ballots were different.

7. The Respondent argued the case was moot because a new board had been seated in a 2017 election. Judge Marwil rejected this, stating that the fact a new board is seated does not prevent an Administrative Law Judge from finding that a statutory violation occurred in a past election.

8. The Final Order, issued by Commissioner Judy Lowe on June 12, 2017, granted the Petitioner’s petition. It ordered the Respondent to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

9. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” as stated in A.A.C. R2-19-119(A). Pursuant to A.A.C. R2-19-119(B), the Petitioner has the burden of proof in the matter.

10. In its February 17, 2017, Order Granting Request for Rehearing, the Department of Real Estate specifically requested a review of A.R.S. § 33-1250, and in particular, A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal findings and recommendations. In this case, Diane Mihalsky and Suzanne Marwil served as ALJs.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified collection of laws for the state of Arizona. This case centered on the interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1250.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (the Department)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona. It granted the rehearing and accepted the final ALJ decision.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or condominium. The Petitioner alleged the Respondent violated Article VII of its CC&Rs.

Final Order

The concluding and binding decision in an administrative case. In this matter, the Final Order was issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on June 12, 2017, accepting the ALJ’s decision.

A legal term for a matter that is no longer in controversy or has become irrelevant. The Respondent unsuccessfully argued the case was moot because a subsequent election had been held.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency that conducts administrative hearings for other state agencies. The Department of Real Estate referred this case to the OAH for a hearing.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, the Petitioner was Paul Gounder.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It means the party with the burden of proof must convince the judge that there is a greater than 50% chance that their claim is true.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to review the decision made in the first hearing. The Petitioner requested and was granted a rehearing after the initial recommendation to dismiss his petition.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Royal Riviera Condominium Association.

Blog Post – 17F-H1716002-REL

Your HOA’s Election Rules Might Be Unfair. This Court Case Explains Why.

Introduction: The Devil in the Details

Living in a community governed by a Homeowners’ Association (HOA) often means navigating a complex web of rules, regulations, and procedures. While most are designed to maintain property values and community standards, the enforcement of these rules can sometimes feel arbitrary. But what happens when the very process for electing the board that enforces those rules is flawed?

A fascinating legal challenge demonstrates that even a single, seemingly minor discrepancy in an HOA election can have significant consequences. But the victory was anything but certain. In the case of Paul Gounder versus the Royal Riviera Condominium Association, the homeowner’s initial petition was actually recommended for dismissal by the first judge. It was only through persistence—requesting a rehearing—that the homeowner ultimately prevailed. This case serves as a powerful real-world example of why procedural fairness in community governance is not just important—it’s legally required—and reveals several surprising lessons for any homeowner who values a fair and transparent election process.

Takeaway 1: “Common Practice” Isn’t a Legal Defense

When challenged on its election procedures, the Royal Riviera Condominium Association’s defense was simple: it was merely following “common practice.” The board argued that many HOAs use a different absentee and in-person ballot, so they had done nothing wrong. However, the Administrative Law Judge disregarded this argument entirely, focusing instead on the explicit requirements of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2). This decision provides a crucial lesson for all homeowners: an association’s internal habits or traditions do not override clear legal statutes. If a state law or the community’s own governing documents dictate a specific procedure, the HOA must follow it, regardless of what other associations might be doing. This empowers homeowners by showing that the law, not just internal tradition, is the ultimate authority governing their association’s actions.

Takeaway 2: A “Small” Change Can Invalidate an Election

The dispute in the March 14, 2016 election centered on two different ballots used for the same board election. The mail-in ballot, sent to members voting absentee, listed six names and included a blank line for a write-in candidate. The in-person ballot, distributed to members at the meeting, listed seven names—adding candidate Eric Thompson—and provided no space for write-ins. This difference was not seen as a minor error but as a “substantive” change that fundamentally altered the election. The judge reasoned that members who voted by mail “did not have the opportunity to vote for him and hence were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot.”

The judge made a critical distinction about what constitutes a fair process, clarifying that the issue wasn’t about perfection, but equality of opportunity.

Finding this violation does not impose a requirement that ballots be identical; it simply states that substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.

This point is not about minor cosmetic differences like fonts or paper color. It’s about ensuring every single voting member has the exact same set of choices. Adding or removing a candidate on one version of a ballot creates two different elections, disenfranchising one group of voters. This ruling affirms that a fair election requires that all members have an equal opportunity to vote on all candidates and measures.

Takeaway 3: Accountability Matters, Even After the Fact

The association attempted to have the case dismissed by arguing that the issue was “moot.” Because a new election had already been held in 2017 and a new board was in place, the HOA claimed the flawed 2016 election no longer mattered. The Administrative Law Judge explicitly rejected this argument. The decision stated that “the fact that a new board is currently seated does not render the matter moot as the Administrative Law Judge can and does find that Respondent committed a statutory violation in the course of holding its 2016 election.” The final order granted the homeowner’s petition and required the Royal Riviera Condominium Association to reimburse his $500.00 filing fee. This is an impactful takeaway for any homeowner who feels it’s too late to act. It demonstrates that an HOA can be held legally accountable for past procedural violations, establishing an important precedent for the community and putting the board on notice for future conduct.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Power

The case of Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association is a powerful reminder that procedural fairness, strict adherence to legal statutes, and the vigilance of individual homeowners are essential checks on the power of an HOA board. The core lesson is clear: seemingly small details in an election process can have major legal consequences. Homeowners who take the time to understand the specific laws and bylaws governing their community can successfully challenge their associations. But this case also teaches a deeper lesson about perseverance. Faced with an initial recommendation for dismissal, the homeowner could have given up. Instead, he challenged the ruling and won on rehearing, proving that knowledge combined with conviction is a powerful force for ensuring the principles of fairness and equality are upheld.

Does your own community’s voting process ensure every member has an equal voice, and would it stand up to this kind of scrutiny?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Paul Gounder (petitioner)
Frederick C. Zehm (witness)
Royal Riviera Condominium Association member
Testified for Petitioner
Marlys Kleck (witness)
Royal Riviera Condominium Association member
Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

Mark Kristopher Sahl (HOA attorney)
Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen PLC
Dan Peterson (property manager)
Owner of Respondent's management company

Neutral Parties

Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
Presided over initial hearing
Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
Presided over rehearing
Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Abby Hansen (ADRE staff/HOA Coordinator)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Also listed as AHansen
LDettorre (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
djones (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
jmarshall (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
ncano (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
M. Aguirre (staff)
Transmitted order

Other Participants

Eric Thompson (member/candidate)
Candidate added to meeting ballot
Al DeFalco (member/candidate)
Nominated from the floor

Paul Gounder vs. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Posted on October 18, 2016 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1716002-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-06-12
Administrative Law Judge	Suzanne Marwil
Outcome	partial
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Paul Gounder	Counsel	—
Respondent	Royal Riviera Condominium Association	Counsel	Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner achieved a partial win. The Respondent HOA was found to have violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using substantively different ballots which impaired the voting rights of absentee members. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee, but no other relief was granted.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Key Issues & Findings

Denial of right to vote for or against each proposed action due to substantively different ballots.

The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using two substantively different ballots for the 2016 election. The meeting ballot included a seventh candidate whose name was not on the mail-in ballot, denying members who did not attend the meeting the opportunity to vote for or against all proposed candidates.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition is granted. Respondent must reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days. No other relief is available to Petitioner.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Absentee Ballot Requirements (Received-by date and advance delivery)

The ALJ concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4). While the meeting ballot lacked the statutory requirements listed in C(4), those requirements apply primarily to absentee ballots, and a meeting ballot does not need to comply if it is substantively the same as the compliant absentee ballot.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Absentee Voting, Ballot Differences, Statutory Violation, Condominium Association, Filing Fee Refund

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
Section 10-3708

Decision Documents

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 564851.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:06 (44.2 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 567887.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:07 (79.0 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 575055.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:07 (689.5 KB)

Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716002-REL

Briefing Document: Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview and Background

This matter was brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Petitioner: Paul Gounder, a condominium owner and member of the Association.

• Respondent: Royal Riviera Condominium Association, a homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 32 condominiums.

• Initial Petition: Filed on or about June 23, 2016.

• Core Allegation: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and its own CC&Rs by using two substantively different ballots to elect Board members at its March 14, 2016, annual meeting.

II. Procedural History

1. Initial Hearing (October 17, 2016): A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

2. Recommended Dismissal (October 18, 2016): Judge Mihalsky recommended the petition be dismissed, concluding:

5. ALJ Decision (June 2, 2017): Judge Marwil issued a decision finding that the Respondent had committed a statutory violation.

6. Final Order (June 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s decision and issued a Final Order making the decision binding.

III. The Core Dispute: The Two-Ballot System

The parties stipulated that two different ballots were used for the March 14, 2016, board election, which had seven open positions. The key differences are outlined below.

Feature

Mail Ballot (Absentee)

Meeting Ballot (In-Person)

“Mail Ballot”

“Ballot”

Candidates Listed

Six names

Seven names (added Eric Thompson)

Write-in Option

Included a blank line for a write-in candidate

No space provided for write-in candidates

Distribution

Distributed at least seven days before the meeting

Handed out to members attending the meeting

Return Deadline

Specified the date by which it had to be returned

Did not specify when it needed to be returned

IV. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner’s Position (Paul Gounder)

B. Respondent’s Position (Royal Riviera Condominium Association)

• No Violation: The statutes do not explicitly require the use of identical ballots for an election.

• Common Practice: It is a common practice for homeowners’ associations to use a different absentee ballot and meeting ballot.

• Mootness: The issue is moot because the Association had already held another election in 2017 and seated a new board, which included the Petitioner’s wife as a member.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

In her June 2, 2017 decision, ALJ Suzanne Marwil made the following key legal conclusions:

The ALJ found that the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots did violate this statute.

The ALJ concluded that no violation of this subsection occurred.

VI. Final Order and Outcome

• ALJ Recommended Order (June 2, 2017):

◦ The Petitioner’s petition should be granted.

◦ The Respondent must reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee.

◦ No other relief was available to the Petitioner.

• Department of Real Estate Final Order (June 12, 2017):

◦ The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision.

◦ The Order is a final administrative action, effective immediately.

◦ The Royal Riviera Condominium Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

◦ The parties were notified that the Order could be appealed via a complaint for judicial review.

Paul Gounder vs. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Posted on October 18, 2016 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1716002-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-06-12
Administrative Law Judge	Suzanne Marwil
Outcome	partial
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Paul Gounder	Counsel	—
Respondent	Royal Riviera Condominium Association	Counsel	Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)

Outcome Summary

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Key Issues & Findings

Denial of right to vote for or against each proposed action due to substantively different ballots.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition is granted. Respondent must reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days. No other relief is available to Petitioner.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Absentee Ballot Requirements (Received-by date and advance delivery)

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Absentee Voting, Ballot Differences, Statutory Violation, Condominium Association, Filing Fee Refund

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
Section 10-3708

Decision Documents

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 564851.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:38 (44.2 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 567887.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:39 (79.0 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 575055.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:40 (689.5 KB)

Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716002-REL

Briefing Document: Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview and Background

This matter was brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Petitioner: Paul Gounder, a condominium owner and member of the Association.

• Respondent: Royal Riviera Condominium Association, a homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 32 condominiums.

• Initial Petition: Filed on or about June 23, 2016.

• Core Allegation: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and its own CC&Rs by using two substantively different ballots to elect Board members at its March 14, 2016, annual meeting.

II. Procedural History

1. Initial Hearing (October 17, 2016): A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

2. Recommended Dismissal (October 18, 2016): Judge Mihalsky recommended the petition be dismissed, concluding:

5. ALJ Decision (June 2, 2017): Judge Marwil issued a decision finding that the Respondent had committed a statutory violation.

6. Final Order (June 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s decision and issued a Final Order making the decision binding.

III. The Core Dispute: The Two-Ballot System

The parties stipulated that two different ballots were used for the March 14, 2016, board election, which had seven open positions. The key differences are outlined below.

Feature

Mail Ballot (Absentee)

Meeting Ballot (In-Person)

“Mail Ballot”

“Ballot”

Candidates Listed

Six names

Seven names (added Eric Thompson)

Write-in Option

Included a blank line for a write-in candidate

No space provided for write-in candidates

Distribution

Distributed at least seven days before the meeting

Handed out to members attending the meeting

Return Deadline

Specified the date by which it had to be returned

Did not specify when it needed to be returned

IV. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner’s Position (Paul Gounder)

B. Respondent’s Position (Royal Riviera Condominium Association)

• No Violation: The statutes do not explicitly require the use of identical ballots for an election.

• Common Practice: It is a common practice for homeowners’ associations to use a different absentee ballot and meeting ballot.

• Mootness: The issue is moot because the Association had already held another election in 2017 and seated a new board, which included the Petitioner’s wife as a member.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

In her June 2, 2017 decision, ALJ Suzanne Marwil made the following key legal conclusions:

The ALJ found that the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots did violate this statute.

The ALJ concluded that no violation of this subsection occurred.

VI. Final Order and Outcome

• ALJ Recommended Order (June 2, 2017):

◦ The Petitioner’s petition should be granted.

◦ The Respondent must reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee.

◦ No other relief was available to the Petitioner.

• Department of Real Estate Final Order (June 12, 2017):

◦ The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision.

◦ The Order is a final administrative action, effective immediately.

◦ The Royal Riviera Condominium Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

◦ The parties were notified that the Order could be appealed via a complaint for judicial review.

Paul Gounder vs. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Posted on October 18, 2016 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1716002-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-06-12
Administrative Law Judge	Suzanne Marwil
Outcome	partial
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Paul Gounder	Counsel	—
Respondent	Royal Riviera Condominium Association	Counsel	Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)

Outcome Summary

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Key Issues & Findings

Denial of right to vote for or against each proposed action due to substantively different ballots.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition is granted. Respondent must reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days. No other relief is available to Petitioner.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Absentee Ballot Requirements (Received-by date and advance delivery)

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Absentee Voting, Ballot Differences, Statutory Violation, Condominium Association, Filing Fee Refund

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
Section 10-3708

Decision Documents

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 564851.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:33 (44.2 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 567887.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:34 (79.0 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 575055.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:34 (689.5 KB)

Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716002-REL

Briefing Document: Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview and Background

This matter was brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Petitioner: Paul Gounder, a condominium owner and member of the Association.

• Respondent: Royal Riviera Condominium Association, a homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 32 condominiums.

• Initial Petition: Filed on or about June 23, 2016.

• Core Allegation: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and its own CC&Rs by using two substantively different ballots to elect Board members at its March 14, 2016, annual meeting.

II. Procedural History

1. Initial Hearing (October 17, 2016): A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

2. Recommended Dismissal (October 18, 2016): Judge Mihalsky recommended the petition be dismissed, concluding:

5. ALJ Decision (June 2, 2017): Judge Marwil issued a decision finding that the Respondent had committed a statutory violation.

6. Final Order (June 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s decision and issued a Final Order making the decision binding.

III. The Core Dispute: The Two-Ballot System

The parties stipulated that two different ballots were used for the March 14, 2016, board election, which had seven open positions. The key differences are outlined below.

Feature

Mail Ballot (Absentee)

Meeting Ballot (In-Person)

“Mail Ballot”

“Ballot”

Candidates Listed

Six names

Seven names (added Eric Thompson)

Write-in Option

Included a blank line for a write-in candidate

No space provided for write-in candidates

Distribution

Distributed at least seven days before the meeting

Handed out to members attending the meeting

Return Deadline

Specified the date by which it had to be returned

Did not specify when it needed to be returned

IV. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner’s Position (Paul Gounder)

B. Respondent’s Position (Royal Riviera Condominium Association)

• No Violation: The statutes do not explicitly require the use of identical ballots for an election.

• Common Practice: It is a common practice for homeowners’ associations to use a different absentee ballot and meeting ballot.

• Mootness: The issue is moot because the Association had already held another election in 2017 and seated a new board, which included the Petitioner’s wife as a member.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

In her June 2, 2017 decision, ALJ Suzanne Marwil made the following key legal conclusions:

The ALJ found that the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots did violate this statute.

The ALJ concluded that no violation of this subsection occurred.

VI. Final Order and Outcome

• ALJ Recommended Order (June 2, 2017):

◦ The Petitioner’s petition should be granted.

◦ The Respondent must reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee.

◦ No other relief was available to the Petitioner.

• Department of Real Estate Final Order (June 12, 2017):

◦ The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision.

◦ The Order is a final administrative action, effective immediately.

◦ The Royal Riviera Condominium Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

◦ The parties were notified that the Order could be appealed via a complaint for judicial review.

Kristi Hillebrand vs. Camelback Garden Farms Homeowners Association

Posted on September 30, 2016 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	16F-H1616009-BFS/REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2016-09-30
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	no
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Kristi Hillebrand	Counsel	Mark J. Bainbridge
Respondent	Camelback Garden Farms Homeowners Association	Counsel	Mark E. Lines

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1812
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. § 33-1805
CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated statutes or governing documents regarding election procedures, open meeting notices, or records requests. The ALJ accepted the Association's interpretation of election notice requirements as reasonable and found evidence of proper meeting notices and records production.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish violations by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Election Procedures (Write-in Candidates and Quorum)

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated election procedures by refusing floor nominations/write-ins and failing to have a quorum. The ALJ found the HOA's interpretation of notice statutes to preclude floor nominations was reasonable and that Petitioner failed to prove the election was improper.

Orders: Dismissed

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1812

Open Meeting Law (Notice)

Petitioner alleged the Board held meetings without proper notice. The ALJ found that the Board had adopted reasonable procedures for noticing meetings and credited testimony/evidence that notices were sent.

Orders: Dismissed

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Records Request

Petitioner alleged the HOA withheld documents including emails and payment ledgers. The ALJ found Respondent provided all responsive records in its possession and that requested personal financial info of members was exempt.

Orders: Dismissed

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Enforcement of RV Parking Restrictions

Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to enforce RV parking rules. This claim was dismissed prior to hearing based on a previous settlement agreement between the parties.

Orders: Dismissed prior to hearing

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Decision Documents

16F-H1616009-BFS Decision – 520854.pdf

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16F-H1616009-BFS Decision – 528135.pdf

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**Case Summary: 16F-H1616009-BFS**
**Kristi Hillebrand v. Camelback Garden Farms Homeowners Association**

**Overview**
This administrative hearing addressed a petition filed by homeowner Kristi Hillebrand (Petitioner) against the Camelback Garden Farms Homeowners Association (Respondent). The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Diane Mihalsky on July 29 and September 26, 2016. The Petitioner alleged violations of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), bylaws, and Arizona statutes regarding election irregularities, open meeting laws, and records requests.

**Key Facts and Proceedings**
The Petitioner filed her complaint on March 21, 2016. Prior to the hearing, the ALJ dismissed a claim regarding RV parking enforcement because the issue had been resolved in a previous Superior Court settlement. The hearing proceeded on three remaining claims:
1. **Election Procedures:** The Petitioner attempted to run for the Board as a write-in candidate/floor nominee during the February 20, 2016, annual meeting but was denied,. She also argued the election lacked a quorum because the HOA counted votes from members who were delinquent in their dues,.
2. **Open Meeting Law:** The Petitioner alleged the Board held meetings without proper notice to the membership,.
3. **Records Requests:** The Petitioner claimed the Respondent failed to provide all responsive documents, specifically seeking a ledger showing which members had paid assessments,.

**Arguments and Legal Analysis**
The ALJ ruled in favor of the Respondent on all counts, finding the Petitioner failed to prove violations by a preponderance of the evidence,.

* **Election Validity:** The Respondent argued that Arizona law requires candidate names to be listed on ballots before mailing, prohibiting floor nominations. The ALJ found this interpretation reasonable, noting that no statute, CC&R, or bylaw explicitly authorized write-ins or floor nominations. regarding the quorum, the ALJ determined that no governing document prohibited members with delinquent assessments from voting; therefore, the Petitioner did not prove the election results were invalid,.

* **Open Meetings:** The Petitioner and witnesses testified they did not receive notice of specific Board meetings. The ALJ found that the January 9 meeting was properly held as an executive session to discuss candidate qualifications. regarding open sessions, the Respondent provided affidavits proving notices were emailed and posted,. The ALJ cited A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), which states that a member's failure to receive actual notice does not invalidate actions taken at a meeting.

* **Records Access:** The Respondent testified that it produced all existing responsive records, including ballots and bank information,. The ALJ accepted testimony that the specific "QuickBooks spreadsheet" requested by the Petitioner did not exist

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Kristi Hillebrand (petitioner)
Camelback Garden Farms HOA member
Homeowner and member
Mark J. Bainbridge (attorney)
The Bainbridge Law Firm, LLC
Louise Vaccaro (witness)
Former Board Member
Called by Petitioner; resigned from board Jan 7, 2016
Greg Josey (witness)
Camelback Garden Farms HOA member
Called by Petitioner
Mary Ellen Kunz (witness)
Camelback Garden Farms HOA member
Called by Petitioner

Respondent Side

Mark E. Lines (attorney)
Shaw & Lines, LLC
Neil Stafford (witness)
Board Member
Referred to as Dr. Stafford; called by Respondent
Kathy Loscheider (witness)
Former Board Member
Served as secretary until Feb 20, 2016; called by Respondent
Aaron Chournos (board member)
Former Board President
Did not testify; resigned prior to hearing
Daniel Shuler (board member)
Mentioned in minutes
Alice Thomas (board member)
Elected Feb 2016
Becky Bernal (board member)
Elected Feb 2016
Melissa Cruz (board member)
Appointed to fill vacancy Feb 2016

Neutral Parties

Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe (agency official)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Commissioner
Louis Dettorre (agency official)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Deputy Commissioner
Greg Hanchett (agency official)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Interim Director; signed Certification of Decision
Rosella J. Rodriguez (staff)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Mailed/processed the certification

David Carr vs. Sunset Plaza Condominium Association

Posted on September 9, 2016 by jeremy@yourazhoaattorney.com

Case Summary

Case ID	16F-H1616011-BFS
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2016-09-09
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	David Carr	Counsel	—
Respondent	Sunset Plaza Condo Association	Counsel	Paige Hulton

Alleged Violations

Article VI, Section 2 of By-Laws

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Association did not violate the By-Laws regarding the special meeting request and that the homeowners' attempted amendments were invalid because authority to amend rests with the Board.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove a violation of the By-Laws; the Board had authority to set the meeting schedule and the governing documents did not grant homeowners the power to amend By-Laws without Board action.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to call special meeting and recognize amendments

Petitioner alleged the HOA Board violated the By-Laws by denying a request for a special meeting and refusing to adopt amendments passed by homeowners at a meeting they organized themselves.

Orders: Petition dismissed. Respondent deemed prevailing party. Respondent's request for civil penalty against Petitioner denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Decision Documents

16F-H1616011-BFS Decision – 517259.pdf

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16F-H1616011-BFS Decision – 517327.pdf

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16F-H1616011-BFS Decision – 525294.pdf

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**Case Title:** *David Carr vs. Sunset Plaza Condo Association* (No. 16F-H1616011-BFS)

**Hearing Proceedings**
The hearing was conducted on August 23, 2016, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden at the Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix, Arizona,. The matter was under the jurisdiction of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

**Key Facts**
Petitioner David Carr alleged that the Respondent, Sunset Plaza Condo Association, violated Article VI, Section 2 of the Association’s By-Laws. The dispute originated when six homeowners submitted a written request for a special meeting to be held on February 13, 2016, or if that date was unacceptable, within thirty days.

The Board denied the request for the February 13 date, noting that an open meeting was already scheduled for February 22, 2016, at which homeowners could discuss agenda items. Despite the Board's decision, nine homeowners gathered on February 13 for what they deemed a special meeting and voted to approve revisions to the By-Laws and Rules. The Board refused to incorporate these changes, prompting Carr to file the petition,.

**Main Issues and Arguments**
The primary legal issues were whether the Board violated the By-Laws by failing to schedule the requested special meeting and whether the homeowners had the authority to amend governing documents unilaterally.

* **Petitioner’s Argument:** Carr argued that the Board violated the By-Laws and that a conflict existed between the By-Laws and the Declaration, asserting the Declaration was controlling,. He sought an order compelling the Association to adopt the amendments passed on February 13.
* **Respondent’s Argument:** The Association contended that Carr attempted to amend the By-Laws by improper means and requested that Carr be assessed a civil penalty for filing a frivolous petition.

**Legal Analysis and Findings**
The ALJ applied the standard of preponderance of the evidence.

1. **Alleged By-Law Violation:** The ALJ found the Board did not violate Article VI, Section 2. The homeowners' written request explicitly permitted the meeting to be held within thirty days of February 13. By providing a meeting on February 22, the Board acted within the timeframe requested.
2. **Authority to Amend:** The ALJ determined there was no conflict between the governing documents. The By-Laws and Declaration vest the authority to amend rules and by-laws in the Board, not the homeowners. While rule amendments require homeowner approval to become binding, the initiation and adoption process lies with the Board,. Consequently, the homeowners lacked the authority to validly amend the documents at their February 13 meeting.

**Outcome and Final Decision**
The ALJ ordered the dismissal of David Carr's petition, ruling that he failed to provide substantial evidence to support his claims,. The Association was deemed the prevailing party.

Regarding the Respondent's request for sanctions, the ALJ denied the civil penalty against Carr. The judge reasoned that although Carr had misconstrued the condominium documents, the Association failed to demonstrate that he had actually violated them.

The decision was certified as the final administrative decision of the Department of Real Estate on October 26, 2016.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

David Carr (petitioner)
Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

Paige Hulton (attorney)
Mulcahy Law Firm, PC
Attorney for Respondent at hearing
Beth Mulcahy (attorney)
Mulcahy Law Firm, PC
Listed on mailing list for final certification

Neutral Parties

Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Presiding Administrative Law Judge
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of decision
Greg Hanchett (Interim Director)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Certified the decision
Rosella J. Rodriguez (clerk)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Processed mailing of certification

Other Participants

Leslie Grant (homeowner)
Wrote letters regarding special meeting; provided replacement ballot

Case Summary

Parties & Counsel

Alleged Violations

Outcome Summary

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Analytics Highlights

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Final Administrative Disposition

Study Guide: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer Key

Suggested Essay Questions

Glossary of Key Terms

How a $660 Fee Sparked a Legal Showdown: 5 Surprising Lessons from a Homeowner vs. HOA Dispute

1. A Simple Label Can Ignite a Legal Firestorm

2. In the Eyes of the Law, Substance Can Trump Form

3. You Can Lose the Battle but Win the War

4. The ‘Burden of Proof’ Is More Than Just a Phrase

5. A Small Contradiction Can Damage Credibility

Conclusion: The Devil Is in the Details

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Respondent Side

Neutral Parties

Case Summary

Parties & Counsel

Alleged Violations

Outcome Summary

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Analytics Highlights

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Final Administrative Disposition

Case Summary

Parties & Counsel

Alleged Violations

Outcome Summary

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Analytics Highlights

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary