James and Shawna Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corp

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-12-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome no_win
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner James and Shawna Larson Counsel Lisa M. Hanger
Respondent Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1255(C); CC&R Sections 9 and 9(b)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the Petitioners' complaint, ruling that the HOA acted reasonably and within its authority under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 33-1255(C) by requiring homeowners to remove their limited common element patio covers for necessary maintenance and requiring the homeowners to bear the associated cost.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Respondent HOA committed a violation of the condominium documents or statutes.

Key Issues & Findings

Authority of HOA to require removal of a limited common element (patio cover) for maintenance and allocation of associated costs.

Petitioners alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by mandating the removal of their patio cover at their expense to facilitate building painting. The ALJ found the HOA's proposed plan was reasonable and authorized by CC&R Sections 9 and 9(b), and that Petitioners, under A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), must bear the cost of removing and reinstalling the limited common element.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is dismissed. Respondent Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation is deemed to be the prevailing party. Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove and reinstall their patio cover.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
  • CC&R Section 9
  • CC&R Section 9(b)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Authority, Limited Common Element, Maintenance Costs, CC&R Interpretation, Patio Cover Removal
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1806(E)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717038-REL-RHG Decision – 605540.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:47 (105.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG


Briefing on Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowners James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (the “Respondent” or “HOA”). The core conflict centered on the HOA’s directive that the Larsons remove their wooden patio cover at their own expense to facilitate a community-wide building repair and painting project.

The case progressed through two distinct phases. Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended dismissing the Larsons’ petition for a lack of a “justiciable controversy,” reasoning that the HOA had not yet acted on its threat to remove the patio cover, rendering the dispute speculative. However, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate rejected this recommendation, finding the matter was “ripe for adjudication,” and ordered a full hearing on the merits.

In the final decision, a second ALJ dismissed the Larsons’ petition and ruled in favor of the HOA. The judge found the HOA’s plan to be reasonable and necessary for the proper and safe completion of the project, based on credible testimony from the project manager. The decision affirmed the HOA’s authority under its CC&Rs to require the removal of the structure. Crucially, the ruling established that the patio cover is a “limited common element” under Arizona law. Consequently, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the homeowners (the Larsons) are exclusively responsible for all costs associated with it, including its removal and potential reinstallation.

Procedural History and Jurisdictional Rulings

Initial Petition and Dismissal Recommendation

On June 16, 2017, James and Shawna Larson filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate against their HOA, alleging a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). However, the initial filing did not specify which provisions had been violated.

Upon inquiry, the Petitioners’ counsel admitted via email that no specific provision of the CC&Rs had yet been violated. Instead, their concern was that section 10(a) would be violated if the HOA acted on its threat to forcibly remove their patio cover and charge them for the cost.

This led to the “ORDER RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY,” issued on August 25, 2017, by Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. The key findings of this order were:

Speculative Harm: The Judge found that the HOA’s actions “have not yet been undertaken and our [are] speculative at this juncture.”

Lack of Jurisdiction: The order stated that the Office of Administrative Hearings’ jurisdiction, per A.R.S. § 32-2199, is limited to adjudicating existing violations of community documents, not potential future ones.

Misunderstanding by Both Parties: The order noted, “Both parties fundamentally misunderstand the limits of this Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” The Petitioners were seeking a ruling on a future action, while the Respondent was urging the Tribunal to find the Petitioners had violated the CC&Rs, which was not the subject of the petition.

Recommended Forum: The Judge suggested that the appropriate forum for the Petitioners would be a declaratory judgment action in superior court.

Rejection of Dismissal and Re-Hearing

On August 31, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued an “ORDER REJECTING RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.”

• The Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s finding that the matter lacked a justiciable controversy.

• The order cited a letter from the Respondent dated June 1, 2017, which posed the question: “Is the presence of the awning a violation of the Association’s governing documents?”

• This question was deemed sufficient to make the matter “ripe for adjudication.”

• The Commissioner requested that the hearing be rescheduled for a ruling on the matter. A re-hearing was subsequently conducted on November 20, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

Analysis of the Merits of the Dispute

The re-hearing focused on the substantive conflict: whether the HOA had the authority to compel the Larsons to remove their patio cover at their own expense for the maintenance project.

Respondent’s (HOA) Case

The HOA, consisting of 169 units, initiated a project to make necessary repairs to its twenty-five buildings and then have them painted. The HOA’s position was based on the following points:

Legal Authority: The HOA asserted its authority under sections 9 and 9(b) of its CC&Rs, which state that the HOA is responsible for maintaining building exteriors and that “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep of the… [building] exteriors… shall be taken by the [Respondent].”

Project Necessity: The project manager, Wayne King, provided testimony that the HOA’s board deemed credible and reasonable.

Safety: King stated that all five bidding contractors required the patio covers to be removed to ensure a safe work environment as mandated by the Arizona Department of Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA).

Logistics: Standard scaffolding would not fit without removing the covers, commercial scaffolding would not provide full access, a forklift was not viable due to overhead power lines, and allowing painters to walk on homeowner patio covers was unsafe.

Quality of Work: The project involved sanding, power washing, and patching before painting to “do the job right.” Many covers had been improperly flashed, causing damage to the buildings that needed repair.

Warranty: The paint company would not provide a warranty for the project if individual homeowners, such as the Larsons, were permitted to paint their own units.

Petitioners’ (Larsons’) Case

The Larsons, who purchased their unit in 1999 with the wooden patio cover already in place, contested the HOA’s demands.

Challenge to Authority: The Petitioners argued that the HOA had no legal authority to demand the removal of their patio cover.

Unreasonable Cost: They asserted that the cost of removal and reinstallation was unreasonable, submitting two bids:

◦ One bid quoted $1,250 to remove and dispose of the cover and $3,980 to remove and rebuild it with new wood.

◦ A second bid quoted $5,975 to remove and then replace the structure.

Proposed Alternative: In a letter dated May 19, 2017, the Larsons offered to have the back of their unit painted at their own expense.

Compromise Offer: During the November 20, 2017 hearing, after hearing the project manager’s testimony, Ms. Larson offered that they would agree not to reinstall the patio cover if the HOA would pay for its removal.

Final Administrative Law Judge Decision

On December 11, 2017, ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a final decision dismissing the Larsons’ petition and finding in favor of the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation.

Key Findings and Conclusions of Law

Finding/Conclusion

Details

Standard of Review

The HOA’s decisions regarding maintenance and repair are given deference, provided they act reasonably.

Reasonableness of HOA Action

Based on the “credible testimony” of Wayne King, the Judge found that the HOA’s proposed plan for repairing and painting the buildings, which required the removal of patio covers, was reasonable.

HOA Authority

CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) were found to be “sufficient to show that Respondent has the authority to remove Petitioners’ patio to complete the painting work.”

Patio Cover Classification

The Petitioners’ patio cover was legally classified as a “limited common element” within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4).

Cost Responsibility

The central issue of payment was decided by statute. The Judge concluded that under a “reasonable reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C),” any common expense associated with a limited common element “shall be assessed exclusively against the units benefitted.”

Final Order

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

“The evidence of record supports a conclusion that Respondent has authority to require Petitioners to remove their patio cover to allow the building to be properly and safely painted, and that Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.”

The final order was that the Petitioners’ petition be dismissed, and the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party.


James and Shawna Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corp

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-12-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome no_win
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner James and Shawna Larson Counsel Lisa M. Hanger
Respondent Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1255(C); CC&R Sections 9 and 9(b)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the Petitioners' complaint, ruling that the HOA acted reasonably and within its authority under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 33-1255(C) by requiring homeowners to remove their limited common element patio covers for necessary maintenance and requiring the homeowners to bear the associated cost.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Respondent HOA committed a violation of the condominium documents or statutes.

Key Issues & Findings

Authority of HOA to require removal of a limited common element (patio cover) for maintenance and allocation of associated costs.

Petitioners alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by mandating the removal of their patio cover at their expense to facilitate building painting. The ALJ found the HOA's proposed plan was reasonable and authorized by CC&R Sections 9 and 9(b), and that Petitioners, under A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), must bear the cost of removing and reinstalling the limited common element.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is dismissed. Respondent Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation is deemed to be the prevailing party. Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove and reinstall their patio cover.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
  • CC&R Section 9
  • CC&R Section 9(b)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Authority, Limited Common Element, Maintenance Costs, CC&R Interpretation, Patio Cover Removal
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1806(E)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717038-REL-RHG Decision – 605540.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:58:20 (105.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG


Briefing on Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowners James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (the “Respondent” or “HOA”). The core conflict centered on the HOA’s directive that the Larsons remove their wooden patio cover at their own expense to facilitate a community-wide building repair and painting project.

The case progressed through two distinct phases. Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended dismissing the Larsons’ petition for a lack of a “justiciable controversy,” reasoning that the HOA had not yet acted on its threat to remove the patio cover, rendering the dispute speculative. However, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate rejected this recommendation, finding the matter was “ripe for adjudication,” and ordered a full hearing on the merits.

In the final decision, a second ALJ dismissed the Larsons’ petition and ruled in favor of the HOA. The judge found the HOA’s plan to be reasonable and necessary for the proper and safe completion of the project, based on credible testimony from the project manager. The decision affirmed the HOA’s authority under its CC&Rs to require the removal of the structure. Crucially, the ruling established that the patio cover is a “limited common element” under Arizona law. Consequently, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the homeowners (the Larsons) are exclusively responsible for all costs associated with it, including its removal and potential reinstallation.

Procedural History and Jurisdictional Rulings

Initial Petition and Dismissal Recommendation

On June 16, 2017, James and Shawna Larson filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate against their HOA, alleging a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). However, the initial filing did not specify which provisions had been violated.

Upon inquiry, the Petitioners’ counsel admitted via email that no specific provision of the CC&Rs had yet been violated. Instead, their concern was that section 10(a) would be violated if the HOA acted on its threat to forcibly remove their patio cover and charge them for the cost.

This led to the “ORDER RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY,” issued on August 25, 2017, by Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. The key findings of this order were:

Speculative Harm: The Judge found that the HOA’s actions “have not yet been undertaken and our [are] speculative at this juncture.”

Lack of Jurisdiction: The order stated that the Office of Administrative Hearings’ jurisdiction, per A.R.S. § 32-2199, is limited to adjudicating existing violations of community documents, not potential future ones.

Misunderstanding by Both Parties: The order noted, “Both parties fundamentally misunderstand the limits of this Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” The Petitioners were seeking a ruling on a future action, while the Respondent was urging the Tribunal to find the Petitioners had violated the CC&Rs, which was not the subject of the petition.

Recommended Forum: The Judge suggested that the appropriate forum for the Petitioners would be a declaratory judgment action in superior court.

Rejection of Dismissal and Re-Hearing

On August 31, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued an “ORDER REJECTING RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.”

• The Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s finding that the matter lacked a justiciable controversy.

• The order cited a letter from the Respondent dated June 1, 2017, which posed the question: “Is the presence of the awning a violation of the Association’s governing documents?”

• This question was deemed sufficient to make the matter “ripe for adjudication.”

• The Commissioner requested that the hearing be rescheduled for a ruling on the matter. A re-hearing was subsequently conducted on November 20, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

Analysis of the Merits of the Dispute

The re-hearing focused on the substantive conflict: whether the HOA had the authority to compel the Larsons to remove their patio cover at their own expense for the maintenance project.

Respondent’s (HOA) Case

The HOA, consisting of 169 units, initiated a project to make necessary repairs to its twenty-five buildings and then have them painted. The HOA’s position was based on the following points:

Legal Authority: The HOA asserted its authority under sections 9 and 9(b) of its CC&Rs, which state that the HOA is responsible for maintaining building exteriors and that “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep of the… [building] exteriors… shall be taken by the [Respondent].”

Project Necessity: The project manager, Wayne King, provided testimony that the HOA’s board deemed credible and reasonable.

Safety: King stated that all five bidding contractors required the patio covers to be removed to ensure a safe work environment as mandated by the Arizona Department of Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA).

Logistics: Standard scaffolding would not fit without removing the covers, commercial scaffolding would not provide full access, a forklift was not viable due to overhead power lines, and allowing painters to walk on homeowner patio covers was unsafe.

Quality of Work: The project involved sanding, power washing, and patching before painting to “do the job right.” Many covers had been improperly flashed, causing damage to the buildings that needed repair.

Warranty: The paint company would not provide a warranty for the project if individual homeowners, such as the Larsons, were permitted to paint their own units.

Petitioners’ (Larsons’) Case

The Larsons, who purchased their unit in 1999 with the wooden patio cover already in place, contested the HOA’s demands.

Challenge to Authority: The Petitioners argued that the HOA had no legal authority to demand the removal of their patio cover.

Unreasonable Cost: They asserted that the cost of removal and reinstallation was unreasonable, submitting two bids:

◦ One bid quoted $1,250 to remove and dispose of the cover and $3,980 to remove and rebuild it with new wood.

◦ A second bid quoted $5,975 to remove and then replace the structure.

Proposed Alternative: In a letter dated May 19, 2017, the Larsons offered to have the back of their unit painted at their own expense.

Compromise Offer: During the November 20, 2017 hearing, after hearing the project manager’s testimony, Ms. Larson offered that they would agree not to reinstall the patio cover if the HOA would pay for its removal.

Final Administrative Law Judge Decision

On December 11, 2017, ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a final decision dismissing the Larsons’ petition and finding in favor of the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation.

Key Findings and Conclusions of Law

Finding/Conclusion

Details

Standard of Review

The HOA’s decisions regarding maintenance and repair are given deference, provided they act reasonably.

Reasonableness of HOA Action

Based on the “credible testimony” of Wayne King, the Judge found that the HOA’s proposed plan for repairing and painting the buildings, which required the removal of patio covers, was reasonable.

HOA Authority

CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) were found to be “sufficient to show that Respondent has the authority to remove Petitioners’ patio to complete the painting work.”

Patio Cover Classification

The Petitioners’ patio cover was legally classified as a “limited common element” within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4).

Cost Responsibility

The central issue of payment was decided by statute. The Judge concluded that under a “reasonable reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C),” any common expense associated with a limited common element “shall be assessed exclusively against the units benefitted.”

Final Order

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

“The evidence of record supports a conclusion that Respondent has authority to require Petitioners to remove their patio cover to allow the building to be properly and safely painted, and that Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.”

The final order was that the Petitioners’ petition be dismissed, and the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party.


James and Shawna Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corp

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-12-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome no_win
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner James and Shawna Larson Counsel Lisa M. Hanger
Respondent Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1255(C); CC&R Sections 9 and 9(b)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the Petitioners' complaint, ruling that the HOA acted reasonably and within its authority under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 33-1255(C) by requiring homeowners to remove their limited common element patio covers for necessary maintenance and requiring the homeowners to bear the associated cost.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Respondent HOA committed a violation of the condominium documents or statutes.

Key Issues & Findings

Authority of HOA to require removal of a limited common element (patio cover) for maintenance and allocation of associated costs.

Petitioners alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by mandating the removal of their patio cover at their expense to facilitate building painting. The ALJ found the HOA's proposed plan was reasonable and authorized by CC&R Sections 9 and 9(b), and that Petitioners, under A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), must bear the cost of removing and reinstalling the limited common element.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is dismissed. Respondent Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation is deemed to be the prevailing party. Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove and reinstall their patio cover.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
  • CC&R Section 9
  • CC&R Section 9(b)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Authority, Limited Common Element, Maintenance Costs, CC&R Interpretation, Patio Cover Removal
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1806(E)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717038-REL-RHG Decision – 605540.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:35 (105.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG


Briefing on Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowners James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (the “Respondent” or “HOA”). The core conflict centered on the HOA’s directive that the Larsons remove their wooden patio cover at their own expense to facilitate a community-wide building repair and painting project.

The case progressed through two distinct phases. Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended dismissing the Larsons’ petition for a lack of a “justiciable controversy,” reasoning that the HOA had not yet acted on its threat to remove the patio cover, rendering the dispute speculative. However, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate rejected this recommendation, finding the matter was “ripe for adjudication,” and ordered a full hearing on the merits.

In the final decision, a second ALJ dismissed the Larsons’ petition and ruled in favor of the HOA. The judge found the HOA’s plan to be reasonable and necessary for the proper and safe completion of the project, based on credible testimony from the project manager. The decision affirmed the HOA’s authority under its CC&Rs to require the removal of the structure. Crucially, the ruling established that the patio cover is a “limited common element” under Arizona law. Consequently, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the homeowners (the Larsons) are exclusively responsible for all costs associated with it, including its removal and potential reinstallation.

Procedural History and Jurisdictional Rulings

Initial Petition and Dismissal Recommendation

On June 16, 2017, James and Shawna Larson filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate against their HOA, alleging a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). However, the initial filing did not specify which provisions had been violated.

Upon inquiry, the Petitioners’ counsel admitted via email that no specific provision of the CC&Rs had yet been violated. Instead, their concern was that section 10(a) would be violated if the HOA acted on its threat to forcibly remove their patio cover and charge them for the cost.

This led to the “ORDER RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY,” issued on August 25, 2017, by Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. The key findings of this order were:

Speculative Harm: The Judge found that the HOA’s actions “have not yet been undertaken and our [are] speculative at this juncture.”

Lack of Jurisdiction: The order stated that the Office of Administrative Hearings’ jurisdiction, per A.R.S. § 32-2199, is limited to adjudicating existing violations of community documents, not potential future ones.

Misunderstanding by Both Parties: The order noted, “Both parties fundamentally misunderstand the limits of this Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” The Petitioners were seeking a ruling on a future action, while the Respondent was urging the Tribunal to find the Petitioners had violated the CC&Rs, which was not the subject of the petition.

Recommended Forum: The Judge suggested that the appropriate forum for the Petitioners would be a declaratory judgment action in superior court.

Rejection of Dismissal and Re-Hearing

On August 31, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued an “ORDER REJECTING RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.”

• The Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s finding that the matter lacked a justiciable controversy.

• The order cited a letter from the Respondent dated June 1, 2017, which posed the question: “Is the presence of the awning a violation of the Association’s governing documents?”

• This question was deemed sufficient to make the matter “ripe for adjudication.”

• The Commissioner requested that the hearing be rescheduled for a ruling on the matter. A re-hearing was subsequently conducted on November 20, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

Analysis of the Merits of the Dispute

The re-hearing focused on the substantive conflict: whether the HOA had the authority to compel the Larsons to remove their patio cover at their own expense for the maintenance project.

Respondent’s (HOA) Case

The HOA, consisting of 169 units, initiated a project to make necessary repairs to its twenty-five buildings and then have them painted. The HOA’s position was based on the following points:

Legal Authority: The HOA asserted its authority under sections 9 and 9(b) of its CC&Rs, which state that the HOA is responsible for maintaining building exteriors and that “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep of the… [building] exteriors… shall be taken by the [Respondent].”

Project Necessity: The project manager, Wayne King, provided testimony that the HOA’s board deemed credible and reasonable.

Safety: King stated that all five bidding contractors required the patio covers to be removed to ensure a safe work environment as mandated by the Arizona Department of Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA).

Logistics: Standard scaffolding would not fit without removing the covers, commercial scaffolding would not provide full access, a forklift was not viable due to overhead power lines, and allowing painters to walk on homeowner patio covers was unsafe.

Quality of Work: The project involved sanding, power washing, and patching before painting to “do the job right.” Many covers had been improperly flashed, causing damage to the buildings that needed repair.

Warranty: The paint company would not provide a warranty for the project if individual homeowners, such as the Larsons, were permitted to paint their own units.

Petitioners’ (Larsons’) Case

The Larsons, who purchased their unit in 1999 with the wooden patio cover already in place, contested the HOA’s demands.

Challenge to Authority: The Petitioners argued that the HOA had no legal authority to demand the removal of their patio cover.

Unreasonable Cost: They asserted that the cost of removal and reinstallation was unreasonable, submitting two bids:

◦ One bid quoted $1,250 to remove and dispose of the cover and $3,980 to remove and rebuild it with new wood.

◦ A second bid quoted $5,975 to remove and then replace the structure.

Proposed Alternative: In a letter dated May 19, 2017, the Larsons offered to have the back of their unit painted at their own expense.

Compromise Offer: During the November 20, 2017 hearing, after hearing the project manager’s testimony, Ms. Larson offered that they would agree not to reinstall the patio cover if the HOA would pay for its removal.

Final Administrative Law Judge Decision

On December 11, 2017, ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a final decision dismissing the Larsons’ petition and finding in favor of the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation.

Key Findings and Conclusions of Law

Finding/Conclusion

Details

Standard of Review

The HOA’s decisions regarding maintenance and repair are given deference, provided they act reasonably.

Reasonableness of HOA Action

Based on the “credible testimony” of Wayne King, the Judge found that the HOA’s proposed plan for repairing and painting the buildings, which required the removal of patio covers, was reasonable.

HOA Authority

CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) were found to be “sufficient to show that Respondent has the authority to remove Petitioners’ patio to complete the painting work.”

Patio Cover Classification

The Petitioners’ patio cover was legally classified as a “limited common element” within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4).

Cost Responsibility

The central issue of payment was decided by statute. The Judge concluded that under a “reasonable reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C),” any common expense associated with a limited common element “shall be assessed exclusively against the units benefitted.”

Final Order

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

“The evidence of record supports a conclusion that Respondent has authority to require Petitioners to remove their patio cover to allow the building to be properly and safely painted, and that Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.”

The final order was that the Petitioners’ petition be dismissed, and the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party.


James and Shawna Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corp

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-12-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome no_win
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner James and Shawna Larson Counsel Lisa M. Hanger
Respondent Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1255(C); CC&R Sections 9 and 9(b)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the Petitioners' complaint, ruling that the HOA acted reasonably and within its authority under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 33-1255(C) by requiring homeowners to remove their limited common element patio covers for necessary maintenance and requiring the homeowners to bear the associated cost.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Respondent HOA committed a violation of the condominium documents or statutes.

Key Issues & Findings

Authority of HOA to require removal of a limited common element (patio cover) for maintenance and allocation of associated costs.

Petitioners alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by mandating the removal of their patio cover at their expense to facilitate building painting. The ALJ found the HOA's proposed plan was reasonable and authorized by CC&R Sections 9 and 9(b), and that Petitioners, under A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), must bear the cost of removing and reinstalling the limited common element.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is dismissed. Respondent Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation is deemed to be the prevailing party. Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove and reinstall their patio cover.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
  • CC&R Section 9
  • CC&R Section 9(b)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Authority, Limited Common Element, Maintenance Costs, CC&R Interpretation, Patio Cover Removal
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1806(E)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717038-REL-RHG Decision – 605540.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:48 (105.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG


Briefing on Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowners James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (the “Respondent” or “HOA”). The core conflict centered on the HOA’s directive that the Larsons remove their wooden patio cover at their own expense to facilitate a community-wide building repair and painting project.

The case progressed through two distinct phases. Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended dismissing the Larsons’ petition for a lack of a “justiciable controversy,” reasoning that the HOA had not yet acted on its threat to remove the patio cover, rendering the dispute speculative. However, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate rejected this recommendation, finding the matter was “ripe for adjudication,” and ordered a full hearing on the merits.

In the final decision, a second ALJ dismissed the Larsons’ petition and ruled in favor of the HOA. The judge found the HOA’s plan to be reasonable and necessary for the proper and safe completion of the project, based on credible testimony from the project manager. The decision affirmed the HOA’s authority under its CC&Rs to require the removal of the structure. Crucially, the ruling established that the patio cover is a “limited common element” under Arizona law. Consequently, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the homeowners (the Larsons) are exclusively responsible for all costs associated with it, including its removal and potential reinstallation.

Procedural History and Jurisdictional Rulings

Initial Petition and Dismissal Recommendation

On June 16, 2017, James and Shawna Larson filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate against their HOA, alleging a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). However, the initial filing did not specify which provisions had been violated.

Upon inquiry, the Petitioners’ counsel admitted via email that no specific provision of the CC&Rs had yet been violated. Instead, their concern was that section 10(a) would be violated if the HOA acted on its threat to forcibly remove their patio cover and charge them for the cost.

This led to the “ORDER RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY,” issued on August 25, 2017, by Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. The key findings of this order were:

Speculative Harm: The Judge found that the HOA’s actions “have not yet been undertaken and our [are] speculative at this juncture.”

Lack of Jurisdiction: The order stated that the Office of Administrative Hearings’ jurisdiction, per A.R.S. § 32-2199, is limited to adjudicating existing violations of community documents, not potential future ones.

Misunderstanding by Both Parties: The order noted, “Both parties fundamentally misunderstand the limits of this Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” The Petitioners were seeking a ruling on a future action, while the Respondent was urging the Tribunal to find the Petitioners had violated the CC&Rs, which was not the subject of the petition.

Recommended Forum: The Judge suggested that the appropriate forum for the Petitioners would be a declaratory judgment action in superior court.

Rejection of Dismissal and Re-Hearing

On August 31, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued an “ORDER REJECTING RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.”

• The Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s finding that the matter lacked a justiciable controversy.

• The order cited a letter from the Respondent dated June 1, 2017, which posed the question: “Is the presence of the awning a violation of the Association’s governing documents?”

• This question was deemed sufficient to make the matter “ripe for adjudication.”

• The Commissioner requested that the hearing be rescheduled for a ruling on the matter. A re-hearing was subsequently conducted on November 20, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

Analysis of the Merits of the Dispute

The re-hearing focused on the substantive conflict: whether the HOA had the authority to compel the Larsons to remove their patio cover at their own expense for the maintenance project.

Respondent’s (HOA) Case

The HOA, consisting of 169 units, initiated a project to make necessary repairs to its twenty-five buildings and then have them painted. The HOA’s position was based on the following points:

Legal Authority: The HOA asserted its authority under sections 9 and 9(b) of its CC&Rs, which state that the HOA is responsible for maintaining building exteriors and that “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep of the… [building] exteriors… shall be taken by the [Respondent].”

Project Necessity: The project manager, Wayne King, provided testimony that the HOA’s board deemed credible and reasonable.

Safety: King stated that all five bidding contractors required the patio covers to be removed to ensure a safe work environment as mandated by the Arizona Department of Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA).

Logistics: Standard scaffolding would not fit without removing the covers, commercial scaffolding would not provide full access, a forklift was not viable due to overhead power lines, and allowing painters to walk on homeowner patio covers was unsafe.

Quality of Work: The project involved sanding, power washing, and patching before painting to “do the job right.” Many covers had been improperly flashed, causing damage to the buildings that needed repair.

Warranty: The paint company would not provide a warranty for the project if individual homeowners, such as the Larsons, were permitted to paint their own units.

Petitioners’ (Larsons’) Case

The Larsons, who purchased their unit in 1999 with the wooden patio cover already in place, contested the HOA’s demands.

Challenge to Authority: The Petitioners argued that the HOA had no legal authority to demand the removal of their patio cover.

Unreasonable Cost: They asserted that the cost of removal and reinstallation was unreasonable, submitting two bids:

◦ One bid quoted $1,250 to remove and dispose of the cover and $3,980 to remove and rebuild it with new wood.

◦ A second bid quoted $5,975 to remove and then replace the structure.

Proposed Alternative: In a letter dated May 19, 2017, the Larsons offered to have the back of their unit painted at their own expense.

Compromise Offer: During the November 20, 2017 hearing, after hearing the project manager’s testimony, Ms. Larson offered that they would agree not to reinstall the patio cover if the HOA would pay for its removal.

Final Administrative Law Judge Decision

On December 11, 2017, ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a final decision dismissing the Larsons’ petition and finding in favor of the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation.

Key Findings and Conclusions of Law

Finding/Conclusion

Details

Standard of Review

The HOA’s decisions regarding maintenance and repair are given deference, provided they act reasonably.

Reasonableness of HOA Action

Based on the “credible testimony” of Wayne King, the Judge found that the HOA’s proposed plan for repairing and painting the buildings, which required the removal of patio covers, was reasonable.

HOA Authority

CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) were found to be “sufficient to show that Respondent has the authority to remove Petitioners’ patio to complete the painting work.”

Patio Cover Classification

The Petitioners’ patio cover was legally classified as a “limited common element” within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4).

Cost Responsibility

The central issue of payment was decided by statute. The Judge concluded that under a “reasonable reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C),” any common expense associated with a limited common element “shall be assessed exclusively against the units benefitted.”

Final Order

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

“The evidence of record supports a conclusion that Respondent has authority to require Petitioners to remove their patio cover to allow the building to be properly and safely painted, and that Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.”

The final order was that the Petitioners’ petition be dismissed, and the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party.


Brian Sopatyk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The ALJ found that the $660 charge was a working capital fee authorized by the CC&Rs and was not subject to the statutory fee cap for disclosure documents.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the fee in dispute was deemed a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a resale disclosure fee capped by A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum transfer/disclosure fee

Petitioner alleged the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging a $660 transfer fee, exceeding the $400 statutory maximum for disclosure documents. The Association argued the $660 was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, which had been mislabeled.

Orders: The petition was dismissed. Petitioner's request for orders requiring compliance, refunds, and civil penalties was denied. The Association was deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory limit, mislabeled fee, ARS 33-1260
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 571793.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:20 (96.8 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 580965.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:20 (61.2 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593042.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:21 (100.9 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:21 (59.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

——————————————————————————–

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.


Brian Sopatyk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The ALJ found that the $660 charge was a working capital fee authorized by the CC&Rs and was not subject to the statutory fee cap for disclosure documents.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the fee in dispute was deemed a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a resale disclosure fee capped by A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum transfer/disclosure fee

Petitioner alleged the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging a $660 transfer fee, exceeding the $400 statutory maximum for disclosure documents. The Association argued the $660 was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, which had been mislabeled.

Orders: The petition was dismissed. Petitioner's request for orders requiring compliance, refunds, and civil penalties was denied. The Association was deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory limit, mislabeled fee, ARS 33-1260
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 571793.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:43 (96.8 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 580965.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:43 (61.2 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593042.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:44 (100.9 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:44 (59.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

——————————————————————————–

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.


Brian Sopatyk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The ALJ found that the $660 charge was a working capital fee authorized by the CC&Rs and was not subject to the statutory fee cap for disclosure documents.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the fee in dispute was deemed a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a resale disclosure fee capped by A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum transfer/disclosure fee

Petitioner alleged the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging a $660 transfer fee, exceeding the $400 statutory maximum for disclosure documents. The Association argued the $660 was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, which had been mislabeled.

Orders: The petition was dismissed. Petitioner's request for orders requiring compliance, refunds, and civil penalties was denied. The Association was deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory limit, mislabeled fee, ARS 33-1260
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 571793.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:50 (96.8 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 580965.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:51 (61.2 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593042.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:51 (100.9 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:52 (59.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

——————————————————————————–

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.


Brian Sopatyk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The ALJ found that the $660 charge was a working capital fee authorized by the CC&Rs and was not subject to the statutory fee cap for disclosure documents.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the fee in dispute was deemed a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a resale disclosure fee capped by A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum transfer/disclosure fee

Petitioner alleged the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging a $660 transfer fee, exceeding the $400 statutory maximum for disclosure documents. The Association argued the $660 was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, which had been mislabeled.

Orders: The petition was dismissed. Petitioner's request for orders requiring compliance, refunds, and civil penalties was denied. The Association was deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory limit, mislabeled fee, ARS 33-1260
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 571793.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:30:59 (96.8 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 580965.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:30:59 (61.2 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593042.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:30:59 (100.9 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:00 (59.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

——————————————————————————–

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.


Brian Sopatk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc., Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews, Esq. and Jill Kennedy, Esq.
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show a statutory violation because the fee in question was a valid working capital fee collected under the CC&Rs, not an illegal transfer fee under A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Petitioner alleged the Association charged a $660 transfer fee, plus a $30 statement fee, violating A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits aggregate fees for resale disclosure and transfer services to $400. The ALJ found the $660 fee was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a statutory disclosure fee, despite being mislabeled by the Association.

Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 1-243

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:51 (67.9 KB)

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:51 (154.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

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Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

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Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

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Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.


Brian Sopatk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc., Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews, Esq. and Jill Kennedy, Esq.
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show a statutory violation because the fee in question was a valid working capital fee collected under the CC&Rs, not an illegal transfer fee under A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Petitioner alleged the Association charged a $660 transfer fee, plus a $30 statement fee, violating A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits aggregate fees for resale disclosure and transfer services to $400. The ALJ found the $660 fee was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a statutory disclosure fee, despite being mislabeled by the Association.

Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 1-243

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:58:23 (67.9 KB)

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:58:24 (154.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

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Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

——————————————————————————–

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.